UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS versus METHU MEDA

UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS

METHU MEDA

(Civil Appeal No. 6238 of 2021)

OCTOBER 06, 2021

[INDIRA BANERJEE AND J.K MAHESHWARI, JJ.]

Service Law – Appointment – Acquittal from criminal case –Nature of – Effect of – Respondent applied for the post of Constablein Central Industrial Security Force – Provisionally selected – Foundnot eligible for appointment on account of criminal case ofkidnapping for ransom against him, though acquitted – Held: If aperson is acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the chargeof an offence involving moral turpitude or because the witnessesturned hostile, like in the present case, it would not automaticallyentitle him for the employment, that too in disciplined force – Meredisclosure of the offences alleged and the result of the trial is notsufficient – Employer cannot be compelled to give appointment tothe candidate – Impugned orders passed by Single Judge as well asDivision Bench set aside.

Words & Expressions – ‘honourable acquittal’– Meaning of– Discussed.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The expressions ‘honourable acquittal’,‘acquitted of blame’ and ‘fully acquitted’ are unknown to the Codeof Criminal Procedure or the Indian Penal Code. It has beendeveloped by judicial pronouncements. if the acquittal is directedby the court on consideration of facts and material evidence onrecord with the finding of false implication or the finding that theguilt had not been proved, accepting the explanation of accusedas just, it be treated as honourable acquittal. If prosecution couldnot prove the guilt for other reasons and not ‘honourably’ acquittedby the Court, it be treated other than ‘honourable’, andproceedings may follow. Acquittal giving benefit of doubt wouldnot automatically lead to reinstatement of candidate unless therules provide so. [Paras 11, 13 and 14][663-C-D-; 664-A-B, D-E]

AInspector General of Police & Another vs. Samuthiram(2013) 1 SCC 598:[2012] 11 SCR 174; State of Assam& Another vs. Raghava Rajgopalachari (1972) 7 SLR44; R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India AIR 1964 SC 787 :[1964] SCR 431; Reserve Bank of India vs. BhopalSingh Panchal (1994) 1 SCC 541 : [1993] 3 Suppl.BSCR 586 – relied on.

1.2 If acquittal is not honourable, the candidates are notsuitable for government service and are to be avoided. Therelevant factors and the nature of offence, extent of hisinvolvement, propensity of such person to indulge in similarCactivities in future, are the relevant aspects for consideration bythe Screening Committee, which is competent to decide all theseissues. In the present case, the charges were framed against therespondent for the offences punishable under Sections 347/327/323/506(Part-II) and 364A IPC. He was acquitted after trial byDthe Sessions Judge, Jhabua because the person kidnapped andalso his wife have not supported the case of prosecution. As perprosecution, the complainant was beaten by the respondent andthe said fact found support from the evidence of doctor. Therefore,it appears that the Committee was of the view that acquittal ofthe respondent, in the facts of the present case, cannot be termedEas ‘honourable acquittal’ and the said acquittal may be treated bygiving benefit of doubt. The employer is having right to considerthe suitability of the candidate as per government orders/instructions/rules at the time of taking the decision for inductionof the candidate in employment. Acquittal on technical ground in

Frespect of the offences of heinous/serious nature, which is not aclean acquittal, the employer may have right to consider allrelevant facts available as to the antecedents, and may takeappropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee. Evenin case, truthful declaration regarding concluded trial has beenmade by the employee, still the employer has the right to considerGantecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.[Paras 15, 16 and 18][664-G-H; 665-A-C; 667-C-E]

New Delhi and Another vs. Mehar Singh (2013) 7 SCC685: [2013] 13 SCR 432; Union Territory, ChandigarhAdministration and Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr.H(2018) 1 SCC 797: [2018] 1 SCR 112 - relied on.

1.3 The respondent who wishes to join the police force mustbe person of utmost rectitude and have impeccable characterand integrity. person having criminal antecedents would notbe fit in this category. The employer is having right to considerthe nature of acquittal or decide until he is completely exoneratedbecause even possibility of his taking to the life of crimes posesa threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order,therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in thesematters to the Screening Committee and the decision of theCommittee would be final unless mala fide. If person is acquittedgiving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an offenceinvolving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned hostile,it would not automatically entitle him for the employment, thattoo in disciplined force. The employer is having right to considerhis candidature in terms of the circulars issued by the ScreeningCommittee. The mere disclosure of the offences alleged and theresult of the trial is not sufficient. In the said situation, theemployer cannot be compelled to give appointment to thecandidate. Both the Single Bench and the Division Bench of theHigh Court have not considered the said legal position in theorders impugned. The impugned orders passed by the SingleJudge of the High Court in writ petition and Division Bench inwrit appeal are set-aside. [Paras 21-23][669-F-G; 670-A-C]

Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and Others (2016) 8SCC 471 : [2016] 7 SCR 445; Commissioner of Policevs. Raj Kumar 2021(9) SCALE 713 – relied on.

Commissioner of Police, State of Madhya Pradesh andOthers vs. Abhijit Singh Pawar (2018) 18 SCC 733 :[2018] 13 SCR 1133; State of Rajasthan and Othersvs. Love Kush Meena 2021(4) SCALE 634; Rahul Yadavvs CISF and another: 178 (2011) DLT 263; PannaMehta vs. State of M.P. (2002) 4 M.P.H.T. 226; RobertStuart Wauchope vs. Emperor (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168– referred to.

Case Law Referencerelied onPara 7

[2012] 11 SCR 174

ABC

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.6238 of

CFrom the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.2013 of the High Courtof Madhya Pradesh at Indore in Writ Appeal No.1090 of 2013.

Ms. Madhvi Divan, ASG, Ms. V. Mohana, Sr. Adv., ParthivGowswamy, Ayush Puri, Nachiketa Joshi, B. Krishna Prasad, Advs. forthe Appellants.DAvinash Sharma, Adv. for the Respondent.The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

J. K. MAHESHWARI, J.

1. Leave granted.E

2. Questioning the validity of the order passed in Writ Appeal No.1090 of 2013 on 20.12.2013 upholding the order of the learned SingleJudge passed on 27.09.2013 in Writ Petition No. 3897 of 2013, this appealhas been preferred.

3. The facts unfolded in the present case are that the respondentFwas found involved in an offence of kidnapping of Nilesh for demand ofransom. An FIR was registered against him on 22.8.2009. Afterinvestigation challan was filed, and he was tried before the SessionsCourt, Jhabua, Madhya Pradesh in Sessions Case Serial No. 1 of 2010for the charge framed against him under Sections 347/327/323/506 (Part-GII) and 364A IPC. The Sessions Court acquitted him for the said chargebecause the complainant, who was abducted, turned hostile in the Court.Thereafter, respondent applied for the post of Constable in CentralIndustrial Security Force (for short “CISF”) and got selected throughthe Staff Selection Commission (for short “SSC”). An offer ofappointment for provisional selection to the post of Constable/GD wasH

issued to the respondent on 30.3.2012, subject to the conditions given inthe agreement form. The respondent was required to furnish thedocuments including attestation forms, certificate of character, characterand antecedent certificate from local Station House Officer. Therespondent, while submitting the attestation form, specified the registrationof above-said criminal case and acquittal from the charges in trial bythe competent court.

4. As the offer of appointment was conditional, therefore, in termsof the CISF Circular No. E-EG7023/TRG.SEC/ADM.I/CIRCULARS/2010-1157 dated 31.03.2010. he was not allowed to join training. TheMinistry of Home Affairs vide letter No. I-45020/6/2010-Pers.II issuedthe guidelines on 01.02.2012 for consideration of the cases of thecandidates against whom criminal cases were registered or tried by thecourts.

5. In furtherance to the said guidelines, the case of the respondentwas referred to AIG(L&R), CISF Hqrs, New Delhi with an informationto IG/TS, CISF(TS) NISA, Hyderabad vide letter No.F37023/CISF/RTC(D)/Trg./CBG/2012/2656 dated 04.05.2012. The Standing ScreeningCommittee assembled on 27.07.2012 and examined the cases of 89candidates including the respondent and on 15.10.2012 passed an orderthat respondent was not eligible for appointment.

6. Questioning the validity of the said action and asking forconsequential reliefs, Writ Petition No. 3897 of 2013 was filed beforethe High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Indore Bench. The learned SingleJudge, vide order dated 27.09.2013, allowed the Writ Petition directingthe respondents therein to issue an order for sending the respondentherein on training commencing with effect from 21.10.2013. The Courtfurther held that he would be entitled for all consequential benefitsincluding seniority, notional fixation of salary etc. but back wages weredenied. The said order was assailed before the Division Bench by filingWrit Appeal, but it was also dismissed, which led to filing the presentappeal through the department.

7. The validity of the order passed by the learned Single Judgeand also by the Division Bench have been assailed, inter alia, contending,until the respondent is honourably acquitted from the charge involvingmoral turpitude and the decision of the Screening Committee is not passedmala fide, interference in such decision is not warranted. Reliance isplaced on the decision of this Court in Inspector General of Police &

AAnother vs. S. Samuthiram (2013) 1 SCC 598 to clarify the meaningof ‘honourable acquittal’.

8. It is argued that merely making disclosure of the criminalcase in the attestation form is not sufficient. As per the Policy Guidelinesdated 01.02.2012, in view of involvement of the respondent in heinousBoffences including the offences under Sections 327/347/364A IPC, hewould not be entitled for appointment until honourably acquitted. Eventhough, the respondent has been provisionally selected vide letter dated30.03.2012, issued by the Chairman of the Recruitment Board, but mereacquittal giving benefit of doubt, as the witnesses have turned hostile,would not make the candidate suitable for appointment. The impugnedCorders passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh are contrary to thelaw laid down in the case of Avtar Singh vs. Union of India and Others(2016)8 SCC 471, Commissioner of Police, New Delhi and Anothervs. Mehar Singh (2013)7 SCC 685, State of Madhya Pradesh andOthers vs. Abhijit Singh Pawar (2018) 18 SCC 733, State of RajasthanDand Others vs. Love Kush Meena 2021(4) SCALE 634 andCommissioner of Police vs. Raj Kumar 2021(9) SCALE 713. It isurged that acquittal in criminal case is not conclusive for suitability ofthe candidate for appointment. Thus, unless the respondent is honourablyacquitted in criminal case, it would not automatically entitle him forappointment to the post.E

9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent contended thatthe Single Judge as well as the Division Bench of the High Court ofMadhya Pradesh have considered the judgment of Delhi High Court inthe case of Rahul Yadav vs CISFand another, 178(2011) DLT 263,where the High Court observed that the situation and background of theFcandidates hailing from the rural areas were relevant factors forconsideration. Mere registration of criminal case and acquittal fromthe said charges, would not disentitle him from appointment. The specialleave petition preferred against the said judgment has been dismissed bythis Court on 05.10.2012. On the point of defining the ‘acquittal’, theGjudgment in Panna Mehta vs. State of M.P. (2002) 4 M.P.H.T. 226 hasbeen relied and urged that if the respondent has not concealed the materialfact and specified details in the attestation form regarding the criminalcase, trial and its result, it would not disentitle him from appointment tothe post, in particular when in Bombay High Court, in the case of similarlysituated person Ramesh has been sent on training. It is urged that theHimpugned order passed by the High Court is in conformity to law. The

judgment in Panna Mehta (supra) is, however, distinguishable on factsin that similarly situated person had been sent on training.

10. After having heard learned counsel for the parties at length,the question which arises in the present appeal is whether the decisionof the Screening Committee rejecting the candidature of the respondent,when there was no allegation of malice against the Screening Committeeand the respondent-writ petitioner had been acquitted of serious charges,inter alia, of kidnapping for ransom as some prosecution witnesses hadturned hostile, ought to have been interfered with.

11. While addressing the question, as argued the meaning ofexpression ‘acquittal’ is required to be looked into. The expressions‘honourable acquittal’, ‘acquitted of blame’ and ‘fully acquitted’ areunknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure or the Indian Penal Code.It has been developed by judicial pronouncements. In the case of Stateof Assam & Another vs. Raghava Rajgopalachari, (1972) 7 SLR 44,the effect of the word ‘honourably acquitted’ has been considered in thecontext of the Assam Fundament Rules (FR) 54 (a) for entitlement offull pay and allowance if the employee is not dismissed. The Court hasreferred the judgment of Robert Stuart Wauchope vs. Emperor reportedin (1934) 61 ILR Cal. 168, in the context of expression ‘honourablyacquitted’, Lord Williams, J. observed as thus:“The expression “honourably acquitted” is one which is unknownto courts of justice. Apparently it is form of order used in courtsmartial and other extra judicial tribunals. We said in our judgmentthat we accepted the explanation given by the Appellant believedit to be true and considered that it ought to have been accepted bythe Government authorities and by the magistrate. Further wedecided that the Appellant had not misappropriated the moniesreferred to in the charge. It is thus clear that the effect of ourjudgment was that the Appellant was acquitted as fully andcompletely as it was possible for him to be acquitted. Presumably,this is equivalent to what Government authorities term “honourablyacquitted”. “

12. In the case of R.P. Kapur vs. Union of India AIR 1964 SC787, it is observed and held by Wanchoo, J., as thus:

“Even in case of acquittal, proceedings may follow where theacquittal is other than honourable.”

A13. In view of the above, if the acquittal is directed by the courton consideration of facts and material evidence on record with the findingof false implication or the finding that the guilt had not been proved,accepting the explanation of accused as just, it be treated as honourableacquittal. In other words, if prosecution could not prove the guilt forother reasons and not ‘honourably’ acquitted by the Court, it be treatedBother than ‘honourable’, and proceedings may follow.

14. The expression ‘honourable acquittal’ has been considered inthe case of S. Samuthiram (supra) after considering the judgments ofReserve Bank of India vs. Bhopal Singh Panchal (1994)1 SCC 541,R.P. Kapur (supra), Raghava Rajagopalachari (supra); this CourtCobserved that the standard of proof required for holding person guiltyby criminal court and enquiry conducted by way of disciplinaryproceeding is entirely different. In criminal case, the onus of establishingguilt of the accused is on the prosecution, until proved beyond reasonabledoubt. In case, the prosecution failed to take steps to examine crucialDwitnesses or the witnesses turned hostile, such acquittal would fall within

the purview of giving benefit of doubt and the accused cannot be treatedas honourably acquitted by the criminal court. While, in case ofdepartmental proceedings, the guilt may be proved on the basis ofpreponderance and probabilities, it is thus observed that acquittal givingbenefit of doubt would not automatically lead to reinstatement of

Ecandidate unless the rules provide so.

15. Recently, this Court in Union Territory, ChandigarhAdministration and Ors. vs. Pradeep Kumar and Anr. (2018) 1 SCC797, relying upon the judgment of S. Samuthiram (supra) said thatacquittal in criminal case is not conclusive of the suitability of theFcandidates on the post concerned. It is observed, acquittal or dischargeof person cannot always be inferred that he was falsely involved or hehad no criminal antecedent. The said issue has further been consideredin Mehar Singh (supra) holding non-examination of key witnesses leadingto acquittal is not honourable acquittal, in fact, it is by giving benefit ofGdoubt. The Court said nature of acquittal is necessary for coreconsideration. If acquittal is not honourable, the candidates are not suitablefor government service and are to be avoided. The relevant factors andthe nature of offence, extent of his involvement, propensity of such personto indulge in similar activities in future, are the relevant aspects forconsideration by the Screening Committee, which is competent to decideHall these issues.16. In the present case, the charges were framed against therespondent for the offences punishable under Sections 347/327/323/506(Part-II) and 364A IPC. He was acquitted after trial vide judgmentdated 19.03.2010 by the Sessions Judge, Jhabua because the personkidnapped Nilesh and also his wife have not supported the case ofprosecution. As per prosecution, the complainant was beaten by therespondent and the said fact found support from the evidence of doctor.Therefore, it appears that the Committee was of the view that acquittalof the respondent, in the facts of the present case, cannot be termed as‘honourable acquittal’ and the said acquittal may be treated by givingbenefit of doubt.

17. The law with regard to the effect and consequence of theacquittal, concealment of criminal case on appointments etc. has beensettled in the case of Avtar Singh (supra), wherein

three-Judge Bench of this Court decided, as thus:

“38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain andreconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaiddiscussion, we summarize our conclusion thus:

“38.1 Information given to the employer by candidate as toconviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of criminal case,whether before or after entering into service must be true andthere should be no suppression or false mention of requiredinformation.

38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellationof candidature for giving false information, the employer may takenotice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while givingsuch information.

38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the Governmentorders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the timeof taking the decision.

38.4. In case there is suppression or false information ofinvolvement in criminal case where conviction or acquittal hadalready been recorded before filling of the application/verificationform and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any ofthe following recourse appropriate to the case may be adopted :

38.4.1. In case trivial in nature in which conviction had beenrecorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for petty

offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbentunfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignoresuch suppression of fact or false information by condoning thelapse.

38.4.2 Where conviction has been recorded in case which is notBtrivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminateservices of the employee.

38.4.3 If acquittal had already been recorded in case involvingmoral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technicalground and it is not 3 case of clean acquittal, or benefit ofCreasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider allrelevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriatedecision as to the continuance of the employee.

38.5. In case where the employee has made declaration truthfullyof concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right toDconsider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint thecandidate.

38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in characterverification form regarding pendency of criminal case of trivialnature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in itsEdiscretion may appoint the candidate subject to decision of suchcase.

38.7. In case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect tomultiple pending cases such false information by itself will assumesignificance and an employer may pass appropriate ordercancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment ofFa 4 person against whom multiple criminal cases were pendingmay not be proper.

38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidateat the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact andthe appointing authority would take decision after considering theGseriousness of the crime.

38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holdingDepartmental enquiry would be necessary before passing orderof termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppressionor submitting false information in verification form.

38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only suchinformation which was required to be specifically mentioned hasto be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comesto knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in anobjective manner while addressing the question of fitness.However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis ofsuppression or 5 submitting false information as to fact whichwas not even asked for.

38.11. Before person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestiofalsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him.”

18. In view of the above, in the facts of the present case, as perparas 38.3, 38.4.3 and 38.5, it is clear that the employer is having right toconsider the suitability of the candidate as per government orders/instructions/rules at the time of taking the decision for induction of thecandidate in employment. Acquittal on technical ground in respect of theoffences of heinous/serious nature, which is not clean acquittal, theemployer may have right to consider all relevant facts available as tothe antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuanceof the employee. Even in case, truthful declaration regarding concludedtrial has been made by the employee, still the employer has the right toconsider antecedents and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

19. If we look into the facts of the present case, the instructionsof the Home Department dated 1.02.2012, prevalent at the time ofselection and appointment specify such candidate would not be consideredfor recruitment. In Circular No. 2/2010 dated 31.03.2010, issued by theOffice of the Training Sector, National Industrial Security Academy,Central Industrial Security Force (Ministry of Home Affairs), it is clarifiedif candidate is found involved in any criminal case, whether it is finalizedor pending, the candidate may not be allowed to join without furtherinstructions from the headquarter. After seeking instructions from theheadquarter, the Standing Committee has taken the decision on 15.10.2012that because of acquittal giving benefit of doubt, the respondent-writpetitioner was not considered eligible for appointment in CISF.

20. In the aforesaid fact, guidance can further be taken from thejudgment of Mehar Singh (supra), in paras 23, 34, 35, this Court observed,as thus:

23. careful perusal of the policy leads us to conclude that theScreening Committee would be entitled to keep persons involvedin grave cases of moral turpitude out of the police force even ifthey are acquitted or discharged if it feels that the acquittal ordischarge is on technical grounds or not honourable. The ScreeningCommittee will be within its rights to cancel the candidature of acandidate if it finds that the acquittal is based on some seriousflaw in the conduct of the prosecution case or is the result ofmaterial witnesses turning hostile. It is only experienced officersof the Screening Committee who will be able to judge whetherthe acquitted or discharged candidate is likely to revert to similaractivities in future with more strength and vigour, if appointed, tothe post in police force. The Screening Committee will have toconsider the nature and extent of such person’s involvement inthe crime and his propensity of becoming cause for worseningthe law and order situation rather than maintaining it. In our opinion,this policy framed by the Delhi Police does not merit anyinterference from this Court as its object appears to be to ensurethat only persons with impeccable character enter the police force.

34. The respondents are trying to draw mileage from the fact thatin their application and/or attestation form they have disclosedtheir involvement in criminal case. We do not see how this factimproves their case. Disclosure of these facts in the application/attestation form is an essential requirement. An aspirant isexpected to state these facts honestly. Honesty and integrity areinbuilt requirements of the police force. The respondents shouldnot, therefore, expect to score any brownie points because of thisdisclosure. Besides, this has no relevance to the point in issue. Itbears repetition to state that while deciding whether personagainst whom criminal case was registered and who was lateracquitted or discharged should be appointed to post in the policeforce, what is relevant is the nature of the offence, the extent ofhis involvement, whether the acquittal was clean acquittal or anacquittal by giving benefit of doubt because the witnesses turnedhostile or because of some serious flaw in the prosecution, andthe propensity of such person to indulge in similar activities infuture. This decision, in our opinion, can only be taken by theScreening Committee created for that purpose by the Delhi Police.If the Screening Committee’s decision is not mala fide or actuatedby extraneous considerations, then, it cannot be questioned.35. The police force is disciplined force. It shoulders the greatresponsibility of maintaining law and order and public order in thesociety. People repose great faith and confidence in it. It must beworthy of that confidence. candidate wishing to join the policeforce must be person of utmost rectitude. He must haveimpeccable character and integrity. person having criminalantecedents will not fit in this category. Even if he is acquitted ordischarged in the criminal case, that acquittal or discharge orderwill have to be examined to see whether he has been completelyexonerated in the case because even possibility of his taking tothe life of crimes poses threat to the discipline of the policeforce. The Standing Order, therefore, has entrusted the task oftaking decisions in these matters to the Screening Committee.The decision of the Screening Committee must be taken as finalunless it is mala fide. In recent times, the image of the policeforce is tarnished. Instances of police personnel behaving in awayward manner by misusing power are in public domain andare matter of concern. The reputation of the police force hastaken beating. In such situation, we would not like to dilute theimportance and efficacy of mechanism like the ScreeningCommittee created by the Delhi Police to ensure that personswho are likely to erode its credibility do not enter the police force.At the same time, the Screening Committee must be alive to theimportance of trust reposed in it and must treat all candidateswith even hand.

21. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear the respondent who wishesto join the police force must be person of utmost rectitude and haveimpeccable character and integrity. person having criminalantecedents would not be fit in this category. The employer is havingright to consider the nature of acquittal or decide until he is completelyexonerated because even possibility of his taking to the life of crimesposes threat to the discipline of the police force. The Standing Order,therefore, has entrusted the task of taking decisions in these matters tothe Screening Committee and the decision of the Committee would befinal unless mala fide. In the case of Pradeep Kumar (supra), thisCourt has taken the same view, as reiterated in the case of MeharSingh (supra). The same view has again been reiterated by this Court inthe case of Raj Kumar (supra).

ABC

A22. As discussed hereinabove, the law is well-settled. If personis acquitted giving him the benefit of doubt, from the charge of an offenceinvolving moral turpitude or because the witnesses turned hostile, it wouldnot automatically entitle him for the employment, that too in disciplinedforce. The employer is having right to consider his candidature in termsof the circulars issued by the Screening Committee. The mere disclosureBof the offences alleged and the result of the trial is not sufficient. In thesaid situation, the employer cannot be compelled to give appointment tothe candidate. Both the Single Bench and the Division Bench of theHigh Court have not considered the said legal position, as discussedabove in the orders impugned. Therefore, the impugned orders passedCby the learned Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition No. 3897of 2013 and Division Bench in Writ Appeal No. 1090 of 2013 are notsustainable in law, as discussed hereinabove.

23. Accordingly, this appeal is hereby allowed and the impugnedorders are set-aside. No order as to costs.

Divya Pandey

Appeal allowed.