G.V. RAO versus L.H.V. PRASAD AND ORS.

G.V.RAO

L.H.V. PRASAD AND ORS.

MARCH 6, 2000 [S. SAGHIR AHMAD AND D.P. WADHWA, JJ.]

Indian Penal Code, J 860o:

S.415-Cheating-Complainant alleging that he was induced to marry girl of Scheduled Tribe on the misrepresentation that she belonged to forward community-High Court quashing the proceedings holding that the section relates to property, which in the instant case was not involved and therefore FIR was liable to be quashed-Held, High Court erred in interpreting the provisions-However, petition dismissed being without merit.

Matrimonial litigations-Held, should not be encouraged-Parties should tenninate such disputes amicably by mutual agreement.

The petitioner, member of forward community, filed complaint in the court against the respondents for offences under ss.415, 419, 420 read with s.34 I.P.C. It was alleged that he was induced to marry respond-ent No. 4 on the misrepresentation that the respondents belonged to for-ward community and on this misrepresentation he married respondent No. 4; and had he known that the respondents were members of Scheduled Tribe, which fact, it was alleged, came to his notice after the marriage, he would not have married respondent No. 4. During the investigation the respondents filed petition under s.482 Cr.P.C. The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on the ground that s.415 relates to property, which, in the instant case was not involved, and, therefore, the FIR was liable to be quashed. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the present petition for special leave to appeal.

This Court dismissed the petition on 4.10.1999 observing that rea-sons would follow. Delivering the judgment with reasons, this Court

HELD: 1.1. The High Court was not correct in its interpretation of provisions contained under s.415, IPC. While the first part of the defini-tion of 'cheating' relates to property; the second part need not necessarily related to property and speaks of deception which must be intended not

only to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to complainant in body, mind, reputation or property. Thus so far as the second part of s.415 is concerned, it is the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the complainant as result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. [128-E; 126-H; 127-F]

Jaswantrai Manila[ Akhaney v. State of Bombay, Am (1956) SC575 = (1956) Crl.L.J. 1611 = [1956] SCR 483 and Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal, Am (1954) SC 724 = (1954) Cr.L.J. 1806, relied on. ·

Empress v. Sheoram and Another, (1982) 2 AWN 237; Queen-Empress v. Ramka Kom Sadhu, ILR (1887) 2 Bombay 59; Queen v. Dabee Singh and Others, (1867) Weekly Reporter (Crl.) 55 and Queen v. Puddomonie Boistobee, (1866) 5 Weekly Reporter (Crl.) 98, referred to.

1.2. However, there is no merit in the instant case. Besides, matrimo-nial litigations should not be encouraged so that parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in court of law where it takes years to conchide and in that process parties lose their "young'' days in chasing their "cases'' in different courts. [128-H; 129-A]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3164 of 1999.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.6.99 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Crl. P. No. 2445 of 1997.

Manoj Kumar, Koka S. Kumar, Manoj Kumar Misra and A.S. Bhasme for the Petitioner.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

S. SAGHm AHMAD, J. This Special Leave Petition was dismissed by us on 04.10.1999. We, hereinbelow, give our reasons for dismissing the Special Leave Petition.

The petitioner is Post-Doctoral fellow at Centre for Cellular and Molecular Biology, Hyderabad. He invited marriage proposals for himself

through advertisement in Deccan Chronicle dated 27th of January, 1994, in pursuance of which respondent No.1 approached the petitioner and furnished the particulars of respondent No.4 who is his sister. It was represented by respondent No.I that respondent No.4 was born on 29th of June, 1966 and they belonged to Thurupukapu Community. The petitioner himself gave out that he belonged to Gujala Balija Community which was forward commu-nity and. therefore, he wanted wife from forward con:imunity. The parents of respondent No.4, who are respondents 2 to 3 in this petition, met the parents of the petitioner and they talked and the marriage proposal was fmalised. Betrothel ceremony took place on 27th of June, 1994 and later the marriage took place on 19.8.94. On 4th of March, 1997, the petitioner, allegedly, crune to know that respondents 1 to 4 belonged to Kondakapu Community, which was Scheduled Tribe, and it was then that he realised thayby misrepresenting themselves as members of Thurupukapu Community, they had lured the petitioner into wedlock, for which the petitioner would nc\t I have agreed at all, had he known that the respondents did not belong t6 Thurupukapu Community but belonged to Kondakapu Community. It was in these circumstances that he filed complaint in the Court on 10. 7 .1996 under Sections 415, 419, 420 read with Section 34 IPC which was referred to Station House Officer, Police Station Alwal, Rangareddy District, Andhra Pradesh for investigation and report. Since the investigation was considerably delayed. the petitioner filed Writ Petition No.11477of1997 in the High Court for Writ of Mandrunus directing the Station House Officer to expedite the investigation. While the Writ Petition was pending, an affidavit was filed by the St.ation House Officer that after completing the investigation, he had submitted the chargesheet in the Court on 28.5.1997 against the respondents. The respondents, however, approached the High Court through petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. seeking the quashing of the FIR which was allowed, by the impugned judgment and it is in these circumstances that this petition has been filed in this Court. Learned counsel for the petitioI).er has contended that the High Court was not justified in quashing the complaint (FIR) as chargesheet had already been submitted after the investigation and prima facie case was made out against the respondents. He has further contended that the High Court was wrong in its interpretation of Section 415 IPC .

. Before considering the contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner on merits, we may state another important fact that tl1e petitioner himself is facing case under Section 498-A IPC instituted by the respond-ents against him. It is stated in the petition that this pro~ecution was launched

[2000] 2 S.C.R.

by the respondents against the petitioner as counter-blast to the notice dated 13.6.1995 which was issued by him to respondent No.l as to why he had misrepresented about his caste and why had he represented to the petitioner that he belonged to Thurupukapu Community instead of Kondakapu Commu-nity.

CHEATING is defined in Section 415 of the Indian Penal Code which· provides as under:-

"415. Cheating. - Whoever, by deceiving any person, fraudulently or dishonestly induces the person so deceived to deliver any property to any person, or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat".

Explanation.-A dishonest concealment of facts is deception within the meaning of this section."

The High Court quashed the proceedings principally on the ground that Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code deals with the offences agamst properties and, therefore, Section 415 must also necessarily relate to the property which, in the instant case, is not involved and, consequently, the FIR was liable to be quashed. The broad proposition on which the High Court proceeded is not correct. While the first part of the defition relates to property, the second part need not necessarily relate to property. The second part is reproduced below:-

" ......... intentionally induces the person so deceived to do or omit to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and which act or omission causes or is likely to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property, is said to "cheat"."

This part speaks of intentional deception which must be intended not only to induce the person deceived to do or omit to do something but also to cause damage or harm to that person in body, mind, reputation or property. The intentional deception presupposes the existence of dominant motive of

the person making the inducement. Such inducement should have led the. person deceived or induced to do or omit to do anything which he would not have done or omitted to do if he were not deceived. The further requirement is that such act or omission should have caused damage or harm to body, mind, reputation or property.

As mentioned above, Section 415 has two parts. While in the first part, the person must "dishonestly" or "fraudulently" induce the complainant to deliver any property; in the second part, the person should intentionally induce the complainant to do or omit to do thing. That is to say, in the first part, inducement must be dishonest or fraudulent. In the second part, the inducement should be intentional. As observed by this Court in Jasw<intrai Manilal Akhaney v. State of Bombay, AIR (1956) SC 575 = 1956 Crl.L.J. 16fl = [1956] SCR 483, gui~ty intention is an essential ingredient of the offence of cheating. In order, therefore, to secure conviction of person for the offence of cheating, "mens rea" on the part of that person, must be established. It was also observed in Mahadeo Prasad v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1954 SC 724 = 1954 Cr.L.J. 1806, that in order to constitute the offence of cheating, the intention to deceive should be in existence at the time when the inducement was offered.Thus, so far as second part of Section 415 is concerned, "property", at no stage, is involved. Here it is the doing of an act or omission to do an act by the complainant, as result of intentional inducement by the accused, which is material. Such inducement should result in the doing of an act or omission to do an act as result of which the person concerned should have suffered or was likely to suffer damage or harm in body, mind, reputation or property. In an old decision of the Allahabad High Court in Empress v. Sheoram and another, (1882) 2 AWN 237, it was held by Mahmood, J.:-

"That to palm off young woman as belonging to caste different to the one to which she really belongs, with the object of obtaining money, amounts to the offence of cheating by personation as defmed in s.416 of the Indian Penal Code, which must be read in the light of the preceding, s.415."

In an another old decision in Queen-Empress v. Ramka Kom Sadhu, ILR (1887) 2 Bombay 59, it was held that prostitute may be charged for cheating under Section 417 if the intercourse was induced by any misrep-

resentation on her part that she did not suffer from syphilis.

In Queen v. Dabee Singh and others, (1867) Weekly Reporter (Crl.) 55, the Calcutta High Court convicted person under Section 417 who had brought two girls and palmed them off as women of muc~ higher caste than they really were and married to two Rajputs after receiving usual bonus. It was further held that the two Rajputs who married the two girls on the faith that they were marrying women of their own caste and status, were fraudulently and dishonestly induced by deception to do thing (that is to say, to marry women of caste wholly prohibited to them) which but for the deception practised upon them by the accused, they would have omitted to do. In another case which was almost similar to the one mentioned above, namely, Queen v. Puddomonie Boistobee, (1866) 5 Weekly Reporter (Crl.) 98, person was induced to part with his money and to contract marriage under the false impression that the girl he was marrying was Brahminee. The person who induced the complainant into marrying that girl was held Jiable for punishment under Section 417 IPC.

Having regard to the above discussion, the High Court, as we have already observed earlier, was not correct in its interpretation of the provisions contained under Section 415 IPC but the important question for our consideration is that, should we, having regard to the facts of this case, interfere under Article 136 of the Constitution.

There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. The marriage is sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious propor-tions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose' their "young" days in chasing their "cases" in different courts.

The petitioner himself is Scientist at the Centre for DNA Finger

Printing & Diagnostics, Hyderabad which is prestigious Institution of the country. In this capacity, he can be reasonably presumed to be aware of the bio-diversity at the Cellular and Molecular level amongst human beings without the "caste" having any role in the field of Human Biotechnology.

It was for these reasons that the Petition, being without merit, was dismissed on October 4, 1999.

Petition dismissed.