BRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR. versus NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY

[2020] 9 S.C.R.

ABRAHAMPAL @ SAMMAY AND ANR.

NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY

(Civil Appeal No. 2926 of 2020)

AUGUST 07, 2020

[N. V. RAMANA, S. ABDUL NAZEER ANDSURYA KANT JJ.]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988:

Cs. 173 – Delay of 45 days in filing appeal against order ofMotor Accident Claim Tribunal – Application for condonation ofdelay and appeal dismissed by High Court – Appeal to SupremeCourt – Held: s. 173 provides limitation period for filing appeal –The provision also gives sufficient discretionary powers to the Courtto condone delay in filing the appeal if it is satisfied that thereDexisted “sufficient cause” - The provision being beneficiallegislation “sufficient cause” must be given liberal interpretationto serve the object of the Act – In the present case delay of 45 dayshas been properly explained – The strict approach taken in theimpugned order was hypertechnical and hence not sustainable –EDelay is condoned – Matter remanded to High Court to be decidedon merit – Limitation – Delay.

Delay:

Condonation of delay – Criteria to be adopted – Held: Thereis no straight jacket formula for condonation of delay – The CourtsFare required to take into consideration entire facts and circumstancesof the case as well as conduct of the parties while consideringcondonation of delay – Keeping in view substantive rights of theparties, undue emphasis should not be given to technicalities andprovisions cannot be viewed strictly as compared to commercialGclaims.

Interpretation of Statutes:

Beneficial legislation – Interpretation of – Held: Interpretationof beneficial legislation must be remedial and must be in furtheranceof the purpose which the statute seeks to serve.

Words and Phrases:

Expressions “may” and “sufficient cause” — Interpretationof, in the context of s. 173 of Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. Chapter XII of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is abeneficial legislation intended at protecting the rights of victimsaffected in road accidents. Moreover, the Act is self-containedcode in itself which provides procedures for filing claims, forpassing of award and for preferring an appeal. Even, the limitationsfor preferring the remedies are contained in the code itself. Theinterpretation of beneficial legislation must be remedial andmust be in furtherance with the purpose which the statute seeksto serve. [Paras 8 and 9][509-F-G]

Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. Deputy Director,Employees State Insurance Corporation. (2009) 9 SCC61 : [2009] 13 SCR 1139; Vimla Devi v. NationalInsurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 186 : [2018] 13 SCR753 – relied on.

2.1 Section 173 of the Act provides that, any personaggrieved by the award passed by the Tribunal may approach theHigh Court within ninety days. However, the second provisostates that the High Court “may” still entertain such appeal evenafter the expiry of ninety days, if the appellant satisfies the Courtthat there exists sufficient reason behind the delay. [Para 12][511-D]

2.2 Ordinarily, the word “may” is not word of compulsion.It is an enabling word and it only confers capacity, power orauthority and implies discretion.“It is used in statute to indicatethat something may be done which prior to it could not be done”.[Para 13][511-E]

Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavooalias Periana Gounder (1982) 1 SCC 159 : [1982] 2SCR 146; Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. ShreeChangdeo Sugar Mills Ltd. [1962] 3 Suppl. SCR 973 –relied on.

Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P.Singh, 14[th] Edn. - referred to.

A2.3 The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section173 of the Act, conferred sufficient discretionary powers uponthe Court to entertain appeals even beyond the period of ninetydays. Such discretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, toenforce the rights of the victims and their dependents. Thelegislature intended that Courts must have such power so as toBensure that substantive justice is not trumped by technicalities.If the specific conditions wherein the power could be exercisedis also provided in the statute, then the Court must exercise theaforesaid discretion in the manner as specified by the statuteitself. In the second proviso to Section 173 it is stated that CourtChas the power to condone delay only if it is satisfied that thereexisted “sufficient cause”. [Paras 14, 16 and 17][511-F; 512-C-F]

Official Liquidator v. Dharti Dhan (P) Ltd. (1977) 2SCC 166 : [1977] 2 SCR 964 – relied on.DBhaiya Punjalal Bhagwandin v. Dave BhagwatprasadPrabhuprasad AIR 1963 SC 120 : [1963] 3 SCR 312;Shri Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd.,(1970) 2 SCC 806 : [1969] 2 SCR 675 – referred to.

2.4 Although the provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963 donot apply while deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act,Ebut even while interpreting “sufficient cause” under theLimitation Act Courts have taken liberal interpretation.[Para 18][512-G]

Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v.Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 321 :F[2008] 11 SCR 1; Balwant Singh (Dead) v. JagdishSingh, (2010) 8 SCC 685 : [2010] 8 SCR 597; ManibenDevraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of BrihanMumbai (2012) 5 SCC 157 – relied on.

2.5 Therefore, the aforesaid provision being beneficialGlegislation, must be given liberal interpretation to serve its object.Keeping in view the substantive rights of the parties, undueemphasis should not be given to technicalities. In such casesdelay in filing and refiling cannot be viewed strictly, as comparedto commercial claims under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,1996 or the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. [Para 22][514-F-G]H

P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar (2019) 13 SCC 445 :[2018] 12 SCR 143 – relied on.

2.6 The legislative intent of Motor Vehicles Act is to provideappropriate compensation for the victims and to protect theirsubstantive rights, in pursuit of the same, the interpretationshould not be as strict as commercial claims. [Para 22][515-E]

2.7 Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts withdiscretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the sametime it also places an obligation upon the party to justify that hewas prevented from abiding by the same due to the existence of“sufficient cause”. Although there exists no strait jacket formulafor the Courts to condone delay, but the Courts must not onlytake into consideration the entire facts and circumstances of casebut also the conduct of the parties. The concept of reasonablenessdictates that the Courts even while taking liberal approach mustweigh in the rights and obligations of both the parties. When aright has accrued in favour of one party due to gross negligenceand lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrainfrom exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief. [Para 23][515-F-G]3. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, thedelay of 45 days has been properly explained by the appellants,which was on account of illness of the wife of Appellant No.1. Itwas not appropriate on the part of the High Court to dismiss theappeal merely on the ground of delay of short duration, particularlyin matters involving death in motor accident claims. Moreover,in the present case no mala fide can be imputable against theappellants for filing the appeal after the expiry of ninety days.Therefore, the strict approach taken in the impugned order ishyper-technical and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.[Para 24][515-H; 516-A-B]

4. As the adjudication on the merits of the case has nottaken place, the matter is remanded to the High Court for freshconsideration on merits. [Para 25][516-C]

ACase Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2926of 2020.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.10.2016 of the High Courtof Uttarakhand at Nainital in A.O. No. 266 of 2014.

Yunus Malik, Anish Maheshwari, Aman Malik, Samir Malik,Ms. Meenakshi Midha, Kapil Midha, Ms. Pritika Juneja, ChanderShekhar Ashri, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

N. V. RAMANA, J.F

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. This appeal arises out of the impugned order dated 17.10.2016passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in AO No.266 ofG2014, wherein the High Court dismissed the appeal on the grounds ofdelay of 45 days.

4. The facts in brief giving rise to this appeal are as follows: Thedeceased aged 26 years, met with an accident on 15.04.2011, as his bikecrashed into truck parked negligently on the road, without anyback-Hlight’s indication. Resultantly, he succumbed to the injuries while being

taken to the hospital. The appellants (parents of the deceased) preferreda petition before the Motor Accident Claim Tribunal seekingcompensation to the tune of Rs. 10 lakhs. Vide order 07.02.2014, thetribunal awarded total sum of Rs.2.24 Lakhs as compensation alongwith interest of 6% p.a. Aggrieved, the appellants approached the HighCourt for seeking enhancement of compensation. It is to be noted thatthe aforesaid appeal before the High Court was filed with 45 days delay.In order to explain the same, the appellants herein filed an applicationbeing CLMA 6569/2014, seeking condonation of delay on the groundthat his wife was ill, which prevented him from appealing in time.

5. By impugned order dated 17.10.2016, the High Court dismissedthe aforesaid delay condonation application, consequent upon which theappeal also got dismissed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the appellantsherein have approached this Court through special leave petition.

6. The counsel on behalf of the appellants submitted that HighCourt has acted in an unjustified manner in dismissing the application forcondonation of delay. On the contrary, the counsel on behalf of theRespondent supported the judgment passed by the High Court.

7. Having heard the counsel for both parties, the short questionwhich arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the High Courterred in dismissing the delay condonation application for 45 days? Thisquestion turns on interpretation of Section 173 of Motor Vehicles Act,1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”).

8. At the outset, we must note that, Chapter XII of the Act is abeneficial legislation intended at protecting the rights of victims affectedin road accidents. Moreover, the Act is self-contained code in itselfwhich provides procedures for filing claims, for passing of award andfor preferring an appeal. Even, the limitations for preferring the remediesare contained in the code itself.

9. The interpretation of beneficial legislation must be remedialand must be in furtherance with the purpose which the statute seeks toserve. The aforesaid view has been reiterated by this court on multipleoccasions wherein this court has highlighted the importanceacknowledging legislative intention while interpreting the provisions ofthe statute. This court in the case of Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurantv. Deputy Director, Employees State Insurance Corporation., (2009)9 SCC 61while interpreting the provisions of the Employees State

AInsurance Act held that it being beneficial legislation should receive aliberal construction so as to promote its objectives. This court held therein:

“20. The Employees’ State Insurance Act is beneficiallegislation. The main purpose of the enactment as the Preamblesuggests, is to provide for certain benefits to employees of aBfactory in case of sickness, maternity and employment injury andto make provision for certain other matters in relation thereto.

The Employees’ State Insurance Act is social securitylegislation and the canons of interpreting social legislationare different from the canons of interpretation of taxationlaw. The courts must not countenance any subterfuge whichCwould defeat the provisions of social legislation and thecourts must even, if necessary, strain the language of theAct in order to achieve the purpose which the legislaturehad in placing this legislation on the statute book. The Act,therefore, must receive liberal construction so as toDpromote its objects.” (emphasis supplied)

10. Similarly, this Court in the case of Vimla Devi v. NationalInsurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 2 SCC 186 while interpreting the provisionsof the Act held that strict compliance of procedures can be relaxed inorder to ensure that victims receive just compensation. This court observedEtherein:

“15. At the outset, we may reiterate as has been consistentlysaid by this Court in series of cases that the Act is beneficialpiece of legislation enacted to give solace to the victims of themotor accident who suffer bodily injury or die untimely. The ActFis designed in manner, which relieves the victims fromensuring strict compliance provided in law, which areotherwise applicable to the suits and other proceedingswhile prosecuting the claim petition filed under the Act forclaiming compensation for the loss sustained by them inthe accident.” (emphasis supplied)G11. While keeping in view, the general nature of the legislation, itis pertinent for us to have look at Section 173 of the Act which readsas under:

173. Appeals. — (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-section (2),any person aggrieved by an award of Claims Tribunal may,H

within ninety days from the date of the award, prefer an appeal tothe High Court:

Provided that no appeal by the person who is required to pay anyamount in terms of such award shall be entertained by the HighCourt unless he has deposited with it twenty-five thousand rupeesor fifty per cent of the amount so awarded, whichever is less, inthe manner directed by the High Court:

Provided further that the High Court may entertain theappeal after the expiry of the said period of ninety days, if itis satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficientcausefrom preferring the appeal in time.

(2) No appeal shall lie against any award of Claims Tribunal, ifthe amount in dispute in the appeal is less than ten thousand rupees.

(emphasis supplied)

12. Section 173 provides that, any person aggrieved by the awardpassed by the Tribunal may approach the High Court within ninety days.However, the second proviso states that the High Court “may” stillentertain such appeal even after the expiry of ninety days, if the appellantsatisfies the Court that there exists sufficient reason behind the delay.

13. Ordinarily, the word “may” is not word of compulsion.[1]It isan enabling word and it only confers capacity, power or authority andimplies discretion.[2] “It is used in statute to indicate that something maybe done which prior to it could not be done”.[3]

14. The legislature by usage of the word “may” in Section 173 ofthe Act, conferred sufficient discretionary powers upon the Court toentertain appeals even beyond the period of ninety days. The pertinentissuebefore us relates towhat the extent of such discretionary power is.

15. In order to understand the extent of conferment of power bythe usage of the word “may”, we may observe Official Liquidator v.Dharti Dhan (P.) Ltd., (1977) 2 SCC 166, wherein this Court held:

1 Justice G.P. Singh in Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 14th Edn.,page 519

2 Chinnamarkathian alias Muthu Gounder v. Ayyavoo alias Periana Gounder, (1982)

1 SCC 159

3Madanlal Fakirchand Dudhediya v. Shree Changdeo Sugar Mills Ltd., 1962 Supp(3) SCR 973

A“10.The principle laid down above has been followed consistentlyby this Court whenever it has been contended that the word “may”carries with it the obligation to exercise power in particularmanner or direction. In such case, it is always the purposeof the power which has to be examined in order todetermine the scope of the discretion conferred upon theBdonee of the power.If the conditions in which the power isto be exercised in particular cases are also specified by astatute then, on the fulfilment of those conditions, the powerconferred becomes annexed with duty to exercise it inthat manner”(emphasis supplied)C

16. This Court has firstly held that purpose of conferment of suchpower must be examined for the determination of the scope of suchdiscretion conferred upon the court.[refer to Bhaiya PunjalalBhagwandin v. Dave Bhagwat prasad Prabhuprasad , AIR 1963 SC120; Shri Prakash Chand Agarwal v. Hindustan Steel Ltd., (1970) 2DSCC 806]. Our analysis of the purpose of the Act suggests that suchdiscretionary power is conferred upon the Courts, to enforce the rightsof the victims and their dependents. The legislature intended that Courtsmust have such power so as to ensure that substantive justice is nottrumped by technicalities.

E17. Secondly, it has been held that if the specific conditions whereinthe power could be exercised is also provided in the statute, then theCourt must exercise the aforesaid discretion in the manner as specifiedby the statute itself. In the second proviso to Section 173 it is stated thatCourt has the power to condone delay only if it is satisfied that thereexisted “sufficient cause”.F

18. At this juncture, we need to interpret the term “sufficientcause” as condition precedent for the granting of the discretionaryrelief of allowing the appeal beyond the statutory limit of ninety days.Although this Court has held that provisions of the Limitation Act, 1963does not apply while deciding claims under the Motor Vehicles Act, butGit is relevant to note that even while interpreting “sufficient cause” underthe Limitation Act Courts have taken liberal interpretation. This Courtin the case of Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, Perinadu Village v.Bhargavi Amma (Dead) by LRs, (2008) 8 SCC 321, observed that:“13. …The words “sufficient cause for not making theHapplication within the period of limitation” should be

understood and applied in reasonable, pragmatic, practicaland liberal manner, depending upon the facts andcircumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words“sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receivea liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, whenthe delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bonafides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. The aforesaid view was reiterated in the case of BalwantSingh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh, (2010) 8 SCC 685, wherein this Courtheld that:

“25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has toreceive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the conceptof reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned.The purpose of introducing liberal construction normallyis to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it isunderstood in its general connotation.

26. The law of limitation is substantive law and has definiteconsequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. Theseprinciples should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending onthe facts and circumstances of given case. Once valuable righthas accrued in favour of one party as result of the failure of theother party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause andits own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right onthe mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay isdirectly result of negligence, default or inaction of that party.Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends ofjustice can be achieved. If party has been thoroughly negligent inimplementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprivethe other party of valuable right that has accrued to it in law as result”of his acting vigilantly. (emphasis supplied)

20. The Court in the above-mentioned cases, highlighted upon theimportance introducing the concept of “reasonableness” while givingthe clause “sufficient cause” liberal interpretation.In furtherance ofthe same, this Court has cautioned regarding the necessity of distinguishingcases where delay is of few days,as against the cases where the delayis inordinate as it might accrue to the prejudice of the rights of the other

Aparty. In such cases, where there exists inordinate delay and the same isattributable to the party’s inaction and negligence, the Courts have totake strict approach so as to protect the substantial rights of the parties.

21. The aforesaid view was taken by this Court in the case ofManiben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai,B(2012) 5 SCC 157 wherein the Court held that:

“23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though liberaland justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in theexercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and othersimilar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious ofCthe fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rightson the basis of the judgment under challenge and lot oftime is consumed at various stages of litigation apart fromthe cost.

24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get inDthe factual matrix of given case would largely depend on bonafide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there hasbeen no negligence on the part of the applicant and thecause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then itmay condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanationgiven by the applicant is found to be concocted or he isEthoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it wouldbe legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone thedelay.” (emphasis supplied)22. Therefore, the aforesaid provision being beneficial legislation,must be given liberal interpretation to serve its object. Keeping in viewFthe substantive rights of the parties, undue emphasis should not be givento technicalities. In such cases delay in filing and refiling cannot be viewedstrictly, as compared to commercial claims under the Arbitration andConciliation Act, 1996 or the Commercial Courts Act, 2015. In P. RadhaBai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445, wherein this Court whileGinterpreting Section 34 of the Arbitration Act, held that the right to objectto an award itself is substantively bound with the limitation periodprescribed therein and the same cannot merely procedural prescription.In effect the Court held that complete petition, has to be filed withinthe time prescribed under Section 34 of the Arbitration Actand ‘notthereafter’. The Court while coming to the aforesaid conclusion,Hreasoned as under:

“36.1 First, the purpose of the Arbitration Act was to provide fora speedy dispute resolution process. The Statement of Objectsand Reasons reveal that the legislative intent of enacting theArbitration Act was to provide parties with an efficient alternativedispute resolution system which gives litigants an expeditedresolution of disputes while reducing the burden on the courts.Article 34(3) reflects this intent when it defines thecommencement and concluding period for challenging an award.This Court in Popular Construction case [Union ofIndia v. Popular Construction Co., (2001) 8 SCC 470]highlighted the importance of the fixed periods under theArbitration Act. We may also add that the finality is afundamental principle enshrined under the Arbitration Actand definitive time-limit for challenging an award isnecessary for ensuring finality.If Section 17 were to be applied,an award can be challenged even after 120 days. This woulddefeat the Arbitration Act’s objective of speedy resolution ofdisputes. The finality of award would also be in limbo as partycan challenge an award even after the 120 day period.”

(emphasis supplied)

Coming back to the Motor Vehicles Act, the legislative intent is toprovide appropriate compensation for the victims and to protect theirsubstantive rights, in pursuit of the same, the interpretation should not beas strict as commercial claims as elucidated above.

23. Undoubtedly, the statute has granted the Courts withdiscretionary powers to condone the delay, however at the same time italso places an obligation upon the party to justify that he was preventedfrom abiding by the same due to the existence of “sufficient cause”.Although there exists no strait jacket formula for the Courts to condonedelay, but the Courts must not only take into consideration the entirefacts and circumstances of case but also the conduct of the parties. Theconcept of reasonableness dictates that, the Courts even while taking aliberal approach must weigh in the rights and obligations of both theparties. When right has accrued in favour of one party due to grossnegligence and lackadaisical attitude of the other, this Court shall refrainfrom exercising the aforesaid discretionary relief.

24. Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of thepresent case, we are of the opinion that the delay of 45 days has been

ABC

Aproperly explained by the appellants, which was on account of illness ofthe wife of Appellant No.1. It was not appropriate on the part of theHigh Court to dismiss the appeal merely on the ground of delay of shortduration, particularly in matters involving death in motor accident claims.Moreover, in the present case no malafide can be imputable against theappellants for filing the appeal after the expiry of ninety days.Therefore,Bwe are of the opinion that the strict approach taken in the impugnedorder is hyper-technical and cannot be sustained in the eyes of law.25. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the impugnedorder of the High Court is set aside. As the adjudication on the merits ofthe case has not taken place, we remand the matter to the said Court forCfresh consideration on merits.

26. Taking into consideration the fact that the appeal is of theyear 2014, we request the High Court to dispose of the same within aperiod of six months from the date of communication of this order.

Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeal allowed.