STATE OF GUJARAT versus MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH

[2020] 9 S.C.R.

STATE OF GUJARAT

MANSUKHBHAI KANJIBHAI SHAH

(Criminal Appeal No. 989 of 2018)

BAPRIL 27, 2020

[N. V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR ANDAJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: s.2(c)(xi) – DeemedUniversity – Whether Deemed University is not covered under theCprovisions of PC Act – Held: The object of the PC Act is not only toprevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to makethe same applicable to individuals who might conventionally not beconsidered public servants – The purpose under the PC Act is toshift focus from those who are traditionally called public officials,Dto those individuals who perform public duties – Keeping the samein mind, it cannot be stated that “Deemed University” and theofficials therein, perform any less or any different public duty,than those performed by University simpliciter, and the officialstherein – Therefore, “Deemed University” is not excluded fromambit of term “University” u/s.2(c)(xi) of the PC Act.E

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: s.2(c) – Public servant,definition of – Held: The language of s.2(b) of the PC Act indicatesthat any duty discharged wherein State, the public or community atlarge has any interest is called public duty – The first explanationto s.2 further clarifies that any person who falls in any of theFcategories stated under s.2 is public servant whether or notappointed by the government – The second explanation furtherexpands the ambit to include every person who de facto dischargesthe functions of public servant, and that he should not be preventedfrom being brought under the ambit of public servant due to anyGlegal infirmities or technicalities.

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988: ss.7, 8, 10, 13(1)(b) and13(2) – Charge sheet against respondent, trustee in DeemedUniversity specifically disclosing that he allegedly was collectingcertain extra amount over the prescribed fees on the pretext ofHallowing the students to fill up their examination forms – In the

complaint, it was alleged that the respondent had demanded Rs.20Lakhs to be paid to the co-accused, failing which the daughter ofthe complainant would not be permitted to appear in the examination– Held: Plea taken by respondent was that he was trustee of the“Sumandeep Charitable Trust” and has no connection with the“Sumandeep University” – Courts below failed to analyze theconnection between the trust and the University, as well as therelationship of the respondent with the university – Prima facie, agrave suspicion is made out that the respondent was rendering hisservice by dealing with the students and the examination aspect ofthe University – But detailed appreciation of evidence is calledfor before one can reach conclusion as to the exact position ofthe respondent vis-à-vis the University – Jurisdiction of Court withregards to s.227 is limited and should not be exercised by conductingroving enquiries on the aspect of factual inferences – Trial courtdirected to proceed with the case expeditiously – Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 – s.227.

Interpretation of Statutes: Extension of technical definitionsused under one statute to the other statute – Held: Technicaldefinitions under one statute should not be imported to anotherstatute which is not in pari materia with the first – The UGC Act andthe PC Act are enactments which are completely distinct in theirpurpose, operation and object – The preamble of the UGC Act statesthat it is ‘an Act to make provision for the co-ordination anddetermination of standards in Universities, and for that purpose, toestablish University Grants Commission’ – On the other hand, thePC Act is an enactment meant to curb the social evil of corruptionin the country – As such, the extension of technical definitions usedunder one Act to the other might not be appropriate, as the two Actsare not in pari materia with one another – Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1988 – University Grants Commission Act, 1956.University Grants Commission Act, 1956 – Per Ajay Rastogi,J. (Supplementing) – Deemed University – “University” under s.2(f)of the UGC Act is established either in the Central Act, ProvincialAct or State Act – At the same time, such of the institutions forhigher education other than the University created under thestatutory enactment, after being declared by the Central Governmentby notification in the Official Gazette, shall be deemed to be

ABC

Auniversity for the purposes of this Act and all provisions of theUGC Act shall apply to such institutions as if it were universitywithin the meaning of clause (f) of s.2 of the Act – By introductionof s.2(c)(xi) of the Act, 1988, any person or member of anygoverning body with whatever designation called of any universityhas been included in the definition of “public servant” and anyBuniversity includes all universities regardless of the fact whether ithas been established under the statute or declared deemed to beuniversity under s.3 of the UGC Act – No distinction could be carvedout between the university and deemed to be university so far itrelates to the term ‘public servant’ as defined under s.2(c) (xi) ofCthe Act1988 – In construing the definition of ‘public servant’ inclause (c) of s.2 of the Act 1988, the Court is required to adopt anapproach as would give effect to the intention of the legislature –The legislature has, intentionally, while extensively defining the term‘public servant’ in clause (c) of s.2 of the Act and clause (xi) inparticular has specifically intended to explore the word‘any’ whichDincludes all persons who are directly or indirectly activelyparticipating in managing the affairs of any university in any manneror the form – In this context, the legislature has taken note of ‘any’person or member of “any” governing body by whatever designationcalled of “any” university to be termed as ‘public servant’ for theEpurposes of invoking the provisions of Act 1988 –The question forconsideration is the term ‘any’ university in the broader spectrumto curb corruption in the educational institutions as referred to unders.2(c)(xi) of Act 1988 and the legislature in its wisdom has referredto the word “any university” which clearly mandates the universityreferred to and controlled by its statutory mechanism referred toFunder s.2(f) and deemed to be university under s.3 of the UGC Act– Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.2(c)(xi).

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD:

GPer N. V. Ramana, J. (for himself and forMohan M. Shantagoudar, J.)

1. The contention of the respondent is that the term“University” needs to be read in accordance with the UGC Act,wherein only those Universities covered under the Section 2(f)

of the UGC Act are covered under the PC Act. Such aninterpretation, by importing the technical definition under adifferent Act may not be feasible herein. It is settled law thattechnical definitions under one statute should not be imported toanother statute which is not in pari materia with the first. TheUGC Act and the PC Act are enactments which are completelydistinct in their purpose, operation and object. The preamble ofthe UGC Act states that it is ‘an Act to make provision for the co-ordination and determination of standards in Universities, and forthat purpose, to establish University Grants Commission’. On theother hand, the PC Act is an enactment meant to curb the socialevil of corruption in the country. As such, the extension oftechnical definitions used under one Act to the other might notbe appropriate, as the two Acts are not in pari materia with oneanother. The purport of UGC Act cannot be borrowed under thePC Act, and that an independent meaning needs to be providedfor the term “University” as occurring under the PC Act. [Paras31, 33][346-A-C; 347-G]

Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. Regional Director, ESICorporation (2014) 9 SCC 657 : [2014] 8 SCR 1021;Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi SankarPatro (2018) 1 SCC 468 : [2017] 13 SCR 921 –referred to.

2.1 In Section 2(c) of the PC Act, the emphasis is not onthe position held by an individual, rather, it is on the public dutyperformed by him/her. In this regard, the legislative intentionwas to not provide an exhaustive list of authorities which arecovered, rather general definition of ‘public servant’ is providedthereunder. The object of the PC Act is not only to prevent thesocial evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make the sameapplicable to individuals who might conventionally not beconsidered public servants. The purpose under the PC Act is toshift focus from those who are traditionally called public officials,to those individuals who perform public duties. Keeping the samein mind, it cannot be stated that “Deemed University” and theofficials therein, perform any less or any different public duty,than those performed by University simpliciter, and the officialstherein. Therefore, the High Court was incorrect in holding that

ABC

Aa “Deemed University” is excluded from the ambit of the term“University” under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act. [Paras 34, 44,45][348-B; 351-B-D]

Hira Devi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur [1952] SCR1122; CBI v. Ramesh Gelli (2016) 3 SCC 788 : [2016]B1 SCR 762; P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE)(1998) 4 SCC 626 : [1998] 2 SCR 870; Manish Trivediv. State of Rajasthan, (2014) 14 SCC 420 : [2013] 12SCR 205 – referred to.

Black’s Law Dictionary defines “University”; LawCLexicon; Third Edition of Halsbury’s, Volume 13, page707; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn. (WestPublishing Company) – referred to.

2.2 Evidently, the language of Section 2(b) of the PC Actindicates that any duty discharged wherein State, the public orDcommunity at large has any interest is called public duty. Thefirst explanation to Section 2 further clarifies that any person whofalls in any of the categories stated under Section 2 is publicservant whether or not appointed by the government. The secondexplanation further expands the ambit to include every personwho de facto discharges the functions of public servant, andEthat he should not be prevented from being brought under theambit of public servant due to any legal infirmities or technicalities.In the present case, on prima-facie evaluation of the statementsof the Vice-Chancellor), the account officer of SumandeepVidhyapith University and other witnesses, it appears that theFrespondent was the final authority with regard to the grant ofadmission, collection of fees and donation amount. [Paras 50,51][354-A-C]

2.3 The charge sheet specifically discloses that therespondent allegedly was collecting certain extra amount overGthe prescribed fees on the pretext of allowing the students to fillup their examination forms. Therefore, paying the respondentthe alleged amount was condition precedent before filling upthe forms, to appear for the examinations. Specifically, in thecomplaint, it was alleged that the respondent had demanded Rs.20Lakhs to be paid to the co-accused, failing which the daughter ofHthe complainant would not have been permitted to appear in theexamination. The fact that there were large number of chequeswhich were found during the raid is more than sufficient toestablish grave suspicion as to the commission of the allegedoffence. The respondent has vehemently stressed upon the factthat he is admittedly trustee of the “Sumandeep CharitableTrust” and has no connection with the “Sumandeep University”.But, it ought to be noted that the courts below have failed toanalyze the connection between the trust and the University, aswell as the relationship of the respondent with the university.Prima facie, grave suspicion is made out that the respondentwas rendering his service by dealing with the students and theexamination aspect of the University. But detailed appreciationof evidence is called for before one can reach conclusion as tothe exact position of the respondent vis-à-vis the University. [Paras52, 53][354-D-H]

3. At this stage, the jurisdiction of this Court, with regardsto Section 227 of CrPC, is limited and should not be excercisedby conducting roving enquiries on the aspect of factual inferences.This case is not an appropriate one to have exercised the powerunder Section 227 to discharge the accused-respondent, havingregards to the facts and circumstances of the case. The trial courtis directed to proceed with the case expeditiously. [Paras 54,56][355-A; 356-B]

Union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal (1979) 3 SCC4 : [1979] 2 SCR 229; Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureauof Investigation (2010) 9 SCC 368 : [2010] 11 SCR669; Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. Stateof Madhya Pradesh. (2016) 7 SCC 353 : [2016] 3 SCR579; Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University (2015) 16 SCC530; K. Veeraswami v. Union Of India, (1991) 3 SCC655 : [1991] 3 SCR 189 (12); State of Madhya Pradeshv. M. V. Narasimhan (1975) 2 SCC 377 : [1976] 1 SCR6 (23); M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala [1963]2 Suppl. SCR 724; Commissioner of Customs (Import),Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company (2018) 9 SCC 1 :[2018] 7 SCR 1191; Subramanian Swamy v. ManmohanSingh (2012) 3 SCC 64 : [2012] 3 SCR 52 – referredto.

APer Ajay Rastogi, J. (Supplementing)

1. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was amended in1964 based on the recommendations of the SanthanamCommittee. Although, there are provisions in Chapter IX of theIndian Penal Code to deal with public servants and those whoBabet them by way of criminal misconduct, they were found to beinadequate to deal with the offence of corruption effectively. Tomake the anti-corruption laws more effective, the Prevention ofCorruption Bill was introduced in the Parliament. The object andstatement of reasons of the Act, 1988 was intended to make theexisting anti-corruption laws more effective by widening theirCcoverage and by strengthening the provisions. The Act 1988caters to its wide scope by providing for “different paths to liability,some of which are especially suited to, but by no means confinedto, those who hold public office.” [Paras 4, 5][356-G-H; 357-A-

D2. The UGC Act was established by an Act of 1956 to makeprovisions for the coordination and determination of standardsof education in universities. “University” has been defined underSection 2(f) of the UGC Act and those who are declared as‘deemed to be university’, declaration has to be notified underSection 3 with restrictions which has been imposed upon theEdeemed to be university as referred to under Section 23 of theUGC Act. “University” under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act isestablished either in the Central Act, Provincial Act or StateAct. At the same time, such of the institutions for higher educationother than the University created under the statutory enactment,Fafter being declared by the Central Government by notificationin the Official Gazette, shall be deemed to be university for thepurposes of this Act and all provisions of the UGC Act shall applyto such institutions as if it were university within the meaningof clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act. [Paras 8, 9][357-H; 358-A-B,

3. It cannot be lost sight of that the Act, 1988, as itspredecessor that is the repealed Act of 1947 on the same subject,was brought into force with avowed purpose of effectiveprevention of bribery and corruption. The Act of 1988 whichrepeals and replaces the Act of 1947 contains definition of ‘publicHservant’ with wide spectrum in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act,

1988, so as to purify public administration. The objects and reasonscontained in the Bill leading to passing of the Act can be takenassistance of, which gives the background in which the legislationwas enacted. When the legislature has introduced such acomprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve thepurpose of punishing and curbing the growing menace ofcorruption in the society imparting public duty, it would beapposite not to limit the contents of the definition clause byconstruction which would be against the spirit of the statute.[Para 10][358-H; 359-A-C]

4. By introduction of Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act, 1988, anyperson or member of any governing body with whateverdesignation called of any university has been included in thedefinition of “public servant” and any university includes alluniversities regardless of the fact whether it has been establishedunder the statute or declared deemed to be university underSection 3 of the UGC Act. It is true that the distinction has beenpointed out by the Parliament under the provisions of the UGCAct for consideration and determination of standards of educationin universities, no distinction could be carved out between theuniversity and deemed to be university so far it relates to theterm ‘public servant’ as defined under Section 2(c) (xi) of the Act1988. [Para 11][359-C-E]

5. In construing the definition of ‘public servant’ in clause(c) of Section 2 of the Act 1988, the Court is required to adopt anapproach as would give effect to the intention of the legislature.The legislature has, intentionally, while extensively defining theterm ‘public servant’ in clause (c) of Section 2 of the Act andclause (xi) in particular has specifically intended to explore theword ‘any’which includes all persons who are directly or indirectlyactively participating in managing the affairs of any university inany manner or the form. In this context, the legislature has takennote of ‘any’ person or member of “any” governing body bywhatever designation called of “any” university to be termed as‘public servant’ for the purposes of invoking the provisions ofAct 1988. The question for consideration is the term ‘any’university in the broader spectrum to curb corruption in theeducational institutions as referred to under Section 2(c)(xi) of

AAct 1988 and the legislature in its wisdom has referred to theword “any university” which clearly mandates the universityreferred to and controlled by its statutory mechanism referred tounder Section 2(f) and deemed to be university under Section 3of the UGC Act. [Paras 12, 14][359-E-G; 360-B-C]

BOrissa Lift Irrigation Corporation v. Rabi Sankar (2018)1 SCC 468 : [2017] 13 SCR 921 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

GCRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.989 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.02.2018 of the High Courtof Gujarat at Ahmedabad in Criminal Revision Application (Against Orderpassed by Subordinate Court) No. 1188 of 2017.

Aman Lekhi, ASG, Mukul Rohatgi, P.S. Narsimha, HuzefaAhmadi, Sr. Advs., Mahesh Agarwal, Mitul Shelat, Anshuman Srivastava,Nishant Rao, E. C. Agrawala, Aniruddha P. Mayee, A. Rajarajan, UjjwalSinha, Ms. Mehak H., Sanjeev Kr. Choudhary, Advs., for the appearingparties.

The Judgments of the Court were delivered by

N. V. RAMANA, J.

1. Corruption is the malignant manifestation of malady menacingthe morality of men. There is common perception that corruption inIndia has spread to all corners of public life and is currently choking theconstitutional aspirations enshrined in the Preamble. In this context, thiscase revolves around requiring this Court to facilitate making Indiacorruption free.

2. This Appeal is from the impugned judgment and final orderdated 02.02.2018, passed by the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad inCriminal Revision Application (against Order passed by SubordinateCourt) No. 1188 of 2017.

3. The respondent herein is allegedly aTrustee of trust calledthe Sumandeep Charitable Trust, which established and sponsors‘Sumandeep Vidyapeeth’, deemed University, which is the institutionconcerned herein.

4. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of the case are that anFIR, being I-ER No. 3 of 2017, dated 28.02.2017 was filed by oneDr.Jasminaben, wife of Dilip bhai Devda, before the Vadodara CityA.C.B. Police Station against four accused persons including the presentrespondent. Broadly, the allegations were that the complainant’s elderdaughter was admitted to the MBBS Course in the above-mentionedDeemed University in the year 2012. Her daughter’s course fee wascompletely paid up as per the annual fee slab. In the year 2017, her elderdaughter while filling up her final examination form, was asked to meetthe respondent herein. On meeting, the respondent, in conspiracy withothers, had communicated that the complainant’s husband had to furtherpay Rupees Twenty Lakhs for allowing the complainant’s daughter totake the examination. Further, it is alleged that the accused-respondenthad communicated that they can deposit cheque and the same wouldbe returned on payment of cash, considering that demonetization hadrecently taken place. In lieu of the same, cheques were deposited with

Athe accused-respondent herein. Thereafter, the complainant, who wasunwilling to pay the amount, filed the FIR.

5. After following the necessary procedure, phenolphthaleinpowder was applied to the currency notes and were delivered to accusedVinod alias Bharatbhai Savant (the alleged companion/agent ofBrespondent through whom the demand was facilitated). Thereafter,accused Vinod confirmed the receipt of money to the respondent overthe telephone. The aforesaid incriminating conversation stood interceptedin an audio video camera set up by the complainant. Further, separateraids were conducted whereupon several undated cheques drawn in thename of the institution worth more than Rs. 100 crores and certain fixedCdeposits were recovered.

6. The chargesheet came to be filed on 25.04.2017 against severalaccused persons, including the present respondent for various offencesunder Sections 7, 8, 10 and 13 (1)(b) and 13(2) of the Prevention ofCorruption Act, 1988 [hereinafter referred to as the‘PC Act’] readDwith Section 109 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 [hereinafter referred toas the‘IPC’],.

7. The respondent herein filed discharge application underSection 227 of CrPC before the District and Sessions Court in SpecialACB Case No. 2 of 2017. The District and Sessions Court by an orderEdated 29.11.2017, rejected the application.

8. Aggrieved by the rejection of the aforesaid application, therespondent herein filed criminal revision application, being CriminalRevision Application No. 1188 of 2017, before the High Court of Gujarat,at Ahmedabad. The High Court, by the impugned judgment and orderFdated 02.02.2018, allowed the revision and discharged the accused-respondent herein.

9. Aggrieved by the impugned order, the State of Gujarat is inappeal before this Court.

10. The senior counsel on behalf of the appellant submitted thatGthe PCAct is comprehensive statute which was passed to preventcorruption and therefore, should be construed liberally as the legislatureintended to include the abovementioned acts, which harm the public atlarge, within the ambit of the PC Act. The PCAct is social legislationintended to curb illegal activities of public servants and is designed to beHconstrued so as to advance its objectives. The Courts, while keeping the

public interest in mind,must ensure that technicalities should not defeatthe object sought to be achieved.

11. The counsel further argued that public function need not bethe exclusive domain of the State; private institutions such as universitiesmay also perform public function. The counsel placed reliance uponModern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of MadhyaPradesh.,(2016) 7 SCC 353 and Janet Jeyapaul v. SRM University.,(2015) 16 SCC 530 to state that imparting education to the public is awelfare activity and hence can be called as an activity done forpublicgood. Considering the UGC guidelines, the counsel submitted thatDeemed Universities effectively discharge the public function of impartingeducation to the public.

12. Moreover, the counsel placed reliance upon the case ofK. Veeraswami v. Union Of India, (1991) 3 SCC 655 to submit thatthere is no requirement of having master-servant relationship betweenthe competent authority and the public servant. The PC Act does notdefine public servant, rather,it provides categories of the same. Thecounsel further stated that the lack of any authority to grant the sanctioncannot result in non-prosecution. In such situations, there is no necessityfor obtaining sanction. In any case, the sanction was obtained from theCharity Commissioner out of abundant caution.

13. Lastly, the counsel submitted that the respondent wasdischarging public duty. In the present facts, it was pre-condition topay the respondent before obtaining an examination pass, although hewas never formally assigned this task or role. The counsel thereforeconcluded that there need not be requirement of positive commandunder the law to discharge his public duty. In fact, there may not be anyformal requirement of providing remuneration or payment in lieu of theservice rendered.

14. On the contrary, the counsel on behalf of the respondentsubmitted that it is settled principle of law that criminal statute has tobe construed strictly. In cases where two interpretations are possible,the Courts must lean towards the construction which exempts the subjectfrom penalty rather than the one which imposes the same.

15. The counsel further vehemently argued that the respondent,being trustee, cannot be termed as Public Servant. There is noallegation in the charge sheet that the respondent was holding any position

Aor post in the institution which was Deemed to be University or that hewas engaged by the institution for rendering any service. In light of theabove fact, the High Court was correct in discharging the respondent ashe does not qualify within the ambit of Section 2 (c)(xi) of the PC Act.

16. Moreover, the counsel argued that the High Court has correctlyBheld that the relevant provision as laid down under Section 2 (c)(xi) isinapplicable in the present case as the said Institution was “deemed tobe university”. Finally, the counsel argued that no valid or proper sanctionwas obtained for prosecuting the respondent. The sanction obtained fromthe Charity Commissioner is not valid as he cannot be considered as aCompetent Authority, since he does not have the power to remove orCappoint Trustee.

17. Having heard the learned counsel for the parties, the questionsto be answered herein are-

i.Whether the respondent-trustee is ‘public servant’ coveredDunder Section 2(c) of the PC Act?

ii. Whether the accused-respondent can be discharged underSection 227 of CrPC?

18. The first question before us, that is, whether the respondent-who is allegedly trustee in the Sumandeep Charitable Trust whichEestablished and sponsors the said University (‘Deemed to be University’)is ‘public servant’ covered under Section 2(c) of the PC Act, can bebroken up into two parts: first, whether the ‘Deemed University’ iscovered under the provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988,and secondly, whether the ‘respondent-trustee’ can be termed as ‘publicFservant’ under Section 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act?

19. Before we proceed further, we need to observe the relevantprovisions under the PC Act:

2(c.). “public servant” means-

(xi) any person who is Vice-Chancellor or member of anygoverning body, professor, reader, lecturer or any other teacheror employee, by whatever designation called, of any Universityand any person whose services have been availed of by aUniversity or any other public authority in connection with holdingHor conducting examinations;

20. Simply speaking, any person, who is Vice-Chancellor, anymember of any governing body, professor, reader, lecturer, any otherteacher or employee, by whatever designation called, of any University,issaid to be public servant. Further, the definition inter alia, covers anyperson whose services have been availed of by University, or anyother public authority in connection with holding or conductingexaminations.

21. However, the interpretative necessity arises in this case dueto the fact that the ambit of the term ‘University’, as occurring underSection 2(c)(xi) of the PC Act, has not been clearly defined and thequestion arises as to whether the same covers ‘deemed to be University’as well. In this regard, we need to observe certain ground rules oninterpretation, concerning the PC Act.

22. There is no gainsaying that nations are built upon trust. It isinevitable that in democracy one needs to rely on those with powerand influence and to trust them of being transparent and fair. There is nodoubt that any action which is driven by the self-interest of these powerfulindividuals, rather than the public interest, destroys that trust. Where thisbecomes the norm, democracy, the economy and the rule of law, all takea beating, ultimately putting the whole nation at risk. Corrupt societiesoften spring from the examples set at the highest levels of government,but small-scale corruption can be equally insidious. In this regard, thePC Act was formulated to bring about transparency and honesty in publiclife, as indicated by its objects and reasons. We need to keep the aforesaidlegislative intention in mind while interpreting the provisions of the PCAct.23. Learned senior counsel for the appellant-State, vehementlycontended that the PC Act, being welfare legislation, cannot be narrowlyinterpreted, and rather, that broad interpretation needs to be providedfor the same [refer State of Madhya Pradesh v. M. V. Narasimhan,(1975) 2 SCC 377; M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala, (1963)Supp. (2) SCR 724].

24. The golden rule of interpretation for any penal legislation is tointerpret the same strictly, unless any constitutional considerations areinvolved, and in cases of ambiguity, the benefit of the same should enurein favour of the accused. Having said so, we need to clarify that strictinterpretation does not necessarily mean literal interpretation in all cases,rather the interpretation should have regards to the genuine import of

Athe words, taken in their usual sense [refer Commissioner of Customs(Import), Mumbai v. Dilip Kumar & Company, (2018) 9 SCC 1].

25. However, we are concerned herein with interpreting theprovisions of the PC Act. There is no dispute that corruption in India ispervasive. Its impact on the nation is more pronounced, due to the factBthat India is still developing economy. Presently, it can be stated thatcorruption in India has become an issue which affects all walks of life.In this context, we must state that although anti-corruption laws arefairly stringent in India, the percolation and enforcement of the same aresometimes criticized as being ineffective. Due to this, the constitutionalaspirations of economic and social justice are sacrificed on daily basis.CIt is in the above context that we need to resolve the issues concernedherein.

26. In Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh, (2012) 3 SCC64, this Court observed:

D“68. Today, corruption in our country not only poses grave dangerto the concept of constitutional governance, it also threatens thevery foundation of Indian democracy and the Rule of Law. Themagnitude of corruption in our public life is incompatible with theconcept of socialist, secular democratic republic. It cannot bedisputed that where corruption begins all rights end. CorruptionEdevalues human rights, chokes development and underminesjustice, liberty, equality, fraternity which are the core values in ourpreambular vision. Therefore, the duty of the Court is that-any anticorruption law has to be interpreted and workedout in such fashion as to strengthen the fight againstFcorruption. That is to say in situation where twoconstructions are eminently reasonable, the Court has toaccept the one that seeks to eradicate corruption to theone which seeks to perpetuate it.”

(emphasis supplied)

G27. We shall accordingly have due regard to the aforesaid principleswhile interpreting the provisions herein. The point of contention relatesto whether deemed University would be included within the ambit ofthe PC Act, particularly under Section 2(c)(xi) of the same, where theword used is “University”. The learned senior counsel for the appellant-State submits that the word “University” as used in Section 2(c)(xi) ofH

the Act, must be purposively interpreted. An institution which is “deemedto be University” under the University Grants Commission Act, 1956[UGC Act] plays the same role in society as “University”. Theseinstitutions have the common public duty of granting degrees, which areultimately qualifications recognized in society. As such, an institutionwhich is “deemed to be University”, such as the institution in the presentcase, is included within the ambit of the term “University” used underthe Act.

28. On the other hand, the learned senior counsel for therespondent, supporting the decision of the High Court in the impugnedjudgment, submits that the term “University” as used in Section 2(c)(xi)of the PC Act, does not include an institution which is “deemed to be aUniversity”. The learned senior counsel submitted that the inclusivedefinition of “University” under the UGC Actis only for the limitedpurpose of funding, and an institution which is “deemed to be University”is not University for any other purpose. The learned senior counselsubmitted that the same is abundantly clear from the provisions of theUGC Act, which makes distinction between “University”, and aninstitution “other than University” which is “deemed to be University”.

29. At this juncture, it would be apposite to look to the holding ofthe High Court in the impugned judgment on this point:

“27.…However, the fact remains that either as trustee or inany other capacity, even if applicant is connected with SumandeepVidyapith, which is not regular University getting Governmentgrant in any manner whatsoever and thereby, when there is nodispute that it is only Deemed University, the submissionsrecorded herein above on behalf of the applicant makes it clearthat such Deemed University cannot considered as regularUniversity and thereby, applicant cannot be termed as apublic servant and therefore, irrespective of such changereport after the complaint, it is clear and obvious that”applicant cannot be termed as public servant.

(emphasis supplied)

30. The counsel for the respondent has contended that the term“University” needs to be read in accordance with the Section 2(f), 3 and23 of the UGC Act, wherein “deemed University” is different froma”University”,stricto sensu. However, we do not subscribe to suchcontention for the reasons provided below.

A31. The contention of the respondent is that the term “University”needs to be read in accordance with the UGC Act, wherein only thoseUniversities covered under the Section 2(f) of the UGC Act are coveredunder the PC Act. Such an interpretation, by importing the technicaldefinition under different Act may not be feasible herein. It is settledlaw that technical definitions under one statute should not be imported toBanother statute which is not in pari materia with the first. The UGCAct and the PC Act are enactments which are completely distinct intheir purpose, operation and object. The preamble of the UGC Act statesthat it is ‘an Act to make provision for the co-ordination anddetermination of standards in Universities, and for that purpose, toCestablish University Grants Commission’. On the other hand, thePC Act is an enactment meant to curb the social evil of corruption in thecountry. As such, the extension of technical definitions used under oneAct to the other might not be appropriate, as the two Acts are not inpari materia with one another.

D32. The above principle of law was recently applied by 3-JudgeBench of this Court in Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. Regional Director,ESI Corporation, (2014) 9 SCC 657, where an argument was advancedby counsel that the interpretation of the term ‘shop’ under the ESI Actshould be determined in light of the definition of the same under therelevant Shops and Commercial Establishments Act. Negativing thisEcontention of the counsel, the Court went on to hold that:

“52. An argument raised by the appellants herein is the issuerelating to the “doctrine of pari materia”. It is contended thatsince the ESI Act does not define the term “shop”, the saiddefinition may be ascertained in the light of the definitions underFthe relevant Shops and Commercial Establishments Act as enactedby the respective State Legislatures, since the purpose and objectof both the enactments are one and the same.

53. For the above purpose, it would be necessary to look into theconcept of “doctrine of pari materia” and further ascertainGwhether the given statutes are in fact pari materia with the ESIAct. It is settled law that two statutes are said to be in pari materiawith each other when they deal with the same subject-matter.The rationale behind this rule is based on the interpretativeassumption that words employed in legislations are used in anHidentical sense. However, this assumption is rebuttable by the

context of the statutes. According to Sutherland in Statutes andStatutory Construction, Vol. 2, 3rd Edn.:

“Statutes are considered to be in pari materia to pertain to thesame subject-matter when they relate to the same person orthings, or to the same class of persons or things, or have thesame purpose or object.”

58. It can be concluded that though the ESI Act, the 1948Act and the 1961 Act deal with labour and workmen, inessence and spirit they have different scope andapplication. The Acts do not appear to have any overlap intheir fields of operation and have mutually exclusiveschemes.Therefore, the argument that the Acts are parimateriawith each other, must fail.

59. This Court must also address the issue that arose inthe course of the arguments that the word “shop” has beenused in the impugned notifications as well as the 1948 Actand the 1961 Act and therefore assistance may be takenfrom the latter statutes to interpret the notification. Thisargument, in light of the above discussion, does not appealto us…”

(emphasis supplied)

It is for the same reasoning that we are of the opinion that theHigh Court’s reliance on the judgment of this Court in Orissa LiftIrrigation Corporation Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro, (2018) 1 SCC 468was not appropriate, as the same was with reference to enactmentsrelating to administration/regulation of universities, and is unconnectedwith the objects of the PC Act.

33. This brings us to the conclusion that purport of UGC Actcannot be borrowed under the PC Act, and that an independent meaningneeds to be provided for the term “University” as occurring under thePC Act. In India, there are 12,206 Universities under Section 2(f) and12B of the UGC Act, as of 31.07.2019. While there are about 124 deemeduniversities across India, as of 23.06.2008. The education sector in Indiahas seen general rise. There is no dispute that the education sector,which is very important service sector in the country, has seen various

Ascandals. In this context, we need to understand whether deemeduniversity would be covered within the ambit of the Section 2(c)(xi) ofthe PC Act.

34. On perusal of Section 2(c) of the PC Act, we may observethat the emphasis is not on the position held by an individual, rather,it isBon the public duty performed by him/her. In this regard, the legislativeintention was to not provide an exhaustive list of authorities which arecovered, rather general definition of ‘public servant’ is providedthereunder. This provides an important internal evidence as to thedefinition of the term”University”.

C35. The use of ‘any’ is critical in our understanding as to the termUniversity. We are aware of the line of authorities, wherein this Courthas reduced the impact of term ‘any’ to not mean ‘every’ [See HiraDevi v. District Board, Shahjahanpur, (1952) S.C.R. 1122]. However,we cannot accept such view as the context in which the present disputeemanates, differs from the above.D

36. Our attention was also drawn to the notes on clauses ofPrevention of Corruption Bill dated 20.02.1987. Clause 2 of the Noteson Clauses in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II, Section 2,clarifies the legislative intent, wherein it was commented as under:

E“2. This clause defines the expressions used in the Bill. Clause2(c) defines ‘public servant’. In the existing definition theemphasis is on the authority employing and the authorityremunerating. In the proposed definition the emphasis ison public duty.The definition of ‘election’ is based on thedefinition of this expression in the Penal Code, 1860.”

(emphasis supplied)

37. Additionally our attention is drawn to the legislative debateswhich took place prior to the enactment of the PC Act. It was uniformacross the party line that the purpose of preventing corruption ineducational institutions was emphasised.G

38. Coming to external aids of interpretation, theword ”University” is etymologically derived from the Latin, universitasmagistrorum et scholarium, which roughly means “community ofteachers and scholars”. Black’s Law dictionary defines “University”as:

“An institution of higher learning, consisting of an assemblage ofcolleges united under one corporate organization and government,affording instruction in the arts and sciences and the learnedprofessions. and conferring degrees. See Com. v. Banks, 198 Pa.397. 48 Atl. 277.”

39. Law Lexicon, defines the same as:

“A corporation of teachers or assemblage of learned men orcolleges for teaching the higher branches of learning: ;andhaving power to confer degrees.

University. place where all kinds of literature are universallytaught. (Tomlin’s Law Dic.) See also Act VIII of 1904, S.2,Cl. (2)(c).

University, of normal type, may be described in popularlanguage as an organization of teachers and learners, settledin fixed locality, for the purpose of nature study, in which thebody of teachers has authority to attest the proficiency of thelearners, by bestowing upon them titles, signifying that theyalso possess the qualifications and are admitted to the rank ofthose that are learned in the particular branch of knowledge inwhich they are taught.

The term ‘University’ is usually understood to mean bodyincorporated for the purpose of learning, with variousendowments and privileges. Such bodies were anciently foundedby papal bull or charter, later by royal charter or act ofParliament. University is corporation aggregate-Aggregationof corporations-The corporations are usually colleges orschools.”

40. Third Edition of Halsbury’s, Volume 13, page 707, at para1441 deals with the term “Universities”. According to the same:

“The word “university is not word of art and, although theinstitutions to which it refers are readily identifiable, precisedefinition is difficult. The essential features of university seemsto be that it was incorporated as such by the sovereign power.

Other attributes of university appear to be the admission ofstudents from all parts of the world, plurality of masters, theteaching of one at least of the higher faculties, namely theology,

Alaw or philosophy, which in some definitions are regarded asidentical, and medicine, provision for residence, and the right toconfer degrees, but possession of these attributes will not makean institution university in the absence of any express intentionof the sovereign power to make it one.

BIncorporation was anciently affected by papal bull or charter laterby royal charter or Act of Parliament.”

41. In Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn. (West PublishingCompany), the word “Universities” is defined as follows:

“Universities:C

Bodies politic and corporate have “been known to exist as Farback at last as the time of Cicero, and Gaius traces them even tothe laws of Solon of Athens, who lived some 500 years before….And from time immemorial, as at the present day, this privilege ofbeing corporation or artificial body of individuals, with power ofDholding their property, rights, and immunities in common as legallyorganized body and of transmitting the same in such body by anartificial succession different from the natural succession of theproperty of individuals has been considered franchise whichcould not be lawfully assumed by any associated body without aEspecial authority for that purpose from the government orsovereign power.”42. Under the UGC Act, University is defined and recognizedunder Section 2(f) in the following manner:

“University” means University established or incorporated byFor under Central Act, Provincial Act or State Act, and includesany such institution as may, in consultation with the Universityconcerned, be recoginsed by the Commission in accordance withthe regulations made in this behalf under this Act.

43. ‘deemed to be University’ is recognized under Section 3 ofGthe UGC Act, in the following manner:

Application of Act to institutions for higher studies otherthan Universities

3. The Central Government may, on the advice of the Commission,declare by notification in the Official Gazette, that any institutionH

for higher education, other than University, shall be deemed tobe University for the purposes of this Act, and on such adeclaration being made, all the provisions of this Act shall apply tosuch institution as if it were University within the meaning ofclause (f) of section 2.

44. As discussed earlier, the object of the PC Act was not only toprevent the social evil of bribery and corruption, but also to make thesame applicable to individuals who might conventionally not be consideredpublic servants. The purpose under the PC Act was to shift focus fromthose who are traditionally called public officials, to those individualswho perform public duties. Keeping the same in mind, as rightly submittedby the learned senior counsel for the appellant-State, it cannot be statedthat “Deemed University” and the officials therein, perform any lessor any different public duty, than those performed by Universitysimpliciter, and the officials therein.

45. Therefore, for all the above reasons, we are of the opinionthat the High Court was incorrect in holding that “Deemed University”is excluded from the ambit of the term “University” under Section 2(c)(xi)of the PC Act.

46. Having come to the above conclusion, in the present case, thepivotal question is whether the appellant-trustee in the Board of ‘Deemedto be University’ is ‘public servant’ covered under Section 2(c) of thePC Act. Recently, this Court in the case of CBI v. Ramesh Gelli, (2016)3 SCC 788, dealt with the question as to whether Chairman, Directorsand officers of private bank before its amalgamation with publicsector bank, can be classified as public servants for prosecution underthe PC Act. While dealing with the aforesaid proposition of law, theCourt analysed the purpose and scope of the PC Act and made thefollowing observations:

“15. From the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the PC Bill itis clear that the Act was intended to make the anti-corruption lawmore effective by widening its coverage. It is also clear thatthe Bill was introduced to widen the scope of the definitionof “public servant”. Before the PC Act, 1988, it was thePrevention of Corruption Act, 1947 and Sections 161 to 165-A inChapter IX IPC which were governing the field of law relating toprevention of corruption. Parliament repealed the Prevention of

Corruption Act, 1947 and also omitted Sections 161 to 165-A IPCas provided under Sections 30 and 31 of the PC Act, 1988. Sincea new definition of “public servant” is given under the PC Act,1988, it is not necessary here to reproduce the definition of “publicservant” given in Section 21 IPC.

17. The above definition shows that under sub-clause (viii)contained in Section 2(c) of the PC Act, 1988, person whoholds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or requiredto perform any public duty, is public servant. Now, for thepurposes of the present case this Court is required to examine asto whether the Chairman/Managing Director or Executive Directorof private bank operating under licence issued by RBI under theBanking Regulation Act, 1949, held/holds an office and performed/performs public duty so as to attract the definition of “publicservant” quoted above.”

(emphasis supplied)

47. This Court in the case of P.V. Narasimha Rao v. State (CBI/SPE), (1998) 4 SCC 626, has clarified the word “office” in the followingmanner:

“61. … The word ‘office’ is normally understood to mean ‘aposition to which certain duties are attached, especially place oftrust, authority or service under constituted authority’. (See OxfordShorter English Dictionary, 3rd Edn., p. 1362.)In McMillan v. Guest, (1942) 1 All ER 606 (HL), Lord Wrighthas said:

‘…The word “office” is of indefinite content. Its variousmeanings cover four columns of the New English Dictionary,but I take as the most relevant for purposes of this case thefollowing:

G“A position or place to which certain duties are attached,especially one of more or less public character.”’

In the same case Lord Atkin gave the following meaning:

‘…”an office or employment which was subsisting, permanent,substantive position, which had an existence independent of

the person who filled it, which went on and was filled insuccession by successive holders.”’

In Statesman (P) Ltd. v. H.R. Deb, AIR 1968 SC1495and Mahadeo v. Shantibhai, (1969) 2 SCR 422 this Court hasadopted the meaning given by Lord Wright when it said:

‘An office means no more than position to which certainduties are attached.’”

48. This Court in the case of Manish Trivedi v. State ofRajasthan, (2014) 14 SCC 420 further elucidated upon the ambit of thephrase “public servant” by stressing upon the relevance of “office”,wherein the emphasis was upon the duties performed. The Court notedtherein:

“19. The present Act (the 1988 Act) envisages widening of thescope of the definition of the expression “public servant”. It wasbrought in force to purify public administration. The legislaturehas used comprehensive definition of “public servant” to achievethe purpose of punishing and curbing corruption among publicservants. Hence, it would be inappropriate to limit the contents ofthe definition clause by construction which would be against thespirit of the statute. Bearing in mind this principle, when we considerthe case of the appellant, we have no doubt that he is publicservant within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act. Clause(viii) of Section 2(c) of the present Act makes any person,who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised orrequired to perform any public duty, to be public servant.The word “office” is of indefinite connotation and, in thepresent context, it would mean position or place to whichcertain duties are attached and has an existence which isindependent of the persons who fill it.”

(emphasis supplied)

49. In order to appreciate the amplitude of the word “publicservant”,the relevance of the term “public duty” cannot be disregarded.“Public duty” is defined under Section 2(b) of the PC Act, which isreproduced below:

2(b) ‘public duty’ means duty in the discharge of which theState, the public or the community at large has an interest.

A50. Evidently, the language of Section 2(b) of the PC Act indicatesthat any duty discharged wherein State, the public or community at largehas any interest is called public duty. The first explanation to Section 2further clarifies that any person who falls in any of the categories statedunder Section 2 is public servant whether or not appointed by thegovernment. The second explanation further expands the ambit to includeBevery person who de facto discharges the functions of public servant,and that he should not be prevented from being broughtunder the ambitof public servant due to any legal infirmities or technicalities.

51. In the present case, on aprima-facie evaluation of thestatements of the Gaurav D. Mehta (the Vice-Chancellor); Mr. PragneshCkumar Ramesh bhai Trivedi (account officer of Sumandeep VidhyapithUniversity) and other witnesses it appears that the present respondentwas the final authority with regard to the grant of admission, collectionof fees and donation amount.

52. The charge sheet specifically discloses that the respondentDallegedly was collecting certain extra amount over the prescribed feeson the pretext of allowing the students to fill up their examination forms.Therefore, paying the respondent the alleged amount was conditionprecedent before filling up the forms, to appear for the examinations.Specifically, in the complaint, it was alleged that the respondent hadEdemanded an amount of RupeesTwenty Lakhs to be paid to the co-accused Bharat Savant, failing which the daughter of the complainantwould not have been permitted to appear in the examination. In ouropinion, the fact that there were large number of cheques which werefound during the raid is more than sufficient to establish grave suspicionas to the commission of the alleged offence.F53. The respondent has vehemently stressed upon the fact thathe is admittedly trustee of the “Sumandeep Charitable Trust” and hasno connection with the “Sumandeep University”. But, it ought to benoted that the courts below have failed to analyze the connection betweenthe trust and the University,as well as the relationship of the respondentGwith the university. Prima facie, grave suspicion is made out that therespondent was rendering his service by dealing with the students andthe examination aspect of the University. But detailed appreciation ofevidence is called for before one can reach conclusion as to the exactposition of the respondent vis-à-vis the University.

54. At this stage, we may note that the jurisdiction of this Court,with regards to Section 227 of CrPC, is limited and should not beexcercised by conducting roving enquiries on the aspect of factualinferences. This Court, in Union of India Vs. Prafulla Kumar Samal,1979 (3) SCC 4, had an occasion to consider the scope of Section 227CrPC and it held as under:-

“7. Section 227 of the Code runs thus:

“If, upon consideration of the record of the case and thedocuments submitted therewith, and after hearing thesubmissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf,the Judge considers that there is not sufficient groundfor proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge theaccused and record his reasons for so doing.”

The words “not sufficient ground for proceeding against theaccused” clearly show that the Judge is not mere post office toframe the charge at the behest of the prosecution, but has toexercise his judicial mind to the facts of the case in order todetermine whether case for trial has been made out by theprosecution. In assessing this fact, it is not necessary for the courtto enter into the pros and cons of the matter or into weighingand balancing of evidence and probabilities which is really hisfunction after the trial starts. At the stage of Section 227, theJudge has merely to sift the evidence in order to find out whetheror not there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.The sufficiency of ground would take within its fold the nature ofthe evidence recorded by the police or the documents producedbefore the court which ex facie disclose that there aresuspicious circumstances against the accused so as to frame acharge against him.”

55. Further, in Sajjan Kumar v. Central Bureau of Investigation,2010 (9) SCC 368, this Court, inter alia, observed :-

“21.On consideration of the authorities about the scope of Sections227 and 228 of the Code, the following principles emerge:

(ii) Where the materials placed before the court disclose gravesuspicion against the accused which has not been properly

Aexplained, the court will be fully justified in framing charge andproceeding with the trial…”

56. Therefore, in line with the aforesaid proposition, this case isnot an appropriate one to have exercised the power under Section 227to discharge the accused-respondent herein, having regards to the factsBand circumstances of the case. However, it should be noted that thisjudgment is rendered for limited purpose, and we have not expressedany opinion on the merits of the case. The trial court is directed to proceedwith the case expeditiously.

57. Accordingly, the impugned judgment of the High Court is setCaside. Appeal is allowed.

AJAY RASTOGI, J.

1. I have had the advantage of going through the draft judgmentproposed by my esteemed Brother Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana. I entirelyagree with the conclusions which my erudite Brother has drawn, basedDon the remarkable process of reasoning. I would all the same like to addsome of my views, not because the judgment requires any furtherelaboration but looking for the question of law that emerged ofconsiderable importance.

2. The question that emerged for consideration in the present appealEis whether the respondent-trustee in the board of ‘deemed to be university’is ‘public servant’ covered under Section 2(c ) (xi) of the Preventionof Corruption Act, 1988 (hereinafter being referred to as “Act 1988”).

3. Zero tolerance towards corruption should be the top-notchpriority for ensuring system based and policy driven, transparent andFresponsive governance. Corruption cannot be annihilated but strategicallybe dwindled by reducing monopoly and enabling transparency in decisionmaking. However, fortification of social and moral fabric must be anintegral component of long-term policy for nation building to accomplishcorruption free society.G4. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was amended in 1964

G4. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was amended in 1964based on the recommendations of the Santhanam Committee. Although,there are provisions in Chapter IX of the Indian Penal Code to deal withpublic servants and those who abet them by way of criminal misconduct,they were found to be inadequate to deal with the offence of corruptioneffectively.H

5. To make the anti-corruption laws more effective, the Preventionof Corruption Bill was introduced in the Parliament. The object andstatement of reasons of the Act, 1988 was intended to make the existinganti-corruption laws more effective by widening their coverage and bystrengthening the provisions. The Act 1988 caters to its wide scope byproviding for “different paths to liability, some of which are especiallysuited to, but by no means confined to, those who hold public office.”

6. There are number of judicial precedents dealing with thedefinition and meaning of corruption. The simplest definition of corruptionis, any act or omission by public servant for securing pecuniary orother material advantage directly or indirectly for himself, his family orfriends. It will be apposite to refer the provisions of the Act, 1988 relevantfor the purpose ad infra:-

(c) “public servant” means—

(i)-(x)…..

(xi)any personwho is Vice-Chancellor ormember of anygoverning body, professor, reader, lecturer or any their teacheror employee, by whatever designation called, of anyUniversityand any person whose services have been availed ofby University or any other public authority in connection withholding or conducting examinations;

(xii)…”

(Emphasis supplied)

7. It will be relevant to note that prior to the Act, 1988, employeesof the university, professors, readers, etc. were not covered within thedefinition of ‘public servant’ as it was contained in Section 21 of theIndian Penal Code. Thrust of submission of the learned counsel for therespondent is that respondent herein who is trustee of deemed to beuniversity which cannot by any stretch of imagination be construed to bea public servant and would not fall within the ambit of Section 2(c ) (xi)of the Act, 1988. The High Court although has accepted the contentionof the learned counsel for the respondent on the said premise but itneeds to be examined in the context in which the term “University” hasbeen referred to under Section 2(c )(xi) of the Act, 1988.

8. The UGC Act was established by an Act of 1956 to makeprovisions for the coordination and determination of standards of

Aeducation in universities. “University” has been defined under Section2(f) of the UGC Act and those who are declared as ‘deemed to beuniversity’, declaration has to be notified under Section 3 withrestrictions which has been imposed upon the deemed to be universityas referred to under Section 23 of the UGC Act. The relevant Sectionsof the UGC Act are as infra:-B

“Section 2(f) – “University” means University established orincorporated by or under Central Act, Provincial Act or aState Act, and includes any such institution as may, in consultationwith the University concerned, be recognized by the Commissionin accordance with the regulations made in this behalf under thisCAct.

Section 3 - The Central Government may, on the advice of theCommission, declare by notification in the Official Gazette, thatany institution for higher education, other than University, shallbe deemed to be University for the purposes of this Act, and onDsuch declaration being made, all the provisions of this Act shallapply to such institution as if it were University within the meaningof clause (f) of Section 2.

Section 23 – No institution, whether corporate body or not,other than University established or incorporated by or under aECentral Act, Provincial Act or State Act shall be entitled tohave the word “University” associated with its name in any mannerwhatsoever. Provided that nothing in this Section shall, for periodof two years from the commencement of this Act, apply to aninstitution which, immediately before such commencement, hadFthe word “University” associated with its name.”

9. “University” under Section 2(f) of the UGC Act is establishedeither in the Central Act, Provincial Act or State Act. At the sametime, such of the institutions for higher education other than the Universitycreated under the statutory enactment, after being declared by the CentralGGovernment by notification in the Official Gazette, shall be deemed tobe university for the purposes of this Act and all provisions of the UGCAct shall apply to such institutions as if it were university within themeaning of clause (f) of Section 2 of the Act.

10. It cannot be lost sight of that the Act, 1988, as its predecessorthat is the repealed Act of 1947 on the same subject, was brought intoH

force with avowed purpose of effective prevention of bribery andcorruption. The Act of 1988 which repeals and replaces the Act of 1947contains definition of ‘public servant’ with vide spectrum in clause (c )of Section 2 of the Act, 1988, so as to purify public administration. Theobjects and reasons contained in the Bill leading to passing of the Actcan be taken assistance of, which gives the background in which thelegislation was enacted. When the legislature has introduced such acomprehensive definition of “public servant” to achieve the purpose ofpunishing and curbing the growing menace of corruption in the societyimparting public duty, it would be apposite not to limit the contents of thedefinition clause by construction which would be against the spirit of thestatute.

11. By introduction of Section 2(c)(xi) of the Act, 1988, any personor member of any governing body with whatever designation called ofany university has been included in the definition of “public servant” andany university includes all universities regardless of the fact whether ithas been established under the statute or declared deemed to be universityunder Section 3 of the UGC Act. It is true that the distinction has beenpointed out by the Parliament under the provisions of the UGC Act forconsideration and determination of standards of education in universities,but in my view, no distinction could be carved out between the universityand deemed to be university so far it relates to the term ‘public servant’as defined under Section 2(c ) (xi) of the Act 1988.12. In construing the definition of ‘public servant’ in clause (c ) ofSection 2 of the Act 1988, the Court is required to adopt an approach aswould give effect to the intention of the legislature. The legislature has,intentionally, while extensively defining the term ‘public servant’ in clause(c ) of Section 2 of the Act and clause (xi) in particular has specificallyintended to explore the word ‘any’ which includes all persons who aredirectly or indirectly actively participating in managing the affairs of anyuniversity in any manner or the form. In this context, the legislature hastaken note of ‘any’ person or member of “any” governing body bywhatever designation called of “any” university to be termed as ‘publicservant’ for the purposes of invoking the provisions of Act 1988.

13. Heavy reliance was placed on the judgment in Orissa LiftIrrigation CorporationVs. Rabi Sankar1 wherein, the scope and

1 2018 (1) SCC 468

Aparameters were examined by this Court under which the deemed to beuniversity would regulate its educational fora under the regulations framedby the UGC for the purpose of imparting education by the deemed to beuniversity.

14. But so far as the present case is concerned, the question forBconsideration is the term ‘any’ university in the broader spectrum tocurb corruption in the educational institutions as referred to under Section2(c )(xi) of Act 1988 and the legislature in its wisdom has referred to theword “any university” which clearly mandates the university referred toand controlled by its statutory mechanism referred to under Section 2(f)and deemed to be university under Section 3 of the UGC Act.C

15. In my considered opinion, the view expressed by the HighCourt is unsustainable in law and all the questions raised on merits areleft open to the respondent to urge during the course of the trial. Theappeal is accordingly allowed. The judgment of the High Court of Gujaratdated 2[nd] February 2018 is hereby set aside. No costs.

Devika GujralAppeal allowed.