NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

[2021] 4 S.C.R.

AM/S NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD.

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

(Criminal Appeal No. 330 of 2021)

BAPRIL 13, 2021

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD,M. R. SHAH AND SANJIV KHANNA, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Constitution ofIndia – Article 226 – Quashing of FIR – Blanket interim orders ofCstay of investigation and/or “no coercive steps to be adopted” duringpendency of quashing proceedings and/or u/Art.226 –Impermissibility of – Held: Police has the statutory right and dutyto investigate into cognizable offence – Save in exceptional cases,the Court should not interfere at the stage of investigation of offencesD– When the investigation is in progress and the facts are hazy, theHigh Court should restrain itself from passing the interim order ofnot to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted” – FIR is not anencyclopaedia disclosing all facts and details of the offence –Therefore, when the investigation is in progress, the court shouldnot go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR – Police must beEpermitted to complete the investigation – Extraordinary and inherentpowers of the Court do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on theCourt to act according to its whims or caprice – Power of quashingshould be exercised sparingly with circumspection in the ‘rarest ofrare cases’ (not to be confused with the formation in the context ofFdeath penalty) – Even in case where the High Court is prima facieof the opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant ofinterim stay of further investigation, it has to give brief reasonswhy such an order is warranted – In the present case, impugnedinterim order passed by the High Court directing “no coercivemeasures to be adopted” against the respondent nos. 2 to 4-accused,Gset aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.406, 420, 465, 468, 471, 120B.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Constitution ofIndia – Article 226 – Quashing petitions u/s.482 or Article 226dismissed – Orders passed by High Courts of not to arrestduringthe pendency of the investigation – Held: Despite the law laid downH

M/S NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. v. STATE OFMAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

by Supreme Court deprecating such orders, many High Courts arepassing such orders – Law declared by Supreme Court is bindingon all the High Courts – High Courts cautioned against passingsuch orders.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.340 r/w s.195 (1)(B) –Petition under, filed by respondent nos.2 to 4-accused alleging thatthe appellant suppressed vital agreements, facts and obtained interimorder by Supreme Court which stayed the impugned order passedby High Court – Held: Interim order staying the impugned orderwas passed by giving reasons – Further, even if the documents/agreements alleged to have been suppressed would have been there,it would not have any bearing on the interim order passed.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Before passing an interim order of stayingfurther investigation pending the quashing petition under Section482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, theHigh Court has to apply the very parameters which are requiredto be considered while quashing the proceedings in exercise ofpowers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in exercise of its inherentjurisdiction. In given case, there may be allegations of abuse ofprocess of law by converting civil dispute into criminal dispute,only with view to pressurise the accused. Similarly, in givencase the complaint itself on the face of it can be said to be barredby law. The allegations in the FIR/complaint may not at all disclosethe commission of cognizable offence. In such cases and inexceptional cases with circumspection, the High Court may staythe further investigation. However, at the same time, there maybe genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigating agencyhas statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizableoffences. Therefore, balance has to be struck between the rightsof the genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commissionof cognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of theinvestigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offenceson the one hand and those innocent persons against whom thecriminal proceedings are initiated which may be in given caseabuse of process of law and the process. The High Court mustappreciate that speedy investigation is the requirement in thecriminal administration of justice. [Paras 11, 12][1085-C-H; 1086-A]

A1.2 The High Court should be slow in interfering the criminalproceedings at the initial stage, i.e., quashing petition filedimmediately after lodging the FIR/complaint and no sufficient timeis given to the police to investigate into the allegations of theFIR/complaint. It is the statutory right and even the duty of thepolice to investigate into the cognizable offence and collect theBevidence during the course of investigation. There may berequirement of custodial investigation for which the accused isrequired to be in police custody (popularly known as remand).Therefore, passing such type of blanket interim orders withoutassigning reasons, of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps”Cwould hamper the investigation and may affect the statutory right/duty of the police to investigate the cognizable offence conferredunder the provisions of the Cr.P.C. Therefore, such blanketorder is not justified at all. The order of the High Court mustdisclose reasons why it has passed an ad-interim direction duringthe pendency of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. SuchDreasons, however brief must disclose an application of mind.Granting of such blanket order would not only adversely affectthe investigation but would have far reaching implications formaintaining the Rule of Law. Where the investigation is stayedfor long time, even if the stay is ultimately vacated, theEsubsequent investigation may not be very fruitful for the simplereason that the evidence may no longer be available. Therefore,in case, the accused named in the FIR/complaint apprehends hisarrest, he has remedy to apply for anticipatory bail under Section438 Cr.P.C. and on the conditions of grant of anticipatory bailunder Section 438 Cr.P.C being satisfied, he may be released onFanticipatory bail by the competent court. Therefore, it cannot besaid that the accused is remediless. It cannot be disputed thatthe anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. can be granted onthe conditions prescribed under Section 438 Cr.P.C. are satisfied.Arrest is not must whenever an FIR of cognizable offence isGlodged. Still in case person is apprehending his arrest inconnection with an FIR disclosing cognizable offence has remedyto apply for anticipatory bail. So far as the order of not to arrestand/or “no coercive steps” till the final report/chargesheet isfiled and/or during the course of investigation or not to arrest tillthe investigation is completed, passed while dismissing theH

M/S NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. v. STATE OFMAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

quashing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article226 of the Constitution of India and having opined that no case ismade out to quash the FIR/complaint is concerned, the same iswholly impermissible. [Paras 15-17][1087-E-G; 1088-B-G; 1089-D]

Hema Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2014) 4 SCC453 : [2014] 1 SCR 465 – relied on.

1.3 Despite the law laid down by this Court deprecatingsuch orders passed by the High Courts of not to arrestduringthe pendency of the investigation, even when the quashingpetitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of theConstitution of India are dismissed, even thereafter also, manyHigh Courts are passing such orders. The law declared/laid downby this Court is binding on all the High Courts and not followingthe law laid down by this Court would have very seriousimplications in the administration of justice. Therefore, the lawlaid down by this Court in the case of Habib Abdullah Jeelani isagain reiterated and all the High Courts are directed toscrupulously follow the law laid down and the law laid down bythis Court in the present case, which otherwise the High Courtsare bound to follow. The High Courts are cautioned again againstpassing such orders of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to betaken” till the investigation is completed and the final report isfiled, while not entertaining quashing petitions under Section 482Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India. [Paras 19,20][1090-F-G; 1091-D-E]State of Telangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2SCC 779 : [2017] 1 SCR 141; Ravuri Krishna Murthyv. The State of Telangana and Others (Decision ofSupreme Court dtd. 05.03.2021 in Criminal AppealNos. 274-275 of 2021) – relied on.

1.4 The impugned interim order passed by the High Courtdirecting the investigating agency/police “not to adopt anycoercive steps” against the accused is unsustainable. It is crypticorder. No reasons whatsoever have been assigned by the HighCourt, while passing such blanket order of “no coercive stepsto be adopted” by the police. It is not clear what the High Court

Ameant by passing the order of “not to adopt any coercive steps”,as it is clear from the impugned interim order that it was broughtto the notice of the High Court that so far as the accused areconcerned, they are already protected by the interim protectiongranted by the Sessions Court, and therefore there was no furtherreason and/or justification for the High Court to pass such anBinterim order of “no coercive steps to be adopted”. If the HighCourt meant by passing such an interim order of “no coercivesteps” directing the investigating agency/police not to furtherinvestigate, in that case, such blanket order without assigningany reasons whatsoever and without even permitting theCinvestigating agency to further investigate into the allegations ofthe cognizable offence is otherwise unsustainable. It has affectedthe right of the investigating agency to investigate into thecognizable offences. [Para 21][1091-F-H; 1092-A-D]

1.5 Even while passing such an interim order, in exceptionalDcases with caution and circumspection, the High Court has togive brief reasons why it is necessary to pass such an interimorder, more particularly when the High Court is exercising theextraordinary and inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, inthe facts and circumstances of the case, the High Court committedEgrave error of law and also of facts in passing such an interimorder of “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the same deservesto be quashed and set aside. [Para 21.4][1094-G-H; 1095-A-B]

Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed, (2010) 9SCC 496 : [2010] 10 SCR 1070 – relied on.F

1.6 This Court has passed an interim order dated 12.10.2020staying order dated 28.09.2020 passed by the High Court, bygiving brief reasons and even if the documents/agreements whichare alleged to have been suppressed would have been there, itwould not have any bearing on the interim order passed by thisGCourt. What is weighed while passing interim order dated12.10.2020 is very clear from the interim order dated 12.10.2020.Therefore, the criminal miscellaneous petition No. 4961/2021 isclosed. [Para 22][1095-E-F]

1.7 Conclusions:

i)Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevantprovisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained inChapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizable offence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into thecognizable offences;

iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offenceof any kind is disclosed in the first information report that theCourt will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparinglywith circumspection in the ‘rarest of rare cases (not to be confusedwith the formation in the context of death penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which issought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to thereliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made inthe FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at theinitial stage;

vii) Quashing of complaint/FIR should be an exceptionrather than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping thejurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the State operatein two specific spheres of activities and one ought not to treadover the other sphere;

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police arecomplementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference wouldresult in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial processshould not interfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do notconfer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according toits whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaediawhich must disclose all facts and details relating to the offence

Areported. Therefore, when the investigation by the police is inprogress, the court should not go into the merits of the allegationsin the FIR. Police must be permitted to complete theinvestigation. It would be premature to pronounce the conclusionbased on hazy facts that the complaint/FIR does not deserve tobe investigated or that it amounts to abuse of process of law.BAfter investigation, if the investigating officer finds that there isno substance in the application made by the complainant, theinvestigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary beforethe learned Magistrate which may be considered by the learnedMagistrate in accordance with the known procedure;Cxiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, butconferment of wide power requires the court to be more cautious.It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit,regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-Drestraint imposed by law, more particularly the parameters laiddown by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur and Bhajan Lal,has the jurisdiction to quash the FIR/complaint;

xv) When prayer for quashing the FIR is made by thealleged accused and the court when it exercises the power underESection 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whether the allegationsin the FIR disclose commission of cognizable offence or not.The court is not required to consider on merits whether or notthe merits of the allegations make out cognizable offence andthe court has to permit the investigating agency/police toFinvestigate the allegations in the FIR;

xvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/orthe aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by the HighCourt while passing an interim order in quashing petition inexercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under ArticleG226 of the Constitution of India. However, an interim order ofstay of investigation during the pendency of the quashing petitioncan be passed with circumspection. Such an interim order shouldnot require to be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically.Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the facts arehazy and the entire evidence/material is not before the HighHCourt, the High Court should restrain itself from passing the

M/S NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. v. STATE OFMAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

interim order of not to arrest or “no coercive steps to be adopted”and the accused should be relegated to apply for anticipatory bailunder Section 438 Cr.P.C. before the competent court. The HighCourt shall not and as such is not justified in passing the order ofnot to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” either during theinvestigation or till the investigation is completed and/or till thefinal report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., whiledismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section 482Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.xvii) Even in case where the High Court is prima facie ofthe opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grant of interimstay of further investigation, after considering the broadparameters while exercising the powers under Section 482Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of Indiareferred to herein, the High Court has to give brief reasons whysuch an interim order is warranted and/or is required to be passedso that it can demonstrate the application of mind by the Courtand the higher forum can consider what was weighed with theHigh Court while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the HighCourt of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within the aforesaidparameters, the High Court must clarify what does it mean by“no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term “no coercive stepsto be adopted” can be said to be too vague and/or broad whichcan be misunderstood and/or misapplied. [Para 23][1096-B-H;1097-A-H; 1098-A-H; 1099-A]

R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866; Stateof Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992) 1 Suppl. SCC 335 –relied on.

1.8 The impugned interim order/direction contained inclause (d) of the impugned interim order by which the High Courthas directed that “no coercive measures to be adopted” againstthe petitioners (respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein) in respect of FIRNo.367/2019 dated 19.09.2019, registered at Worli Police Station,Mumbai, Maharashtra (subsequently transferred to EconomicOffence Wing, Unit IX, Mumbai, renumbered as C.R. No. 82/2019) is quashed and set aside. [Para 24][1099-B-C]

ABC

Kurukshetra University v. State of Haryana (1977) 4SCC 451; State of A.P. v. Golconda Linga Swamy(2004) 6 SCC 522 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 147; ZanduPharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque(2005) 1 SCC 122 : [2004] 5 Suppl. SCR 790;Sanapareday Maheedhar Seshagiri v. State of AndhraPradesh (2007) 13 SCC 165 : [2007] 13 SCR 478;State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali (2010) 9SCC 701 : [2010] 10 SCR 683; State of Orissa v. UjjalKumar Burdhan (2012) 4 SCC 547 : [2012] 4 SCC547; Imtiyaz Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 2SCC 688 : [2012] 1 SCR 779; Asian Resurfacing ofRoad Agency Private Limited v. Central Bureau ofInvestigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299 : [2018] 2 SCR 1045;State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha, (1980) 1 SCC 554 :[1980] 2 SCR 16; S.M. Sharma v. Bipen Kumar Tiwari,(1970) 1 SCC 653 : [1970] 3 SCR 946 ; Union of Indiav. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003) 6 SCC 195 : [2003] 1Suppl. SCR 307; Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCTof Delhi),(1999) 8 SCC 728 : [1999] 3 Suppl. SCR348; Supdt. of Police, CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh,(2003) 6 SCC 175 : [2003] 3 SCR 485; State of U.P. v.Naresh, (2011) 4 SCC 324 : [2011] 4 SCR 1176;P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement, (2019)9 SCC 24 : [2019] 12 SCR 172; Skoda AutoVolkswagen India Private Limited v. State of UttarPradesh, (2020) SCC OnLine SC 958; Special Directorv. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440 : [2004]1 SCR 399; Nitco Tiles Ltd. v. Gujarat Ceramic FloorTiles Mfg. Association, (2005) 12 SCC 454; HindustanTimes Limited v. Union of India, (1998) 2 SCC 242 :[1998] 1 SCR 4 – relied on.

State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bajjoori Kanthaiah (2009)1 SCC 114 : [2008] 14 SCR 841; State of Karnatakav. L. Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699 : [1977] 3 SCR113; Rajiv Thapar V. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC330 : [2013] 3 SCR 52; State of U.P. v. MohammadNaim AIR 1964 SC 703; State of Andhra Pradesh v.

M/S NEEHARIKA INFRASTRUCTURE PVT. LTD. v. STATE OFMAHARASHTRA AND OTHERS

Gourishetty Mahesh (2010) 11 SCC 226 : [2010] 8SCR 423; Vijeta Gajra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010)11 SCC 618 : [2010] 7 SCR 1150; State ofMaharashtra v. Sanjay Dalmia, (2015) 17 SCC 539;Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1 SCC 1;Decision of the Delhi High Court dtd.22.06.2020 inGanga Ram Hospital v. State [CRL.M.A. No. 7661/2020 in W.P. (CRL.) No. 921/2020]; Noor Taki AliasMammu v. State of Rajasthan AIR 1987 RAJ 52;Madhukar Purshottam Mondkar v. Talab Haji Hussain

AIR 1958 BOM 406 – referred to.

King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC18 – referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.C330 of 2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 28.09.2020 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (ST) No. 2306 of 2020.

K.V. Vishwanathan, Sr. Adv., Arunabh Chowdhury, VaibhavTomar, Abhay Jadeja, Ms. Barnalli Chowdhury, Varun Satiya, DechanDW. Lachungpa, Mrs. Pragya Baghel, Advs. for the Appellant.

Sachin Patil, Rahul Chitnis, Aaditya A. Pande, Geo Joseph, DiljeetAhluwalia, Malak Manish Bhatt, Ms. Neeha Nagpal, Advs. for theRespondents.

EThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M.R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned interimorder dated 28.09.2020 passed by the Division Bench of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition (ST) No. 2306 of 2020, byFwhich, in an application filed by private respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein(hereinafter referred to as the ‘original accused’) under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India r/w Section 482 Cr.P.C. with prayer to quashthe criminal proceedings being FIR No. 367/2019 dated 19.09.2019, theHigh Court has directed that “no coercive measures shall be adopted”against the original accused in respect of the said FIR, the originalGcomplainant has preferred the present appeal.

2. That the appellant herein has lodged an FIR against respondentnos. 2 to 4 herein – original accused at Worli Police Station, Mumbai forthe offences under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 471 and 120B of theIndian Penal Code. That the allegations against the original accusedH

pertain to forgery and fabrication of Board Resolution and the fraudulentsale of valuable property Naziribagh Palace ad-measuring 111,882 sq.ft. belonging to the appellant company to one M/s Irish Hospitality Pvt.Ltd.

2.1 Apprehending their arrest in connection with the aforesaidFIR, the original accused filed anticipatory bail application before thelearned trial Court under Section 438 Cr.P.C. That the learned SessionsCourt, Mumbai granted interim protection from arrest to the allegedaccused. That the interim protection, which was granted by the learnedSessions Court, was further extended from time to time and continuednearly for year thereafter. That during the pendency of the anticipatorybail application pending before the learned Sessions Court, Mumbai,original accused – respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein preferred petitionbefore the High Court of Judicature at Bombay under Article 226 of theConstitution of India r/w Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR, on17.09.2020. That the said writ petition was listed for hearing before theDivision Bench of the High Court on 22.09.2020, wherein an order waspassed directing the matter to be listed on 24.09.2020 before anotherBench. That on 28.09.2020, the writ petition was listed for hearingbefore another Division Bench. Learned counsel appearing on behalfof the appellant herein (respondent no.2 before the High Court) prayedfor two weeks’ time to file an affidavit in reply with an additionalcompilation of documents. That the Division Bench granted two weeks’time to the appellant herein to file an affidavit in reply with an additionalcompilation of documents in the Registry on or before 12.10.2020 withcopy to the other side. Liberty was granted to the original accused (writpetitioners before the High Court) to file rejoinder, if any, on or before19.10.2020. The matter was directed to be listed on board on 28.10.2020.While adjourning the matter to 28.10.2020, the High Court has passedthe impugned interim order directing that “no coercive measures shallbe adopted against the petitioners (original accused – respondent nos. 2to 4 herein) in respect of the said FIR”. When the aforesaid order wasbeing passed, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellantsubmitted that anticipatory bail application filed by the original writpetitioners before the learned Sessions Court is pending for hearing andthe learned Sessions Court may get influenced by the said order andtherefore the Division Bench clarified that the learned Sessions Courtshall decide the anticipatory bail application on its own merits.

2.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned interimorder passed by the Division Bench of the High Court directing that “nocoercive measures shall be adopted” against the original accused (writpetitioners before the High Court) in respect of the said FIR, the originalcomplainant has preferred the present appeal.

3. Shri K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior Advocate has appearedon behalf of the appellant – original respondent no.2 – complainant, ShriDiljeet Ahluwalia with Shri Malak Manish Bhatt, learned Advocates haveappeared on behalf of the original accused – writ petitioners – respondentnos. 2 to 4 herein and Shri Sachin Patil and Shri Rahul Chitnis, learnedAdvocates have appeared on behalf of the State of Maharashtra.

3.1 Shri K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior Advocate appearingon behalf of the appellant – original complainant has vehemently submittedthat such blanket direction of the High Court restraining the investigatingofficer from taking coercive measures, in the facts and circumstancesof the case, was not warranted at all.D

3.2 It is submitted that, as such, the original accused – respondentnos. 2 to 4 herein were already having the interim protection from thelearned Sessions Court, Mumbai in the anticipatory bail application whichwas continued from time to time since last one year. It is submitted that,as such, the original accused were not co-operating with the investigationEafter having obtained the interim protection of arrest and, in fact, theinvestigating officer addressed communication to the learned SessionsCourt stating that the accused were not co-operating with theinvestigation. It is submitted that therefore thereafter and that too whileenjoying the interim protection from arrest, to file an application forFquashing after period of almost one year and obtain such an order isnothing but an abuse of process.

3.3 It is submitted that, as such, no reasons whatsoever havebeen assigned by the High Court while passing such an interim order of“no coercive measures to be adopted/taken” against the original accused.

G3.4 It is submitted that the High Court ought to have appreciatedthat the original accused – respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein are facing veryserious charges for the offences under Sections 406, 420, 465, 468, 471and 120B of the Indian Penal Code and, in fact, the FIR was transferredto the Economic Offences Wing and the investigation was beingconducted by the Economic Offences Wing. It is submitted that, as such,H

the original accused were not co-operating with the investigation afterhaving obtained the interim protection from arrest.

3.5 It is further submitted by Shri Vishwanathan, learned SeniorAdvocate appearing on behalf of the appellant that, as such, by issuingsuch blanket direction restraining the investigating officer from takingcoercive measures against the original accused, the valuable right of theinvestigating officer to investigate the offences has been hampered and/or taken away.

3.6 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of State ofTelangana v. Habib Abdullah Jeelani, (2017) 2 SCC 779, it issubmitted by Shri Vishwanathan that as observed and held by this Courtthe powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C or under Article 226 of theConstitution of India to quash the first information report is to be exercisedin very sparing manner and is not to be used to choke or smother theprosecution that is legitimate. It is submitted that it is observed by thisCourt in the aforesaid decision that inherent powers do not confer anarbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according to whim orcaprice. That such power has to be exercised sparingly, withcircumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. It is submitted that itcannot be disputed that accused cannot approach the High Court underSection 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.However, as held by this Court in catena of decisions, inherent power ina matter of quashing of FIR has to be exercised sparingly and withcaution and when and only when such exercise is justified by the testspecifically laid down in the provision itself. It is submitted that in theaforesaid decision it is observed and held that power under Section 482Cr.P.C. is very wide but conferment of wide power requires the Courtto be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on theCourt.3.7 It is submitted that in given case, the Court, having foundthat the case falls within the parameters of exercise of powers underSection 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR, may pass appropriate interimorders as thought apposite in law, but even such an interim order shall bepassed regard being had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposed by law. It is submitted that even in such case theHigh Court has to consider the allegations made in the FIR or what hascome out in the investigation.

A3.8 It is submitted that in case the accused against whom theFIR is lodged is apprehending arrest, remedy is available to him to filethe anticipatory bail application under Section 438 Cr.P.C. It is submittedthat even when the anticipatory bail application under Section 438 isfiled, the same can be granted within the parameters of Section 438Cr.P.C. and the conditions of the said provision are satisfied. It is submittedBthat, however, such blanket order of no coercive steps without imposingany condition whatsoever and without satisfaction of the conditions ofSection 438 Cr.P.C. is not permissible at all.

3.9 It is further submitted that, as such, by passing such blanketorder of “no coercive steps to be taken”, even the valuable right of theCinvestigating agency/police to investigate the FIR will be affected.

3.10 It is submitted that assuming that the High Court hasjurisdiction to pass an interim order in given case, regard being had tothe parameters of quashing, in that case also, such interim orders cannotbe passed mechanically and/or without assigning any reasons. It isDsubmitted that while granting such protection, even the High Court hasto give some brief reasons why stay of investigation and/or such anorder of “no coercive steps” is warranted. It is submitted that theremust be reflection of application of mind to the facts of the case;allegations in the FIR and what has come out in the investigation. It isEsubmitted that, as such, when the investigation is in progress at thethreshold, it is not appropriate to stay the investigation of the case. It issubmitted that only in an exceptional case and rarest of rare case, thepowers to quash the FIR are required to be exercised sparingly and withcircumspection. It is submitted that the same parameters which shall beapplicable while exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/For under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the FIR/investigation shall be applicable while passing an appropriate interim order.

3.11 Shri Vishwanathan, learned Senior Advocate appearing onbehalf of the appellant has relied upon the following decisions on when aHigh Court can grant stay of investigation or “no coercive measuresGorder” in exercise of its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C./under Article226 of the Constitution of India and in support of his submissions that (1)inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Courtto act according to whim or caprice and the statutory power has to beexercised sparingly, with circumspection and in the rarest of rare cases;H(2) power of the police to investigate into cognizable offence is ordinarilynot to be interfered with by the judiciary; (3) save in exceptional casewhere non-interference would result in miscarriage of Justice, the Courtand the judicial process should not interfere at the stage of investigationof offences; (4) in case police officer transgresses the circumscribedlimits and improperly and illegally exercises his powers in relation to theprocess of investigation, then the Court has the necessary powers toconsider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders;(5) the High Court being the highest Court of State should normallyrefrain from giving prima facie decision in case where the entirefacts are incomplete and hazy, more so when the evidence has not beencollected and produced before the Court; (6) the High Court has noinherent powers to interfere with the investigation, unless it is found thatthe allegations do not disclose the commission of cognizable offenceor the power of investigation is being exercised by the police malafidely;(7) the High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interferewith the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stallthe investigation and/or prosecution except when it is convinced beyondany manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of anoffence or that the allegations contained in the FIR do not constituteany cognizable offence or that the prosecution is barred by law or theHigh Court is convinced that it is necessary to interfere to preventabuse of the process of the Court. In support of his above submissions,learned Senior Advocate has relied upon the following decisions, namely,King-Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad AIR 1945 PC 18; R.P. Kapurv. State of Punjab AIR 1960 SC 866; Kurukshetra University v.State of Haryana (1977) 4 SCC 451; State of A.P. v. GolcondaLinga Swamy (2004) 6 SCC 522; Zandu Pharmaceutical WorksLtd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque (2005) 1 SCC 122; SanaparedayMaheedhar Seshagiri v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2007) 13 SCC165; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Bajjoori Kanthaiah (2009)1 SCC114; State of Maharashtra v. Arun Gulab Gawali (2010) 9 SCC701; and State of Orissa v. Ujjal Kumar Burdhan (2012) 4 SCC547.

3.12 Shri Vishwanathan, learned Senior Advocate has heavily reliedupon the decision of this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. BhajanLal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, on when the High Court would be justifiedin quashing the FIR/investigation. He has relied upon paras 60, 61, 102and 103 respectively of the aforesaid decision.

3.13 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of ImtiyazAhmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 2 SCC 688, it is submittedthat the power to grant stay of investigation and trial is very extraordinarypower given to the High Courts and such power is to be exercised sparinglyonly to prevent abuse of process and to promote the ends of justice.

B3.14 Shri Vishwanathan, learned Senior Advocate also relied uponthe recent decision of this Court in the case of Ravuri Krishna Murthyv. The State of Telangana and others (Criminal Appeal Nos. 274-275 of 2021, decided on 05.03.2021), by which somewhat similarorder of protection of not to arrest passed while not entertaining thequashing petition under Section 482, has been set aside by this CourtCconsidering the decision of this Court in the case of Habib AbdullahJeelani (supra).

3.15 Shri Vishwanathan, learned Senior Advocate appearing onbehalf of the appellant has further submitted that in the case of AsianResurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited v. Central Bureau ofDInvestigation, (2018) 16 SCC 299, this Court has observed and heldthat even in case of challenge to the framing of the charge, whereverthe stay is granted by the High Court in exercise of its revisionaljurisdiction or otherwise, speaking order must be passed showing thatthe case was of an exceptional nature.

3.16 It is further submitted that in many of the cases it is seen thatthe High Court while not entertaining the quashing petitions under Section482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India andwhile dismissing such petitions, still grants interim protection/protectionof not to arrest for particular period or even till the report is filed underFSection 173 Cr.P.C. It is submitted that the aforesaid is absolutelyimpermissible and such an order of not to arrest for particular periodcan be said to be beyond the scope and ambit of Section 482 Cr.P.C.Once the quashing petition is dismissed, the accused may avail the remedyof approaching the trial Court and/or the concerned Court for anticipatorybail under Section 438 Cr.P.C and the same can be considered whileGimposing the conditions and/or having been satisfied that the conditionsof grant of anticipatory bail are satisfied. It is submitted that in givencase the immediate custodial investigation is warranted and in view ofsuch blanket order of not to arrest, will take away the right of theinvestigating agency/police to investigate into the allegations in the FIR.HIt is submitted that as held by this Court in catena of decisions and even

as per the provisions of the Cr.P.C., the police/investigating officer hasthe statutory obligation to investigate into the allegations in the FIR andto find out the truth. It is submitted that therefore such protection whiledismissing the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article226 of the Constitution of India is not sustainable and is whollyimpermissible. It is submitted that despite such orders have been criticizedby this Court in the case of Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra), still theHigh Courts are passing such orders, disregarding the law laid down bythis Court.

4. Shri Diljeet Ahluwalia and Shri Malak Manish Bhatt, learnedAdvocates appearing on behalf of the original accused – respondentnos. 2 to 4 herein have vehemently submitted that, as such, in the factsand circumstances of the case and looking to the nature of the allegationsmade in the FIR and the dispute which, as such, can be said to be civildispute, no error has been committed by the High Court in passing suchan order of “no coercive steps” against respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein –original accused – original writ petitioners.

4.1 Number of submissions have been made by the learnedAdvocates appearing on behalf of respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein – originalaccused – original writ petitioners on merits and in support of theirsubmissions that the impugned FIR is nothing but an abuse of process oflaw and that civil dispute is tried to be converted into criminal dispute,only with view to harass respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein. However, wedo not propose to deal with the case on merits and consider whether theimpugned FIR is an abuse of process of law or not, as Section 482petition is yet required to be dealt with by the High Court on merits in thepending proceedings.

4.2 Learned Advocates appearing on behalf of respondent nos. 2to 4 herein – original accused – original writ petitioners have submittedthat as held by this Court in catena of decisions, the powers possessedby the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India are very wide. It is submitted that as held bythis Court, the High Court may exercise its powers under Section 482Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India relating tocognizable offences to prevent abuse of process of any court or otherwiseto secure the ends of justice. It is submitted therefore in exercise of itswholesome powers, the High Court would be justified and entitled toquash the proceedings. It is submitted that similarly the High Court would

Abe justified and entitled to stay the further investigation and even grantan interim order of stay of arrest and/or “no coercive measures to betaken”.

4.3 It is submitted that in the case of State of Karnataka v. L.Muniswamy, (1977) 2 SCC 699, it is observed by this Court that theBHigh Court in its inherent powers is designed to achieve salutary publicpurpose which is that court proceeding ought not to be permitted todegenerate into weapon of harassment or persecution.

4.4 It is submitted that if the Court is of the prima facie view thatfurther investigation or proceedings pursuant to the FIR is likely to causeCunwarranted and unjustified harassment to the petitioner, the Court maygrant an order of “no coercive measures” in favour of the accused.

4.5 It is further submitted by the learned Advocates appearing onbehalf of respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein – original accused – original writpetitioners that powers to grant interim stay/interim relief in quashingDpetition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 of theConstitution of India are akin to the powers of the civil court underOrder XXXIX Rule 1 CPC, namely, prima facie case; balance ofconvenience and irreparable loss. It is submitted that therefore an interiminjunction restraining the police from investigation consequent to the FIRcan be justified on the touchstone of balance of convenience, irreparableEloss and prima facie case.

4.6 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of ImtiyazAhmad (supra), it is submitted that the authority of the High Court toorder stay of investigation pursuant to lodging of the FIR or trial indeserving cases is unquestionable. However, the learned Advocates haveFfairly conceded that wherever stay is granted, speaking order must bepassed showing that the case is of an exceptional nature.

4.7 It is vehemently submitted by the learned Advocates that whena criminal proceeding initiated pursuant to the FIR/complaint is nothingbut an abuse of process of law and/or the same is wholly withoutGjurisdiction or where it manifestly appears that there is legal bar againstthe institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding in respect of theoffence alleged or where the allegations in the FIR/complaint even ifthey are taken at the face value and accepted in their entirety, do notconstitute the offence alleged and exceptional case being made out onthe grounds mentioned by this Court in the cases of Bhajan Lal (supra);H

R.P. Kapur (supra); and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (supra),by giving brief reasons, the High Court would be justified in even stayingthe further investigation, by way of an interim order. It is submitted thatmisuse of criminal proceedings is not unknown and the criminal lawcannot be set into motion as matter of course and therefore to takeaway the inherent powers of the High Court would not be in the largerpublic interest also.

4.8 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of RajivThapar V. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, it is submitted thatwhile exercising the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Courtis required to undertake step-wise enquiry as mentioned in para 30 ofthe said decision and if the answer to all the steps is in the affirmative,the High Court would be justified in quashing the criminal proceedings.It is submitted that the grounds on which the criminal proceedings canbe quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the verygrounds can be made applicable while granting stay of furtherinvestigation, pending the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.4.9 In support of his submissions, learned Advocates have reliedupon the following decisions of this Court and various High Courts, namely,State of U.P. v. Mohammad Naim AIR 1964 SC 703; L. Muniswamy(supra); State of Andhra Pradesh v. Gourishetty Mahesh (2010) 11SCC 226; Vijeta Gajra v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 11 SCC 618;Rajiv Thapar (supra); State of Maharashtra v. Sanjay Dalmia,(2015) 17 SCC 539; Amish Devgan v. Union of India, (2021) 1SCC 1; the decision of the Delhi High Court in Ganga Ram Hospital v.State dated 22.06.2020 in CRL.M.A. No. 7661/2020 in W.P. (CRL.)No. 921/2020; the decision of the Rajasthan High Court in Noor TakiAlias Mammu v. State of Rajasthan dated 26.02.1986 AIR 1987RAJ 52; and decision of the Bombay High Court in MadhukarPurshottam Mondkar v. Talab Haji Hussain dated 14.01.1958 AIR1958 BOM 406.

5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the respectiveparties at length.

6. The principal issue which arises is when and where the HighCourt would be justified in passing an interim order either staying thefurther investigation in the FIR/complaint or interim order in the natureof “no coercive steps” and/or not to arrest the accused either pending

Ainvestigation by the police/investigating agency or during the pendencyof the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article226 of the Constitution of India pending before the High Court?

7. While considering the aforesaid issue, law on the exercise ofpowers by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under ArticleB226 of the Constitution of India to quash the FIR/complaint and theparameters for exercise of such powers and scope and ambit of thepower by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article226 of the Constitution of India are required to be referred to as the veryparameters which are required to be applied while quashing the FIR willalso be applicable while granting interim stay/protection.C

7.1 The first case on the point which is required to be noticed isthe decision of this Court in the case of R.P. Kapur (supra). Whiledealing with the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 561-Aof the earlier Code (which is pari materia with Section 482 of the Code),it is observed and held that the inherent powers of the High Court underDSection 561 of the earlier Code cannot be exercised in regard to thematters specifically covered by the other provisions of the Code; theinherent jurisdiction of the High Court can be exercised to quashproceedings in proper case either to prevent the abuse of the processof any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice; ordinarily criminalEproceedings instituted against an accused person must be tried underthe provisions of the Code, and the High Court would be reluctant tointerfere with the said proceedings at an interlocutory stage. Afterobserving this, thereafter this Court then carved out some exceptions tothe above-stated rule, which are as under:

“(i) Where it manifestly appears that there is legal baragainst the institution or continuance of the criminal proceeding inrespect of the offence alleged. Absence of the requisite sanctionmay, for instance, furnish cases under this category.

(ii) Where the allegations in the first information reportGor the complaint, even if they are taken at their face valueand accepted in their entirety, do not constitute the offencealleged; in such cases no question of appreciating evidencearises; it is matter merely of looking at the complaint or thefirst information report to decide whether the offence allegedis disclosed or not.

(iii) Where the allegations made against the accused persondo constitute an offence alleged but there is either no legalevidence adduced in support of the case or the evidence adducedclearly or manifestly fails to prove the charge. In dealing with thisclass of cases it is important to bear in mind the distinction betweena case where there is no legal evidence or where there is evidencewhich is manifestly and clearly inconsistent with the accusationmade and cases where there is legal evidence which on itsappreciation may or may not support the accusation in question.In exercising its jurisdiction under Section 561-A the High Courtwould not embark upon an enquiry as to whether the evidence inquestion is reliable or not. That is the function of the trial Magistrate,and ordinarily it would not be open to any party to invoke the HighCourt’s inherent jurisdiction and contend that on reasonableappreciation of the evidence the accusation made against theaccused would not be sustained.”

7.2 In the case of Kurukshetra University (supra), this Courtobserved and held that inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. donot confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the High Court to act according towhim or caprice; that statutory power has to be exercised sparingly withcircumspection and in the rarest of rare cases. In the case before thisCourt, the High Court quashed the first information report filed by theKurukshetra University through Warden and that too without issuingnotice to the University, in exercise of inherent powers under Section482 Cr.P.C. This Court noticed and observed that the High Court wasnot justified in quashing the FIR when the police had not even commencedinvestigation into the complaint filed by the Warden of the Universityand no proceedings were at all pending before any Court in pursuanceof the FIR.

7.3 Then comes the celebrated decision of this Court in the caseof Bhajan Lal (supra). In the said decision, this Court considered indetail the scope of the High Court powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India to quash the FIR andreferred to several judicial precedents and held that the High Court shouldnot embark upon an inquiry into the merits and demerits of the allegationsand quash the proceedings without allowing the investigating agency tocomplete its task. At the same time, this Court identified the followingcases in which FIR/complaint can be quashed:

“102.(1) Where the allegations made in the first informationreport or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face valueand accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute anyoffence or make out case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report andother materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose acognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officersunder Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of aMagistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIRor complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same donot disclose the commission of any offence and make out caseagainst the accused.

(4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not constitute acognizable offence but constitute only non-cognizable offence,no investigation is permitted by police officer without an orderof Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint areso absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which noprudent person can ever reach just conclusion that there issufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any ofthe provisions of the Code or the Act concerned (under which acriminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuanceof the proceedings and/or where there is specific provision inthe Code or the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress forthe grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where criminal proceeding is manifestly attended withmala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously institutedwith an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accusedand with view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

7.4 In the case of Golconda Lingaswamy (supra), afterconsidering the decisions of this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur (supra)and Bhajan Lal (supra) and other decisions on the exercise of inherentpowers by the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., in paragraphs 5, 7and 8, it is observed and held as under:

“5. Exercise of power under Section 482 of the Code in acase of this nature is the exception and not the rule. The sectiondoes not confer any new powers on the High Court. It only savesthe inherent power which the Court possessed before theenactment of the Code. It envisages three circumstances underwhich the inherent jurisdiction may be exercised, namely: (i) togive effect to an order under the Code, (ii) to prevent abuse ofthe process of court, and (iii) to otherwise secure the ends ofjustice. It is neither possible nor desirable to lay down any inflexiblerule which would govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. Nolegislative enactment dealing with procedure can provide for allcases that may possibly arise. Courts, therefore, have inherentpowers apart from express provisions of law which are necessaryfor proper discharge of functions and duties imposed upon themby law. That is the doctrine which finds expression in the sectionwhich merely recognises and preserves inherent powers of theHigh Courts. All courts, whether civil or criminal, possess in theabsence of any express provision, as inherent in their constitution,all such powers as are necessary to do the right and to undo awrong in course of administration of justice on the principle quandolex aliquid alique concedit, conceditur et id sine quo res ipsaesse non potest (when the law gives person anything, it giveshim that without which it cannot exist). While exercising powersunder the section, the Court does not function as court of appealor revision. Inherent jurisdiction under the section though widehas to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with caution and onlywhen such exercise is justified by the tests specifically laid downin the section itself. It is to be exercised ex debito justitiae to doreal and substantial justice for the administration of which alonecourts exist. Authority of the court exists for advancement ofjustice and if any attempt is made to abuse that authority so as toproduce injustice, the court has power to prevent such abuse. Itwould be an abuse of the process of the court to allow any actionwhich would result in injustice and prevent promotion of justice.In exercise of the powers court would be justified to quash anyproceeding if it finds that initiation or continuance of it amounts toabuse of the process of court or quashing of these proceedingswould otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence isdisclosed by the complaint, the court may examine the question of

fact. When complaint is sought to be quashed, it is permissibleto look into the materials to assess what the complainant hasalleged and whether any offence is made out even if the allegationsare accepted in toto.

7. In dealing with the last category, it is important to bear inmind the distinction between case where there is no legal evidenceor where there is evidence which is clearly inconsistent with theaccusations made, and case where there is legal evidence which,on appreciation, may or may not support the accusations. Whenexercising jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code, the HighCourt would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether theevidence in question is reliable or not or whether on reasonableappreciation of it accusation would not be sustained. That is thefunction of the trial Judge. Judicial process, no doubt should notbe an instrument of oppression, or, needless harassment. Courtshould be circumspect and judicious in exercising discretion andshould take all relevant facts and circumstances into considerationbefore issuing process, lest it would be an instrument in the handsof private complainant to unleash vendetta to harass any personneedlessly. At the same time the section is not an instrument handedover to an accused to short-circuit prosecution and bring aboutits sudden death…..

8. As noted above, the powers possessed by the High Courtunder Section 482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitudeof the power requires great caution in its exercise. Court must becareful to see that its decision in exercise of this power is basedon sound principles. The inherent power should not be exercisedto stifle legitimate prosecution. High Court being the highestcourt of State should normally refrain from giving prima faciedecision in case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy,more so when the evidence has not been collected and producedbefore the Court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal,are of magnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspectivewithout sufficient material. Of course, no hard-and-fast rule canbe laid down in regard to cases in which the High Court willexercise its extraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceedingat any stage. [See Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary [(1992) 4 SCC305 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 36 : AIR 1993 SC 892] and Raghubir Saran

(Dr.) v. State of Bihar [AIR 1964 SC 1 : (1964) 1 Cri LJ 1] .] Itwould not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case of thecomplainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determinewhether conviction would be sustainable and on such premises,arrive at conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. Itwould be erroneous to assess the material before it and concludethat the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceedinginstituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quashthe proceedings is called for only in case where the complaintdoes not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious oroppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do notconstitute the offence of which cognisance has been taken by theMagistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same inexercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. Itis not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysisof the case before the trial to find out whether the case would endin conviction or acquittal. The complaint/FIR has to be read as awhole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in thelight of the statement made on oath of the complainant or disclosedin the FIR that the ingredients of the offence or offences aredisclosed and there is no material to show that the complaint/FIRis mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would beno justification for interference by the High Court. When aninformation is lodged at the police station and an offence isregistered, then the mala fides of the informant would be ofsecondary importance. It is the material collected during theinvestigation and evidence led in court which decides the fate ofthe accused person. The allegations of mala fides against theinformant are of no consequence and cannot by themselves bethe basis for quashing the proceeding.”

7.5 In the case of Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. (supra),in paragraph 11, this Court has observed and held as under:

“11. … the powers possessed by the High Court under Section482 of the Code are very wide and the very plenitude of the powerrequires great caution in its exercise. Court must be careful tosee that its decision in exercise of this power is based on soundprinciples. The inherent power should not be exercised to stifle alegitimate prosecution. The High Court being the highest court of

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Aa State should normally refrain from giving prima facie decisionin case where the entire facts are incomplete and hazy, more sowhen the evidence has not been collected and produced beforethe court and the issues involved, whether factual or legal, are ofmagnitude and cannot be seen in their true perspective withoutsufficient material. of course, no hard-and-fast rule can be laidBdown in regard to cases in which the High Court will exercise itsextraordinary jurisdiction of quashing the proceeding at any stage.It would not be proper for the High Court to analyse the case ofthe complainant in the light of all probabilities in order to determinewhether conviction would be sustainable and on such premiseCarrive at conclusion that the proceedings are to be quashed. Itwould be erroneous to assess the material before it and concludethat the complaint cannot be proceeded with. In proceedinginstituted on complaint, exercise of the inherent powers to quashthe proceedings is called for only in case where the complaintdoes not disclose any offence or is frivolous, vexatious orDoppressive. If the allegations set out in the complaint do notconstitute the offence of which cognizance has been taken by theMagistrate, it is open to the High Court to quash the same inexercise of the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code. Itis not, however, necessary that there should be meticulous analysisEof the case before the trial to find out whether the case would endin conviction or acquittal. The complaint has to be read as whole.If it appears that on consideration of the allegations in the light ofthe statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredientsof the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no materialto show that the complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, inFthat event there would be no justification for interference by theHigh Court. When an information is lodged at the police stationand an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informantwould be of secondary importance. It is the material collectedduring the investigation and evidence led in court which decidesGthe fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides againstthe informant are of no consequence and cannot by themselvesbe the basis for quashing the proceedings.”

7.6 In the case of Sanapareddy Maheedhar Seshagiri (supra),in paragraph 31, it is observed and held as under:H

“31. careful reading of the abovenoted judgments makesit clear that the High Court should be extremely cautious andslow to interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal casesand should not stall the investigation and/or prosecution exceptwhen it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that FIR doesnot disclose commission of any offence or that the allegationscontained in FIR do not constitute any cognizable offence or thatthe prosecution is barred by law or the High Court is convincedthat it is necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of the process ofthe Court. In dealing with such cases, the High Court has to bearin mind that judicial intervention at the threshold of the legal processinitiated against person accused of committing offence is highlydetrimental to the larger public and societal interest. The peopleand the society have legitimate expectation that those committingoffences either against an individual or the society are expeditiouslybrought to trial and, if found guilty, adequately punished. Therefore,while deciding petition filed for quashing FIR or complaint orrestraining the competent authority from investigating theallegations contained in FIR or complaint or for stalling the trial ofthe case, the High Court should be extremely careful andcircumspect. If the allegations contained in FIR or complaintdisclose commission of some crime, then the High Court mustkeep its hands off and allow the investigating agency to completethe investigation without any fetter and also refrain from passingorder which may impede the trial. The High Court should not gointo the merits and demerits of the allegations simply because thepetitioner alleges malus animus against the author of FIR or thecomplainant. The High Court must also refrain from makingimaginary journey in the realm of possible harassment which maybe caused to the petitioner on account of investigation of FIR orcomplaint. Such course will result in miscarriage of justice andwould encourage those accused of committing crimes to repeatthe same. However, if the High Court is satisfied that the complaintdoes not disclose commission of any offence or prosecution isbarred by limitation or that the proceedings of criminal case wouldresult in failure of justice, then it may exercise inherent powerunder Section 482 CrPC.”

7.7 In the case of Arun Gulab Gawali (supra), this Court setaside the order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal complaint/

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AFIR which was even filed by the complainant. In the case before thisCourt, prayer for quashing the FIR before the High Court was by thecomplainant himself and the High Court quashed the FIR/complaint inexercise of the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Quashing and settingaside the judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing theFIR, this Court in paragraphs 13 and 27 to 29 has observed as under:B

“13. The power of quashing criminal proceedings has to beexercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that tooin the rarest of rare cases and the Court cannot be justified inembarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness orotherwise of allegations made in the FIR/complaint, unless theallegations are so patently absurd and inherently improbable sothat no prudent person can ever reach such conclusion. Theextraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not confer anarbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims orcaprice. However, the Court, under its inherent powers, can neitherintervene at an uncalled for stage nor can it “soft-pedal the course

of justice” at crucial stage of investigation/proceedings. Theprovisions of Articles 226, 227 of the Constitution of India andSection 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinaftercalled as “CrPC”) are device to advance justice and not tofrustrate it. The power of judicial review is discretionary, however,it must be exercised to prevent the miscarriage of justice and forcorrecting some grave errors and to ensure that stream ofadministration of justice remains clean and pure. However, thereare no limits of power of the Court, but the more the power, themore due care and caution is to be exercised in invoking thesepowers. (Vide State of W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha [(1982) 1SCC 561 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 283 : AIR 1982 SC 949] , Pepsi FoodsLtd. v. Special Judicial Magistrate [(1998) 5 SCC 749 : 1998SCC (Cri) 1400] , G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P. [(2000) 2 SCC636 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 513 : AIR 2000 SC 754] and AjayMitra v. State of M.P. [(2003) 3 SCC 11 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 703] )

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27. The High Court proceeded on the perception that asthe complainant himself was not supporting the complaint, he wouldnot support the case of the prosecution and there would be nochance of conviction, thus the trial itself would be futile exercise.

Quashing of FIR/complaint on such ground cannot be held to bejustified in law. Ordinarily, the Court of Session is empowered todischarge an accused under Section 227 CrPC even beforeinitiating the trial. The accused can, therefore, move the trial courtitself for such relief and the trial court would be in betterposition to analyse and pass an order as it is possessed of all thepowers and the material to do so. It is, therefore, not necessary toinvoke the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for the quashingof prosecution in such case. The reliance on affidavits by theHigh Court would be weak, hazy and unreliable source foradjudication on the fate of trial. The presumption that an accusedwould never be convicted on the material available is too risky aproposition to be accepted readily, particularly in heinous offenceslike extortion.

28. claim founded on denial by the complainant evenbefore the trial commences coupled with an allegation that thepolice had compelled the lodging of false FIR, is matter whichrequires further investigation as the charge is levelled against thepolice. If the prosecution is quashed, then neither the trial courtnor the investigating agency has any opportunity to go into thisquestion, which may require consideration. The State is theprosecutor and all prosecution is the social and legal responsibilityof the State. An offence committed is crime against society andnot against the victim alone. The victim under undue pressure orinfluence of the accused or under any threat or compulsion mayresile back but that would not absolve the State from bringing theaccused to book, who has committed an offence and has violatedthe law of the land.

29. Thus, while exercising such power the Court has to actcautiously before proceeding to quash prosecution in respect ofan offence which hits and affects the society at large. It shouldbe case where no other view is possible nor any investigation orinquiry is further required. There cannot be general propositionof law, so as to fit in as straitjacket formula for the exercise ofsuch power. Each case will have to be judged on its own meritand the facts warranting exercise of such power. More so, it wasnot case of civil nature where there could be possibility ofcompromise or involving an offence which may be compoundable

under Section 320 CrPC, where the Court could apply the ratioof Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia [(1988) 1 SCC 692 : 1988 SCC(Cri) 234 : AIR 1988 SC 709] .”

7.8 Thereafter in catena of decisions, this Court has reiteratedthe parameters for exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.Band/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India in the matter ofquashing the FIR/complaint.

8. While considering the issue involved, the rights and duties ofthe police to investigate into cognizable offences are also required to beconsidered.

8.1 The powers of investigation into cognizable offences arecontained in Chapter XIV of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Section154 deals with information in cognizable offence and Section 156 withinvestigation into such offence and under these sections the police havethe statutory right to investigate into the circumstances of any allegedDcognizable offence.

8.2 The Privy Council in the case of Khwaja Nazir Ahmad (supra)observed that in India, there is statutory right on the part of the policeto investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime withoutrequiring any authority from the judicial authorities. It is further observedEthat it would be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible tointerfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherentjurisdiction of the court. It is further observed that the functions of thejudiciary and the police are complementary, not overlapping, and thecombination of individual liberty with due observance of law and orderis only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function.F

9. When the High Court would be justified in interfering with theinvestigation by the police, while exercising the inherent powers underSection 482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India, fewdecisions of this Court are required to be noticed and referred to, whichare as under.

9.1 In the case of State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha, (1980) 1SCC 554, this Court, after referring to the precedents including thedecision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir Ahmad(supra), has observed in paragraphs 25 and 26 as under:

“25. There is clear-cut and well demarcated sphere ofactivity in the field of crime detection and crime punishment.Investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved forthe executive through the police department the superintendenceover which vests in the State Government. The executive whichis charged with duty to keep vigilance over law and order situationis obliged to prevent crime and if an offence is alleged to havebeen committed it is its bounded duty to investigate into the offenceand bring the offender to book. Once it investigates and finds anoffence having been committed it is its duty to collect evidencefor the purpose of proving the offence. Once that is completedand the investigating officer submits report to the court requestingthe court to take cognizance of the offence under Section 190 ofthe Code its duty comes to an end. On cognizance of the offencebeing taken by the court the police function of investigation comesto an end subject to the provision contained in Section 173(8),there commences the adjudicatory function of the judiciary todetermine whether an offence has been committed and if so,whether by the person or persons charged with the crime by thepolice in its report to the court, and to award adequate punishmentaccording to law for the offence proved to the satisfaction of thecourt. There is thus well defined and well demarcated functionin the field of crime detection and its subsequent adjudicationbetween the police and the Magistrate. This had been recognisedway back in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad [AIR 1944PC 18 : 1944 LR 71 IA 203, 213] where the Privy Councilobserved as under:“In India, as has been shown, there is statutory righton the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of analleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority fromthe judicial authorities and it would, as Their Lordships think,be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interferewith those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherentjurisdiction of the court. The functions of the judiciary and thepolice are complementary, not overlapping, and the combinationof individual liberty with due observance of law and order isonly to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function,always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervenein an appropriate case when moved under Section 491 of the

1076SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ACriminal Procedure Code to give directions in the nature ofhabeas corpus. In such case as the present, however, theCourt’s functions begin when charge is preferred before it,and not until then.”

26. This view of the Judicial Committee clearly demarcates theBfunctions of the executive and the judiciary in the field of detection ofcrime and its subsequent trial and it would appear that the power of thepolice to investigate into cognizable offence is ordinarily not to beinterfered with by the judiciary.”

In the said decision, this Court also took note of the followingCobservations made by this Court in the case of S.M. Sharma v. BipenKumar Tiwari, (1970) 1 SCC 653:

“It appears to us that, though the Code of CriminalProcedure gives to the police unfettered power to investigate allcases where they suspect that cognizable offence has beenDcommitted, in appropriate cases an aggrieved person can alwaysseek remedy by invoking the power of the High Court underArticle 226 of the Constitution under which, if the High Courtcould be convinced that the power of investigation has beenexercised by police officer mala fide, the High Court can alwaysissue writ of mandamus restraining the police officer fromEmisusing his legal powers.”

9.2 In the case of Union of India v. Prakash P. Hinduja, (2003)6 SCC 195, in paragraph 20, it is observed and held as under:

“20. Thus the legal position is absolutely clear and alsoFsettled by judicial authorities that the court would not interferewith the investigation or during the course of investigation whichwould mean from the time of the lodging of the first informationreport till the submission of the report by the officer in charge ofthe police station in court under Section 173(2) CrPC, this fieldbeing exclusively reserved for the investigating agency.”G

9.3 In the case of Bhajan Lal (supra), it is observed and held bythis Court that save in exceptional cases where non interference wouldresult in miscarriage of justice, the court and the judicial process shouldnot interfere at the stage of the investigation of offence. It is furtherobserved that in routine case where information of an offence or

offences has been lodged, investigation commenced, search and seizurefollowed and suspects arrested, the resort to the unusual procedure oforal applications and oral appeals and interim stay order thereon wouldhave the effect of interfering and staying the investigation of offencesby the investigating officer performing statutory duty under Cr.P.C.

9.4 In the case of Ujjal Kumar Burdhan (supra), it is observedand held by this Court that unless case of gross abuse of power is madeout against those in charge of investigation, the High Court should beloath to interfere at early/premature stage of investigation.

9.5 In the case of Satvinder Kaur v. State (Govt. of NCT ofDelhi), (1999) 8 SCC 728, in paragraphs 14 to 16, it is observed andheld as under:

“14. Further, the legal position is well settled that if an offenceis disclosed the court will not normally interfere with aninvestigation into the case and will permit investigation into theoffence alleged to be completed. If the FIR, prima facie, disclosesthe commission of an offence, the court does not normally stopthe investigation, for, to do so would be to trench upon the lawfulpower of the police to investigate into cognizable offences. [Stateof W.B. v. Swapan Kumar Guha, (1982) 1 SCC 561 : 1982 SCC(Cri) 283] It is also settled by long course of decisions of thisCourt that for the purpose of exercising its power under Section482 CrPC to quash an FIR or complaint, the High Court wouldhave to proceed entirely on the basis of the allegations made inthe complaint or the documents accompanying the same per se; ithas no jurisdiction to examine the correctness or otherwise of theallegations. [Pratibha Rani v. Suraj Kumar, (1985) 2 SCC 370,395 : 1985 SCC (Cri) 180]

15. Hence, in the present case, the High Court committeda grave error in accepting the contention of the respondent thatthe investigating officer had no jurisdiction to investigate the matterson the alleged ground that no part of the offence was committedwithin the territorial jurisdiction of the police station at Delhi. Theappreciation of the evidence is the function of the courts whenseized of the matter. At the stage of investigation, the materialcollected by an investigating officer cannot be judicially scrutinizedfor arriving at conclusion that the police station officer of

CDE

particular police station would not have territorial jurisdiction. Inany case, it has to be stated that in view of Section 178(c) of theCriminal Procedure Code, when it is uncertain in which of theseveral local areas an offence was committed, or where it consistsof several acts done in different local areas, the said offence canbe enquired into or tried by court having jurisdiction over any ofsuch local areas. Therefore, to say at the stage of investigationthat the SHO, Police Station Paschim Vihar, New Delhi was nothaving territorial jurisdiction, is on the face of it, illegal anderroneous. That apart, Section 156(2) contains an embargo thatno proceeding of police officer shall be challenged on the groundthat he has no territorial power to investigate. The High Court hascompletely overlooked the said embargo when it entertained thepetition of Respondent 2 on the ground of want of territorialjurisdiction.

16. Lastly, it is required to be reiterated that while exercisingthe jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Codeof quashing an investigation, the court should bear in mind whathas been observed in the State of Kerala v. O.C. Kuttan [(1999)2 SCC 651 : 1999 SCC (Cri) 304 : JT (1999) 1 SC 486] to thefollowing effect: (SCC pp. 654-55, para 6)

“Having said so, the Court gave note of caution to theeffect that the power of quashing the criminal proceedingsshould be exercised very sparingly with circumspection andthat too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not bejustified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability orgenuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR orthe complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers donot confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act accordingto its whim or caprice. It is too well settled that the firstinformation report is only an initiation to move the machineryand to investigate into cognizable offence and, therefore,while exercising the power and deciding whether theinvestigation itself should be quashed, utmost care should betaken by the court and at that stage, it is not possible for thecourt to sift the materials or to weigh the materials and thencome to the conclusion one way or the other. In the caseof State of U.P. v. O.P. Sharma [(1996) 7 SCC 705 : 1996

SCC (Cri) 497 : JT (1996) 2 SC 488] three-Judge Bench ofthis Court indicated that the High Court should be loath tointerfere at the threshold to thwart the prosecution exercisingits inherent power under Section 482 or under Articles 226 and227 of the Constitution of India, as the case may be, and allowthe law to take its own course. The same view was reiteratedby yet another three-Judge Bench of this Court in the caseof Rashmi Kumar v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada [(1997) 2 SCC397 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 415 : JT (1996) 11 SC 175] where thisCourt sounded word of caution and stated that such powershould be sparingly and cautiously exercised only when thecourt is of the opinion that otherwise there will be grossmiscarriage of justice. The Court had also observed that socialstability and order is required to be regulated by proceedingagainst the offender as it is an offence against society as awhole.”

9.6 In the case of Supdt. of Police, CBI v. Tapan Kumar Singh,(2003) 6 SCC 175 and in the case of State of U.P. v. Naresh, (2011)4 SCC 324, it is observed and held by this Court that FIR is not anencyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relating to theoffence reported. In paragraph 20 in the case of Tapan Kumar Singh(supra), it is observed and held as under:

20. It is well settled that first information report is not anencyclopaedia, which must disclose all facts and details relatingto the offence reported. An informant may lodge report aboutthe commission of an offence though he may not know the nameof the victim or his assailant. He may not even know how theoccurrence took place. first informant need not necessarily bean eyewitness so as to be able to disclose in great detail all aspectsof the offence committed. What is of significance is that theinformation given must disclose the commission of cognizableoffence and the information so lodged must provide basis forthe police officer to suspect the commission of cognizableoffence. At this stage it is enough if the police officer on the basisof the information given suspects the commission of cognizableoffence, and not that he must be convinced or satisfied that acognizable offence has been committed. If he has reasons tosuspect, on the basis of information received, that cognizable

Aoffence may have been committed, he is bound to record theinformation and conduct an investigation. At this stage it is alsonot necessary for him to satisfy himself about the truthfulness ofthe information. It is only after complete investigation that hemay be able to report on the truthfulness or otherwise of theinformation. Similarly, even if the information does not furnish allBthe details he must find out those details in the course ofinvestigation and collect all the necessary evidence. The informationgiven disclosing the commission of cognizable offence only setsin motion the investigative machinery, with view to collect allnecessary evidence, and thereafter to take action in accordanceCwith law. The true test is whether the information furnished providesa reason to suspect the commission of an offence, which the policeofficer concerned is empowered under Section 156 of the Codeto investigate. If it does, he has no option but to record theinformation and proceed to investigate the case either himself ordepute any other competent officer to conduct the investigation.DThe question as to whether the report is true, whether it disclosesfull details regarding the manner of occurrence, whether theaccused is named, and whether there is sufficient evidence tosupport the allegations are all matters which are alien to theconsideration of the question whether the report discloses theEcommission of cognizable offence. Even if the information doesnot give full details regarding these matters, the investigating officeris not absolved of his duty to investigate the case and discover thetrue facts, if he can.”

9.7 In the case of Prakash P. Hinduja (supra), it is observedFand held by this Court that the court would not interfere with theinvestigation or during the course of investigation which would meanfrom the time of lodging of the first information report till the submissionof the report by the officer in charge of the police station in court underSection 173(2) Cr.P.C., this field being exclusively reserved for theinvestigating agency.G

9.8 In the case of P. Chidambaram v. Directorate ofEnforcement, (2019) 9 SCC 24, this Court while considering the powersof the investigating agency to investigate the cognizable offence, hasobserved in paragraphs 61, 64 to 67 as under:

“61. The investigation of cognizable offence and thevarious stages thereon including the interrogation of the accusedis exclusively reserved for the investigating agency whose powersare unfettered so long as the investigating officer exercises hisinvestigating powers well within the provisions of the law and thelegal bounds. In exercise of its inherent power under Section 482CrPC, the Court can interfere and issue appropriate direction onlywhen the Court is convinced that the power of the investigatingofficer is exercised mala fide or where there is abuse of powerand non-compliance of the provisions of the Code of CriminalProcedure. However, this power of invoking inherent jurisdictionto issue direction and interfering with the investigation is exercisedonly in rare cases where there is abuse of process or non-compliance of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code.

64. Investigation into crimes is the prerogative of the policeand excepting in rare cases, the judiciary should keep out all theareas of investigation. In State of Bihar v. P.P. Sharma [State ofBihar v. P.P. Sharma, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 222 : 1992 SCC (Cri)192] , it was held that : (SCC p. 258, para 47)

“47. … The investigating officer is an arm of the lawand plays pivotal role in the dispensation of criminal justiceand maintenance of law and order. … Enough power istherefore given to the police officer in the area of investigatingprocess and granting them the court latitude to exercise itsdiscretionary power to make successful investigation….”

65. In Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria[Dukhishyam Benupani v. Arun Kumar Bajoria, (1998) 1 SCC52 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 261] , this Court held that : (SCC p. 55, para7)

“7. … It is not the function of the court to monitorinvestigation processes so long as such investigation does nottransgress any provision of law. It must be left to theinvestigating agency to decide the venue, the timings and thequestions and the manner of putting such questions to personsinvolved in such offences. blanket order fully insulating aperson from arrest would make his interrogation mereritual….”

66. As held by the Supreme Court in catena of judgmentsthat there is well-defined and demarcated function in the fieldof investigation and its subsequent adjudication. It is not the functionof the court to monitor the investigation process so long as theinvestigation does not violate any provision of law. It must be leftto the discretion of the investigating agency to decide the courseof investigation. If the court is to interfere in each and every stageof the investigation and the interrogation of the accused, it wouldaffect the normal course of investigation. It must be left to theinvestigating agency to proceed in its own manner in interrogationof the accused, nature of questions put to him and the manner ofinterrogation of the accused.

67. It is one thing to say that if the power of investigationhas been exercised by an investigating officer mala fide or non-compliance of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code inthe conduct of the investigation, it is open to the court to quash theproceedings where there is clear case of abuse of power. It is adifferent matter that the High Court in exercise of its inherentpower under Section 482 CrPC, can always issue appropriatedirection at the instance of an aggrieved person if the High Courtis convinced that the power of investigation has been exercisedby the investigating officer mala fide and not in accordance with

the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, aspointed out earlier that power is to be exercised in rare caseswhere there is clear abuse of power and non-compliance of theprovisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code of CriminalProcedure requiring the interference of the High Court. In theFinitial stages of investigation where the Court is considering thequestion of grant of regular bail or pre-arrest bail, it is not for theCourt to enter into the demarcated function of the investigationand collection of evidence/materials for establishing the offenceand interrogation of the accused and the witnesses.”

9.9 In the recent decision of this Court in the case of Skoda AutoVolkswagen India Private Limited v. State of Uttar Pradesh, 2020SCC OnLine SC 958, it is observed in paragraph 41 as under:

“41. It is needless to point out that ever since the decision of thePrivy Council in King Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmed AIR1945 PC 18, the law is well settled that Courts would not thwart

any investigation. It is only in cases where no cognizable offenceor offence of any kind is disclosed in the first information reportthat the Court will not permit an investigation to go on. As cautionedby this Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992 Supp (1)SCC 335, the power of quashing should be exercised very sparinglyand with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases.While examining complaint, the quashing of which is sought, theCourt cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability orgenuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or inthe complaint. In S.M. Datta v. State of Gujarat (2001) 7 SCC659 this Court again cautioned that criminal proceedings oughtnot to be scuttled at the initial stage. Quashing of complaintshould rather be an exception and rarity than an ordinary rule.In S.M. Datta (supra), this Court held that if perusal of the firstinformation report leads to disclosure of an offence even broadly,law courts are barred from usurping the jurisdiction of the police,since the two organs of the State operate in two specific spheresof activities and one ought not to tread over the other sphere.’’

10. From the aforesaid decisions of this Court, right from thedecision of the Privy Council in the case of Khawaja Nazir Ahmad(supra), the following principles of law emerge:

i) Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevantprovisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained in Chapter XIVof the Code to investigate into cognizable offences;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into the cognizableoffences;

iii) However, in cases where no cognizable offence or offence ofany kind is disclosed in the first information report the Court will notpermit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparingly withcircumspection, in the ‘rarest of rare cases’. (The rarest of rare casesstandard in its application for quashing under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is notto be confused with the norm which has been formulated in the contextof the death penalty, as explained previously by this Court);

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which is sought,the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuinenessor otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR/complaint;

Avi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at the initial stage;vii) Quashing of complaint/FIR should be an exception and ararity than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping the jurisdictionof the police, since the two organs of the State operate in two specificBspheres of activities. The inherent power of the court is, however,recognised to secure the ends of justice or prevent the above of theprocess by Section 482 Cr.P.C.

ix) The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary,not overlapping;C

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference would resultin miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial process should notinterfere at the stage of investigation of offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do not conferDan arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act according to its whims orcaprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaedia whichmust disclose all facts and details relating to the offence reported.Therefore, when the investigation by the police is in progress, the courtshould not go into the merits of the allegations in the FIR. Police must beEpermitted to complete the investigation. It would be premature topronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that the complaint/FIRdoes not deserve to be investigated or that it amounts to abuse of processof law. During or after investigation, if the investigating officer finds thatthere is no substance in the application made by the complainant, theFinvestigating officer may file an appropriate report/summary before thelearned Magistrate which may be considered by the learned Magistratein accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, butconferment of wide power requires the court to be cautious. It casts anGonerous and more diligent duty on the court;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit, regardbeing had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposedby law, more particularly the parameters laid down by this Court in thecases of R.P. Kapur (supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdictionHto quash the FIR/complaint; and

xv) When prayer for quashing the FIR is made by the allegedaccused, the court when it exercises the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,only has to consider whether or not the allegations in the FIR disclosethe commission of cognizable offence and is not required to consideron merits whether the allegations make out cognizable offence or notand the court has to permit the investigating agency/police to investigatethe allegations in the FIR.

11. Whether the High Court would be justified in granting stay offurther investigation pending the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C.before it and in what circumstances the High Court would be justified isa further core question to be considered.

Before passing an interim order of staying further investigationpending the quashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article226 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has to apply the veryparameters which are required to be considered while quashing theproceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in exerciseof its inherent jurisdiction, referred to hereinabove.

12. In given case, there may be allegations of abuse of processof law by converting civil dispute into criminal dispute, only with aview to pressurise the accused. Similarly, in given case the complaintitself on the face of it can be said to be barred by law. The allegations inthe FIR/complaint may not at all disclose the commission of cognizableoffence. In such cases and in exceptional cases with circumspection,the High Court may stay the further investigation. However, at the sametime, there may be genuine complaints/FIRs and the police/investigatingagency has statutory obligation/right/duty to enquire into the cognizableoffences. Therefore, balance has to be struck between the rights ofthe genuine complainants and the FIRs disclosing commission of acognizable offence and the statutory obligation/duty of the investigatingagency to investigate into the cognizable offences on the one hand andthose innocent persons against whom the criminal proceedings are initiatedwhich may be in given case abuse of process of law and the process.However, if the facts are hazy and the investigation has just begun, theHigh Court would be circumspect in exercising such powers and theHigh Court must permit the investigating agency to proceed further withthe investigation in exercise of its statutory duty under the provisions ofthe Code. Even in such case the High Court has to give/assign briefreasons why at this stage the further investigation is required to be stayed.

AThe High Court must appreciate that speedy investigation is therequirement in the criminal administration of justice.

13. While deprecating the grant of stay of investigation or trial bythe High Courts, this Court in the case of Imtiyaz Ahmad (supra), inparagraphs 25 to 27, held as under:

“25. Unduly long delay has the effect of bringing aboutblatant violation of the rule of law and adverse impact on thecommon man’s access to justice. person’s access to justice is aguaranteed fundamental right under the Constitution andparticularly Article 21. Denial of this right undermines publicconfidence in the justice delivery system and incentivises peopleto look for short cuts and other fora where they feel that justicewill be done quicker. In the long run, this also weakens the justicedelivery system and poses threat to the rule of law.

26. It may not be out of place to highlight that access toDjustice must not be understood in purely quantitative dimension.Access to justice in an egalitarian democracy must be understoodto mean qualitative access to justice as well. Access to justice is,therefore, much more than improving an individual’s access tocourts, or guaranteeing representation. It must be defined in termsof ensuring that legal and judicial outcomes are just and equitableE[see United Nations Development Programme, Access to Justice— Practice Note (2004)].

27. The present case discloses the need to reiterate that“access to justice” is vital for the rule of law, which by implicationincludes the right of access to an independent judiciary. It isFsubmitted that the stay of investigation or trial for significant periodsof time runs counter to the principle of rule of law, wherein therights and aspirations of citizens are intertwined with expeditiousconclusion of matters. It is further submitted that delay inconclusion of criminal matters signifies restriction on the rightGof access to justice itself, thus amounting to violation of thecitizens’ rights under the Constitution, in particular under Article21.”14. similar view has been expressed by this Court again in thecase of Asian Resurfacing of Road Agency Private Limited (supra).By deprecating the interlocutory orders/stay of criminal proceedings byH

the High Courts, it is observed by this Court that the stay should not beconsidered as an incentive to cause delay in the proceedings. It is furtherobserved that order granting stay or extending it must be speakingorder and stay not to operate long. It is further observed in the saiddecision that delay in criminal trial has deleterious effect on theadministration of justice in which the society has vital interest; delay intrials affects the faith in Rule of Law and efficacy of the legal system; itaffects social welfare and development; mere prima facie case is notenough; party seeking stay must be put to terms and stay should not beincentive to delay; the order granting stay must show application of mind;the power to grant stay is coupled with accountability. It is further observedthat wherever stay is granted, speaking order must be passed showingthat the case was of an exceptional nature.

15. As observed hereinabove, there may be some cases wherethe initiation of criminal proceedings may be an abuse of process of law.In such cases, and only in exceptional cases and where it is found thatnon interference would result into miscarriage of justice, the High Court,in exercise of its inherent powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article226 of the Constitution of India, may quash the FIR/complaint/criminalproceedings and even may stay the further investigation. However, theHigh Court should be slow in interfering the criminal proceedings at theinitial stage, i.e., quashing petition filed immediately after lodging theFIR/complaint and no sufficient time is given to the police to investigateinto the allegations of the FIR/complaint, which is the statutory right/duty of the police under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure.There is no denial of the fact that power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. isvery wide, but as observed by this Court in catena of decisions, referredto hereinabove, conferment of wide power requires the court to be morecautious and it casts an onerous and more diligent duty on the court.Therefore, in exceptional cases, when the High Court deems it fit, regardbeing had to the parameters of quashing and the self-restraint imposedby law, may pass appropriate interim orders, as thought apposite in law,however, the High Court has to give brief reasons which will reflect theapplication of mind by the court to the relevant facts.

16. We have come across many orders passed by the High Courtspassing interim orders of stay of arrest and/or “no coercive steps to betaken against the accused” in the quashing proceedings under Section482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India with assigning

Aany reasons. We have also come across number of orders passed by theHigh Courts, while dismissing the quashing petitions, of not to arrest theaccused during the investigation or till the chargesheet/final report underSection 173 Cr.P.C is filed. As observed hereinabove, it is the statutoryright and even the duty of the police to investigate into the cognizableoffence and collect the evidence during the course of investigation. ThereBmay be requirement of custodial investigation for which the accused isrequired to be in police custody (popularly known as remand). Therefore,passing such type of blanket interim orders without assigning reasons, ofnot to arrest and/or “no coercive steps” would hamper the investigationand may affect the statutory right/duty of the police to investigate theCcognizable offence conferred under the provisions of the Cr.P.C.Therefore, such blanket order is not justified at all. The order of theHigh Court must disclose reasons why it has passed an ad-interim directionduring the pendency of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Suchreasons, however brief must disclose an application of mind.DThe aforesaid is required to be considered from another anglealso. Granting of such blanket order would not only adversely affect theinvestigation but would have far reaching implications for maintainingthe Rule of Law. Where the investigation is stayed for long time, evenif the stay is ultimately vacated, the subsequent investigation may not bevery fruitful for the simple reason that the evidence may no longer beEavailable. Therefore, in case, the accused named in the FIR/complaintapprehends his arrest, he has remedy to apply for anticipatory bailunder Section 438 Cr.P.C. and on the conditions of grant of anticipatorybail under Section 438 Cr.P.C being satisfied, he may be released onanticipatory bail by the competent court. Therefore, it cannot be said

Fthat the accused is remediless. It cannot be disputed that the anticipatorybail under Section 438 Cr.P.C. can be granted on the conditions prescribedunder Section 438 Cr.P.C. are satisfied. At the same time, it is to benoted that arrest is not must whenever an FIR of cognizable offenceis lodged. Still in case person is apprehending his arrest in connectionwith an FIR disclosing cognizable offence, as observed hereinabove, heGhas remedy to apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C.As observed by this Court in the case of Hema Mishra v. State ofUttar Pradesh, (2014) 4 SCC 453, though the High Courts have verywide powers under Article 226, the powers under Article 226 of theConstitution of India are to be exercised to prevent miscarriage of justiceHand to prevent abuse of process of law by the authorities indiscriminately

making pre-arrest of the accused persons. It is further observed that inentertaining such petition under Article 226, the High Court is supposedto balance the two interests. On the one hand, the Court is to ensure thatsuch power under Article 226 is not to be exercised liberally so as toconvert it into Section 438 Cr.P.C. proceedings. It is further observedthat on the other hand whenever the High Court finds that in givencase if the protection against pre-arrest is not given, it would amount togross miscarriage of justice and no case, at all, is made for arrest pendingtrial, the High Court would be free to grant the relief in the nature ofanticipatory bail in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of theConstitution of India, keeping in mind that this power has to be exercisedsparingly in those cases where it is absolutely warranted and justified.However, such blanket interim order of not to arrest or “no coercivesteps” cannot be passed mechanically and in routine manner.

17. So far as the order of not to arrest and/or “no coercive steps”till the final report/chargesheet is filed and/or during the course ofinvestigation or not to arrest till the investigation is completed, passedwhile dismissing the quashing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/orunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India and having opined that nocase is made out to quash the FIR/complaint is concerned, the same iswholly impermissible.

18. This Court in the case of Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra),as such, deprecated such practice/orders passed by the High Courts,directing police not to arrest, even while declining to interfere with thequashing petition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. In theaforesaid case before this Court, the High Court dismissed the petitionfiled under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the FIR. However, whiledismissing the quashing petition, the High Court directed the police notto arrest the petitioners during the pendency of the investigation. Whilesetting aside such order, it is observed by this Court that such directionamounts to an order under Section 438 Cr.P.C., albeit without satisfactionof the conditions of the said provision and the same is legallyunacceptable. In the aforesaid decision, it is specifically observed andheld by this Court that “it is absolutely inconceivable and unthinkable topass an order directing the police not to arrest till the investigation iscompleted while declining to interfere or expressing opinion that it is notappropriate to stay the investigation”. It is further observed that this kindof order is really inappropriate and unseemly and it has no sanction in

Alaw. It is further observed that the courts should oust and obstructunscrupulous litigants from invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Courton the drop of hat to file an application for quashing of launching anFIR or investigation and then seek relief by an interim order. It is furtherobserved that it is the obligation of the court to keep such unprincipledand unethical litigants at bay.B

In the aforesaid decision, this Court has further deprecated theorders passed by the High Courts, while dismissing the applications underSection 482 Cr.P.C. to the effect that if the petitioner-accused surrendersbefore the trial Magistrate, he shall be admitted to bail on such termsand conditions as deemed fit and appropriate to be imposed by theCMagistrate concerned. It is observed that such orders are de hors thepowers conferred under Section 438 Cr.P.C. That thereafter, this Courtin paragraph 25 has observed as under:

“25. Having reminded the same, presently we can only say thatthe types of orders like the present one, are totally unsustainable,Dfor it is contrary to the aforesaid settled principles and judicialprecedents. It is intellectual truancy to avoid the precedents andissue directions which are not in consonance with law. It is theduty of Judge to sustain the judicial balance and not to think ofan order which can cause trauma to the process of adjudication.EIt should be borne in mid that the culture of adjudication is stabilisedwhen intellectual discipline is maintained and further when suchdiscipline constantly keeps guard on the mind.”

19. We are at pains to note that despite the law laid down by thisCourt in the case of Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra), deprecating suchForders passed by the High Courts of not to arrest during the pendencyof the investigation, even when the quashing petitions under Section 482Cr.P.C. or Article 226 of the Constitution of India are dismissed, eventhereafter also, many High Courts are passing such orders. The lawdeclared/laid down by this Court is binding on all the High Courts andnot following the law laid down by this Court would have very seriousGimplications in the administration of justice.20. In the recent decision of this Court in the case of RavuriKrishna Murthy (supra), this bench set aside the similar order passedby the Andhra Pradesh High Court of granting blanket order ofprotection from arrest, even after coming to the conclusion that no caseHfor quashing was established. The High Court while disposing of the

quashing petition and while refusing to quash the criminal proceedings inexercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. directed to complete theinvestigation into the crime without arresting the second petitioner – A2and file final report, if any, in accordance with law. The High Courtalso further passed an order that the second petitioner – A2 to appearbefore the investigating agency as and when required and cooperatewith the investigating agency. After considering the decision of this Courtin the case of Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra), this Court set aside theorder passed by the High Court restraining the investigating officer fromarresting the second accused.

Thus, it has been found that despite absolute proposition of lawlaid down by this Court in the case of Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra)that such blanket order of not to arresttill the investigation is completedand the final report is filed, passed while declining to quash the criminalproceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C, as observedhereinabove, the High Courts have continued to pass such orders.Therefore, we again reiterate the law laid down by this Court in the caseof Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra) and we direct all the High Courtsto scrupulously follow the law laid down by this Court in the case ofHabib Abdullah Jeelani (supra) and the law laid down by this Court inthe present case, which otherwise the High Courts are bound to follow.We caution the High Courts again against passing such orders of not toarrest or “no coercive steps to be taken”till the investigation is completedand the final report is filed, while not entertaining quashing petitions underSection 482 Cr.P.C. and/or Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

21. Now so far as the legality of the impugned interim order passedby the High Court directing the investigating agency/police “not to adoptany coercive steps” against the accused is concerned, for the reasonsstated hereinbelow, the same is unsustainable:

i) that such blanket interim order passed by the High Court affectsthe powers of the investigating agency to investigate into thecognizable offences, which otherwise is statutory right/duty ofthe police under the relevant provisions of the Cr.P.C.;

ii) that the interim order is cryptic order;

iii) that no reasons whatsoever have been assigned by the HighCourt, while passing such blanket order of “no coercive steps tobe adopted” by the police;

iv) that it is not clear what the High Court meant by passing theorder of “not to adopt any coercive steps”, as it is clear from theimpugned interim order that it was brought to the notice of theHigh Court that so far as the accused are concerned, they arealready protected by the interim protection granted by the learnedSessions Court, and therefore there was no further reason and/orjustification for the High Court to pass such an interim order of“no coercive steps to be adopted”. If the High Court meant bypassing such an interim order of “no coercive steps” directing theinvestigating agency/police not to further investigate, in that case,such blanket order without assigning any reasons whatsoeverand without even permitting the investigating agency to furtherinvestigate into the allegations of the cognizable offence isotherwise unsustainable. It has affected the right of theinvestigating agency to investigate into the cognizable offences.While passing such blanket order, the High Court has not indicatedany reasons.21.1 As observed and held by this Court in the case of SpecialDirector v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, (2004) 3 SCC 440 thatthough, while passing interim orders, it is not necessary toelaborately deal with the merits, it is certainly desirable and properfor the High Court to indicate the reasons which have weighedwith it in granting such an extraordinary relief in the form of aninterim protection.

21.2 In the case of Nitco Tiles Ltd. v. Gujarat Ceramic FloorTiles Mfg. Association, (2005) 12 SCC 454, it is observed andheld by this Court that when an interim order should, particularlywhen that order may be impugned before the higher authority/Forum, contain reasons, however brief, in support of the grant orrefusal thereof. It is further observed that in the absence of suchreasons, it is virtually impossible for such higher authority/Forumto determine what persuaded the grant or refusal of relief.

21.3 In the case of Hindustan Times Limited v. Union of India,(1998) 2 SCC 242, while emphasising on giving reasons by theHigh Court, it is observed that necessity to provide reasons,howsoever brief, in support of the High Court’s conclusions is tooobvious to be reiterated. Obligation to give reasons introducesclarity and excludes or at any rate minimises the changes of

arbitrariness and the higher forum can test the correctness ofthose reasons.

21.4 While considering the importance of the reasons to be givenduring the decision-making process, in the case of KrantiAssociates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed, (2010) 9 SCC 496, inparagraph 47, this Court has summarised as under:

“47. Summarising the above discussion, this Court holds:

(a) In India the judicial trend has always been to recordreasons, even in administrative decisions, if such decisions affectanyone prejudicially.

(b) quasi-judicial authority must record reasons in supportof its conclusions.

(c) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to servethe wider principle of justice that justice must not only be done itmust also appear to be done as well.

(d) Recording of reasons also operates as valid restrainton any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi-judicial oreven administrative power.

(e) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised bythe decision-maker on relevant grounds and by disregardingextraneous considerations.

(f) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable acomponent of decision-making process as observing principlesof natural justice by judicial, quasi-judicial and even byadministrative bodies.

(g) Reasons facilitate the process of judicial review bysuperior courts.

(h) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed torule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of reasoneddecisions based on relevant facts. This is virtually the lifeblood ofjudicial decision-making justifying the principle that reason is thesoul of justice.

(i) Judicial or even quasi-judicial opinions these days canbe as different as the judges and authorities who deliver them. All

these decisions serve one common purpose which is todemonstrate by reason that the relevant factors have beenobjectively considered. This is important for sustaining the litigants’faith in the justice delivery system.

(j) Insistence on reason is requirement for both judicialaccountability and transparency.

(k) If judge or quasi-judicial authority is not candidenough about his/her decision-making process then it is impossibleto know whether the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine ofprecedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(l) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clearand succinct. pretence of reasons or “rubber-stamp reasons” isnot to be equated with valid decision-making process.

(m) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine quanon of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency inDdecision-making not only makes the judges and decision-makersless prone to errors but also makes them subject to broader scrutiny.(See David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100Harvard Law Review 731-37] .)

(n) Since the requirement to record reasons emanates fromEthe broad doctrine of fairness in decision-making, the saidrequirement is now virtually component of human rights andwas considered part of Strasbourg Jurisprudence. See RuizTorija v. Spain [(1994) 19 EHRR 553] EHRR, at 562 para 29and Anya v. University of Oxford [2001 EWCA Civ 405 (CA)]F, wherein the Court referred to Article 6 of the EuropeanConvention of Human Rights which requires, “adequate andintelligent reasons must be given for judicial decisions”.

(o) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play vitalrole in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, fordevelopment of law, requirement of giving reasons for the decisionGis of the essence and is virtually part of “due process”.”

Therefore, even while passing such an interim order, in exceptionalcases with caution and circumspection, the High Court has to give briefreasons why it is necessary to pass such an interim order, more particularlywhen the High Court is exercising the extraordinary and inherent powersH

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitutionof India. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the HighCourt has committed grave error of law and also of facts in passingsuch an interim order of “no coercive steps to be adopted” and the samedeserves to be quashed and set aside.

Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4961 of 2021

22. Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 4961 of 2021 has beenpreferred by respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein – original accused underSection 340 r/w Section 195 (1)(B), Cr.P.C. for initiating action againstthe appellant. It is alleged that the appellant has suppressed the vitaldocuments/agreements and the facts and by suppressing the materialdocuments/agreements and the facts has obtained an interim order dated12.10.2020 from this Court, staying order dated 28.09.2020 passed bythe High Court.

Number of submissions and counter submissions have been madeby the learned counsel for the respective parties. However, consideringthe fact that the quashing petition is yet to be considered by the HighCourt on merits, we do not propose to entertain the present applicationand enter into the merits of the allegations in the present application.However, it will sufficed to say that this Court has passed an interimorder dated 12.10.2020, staying order dated 28.09.2020 passed by theHigh Court, by giving brief reasons and even if the documents/agreementswhich are alleged to have been suppressed would have been there, itwould not have any bearing on the interim order passed by this Court.What is weighed while passing interim order dated 12.10.2020 is veryclear from the interim order dated 12.10.2020. Therefore, we close thecriminal miscellaneous petition No. 4961/2021 and consequently the samestands disposed of.

Conclusions:

23. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, ourfinal conclusions on the principal/core issue, whether the High Courtwould be justified in passing an interim order of stay of investigationand/or “no coercive steps to be adopted”, during the pendency of thequashing petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C and/or under Article 226 ofthe Constitution of India and in what circumstances and whether theHigh Court would be justified in passing the order of not to arrest theaccused or “no coercive steps to be adopted” during the investigation or

DEF

Atill the final report/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., whiledismissing/disposing of/not entertaining/not quashing the criminalproceedings/complaint/FIR in exercise of powers under Section 482Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, our finalconclusions are as under:

Bi)Police has the statutory right and duty under the relevantprovisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure contained inChapter XIV of the Code to investigate into cognizableoffence;

ii) Courts would not thwart any investigation into theCcognizable offences;iii) It is only in cases where no cognizable offence or offenceof any kind is disclosed in the first information report thatthe Court will not permit an investigation to go on;

iv) The power of quashing should be exercised sparinglyDwith circumspection, as it has been observed, in the ‘rarestof rare cases (not to be confused with the formation in thecontext of death penalty).

v) While examining an FIR/complaint, quashing of which issought, the court cannot embark upon an enquiry as to theEreliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegationsmade in the FIR/complaint;

vi) Criminal proceedings ought not to be scuttled at theinitial stage;

vii) Quashing of complaint/FIR should be an exceptionFrather than an ordinary rule;

viii) Ordinarily, the courts are barred from usurping thejurisdiction of the police, since the two organs of the Stateoperate in two specific spheres of activities and one oughtnot to tread over the other sphere;Gix) The functions of the judiciary and the police arecomplementary, not overlapping;

x) Save in exceptional cases where non-interference wouldresult in miscarriage of justice, the Court and the judicial

process should not interfere at the stage of investigationof offences;

xi) Extraordinary and inherent powers of the Court do notconfer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the Court to act accordingto its whims or caprice;

xii) The first information report is not an encyclopaediawhich must disclose all facts and details relating to theoffence reported. Therefore, when the investigation by thepolice is in progress, the court should not go into the meritsof the allegations in the FIR. Police must be permitted tocomplete the investigation. It would be premature topronounce the conclusion based on hazy facts that thecomplaint/FIR does not deserve to be investigated or thatit amounts to abuse of process of law. After investigation, ifthe investigating officer finds that there is no substance inthe application made by the complainant, the investigatingofficer may file an appropriate report/summary before thelearned Magistrate which may be considered by the learnedMagistrate in accordance with the known procedure;

xiii) The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is very wide, butconferment of wide power requires the court to be morecautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent duty on thecourt;

xiv) However, at the same time, the court, if it thinks fit,regard being had to the parameters of quashing and theself-restraint imposed by law, more particularly theparameters laid down by this Court in the cases of R.P. Kapur(supra) and Bhajan Lal (supra), has the jurisdiction to quashthe FIR/complaint;

xv) When prayer for quashing the FIR is made by thealleged accused and the court when it exercises the powerunder Section 482 Cr.P.C., only has to consider whetherthe allegations in the FIR disclose commission of acognizable offence or not. The court is not required toconsider on merits whether or not the merits of theallegations make out cognizable offence and the court hasto permit the investigating agency/police to investigate theallegations in the FIR;

Axvi) The aforesaid parameters would be applicable and/orthe aforesaid aspects are required to be considered by theHigh Court while passing an interim order in quashingpetition in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C.and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.However, an interim order of stay of investigation duringBthe pendency of the quashing petition can be passed withcircumspection. Such an interim order should not requireto be passed routinely, casually and/or mechanically.Normally, when the investigation is in progress and the factsare hazy and the entire evidence/material is not before theCHigh Court, the High Court should restrain itself frompassing the interim order of not to arrest or “no coercivesteps to be adopted” and the accused should be relegatedto apply for anticipatory bail under Section 438 Cr.P.C.before the competent court. The High Court shall not andas such is not justified in passing the order of not to arrestDand/or “no coercive steps” either during the investigationor till the investigation is completed and/or till the finalreport/chargesheet is filed under Section 173 Cr.P.C., whiledismissing/disposing of the quashing petition under Section482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of the Constitution ofEIndia.

xvii) Even in case where the High Court is prima facie ofthe opinion that an exceptional case is made out for grantof interim stay of further investigation, after consideringthe broad parameters while exercising the powers underFSection 482 Cr.P.C. and/or under Article 226 of theConstitution of India referred to hereinabove, the HighCourt has to give brief reasons why such an interim orderis warranted and/or is required to be passed so that it candemonstrate the application of mind by the Court and thehigher forum can consider what was weighed with the HighGCourt while passing such an interim order.

xviii) Whenever an interim order is passed by the HighCourt of “no coercive steps to be adopted” within theaforesaid parameters, the High Court must clarify what doesit mean by “no coercive steps to be adopted” as the term

“no coercive steps to be adopted” can be said to be toovague and/or broad which can be misunderstood and/ormisapplied.

24. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, thepresent appeal succeeds. The impugned interim order/direction containedin clause (d) of the impugned interim order dated 28.09.2020 by whichthe High Court has directed that “no coercive measures to be adopted”against the petitioners (respondent nos. 2 to 4 herein) in respect of FIRNo. 367/2019 dated 19.09.2019, registered at Worli Police Station,Mumbai, Maharashtra (subsequently transferred to Economic OffenceWing, Unit IX, Mumbai, renumbered as C.R. No. 82/2019) is herebyquashed and set aside. However, it is made clear that we have notexpressed anything on the merits of the case, more particularly theallegations in the FIR and the High Court to consider the quashing petitionin accordance with law and on its own merits and considering the afore-stated observations made by this Court in the present judgment.

25. Having regard to the fact that despite the law laid down bythis Court in the case of Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra) and otherdecisions, referred to hereinabove, some High Courts have continued topass such interim orders, we direct the Registry to forward copy ofthis judgment to all the High Courts to be placed before Hon’ble theChief Justice to circulate to all the Judges of the High Courts.

Divya Pandey

Appeal allowed.