THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH versus LAXMI NARAYAN AND OTHERS

ATHE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

LAXMI NARAYAN AND OTHERS

(Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019)

BMARCH 05, 2019

[A. K. SIKRI, S. ABDUL NAZEER AND M. R. SHAH, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973:

s. 482 – Inherent powers of the High Court – Quashing ofCFIR – On facts, FIR for the offences u/ss. 307 and 34 and for theoffences punishable u/ss. 323, 294, 308 and 34 respectively –Quashed by the High Court on basis of compromise between thecomplainant and the accused – Sustainability of – Held: Notsustainable – High Court mechanically quashed the FIR, in exerciseof its powers u/s. 482 CrPC – High Court did not at all consider theDfact that the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences asper s. 320 CrPC, and more particularly the seriousness of theoffences and its social impact, and the antecedents of the accused– High Court erred in quashing the FIR holding that as thecomplainant had compromised with the accused, there was noEpossibility of recording conviction, and/or the further trial wouldbe an exercise in futility – Thus, the order passed by the High Courtis quashed and set aside.

ss. 482 and 320 – Power u/s. 482 to quash the criminalproceedings for the non-compoundable offences u/s. 320, whereparties have settled the matter between themselves – Exercise of –FGuiding principles – Elucidated.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The High Court quashed the FIR holding thatthere is no chance of recording conviction against the accusedpersons and the entire exercise of trial would be exercise inGfutility. The High Court did not at all consider the fact that theoffences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section320 Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgment and order, it appearsthat the High Court has not at all considered the relevant factsand circumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousnessHof the offences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment

and order passed by the High Court, it appears that the HighCourt has mechanically quashed the FIR, in exercise of its powersunder Section 482 Cr.P.C. The High Court has not at allconsidered the distinction between personal or private wrongand social wrong and the social impact. [Para 9, 9.1][873-B-E]

1.2 As regards the reliance placed upon the decision of thisCourt in Shiji’s case, while quashing the FIR by observing that asthe complainant has compromised with the accused, there is nopossibility of recording conviction, and/or the further trial wouldbe an exercise in futility is concerned, the High Court clearlyerred in quashing the FIR on the said ground. It appears that theHigh Court has misread or misapplied the said decision to thefacts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to haveappreciated that it is not in every case where the complainanthas entered into compromise with the accused, there may notbe any conviction. Such observations are presumptive and manya time too early to opine. In given case, it may happen that theprosecution still can prove the guilt by leading cogent evidenceand examining the other witnesses and the relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the dispute is not commercialtransaction and/or of civil nature and/or is not private wrong.The Shiji’s decision may be applicable in case which has itsorigin in the civil dispute between the parties; the parties haveresolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the societyat large and/or the same may not have social impact; the disputeis family/matrimonial dispute etc. The said decision may not beapplicable in case where the offences alleged are very seriousand grave offences, having social impact like offences underSection 307 IPC. The High Court has mechanically consideredShiji’s case without considering the relevant facts andcircumstances of the case. [Paras 11, 11.1][880-B-F; 881-D-E]Shiji @ Pappu & others v. Radhika and another (2011)10 SCC 705 : [2011] 13 SCR 135 – held inapplicable.

2.1 The power conferred under Section 482 of the Code toquash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundableoffences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised havingoverwhelmingly and predominantly the civil character, particularlythose arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of

Amatrimonial relationship or family disputes and when the partieshave resolved the entire dispute amongst themselves. Suchpower is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involvedheinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences likemurder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in natureand have serious impact on society. Similarly, such power is notBto be exercised for the offences under the special statutes likePrevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by publicservants while working in that capacity are not to be quashedmerely on the basis of compromise between the victim and theoffender. [Para 13 (iii)][884-E-H]C2.2 Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc.would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences andtherefore are to be treated as crime against the society and notagainst the individual alone, and therefore, the criminalproceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the

DArms Act etc. which have serious impact on the society cannotbe quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code,on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire disputeamongst themselves. However, the High Court would not restits decision merely because there is mention of Section 307

IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. ItEwould be open to the High Court to examine as to whetherincorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for the sake of it or theprosecution has collected sufficient evidence, which if proved,would lead to framing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For thispurpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the natureFof injury sustained, whether such injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weapons used etc. However,such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible onlyafter the evidence is collected after investigation and the chargesheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Suchexercise is not permissible when the matter is still underGinvestigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion of the decisionof this Court in the case of Narinder Singh’s case should be readharmoniously and to be read as whole and in the circumstancesstated herein. [Para 13 (iv)][885-A-E]

Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466 :[2014] 4 SCR 1012 – relied on.

2.3 While exercising the power under Section 482 of theCode to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do nothave serious impact on society, on the ground that there is asettlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, theHigh Court is required to consider the antecedents of the accused;the conduct of the accused, namely, whether the accused wasabsconding and why he was absconding, how he had managedwith the complainant to enter into compromise etc.[Para 13 (v)][885-F-G]3. The High Court has quashed the criminal proceedingsfor the offences under Sections 307 and 34 IPC mechanically andeven when the investigation was under progress. Somehow, theaccused managed to enter into compromise with the complainantand sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of settlement. Theallegations are serious in nature. He used the fire arm also incommission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offenceand the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by theHigh Court and solely on the basis of settlement between theaccused and the complainant, the High Court has mechanicallyquashed the FIR, in exercise of power under Section 482 of theCode, which is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The High Courtalso failed to note the antecedents of the accused. The impugnedjudgment and order dated 07.10.2013 passed by the High Courtis hereby quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against the accused.[Para 14, 15][885-G, H; 886-A-C]

4. So far as Criminal Appeal No. 350/2019 by the impugnedjudgment and order, the High Court has quashed the criminalproceedings for the offences punishable under Sections 323, 294,308 & 34 IPC. Offence under Section 308 IPC is non-compoundable offence. While committing the offence, the accusedhas used the fire arm. They are also absconding, and in themeantime, they have managed to enter into compromise with

DEF

Athe complainant. Thus, the impugned judgment and order passedby the High Court is quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/criminal proceedings be proceeded against theaccused. [Para 16][886-D-F]

State of Rajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat (2014) 4 SCCB149 : [2013] 12 SCR 973 ; Gian Singh v. State of Punjab(2012) 10 SCC 303 : [2012] 8 SCR 753 ; State ofRajasthan v. Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149 :[2013] 12 SCR 973 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v.Deepak (2014) 10 SCC 285 ; State of Madhya Pradeshv. Manish (2015) 8 SCC 307 : [2015] 8 SCR 723 ;CJ.Ramesh Kamath v. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12 SCC179 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Rajveer Singh (2016)12 SCC 471 ; Parbatbhai AAhir v. State of Gujarat(2017) 9 SCC 641 : [2017] 10 SCR 12 ; State of MadhyaPradesh v. Kalyan Singh decided on 4.1.2019 in Crl.DAppeal No.14/2019 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. DhruvGurjar decided on 22.02.2019 in Crl. Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013 ; State of Maharashtra v.Vikram Anantrai Doshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29 – referredto.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal AppealNo. 349 of 2019.

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.10.2013 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh, Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal CaseNo. 8000 of 2013.

WITH

Criminal Appeal No. 350 of 2019.

Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, B. N. Dubey, Makesh Kumar,Ms. Indira Bhakar, Ms. Aparna Trivedi, Santanu Singh, Rahul Kaushik,Bhuvenshwari Pathak, Ms. Shilpi Satyapraiya Satyam, SiddharthChakravorty, Arjun Garg, Advs. for the Appellant.

Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, Adv. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

Criminal Appeal No. 349 of 2019

1. two Judge bench of this Court vide its order dated 08.09.2017,in view of the apparent conflict between the two decisions of this Courtin the cases of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466and State of Rajasthan vs. Shambhu Kewat (2014) 4 SCC 149, hasreferred the matter to Bench of three Judges, and that is how thematter is placed before Bench of three Judges.

1.1 Vide order dated 19.11.2018, since the same question of law isinvolved, this Court tagged the connected appeal with the main appeal.

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 7.10.2013 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh,Bench at Gwalior in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000/2013, bywhich the High Court has allowed the said application, preferred by therespondents herein/original accused (hereinafter referred to as the‘Accused’), and in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure, has quashed the proceedings against the accusedfor the offences punishable under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, relyingupon the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji @ Pappu & othersvs. Radhika and another (2011) 10 SCC 705, the State of MadhyaPradesh has preferred the present appeal.

A2.1 Office report dated 18.08.2017 indicates that service of showcause notice on the respondents is complete, and respondent nos. 1 to 3are represented by Ms. Mridula Ray Bhardwaj, Advocate, but duringthe course of hearing, nobody appeared for the respondents.

3. The facts leading to this appeal are, that an FIR was lodgedBagainst the respondents herein and two unknown persons at Police StationRaun, District Bhind, for the offences punishable under Sections 307and 34 of the IPC, which was registered as Crime No.36/13. It wasalleged that on 03.03.2013 at about 9:30 p.m., the complainant – CharanSingh, who is an operator of LNT machine is extracting sand of SindhRiver at Indukhi Sand Mine and at that time firing from other side ofCriver started and the counter firing from this side also started then heheard that take away your machine from here. It is alleged that somepeople came there from which Sanjeev (respondent no.2 herein), Lature(respondent no.1 herein), Sant Singh (respondent no.3 herein) and twounknown persons came near to the complainant and his machine andDtold him to run away, then somebody told to Sanjeev (respondent no.2herein) to fire and then Sanjeev fired on the complainant and then theyran away. The complainant fell from the machine. The bullet hit thecomplainant on elbow of right hand. Somehow the complainant managedto reach the village and person called car and admitted the complainantin District Hospital.E3.1 That on 04.03.2013, the duty doctor in the District Hospitalinformed the police and on the basis of the statement of the complainant,a Dehati Nalishi bearing No. 0/13 was registered under Sections 307and 34 of the IPC.

3.2 That the medical examination of the injured complainant wasFconducted at District Hospital and five injuries were found on his bodyand injuries nos. 1 to 4 were opined to be caused by fire arm and injuryno.5 was advised for x-ray.

3.3 That on 05.03.2013, the police reached on the spot and preparedspot map; statement of witnesses were recorded under Section 161 ofGthe Cr.P.C. and the police seized simple soil, blood stained soil and otherarticles from the spot of the incident and prepared their seizure memos.

3.4 That the accused filed Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000of 2013 under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court of MadhyaPradesh, Bench at Gwalior for quashing the criminal proceedings againstthe accused arising out of the FIR, on the sole ground of compromiseHarrived at between the accused and the complainant.

4. That, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court, inexercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C., has quashed thecriminal proceedings against the accused solely on the ground that theaccused and the complainant have settled the disputes amicably. Whilequashing the criminal proceedings against the accused, the High Courthas considered and relied upon the decision of this Court in the case ofShiji (supra).

5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgmentand order, quashing the criminal proceedings against the accused for theoffences punishable under Sections 307 and 34 of the IPC, the State ofMadhya Pradesh has preferred the present appeal.

6. Learned advocate appearing on behalf of the State of MadhyaPradesh has vehemently submitted that the High Court has committed agrave error in quashing the FIR which was for the offences under Sections307 and 34 of the IPC.

6.1 It is vehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearingon behalf of the appellant-State that in the present cases the High Courthas quashed the FIR mechanically and solely on the basis of thesettlement/compromise between the complainant and the accused, withouteven considering the gravity and seriousness of the offences allegedagainst the accused persons.

6.2 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant-State that while exercising the powers underSection 482 of the Cr.P.C. and quashing the FIR, the High Court has notat all considered the fact that the offences alleged were against thesociety at large and not restricted to the personal disputes between thetwo individuals.

6.3. It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant-State that the High Court has misread the decisionof this Court in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the FIR. It isvehemently submitted by the learned counsel that the High Court oughtto have appreciated that in all the cases where the complainant hascompromised/entered into settlement with the accused, that need notnecessarily mean resulting into no chance of recording conviction and/or the entire exercise of trial destined to be exercise of futility. It isvehemently submitted by the learned counsel appearing on behalf of theappellant-State that in given case despite the complainant may notsupport in future and in the trial in view of the settlement and compromise

Awith the accused, still the prosecution may prove the case against theaccused persons by examining the other witnesses, if any, and/or on thebasis of the medical evidence and/or other evidence/material. It issubmitted that in the present cases the investigation was in progress andeven the statement of the witnesses was recorded and the medicalevidence was also collected. It is submitted that therefore in the factsBand circumstances of the case, the High Court has clearly erred inconsidering and relying upon the decision of this Court in the case ofShiji (supra).

6.4 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellant-State that the accused were hard core criminalsCand many criminal cases were registered against them and they are aserious threat to the society. It is submitted that all these aforesaidcircumstances and the conduct on the part of the accused were requiredto be considered by the High Court while quashing the FIR in exerciseof its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C., and more

Dparticularly when the offences alleged were against the society at large,namely, attempt to murder, which is non-compoundable offence. Insupport of his submissions, learned counsel for the appellant-State hasplaced reliance on the decisions of this Court in the cases of Gian Singhvs. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303; State of Rajasthan vs.Shambhu Kewat, (2014) 4 SCC 149; State of Madhya Pradesh vs.EDeepak (2014) 10 SCC 285; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Manish(2015) 8 SCC 307; J.Ramesh Kamath vs. Mohana Kurup (2016) 12SCC 179; State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Rajveer Singh (2016) 12SCC 471; Parbatbhai AAhir vs. State of Gujarat (2017) 9 SCC 641;and 2019 SCC Online SC 7, State of Madhya Pradesh vs. KalyanFSingh, decided on 4.1.2019 in Criminal Appeal No. 14/2019, Stateof Madhya Pradesh vs. Dhruv Gurjar, decided on 22.02.2019 inCriminal Appeal @ SLP(Criminal) No.9859/2013.

6.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaiddecisions of this Court, learned counsel appearing on behalf of theappellant-State has prayed to allow the present appeal and quash andGset aside the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Courtquashing and setting aside the FIR, in exercise of its inherent powersunder Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

7. As observed hereinabove, nobody appeared on behalf of therespondents – accused.H

8. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant at greatlength.

9. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present appeals,the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.has quashed the FIR for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 of theIPC solely on the basis of compromise between the complainant andthe accused. That in view of the compromise and the stand taken by thecomplainant, considering the decision of this Court in the case of Shiji(supra), the High Court has observed that there is no chance of recordingconviction against the accused persons and the entire exercise of trialwould be exercise in futility, the High Court has quashed the FIR.9.1 However, the High Court has not at all considered the factthat the offences alleged were non-compoundable offences as per Section320 of the Cr.P.C. From the impugned judgment and order, it appearsthat the High Court has not at all considered the relevant facts andcircumstances of the case, more particularly the seriousness of theoffences and its social impact. From the impugned judgment and orderpassed by the High Court, it appears that the High Court has mechanicallyquashed the FIR, in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.The High Court has not at all considered the distinction between personalor private wrong and social wrong and the social impact. As observedby this Court in the case of State of Maharashtra vs. Vikram AnantraiDoshi, (2014) 15 SCC 29, the Court’s principal duty, while exercisingthe powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the criminal proceedings,should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of the allegationsand the crux of the settlement. As observed, it is the experience of theJudge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used withcare, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence. In the case athand, the High Court has not at all taken pains to scrutinise the entireconspectus of facts in proper perspective and has quashed the criminalproceedings mechanically. Even, the quashing of the FIR by the HighCourt in the present case for the offences under Sections 307 and 34 ofthe IPC, and that too in exercise of powers under Section 482 of theCr.P.C. is just contrary to the law laid down by this Court in catena ofdecisions.

9.2 In the case of Gian Singh (supra), in paragraph 61, thisCourt has observed and held as under:

“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can besummarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing acriminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherentjurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to acriminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutorylimitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guidelineengrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the ends of justice, or(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what casespower to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR maybe exercised where the offender and the victim have settled theirdispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of eachcase and no category can be prescribed. However, before exerciseof such power, the High Court must have due regard to the natureand gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mentaldepravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot befittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and theoffender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not privatein nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, anycompromise between the victim and the offender in relation tothe offences under special statutes like the Prevention of CorruptionAct or the offences committed by public servants while workingin that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashingcriminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminalcases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavourstand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularlythe offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out ofmatrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes wherethe wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the partieshave resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, theHigh Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view,because of the compromise between the offender and the victim,the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuationof the criminal case would put the accused to great oppressionand prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him bynot quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlementand compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Courtmust consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest

of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuationof the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of processof law despite settlement and compromise between the victimand the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it isappropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answerto the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shallbe well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

9.3 In the case of Narinder Singh vs. State of Punjab (2014) 6SCC 466, after considering the decision in the case of Gian Singh(supra), in paragraph 29, this Court summed up as under:

“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay downthe following principles by which the High Court would be guidedin giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the partiesand exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code whileaccepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusingto accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminalproceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to bedistinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compoundthe offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, underSection 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent powerto quash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which arenot compoundable, where the parties have settled the matterbetween themselves. However, this power is to be exercisedsparingly and with caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on thatbasis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, theguiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.

While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinionon either of the aforesaid two objectives.

29.3. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutionswhich involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravityor offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are notprivate in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly,for the offences alleged to have been committed under special

statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offencescommitted by public servants while working in that capacity arenot to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise betweenthe victim and the offender.

29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases havingoverwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularlythose arising out of commercial transactions or arising out ofmatrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed whenthe parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examineas to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak andcontinuation of criminal cases would put the accused to greatoppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be causedto him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the categoryof heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generallytreated as crime against the society and not against the individualalone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merelybecause there is mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or thecharge is framed under this provision. It would be open to theHigh Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collectedsufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving thecharge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be opento the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whethersuch injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, natureof weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries sufferedby the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis ofthis prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whetherthere is strong possibility of conviction or the chances ofconviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuseto accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedingswhereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the HighCourt to accept the plea compounding the offence based oncomplete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Courtcan also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between theparties is going to result in harmony between them which mayimprove their future relationship.29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play crucial role.Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately afterthe alleged commission of offence and the matter is still underinvestigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting thesettlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It isbecause of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still onand even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, thosecases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to startor the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can showbenevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after primafacie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almostcomplete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is atthe stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrainfrom exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as insuch cases the trial court would be in position to decide the casefinally on merits and to come to conclusion as to whether theoffence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, inthose cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trialcourt and the matter is at the appellate stage before the HighCourt, mere compromise between the parties would not be aground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offenderwho has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge isproved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recordedof heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparinga convict found guilty of such crime.”

9.4 In the case of Parbatbhai Aahir (supra), again this Courthas had an occasion to consider whether the High Court can quash theFIR/complaint/criminal proceedings, in exercise of the inherent jurisdictionunder Section 482 Cr.P.C. Considering catena of decisions of this Courton the point, this Court summarised the following propositions:

“(1) Section 482 CrPC preserves the inherent powers of theHigh Court to prevent an abuse of the process of any court or tosecure the ends of justice. The provision does not confer newpowers. It only recognises and preserves powers which inhere inthe High Court.

(2) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quasha first information report or criminal proceeding on the groundthat settlement has been arrived at between the offender andthe victim is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for thepurpose of compounding an offence. While compounding anoffence, the power of the court is governed by the provisions ofSection 320 CrPC. The power to quash under Section 482 isattracted even if the offence is non-compoundable.

(3) In forming an opinion whether criminal proceeding orcomplaint should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction underSection 482, the High Court must evaluate whether the ends ofjustice would justify the exercise of the inherent power.

(4) While the inherent power of the High Court has wideambit and plenitude it has to be exercised (i) to secure the ends ofjustice, or (ii) to prevent an abuse of the process of any court.

(5) the decision as to whether complaint or first informationreport should be quashed on the ground that the offender andvictim have settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the factsand circumstances of each case and no exhaustive elaboration ofprinciples can be formulate.

(6) In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and whiledealing with plea that the dispute has been settled, the HighCourt must have due regard to the nature and gravity of theoffence. Heinous and serious offences involving mental depravityor offences such as murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriatelybe quashed though the victim or the family of the victim havesettled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not privatein nature but have serious impact upon society. The decision tocontinue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overridingelement of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.

(7) As distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminalcases which have an overwhelming or predominant element of acivil dispute. They stand on distinct footing insofar as the exerciseof the inherent power to quash is concerned.

(8) Criminal cases involving offences which arise fromcommercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similartransactions with an essentially civil flavour may in appropriatesituations fall for quashing where parties have settled the dispute.

(9) In such case, the High Court may quash the criminalproceeding if in view of the compromise between the disputants,the possibility of conviction is remote and the continuation of acriminal proceeding would cause oppression and prejudice; and

(10) There is yet an exception to the principle set out inPropositions (8) and (9) above. Economic offences involving thefinancial and economic well-being of the State have implicationswhich lie beyond the domain of mere dispute between privatedisputants. The High Court would be justified in declining to quashwhere the offender is involved in an activity akin to financial oreconomic fraud or misdemeanour. The consequences of the actcomplained of upon the financial or economic system will weighin the balance.”

9.5 In the case of Manish (supra), this Court has specificallyobserved and held that, when it comes to the question of compoundingan offence under Sections 307, 294 and 34 IPC, by no stretch ofimagination, can it be held to be an offence as between the private partiessimpliciter. It is observed that such offences will have serious impacton the society at large. It is further observed that where the accusedare facing trial under Sections 307 read with Section 34 IPC, as theoffences are definitely against the society, accused will have tonecessarily face trial and come out unscathed by demonstrating theirinnocence.

9.6 In the case of Deepak (supra), this Court has specificallyobserved that as offence under Section 307 IPC is non-compoundableand as the offence under Section 307 is not private dispute betweenthe parties inter se, but is crime against the society, quashing of theproceedings on the basis of compromise is not permissible. Similar isthe view taken by this Court in recent decision of this Court in the caseof Kalyan Singh (supra) and Dhruv Gurjar (supra).

10. Now so far as the decision of this Court in the case of NarinderSingh (supra) is concerned, this Court in paragraph 29.6 admitted thatthe offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinousand serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crimeagainst the society and not against the individual alone. However, thisCourt further observed that the High Court would not rest its decisionmerely because there is mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or thecharge is framed. Its further corroboration with the medical evidence or

Aother evidence is to be seen, which will be possible during the trial only.Hence, the decision of this case in the case of Narinder Singh (supra)shall be of no assistance to the accused in the present case.

11. Now so far as the reliance placed upon the decision of thisCourt in the case of Shiji (supra), while quashing the FIR by observingBthat as the complainant has compromised with the accused, there is nopossibility of recording conviction, and/or the further trial would be anexercise in futility is concerned, we are of the opinion that the HighCourt has clearly erred in quashing the FIR on the aforesaid ground. Itappears that the High Court has misread or misapplied the said decisionto the facts of the cases on hand. The High Court ought to haveCappreciated that it is not in every case where the complainant has enteredinto compromise with the accused, there may not be any conviction.Such observations are presumptive and many time too early to opine.In given case, it may happen that the prosecution still can prove theguilt by leading cogent evidence and examining the other witnesses and

Dthe relevant evidence/material, more particularly when the dispute is nota commercial transaction and/or of civil nature and/or is not privatewrong. In the case of Shiji (supra), this Court found that the case hadits origin in the civil dispute between the parties, which dispute wasresolved by them and therefore this Court observed that, ‘that being so,

continuance of the prosecution where the complainant is not ready toEsupport the allegations…will be futile exercise that will serve nopurpose’. In the aforesaid case, it was also further observed ‘that eventhe alleged two eyewitnesses, however, closely related to the complainant,were not supporting the prosecution version’, and to that this Courtobserved and held ‘that the continuance of the proceedings is nothingFbut an empty formality and Section 482 Cr.P.C. can, in suchcircumstances, be justifiably invoked by the High Court to prevent abuseof the process of law and thereby preventing wasteful exercise by thecourts below. Even in the said decision, in paragraph 18, it is observedas under:

“18. Having said so, we must hasten to add that the plenitude ofGthe power under Section 482 CrPC by itself, makes it obligatoryfor the High Court to exercise the same with utmost care andcaution. The width and the nature of the power itself demandsthat its exercise is sparing and only in cases where the High Courtis, for reasons to be recorded, of the clear view that continuanceHof the prosecution would be nothing but an abuse of the process

of law. It is neither necessary nor proper for us to enumerate thesituations in which the exercise of power under Section 482 maybe justified. All that we need to say is that the exercise of powermust be for securing the ends of justice and only in cases whererefusal to exercise that power may result in the abuse of theprocess of law. The High Court may be justified in declininginterference if it is called upon to appreciate evidence for it cannotassume the role of an appellate court while dealing with petitionunder Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Subject to theabove, the High Court will have to consider the facts andcircumstances of each case to determine whether it is fit casein which the inherent powers may be invoked.”11.1 Therefore, the said decision may be applicable in casewhich has its origin in the civil dispute between the parties; the partieshave resolved the dispute; that the offence is not against the society atlarge and/or the same may not have social impact; the dispute is family/matrimonial dispute etc. The aforesaid decision may not be applicablein case where the offences alleged are very serious and grave offences,having social impact like offences under Section 307 IPC. Therefore,without proper application of mind to the relevant facts andcircumstances, in our view, the High Court has materially erred inmechanically quashing the FIR, by observing that in view of thecompromise, there are no chances of recording conviction and/or thefurther trial would be an exercise in futility. The High Court hasmechanically considered the aforesaid decision of this Court in the caseof Shiji (supra), without considering the relevant facts and circumstancesof the case.

12. Now so far as the conflict between the decisions of this Courtin the cases of Narinder Singh (supra) and Shambhu Kewat (supra)is concerned, in the case of Shambhu Kewat (supra), this Court hasnoted the difference between the power of compounding of offencesconferred on court under Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the powers conferredunder Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing of criminal proceedings by theHigh Court. In the said decision, this Court further observed that incompounding the offences, the power of criminal court is circumscribedby the provisions contained in Section 320 Cr.P.C. and the court is guidedsolely and squarely thereby, while, on the other hand, the formation ofopinion by the High Court for quashing criminal proceedings or criminal

Acomplaint under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is guided by the material on recordas to whether ends of justice would justify such exercise of power,although ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.However, in the subsequent decision in the case of Narinder Singh(supra), the very Bench ultimately concluded in paragraph 29 as under:B“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down

B“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay downthe following principles by which the High Court would be guidedin giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the partiesand exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code whileaccepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusingto accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminalCproceedings:

29.1. Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is to bedistinguished from the power which lies in the Court to compoundthe offences under Section 320 of the Code. No doubt, underSection 482 of the Code, the High Court has inherent power toDquash the criminal proceedings even in those cases which are notcompoundable, where the parties have settled the matter betweenthemselves. However, this power is to be exercised sparingly andwith caution.

29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on thatbasis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the

Eguiding factor in such cases would be to secure:

(i) ends of justice, or

(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinionon either of the aforesaid two objectives.

F29.3. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutionswhich involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravityor offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are notprivate in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly,for the offences alleged to have been committed under specialstatute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offencesGcommitted by public servants while working in that capacity arenot to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise betweenthe victim and the offender.29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases havingoverwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularlythose arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of

matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed whenthe parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examineas to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak andcontinuation of criminal cases would put the accused to greatoppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be causedto him by not quashing the criminal cases.

29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the categoryof heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generallytreated as crime against the society and not against the individualalone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merelybecause there is mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or thecharge is framed under this provision. It would be open to theHigh Court to examine as to whether incorporation of Section307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution has collectedsufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead to proving thecharge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be opento the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained, whethersuch injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, natureof weapons used, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries sufferedby the victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basis ofthis prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine as to whetherthere is strong possibility of conviction or the chances ofconviction are remote and bleak. In the former case it can refuseto accept the settlement and quash the criminal proceedingswhereas in the latter case it would be permissible for the HighCourt to accept the plea compounding the offence based oncomplete settlement between the parties. At this stage, the Courtcan also be swayed by the fact that the settlement between theparties is going to result in harmony between them which mayimprove their future relationship.

29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play crucial role.Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately afterthe alleged commission of offence and the matter is still underinvestigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting thesettlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It isbecause of the reason that at this stage the investigation is still onand even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those

Acases where the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to startor the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court can showbenevolence in exercising its powers favourably, but after primafacie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned above.On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almostcomplete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is atBthe stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrainfrom exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as insuch cases the trial court would be in position to decide the casefinally on merits and to come to conclusion as to whether theoffence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, inCthose cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trialcourt and the matter is at the appellate stage before the HighCourt, mere compromise between the parties would not be aground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offenderwho has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge isproved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recordedDof heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparinga convict found guilty of such crime.”

13. Considering the law on the point and the other decisions ofthis Court on the point, referred to hereinabove, it is observed and heldas under:E

i) that the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code to quashthe criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable offences underSection 320 of the Code can be exercised having overwhelminglyand predominantly the civil character, particularly those arisingout of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonialFrelationship or family disputes and when the parties have resolvedthe entire dispute amongst themselves;

ii) such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions whichinvolved heinous and serious offences of mental depravity oroffences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are notprivate in nature and have serious impact on society;

iii) similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the offencesunder the special statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or theoffences committed by public servants while working in thatcapacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromisebetween the victim and the offender;

iv) offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act etc. wouldfall in the category of heinous and serious offences and thereforeare to be treated as crime against the society and not against theindividual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for theoffence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. whichhave serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exerciseof powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that theparties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves.However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely becausethere is mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge isframed under this provision. It would be open to the High Courtto examine as to whether incorporation of Section 307 IPC isthere for the sake of it or the prosecution has collected sufficientevidence, which if proved, would lead to framing the charge underSection 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the HighCourt to go by the nature of injury sustained, whether such injuryis inflicted on the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weaponsused etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would bepermissible only after the evidence is collected after investigationand the charge sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during thetrial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is stillunder investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion inparagraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in the caseof Narinder Singh (supra) should be read harmoniously and tobe read as whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;

v) while exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code toquash the criminal proceedings in respect of non-compoundableoffences, which are private in nature and do not have seriousimpact on society, on the ground that there is settlement/compromise between the victim and the offender, the High Courtis required to consider the antecedents of the accused; the conductof the accused, namely, whether the accused was abscondingand why he was absconding, how he had managed with thecomplainant to enter into compromise etc.

14. Insofar as the present case is concerned, the High Court hasquashed the criminal proceedings for the offences under Sections 307and 34 IPC mechanically and even when the investigation was underprogress. Somehow, the accused managed to enter into compromisewith the complainant and sought quashing of the FIR on the basis of

ABCDE

Asettlement. The allegations are serious in nature. He used the fire armalso in commission of the offence. Therefore, the gravity of the offenceand the conduct of the accused is not at all considered by the High Courtand solely on the basis of settlement between the accused and thecomplainant, the High Court has mechanically quashed the FIR, inexercise of power under Section 482 of the Code, which is not sustainableBin the eyes of law. The High Court has also failed to note the antecedentsof the accused.

15. In view of the above and for the reasons stated, the presentappeal is allowed. The impugned judgment and order dated 07.10.2013passed by the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 8000 ofC2013 is hereby quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/criminalproceedings be proceeded against the accused, and they shall be dealtwith, in accordance with law.

Criminal Appeal No.350 of 2019

D16. So far as Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP 10324/2018 isconcerned, by the impugned judgment and order, the High Court hasquashed the criminal proceedings for the offences punishable underSections 323, 294, 308 & 34 of the IPC, solely on the ground that theaccused and the complainant have settled the matter and in view of thedecision of this Court in the case of Shiji(supra), there may not be anyEpossibility of recording conviction against the accused. Offence underSection 308 IPC is non-compoundable offence. While committing theoffence, the accused has used the fire arm. They are also absconding,and in the meantime, they have managed to enter into compromisewith the complainant. Therefore, for the reasons stated above, this appealFis also allowed, the impugned judgment and order dated 28.05.2018 passedby the High Court in Miscellaneous Criminal Case No. 19309/2018 ishereby quashed and set aside, and the FIR/investigation/criminalproceedings be proceeded against the accused, and they shall be dealtwith, in accordance with law.

GNidhi Jain

Appeals allowed.