DR. U. N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER & ORS. versus ASSAM ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION & ANR.

[2021] 10 S.C.R.

ADR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER & ORS.

ASSAM ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION & ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1967 of 2009)

BOCTOBER 26, 2021

[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]

Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Assam Agricultural ProduceMarket Act, 1972 – s.21 – Levy of cess on the agricultural producebought or sold in the notified market area – Deeming fiction – WritCpetitions filed by respondent no.1-Association – Rules struck down– s.21A inserted by 2006 amending Act – Challenged – DivisionBench of High Court upheld s.21 and held that the deeming fictionwould apply only where trader fails to establish direct evidenceof sale or purchase having been undertaken outside the notifiedDmarket area; Committee constituted – Contempt alleged – Appellantsheld guilty – On appeal, held: Civil contempt means willfuldisobedience of decision of the Court – Willful disobedience isrelevant – Merely because subordinate official acted in disregardof an order passed by the Court, liability cannot be fastened on ahigher official in the absence of knowledge – Vicarious liability asEa principle cannot be applied to case of contempt – Further, HighCourt on the earlier occasion while dealing with the challenge madeto s.21 made categorical assertion that it did not wish to go intothe disputed questions of fact – However, in the order underchallenge it was done – finding was given on the documentsFproduced by the respondent no.1 which could at best be pieces ofevidence to be appreciated by the committee constituted – In caseswhere cess was levied, individual members of the respondent no.1could have made their challenge before the Committee – Orderpassed by the High Court in contempt case set aside.

GContempt of Courts Act, 1971 – Standard of proof – Held:Proof beyond reasonable doubt is required since the proceedingsare quasi-criminal in nature.

Contempt of Court – Disputed questions of facts – Held: Whiledealing with contempt petition, the Court is not expected to conductHa roving inquiry and go beyond the very judgment which was

allegedly violated – Said principle has to be applied with more vigorwhen disputed questions of facts are involved.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 After the order under challenge before thisCourt, the provision underwent further change having beenrepealed by an ordinance followed by an appropriateenactment. The Court is dealing with civil contempt. TheContempt of Courts Act, 1971 explains civil contempt to meana willful disobedience of decision of the Court. Therefore, whatis relevant is the “willful” disobedience. Knowledge acquiressubstantial importance qua contempt order. Merely because asubordinate official acted in disregard of an order passed by theCourt, liability cannot be fastened on higher official in theabsence of knowledge. When two views are possible, the elementof willfulness vanishes as it involves mental element. It is adeliberate, conscious and intentional act. What is required is aproof beyond reasonable doubt since the proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature. Similarly, when distinct mechanism isprovided and that too, in the same judgment alleged to have beenviolated, party has to exhaust the same before approaching thecourt in exercise of its jurisdiction under the Contempt of CourtsAct, 1971. It is well open to the said party to contend that thebenefit of the order passed has not been actually given, throughseparate proceedings while seeking appropriate relief butcertainly not by way of contempt proceeding. While dealing witha contempt petition, the Court is not expected to conduct rovinginquiry and go beyond the very judgment which was allegedlyviolated. The said principle has to be applied with more vigorwhen disputed questions of facts are involved and they were raisedearlier but consciously not dealt with by creating specificforum to decide the original proceedings. [Paras 5, 8][490-G-H;492-C-G]Hukum Chand Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal, 2020 SCCOnline SC 438; Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16SCC 204 : [2014] 1 SCR 538 – relied on.

1.2 The High Court on the earlier occasion while dealingwith the challenge made to Section 21 of the Act, made

Acategorical assertion that it did not wish to go into the disputedquestions of fact. However, in the order under challenge it wasdone. finding has been given on the documents produced bythe respondent no.1 which could at best be pieces of evidence tobe appreciated by the committee constituted already. It is thespecific case of the appellants that they did not violate theBdirectives of the court. There is no material to either establishtheir knowledge on the action of their subordinates, or that theyacted in collusion with each other. Vicarious liability as principlecannot be applied to case of contempt. The question as towhether the drivers of two members of the respondent no.1Cshowed the order passed by the court and the documentsproduced are true and genuine being in the realm of adjudication,ought not to have been taken up by the High Court whileexercising contempt jurisdiction. It is the respondent no.1 whonot being satisfied with the order passed by the High Court, filedthe special leave petition. Even in the communications sent apartDfrom the Press Note, it is nowhere stated that the order passedby the court could be violated. The subsequent developmentsalso shall enure to the benefit of the appellants. In cases wherecess was levied, individual members of the respondent no.1 couldhave made their challenge before the committee. The entireEexercise of the High Court is not warranted and the aggrievedmembers of the respondent no.1 could have been well advisedto seek the alternative remedy open to them including redressalthrough the committee. The order passed by the High Court on23.10.2009 in Contempt Case No.401 of 2008 is set aside. [Paras10,11][497-D-H; 498-A-B]F

Ashok Paper Kamgar Union vs. Godha and Ors., (2013)11 SCC 1; Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. vs. State ofBihar, (1999) 7 SCC 569 : [1999] Suppl. SCR 725;Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs. United India InsuranceCompany Ltd. and Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 770 : [2010]G13 SCR 599; Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. vs. HirakGhosh and Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 21 : [2002] 2 SCR 346;India Airports Employees Union vs. Ranjan Chatterjeeand Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 537 : [1999] 1 SCR 326;Director of Education, Uttaranchal vs. Ved Prakash

DR. U.N. BORA, EX. CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER v. ASSAM

ROLLER FLOUR MILLS ASSOCIATION

Joshi and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 98 : [2005] 1 Suppl. SCR620; Union of India and Ors. vs. Subedar Devassy PV,(2006) 1 SCC 613 : [2006] 1 SCR 303; MrityunjoyDas and Anr. vs. Sayed Hasibur Tahaman and Ors.,(2001) 3 SCC 739 : [2001] 2 SCR 471; Bal KishanGiri vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 7 SCC 280:[2014] 6 SCR 545 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal AppealNo.1967 of 2009.

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.10.2009 of the High Courtof Gauhati in Contempt Case No.401 of 2008.

Arunabh Chowdhury, Ms. Barnali Chowdhury, Dechen WangdiLachungpa, Ms. Pallavi Langar, Rahul Pratap, M/s Coac, Advs. for theAppellants.

Hrishikesh Baruah, Ms. Radhika Gupta, Ms. Akangsha Manik,Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Manish Goswami, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Advs.for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. M. SUNDRESH, J.

1. The present appeal has been filed against the order of theDivision Bench of the High Court finding the appellants guilty of willfuldisobedience of the order passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 5491 of

A2001 etc. dated 12.09.2008 in respect to the levy made while upholdingSection 21 of the Assam Agricultural Produce Market Act, 1972.

2. Pending the appeal, the first appellant died on 27.02.2017.Taking note of the aforesaid fact, the proceedings as against him weredeclared as abated by the order of this court dated 07.10.2021.

B3. We have heard the arguments of the counsels at the Bar andperused the documents filed along with the written arguments.

FACTS:

4. While leapfrogging unnecessary facts, brief sketch is furnishedhereunder:C

a)On 03.09.1974, the Assam Agricultural Produce MarketAct, 1972 came into the statute book. Section 21 of the Actconferred power on the marketing committees or the AssamState Agricultural Marketing Board (hereinafter referredto as “the Board”) to levy cess on the agricultural produceDbought or sold in the notified market area, at the prescribedrate. Explanation-I appended to the said provision broughtin deeming fiction. Rules were enacted in exercise of thepower conferred under Section 49 of the Act.

b)Writ petitions were filed by the respondent no.1-AssociationEamong others before the High Court on the premise that itsmembers purchased the agricultural produce outside theState and thus, no cess is leviable. Rules were struck downleading to the introduction of the Amendment Act, 2000,amending Section 21 of the Act while inserting Section 21A.A challenge made by the Board to the decision of the FullFBench dated 04.04.2001 before this Court resulted in theorder dated 08.12.2005, inter alia holding that in view of thesubsequent developments, there is no need to go into theissues.

c)Section 21A was inserted by the amending Act, 2006Gfacilitating the Board to levy and collect cess for themarketing committees in the notified market areas in additionto their existing power. This amendment was put intochallenge in the batch of writ petitions before the DivisionBench of the High Court. While upholding the constitutionalHvalidity vide judgment dated 12.09.2008, it has been held

that the deeming fiction would apply only to such of thosecases where trader fails to establish that there is directevidence of sale or purchase having been undertaken outsidethe notified market area. It was further held that disputedquestions including that of refund cannot be gone into in awrit petition invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India,and such disputes can be dealt with by the committeeconstituted.

d)Alleging that the orders passed by the Division Bench withrespect to the direct evidence produced by the members ofthe respondent no.1 were not looked into and scrutinizedon purpose while levying cess, contempt petition was filedin Contempt Case (Civil) No.401 of 2008. Incidentally, therespondent no. 1 also filed Special Leave Petition (Civil)No. 11317 of 2009 challenging the order of the DivisionBench dated 12.09.2008, which was converted into CivilAppeal No. 9655 of 2013, wherein, leave was granted bythis court vide order dated 25.10.2013.

e)In the aforesaid contempt petition, the Division Bench videthe impugned order dated 23.10.2009 took note of certaindocuments produced by two members of the respondentno.1, such as sale invoices, lorry challans, tax challans,insurance receipts etc. It went into the factual assertionsmade, notwithstanding the committee constituted by it earlierfor the aforesaid purpose and accordingly, hauled all theappellants for committing willful disobedience.

f)Against the aforesaid order punishing the appellants forhaving committed contumacious act, Special LeavePetition (Civil) No.10538 of 2010 was filed by the Boardand on grant of leave the same was registered as CivilAppeal No. 9656 of 2013. This Court has passed thefollowing order on 30.03.2010 while issuing notice in theaforesaid appeal filed by the Board when the matter waspending as special leave petition:

“Permission to file SLP is granted.

Issue notice on the application for condonation of delayas well as on the special leave petitions.

Assam State Agricultural Marketing Board is permittedto collect tax in accordance with the Judgment passedby the Division Bench of High Court dated 12.9.2008,uninfluenced by the order passed in the contemptproceedings dated 23.10.2009.

Post along with SLP(C) No. 11317 of 2009.”

g)The special leave petitions filed by the respondent no.1challenging the original order of the Division Bench wastaken up as Civil Appeal Nos. 9655 of 2013, 9657-9665 of2013 and 9666 of 2013 and accordingly the order datedC29.09.2021 was passed, which is appositely referredhereunder:

“Learned Counsel for the Appellants state that theimpugned Act has been repealed by an Ordinance issuedon 13.07.2020 and subsequently Act has been broughtin place.

In view of the aforesaid, the issue sought to be debatedin the present appeals have become academic and thusit is not disputed that the appeals really do not survivefor consideration.

ECivil appeals are disposed of accordingly. Pendingapplications also stand disposed of.”

h)After the order dated 12.09.2008 passed by the DivisionBench upholding Section 21 of the Act, there were exchangeof communications between the appellants and theFrespondents. While the respondent no.1 alleged violation ofthe order passed, the appellants contended that the actionwas only taken in tune with the mandate of the Board underSection 21 of the Act and the remedy, if any, to the membersof the respondent no.1 would be before the Committeeconstituted in pursuance of the said decision.G

5. Thus, much water has flown under the bridge after the orderunder challenge before us. The provision underwent further changehaving been repealed by an ordinance followed by an appropriateenactment. In light of the aforesaid factual scenario, we shall proceedwith the case.H

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANTS:

6. Learned counsel appearing for the appellants submitted thatthe second appellant was transferred on 23.07.2008 and the appellantno. 1 was in-charge only till 21.01.2009. The first appellant died on27.02.2017. There is no willful and deliberate violation of the orderinvolved. The High Court has erred in going into the facts in appreciatingevidence. It exceeded its jurisdiction which it declined to exercise evenwhile invoking Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It could haverelegated the members of the respondent no.1 to go before the committeeconstituted. There is absolutely no material to implicate the appellantswith the alleged action of their subordinates. The concept of vicariousliability is alien to contempt jurisdiction. Unconditional apologies werealso rendered before the High Court. The respondent no.1 is the onewho simultaneously assailed the order dated 12.09.2008 passed by theDivision Bench, before this Court, while approaching the High Courtunder its contempt jurisdiction. Even otherwise, in light of the subsequentdevelopments, the appeal deserves to be allowed. On the aforesaidsubmissions, the appellants placed reliance upon various decisions ofthis Court in the case of:

•Ashok Paper Kamgar Union vs. Godha and Ors., (2013)11 SCC 1

•Kapildeo Prasad Sah and Ors. vs. State of Bihar, (1999)E7 SCC 569

•Dinesh Kumar Gupta vs. United India InsuranceCompany Ltd. and Ors., (2010) 12 SCC 770

•Anil Ratan Sarkar and Ors. vs. Hirak Ghosh and Ors.,(2002) 4 SCC 21

•India Airports Employees Union vs. RanjanChatterjee and Anr., (1999) 2 SCC 537

•Director of Education, Uttaranchal vs. Ved PrakashJoshi and Ors., (2005) 6 SCC 98

•Union of India and Ors. vs. Subedar Devassy PV, (2006)G1 SCC 613

•Mrityunjoy Das and Anr. vs. Sayed Hasibur Tahamanand Ors., (2001) 3 SCC 739

•Bal Kishan Giri vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 7SCC 280

ASUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENTS:

7. Learned counsel appearing for the respondents submitted thatthe press release followed by the failure on the part of officials workingunder the appellants would clearly show the intention to circumvent theorders passed by the Court. Materials were accordingly produced. It isBa case of deliberate attempt to overcome the judgment of the Court,notwithstanding the adequate knowledge. As the High Court hasconsidered the relevant materials, there is no need to interfere with thereasoned order passed.

DISCUSSION:C

8. We are dealing with civil contempt. The Contempt of CourtsAct, 1971 explains civil contempt to mean willful disobedience of adecision of the Court. Therefore, what is relevant is the “willful”disobedience. Knowledge acquires substantial importance qua contemptorder. Merely because subordinate official acted in disregard of anDorder passed by the Court, liability cannot be fastened on higherofficial in the absence of knowledge. When two views are possible, theelement of willfulness vanishes as it involves mental element. It is adeliberate, conscious and intentional act. What is required is proofbeyond reasonable doubt since the proceedings are quasi-criminal innature. Similarly, when distinct mechanism is provided and that too, inEthe same judgment alleged to have been violated, party has to exhaustthe same before approaching the court in exercise of its jurisdiction underthe Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. It is well open to the said party tocontend that the benefit of the order passed has not been actually given,through separate proceedings while seeking appropriate relief butFcertainly not by way of contempt proceeding. While dealing with acontempt petition, the Court is not expected to conduct roving inquiryand go beyond the very judgment which was allegedly violated. The saidprinciple has to be applied with more vigor when disputed questions offacts are involved and they were raised earlier but consciously not dealtwith by creating specific forum to decide the original proceedings.G

9. We do not wish to reiterate the aforesaid settled principle oflaw except by quoting the reasoned decision of this Court in HukumChand Deswal v. Satish Raj Deswal, 2020 SCC Online SC 438 whereinthe celebrated judgment in Ram Kishan v. Tarun Bajaj, (2014) 16 SCC204, has been quoted. The following paragraphs would govern theHaforesaid principle:

“18. At the outset, we must advert to the contours delineated bythis court for initiating civil contempt action in Ram Kishan vs.Tarun Bajaj & Ors. In paragraphs 11, 12 and 15 of the reporteddecision, this Court noted thus:

“11. The contempt jurisdiction conferred on to the law courtspower to punish an offender for his wilful disobedience/contumacious conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law, forthe reason that respect and authority commanded by the courtsof law are the greatest guarantee to an ordinary citizen that hisrights shall be protected and the entire democratic fabric ofthe society 5 (2014) 16 SCC 204 18 will crumble down if therespect of the judiciary is undermined. Undoubtedly, thecontempt jurisdiction is powerful weapon in the hands of thecourts of law but that by itself operates as string of cautionand unless, thus, otherwise satisfied beyond reasonable doubt,it would neither be fair nor reasonable for the law courts toexercise jurisdiction under the Act. The proceedings are quasicriminal in nature, and therefore, standard of proof required inthese proceedings is beyond all reasonable doubt. It wouldrather be hazardous to impose sentence for contempt on theauthorities in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction on mereprobabilities. (Vide V.G. Nigam v. Kedar Nath Gupta, (1992)4 SCC 697, Chhotu Ram v. Urvashi Gulati, (2001) 7 SCC530, Anil Ratan Sarkar v. Hirak Ghosh, (2002) 4 SCC 21,Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya, (2004) 1 SCC360, Sahdeo v. State of U.P., (2010) 3 SCC 705 and NationalFertilizers Ltd. v. Tuncay Alankus, (2013) 9 SCC 600.

12. Thus, in order to punish contemnor, it has to be establishedthat disobedience of the order is “wilful”. The word “wilful”introduces mental element and hence, requires looking intothe mind of person/contemnor by gauging his actions, whichis an indication of one’s state of mind. “Wilful” means knowinglyintentional, conscious, calculated and deliberate with fullknowledge of consequences flowing therefrom. It excludescasual, accidental, bona fide or unintentional acts or genuineinability. Wilful acts does not encompass involuntarily ornegligent actions. The act has to be done with “bad purposeor without justifiable excuse or stubbornly, obstinately orperversely”. Wilful act is to be distinguished from an act done

carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It doesnot include any act done negligently or involuntarily. Thedeliberate conduct of person means that he knows what heis doing and intends to do the same. Therefore, there has to bea calculated action with evil motive on his part. Even if there isa disobedience of an order, but such disobedience is the resultof some compelling circumstances under which it was notpossible for the contemnor to comply with the order, thecontemnor cannot be punished. “Committal or sequestrationwill not be ordered unless contempt involves degree of defaultor misconduct.” (Vide S. Sundaram Pillai v. V.R.Attabiraman, (1985) 1 SCC 591, Rakapalli Raja Ram GopalaRao v. Naragani Govinda Sehararao, (1989) 4 SCC 255,Niaz Mohammad v. State of 19 Haryana, (1994) 6 SCC 332,Chordia Automobiles v. S. Moosa, (2000) 3 SCC 282, AshokPaper Kamgar Union v. Dharam Godha, (2003) 11 SCC 1,State of Orissa v. Mohd. Illiyas, (2006) 1 SCC 275 andUniworth Textiles Ltd. v. CCE, (2013) 9 SCC 753.

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15. It is well settled principle of law that if two interpretationsare possible, and if the action is not contumacious, contemptproceeding would not be maintainable. The effect and purportof the order is to be taken into consideration and the samemust be read in its entirety. Therefore, the element ofwillingness is an indispensable requirement to bring home thecharge within the meaning of the Act. [See Sushila RajeHolkar v. Anil Kak, (2008) 14 SCC 392 and Three CheersEntertainment (P) Ltd. v. CESC Ltd., (2008) 16 SCC 592.”

Similarly, in R.N. Dey & Ors. vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik & Ors.,this Court expounded in paragraph 7 as follows:

“7. We may reiterate that the weapon of contempt is not to beused in abundance or misused. Normally, it cannot be used forexecution of the decree or implementation of an order for whichalternative remedy in law is provided for. Discretion given tothe court is to be exercised for maintenance of the court’sdignity and majesty of law. Further, an aggrieved party has noright to insist that the court should exercise such jurisdiction as

contempt is between contemner and the court. It is true thatin the present case, the High Court has kept the matter pendingand has ordered that it should be heard along with the firstappeal. But, at the same time, it is to be noticed that under thecoercion of contempt proceeding, appellants cannot be directedto pay the compensation amount which they are disputing byasserting that claimants were not the owners of the propertyin question and that decree was obtained by suppressing thematerial fact and by fraud. Even presuming that the claimantsare entitled to recover the amount of compensation as awardedby the trial court as no stay order is granted by the High Court,at the most they are entitled to recover the same by executingthe 6 (2000) 4 SCC 400 20 said award wherein the State canor may contend that the award is nullity. In such situation,as there was no wilful or deliberate disobedience of the order,the initiation of contempt proceedings was wholly unjustified.”

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22. Pertinently, the special leave petitions were filed by therespondent against the order dated 28.1.2019, which as aforesaid,did not deal with the question regarding the monthly rent payableby the respondent but explicitly left the parties to pursue the samebefore the executing Court. The plaintiff/petitioner havingacquiesced of that observation of the High Court, cannot be allowedto contend to the contrary. This Court in Jhareswar Prasad Paul& Anr. vs. Tarak Nath Ganguly & Ors., in paragraph 11, opinedthus:

“11. … The court exercising contempt jurisdiction is not entitledto enter into questions which have not been dealt with anddecided in the judgment or order, violation of which is allegedby the applicant. The court has to consider the direction issuedin the judgment or order and not to consider the question as towhat the judgment or order should have contained. At the costof repetition, 7 (2002) 5 SCC 352 23 be it stated here that thecourt exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concernedwith the question of contumacious conduct of the party, whichis alleged to have committed deliberate default in complyingwith the directions in the judgment or order. If the judgment ororder does not contain any specific direction regarding matter

or if there is any ambiguity in the directions issued therein thenit will be better to direct the parties to approach the court whichdisposed of the matter for clarification of the order instead ofthe court exercising contempt jurisdiction taking upon itself thepower to decide the original proceeding in manner not dealtwith by the court passing the judgment or order. If this limitationis borne in mind then criticisms which are sometimes levelledagainst the courts exercising contempt of court jurisdiction “thatit has exceeded its powers in granting substantive relief andissuing direction regarding the same without properadjudication of the dispute” in its entirety can be avoided. Thiswill also avoid multiplicity of proceedings because the partywhich is prejudicially affected by the judgment or order passedin the contempt proceeding and granting relief and issuing freshdirections is likely to challenge that order and that may giverise to another round of litigation arising from proceedingwhich is intended to maintain the majesty and image of courts.”

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23. Thus understood, we find force in the explanation offered bythe respondent that as per its bona fide understanding, there wasno outstanding dues payable to the petitioner. Moreover, asobserved by the High Court, these aspects could be answered bythe executing Court if the parties pursue their claim(s) before it inthat regard. Suffice it to observe that it is not case of intentionalviolation or wilful disobedience of the order passed by this Courtto initiate contempt action against the respondent. Instead, wehold that it would be open to the parties to pursue their claim(s) inexecution proceedings or any other proceedings, as may bepermissible in law in respect of the issue(s) under consideration.In such proceedings, all aspects can be considered by theconcerned forum/Court on merits inaccordance with law. Wesay no more.

24. Reverting to the allegation about damage caused to the suitproperty by the respondent at the time of vacating the same, inour opinion, the respondent has made out formidable case that itdid not cause any damage, much less permanent damage to thestructure in the suit property. Whereas, the petitioner was relyingon photographs concerning the debris on the site left behind at the

time of vacating the suit property. The debris cannot cause damageand it is certainly not case of defacement of the suit property.That position is reinforced from the fact that the water park in thesuit premises was started and became fully functional within 2-3months. Viewed thus, it is rightly urged that it can be safelyassumed that no damage was caused by the respondent to thestructure in question. Minor repairs required to be carried out bythe petitioner for making the water park functional cannot be paintedas intentional disobedience of the order of this Court. In any case,that being complex question of fact, need not be adjudicated inthe contempt proceedings. We leave it open to the petitionertopursue even that claim in execution proceedings or such otherproceedings as may be permissible in law.We may not beunderstood to have expressed any final opinion in respect ofcondition of the suit premises, whilst handing over possession tothe petitioner. We hold that even this issue under considerationdoes not warrant initiation of contempt action against therespondent.”10. On facts, we find that the High Court on the earlier occasionwhile dealing with the challenge made to Section 21 of the Act, made acategorical assertion that it did not wish to go into the disputed questionsof fact. However, in the order under challenge it was done. findinghas been given on the documents produced by the respondent no.1 whichcould at best be pieces of evidence to be appreciated by the committeeconstituted already. It is the specific case of the appellants that they didnot violate the directives of the court. There is no material to eitherestablish their knowledge on the action of their subordinates, or that theyacted in collusion with each other. Vicarious liability as principle cannotbe applied to case of contempt. The question as to whether the driversof two members of the respondent no.1 showed the order passed by thecourt and the documents produced are true and genuine being in therealm of adjudication, ought not to have been taken up by the High Courtwhile exercising contempt jurisdiction. We may note that it is therespondent no.1 who not being satisfied with the order passed by theHigh Court, filed the special leave petition. Even in the communicationssent apart from the Press Note, it is nowhere stated that the order passedby the court could be violated. We find that the subsequent developmentsalso shall enure to the benefit of the appellants. In cases where cesswas levied, individual members of the respondent no.1 could have made

ABC

Atheir challenge before the committee. In our considered view, the entireexercise of the High Court is not warranted and the aggrieved membersof the respondent no.1 could have been well advised to seek the alternativeremedy open to them including redressal through the committee.

11. In light of the aforesaid discussion, we accordingly set asideBthe order passed by the High Court on 23.10.2009 in Contempt CaseNo.401 of 2008. Consequently, the appeal filed by the appellant nos. 2 to4 stands allowed. No costs.

Divya Pandey

Appeal allowed.