NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI & ORS. versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

[2019] 10 S.C.R.

NARESHBHAI BHAGUBHAI & ORS.

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 6270 of 2019)

AUGUST 13, 2019

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND INDU MALHOTRA, JJ.]

Railways Act, 1989: ss. 20D – Hearing of objections – Non-compliance of s. 20D(2) – Effect of – Acquisition of 131 kms ofland including 6 kms of land of the appellant for public purpose ofCconstruction of Special Railway Project-Western Dedicated FreightCorridor in District Surat – Plea of the appellant-land owners thatno order was passed on the objections raised by them in accordancewith s. 20D(2) – Appellant sought quashing of the Notification issuedu/s. 20A and declaration issued u/s. 20E – Dismissal of theDapplications by the High Court – On appeal, held: Limited rightgiven to land-owner/interested person to file objections, and begranted personal hearing u/s.20D cannot be reduced to an emptyformality, or mere eye-wash by the Competent Authority –Competent Authority was duty-bound to consider the objectionsraised by the appellants, and pass reasoned order reflectingEapplication of mind to the objections raised by the land-owners –On facts, file noting contained in an internal office file, or in thereport submitted by the Competent Authority to the CentralGovernment, would not constitute valid order in the eyes of law –There was no order whatsoever passed rejecting the objections,Fafter the personal hearing was concluded – Competent Authoritydid not communicate the contents of the file noting to the appellantsat any stage of the proceedings – The said file noting recordingrejection of the objections only on the ground that the matterpertained to an infrastructure project for public utility, came to lightwhen the matter was pending before the High Court, and the originalGfiles were summoned – In any event, the order u/s. 20D(2) cannotbe passed prior to the personal hearing – In the absence of anorder passed u/s. 20D(2), the subsequent steps taken in the

acquisition would get invalidated – However, remaining stretch ofland comprising of 125 kms on acquisition, stands vested in theGovernment and pre-construction activity and earth work has beencompleted on most parts of the stretch – In order to balance theright of the appellants on the one hand, and the larger publicpurpose on the other, the appellants to be compensated as per thecurrent market value of the land – Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 It is abundantly clear that in the absence of anorder being passed as contemplated by Section 20D of theRailways Act, no further steps could have been taken by theCompetent Authority in the acquisition in question. Section 20Dis mandatory provision which confers substantive and valuableright on the land-owners, to object to the proposed acquisition,before they are forcibly divested of their right, title and interestin the land by an expropriatory legislation. The right to fileobjections under Section 20D of the Railways Act, 1989 is parimateria to Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 eventhough the scope of objections may be more limited. Thejudgments rendered by this Court on the nature of the right toobject under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are equally applicableto the Railways Act. Sub-section (2) of Section 20D mandates theCompetent Authority to give the objectors an opportunity ofhearing, either in person or through legal practitioner. TheCompetent Authority after hearing all objections, and after makingsuch further enquiry, if any, is mandated to pass an order eitherallowing or disallowing the objections. It has been held by thisCourt that the rules of natural justice have been ingrained in thescheme of Section 5-A of the 1894 Act with view to ensure thatbefore any person is forcibly deprived of his land by way ofcompulsory acquisition, he must be provided with an opportunityto oppose the decision of the Government; and that the hearinggiven to person must be an effective one, and not mereformality. Formation of opinion with regard to the public purpose,as also suitability thereof, must be preceded by application ofmind having due regard to the relevant factors. Section 5-A of

CDE

Athe Land Acquisition Act, 1894 confers valuable right on theland-owners. Having regard to the provisions contained in Article300-A of the Constitution, the right to raise and file objectionshas been held to be akin to fundamental right. [Para 10.1, 11][109-C-D; G-H; 110-A-F]

B1.2 The limited right given to land-owner/interestedperson to file objections, and be granted personal hearing underSection 20D cannot be reduced to an empty formality, or mereeye–wash by the Competent Authority. The Competent Authoritywas duty–bound to consider the objections raised by theappellants, and pass reasoned order, which should reflectCapplication of mind to the objections raised by the land-owners.In the instant case, there has been complete dereliction of dutyby the Competent Authority in passing reasoned order on theobjections raised by the Appellants. No order as contemplated inthe eyes of law was passed by the Competent Authority in decidingDthe objections raised by the appellants. statutory authoritydischarging quasi-judicial function is required to pass reasonedorder after due application of mind. [Para 11.1, 11.2] [112-D-H]1.3 valid order must be reasoned order, which is dulycommunicated to the parties. The file noting contained in anEinternal office file, or in the report submitted by the CompetentAuthority to the Central Government, would not constitute validorder in the eyes of law. In the instant case, there was no orderwhatsoever passed rejecting the objections, after the personalhearing was concluded on 30.07.2011. The Competent Authoritydid not communicate the contents of the file noting to theFAppellants at any stage of the proceedings. The said file notingcame to light when the matter was pending before the High Court,and the original files were summoned. The High Court, upon aperusal of the files, came across the file noting recording rejectionof the objections only on the ground that the matter pertained toGan infrastructure project for public utility. [Para 11.3] [119-A-H]

1.4 The respondents submitted that the mandate of the lawis that the order on the objections is required to be passed bythe Competent Authority “after the personal hearing” is granted.The respondents had filed an Affidavit dated 17.07.2018 before

the High Court wherein it was stated that the reply given videletter dated 15.07.2011 does not indicate the decision/order/pre-determination of the Competent Authority. The CompetentAuthority had informed the objectors to remain present with allmaterial documents at the time of personal hearing, the date ofwhich would be notified later. The Union of India submitted thatthe letter dated 15.07.2011 was an order passed under Section20D(2) of the Act. The stand taken by the respondents beforethe High Court and this Court is completely contradictory, andcannot be accepted. [Para 11.4] [120-G-H; 121-A-C]

1.5 In any event, the order under Section 20D(2) cannot bepassed prior to the personal hearing. The mandate of the law isthat the order must be passed “after” the grant of personalhearing, and after any further enquiry is made by the CompetentAuthority. The whole process of granting personal hearing wouldbe reduced to an empty formality and farcical exercise, if theorder on the objections precedes the grant of personal hearing.This would be clearly contrary to the provisions of Section 20D(2)of the Act. It is well settled that where statute provides for athing to be done in particular manner, then it has to be done inthat manner and in no other manner. The provisions of anexpropriatory legislation, which compulsorily deprives personof his right to property without his consent, must bestrictly construed. The Railways Act, 1989 being an expropriatorylegislation, its provisions have to be strictly construed. [Para 11.5][121-D-G; 122-A]

1.6 The Competent Authority being quasi–judicialauthority, is obligated by law to act in conformity with mandatorystatutory provisions. This is the only opportunity made availableto land–owner, as on submission of the Report to the CentralGovernment, there is no further consideration that takes place.The Central Government acts upon the Report of the CompetentAuthority, and issues the Declaration under Section 20E of thesaid Act. This is in contradistinction with the provisions of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 6 of the Land AcquisitionAct requires the satisfaction of Central Government before theDeclaration is issued. In the absence of an order passed u/s

A20D(2), the subsequent steps taken in the acquisition wouldconsequentially get invalidated. [Para 11.6, 11.7] [122-A-D]

1.7 The challenge before this Court has been made by theappellants with respect to stretch of land admeasuringapproximately 6 kms, out of the total stretch of 131 kms. TheBremaining stretch of land comprising of 125 kms has beenacquired, and stands vested in the Government. The respondentshave stated on affidavit that pre–construction activity and earthwork has been completed on most parts of the stretch.Furthermore, most of the bridges are either in progress, or havealready been completed. Appellants’ counsel submitted that sinceCthe land was being acquired for public utility project, his clientswould be satisfied if they were granted compensation by awardingthe current rate for acquisition of land. Admittedly, no mala fideshave been alleged by the appellants against the respondents inthe acquisition proceedings. The larger public purpose of railwayDproject would not be served if the Notification under Section 20Ais quashed. The public purpose of the acquisition is theconstruction and operation of Special Railway Project viz. theWestern Dedicated Freight Corridor in District Surat, Gujarat.In these extraordinary circumstances, it is deemed fit to balancethe right of the appellants on the one hand, and the larger publicEpurpose on the other, by compensating the appellants for theright they have been deprived of. The interests of justice persuadeto adopt this course of action. In the instant case, the relief isbeing moulded by granting compensation to the appellants, to beassessed under Section 20G of the said Act as per the currentFmarket value of the land. The Competent Authority is directedto compute the amount of compensation on the basis of thecurrent market value of the land, which may be determined withreference to Section 20G(2) of the Act. [Para 12] [122-E-H]

1.8 With respect to the remaining 125 kms stretch of land,Gthe land–owners were satisfied with the amount awarded, andhave not approached this Court. Under these circumstances,despite the finding that the respondents have breached themandatory provisions of the Act, this is not fit case to set asidethe entire acquisition proceedings. [Para 13] [124-B-C]

Union of India v. Shivraj (2014) 6 SCC 564 : [2014]8 SCR 751 ; Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. DariusShapur Chenai (2005) 7 SCC 627 : [2005] 3 Suppl.SCR 388 ; Om Prakash v. State of U.P. (1998) 6 SCC1 : [1998] 3 SCR 643 ; Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar(2015) 10 SCC 241 : [2015] 11 SCR 179 ; RaghbirSingh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792: [2011] 14 SCR 1113 ; Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms(P) Ltd. v. State of Haryana (2013) 4 SCC 210 : [2013]5 SCR 645 ; Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. MasoodAhmed Khan (2010) 9 SCC 496 : [2010] 10 SCR 1070; Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1963 SC 395: [1962] Suppl. SCR 713 ; Shanti Sports Club v. Unionof India (2009) 15 SCC 705 : [2009] 13 SCR 710 ;Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA (2009) 1 SCC 180 :[2008] 14 SCR 598 ; Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. Stateof Vindhya Pradesh AIR 1954 SC 322 : [1954]SCR 1038 ; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh AIR 1964SC 358 : [1964] SCR 485 ; J&K Housing Board v.Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul (2011) 10 SCC 714 :[2011] 14 SCR 976 ; Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P.(2007) 5 SCC 85 : [2007] 4 SCR 409 ; JilubhaiNanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat (1995) Supp (1)SCC 596 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 807 ; Khub Chandv. State of Rajasthan AIR 1967 SC 1074 : [1967] SCR 120 ; CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd. (2004) 1 SCC597 : [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 243 ; Indore VikasPradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd.(2007) 8 SCC 705 : [2007] 6 SCR 799 ; Savitri Devi v.State of U.P. & Ors. (2015) 7 SCC 21 : [2015]7 SCR 512 – referred to.

Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor (1875) LR 1 Ch 426– referred to.

Case Law Reference

[2014] 8 SCR 751[2005] 3 Suppl. SCR 388

referred toreferred to

Para 11Para 11

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2018 by the High CourtFof Gujarat in Special Leave Application Nos. 19409/2015, 12711/2016,14000/2016 and 14001/2016.

C. A. Sundaram, Sr. Adv., C. G. Sharma, Galav C. Sharma, Ms.Rohini Musa, Abhishek Gupta, Zafar Inayat, Arjun Singh, NachiketaJoshi, Advs. for the Appellants.G

Sanjay Jain, ASG, Durga Dutt, Ms. Rekha Pandey, Arun KumarYadav, Raj Bahadur Yadav, Ms. Kumud Lata Das, Ms. Indu Kaul, RaviAgrawal, A. P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan, Sanjeev Kr. Choudhary, Advs. forthe Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

INDU MALHOTRA, J. Leave granted.

1. The present Civil Appeals have been filed to challenge theFinal Judgment and Order dated 25.07.2018 passed by the Gujarat HighCourt, whereby the Special Civil Application Nos. 19409 of 2015, 12711of 2016, 14000 of 2016, and 14001 of 2016 have been dismissed.

2. Since common issue arises in all 4 Civil Appeals, they arebeing disposed of by the present common Judgment and Order.

3. The factual matrix in which the present Civil Appeals havebeen filed is as under :

3.1.On 08.02.2011, Notification was issued under Section20A of the Railways Act, 1989 [hereinafter referred toas “the said Act”] by the Ministry of Railways notifyingits intention to acquire the lands specified in 18 Villages,situated in District Surat, Gujarat for the public purposeof construction of the Western Dedicated FreightCorridor. The total land under acquisition was stretchof 131 kms.

The land owned by the Appellants, comprising ofapproximately 6 kms, was included under the Notification.

3.2.The Appellants along with other land-owners filed writtenObjections between 06.04.2011 and 07.04.2011 underSection 20D(1) of the Act before the CompetentAuthority/ Special Land Acquisition Officer, Surat[hereinafter referred to as “the Competent Authority”],Surat to challenge the proposed acquisition.

3.3.The Competent Authority vide letter dated 15.07.2011,informed the land-owners that the acquisition was for anecessary public purpose i.e. the development of theWestern Dedicated Freight Corridor. It was stated thatcompensation would be paid to all affected land-ownersin accordance with Sections 20F and 20G of the RailwaysAct, 1989.

The land-owners were asked to remain present withnecessary proofs at the time of personal hearing, thedate of which would be intimated to them.

3.4.The Competent Authority vide letter dated 19.07.2011,directed the land-owners to appear for personal hearingBon the Objections on 30.07.2011.

3.5.The land-owners appeared before the CompetentAuthority on 30.07.2011 for personal hearing, andsubmitted further written Objections on 31.07.2011.

3.6.The Competent Authority submitted its Report to theCCentral Government under Section 20E(1) of the Act on03.01.2012.

On 06.02.2012, the Ministry of Railways issued aNotification under Section 20E(1) of the Railways Act,1989 stating that 59 Objections had been received inDrespect of the proposed acquisition, which had beenconsidered and disallowed by the Competent Authority.

3.7.On 06.02.2013 and 07.02.2013, Awards were passedby the Competent Authority under Section 20F of theRailways Act, 1989.

3.8.On 13.08.2013, Shri Ghanshyamsinh Gambhirsinh Vashi,a land-owner, filed an RTI Application before theCompetent Authority seeking certified copy of theOrder passed on the Objections filed by the land-owners.

3.9.The Competent Authority replied to the said RTIFApplication on 05.09.2013, and stated that the reply tothe Objections raised by the land-owners had alreadybeen communicated vide letter dated 15.07.2011.

3.10.The Appellants herein challenged the acquisitionproceedings by filing Special Civil Application Nos. 19409Gof 2015, 12711 of 2016, 14000 of 2016, and 14001 of2016 before the Gujarat High Court.

The principal ground of challenge raised by theAppellants was that no Order had been passed on theObjections in accordance with Section 20D(2) of thesaid Act.

The Appellants prayed for quashing and setting asidethe Notification issued under Section 20A on 08.02.2011,and the Declaration issued under Section 20E on06.02.2012.

3.11.During the pendency of the proceedings, the High Courtvide Interim Order dated 12.07.2018, directed theRespondents to file an Affidavit giving specific detailspertaining to the disposal of the Objections after personalhearing was granted on 30.07.2011.

3.12.The Chief Project Manager, Dedicated Freight CorridorCorporation of India Limited filed Affidavit dated17.07.2018 on behalf of the Respondents before the HighCourt, wherein it was stated that :

“4. I state that the clarification/reply given videletter dated 15/7/2011 does not indicate thedecision/order/predetermination of the CompetentAuthority.The Competent Authority has merelyclarified the purpose of acquisition and provisionof Railway Amendment Act 2008 to be consideredwhile awarding compensation. On the contrary,in the said letter dated 15/7/2011, the CompetentAuthority has clearly informed the objector toremain present with all the relevant documents ona date which was to be intimated later.

8. I state that the Competent Authority, afterhearing all the objectors of land underacquisition, has passed two orders dated 28//11/2011 and 3/1/2012 disallowing all the objectionsraised by the objectors in public interest.Annexedhereto and marked as Annexure VI Colly. Are thecopies of the orders dated 28/11/2011 as well as3/1/2012.”

3.13. The High Court vide Final Judgment and Order dated25.07.2018 dismissed the Special Civil Applications filedby the Appellants.

The Court took the view that in matters involvinghighly technical and scientific fields, courts would beextremely slow in overruling the decision taken by theGovernment after due deliberation. Unless it was pointedout that relevant considerations were not properlyweighed, or that the decision was blatantly mala fide,courts would not attempt to substitute their understandingof such complex subjects for that of the Government.The Appellants failed to produce any material to supporttheir objection that the proposed railway line was notadvisable.

It was, however, held that Section 20D of the Actconfers valuable right on person interested in theland under acquisition, to raise objections, and be heardon such objections. The objections raised by personinterested have to be considered and disposed of, aftera hearing is given by the competent authority. If theobjections received by persons interested have not beendisallowed by the competent authority, it would not beopen for the Central Government to proceed to issuethe Declaration under Section 20E(1) of the Act.

The High Court recorded its concern about the mannerin which the entire matter was dealt with by theRespondents. The land-owners were informed that theirobjections were not valid even prior to the personalhearing took place.

After the personal hearing took place on 30.07.2011,the Competent Authority disposed of the objections onthe office file, but never conveyed the decision to theobjectors. The Competent Authority had not fulfilled theimportant stage of disposal of the objections prior to theDeclaration being issued under Section 20E.

It was further observed that the Competent Authoritygave completely wrong reply to the RTI Applicationfiled by the land-owners. This was an act of uttercarelessness which had serious ramifications.

The Competent Authority vide Report dated03.01.2012, informed the Chief Project Manager,Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India Limitedthat all the Objections raised by the Appellants wereheard at length, and orally answered.

The Special Civil Applications were dismissed by theHigh Court, and the Competent Authority was directedto pay Costs of Rs. 50,000/- in each of the Special CivilApplications.

3.14.Aggrieved by the aforesaid Judgment, the Appellant –Land-owners filed the present Civil Appeals.

4. We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties, and perusedthe pleadings and written submissions filed by the parties.

5. Mr. C. A. Sundaram, Senior Counsel appearing for theAppellants inter alia submitted that :

5.1.The Objections raised by the Appellants were not decidedin accordance with the provisions of Section 20D(2) ofthe Act. The non-compliance of the same would renderthe entire acquisition proceedings null and void.

5.2.It was further submitted that the Reply dated 05.09.2013given by the Respondents to the RTI Application filedby the land-owners, clearly showed that there was noapplication of mind on the part of the Respondents. Thesaid Reply simply stated that the Order disposing of theObjections raised by the land-owners had already beencommunicated to them on 15.07.2011.

The letter dated 15.07.2011 cannot be construed to bean Order as contemplated by Section 20D(2) of the Act,since it was issued prior to the personal hearing whichtook place on 30.07.2011, and filing of the final objectionson 31.07.2011.

5.4.The letter dated 15.07.2011 was not an Order, but merelya direction to the Appellants to remain present withnecessary proofs and documents at time and date whichwould be subsequently intimated.

A5.5.It was submitted that even though the land-owners weregranted personal hearing, there was no order passedeither allowing or disallowing the objections as per themandate of S. 20 D(2) of the Act.

5.6.The orders dated 28.11.2011 and 03.01.2012 were notBcommunicated to the land-owners. They were merelynotations made on the internal files of the CompetentAuthority.

The rejection of the Objections vide an endorsementor file noting would not constitute an order in the eyes ofthe law. An order passed by statutory authority mustbe speaking order supported by cogent reasons, whichis required to be communicated to the objectors.

6. Mr. Sanjay Jain, Additional Solicitor General appearing for theUnion of India inter alia submitted that :

6.1.The land acquisition proceedings in the present casehave been undertaken in compliance with Chapter IV Aof the Railways Act, 1989.

6.2.Chapter IV of the Railways Act, 1989 is self-contained code. The Court should not resort to, or seekEthe aid of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 to interpret theprovisions of the Railways Act, particularly since Section20N of the Act makes the provisions of the LandAcquisition Act, 1894 inapplicable to acquisitions underthe Railways Act.

F6.3.The process for filing objections under Section 20D(2)of the Act is two-fold. First, the Competent Authoritypermits objections to be filed within 30 days of thepublication of the Notification under Section 20A by theCentral Government notifying its intention to acquire land.

Thereafter, the Competent Authority has the discretionto call for personal hearing in order to conduct furtherenquiry if deemed necessary.

6.4.In the present case, the Objections raised by theAppellants were received in writing on 06.04.2011. TheCompetent Authority after considering the said

Objections, passed an Order on 15.07.2011 which wascommunicated to each of the Appellants. Thereafter,personal hearing was granted on 30.07.2011, which wasin the nature of further enquiry.

The Objections raised by the Appellants in the personalhearing on 30.07.2011 were almost identical to thoseraised earlier on 06.04.2011. The Objections raised bythe Appellants had effectively been dealt with vide letterdated 15.07.2011, which was communicated to each ofthe Appellants.

6.5.It was further submitted that no order was required tobe passed after the personal hearing dated 30.07.2011,because no fresh material came on record.

7. The issues which arise for our consideration are :

i)Whether the provisions of Section 20D(2) have not beencomplied with by the Competent Authority in the presentcase?

ii)If so, what would be the consequences of the noncompliance of Section 20D(2) with respect to the acquisitionproceedings, and the rights of the Appellants?

8. Relevant Statutory Provisions

To determine the issues raised by the Appellants in the presentproceedings, the statutory provisions of the Railways Act, 1989 asamended in 2008, would require to be considered.

The statutory provisions for acquisition of land for SpecialRailway Project are contained in Chapter IV of the Railways Act,1989. Chapter IV is complete self-contained code for the acquisitionof land.

Chapter IV was incorporated vide Amendment Act 11 of 2008.The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Railways (Amendment)Act, 2008 states that :

“2. There is need to provide for land acquisition provisionsin the Railways Act, 1989 to empower the Central Governmentin the Ministry of Railways for land acquisition on fast trackbasis for the special railway projects on the lines of the land

acquisition provisions available in the National Highways Act,1956.”

Chapter IV comprises of Section 20A to 20P of the amendedAct. The relevant provisions under Chapter IV are set out hereinbelowfor ready reference :

“20A. Power to acquire land, etc.

(1) Where the Central Government is satisfied that for publicpurpose any land is required for execution of specialrailway project, it may, by notification, declare its intentionto acquire such land.

(2) Every notification under sub-section (1), shall give briefdescription of the land and of the special railway project forwhich the land is intended to be acquired.

(3) The State Government or the Union territory, as the casemay be, shall for the purposes of this section, provide thedetails of the land records to the competent authority,whenever required.

(4) The competent authority shall cause the substance of thenotification to be published in two local newspapers, one ofwhich shall be in vernacular language.

20D. Hearing of objections, etc.

(1) Any person interested in the land may, within period ofthirty days from the date of publication of the notificationunder sub-section (1) of section 20A, object to the acquisitionof land for the purpose mentioned in that sub-section.

(2) Every objection under sub-section (1), shall be made tothe competent authority in writing, and shall set out the groundsthereof and the competent authority shall give the objectoran opportunity of being heard, either in person or by legalpractitioner, and may, after hearing all such objections andafter making such further enquiry, if any, as the competentauthority thinks necessary, by order, either allow or disallowthe objections.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “legalpractitioner” has the same meaning as in clause (1) of sub-

section (1) of section 2 of the Advocates Act, 1961(25 of1961).

(3) Any order made by the competent authority under sub-section (2) shall be final.

20E. Declaration of acquisition

(1) Where no objection under sub-section (1) of section 20Dhas been made to the competent authority within the periodspecified therein or where the competent authority hasdisallowed the objections under sub-section (2) of that section,the competent authority shall, as soon as may be, submit areport accordingly to the Central Government and on receiptof such report, the Central Government shall declare, bynotification, that the land should be acquired for the purposementioned in subsection (1) of section 20A.

(2) On the publication of the declaration under sub-section(1), the land shall vest absolutely in the Central Governmentfree from all encumbrances.

(3) Where in respect of any land, notification has beenpublished under subsection (1) of section 20A for itsacquisition, but no declaration under sub-section (1) of thissection has been published within period of one year fromthe date of publication of that notification, the said notificationshall cease to have any effect:

Provided that in computing the said period of one year, theperiod during which any action or proceedings to be takenin pursuance of the notification issued under sub-section (1)of section 20A is stayed by an order of court shall beexcluded.

(4) declaration made by the Central Government under sub-section (1) shall not be called in question in any court or byany other authority.

20G. Criterion for determination of market-value of land

(1) The competent authority shall adopt the following criteriain assessing and determining the market-value of the land,—

(i) the minimum land value, if any, specified in the IndianStamp Act, 1899(2 of 1899), for the registration of sale deedsin the area, where the land is situated; or

(ii) the average of the sale price for similar type of land situatedin the village or vicinity, ascertained from not less than fiftyper cent, of the sale deeds registered during the precedingthree years, where higher price has been paid, whichever ishigher.

(2) Where the provisions of sub-section (1) are not applicablefor the reason that:—

(i) the land is situated in such area where the transactions inland are restricted by or under any other law for the timebeing in force in that area; or

(ii) the registered sale deeds for similar land as mentioned inclause (i) of sub-section (1) are not available for the precedingthree years; or

(iii) the minimum land value has not been specified under theIndian Stamp Act, 1899(2 of 1899) by the appropriateauthority, the concerned State Government shall specify thefloor price per unit area of the said land based on the averagehigher prices paid for similar type of land situated in theadjoining areas or vicinity, ascertained from not less thanfifty per cent, of the sale deeds registered during the precedingthree years where higher price has been paid, and thecompetent authority may calculate the value of the landaccordingly.

(3) The competent authority shall, before assessing anddetermining the market-value of the land being acquired underthis Act,—

(a) ascertain the intended land use category of such land;and

(b) take into account the value of the land of the intendedcategory in the adjoining areas or vicinity, for the purposeof determination of the market-value of the land beingacquired.

(4) In determining the market-value of the building and otherimmovable property or assets attached to the land or buildingwhich are to be acquired, the competent authority may usethe services of competent engineer or any other specialistin the relevant field, as may be considered necessary by thecompetent authority.

(5) The competent authority may, for the purpose ofdetermining the value of trees and plants, use the services ofexperienced persons in the field of agriculture, forestry,horticulture, sericulture, or any other field, as may beconsidered necessary by him.

(6) For the purpose of assessing the value of the standingcrops damaged during the process of land acquisitionproceedings, the competent authority may utilise the servicesof experienced persons in the field of agriculture as heconsiders necessary.

20I. Power to take possession

(1) Where any land has vested in the Central Governmentunder sub-section (2) of section 20E, and the amountdetermined by the competent authority under section 20F withrespect to such authority by the Central Government, thecompetent authority may, by notice in writing direct the owneras well as any other person who may be in possession ofsuch land to surrender or deliver possession thereof to thecompetent authority or any person duly authorised by it inthis behalf within period of sixty days of the service of thenotice.

(2) If any person refuses or fails to comply with any directionmade under sub-section (1), the competent authority shallapply—

(a) In case of any land situated in any area falling within themetropolitan area, to the Commissioner of Police;

(b) In case of any land situated in any area other than thearea referred to in clause (a), to the Collector of district,

And such Commissioner or Collector, as the case may be, shallenforce the surrender of the land, to the competent authorityor to the person duly authorised by it.

20J. Right to enter into land where land has vested in CentralGovernment

Where the land has vested in the Central Government undersection 20E, it shall be lawful for any person authorised bythe Central Government in this behalf, to enter and do otheract necessary upo0n the land for carrying out the building,maintenance, management or operation of the special railwayproject or part thereof or nay other work connected therewith.

20N. Land Acquisition Act 1 of 1894 not to apply

Nothing in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 shall apply to anacquisition under this Act.”

9. The scheme of Chapter IV is as follows :

i)The Central Government is empowered under Section20A to issue preliminary Notification, notifying itsintention to acquire land for public purpose requiredfor the execution of special railway project.

ii)Section 20D provides for filing of objections and grantof personal hearing. The provision is in two parts :

a)Sub-section (1) states that any person interestedin the land, may within period of 30 days fromthe date of publication of the notification undersub-section (1) of Section 20A, file objections tothe acquisition of land for the purpose mentionedin that sub-section.

b)Under sub-section (2) of Section 20D, themandate of the statute is that :Every objection shall be made in writing to theCompetent Authority;

The Competent Authority is mandated to give anopportunity of hearing to the Objector, either inperson or by legal practitioner;

That “after hearing” all objections, and aftermaking such further enquiry, if any, the CompetentAuthority may either allow or disallow theobjections by an order.

c)Sub-section (3) of Section 20D states that anorder passed by the Competent Authority underBSection 20D (2) shall be final.

iii)Sub-section (1) of Section 20E provides that if noobjections are received, or if the objections aredisallowed, then the Competent Authority shall submit areport to the Central Government.

iv)On receipt of such report from the Competent Authority,the Central Government shall declare by notification, thatthe land should be acquired for the purpose mentionedin sub-section (1) of Section 20A.

v)On the publication of the declaration under Section20E(1), the land shall vest absolutely in the CentralGovernment free from all encumbrances.

vi)Sub-section (3) of Section 20E states that if thedeclaration is not published within period of one yearfrom the date of publication of the Notification underSection 20A(1), the Notification shall cease to have anyeffect.

vii)Sub-section (4) of Section 20E states that the declarationmade by the Central Government under sub-section (1)shall not be called in question in any court of law or byany authority.

9.1.A reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions showsthat the land-owner or interested person has beengranted limited right to file objections under Section20D of the Railways Act, 1989. The scope of theobjections is limited to the purpose for which theacquisition is made. It is not general right to fileobjections as under Section 5A of the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894.

A9.2.The statute has mandated strict procedure to befollowed under Section 20D with respect to thesubmission and hearing of objections.

The statute mandates that the order is required to bepassed by the Competent Authority “after hearing” theland-owners. The order cannot precede the hearing ofobjections. If an order is passed prior to the personalhearing, and enquiry by the Competent Authority, itwould be contrary to the statute, invalid, and vitiated bya pre-determined disposition.

C10. In the present case, it is the admitted position that after thepersonal hearing took place on 30.07.2011, no decision was passed onthe objections submitted by the land-owners, either allowing or disallowingtheir objections; nor was any communication sent to them.

This is confirmed by the Affidavit of the Competent AuthorityDdated 18.07.2018 filed before the High Court (pgs. 296 – 301, VolumeII), wherein it is stated as follows :-

“7. It is respectfully submitted that personal hearing was fixedin between 30.07.2011 to 18.08.2011 and 21.10.2011 to03.01.2012 and alongwith the objections raised by theEpetitioners, in total 88 objectors are given opportunity ofhearing in the aforementioned time period, and as the datequa the present petitioners was fixed for providing hearingon 30.07.2011, the personal hearing was provided whereinthe same kind of objections were raised as raised by way ofobjection application dated 06.04.2011 and therefore theFobjection was recorded in the hearing memo dated 30.07.2011and after completion of the hearing proceedings qua all theobjectors, on 28.11.2011 and 03.01.2012 respectively thenoting was prepared by endorsing that all the objections arerejected and therefore the proposal was submitted before theGDedicated Freight Corridor Corporation for furtherprocedure.I crave leave to produce the original file at thetime of hearing of the present matter.

8. It is most humbly and respectfully submitted that so far asthe averment regarding reply dated 05.09.2013 under RTIapplication is concerned, I say and submit that the applicants

have asked for certified copy of the decision taken for hearingprovided to the objector, wherein vide reply dated 05.09.2013the reply was given from the office of the answering respondentby stating that “the reply to the objection application givenby you against Notification under the provisions of Section20A of the Railway Amendment Act has already been given toyou by this office (copy is enclosed). Moreover, necessaryhearing in that behalf has also been afforded to you. No orderregarding objection application is passed after such hearing,because reply regarding objection application has alreadybeen given to you.”

(emphasis supplied)

10.1.It is abundantly clear that in the absence of an orderbeing passed as contemplated by Section 20D of thesaid Act, no further steps could have been taken by theCompetent Authority in the acquisition in question.

10.2.During the hearing of the Special Civil Applications, theHigh Court called for the office files of the Respondent.On perusal of the files, the Court chanced upon hand-written note sent by the Competent Authority to theChief Project Manager, Dedicated FreightCorridor Corporation of India Limited, which is set outhereinbelow :

“Finally after due consideration and taking in toview the nationwide infrastructure, long lifetimepermanent utility and hence public utility isgreater than that of person, all the 59 objectionwere disallowed by order by the undersigned andtheir applications for objection were filed at thisend.”

The file noting in the office files of the CompetentAuthority cannot be considered to be an order on theobjections.

11. Section 20D is mandatory provision which confers asubstantive and valuable right on the land-owners, to object to the proposedacquisition, before they are forcibly divested of their right, title and interestin the land by an expropriatory legislation.

The right to file objections under Section 20D of the RailwaysAct, 1989 is pari materia to Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act,1894 even though the scope of objections may be more limited.

The judgments rendered by this Court on the nature of the right toobject under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 are equally applicable to theBRailways Act.

Sub-section (2) of Section 20D mandates the Competent Authorityto give the objectors an opportunity of hearing, either in person or througha legal practitioner.

The Competent Authority after hearing all objections, and afterCmaking such further enquiry, if any, is mandated to pass an order eitherallowing or disallowing the objections.

There are catena of judgments passed on Section 5-A of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894, which are relevant for the interpretation ofSection 20D(2) of the said Act.D

This Court has held that the rules of natural justice have beeningrained in the scheme of Section 5-A of the 1894 Act with view toensure that before any person is forcibly deprived of his land by way ofcompulsory acquisition, he must be provided with an opportunity to opposethe decision of the Government.[1]

This Court has held that the hearing given to person must be aneffective one, and not mere formality. Formation of opinion with regardto the public purpose, as also suitability thereof, must be preceded byapplication of mind having due regard to the relevant factors.

Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 confers valuableFright on the land-owners. Having regard to the provisions contained inArticle 300-A of the Constitution, the right to raise and file objectionshas been held to be akin to fundamental right.[2]

In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai,[3]this Court held that:

“6. It is not in dispute that Section 5-A of the Act confers avaluable right in favour of person whose lands are sought

1 Union of India v. Shivraj, (2014) 6 SCC 564.

2 Ibid.

3 (2005) 7 SCC 627.

to be acquired. Having regard to the provisions contained inArticle 300-A of the Constitution, the State in exercise of itspower of “eminent domain” may interfere with the right ofproperty of person by acquiring the same but the same mustbe for public purpose and reasonable compensation thereformust be paid.

9. It is trite that hearing given to person must be an effectiveone and not mere formality. Formation of opinion as regardsthe public purpose as also suitability thereof must be precededby application of mind as regards consideration of relevantfactors and rejection of irrelevant ones. The State in itsdecision-making process must not commit any misdirection in-law. It is also not in dispute that Section 5A of the Act confersa valuable important right and having regard to the provisionscontained in Article 300-A of the Constitution it has beenheld to be akin to fundamental right.

(emphasis supplied)

In N. Padmamma v. S. Ramakrishna Reddy, this Court held

that :

“21. If the right of property is human right as also aconstitutional right, the same cannot be taken away except inaccordance with law. Article 300-A of the Constitution protectssuch right. The provisions of the Act seeking to divest such-right, keeping in view of the provisions of Article 300A ofthe Constitution of India, must be strictly construed.”

(emphasis supplied)

In Om Prakash v. State of U.P.,[4] this Court held that :

“21. Our attention was also invited by Shri Shanti Bhushan,learned Senior Counsel for the appellants to decision of atwo-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of State of Punjabv. Gurdial Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 471] wherein Krishna Iyer,J. dealing with the question of exercise of emergency powers

Aunder Section 17 of the Act observed in para 16 of the Reportthat save in real urgency where public interest did not brookeven the minimum time needed to give hearing, landacquisition authorities should not, having regard to Articles14 and 19, burke an inquiry under Section 17 of the Act.Thus, according to the aforesaid decision of this Court,B-inquiry under Section 5A is not merely statutory but also hasa flavour of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 ofthe Constitution though right to property has now no longerremained fundamental right, at least observation regardingArticle 14, vis-à-vis, Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition ActCwould remain apposite.

The said decision has been cited with approval in Union ofIndia v. Krishan Lal Arneja[(2004) 8 SCC 453].”

(emphasis supplied)

11.1.The limited right given to land-owner/interested personto file objections, and be granted personal hearing underSection 20D cannot be reduced to an empty formality,or mere eye-wash by the Competent Authority.

The Competent Authority was duty-bound to considerthe objections raised by the Appellants, and pass areasoned order, which should reflect application of mindto the objections raised by the land-owners.

In the present case, there has been completedereliction of duty by the Competent Authority in passinga reasoned order on the objections raised by theAppellants.

11.2.In the present case, it is the undisputed position that noorder as contemplated in the eyes of law was passed bythe Competent Authority in deciding the objections raisedby the Appellants.

statutory authority discharging quasi-judicialfunction is required to pass reasoned order after dueapplication of mind.

In Laxmi Devi v. State of Bihar,[5] this Court heldthat :

“9. The importance of Section 5-A cannot beoveremphasised. It is conceived from naturaljustice and has matured into manhood in themaxim of audi alteram partem i.e. every personlikely to be adversely affected by decision mustbe granted meaningful opportunity of beingheard. This right cannot be taken away by sidewind, as so powerfully and pellucidly stated inNandeshwar Prasad v. State of U.P. [AIR 1964SC 1217]. So stringent is this right that itmandates that the person who heard andconsidered the objections can alone decide them;and not even his successor is competent to do soeven on the basis of the materials collected byhis predecessor. Furthermore, the decision on the-objections should be available in selfcontained, speaking and reasoned order; reasonscannot be added to it later as that would be akinto putting old wine in new bottles.We can do nobetter than commend careful perusal of Unionof India v. Shiv Raj [(2014) 6 SCC 564 : (2014)3 SCC (Civ) 607] , on these as well as cognateconsiderations.”

(emphasis supplied)

In Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana,[6]this Court held that :

“40. Though it is neither possible nor desirableto make list of the grounds on which thelandowner can persuade the Collector to makerecommendations against the proposedacquisition of land, but what is important is thatthe Collector should give fair opportunity ofhearing to the objector and objectively consider

6 (2012) 1 SCC 792.

his plea against the acquisition of land. Onlythereafter, he should make recommendationssupported by brief reasons as to why theparticular piece of land should or should not beacquired and whether or not the plea put forwardby the objector merits acceptance. In other words,the recommendations made by the Collector mustreflect objective application of mind to theobjections filed by the landowners and otherinterested persons.”

(emphasis supplied)

In Usha Stud & Agricultural Farms (P) Ltd. v. Stateof Haryana,[7] this Court held that,

“The ratio of the aforesaid judgments is thatSection 5-A(2), which represents statutoryembodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem,gives an opportunity to the objector to make anendeavour to convince the Collector that his landis not required for the public purpose specifiedin the Notification issued under Section 4(1) orthat there are other valid reasons for notacquiring the same.That section also makes itobligatory for the Collector to submit report(s) tothe appropriate Government containing hisrecommendations on the objections, together withthe record of the proceedings held by him so thatthe Government may take appropriate decisionon the objections. Section 6(1) provides that ifthe appropriate Government is satisfied, afterconsidering the report, if any, made by theCollector under Section 5-A(2) that particularland is needed for the specified public purposethen declaration should be made. Thisnecessarily implies that the State Government isrequired to apply mind to the report of theCollector and take final decision on the objections

filed by the landowners and other interestedpersons. Then and then only, declaration canbe made under Section 6(1).”

(emphasis supplied)

In Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. (supra), thisCourt held that:

“16. However, considerations of the objectionsby the owner of the land and the acceptance ofthe recommendations by the Government, it is trite,must precede proper application of mind on thepart of the Government.As and when personaggrieved questions the decision-making process,the court in order to satisfy itself as to whetherone or more grounds for judicial review exist, maycall for the records whereupon such records mustbe produced. The writ petition was filed in theyear 1989. As noticed hereinbefore, the said writpetition was allowed. This Court, however,interfered with the said order of the High Courtand remitted the matter back to it upon giving anopportunity to the parties to raise additionalpleadings.

19. Furthermore, the State is required to apply itsmind not only on the objections filed by the ownerof the land but also on the report which issubmitted by the Collector upon making other andfurther enquiries therefor as also therecommendations made by him in that behalf.TheState Government may further inquire into thematter, if any case is made out therefor, forarriving at its own satisfaction that it is necessaryto deprive citizen of his right to property. It is inthat situation that production of records by theState is necessary.

28. Although assignment of reasons is the part ofprinciples of natural justice, necessity thereof maybe taken away by statute either expressly or bynecessary implication. declaration containedin notification issued under Section 6 of theAct need not contain any reason but such anotification must precede the decision of theappropriate Government. When decision isrequired to be taken after giving an opportunityof hearing to person who may suffer civil orevil consequences by reason thereof, the samewould mean an effective hearing.”

(emphasis supplied)

In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood AhmedKhan,[8] this Court held that:

“12. The necessity of giving reason by body orauthority in support of its decision came up forconsideration before this Court in several cases.Initially this Court recognised sort ofdemarcation between administrative orders and-quasijudicial orders but with the passage of timethe distinction between the two got blurred andthinned out and virtually reached vanishingpoint in the judgment of this Court in A.K.Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 :AIR 1970 SC 150]

47. Summarising the above discussion, this Courtholds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been torecord reasons, even in administrative decisions,if such decisions affect anyone prejudicially.

(b) quasi-judicial authority must record reasonsin support of its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant toserve the wider principle of justice that justicemust not only be done it must also appear to bedone as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as validrestraint on any possible arbitrary exercise of-judicial and quasijudicial or even administrativepower.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has beenexercised by the decision-maker on relevantgrounds and by disregarding extraneousconsiderations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as-indispensable component of decisionmakingprocess as observing principles of natural justice-by judicial, quasijudicial and even byadministrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicialreview by superior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countriescommitted to rule of law and constitutionalgovernance is in favour of reasoned decisionsbased on relevant facts. This is virtually thelifeblood of judicial decision-making justifyingthe principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions thesedays can be as different as the judges andauthorities who deliver them. All these decisionsserve one common purpose which is todemonstrate by reason that the relevant factorshave been objectively considered. This isimportant for sustaining the litigants’ faith in thejustice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is requirement for bothjudicial accountability and transparency.

(k) If judge or quasi-judicial authority is notcandid enough about his/her decision-makingprocess then it is impossible to know whether theperson deciding is faithful to the doctrine ofprecedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent,clear and succinct. pretence of reasons or“”rubber-stamp reasons is not to be equated witha valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is thesine qua non of restraint on abuse of judicialpowers. Transparency in decision-making not onlymakes the judges and decision-makers less proneto errors but also makes them subject to broaderscrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence ofJudicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard LawReview 731-37] .)

(n) Since the requirement to record reasonsemanates from the broad doctrine of fairness indecision-making, the said requirement is nowvirtually component of human rights and wasconsidered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. SeeRuiz Torija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR,at 562 para 29 and Anya v. University of Oxford[2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)] , wherein the Courtreferred to Article 6 of the European Conventionof Human Rights which requires, “adequate andintelligent reasons must be given for judicialdecisions”.

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments playa vital role in setting up precedents for the future.Therefore, for development of law, requirementof giving reasons for the decision is of the essenceand is virtually part of “due process”.”

(emphasis supplied)

11.3.File Notings and lack of Communication

It is settled law that valid order must be reasonedorder, which is duly communicated to the parties. Thefile noting contained in an internal office file, or in thereport submitted by the Competent Authority to theCentral Government, would not constitute valid orderin the eyes of law.

In the present case, there was no order whatsoeverpassed rejecting the objections, after the personal hearingwas concluded on 30.07.2011.

It is important to note that the Competent Authoritydid not communicate the contents of the file noting tothe Appellants at any stage of the proceedings. The saidfile noting came to light when the matter was pendingbefore the High Court, and the original files weresummoned.

The High Court, upon perusal of the files, cameacross the file noting recording rejection of the objectionsonly on the ground that the matter pertained to aninfrastructure project for public utility.

In Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab,[9] aConstitution Bench held that merely writing somethingon the file does not amount to an order. For file-notingto amount to decision of the Government, it must becommunicated to the person so affected, before thatperson can be bound by that order. Until the order iscommunicated to the person affected by it, it cannot beregarded as anything more than being provisional incharacter.

Similarly, in Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India,[10]this Court held that notings recorded in the official files,by the officers of the Government at different levels,and even the Ministers, do not become decision of theGovernment, unless the same are sanctified and actedupon, by issuing an order in the name of the President or

9 AIR 1963 SC 395.

10 (2009) 15 SCC 705.

Governor, as the case may be, and are communicated tothe affected persons.

In Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA,[11]this Courtheld that:

“14. It is trite to state that notings in adepartmental file do not have the sanction of lawto be an effective order. noting by an officer isan expression of his viewpoint on the subject. Itis no more than an opinion by an officer forinternal use and consideration of the otherofficials of the department and for the benefit ofthe final decision-making authority. Needless toadd that internal notings are not meant for outsideexposure. Notings in the file culminate into anexecutable order, affecting the rights of the-parties, only when it reaches the final decisionmaking authority in the department, gets hisapproval and the final order is communicated tothe person concerned.

16. To the like effect are the observations of thisCourt in Laxminarayan R. Bhattadv. State ofMaharashtra [(2003) 5 SCC 413] , wherein it wassaid that right created under an order of astatutory authority must be communicated to theperson concerned so as to confer an enforceable”right.

(emphasis supplied)

11.4.Contradictory Stand taken by the Respondents

The mandate of the law is that the order on theobjections is required to be passed by the CompetentAuthority “after the personal hearing” is granted.

The Respondents had filed an Affidavit dated17.07.2018 before the High Court wherein it was stated

that the reply given vide letter dated 15.07.2011 doesnot indicate the decision/order/pre-determination of theCompetent Authority. The Competent Authority hadinformed the objectors to remain present with all materialdocuments at the time of personal hearing, the date ofwhich would be notified later.

At the time of arguments before this Court, it wassought to be contended by the Additional SolicitorGeneral for the Union of India that the letter dated15.07.2011 was an order passed under Section 20D(2)of the Act.

We find that the stand taken by the Respondents beforethe High Court and this Court is completely contradictory,and does not commend acceptance.

In any event, the order under Section 20D(2) cannot bepassed prior to the personal hearing. The mandate ofthe law is that the order must be passed “after” the grantof personal hearing, and after any further enquiry is madeby the Competent Authority.

The whole process of granting personal hearingwould be reduced to an empty formality and farcicalexercise, if the order on the objections precedes the grantof personal hearing. This would be clearly contrary tothe provisions of Section 20D(2) of the Act.

It is well settled that where statute provides for athing to be done in particular manner, then it has to bedone in that manner and in no other manner.[12] Theprovisions of an expropriatory legislation, whichcompulsorily deprives person of his right to propertywithout his consent, must be strictly construed.[13] The

12 Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, (1875) LR 1 Ch 426 followed in Rao Shiv BahadurSingh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, AIR 1954 SC 322; State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh,AIR 1964 SC 358 ; J&K Housing Board v. Kunwar Sanjay Krishan Kaul, (2011) 10SCC 714; Kunwar Pal Singh v. State of U.P., (2007) 5 SCC 85.

13 Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar v. State of Gujarat, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 96; See also KhubChand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1967 SC 1074;CCE v. Orient Fabrics (P) Ltd., (2004) 1 SCC 597.

122SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ARailways Act, 1989 being an expropriatory legislation,its provisions have to be strictly construed.[14]

11.6.The Competent Authority being quasi-judicial authority,is obligated by law to act in conformity with mandatorystatutory provisions. It is important to note that this isBthe only opportunity made available to land-owner, ason submission of the Report to the Central Government,there is no further consideration that takes place. TheCentral Government acts upon the Report of theCompetent Authority, and issues the Declaration underSection 20E of the said Act.

This is in contradistinction with the provisions of theLand Acquisition Act, 1894. Section 6 of the LandAcquisition Act requires the satisfaction of CentralGovernment before the Declaration is issued.

11.7.In the absence of an order passed under Section 20D(2),the subsequent steps taken in the acquisition wouldconsequentially get invalidated.

12. The issue which remains to be decided is that in the absenceof an order passed on the objections under Section 20D, should theEconsequential steps be invalidated.

We find that the challenge before this Court has been made bythe Appellants with respect to stretch of land admeasuring approximately6 kms, out of the total stretch of 131 kms. The remaining stretch of landcomprising of 125 kms has been acquired, and stands vested in theGovernment. The Respondents have stated on Affidavit that pre-Fconstruction activity and earth work has been completed on most partsof the stretch. Furthermore, most of the bridges are either in progress,or have already been completed.

The Senior Counsel representing the Appellants in all the presentCivil Appeals, after taking instructions from his clients, submitted thatGsince the land was being acquired for public utility project, his clientswould be satisfied if they were granted compensation by awarding thecurrent rate for acquisition of land.

14 Indore Vikas Pradhikaran v. Pure Industrial Coke & Chemicals Ltd., (2007) 8 SCC

Admittedly, no mala fides have been alleged by the Appellantsagainst the Respondents in the acquisition proceedings. The larger publicpurpose of railway project would not be served if the Notificationunder Section 20A is quashed. The public purpose of the acquisition isthe construction and operation of Special Railway Project viz. theWestern Dedicated Freight Corridor in District Surat, Gujarat.

In these extraordinary circumstances, we deem it fit to balancethe right of the Appellants on the one hand, and the larger public purposeon the other, by compensating the Appellants for the right they havebeen deprived of. The interests of justice persuade us to adopt this courseof action.

In Savitri Devi v. State of U.P. & Ors.,[15] this Court held that:

“Thus, we have scenario where, on the onehand, invocation of urgency provisions underSection 17 of the Act and dispensing with the rightto file objection under Section 5A of the Act, isDfound to be illegal. On the other hand, we have asituation where because of delay in challengingthese acquisitions by the land owners,developments have taken in these villages and inmost of the cases, third party rights have beencreated. Faced with this situation, the High CourtEgoing by the spirit behind the judgment of thisCourt in Bondu Ramaswamy and Others (supra)came out with the solution which is equitable toboth sides. We are, thus, of the view that the HighCourt considered the ground realities of theFmatter and arrived at more practical andworkable solution by adequately compensatingthe land owners in the form of compensation aswell as allotment of developed Abadi land at ahigher rate i.e. 10% of the land acquired of eachof the land owners against the eligibility and toGthe policy to the extent of 5% and 6% of Noidaand Greater Noida land respectively.”

(emphasis supplied)

In the present case, the relief is being moulded by grantingcompensation to the Appellants, to be assessed under Section 20G ofthe said Act as per the current market value of the land. The CompetentAuthority is directed to compute the amount of compensation on thebasis of the current market value of the land, which may be determinedwith reference to Section 20G(2) of the Act.

13. With respect to the remaining 125 kms stretch of land, theland-owners were satisfied with the amount awarded, and have notapproached this Court.

Under these circumstances, despite our finding that theCRespondents have breached the mandatory provisions of the Act, we donot think this is fit case to set aside the entire acquisition proceedings.

The relief granted in the present case is confined to the Appellantsherein, and would not become precedent for other land-owners whohave not challenged the acquisition proceedings before this Court.

The Civil Appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms. All pendingApplications, if any, are accordingly disposed of.

Ordered accordingly.

Nidhi Jain

Appeals allowed.