KANDASWAMY versus STATE OF TAMIL NADU

[2008] 10 S.C.R 1103

KANDASWAMY v. STATE OF TAMIL NADU CRIMINAL APPEAL N0.1111 OF 2008

JULY 17, 2008

[DR. ARIJIT , PASAYAT AND P. SATHASIVAM, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: s. 299, 300, 302 and 304 (Part I) - Cul-pable Homicide - Conviction under s. 302 - Challenge against - Held: In the light of factual scenario and principles laid down in ss.299 and 300, conviction altered to s.304(Part /).

The prosecution case was that appellant-accused in-

discriminately cut the deceased which resulted in his death. The trial Court convicted appellant under s.302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo life·imprisonment. The only stand before the High Court was that the scenario as pro-jected by the prosecution ruled out the application of s.302 IPC. High Court did not find any substance in the plea.

In appeal to this Court, the crucial question is the ap-plicability of the appropriate provision.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. In the background of the legal principles

and the factual scenario, the inevitable conclusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under s.304 Part I IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the end of justice. [Para 21] [1114 C-D]

2.1. In the scheme of the IPC, culpable homicide is

genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'murder' is 'culpable homicide' but notvice-versa. Speaking generally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of mu'rder is cul-pable homicide not amounting to murder'., For the pur-p~se of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of

[2008] 10 S.C.R.

the generic offence, the IPC. practically recognizes three

degrees of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of culpable homicide, which is defined in s.300 as 'munter'. The second may be termed as 'culpable [homicide ][of ][the second degree'. This is punishable un-]der the first part of s~304. Then, there is 'culpable homi-cide of the third degree'. This is the _lowest type of cul-pable homicide and the punishment provided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three [grades. Culpable homicide ][of ][this ][degree is punishable ]·under the second part of s.304. [Para 8] [1108 D-Gl

2.2. Clause (b) of s.299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of s.300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed D. by the offender regarding the particular victim being in such peculiar condition or state of health that the inter-nal harm caused to him is likely to be fatal; notwithstand-ing the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of person in nor-E [mal health ][or ][condition. ][It ][is noteworthy ][that ][the ]['inten-]tion to cause death' is not an essential requirement of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury coupled with the offender's knowledge of the likelihood of such inJury causing the death of the particular victim, [is ][sufficient ][to ][bring the ][killing ][within ][the ][ambit ][of ][this ]clause. This aspect of clause (2) is borne. out by illustra-tion (b) appended to s.300. Clause (b) of s.299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of s.300 can [be ][where ][the assailant causes ][<!eath ][by ][fist ][blow ][inten-]tionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death of that particular per-son as result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. .. If . the assailant

had no such knowledge about the disease or special

frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the offence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of s.300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of s.299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary course of nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies between bodily injury likely to cause death and bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may re-su It in miscarriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of s.299 and clause (3) of s.300 is one of the degree of probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of 0 probability of death which determines whether culpable homicide is of the gravest, medium or the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of s.299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from mere possibility. The words "bodily injury ....... sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death" mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordi-nary course of nature. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. [Paras 10-12] (1110 A-H -1111-B]

Rajwant and Anr. v. State of Kera/a AIR (1966) SC 1874;

Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab AIR (1958) SC 465- relied on.

2.3. Under clause thirdly of s.300 IPC, culpable ho-

micide is murder, if both the following conditions are sat-isfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the inten-tion of causing bodily injury; and (b) that the injury in-tended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course

[2008] 10 S.C.R.

of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an· intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz., that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. [Para 16] [1113 A-C]

2.4. Clause (c) of s. 299 and clause (4) of s.300 both

require knowledge of the probability of the act causing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case .to 1-dilate much on the distinction between these correspond-ing clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of s.300 would be applicable Where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of person or per-sons in general as distinguished from particular per-son or persons - being caused from his imminently dan-gerous act, approximates to pracUcal certainty. Sl.foh knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the high-est degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid. [Para 18]

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. (1976) 4 SCC 382; Abdul Waheed Khan @ Waheed and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh JT (2002) 6 SC 27 4; August-ine s·aldanha v. State of Karnataka (2003) 10 SCC 472; Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 9 SCC 650; r . Sunder Lal v. State, of Rajasthan (2007) 10 SCC 371 - relied o_n.

CRIMINALAPPELLATEJURISDICTION: Crimin~IAppeal. No. 1111 of 2008

-Fror:n the Judgment dated' 3.1.200p of the High' Cqurt of Madras, Bench at Madurai in Crl. Appeal No. 700/1-996

\ B. Sridhar for the Appellant.

V. Kanakraj, V.G. Pragashm, S.J. Aristotle and Prabu

Rama Subramaniam for the Respondert.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 1. L:eave granted.

2. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of the Divi-

sion Bench of the Madras High Court upholding conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short the 'IPC'), as was awarded by learned Sessions Judge, Kamarajar, District at Srivilliputtur in Sessions case no.99 of 1994.

3. The prosecution case in nutshell is as follows:-

At about 8.30 p.m. on 4.4.1993 the accused indiscrimi-nately cut the victim-Alagarsamy (hereinafter referred to as 'de-ceased') resulting in his instantaneous death. PWs 1 and 2 were examined as eye witnesses to the occurrence.

Gurvammal is the elder sister of PW 1 and deceased . Alagarsamy is her husband. The accused was known to him. Guruvammla died leaving behind two children - girl and boy. 0 This made his father (PW 2) to bring Alagarsamy to his house. At about 8.30 p.m. on the occurrence day, he was standing op-posite to the house of Ramaiah with his son, after returning from the house of Visalam. PW 2 was also coming in the street from the shop and he asked as to whether he had gone to Visalam's house and come back. Alagarsamy alighted from the bus and PW 2 also asked him as to whether he had gone to Visalam's house. Palpandi (son of accused) also alighted from the bus and the accused asked him as to why he has not brought his mother with him for which he had been sent. Palpandi replied to his-"" father (the accused) that unless the accused goes mother will not come. Finding fault that he is repeating the same answer, the accused beat his son. Alagarsamy asked him as to why he was beating the young boy for which the accused responded stating that he had no business to intervene in his family problem and saying so, removed theAruval from his person and cutAlagarsamy G. which injury landed on his left hand. Alagarsamy fell down and the accused thereafter indiscriminately cut him. PWs 1 and 2 rushed towards the scene questioning the act of the accused. Threatening them with dire consequences, the accused made good his escape. Alagarsamy was lying dead. PW-1 went to

the police station and gave the complaint namely Ex. P-1. He identified MO 1 as the weapon of offence and MOs. 2 to 4 as the personal wearing apparels of the deceased.

4. The appellant questioning the correctness of the judgment

and conviction and sentence as imposed by the Trial Court under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo for life imprisonment.

5. The only stand before the High Court was that the see-

nario as projected by the prosecution clearly rules out the appli-cation of Section 302 IPC. The High Court did not find any sub-c [stance ][in ][the plea. ]

6. In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the appel-

lant reiterated the stand before the High Court and submitted that even if the prosecution version is accepted in toto, case under Section 302 IPC is not made out.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand

supported the order.

8. This brings us to the crucial question as to which was

the appropriate provision to be applied. In the scheme .of the IPC culpable homicide is genus and 'murder' its specie. All 'mur-der' is 'culpable homicide' but not vice-versa. Speaking gener-ally, 'culpable homicide' sans 'special characteristics of mur-der is culpable homicide riot amounting to murder'. For the pur-pose of fixing punishment, proportionate to the gravity of the [generic offence, the IPC practically recognizes three degrees ]of culpable homicide. The first is, what may be called, 'culpable homicide of the first degree'. This is the gravest form of cul-pable homicide, which is defined .in Section 300 as 'murder'. The second may be termed as 'culpable homicide of the sec-G [ond degree'. This is punishable under the first part ][of ][Section ]304. Then, there is 'culpable homicide of the third degree'. This is the low~st type of culpable homicide and the punishment pro-vided for it is also the lowest among the punishments provided for the three grades. Culpable homicide of this degree is pun-ishable under the second part of Section 304.

9. The academic distinction between 'murder' and 'cul-pable homicide not amounting to murder' has always vexed the Courts. The confusion is caused, if Courts losing sight of the true scope and meaning of the terms used by the legislature in these sections, allow themselves to be drawn into minute ab-stractions. The safest way of approach to the interpretation and application of these provisions seems to be to keep in focus the keywords used in the various clauses of Sections 299 and 300. The following comparative table will be helpful in appreci-ating the points of distinction between the two offences.

Section 299

Section 300

Subject to certain exceptions culpable homicide is nurder if the act by which the death is cause is done-

person commits culpable homicide if the act by which the death is caused is done-

INTENTION

(a) with the intention of (1) with the intention of causing death; or causing death; or (b) with the intention of (2) with the intention of causing such bodily causing such bodily injury as is likely to injury as the offender cause death; or knows to be likely to cause the death of the person to whom the harm is caused; or is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; or

KNOWLEDGE

(C) with the knowledge that the act is likely to cause death.

(4) with the knowledge that the act is so imminently dangerous that it must in all probability cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as is mentioned above.

10. Clause (b) of Section 299 corresponds with clauses (2) and (3) of Section 300. The distinguishing feature of the mens rea requisite under clause (2) is the knowledge possessed by the; offender regarding the particular victim being in such peculiar condition or state of health that the internal harm caused 8 to him is likely to be fatal, notwithstanding the fact that such harm would not in the ordinary way of nature be sufficient to cause death of person in normal health or condition. It is noteworthy that the 'intention to cause death' is not an essential require-ment of clause (2). Only the intention of causing the bodily injury [coupled with the offender's knowledge ][of ][the likelihood ][of ][such ]injury causing the death of the particular victim, is sufficient to bring the killing within the ambit of this clause. This· aspect of clause (2) is borne out by illustration (b) appended to Section 300.

11. Clause (b) of Section 299 does not postulate any such knowledge on the part of the offender. Instances of cases falling under clause (2) of Section 300 can be where the assailant causes death by fist blow intentionally given knowing that the victim is suffering from an enlarged liver, or enlarged spleen or [diseased heart and such blow is likely to cause death ][of ][that ]particular person as result of the rupture of the liver, or spleen or the failure of the heart, as the case may be. If the assailant had no such knowledge about the disease or special frailty of the victim, nor an intention to cause death or bodily injury suffi-F cient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the of-fence will not be murder, even if the injury which caused the death, was intentionally given. In clause (3) of Section 300, instead of the words 'likely to cause death' occurring in the corresponding clause (b) of Section 299, the words "sufficient in the ordinary [course ][of ][nature" have been used. Obviously, the distinction lies ]between bodily injury likely to cause death and bodily injury sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The distinction is fine but real and if overlooked, may result in mis-carriage of justice. The difference between clause (b) of Sec-tion 299 and clause (3) of Section 300 is one of the degree of

probability of death resulting from the intended bodily injury. To put it more broadly, it is the degree of probability of death which determines whether culpable homicide is of the gravest, me-di um or the lowest degree. The word 'likely' in clause (b) of Sec-tion 299 conveys the sense of probable as distinguished from mere possibility. The words "bodily injury ...... '.sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death:' mean that death will be the "most probable" result of the injury, having regard to the ordinary course of nature.

12. For cases to fall within clause (3), it is not necessary that the offender intended to cause death, so long as the death ensues [c ]from the intentional bodily injury or injuries sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Rajwant and Anr v. State of Kera/a, (AIR 1966 SC 1874) is an apt illustration of this point.

13. In Virsa Singh v. State of Punjab, (AIR 1958 SC 465), Vivian Bose, J. speaking for the Court, explained the meaning and scope of clause (3). It was observed that the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring case under Section 300, "thirdly". First, it must establish quite objectively, that bodily injury is present; secondly the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations. Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say, that it was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended. Once these three elements are proved to be present, the en-quiry proceeds further, and fourthly it must be proved that the injury of the type just described made up of the 'three elements set out above was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and infer-ential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender.

14. The ingredients of clause "Thirdly" of Section 300, IPC [G ]

..... were brought out by the illustrious Judge in his terse language ~ as follows:

"To put it shortly, the prosecution must prove the following facts before it can bring case under Section 300, "thirdly".

First, it must establish, quite objectively, that bodily injury is present.

Secondly, the nature of the injury must be proved. These are purely objective investigations.

Thirdly, it must be proved that there was an intention to

inflict that particular bodily injury, that is to say that. it was not accidental or unintentional, or that some other kind of injury was intended.

Once these three elements are proved to be present, the enquiry proceeds further and,

Fourthly, it must be proved that the injury of the type just

described made up of the three elements set out above is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. This part of the enquiry is purely objective and inferential and has nothing to do with the intention of the offender."

15. The learned Judge explained the third ingredient in the following words (at page 468):

"The question is not whether the prisoner intended to inflict serious injury or trivial one but whether he intended to inflict the injury that is proved to be present. If he can show that he did not, or if the totality of the circumstances justify such an inference, then of course, the intent that the section requires is not proved. But if there is nothing beyond the injury and the fact that the appellant inflicted it, the only possible inference is that he intended to inflict it. Whether he knew of its seriousness or intended serious consequences, is neither here or there. The question, so far as the intention is concerned, is not whether he intended to kill, or to inflict an injury of particular degree of seriousness but whether he intended to inflict the injury in question and once the existence of the injury is proved the intention to cause it will be presumed unless the evidence or the circumstances warrant an opposite conclusion."

16. These observations of Vivian Bose, J. have become

locus classicus. The test laid down by Virsa Singh's case (su-pra) for the applicability of clause "Thirdly" is now ingrained in our legal system and has become part of the rule of law. Under clause thirdly of Section 300 IPC, culpable homicide is murder; if both the following conditions are satisfied: i.e. (a) that the act which causes death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing bodily injury; and (b) that the injury intended to be inflicted is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which, in the ordinary course of nature, was sufficient to cause death, viz., that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted.

17. Thus, according to the rule laid down in Virsa Singh's

case, even if the intention of accused was limited to the inflic-tion of bodily injury sufficient to cause deat~ in the ordinary course of nature, and did not extend to the intention of causing death, the offence would be murder. Illustration (c) appended to Section 300 clearly brings out this point.

18. Clause (c) of Section 299 and clause (4) of Section

300 both require knowledge of the probability of the act caus-ing death. It is not necessary for the purpose of this case to dilate much on the distinction between these corresponding clauses. It will be sufficient to say that clause (4) of Section 300 would be applicable where the knowledge of the offender as to the probability of death of person or persons in general as distinguished from particular person or persons -being caused from his imminently dangerous act, approximates to practical certainty. Such knowledge on the part of the offender must be of the highest degree of probability, the act having been committed by the offender without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid.

19. The above are only broad guidelines and not cast iron imperatives. In most cases, their observance will facilitate the

task of the Court. But sometimes the facts are so intertwined and the second and the third stages so telescoped into each other that it may not be convenient to give separate treatment ·to the matters involved in the second and third stages ..

20. The position was illuminatingly highlighted by this Court 8 in State of Andhra Pradesh v. Rayavarapu Punnayya and Anr. (1976 (4) SCC 382), Abdul Waheed Khan@ Waheed and Ors. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (JT 2002 (6) SC 274), Augus-tine Saldanha v. State of Karnataka (2003 (10) SCC 472), Thangaiya v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005 (9) SCC 650) and Sunder Lal v. State of Rajasthan (2007 (10) SCC 371 ).

21. When the factual scenario is considered in the back-ground of the legal principles set out above, the inevitable con-clusion is that the appropriate conviction would be under Sec-D tion 304Part1 IPC. Custodial sentence of 10 years would meet the end of justice.

22. The appeal is allowed with the aforesaid direction.

D.G. Appeal allowed.