ANITA SHARMA & ORS. versus THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR.

[2020] 12 S.C.R.

ANITA SHARMA & ORS.

THE NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR.(Civil Appeal Nos. 4010-4011 of 2020)

BDECEMBER 08, 2020

[SURYA KANT AND ANIRUDDHA BOSE, JJ.]

Motor Vehicle Accident – Victim-deceased was travelling in acar along with his friend, respondent no. 2 and two other occupants– Respondent no. 2 (owner of the car) was driving the car at night,Cwhen truck came from the opposite side and struck the car as aresult of which all the occupants suffered injuries – They were allrushed to the hospital – Victim was discharged – However, he keptexperiencing one after another medical complication and eventuallydied due to injuries – Victim-deceased’s dependents filed claimDpetition for Rs. 60,94,000/- and alleged that victim died due to therash and negligent driving of respondent no. 2 – The Tribunal reliedupon the statement of the eye-witness, AW-3, according to whomrespondent no. 2 was driving car at very fast speed when itovertook vehicle and collided head-on against the oncoming truck– The Tribunal assigned liability for the accident upon theErespondents and partly allowed the claim petition with acompensation of Rs.16,08,000/- – The High Court set aside theTribunal award and dismissed the claim petition – The High Courtdisbelieved AW-3 and found him unreliable witness – According tothe High Court, AW-3 had failed to report the accident to theFjurisdictional police and he was apparently introduced by theclaimants only to seek compensation – Also, it was held that theassertion of AW-3 that he took the injured to the hospital was notproved – Further, the FIR was lodged by the owner-cum-driver,respondent no. 2, who would not have done so had he been at faultor driving rashly – On appeal, held: Some material facts haveGescaped notice of the High Court – The FIR was not registered bythe owner-cum-driver of the car as assumed by the High Court – Itwas registered by one person ‘P’, who had not witnessed the accidentand lodged on basis of the hearsay information – Further, theinformant had some closeness with the owner-cum-driver of the carH– His version is hearsay and may be influenced by respondent no.2

and thus, cannot be relied upon – The contents of the FIR as well asthe statement of AW-3 leave no room to doubt that the injured weretaken to the hospital by private persons (and not by the Police) –There is nothing on record to suggest that the Police reached thesite of the accident or carried the injured to the hospital – AW-3 isneither related to the deceased nor was he remotely connected tothe family of the deceased – The statement of AW-3, therefore,acquires significance as, according to him, he brought the injuredin his car – It is quite natural that such person who hadaccompanied the injured to the hospital for immediate medical aid,could not have simultaneously gone to the police station to lodgethe FIR – The High Court ought not to have drawn any adverseinference against the witness for his failure to report the matter topolice – Further, failure of the respondents to cross-examine thesolitary eye-witness, AW-3 must lead to an inference of tacitadmission on their part – Also, the fact that respondent no. 2 chosenot to depose in support of what he had pleaded in his writtenstatement, further suggests that he himself was at fault – The HighCourt failed to be cognizant of the fact that strict principles ofevidence and standards of proof like in criminal trial areinapplicable in MACT claim cases – The standard of proof in suchmatters is one of preponderance of probabilities, rather than beyondreasonable doubt – Therefore, the judgment of the High Court isset aside and the appellants are entitled to compensation as awardedby the Tribunal, besides 40% addition in the annual income of thedeceased towards ‘future prospects’.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. The two questions which fall for determinationare whether the accident was caused due to rash and negligentdriving of the car driver and whether AW-3 is reliable witnessor not? [Para 10][1124-F-G]

2. AW-3 is neither related to the deceased nor was heremotely connected to the family of the deceased. He hailed froma different State and lived in faraway place. There is nothing tosuggest that the witness had any business dealings with thedeceased or his family. He has deposed that he was travelling inhis own car on the date of the incident on the same route whenthe owner-cum-driver of the car carelessly overtook him at very

ABC

Ahigh speed. He has further deposed that truck coming from theopposite side collided with the car. Various persons gathered atthe place of accident and four persons trapped inside the car weretaken out, three of whom were unconscious and the fourth wasits driver. The witness has further deposed that he took all thefour injured persons to the District Hospital. [Para 13][1125-F-BH]

3. While the contents of the FIR as well as the statement of(AW-3) leave no room to doubt that the injured were taken to theHospital by private persons (and not by the police), it is quitenatural that the police would also have reached the GovernmentChospital at Ghazipur and, therefore, it was mentioned thatrespondent no. 2 was brought-in by Sub-Inspector. [Para 15][1126-D-E]

4. It is commonplace for most people to be hesitant aboutbeing involved in legal proceedings and they therefore do notDvolunteer to become witnesses. Hence, it is highly likely thatthe name of AW-3 or other persons who accompanied the injuredto the hospital did not find mention in the medical record. Thereis nothing on record to suggest that the police reached the siteof the accident or carried the injured to the hospital. The statementof AW-3, therefore, acquires significance as, according to him, heEbrought the injured in his car to the hospital. AW-3 acted as agood samaritan and responsible citizen, and the High Courtought not to have disbelieved his testimony based merely on aconjecture. It is necessary to reiterate the independence andbenevolence of AW-3. Without any personal interest or motive,Fhe assisted both the deceased by taking him to the hospital andlater his family by expending time and effort to depose beforethe Tribunal. [Para 16][1126-E-H]

5. It is quite natural that such person who had accompaniedthe injured to the hospital for immediate medical aid, could nothave simultaneously gone to the police station to lodge the FIR.GThe High Court ought not to have drawn any adverse inferenceagainst the witness for his failure to report the matter to Police.Further, as the police had themselves reached the hospital uponhaving received information about the accident, there wasperhaps no occasion for AW-3 to lodge report once again to theHpolice at later stage either. [Para 17][1127-A-B]

6. The failure of the respondents to cross examine thesolitary eye-witness or confront him with their version, despiteadequate opportunity, must lead to an inference of tacit admissionon their part. They did not even suggest the witness that he wassiding with the claimants. The High Court has failed to appreciatethe legal effect of this absence of cross-examination of crucialwitness. [Para 19][1128-A-B]

7. This Court is concerned over the failure of the High Courtto be cognizant of the fact that strict principles of evidence andstandards of proof like in criminal trial are inapplicable in MACTclaim cases. The standard of proof in such like matters is one ofpreponderance of probabilities, rather than beyond reasonabledoubt. One needs to be mindful that the approach and role ofCourts while examining evidence in accident claim cases oughtnot to be to find fault with non-examination of some best eye-witnesses, as may happen in criminal trial; but, instead shouldbe only to analyze the material placed on record by the parties toascertain whether the claimant’s version is more likely than nottrue. [Para 22][1130-B-D]

8. The observation of the High Court that the author ofthe FIR (as per its judgment, the owner-cum-driver) had not beenexamined as witness, and hence adverse inference ought to bedrawn against the appellant-claimants, is wholly misconceived andmisdirected. Not only is the owner-cum-driver not the author ofthe FIR, but instead he is one of the contesting respondents inthe Claim Petition who, along with insurance company, is aninterested party with pecuniary stake in the result of the case.If the owner-cum-driver of the car were setting up defence pleathat the accident was result of not his but the truck driver’scarelessness or rashness, then the onus was on him to step intothe witness box and explain as to how the accident had takenplace. The fact that respondent no.2 chose not to depose insupport of what he has pleaded in his written statement, furthersuggests that he was himself at fault. The High Court, therefore,ought not to have shifted the burden of proof. [Para 23][1130-F-H; 1131-A-B]

Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand (2011) 11 SCC 635 : [2011]1 SCR 1096; Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3

ASCC 569 : [1994] 2 SCR 375; Sunita v. Rajasthan StateRoad Transport Corporation (2019) SCC Online SC195; Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz (2013)10 SCC 646 : [2013] 10 SCR 480 – relied on.

National Insurance Co Ltd v. Pranay Sethi (2017) 16BSCC 680 : [2017] 13 SCR 100 – referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 4010-4011 of 2020.

DFrom the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2018 of the High Courtof Rajasthan Bench at Jaipur in S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No.4880 of 2012 and S.B. Civil Miscellaneous Appeal No. 37 of 2013.

Aditya Singh, J.P.N. Shahi, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs. forthe appearing parties.EThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

SURYA KANT, J.

1. Leave Granted.

2. These two appeals, which have been heard through videoFconferencing, are directed against the judgment dated 23.07.2018 passedby the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur wherebythe first appeal preferred by the New India Assurance Co. Ltd.(Respondent No. 1) against the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal’s(hereinafter, “Tribunal”) award dated 01.09.2012 was allowed and theClaim Petition was rejected, whereas the appeal filed by the appellant-Gclaimants for enhancement of compensation was consequently dismissed.

FACTS:

3. Sandeep Sharma (deceased), was resident of District Sikarin Rajasthan. He was travelling in car bearing registration no. UP 65HAA 7100 from Ghazipur to Varanasi (Uttar Pradesh) on the night of

25.03.2009 along with his friend Sanjeev Kapoor (Respondent No. 2)and two other occupants. Sanjeev Kapoor, who was also its owner, wasdriving the car when at about 10:20PM near village Atroli, truck comingfrom the opposite side struck the car as result of which all the occupantssuffered injuries. Sandeep along with the other injured-occupants wasrushed to the District Hospital in Ghazipur at around 11:55PM, but wassubsequently referred to the Institute of Medical Sciences and S.S.Hospital, BHU, Varanasi on 26.03.2009 considering the severity andmultiplicity of his injuries. Although he was discharged on 16.04.2009and brought back to Rajasthan, it appears that Sandeep kept experiencingone after another medical complications, and remained hospitalized atthe Jain Hospital in Jaipur and later the Joshi Nursing Home at Sikar.His injuries eventually got the better of him and Sandeep Sharma passedaway on 10.12.2009.

4. At the time of death, the deceased was aged 34 years and wasan income tax assessee with an Employees Provident Fund (EPF)account. He was employed in Mumbai at Kelvin Ess Vee Textiles as aSales Officer on regular basis. He left behind widow, two minor childrenand mother; all of whom were dependent on him.

5. Sandeep’s dependents filed claim petition for Rs 60,94,000(Rupees sixty lakhs and ninety-four thousand) on 26.08.2010 alleging,inter alia, that he died as result of the injuries suffered in the above-mentioned accident of 25.03.2009, which occurred due to the rash andnegligent driving of Sanjeev Kapoor who was the owner-cum-driver ofthe car in which Sandeep was travelling. Sanjeev Kapoor (hereinafter,“owner-cum-driver”) and the insurer of the car - New India AssuranceCo. Ltd. (hereinafter, “insurance company”) were impleaded as partyrespondents.

6. The owner-cum-driver in his written statement admitted thatthe deceased had suffered multiple injuries in the accident while travellingin the car with him but he disowned responsibility for the accident byasserting that it was the truck which was coming from the opposite sideat very fast speed, and was being driven in rash and negligent manner.Since all the four occupants of the car had been injured, they wereunable to note the registration details of the truck which made hastyget-away towards Ghazipur.

7. The insurance company in its separate written statement tookthe preliminary objection that as per the police investigation and first

Ainformation report, the accident was caused by an unknown truck whichhit the car No. UP-65-AA-7100 and, therefore, the claim petition filedagainst the owner of the car or its insurer was contrary to law. Thefactual averments made in the Claim Petition were denied for want ofknowledge.B8. In reaching its verdict, the Tribunal relied upon the statement of

B8. In reaching its verdict, the Tribunal relied upon the statement ofthe eye-witness Ritesh Pandey (AW-3), according to whom SanjeevKapoor was driving the car at very fast speed when it overtook avehicle and collided head-on against the oncoming truck. The Tribunal,thus, assigned liability for the accident upon the respondents and partlyallowed the Claim Petition with compensation of Rs. 16,08,000 (RupeesCsixteen lakhs and eight thousand).

9. Both the insurance company and the appellant-claimants filedtheir respective appeals before the High Court. Through judgment dated23.07.2018, the High Court set aside the Tribunal’s award and dismissedthe claim petition for the reasons that first, Ritesh Pandey (AW-3) hadDfailed to report the accident to the jurisdictional police. He was apparentlyintroduced by the claimants only to seek compensation. Second, theFIR had been lodged by the owner-cum-driver, Sanjeev Kapoor, whowould not have done so had he been at fault or driving rashly. Third, theassertion of Ritesh Pandey (AW-3) that he took the injured to hospitalEwas not proved from the record of the Government Hospital, Ghazipurwhich revealed that Sandeep Sharma was brought to the hospital bySub-Inspector Sah Mohammed.

CONTENTIONS:

10. We have heard learned counsel for parties and have perusedFthe Original Record of the Tribunal and the High Court. The two questionswhich fall for determination are whether the accident was caused dueto rash and negligent driving of the car driver—Sanjeev Kapoor andwhether Ritesh Pandey (AW-3) is reliable witness or not?

ANALYSIS:

11. At the outset, it may be mentioned that some material factswhich have direct bearing on the fate of this case, have escaped noticeof the High Court. The FIR was not registered by Sanjeev Kapoor(owner-cum-driver of the car) as assumed by the High Court. Instead,as matter of fact, the FIR No. 120/09 (Exh 1) was registered on the

basis of information furnished by one, Pradeep Kumar Aggarwal, son ofBal Krishan Das Aggarwal – resident of District Varanasi. The contentsof this report reveal that Sanjeev Kapoor was travelling in the Wagon RCar No. UP-65-AA-7100 along with three other occupants. Whilereturning from Ghazipur to Varanasi, truck which was being drivenrashly and at fast speed, struck against the car and then sped awaytowards Ghazipur. The number of the truck could not be noticed as itwas dark. The car was badly damaged. Various people gathered at thespot who took out the injured from the car. It is specifically mentionedthat all the injured were taken to the hospital for treatment where RahulSingh @ Chotu Singh passed-away whereas Sandeep Sharma wasreferred to BHU Varanasi for treatment. The FIR was lodged on27.03.2009 and slightly illegible part thereof indicates that SanjeevKapoor and the informant were known to each other. The informanthimself had not witnessed the accident and apparently lodged the FIRbased on hearsay information.

12. Importantly, the owner-cum-driver though denied responsibilityof the accident through his written statement but chose not to enter thewitness box in his defence. The insurance company, on the other hand,relied upon the contents of the FIR and the ‘Investigation Report’ toaver that the accident took place due to rash and negligent driving of thetruck driver alone. But we find that the ‘investigation report’ (Exh. 2)dated 05.05.2009 merely recites that the registration number of theoffending truck could not be ascertained despite best efforts.13. At this juncture, we may refer to the statement of RiteshPandey (AW-3). This witness is resident of Ghazipur in Uttar Pradesh.He is neither related to the deceased nor was he remotely connected tothe family of the deceased. He hailed from different State and lived ina faraway place. There is nothing to suggest that the witness had anybusiness dealings with the deceased or his family. He has deposed thathe was travelling in his own car on the date of the incident on the sameroute when the owner-cum-driver of the Wagon R car carelessly overtookhim at very high speed. He has further deposed that truck comingfrom the opposite side collided with the car. Various persons gathered atthe place of accident and four persons trapped inside the car were takenout, three of whom were unconscious and the fourth was its driver -Sanjeev Kapoor. The witness has further deposed that he took all thefour injured persons to the District Hospital, Ghazipur where some of

Athem were referred to Institute of Medical Sciences and S.S. Hospital,BHU, Varanasi.

14. Most importantly, the only question asked to this witness incross-examination is whether the truck could be spotted and whether hewas able to note the registration number of the truck. The witness hasBcandidly admitted that he could not see the registration number of thetruck. No other question was asked to this witness in the cross-examination. While the Tribunal believed Ritesh Pandey (AW-3) andaccepted the claim petition in part, the High Court, for the reasons whichare already briefly noticed, has disbelieved him on the premise that thedeceased was brought to the hospital by SI Sah Mohammed and not byCRitesh Pandey (AW-3). The entire case, thus, effectively hinges uponthe trustworthiness of the statement of this witness.

FINDINGS:

15. It is not in dispute that the accident took place near GhazipurDand that numerous people had assembled at the spot. Some bystanderwould obviously have informed the police also. While the contents of theFIR as well as the statement of Ritesh Pandey (AW-3) leave no room todoubt that the injured were taken to the Hospital by private persons (andnot by the police), it is quite natural that the police would also havereached the Government hospital at Ghazipur and, therefore, it wasEmentioned that Sandeep Sharma was brought-in by SI Sah Mohammed.

16. It is commonplace for most people to be hesitant about beinginvolved in legal proceedings and they therefore do not volunteer to becomewitnesses. Hence, it is highly likely that the name of Ritesh Pandey orother persons who accompanied the injured to the hospital did not findFmention in the medical record. There is nothing on record to suggest thatthe police reached the site of the accident or carried the injured to thehospital. The statement of AW-3, therefore, acquires significance as,according to him, he brought the injured in his car to the hospital. RiteshPandey (AW-3) acted as good samaritan and responsible citizen,Gand the High Court ought not to have disbelieved his testimony basedmerely on conjecture. It is necessary to reiterate the independenceand benevolence of AW-3. Without any personal interest or motive, heassisted both the deceased by taking him to the hospital and later hisfamily by expending time and effort to depose before the Tribunal.

17. It is quite natural that such person who had accompaniedthe injured to the hospital for immediate medical aid, could not havesimultaneously gone to the police station to lodge the FIR. The HighCourt ought not to have drawn any adverse inference against the witnessfor his failure to report the matter to Police. Further, as the police hadthemselves reached the hospital upon having received information aboutthe accident, there was perhaps no occasion for AW-3 to lodge reportonce again to the police at later stage either.18. Unfortunately, the approach of the High Court was not sensitiveenough to appreciate the turn of events at the spot, or the appellant-claimants’ hardship in tracing witnesses and collecting information foran accident which took place many hundreds of kilometers away in analtogether different State. Close to the facts of the case in hand, thisCourt in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand[1], viewed that:

“12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissedthe case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of UmedSingh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totallyconjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but asa good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellantby helping her to reach the doctor’s chamber in order to ensurethat an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidenceof Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did notfile complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat ourobservation that the total approach of the High Court,unfortunately, was not sensitised enough to appreciate theplight of the victim.

xxx

15. In situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly takena holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne inmind that strict proof of an accident caused by particularbus in particular manner may not be possible to be done bythe claimants. The claimants were merely to establish theircase on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. Thestandard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not havebeen applied.”

(emphasis supplied)

A19. The failure of the respondents to cross examine the solitaryeye-witness or confront him with their version, despite adequateopportunity, must lead to an inference of tacit admission on their part.They did not even suggest the witness that he was siding with theclaimants. The High Court has failed to appreciate the legal effect ofthis absence of cross-examination of crucial witness.B20. The importance of cross-examination has been elucidated onseveral occasions by this Court, including by Constitution Bench inKartar Singh v. State of Punjab[2], which laid down as follows:

“278. Section 137 of the Evidence Act defines what cross-Cexamination means and Sections 139 and 145 speak of themode of cross-examination with reference to the documentsas well as oral evidence. It is the jurisprudence of law thatcross-examination is an acid-test of the truthfulness of thestatement made by witness on oath in examination-in-chief,the objects of which are:D

(1) to destroy or weaken the evidentiary value of the witnessof his adversary;

(2) to elicit facts in favour of the cross-examining lawyer’sclient from the mouth of the witness of the adversary party;

E(3) to show that the witness is unworthy of belief by impeachingthe credit of the said witness;

and the questions to be addressed in the course of cross-examination are to test his veracity; to discover who he is andwhat is his position in life; and to shake his credit by injuringFhis character.

279. The identity of the witness is necessary in the normaltrial of cases to achieve the above objects and the right ofconfrontation is one of the fundamental guarantees so thathe could guard himself from being victimised by any falseGand invented evidence that may be tendered by the adversaryparty.”

(emphasis supplied)

CO. LTD. & ANR. [SURYA KANT, J.]

21. Relying upon Kartar Singh (supra), in MACT case thisCourt in Sunita v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation[3]considered the effect of non-examination of the pillion rider as witnessin claim petition filed by the deceased of the motorcyclist and held asfollows:

“30. Clearly, the evidence given by Bhagchand withstood therespondents’ scrutiny and the respondents were unable toshake his evidence. In turn, the High Court has failed to takenote of the absence of cross examination of this witness bythe respondents, leave alone the Tribunal’s finding on thesame, and instead, deliberated on the reliability ofBhagchand’s (A.D.2) evidence from the viewpoint of him notbeing named in the list of eye witnesses in the criminalproceedings, without even mentioning as to why such absencefrom the list is fatal to the case of the appellants. This approachof the High Court is mystifying, especially in light of thisCourt’s observation [as set out in Parmeshwari (supra) andreiterated in Mangla Ram (supra)] that the strict principlesof proof in criminal case will not be applicable in claimfor compensation under the Act and further, that the standardto be followed in such claims is one of preponderance ofprobability rather than one of proof beyond reasonable doubt.There is nothing in the Act to preclude citing of witness inmotor accident claim who has not been named in the list ofwitnesses in the criminal case. What is essential is that theopposite party should get fair opportunity to cross examinethe concerned witness. Once that is done, it will not be open tothem to complain about any prejudice caused to them. If therewas any doubt to be cast on the veracity of the witness, thesame should have come out in cross examination, for whichopportunity was granted to the respondents by the Tribunal.

xxx

32. The High Court has not held that the respondents weresuccessful in challenging the witnesses’ version of events,despite being given the opportunity to do so. The High Courtaccepts that the said witness (A.D.2) was cross examined by

1130SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Athe respondents but nevertheless reaches conclusiondifferent from that of the Tribunal, by selectively overlookingthe deficiencies in the respondent’s case, without any properreasoning.”

(emphasis supplied)

22. Equally, we are concerned over the failure of the High Courtto be cognizant of the fact that strict principles of evidence and standardsof proof like in criminal trial are inapplicable in MACT claim cases.The standard of proof in such like matters is one of preponderance ofprobabilities, rather than beyond reasonable doubt. One needs to beCmindful that the approach and role of Courts while examining evidencein accident claim cases ought not to be to find fault with non-examinationof some best eye-witnesses, as may happen in criminal trial; but, insteadshould be only to analyze the material placed on record by the parties toascertain whether the claimant’s version is more likely than not true. Asomewhat similar situation arose in Dulcina Fernandes v. JoaquimDXavier Cruz[4]wherein this Court reiterated that:

“7. It would hardly need mention that the plea of negligenceon the part of the first respondent who was driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was required to be decidedby the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderanceEof probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyondreasonable doubt. (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [(2009) 13SCC 530 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 189 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri)1101])”

(emphasis supplied)

23. The observation of the High Court that the author of the FIR(as per its judgment, the owner-cum-driver) had not been examined as awitness, and hence adverse inference ought to be drawn against theappellant-claimants, is wholly misconceived and misdirected. Not only isthe owner-cum-driver not the author of the FIR, but instead he is one ofGthe contesting respondents in the Claim Petition who, along with insurancecompany, is an interested party with pecuniary stake in the result ofthe case. If the owner-cum-driver of the car were setting up defenceplea that the accident was result of not his but the truck driver’scarelessness or rashness, then the onus was on him to step into theH4 (2013) 10 SCC 646.

witness box and explain as to how the accident had taken place. Thefact that Sanjeev Kapoor chose not to depose in support of what he haspleaded in his written statement, further suggests that he was himself atfault. The High Court, therefore, ought not to have shifted the burden ofproof.

24. Further, little reliance can be placed on the contents of theFIR (Exh.-1) , and it is liable to be discarded for more than one reasons.First, the author of the FIR, that is, Praveen Kumar Aggarwal does notclaim to have witnessed the accident himself. His version is hearsay andcannot be relied upon. Second, it appears from the illegible part of theFIR that the informant had some closeness with the owner-cum-driverof the car and there is thus strong possibility that his version wasinfluenced or at the behest of Sanjeev Kapoor. Third, the FIR was lodgedtwo days after the accident, on 27.03.2009. The FIR recites that someof the injured including Sandeep Sharma were referred to BHU, Varanasifor treatment, even though as per the medical report this took place onlyon 26.03.2009, the day after the accident. Therefore the belated FIRappears to be an afterthought attempt to absolve Sanjeev Kapoor fromhis criminal or civil liabilities. Contrarily, the statement of AW-3 does notsuffer from any evil of suspicion and is worthy of reliance. The Tribunalrightly relied upon his statement and decided issue No. 1 in favour of theclaimants. The reasoning given by the High Court to disbelieve RiteshPandey AW-3, on the other hand, cannot sustain and is liable to beoverturned. We hold accordingly.

25. Adverting to the claimants’ appeal for enhancement ofcompensation, we are of the view that no effective argument could beraised on their behalf as to how the compensation assessed by the Tribunalwas inadequate, except that in view of the authoritative pronouncementof this Court in National Insurance Co Ltd v. Pranay Sethi[5], theclaimants are entitled to an increase of 40% towards annual dependencyon account of ‘future prospects’ given the undisputed age of the deceased.Their appeal to that extent deserves to be allowed.

CONCLUSION:

26. In light of the above discussion, the judgment under appeal ofthe High Court is set aside and the appellants are held entitled tocompensation as awarded by the Tribunal, besides 40% addition in the

5 (2017) 16 SCC 680.

1132SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aannual income of the deceased towards ‘future prospects’. The MotorAccident Claims Tribunal, Sikar (Rajasthan) is directed to re-calculatethe compensation amount accordingly. The appellants are held entitledto interest @ 8.5%, as per the Tribunal’s award, on the entire amount ofcompensation. The Tribunal shall re-calculate the compensation withinone month and the insurance company shall deposit the same within oneBmonth thereafter. No order as to costs.

Ankit Gyan

Appeal partly allowed.