RAJU versus THE STATE OF HARYANA

[2019] 4 S.C.R.

RAJU

THE STATE OF HARYANA

(Criminal Appeal No. 1175 of 2014)

FEBRUARY 22, 2019

[N. V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR ANDINDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]

Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,2000 – s.7A – Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children)CRules, 2007 – r.12 – Trial court convicted three accused personsfor the offence of gang-rape u/s.376(2)(g) of IPC – All the accusedappealed to the High Court – Appellant-accused raised the defencethat he was aged less than 18 years at the time of commission of theoffence – High Court rejected the contention and affirmed theDconviction of the three accused including the appellant – In appeal,Supreme Court directed the Registrar (Judicial) to conduct inquiryin respect of the age of the appellant in terms of s.7A of the 2000Act – Pursuant thereto, report was submitted which determined theage of the Appellant as 16 years, 2 months & 2 days at the time ofcommission of the offence and concluded that he was juvenile atEthat time – The State raised the question that whether the plea ofjuvenility as decided by the Registry of Supreme Court should begiven precedence over the view of the High Court – Held: HighCourt decided the issue merely upon an assessment of the materialon record without resorting to the procedure governing inquiriesFfor determination of age as laid out in s.7A of the 2000 Act and r.12of the 2007 Rules – High Court did not conduct inquiry stipulatedas per s.7A & r.12 – In instant case, inquiry was conducted by theRegistrar (Judicial) upon direction of the Supreme Court – As theinquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) was thereafteraffirmed, so that amounted to an inquiry conducted by the SupremeGCourt – Thus, findings of such inquiry would prevail over the viewtaken by the High Court – Accordingly, conviction and sentence ofthe appellant u/s.376 of IPC set aside.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The High Court evidently did not even frame itsdiscussion in terms of whether the evidence brought on recordwas sufficient to conduct an inquiry under the Juvenile Justice(Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 and the JuvenileJustice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2007 let aloneorder and conduct such an inquiry. On the contrary, it simplyrecorded that the evidence did not go to show that the Appellantwas juvenile at the time of the commission of the offence, andproceeded to affirm the conviction of the Appellant on merits.[Para 15][26-E-F]

2. Therefore, it is evident that the only inquiry as stipulatedunder the 2000 Act and the 2007 Rules was conducted by theRegistrar (Judicial) upon the directions of this Court, after theCourt was satisfied upon going through the school certificatesadduced by the Appellant that the certificates in question primafacie entitled him to claim the conduct of such an inquiry. In sucha situation, the question regarding whether precedence may begiven to the inquiry of Registrar (Judicial) of this Court overthe opinion of the High Court regarding the age of an accusedcan be restated as whether such inquiry conducted by theRegistrar (Judicial) upon the direction of this Court, if thereafteraffirmed by this Court, would amount to an inquiry conducted bythis Court itself. If this be the case, the findings of such inquirywould prevail over the view taken by the High Court. [Para 16][26-F-H; 27-A]3. This Court is of the opinion that the above question mustbe answered in the affirmative. This Court, on previous occasionsas well, has adopted the practice of directing the Registrar(Judicial) to conduct the inquiry in terms of Rule 12 of the 2007Rules on behalf of this Court, and accepted the findings madetherein. Seeing that the Registrar (Judicial) is District Judgeserving on deputation at the Supreme Court, recourse to his orher assistance in the form of collecting evidence and arriving at afinding regarding the claim of juvenility of the person concernedmay be undertaken by this Court in order to save its judicialtime. However, it must be stressed that the findings in an inquiryconducted by the Registrar (Judicial) would not per se prevail

[2019] 4 S.C.R.

Aupon contrary view taken by the High Court. Only after thisCourt applies its judicial mind to such report with due regard tothe confines of the procedure stipulated in Section 7A of the 2000Act and Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules, and only if it thereafterconfirms the findings in such report would the same prevail upona contrary view taken by the High Court which is not based uponBany such inquiry. [Para 17][27-A-D]

4. It has been conclusively established that the date ofbirth of the Appellant was 12.07.1984 and as such he was aged 16years, 2 months and 2 days at the time of commission of the offencedated 14.09.2000. In such circumstances, there is no doubt thatCthe inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) upon the directionof this Court in the instant matter amounts to an inquiry conductedby this Court itself, and is conclusive proof of the age of theAppellant as provided in Rule 12(3) of the 2007 Rules. As theAppellant satisfies the requirement of Sections 2(k) and 2(l) ofDthe 2000 Act, the said Act is applicable to him in full force in lightof Section 7A and Section 20. Therefore, criminal appeal herebystands allowed and the order of the High Court affirming theconviction and sentence of the Appellant under Section 376(2)(g)of the IPC is set aside.[Paras 24 and 25][29-G, H; 30-A, B]

EMurari Thakur v. State of Bihar (2009) 16 SCC 256 :[2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 988; Dharambir v. State (NCTof Delhi) (2010) 5 SCC 344 : [2010] 5 SCR 137;Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P. (2010)13 SCC 523 : [2010] 13 SCR 879; Hari Ram v. State ofRajasthan (2009) 13 SCC 211 : [2009] 7 SCR 623;FMohan Mali v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 6 SCC669 : [2010] SCR 373; Daya Nand v. State of Haryana(2011) 2 SCC 224 : [2011] 1 SCR 173; Jitendra Singh@ Babboo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh (2013) 11SCC 193: Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal (2012)G10 SCC 489 : [2012] 9 SCR 244; Abdul Razzaq v. Stateof Uttar Pradesh (2015) 15 SCC 637 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

[2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 988referred toPara 4[2010] 5 SCR 137referred toPara 4H

RAJU v. THE STATE OF HARYANA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1175 of 2014.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.08.2011 of the High Courtof Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 1830-SBof 2003.

Siddhartha Dave, (Amicus Curiae), Ms. Jemtiben A.O., Advs.for the Appellant.

Ms. Bina Madhavan, Dr. Monika Gusain, Advs. for theRespondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J. 1. This appeal isdirected against the final judgment and order dated 24.08.2011 passedby the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CriminalAppeal No. 1830-SB of 2003, by which the High Court dismissed theappeal filed by the Appellant herein challenging the judgment of convictionunder Section 376(2)(g) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) dated 08.11.2002and order of sentence dated 11.11.2002 rendered by the AdditionalSessions Judge, Gurgaon, in Sessions Case No. 5/2001.

2. The brief facts leading to the instant appeal are that an FIRwas lodged against the Appellant Raju s/o Rajendar Singh, and two otherpersons, viz. Raju s/o Bhim and Raja @ Raj Kumar s/o Makhsi, allegingthat the three persons had intercepted the prosecutrix when she waspassing by some fields along with her one-year-old brother and had takenher to field nearby, whereupon Raju s/o Bhim and Raja @ Raj Kumars/o Makhsi engaged in the gang-rape of the prosecutrix, while theAppellant stood outside the field. The prosecutrix was aged fifteen years

Aat the time of the incident, which occurred on 14.09.2000. The threeaccused were convicted for the offence punishable under Section376(2)(g) of the IPC, and sentenced to 10 years’ rigorous imprisonmentand fine of Rs. 500/-, and further two months’ rigorous imprisonmentin default of payment of fine. Aggrieved by the same, the three accusedappealed to the High Court.B

3. The Appellant, inter alia, raised the defence before the HighCourt that he was aged less than 18 years at the time of commission ofthe offence, i.e. 14.09.2000, and hence was entitled to the benefit of theprovisions of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,2000 (in short, “the 2000 Act”). The High Court, however, rejected suchCcontention and affirmed the conviction of the three accused, including

the Appellant.

4. Aggrieved by the above judgment, the Appellant filed the instantappeal, inter alia raising the plea of juvenility again. The Appellant reliedupon transfer certificate issued in his favour by the Dayanand MiddleDSchool, Sohna, Gurgaon which showed his date of birth to be 12.07.1984.He also relied upon certificate issued by the Government SeniorSecondary School (Boys), Sohna which showed his date of birth to bethe same. It was submitted by the Appellant before this Court that thecertificates in question prima facie entitled him to claim the conduct ofEan inquiry in terms of Section 7A of the 2000 Act. The Appellant referredto the decisions of this Court in Murari Thakur v. State of Bihar, (2009)16 SCC 256, Dharambir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 5 SCC 344,and Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of U.P., (2010) 13 SCC523.

F5. Keeping in mind such circumstances and the certificates reliedupon, this Court vide order dated 09.08.2012 directed the Registrar(Judicial) of this Court to conduct an inquiry in respect of the age of theAppellant in terms of Section 7A of the 2000 Act read with the rulesframed thereunder, and to submit report to this Court within four monthsfrom the order.G

6. This Court received such report on 07.01.2013, whichdetermined that the age of the Appellant was 16 years, 2 months and 2days at the time of commission of the offence and that he was thus ajuvenile at that time. Thereafter, arguments were heard and judgementreserved. However, subsequently, the State raised the argument that the

Court had not looked into the question of whether the plea of juvenilityas decided by the Registry of this Court should be given precedenceover the view of the High Court. By an order dated 25.04.2014, thisCourt directed that the appeal be heard further. Shri Siddhartha Davewas subsequently appointed as amicus curiae to assist the Court.

7. It was submitted by the learned amicus curiae that the learnedRegistrar (Judicial) of this Court had, after duly calling for records andappreciating the material adduced, reached the conclusion that theAppellant was juvenile at the time of commission of the offence, andthere was no reason to deny the Appellant the benefit of such finding.Moreover, he submitted that seeing that it was upon the direction of thisCourt that the learned Registrar had conducted the inquiry under Section7A of the 2000 Act and the rules framed thereunder, and had submittedhis report to this Court after conducting such inquiry in accordance withlaw, the report may be treated as having been made by this Court itself.

8. Heard the learned amicus curiae and advocate for the State,and perused the material on record.

9. It is by now well-settled, as was held in Hari Ram v. State ofRajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211, that in light of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7Aread with Section 20 of the 2000 Act as amended in 2006, juvenile whohad not completed eighteen years on the date of commission of theoffence is entitled to the benefit of the 2000 Act (also see Mohan Maliv. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2010) 6 SCC 669; Daya Nand v. Stateof Haryana, (2011) 2 SCC 224; Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi(supra); Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,(2013) 11 SCC 193). It is equally well-settled that the claim of juvenilitycan be raised at any stage before any Court by an accused, includingthis Court, even after the final disposal of case, in terms of Section 7Aof the 2000 Act (see Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (supra),Abuzar Hossain v. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489; JitendraSingh @ Babboo Singh v. State of UP, (supra); Abdul Razzaq v. Stateof Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637).

10. In light of the above legal position, it is evident that the Appellantwould be entitled to the benefit of the 2000 Act if his age is determinedto be below 18 years on the date of commission of the offence. Moreover,it would be irrelevant that the plea of juvenility was not raised before theTrial Court, in light of Section 7A. As per the report of the inquiry

Aconducted by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, in this case, theAppellant was below 18 years of age on the date of commission of theoffence. The only question before us that needs to be determined iswhether such report may be given precedence over the contrary viewtaken by the High Court, so that the benefit of the 2000 Act may begiven to the Appellant.B

11. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to Section7A of the 2000 Act and Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care andProtection of Children) Rules, 2007 (in short, “the 2007 Rules”), whichdeal with the making of an inquiry by the Court in case of claim ofjuvenility. Section 7A of the 2000 Act is as follows:C

“7A. Procedure to be followed when claim of juvenility israised before any court—

(1) Whenever claim of juvenility is raised before any court or acourt is of the opinion that an accused person was juvenile onDthe date of commission of the offence, the court shall make aninquiry, take such evidence as may be necessary (but not anaffidavit) so as to determine the age of such person, and shallrecord finding whether the person is juvenile or child or not,stating his age as nearly as may be:

EProvided that claim of juvenility may be raised before any courtand it shall be recognised at any stage, even after final disposal ofthe case, and such claim shall be determined in terms of theprovisions contained in this Act and the rules made thereunder,even if the juvenile has ceased to be so on or before the date ofcommencement of this Act.

(2) If the court finds person to be juvenile on the date ofcommission of the offence under sub-section (1), it shall forwardthe juvenile to the Board for passing appropriate orders and thesentence, if any, passed by court shall be deemed to have noeffect.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules states the followingregarding the procedure to be followed for age determination:

“In every case concerning child or juvenile in conflict with law,the age determination inquiry shall be conducted by the court or

the Board or, as the case may be, the Committeeby seekingevidence by obtaining –

(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available;and in the absence whereof;

(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than playschool) first attended; and in the absence whereof;

(iii) the birth certificate given by corporation or municipalauthority or panchayat;

(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or (iii) of clause (a)above, the medical opinion will be sought from duly constitutedMedical Board, which will declare the age of the juvenile or child.In case exact assessment of the age cannot be done, the Court orthe Board or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the reasonsto be recorded by them, may, if considered necessary, give benefitto the child or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower sidewithin the margin of one year,

and while passing orders in such case shall, after taking intoconsideration such evidence as may be available, or the medicalopinion, as the case may be, record finding in respect of his ageand either of the evidence specified in any of the clauses (a)(i),(ii), (iii) or in the absence whereof, clause (b) shall be theconclusive proof of the age as regards such child or the juvenile inconflict with law.”

(emphasis supplied)

13. It is evident from perusal of the above that if any Court,including this Court, is of the opinion that an accused person was ajuvenile on the date of commission of the offence, or if claim of juvenilityis raised before it, the Court must conduct an inquiry regarding thedetermination of the age of the accused. The evidence collected by wayof such inquiry, as is specified in clauses (a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of Rule12(3), or in the absence whereof, clause (b) of the same, is treated asconclusive proof of the age of the accused. In such situation, it wouldbe clear that such an inquiry conducted by this Court would be givenprecedence over view of the age of the accused taken by the HighCourt. It is relevant to note here itself that in this case, the High Courtdecided the issue merely upon an assessment of the material on record

Awithout resorting to the procedure governing inquiries for thedetermination of age as laid out in Section 7A of the 2000 Act and Rule12 of the 2007 Rules.

14. At this point, it is necessary to briefly discuss the findings ofthe High Court in the impugned judgment regarding the age of the accusedBto underscore that it has not conducted the inquiry stipulated as perSection 7A and Rule 12. Before the High Court, the Appellant submitteda report of the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Bhondsi, Gurgaon tothe effect that his date of birth was 12.07.1984, thereby claiming thebenefit of the 2000 Act. This plea was rejected on the grounds of failureto raise the plea of juvenility before the Trial court; non-production ofCbirth certificate in spite of an opportunity being granted to do so; absenceof the Appellant’s name in the birth register dated 12.07.1984 and forthe years 1983-84 and 1984-85; non-corroboration of the date of birthcertificates issued by schools attended by the Appellant through otherdocumentary evidence; non-matching of the name on such certificatesD(Raj Kumar) with the name of the Appellant as brought on record (Raju);and non-corroboration of the address of the Appellant through suchcertificates, which simply stated that the date of birth of the studentnamed Raj Kumar was 12.07.1984.

15. The High Court evidently did not even frame its discussion inEterms of whether the evidence brought on record was sufficient toconduct an inquiry under the 2000 Act and the 2007 Rules, let aloneorder and conduct such an inquiry. On the contrary, it simply recordedthat the evidence did not go to show that the Appellant was juvenile atthe time of the commission of the offence, and proceeded to affirm theconviction of the Appellant on merits.F

16. Therefore, it is evident that the only inquiry as stipulated underthe 2000 Act and the 2007 Rules was conducted by the Registrar (Judicial)upon the directions of this Court, after the Court was satisfied upongoing through the school certificates adduced by the Appellant that thecertificates in question prima facie entitled him to claim the conduct ofGsuch an inquiry. In such situation, the question regarding whetherprecedence may be given to the inquiry of Registrar (Judicial) of thisCourt over the opinion of the High Court regarding the age of an accusedcan be restated as whether such inquiry conducted by the Registrar(Judicial) upon the direction of this Court, if thereafter affirmed by thisHCourt, would amount to an inquiry conducted by this Court itself. If this

be the case, the findings of such inquiry would prevail over the viewtaken by the High Court, as is evident from the preceding discussion.

17. We are of the opinion that the above question must be answeredin the affirmative. This Court, on previous occasions as well, has adoptedthe practice of directing the Registrar (Judicial) to conduct the inquiry interms of Rule 12 of the 2007 Rules on behalf of this Court, and acceptedthe findings made therein (see Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi,(supra). Seeing that the Registrar (Judicial) is District Judge servingon deputation at the Supreme Court, recourse to his or her assistance inthe form of collecting evidence and arriving at finding regarding theclaim of juvenility of the person concerned may be undertaken by thisCourt in order to save its judicial time. However, it must be stressed thatthe findings in an inquiry conducted by the Registrar (Judicial) would notper se prevail upon contrary view taken by the High Court. Only afterthis Court applies its judicial mind to such report with due regard to theconfines of the procedure stipulated in Section 7A of the 2000 Act andRule 12 of the 2007 Rules, and only if it thereafter confirms the findingsin such report would the same prevail upon contrary view taken by theHigh Court which is not based upon any such inquiry.

18. We may now undertake to consider the findings in the reportsubmitted by the Registrar (Judicial). As already noted, as per the report,the age of the Appellant was 16 years, 2 months and 2 days at the timeof commission of the offence and he was thus juvenile at that time. Inthe said report, the learned Registrar referred to the original TransferCertificate in Hindi issued by the Headmaster, Dayanand Arya MiddleSchool, Sohna dated 24.03.2012 and the Transfer Certificate issued bythe Principal, Government Senior Secondary School (Boys), Sohna dated12.12.2000. These certificates contain the official seal of the respectiveschools and the signatures of the respective authorities, and state thename of the student as Raj Kumar, son of Rajendar Singh, and recordhis date of birth as 12.07.1984. certificate dated 07.12.2010 was alsoissued by the Principal of the Government Senior Secondary School(Boys), Sohna, verifying that the student named Raj Kumar, son ofRajendar Singh, used to study at the school, and that the school recordsreflected his date of birth as 12.07.1984 and the name of his mother asSmt. Sarla Devi.

19. The learned Registrar also duly corroborated the contents ofthese certificates by referring to other school records and also examined

Awitnesses. With respect to the Dayanand Arya Middle School, Sohna,the learned Registrar examined Mr. Suresh Chand, Teacher, appearingunder the directions of the School Headmaster, who confirmed that theTransfer Certificate dated 24.03.2012 was bona fide and issued underthe signature of the then Principal. The Registrar also verified thecertificate by comparing it with the office copy of the same in the SchoolBLeaving Certificate Register produced before him. The original Admissionand Withdrawal Register of the school was also examined, which alsorecorded the Appellant’s date of birth as 12.07.1984, and stated that hewas admitted in the school on 23.07.1992 and withdrew on 310.3.1996after passing Class V.

20. With respect to the Government Senior Secondary School(Boys), Sohna, the learned Registrar also called for the school records,which were produced through Mrs. Nirmal Kalra, Teacher, under theinstructions of the Principal of the school. She too affirmed that theTransfer Certificate dated 12.12.2000 was bona fide, and issued underDthe signature of the then Principal. She affirmed having compared theentries in the certificate with the corresponding entries in the relevantregister of the school, copies of which had been submitted to the learnedRegistrar. The following details with respect to the Appellant’s period ofstudy in the school were also affirmed by Mrs. Kalra on affidavit:

S. Admission Date of Date of Reasons for No. No. Admission Striking Off Striking Off the Name 1. 14163 7.5.1996 (in 19.4.1997 (in Non-payment of Class VI) Class VII) School Funds 2. 14678 17.5.1997 (in March 1999 (in Failed in Class Class VII) Class VIII) VIII Board Examination 3. 15546 7.7.1999 (in 7.8.1999 (in Continued Class VIII) Class VIII) absence

21. The learned Registrar concluded that the school transferGcertificates dated 24.03.2012 and 12.12.2000, read along with the relevantentries of school registers of the respective schools, were admissible asevidence under Rule 12(3)(a)(ii) of the 2007 Rules, i.e., they were foundto be in the nature of the “date of birth certificate from the school(other than play school) first attended” as specified in the saidclause, and thus accepted the Appellant’s claim of juvenility. It was alsoH

found that the certificates contained the name of the Appellant as RajKumar, son of Rajendar Singh, born on 12.07.1984. This name was foundto be the full name of the Appellant and the name Raju appearing on theSLP record taken to be an alias, as affirmed by both his parents by wayof separate affidavits.

22. In our opinion, the learned Registrar has duly affirmed theveracity and bona fide nature of the certificates adduced by the schoolsattended by the Appellant. At the same time, since Rule 12(3)(a)(ii)specifically mentions that the certificate showing the date of birth of theperson shall be from the school first attended (other than play school),we find that the certificate issued and school records maintained by theDayanand Arya Middle School, Sohna, where the Appellant studied forfour years till class V, as duly affirmed through the examination of awitness from such school, is sufficient to satisfy the requirement of clause(a)(ii) of Rule 12(3). Of course, it goes without saying that the certificateissued by the Government Senior Secondary School (Boys), Sohna andthe accompanying school records serve to corroborate the veracity ofthe records furnished by the former school. It would not be out of placeto highlight here that the findings in the inquiry report have also not beencontroverted by the State.23. We are also conscious of the limitation envisaged under Section7A of the 2000 Act that the evidence adduced with respect to the age ofthe accused cannot be in the form of mere affidavits. Due to this reason,the reliance of the learned Registrar upon affidavits to conclude that thename used in the certificates placed on record (i.e. Raj Kumar) is thefull name of the Appellant and the name Raju is merely an alias is nottenable in our view. However, we find that there is sufficient evidenceon record in the form of the appearance of the name of the father of theAppellant on the certificate dated 24.03.2012 issued by the DayanandArya Middle School, Sohna, to indicate that the name Raj Kumarappearing on such certificate was the full name of the Appellant.

24. In light of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that ithas been conclusively established that the date of birth of the Appellantwas 12.07.1984 and as such he was aged 16 years, 2 months and 2 daysat the time of commission of the offence dated 14.09.2000. In suchcircumstances, we do not have any doubt that the inquiry conducted bythe Registrar (Judicial) upon the direction of this Court in the instantmatter amounts to an inquiry conducted by this Court itself, and is

Aconclusive proof of the age of the Appellant as provided in Rule 12(3) ofthe 2007 Rules. As the Appellant satisfies the requirement of Sections2(k) and 2(l) of the 2000 Act, the said Act is applicable to him in fullforce in light of Section 7A and Section 20.

25. Criminal Appeal hereby stands allowed and the order of theBHigh Court affirming the conviction and sentence of the Appellant underSection 376(2)(g) of the IPC is set aside. Seeing that the Appellant hasalready spent 6 years in imprisonment, whereas the maximum period forwhich juvenile may be sent to special home is only 3 years as perSection 15(1)(g) of the 2000 Act, and since the Appellant has alreadybeen enlarged on bail by virtue of the order of the Court dated 09.05.2014,Che need not be taken into custody. His bail bonds stand discharged andall proceedings against him, so far as they relate to the present case,stand terminated.

26. Before we part with this matter, we would like to place onrecord our appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered to this CourtDby Shri Siddhartha Dave, the learned amicus curiae in this matter.

Ankit Gyan

Appeal allowed.