PUNJAB STATE CO-OPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATION LTD. & ANR. versus BALBIR KUMAR WALIA & ORS.

PUNJAB STATE CO-OPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERSFEDERATION LTD. & ANR.

BALBIR KUMAR WALIA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 7427 of 2011)

JULY 09, 2021

[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND HEMANT GUPTA, JJ.]

Punjab State Co-operative Milk Producers FederationServices (Common Cadre) Rules, 1980: Revised pay scale –Entitlement to, from 1.1.1986 – Writ petitions by the respondents-employees seeking entitlement to pay scale equivalent to theircounterparts in the State of Punjab from 1.1.1986, though the revisedpay scale was allowed by the Punjab State Co-operative MilkProducers Federation Ltd w.e.f. 1.1.1994 – Federation’s case thatthey were suffering with acute financial stringency – High Courtallowed the writ petitions holding that the financial stringency wasno longer an excuse to not revise the pay scales and thus held thatthe date of implementation to grant revised pay scales as 1.1.1994was absolutely unfair – On appeal, held: Objective of the Federationwas not to give employment but to increase milk production in theState – Employees are facilitators of the employer to achieve suchobjective and thus demanding enhanced wages without consideringthe objective and financial condition of the employer would not beideal – Employer and the employees have to work together toachieve the objective of the organization-white revolution – Decisionof not to grant revised pay scale from 1.1.1986 was taken keepingin view the financial condition of the Federation – Process to arriveat such decision can be said to be flawed only on the permissiblegrounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety –Neither the decision-making process, nor the decision itself suffersfrom any such vice - Income generated by the Federation is not tobe expanded only on payment of salary but is also required forupgradation of technology, renovation and expansion of plants etc- Order of the High Courtis unjustified and in excess of the powerof judicial review conferred on the High Court - Orders passed bythe High Court is set aside.

APay scale – Entitlement to – Employees seeking pay scaleequivalent to their counterparts in the State of Punjab from 1.1.1986,though revised pay scale was allowed by the Federation w.e.f.1.1.1994 – High Court holding that employees were entitled to payscale – Held: Not justified – Principle of equal pay for equal worknot applicable to them in as much as Grade I is higher post havingBhigher duties and responsibilities than Grade II – Milk ProcurementAssistants Grade-I is promotion alavenue for Milk ProcurementAssistants Grade-II – Educational qualifications and theresponsibilities of the two posts are quite different.

Allowing the appeals, the CourtC

HELD: 1.1 In the instant case, it was contended that theFederation-Punjab State Co-operative Milk Producers FederationLtd is statutory Co-operative Society which is having its CommonCadre Rules. Any amendment in the Common Cadre Rules is tobe approved by the Registrar (Co-operative Societies). The StateDGovernment communicated on 1.3.1990 and 9.7.1993 that thepay scale as applicable to the Punjab Government employees isnot to be adopted by the Public Sector Undertakings withouttaking into consideration the financial health of the other statutoryBoards and Corporations. The Federation thus took consciousEand concerted decision to not follow the report of the AnomalyCommittee of the State Government to grant revised pay scalefrom 1.1.1986 in view of precarious financial condition. Moreover,financial assistance had to be availed by the Federation from theState Government as well as from the National Dairy DevelopmentBoard. Committee was constituted to examine the grievanceFof the employees for grant of revised pay scale. The Committeealso recommended that pay scale be given w.e.f. 1.1.1994 onaccount of financial stringency being faced by the Federation. TheBoard of Directors approved the recommendation of theCommittee, which was accepted by the Registrar (Co- operativeGSocieties). Therefore, the decision of not to grant revised payscale from 1.1.1986 was taken keeping in view the financialcondition of the Federation. [Para 41, 42][423-C-G]

1.2 Judicial review of administrative action is permissibleon grounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety.

An administrative decision is considered as flawed if it is illegal,and decision is illegal if it pursues an objective other than thatfor which the power to make the decision was conferred. Thediscretion exercised by the decision maker is subject to judicialscrutiny if purpose other than the specified purpose is pursued.[Para 48][430-A-B]

1.3 The decision that the Federation was in financialdifficulties is based upon relevant material before the Federation.The process to arrive at such decision can be said to be flawedonly on the permissible grounds of illegality, irrationality andprocedural impropriety. Neither the decision-making process, northe decision itself suffers from any such vice. [Para 49][430-G-H]

1.4 The information received under the Right to InformationAct to show that the Federation was in profit in the year 1996-1997, is not relevant to determine the financial conditionfortheperiod from 1.1.1986 to 1.1.1994. The Federation hascategorically stated that because of the remedial steps taken bythe Federation, there was turn around only after 1994.Still further,the profits in the balance sheet are not meant to be appropriatedtowards wages of the employees alone. Though the profits had tobe shared by the members of the Co-operative Society,but theemployees of the Federation are not its members.

The income generated by the Federation is not to beexpanded only on payment of salary but is also required forupgradation of technology, renovation and expansion of plantsetc.Therefore, entire profit is not to be appropriated towards thewages of the employees alone. The Federation was establishedas step towards white revolution. The objective of theFederation was not to give employment but to increase milkproduction in the State.The employees are facilitators of theemployer to achieve such objective and thus demanding enhancedwages without considering the objective and financial conditionof the employer would not be ideal. The employer and theemployees have to work together to achieve the objective of theorganisation i.e. white revolution rather frittering way the gains

Amade by the joint efforts of the management and employees bygiving increased wages to the employees irrespective of itscapacity to bear such expenses. [Para 50][431-A-E]

1.5 The submission that there will not be financial burdenon the federation in view of the fact that the High Court hasBordered payment of arrears for period of 3 years and 2 monthsbefore the date of filing of writ petitions is again not tenable. TheHigh Court has granted revised pay scales with effect from01.01.1986 instead of revised pay scales granted to the employeesof the federation with effect from 01.01.1994.Therefore,restricting it for period of 3 years and 2 months will not beChelpful in respect of the financial condition of the Federation asduring the relevant time the federation was suffering from hugelosses. In view thereof, the order of the High Court is unjustifiedand in excess of the power of judicial review conferred on theHigh Court.The orders passed by the High Court are hereby

Dset aside and the writ petitions are dismissed. [Para 51, 52][431-E-H]

2.1 As regards, CA No. 7432 of 2011, is directed against anorder passed by the High Court wherein it was held that theemployees are entitled to pay scale equivalent to theirEcounterparts in the State of Punjab from 1.1.1986, though revisedpay scale was allowed by the Federation w.e.f. 1.1.1994. It wascontended that the argument of the employees claiming equalpay for equal work was not examined by the High Court. Theemployees have not filed any appeal against the impugnedjudgment of the High Court. The employees cannot raise anyFgrievance in an appeal preferred by the Federation to claim equalpay for equal work.The employees are not aggrieved against thejudgment of the High Court. Therefore, the employees cannotraise an argument which was not raised before the High Court.However, their arguments are examined. It was argued that theGclaim of the employees is not of revised pay scale from 1.1.1986but that the categorization of Milk Procurement Assistants asGrade-I & II is unconstitutional and they would be entitled tothe same pay as is being paid to Milk Procurement AssistantsGrade-I on the principle of equal pay for equal work. [Paras 53,54, 55][432-A-E]H

2.2 As per the staffing pattern, the educational qualificationsfor Milk Procurement Assistants Grade-I are Bachelor’s Degreewith minimum three years’ experience of Organisation of MilkProducers Co-operative Societies affiliated with Milk ProducersCo-operative Unit whereas for Milk Procurement AssistantGrade II, the qualification is Graduation preferable in Agriculturewith one year experience of workingas Secretary in Co-operative Milk Supply Society. The pay scale prescribed for theMilk Procurement Assistants Grade-I is Rs.700-1200 whereasthe pay scale prescribed for the Milk Procurement AssistantsGrade-II is Rs.480-880. It is sought to be contended that, infact,Milk Procurement Assistants Grade-I is promotional avenuefor Milk Procurement Assistants Grade-II. The educationalqualifications and the responsibilities of the two posts are quitedifferent. Therefore, the principle of equal pay for equal workwould not be applicable to them in as much as Grade I is higherpost having higher duties and responsibilities than Grade II.There is no merit in the argument claiming equal pay for thealleged equal work. The orders passed by the High Court arehereby set aside. [Para 57-59][433-A-E]

3.1 As regards, CA No. 7434 of 2011, is directed against anorder passed by the Division Bench of the High Court wherein itwas held that the employees are entitled to pay scale equivalentto their counterparts in the State of Punjab from 1.1.1986, thoughrevised pay scale was allowed by the Federation w.e.f. 1.1.1994.It was contended that the argument of the employees claimingequal pay for equal work was not examined by the High Court.[Para 60][433-F]

3.2 The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are Milk ProcurementAssistants Grade-I in the pay scale of Rs.700-1200 whereasrespondent No. 5 is Animal Husbandry Assistant in the same payscale of Rs.700-1200 w.e.f. 1.8.1980. Such employees are claimingparity in the matter of pay with the Area Officers including DeputyManager (Procurement) and Dairy Extension Officer in the payscale of Rs.850-1700. The employees have pleaded that w.e.f.2.2.1987, the designation of Milk Procurement Assistants Grade-I has been changed to Milk Procurement Supervisor and now

Athe workload has increased inasmuch as fifty societies are to besupervised as against eight societies which were supervised,without any increase in the pay scale. It was pointed out that theemployees and the Deputy Manager (Procurement)/DairyExtension Officer do not constitute one class as the posts arenot similar on the points of qualifications and duties to beBperformed by the incumbents. The classification on the basis ofqualifications, educational or by experience, for the fixation ofpay is permissible under the Constitution. The qualifications ofMilk Procurement Assistant Grade-I or Animal HusbandryAssistant is Graduation/Matriculation with live-stock DiplomaCcourse whereas the essential qualifications for the post of DairyExtension Officer and for the post of Deputy Manager(Procurement) is B.Sc. Dairy Husbandry/Dairy Technologywith two to three years’ experience. [Paras 61, 62][433-G-H;434-A-D]

D3.3 The order passed by the High Court has not beenchallenged in appeal by the employees. Secondly, the classificationof different pay scales is permissible based upon educationalqualifications, experience and nature of duties. In view of thesaid facts, the employees are not entitled to the pay scale asclaimed in the writ petition. The orders passed by the High CourtEare set aside. [Para 63-64][434-E-F]

Tata Cellular v. Union of India (1994) 6 SCC 651 :[1994] 2 Suppl. SCR 122 – relied on.

Purshottam Lal & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., (1973)F1 SCC 651; Union of India & Anr. v. S.B. Vohra & Ors.(2004) 2 SCC 150 : [2004] 1 SCR 36 – distinguished.

M.M.R. Khan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1990(Supp.) SCC 191 : [1990] SCR 687; Haryana StateMinor Irrigation Tubewells Corporation & Ors. v. G.S.Uppal & Ors., (2008) 7 SCC 375 : [2008] 6 SCR 662;High Court Employees Welfare Assn., Calcutta & Ors.v. State of W.B. & Ors., (2004) 1 SCC 334 : [2003] 5Suppl. SCR 712; Supreme Court Employees WelfareAssociation v. Union of India & Anr., (1989) 4 SCC187 : [1989] 3 SCR 488; A.K. Bindal & Anr. v. Union

PUNJAB STATE CO-OPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATIONLTD. v. BALBIR KUMAR WALIA

of India & Ors. (2003) 5 SCC 163 : [2003] 3 SCR928; State of Punjab & Ors. v. Amar Nath Goyal &Ors. (2005) 6 SCC 754 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 549;Crown Aluminium Works v. Workmen AIR 1958 SC 30: [1958] SCR 651; Standard Vacuum Refining Co. ofIndia v. Workmen & Anr. AIR 1961 SC 895 : [1961]SCR 536; Hindustan Times Ltd., New Delhi v. Workmen(1963) 1 LLJ 120; Workmen v. Reptakos Brett. & Co.Ltd. (1992) 1 SCC 290 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 129 ;South Malabar Gramin Bank v. Coordination Committeeof South Malabar Gramin Bank Employees’Union.(2001) 4 SCC 101 : [2001] 1 SCR 742; AssociateBank Officers’ Association v. State Bank of India & Ors.(1998) 1 SCC 428 : [1997] 4 Suppl. SCR 475; Officers& Supervisors of I.D.P.L. v. Chairman & M.D., I.D.P.L.& Ors.(2003) 6 SCC 490 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 720;S.C. Chandra & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.(2007) 8 SCC 279 : [2007] 9 SCR 130; MineralExploration Corporation Ltd. v. Arvind Kumar Dixit &Anr. (2015) 2 SCC 535 : [2014] 11 SCR 255; State ofHaryana v. Shri Des Raj Sangar & Anr. (1976) 2 SCC844 : [1976] 2 SCR 1034; The Employees of Tanneryand Footwear Corporation of India Ltd. & Anr. v. Unionof India & Ors. 1991 Supp. (2) SCC 565; Union ofIndia & Anr. v. S.B. Vohra & Ors. (2004) 2 SCC 150 :[2004] 1 SCR 36; General Manager, Kisan SahkariChini Mills Ltd., Sultanpur, U.P. v. Satrughan Nishad& Ors.(2003) 8 SCC 639:[2003] 4 Suppl.SCR 349;K.T. Veerappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.(2006) 9 SCC 406; Balco Employees’ Union (Regd.)v.Union of India & Ors. (2002) 2 SCC 333 : [2001] 5Suppl. SCR 511; Jagdish Mandal v.State of Orissa &Ors. (2007) 14 SCC 517 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 606;West Bengal Central School Service Commission & Ors.v. Abdul Halim & Ors. (2019) 18 SCC 39 : [2019] SCR1089; Municipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo RealEstate & Ors.(2019) 10 SCC 738 : [2019] 12 SCR 532;Harshit Agarwal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.(2021) 2 SCC 710 – referred to.

[2021] 6 S.C.R.

Case Law Reference

PUNJAB STATE CO-OPERATIVE MILK PRODUCERS FEDERATIONLTD. v. BALBIR KUMAR WALIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 7427of 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.03.2009 of the High Courtof Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in C.W.P. No. 4418 of 1992.

With

Civil appeal nos. 7429,7430,7431,7432,7433,7434 and 7435 of 2011

P. S. Patwalia, Sr. Adv., Ashok K. Mahajan, Advs. for theAppellants.

Govind Goel, Ankit Goel. Ravi Kapur, Raghav Kapur, HiminderLal, R. C. Kohli, Ms. Kaveeta Wadia, Karan Bharihoke, SiddhantSharma, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7427 OF 2011, CIVIL APPEAL NO.7429 OF 2011, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7430 OF 2011, CIVILAPPEAL NO. 7431 OF 2011, CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7433 OF 2011AND CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7435 OF 2011

1. The present appeals are directed against an order passed bythe Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarhon 19.3.2009 whereby the writ petitions filed by the respondents[1] hereinwere allowed holding that the Punjab State Co-operative Milk ProducersFederation Ltd.[2] is State within the meaning of Article 12 of theConstitution of India and that the employees are therefore entitled topay scale equivalent to their counterparts in the State of Punjab from1.1.1986, though the revised pay scale was allowed by the Federationw.e.f. 1.1.1994.2. The milk producers in the State launched the setting up ofCooperative Societies at village level which are known as Primary MilkProducers Cooperative Societies. Such Primary Milk ProducersCooperative Societies are in turn members of The District CooperativeMilk Producers Union. These District Level Unions are ultimately themembers of the Federation. The employees have claimed pay scale asrevised by the Punjab Government Anomaly Committee w.e.f. 1.1.1986.

3. Before the High Court, an objection was raised by the Federationthat since it is not State within the meaning of Article 12 of the

1 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘employees’

2 For short, the ‘Federation’

AConstitution, therefore, the writ petitions were not maintainable. However,before this Court, Mr. Patwalia, learned senior counsel appearing forthe Federation has submitted that the question whether the Federation isa State or not is not being raised in the present appeals. The maingrievance of the Federation is regarding grant of revised pay scale w.e.f.1.1.1986 though the Federation was suffering with acute financialBstringency in those days and had therefore granted revised pay scalesfrom 1.1.1994.

4. It is pointed out that The Registrar (Cooperative Societies)accorded approval for implementation of the report of the Third PayCommission on 2.6.1989. The Federation granted revised pay scale andCallowances w.e.f. 1.1.1986 as per the report of the Pay Commission.Thereafter, on 15.2.1990, the State Government revised pay scale ofVeterinary Officers of the Animal Husbandry Department, PunjabGovernment from Rs.850-1700 to Rs.2200-4000 and that after eightyears of service, the pay scale of Veterinary Officers would be Rs.3000-4500 and after eighteen years of service, it would be Rs.3700-5300 withDeffect from 1.1.1986 on the basis of report of an Anomaly Committeeconstituted to consider the grievances of the employees of the State. Itis the said pay scale which was claimed by the filing of writ petitionsbefore the High Court.

5. It was argued that the Federation was facing acute financialEcrisis inasmuch as the State had granted loan of Rs.8 (sic 12) croreson 9.5.1990 which the Federation could not repay and, therefore, thesaid amount was converted into the share capital of the State Governmentwith the Federation. In addition thereto, keeping in view the financialstringency, the National Dairy Development Board gave loan of Rs. 4Fcrores on 2.5.1990 to the Federation. After the loan was granted by theNational Dairy Development Board, there was change in themanagement which led to restructuring of the Federation.6. The service conditions of the employees of the Federation aregoverned by the Punjab State Co-operative Milk Producers FederationServices (Common Cadre) Rules, 1980[3]. The Common Cadre RulesGwere resolved to be amended on 10.8.1990 by the Board of Directors ofthe Federation. The same were approved by the Registrar (Co-operativeSocieties) on 30.10.1990. It is thereafter that the Federation issued anotice under Section 9-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 on12.11.1990 (Annexure P-12) to all the employees on the ground of

H3 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘Common Cadre Rules’

financial stringency showing its intention to effect the changes specifiedin the annexure annexed with the said notice.

7. The employees of the Federation raised protest; therefore, acommittee was constituted on 6.12.1994 to examine the following issues:

“(i) Whether the upward revision should be adopted for theemployees of Milkfed and Milk Unions?

(ii) Whether the revision is to be given with effect from 1.1.1986or any subsequent date by giving the benefit of notional fixation?

(iii) Whether the upward should confine only to the categoriescovered in the report of Government Anomaly Committee orcategories enjoying identical scales (unimproved) need to becovered (a) repercussion if revision is confined to the categoriescovered in the Government report (b) impact, if any, of pendingwrit petitions, resolutions of BOD of M.U., Ludhiana and BODof Milkfed?

(iv) Whether there is any necessity of changing the qualification/improving designations of certain categories being placed in higherscales?

(v) Any other point/issue identical to or connected with the above?”

8. The Committee, inter alia, made the followingrecommendations:

“4. The Committee finds that in case the revision of pay scales istaken up w.e.f. 1.1.1986, the amount of arrears upto 31.12.1993works out to Rs.1.5 crore approx., i.e. about 60 lacs in case ofthose categories for which the scales have been improved andabout Rs.90 lac in case of identical categories. Taking intoconsideration the financial health of the Milkfed and moreparticularly majority of Milk Unions, Committee strongly feels thatpayment of arrears will further shatter the financial health of theMilkfed and Milk Unions and it will not be possible to pay such ahuge amount in the shape of arrears. Committee feels that theemployees concerned also understand this position and will mostprobably be agreeable to the grant of improved pay scales w.e.f.any subsequent date. The 2[nd] alternative of granting benefit from1.1.1994 with notional fixation of BP w.e.f. 1.1.1986 has also beenexamined. In this case, more than 750 employees will be financiallybenefited and the financial burden will be Rs.2.0 lac pm. This isalso considered to be huge liability, especially when the

DEF

Arecommendations of the IVth Pay Commission are expected andthe liability on its implementation is also likely to be heavy. Further,the Committee has been told that the liability of the arrears naccount of Prop. set up from 1.1.1986 to 31.8.1992 are stilloutstanding. The Committee after considering the above as wellas various other aspects, recommends that the improved pay scalesBmay be implemented w.e.f. 1.1.1994 without giving the benefit ofeven notional pay fixation w.e.f. 1.1.1986. Adoption of the PunjabGovernment pattern of Pay Scales has been felt necessary with aview to make parity in the scales for future revisions etc. Thiswould save the organisation from huge liability of the paymentCof arrears and will also give scope to the employee for placementin better pay scale and getting benefit which might accrue as aresult next revision of pay scale likely to be made w.e.f. 1.1.1994on Punjab Government pattern.”

9. The report of the Committee was considered and the grant ofrevised pay scale w.e.f. 1.1.1994 was approved by the Board of DirectorsDof the Federation. The minutes of the meeting of the Board of Directorsof Federation held on 30.8.1996 read as under:

“After discussion, it is unanimously resolved that in view of therecommendations of the Departmental Committee, constituted bythe Milkfed on 6.12.1994, contained in the report enclosed atEAnnexure-3, approval is granted to the implementation of therevised pay scales and Master Pay Scale to the concernedemployees of the Milkfed and the Milk Unions in accordancewith the report of the Anomaly Committee constituted under theThird Pay Commission by the Punjab Government, with effectFfrom 1.1.1994. Its approval may also be obtained from theRegistrar, Cooperative Societies, Punjab.”10. The decision of the Board was approved by the Registrar(Co-operative Societies) on 29.4.1997. Thus, subsequently, revised scaleswith effect from 1.1.1994 were granted to the employees.

11. Mr. Patwalia referred to the communication of the PunjabGGovernment dated 1.3.1990 that grant of allowances or concessionsshould not automatically be made applicable to the employees of PublicSector Undertakings/Cooperative Institutions, without examining theliabilities involved, the available resources of the Undertakings and theextent of concessions already being availed by their employees. TheHState Government communicated as under:

“It has accordingly been decided that instructions, regarding grantof any allowance/perks/concessions etc. by whatever name called,issued by State Government from time to time for its employeesshould not automatically be made applicable to the employees ofPublic Sector Undertakings/Cooperative Institutions. Beforemaking such instructions applicable to your employees/officers,these should thoroughly be examined by B.O.D. with referenceto the liabilities involved, capacity of the Undertakings to bear theadditional financial burden, availability of the resources and theextent/nature of the similar allowances/concessions already beingavailed of and the views of Department of Finance (B.P.E.) shouldalso invariably be obtained through the AdministrativeDepartment.”

12. The State Government reiterated on 9.7.1993 that wheneverinstructions for revision of allowances/pay scale are issued by the PunjabGovernment for its employees, they are adopted by Public SectorUndertakings and are applied to its employees without examining theliability involved and the capacity to pay, which results in loss and PublicSector Undertakings add the same to their costs. It was suggested thatthese practices may be discontinued as the State Government would notbe supporting the PSUs financially in such cases. It was communicatedas under:

“It has been noticed that whenever any instructions regardingrevision of allowances/pay are issued by the Punjab Governmentfor its employees these are adopted by Public Sector Undertakingsand applicable to its employees without examining the liabilityinvolved and the Public Sector Undertakings capacity to pay withthe result that the loss incurring Public Sector Undertakings keepadding to their costs. This practice may be discontinued. Theestablishment cost of per unit of product or service in Public SectorUndertakings has increased very much. Therefore, no furtheradditives should be encouraged and Governments revision is notjustifiable pretext to consider similar increase in the Public SectorUndertakings should see their financial condition, rising cost inrelation to productivity and the fact that Governments is not goingto support the Public Sector Undertakings financially.”

13. The High Court allowed the writ petitions filed by the employeesholding that the financial stringency was no longer an excuse to notrevise the pay scales and thus held that the date of implementation to

ABC

Agrant revised pay scales as 1.1.1994 was absolutely unfair. The Federationis in appeal herein against such order. This Court had stayed the recoverypending further orders on 6.11.2009.

14. Mr. Patwalia, learned counsel for the Federation, submittedthat the High Court erred in law in holding that the date of implementationBto grant revised pay scales as 1.1.1994 was absolutely unfair and thatfinancial stringency was not an excuse for refusing to revise the payscales from 1.1.1986. It was contended that the judgments[4] referred toby the High Court have no applicability to the facts of the present case.Mr. Patwalia also relied upon judgments of this Court reported as A.K.Bindal & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.[5] and State of Punjab & Ors.Cv. Amar Nath Goyal & Ors.[6] wherein the Court had upheld financialstringency as ground to deny higher pay scales etc.15. Mr. Govind Goel, appearing for the respondents in Civil AppealNo. 7433 of 2011 argued that the writ petition before the High Courtwas filed on behalf of one Head Draftsman, two Draftsman, two JuniorDDraftsman and two Surveyors. It was contended that such sevenemployees of the Federation have not been provided the benefit ofrecommendations of the Committee as was granted to the otheremployees of the Federation w.e.f. 1.1.1994. Thus, it was argued thatthe decision to not grant the revised pay scale on the basis of the reportof the Committee of the Federation w.e.f. 1.1.1994 was wholly arbitraryEand discriminatory. It was contended that out of the 1573 employees ofthe Federation, these seven employees alone have been discriminated.It was also argued that the High Court has restricted the arrearsconsequent to its directions to grant arrears of the revised pay scale fora period of 3 years and 2 months from the date preceding the date offiling of respective writ petitions. While contesting the ground of financialFstringency preferred by the Federation, it was stated that though therewere losses for some years, the information disclosed under the Right toInformation Act on 22.7.2011 shows that the Federation has been inprofit since 1996-1997. Hence, such ground of financial stringency isnot tenable.

G4 M.M.R. Khan & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1990 (Supp.) SCC 191; Haryana StateMinor Irrigation Tubewells Corporation & Ors. v. G.S. Uppal & Ors., (2008) 7 SCC375; High Court Employees Welfare Assn., Calcutta & Ors. v. State of W.B. & Ors.,(2004) 1 SCC 334; Supreme Court Employees Welfare Association v. Union of India &Anr., (1989) 4 SCC 187 and Purshottam Lal & Ors. v. Union of India & Anr., (1973) 1SCC 651

5 (2003) 5 SCC 163H6 (2005) 6 SCC 754

16. Mr. Goel relied upon Constitution Bench judgment of thisCourt reported as Purshottam Lal,referred to by the High Court aswell, to contend that revision of pay scale recommended by the PayCommission after acceptance by the Government could not be denied toa category of employees as it would be an act of discrimination.

17. Mr. Patwalia controverted the arguments raised by Mr. Goeland pointed out that the writ petitioners are the employees of theFederation who have no work of the post to which they were appointed.Instead of abolishing the post to which the writ petitioners were appointed,the Committee had nevertheless dealt with the grant of revised pay scalesto them in the following manner:

Sr. Name of Unrevised Already Pay Remarks Recommendations of the CNo. the Pay scale RPS scale Committee for Categories before w.r.f. now improvement from 1.1.94 1.1.86 1.1.86 revised by Govt.xxx 15Head 700-12001640-2200-There is only one Head Draftsman 2925 3500 Draftsman, for whom the deptt. has no work has Dbeen put on alternate job in Milk Union. There is also no likelihood of new civil works to be undertaken. So the pay scale of 1800-3200 is recommended for this post. No financial burden.16Draftsman570-10801500-1800-Jr. Draftsman There are 3 draftsmen. 2640 3200 shall be eligible The civil works have Efor promotion as almost been completed draftsman in the and there is no likelihood scale of Rs.1800-of new civil works to be 3200 after undertaken. Two of them minimum period have been put on alternate of 12 years. jobs, as they are surplus. So the committee feels that the existing pay scale of Rs.1500-2640 is Fsufficient for them. So no improvement is recommended.17.Tracers400-600950-1200-To be designated There are 4 tracers. None 1800 2100 as Jr. draftsman of them is deployed on his and qualification job, but have been put on to be raised to alternate jobs, which are matric with two clerical, to provide this years certificate ITI of work. likelihood of civil work There is no Gdraftsman. for them in future. So no improvement is recommended. 18 Surveyor 400-600 950-1200-There are two Surveyors, 1800 2100 who have been put on alternate jobs. So no improvement is recommended for this category too.

A18. It was thus argued that the Committee had taken consciousdecision not to grant pay scale as revised by the Government. Instead ofgranting enhanced pay scale at par with what was approved by theState Government, higher pay than the recommendations of the PayCommission was granted. The Federation thus exercised this option insteadof abolishing the post. Therefore, the decision of the Committee doesBnot warrant any interference in exercise of the power of judicial review.

19. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and find thatthe judgment and order of the High Court cannot be sustained. In ourcountry, there are broadly three sets of employers such as employers inthe organized sector like the Industrial workers; secondly, Public SectorCUndertakings including Boards and Corporations and all otherestablishments, which meet the test of State within the meaning ofArticle 12 of the Constitution; and thirdly, Central or State Governmentemployees.

20. One of the early judgments of this Court is Crown AluminiumDWorks v. Workmen[7],wherein the question examined was as to whetherin view of financial conditions, the wages of workmen can bereduced.This Court held that it would not be right to hold that there is arigid and inexorable convention that the wage structure once fixed byIndustrial Tribunals can never be changed to the prejudice of workmen.This Court thus held as under:E

“11. … In dealing with claim for such revision, the Tribunal mayhave to consider, as in the present case whether the employer’sfinancial difficulties could not be adequately met by retrenchmentin personnel already effected by the employer and sanctioned bythe Tribunal. The Tribunal may also enquire whether the financialFdifficulties facing the employer are likely to be of short durationor are going to face the employer for fairly long time. It is notnecessary, and would indeed be very difficult, to state exhaustivelyall considerations which may be relevant in given case. It would,however, be enough to observe that, after considering all therelevant facts, if the Tribunal is satisfied that case for reductionGin the wage structure has been established then it would be opento the Tribunal to accede to the request of the employer to makeappropriate reduction in the wage structure, subject to suchconditions as to time or otherwise that the tribunal may deem fitor expedient to impose. …”

21. In respect of Industrial workers, this Court, while dealing withwage structure ina judgment reported as Standard Vacuum RefiningCo. of India v. Workmen & Anr.[8],held that it is usual to divide wagesinto three broad categories: the basic minimum wage which is the baresubsistence wage, above it is the fair wage, and beyond the fair wage isthe living wage. The said three categories of wages are described as thepoverty level, the subsistence level and the comfort or the decency level.This Court accepted the Report by the Commission of Enquiry on“Emoluments and Conditions of Service of Central GovernmentEmployees, 1957-1959” wherein the five norms which should guide allwage fixing authorities including Minimum Wage Committees, WageBoards, adjudicators, etc. were stated by the Court inter alia as under:

“9. It is well known that the problem of wage structure with whichindustrial adjudication is concerned in modern democratic Stateinvolves on the ultimate analysis to some extent ethical and socialconsiderations. ……. As the social conscience of the generalcommunity becomes more alive and active, as the welfare policyof the State takes more dynamic form, as the national economyprogresses from stage to stage, and as under the growing strengthof the trade union movement collective bargaining enters the field,wage structure ceases to be purely arithmetical problem.Considerations of the financial position of the employer and thestate of national economy have their say, and the requirements ofa workman living in civilised and progressive society also cometo be recognised.

19. ... With regard to the minimum wage fixation it was agreedthat the minimum wage was need-based to ensure the minimumhuman needs of the industrial worker irrespective of any otherconsiderations.

(i) In calculating the minimum wage, the standard working classfamily should be taken to consist of 3 consumption units for oneearner; the earnings of women, children and adolescents shouldbe disregarded.

(ii) Minimum food requirement should be calculated on the basisof net intake of calories, as recommended by Dr Aykroyd for anaverage Indian adult of moderate activity.

A(iii) Clothing requirements should be estimated at per capitaconsumption of 18 yards per annum which would give for theaverage workers’ family of four, total of 72 yards.

(iv) In respect of housing, the rent corresponding to the minimumarea provided for under Government’s Industrial Housing SchemeBshould be taken into consideration in fixing the minimum wage.(v) Fuel, lighting and other ‘miscellaneous’ items of expenditureshould constitute 20% of the total minimum wage.”

22. This Court in Hindustan Times Ltd., New Delhi v. Workmen[9]held that numerous complex factors, some of which are economic andCsome spring from social philosophy give rise to conflicting considerationsthat have to be borne in mind and that such factors are not static innature. The financial position of the employer, state of national economy,and the requirements of workman living in civilized and progressivesociety also are to be recognized. This Court held as under:

D“5. The fixation of wage structure is among the most difficulttasks that industrial adjudication has to tackle. On the one handnot only the demands of social justice but also the claims of nationaleconomy require that attempts should be made to secure toworkmen fair share of the national income which they help toproduce, on the other hand, care has to be taken that the attemptEat fair distribution does not tend to dry up the source of thenational income itself On the one hand, better living conditions forworkmen that can only be possible by giving them “living wage”will tend to increase the nation’s wealth and income on the otherhand, unreasonable inroads on the profits of the capitalists mightFhave tendency to drive capital away from fruitful employmentand even to affect prejudicially capital formation itself. The rise inprices that often results from the rise of the workmen’s wagesmay in its turn affect other members of the community and mayeven affect prejudicially the living conditions of the workmenthemselves. The effect of such rise in price on the Country’sGinternational trade cannot also be always ignored. Thus numerouscomplex factors, some of which are economic and some springfrom social philosophy give rise to conflicting considerations thathave to be borne in mind. Nor does the process of valuation of thenumerous factors remain static. ……H9 (1963) 1 LLJ 120

6. In trying to keep true to the two points of social philosophy andeconomic necessities which vie for consideration, industrialadjudication has set for itself certain standards in the matter ofwage fixation. At the bottom of the ladder, there is the minimumbasic wage which the employer of any industrial labour must payin order to be allowed to continue an industry. Above this is thefair wage, which may roughly be said to approximate to the needbased minimum, in the sense of wage which is “adequate tocover the normal needs of the average employee regarded as ahuman being in civilised society.” Above the fair wage is the“living wage” wage “which will maintain the workman in thehighest state of industrial efficiency, which will enable him toprovide his family with all the material things which are neededfor their health and physical well-being, enough to enable him toqualify to discharge his duties as citizen.” (Cited with approvalby Mr. Justice Gajendragadkar in Standard Vacuum Company’sCase (1) from “The living Wage” by Philip Snowden).”

23. In Workmen v. Reptakos Brett. & Co. Ltd.[10],this Court heldthat worker’s wage has the force of collective bargaining under thelabour laws. Each category of the wage structure has to be tested at theanvil of social justice which is the live-fibre of our society today. TheCourt held as under:

“12. The concept of ‘minimum wage’ is no longer the same as itwas in 1936. Even 1957 is way behind. worker’s wage is nolonger contract between an employer and an employee. It hasthe force of collective bargaining under the labour laws. Eachcategory of the wage structure has to be tested at the anvil ofsocial justice which is the live-fibre of our society today. Keepingin view the socio-economic aspect of the wage structure, we areof the view that it is necessary to add the following additionalcomponent as guide for fixing the minimum wage in the industry:

“(vi) children’s education, medical requirement minimumrecreation including festivals/ceremonies and provision for oldage marriages etc. should further constitute 25 per cent of thetotal minimum wage.”

13. The wage structure which approximately answers the abovesix components is nothing more than minimum wage at

Asubsistence level. The employees are entitled to the minimum wageat all times and under all circumstances. An employer who cannotpay the minimum wage has no right to engage labour and nojustification to run the industry”.

24. Now, in respect of the establishments which meet theBparameters of being State within the meaning of Article 12, this Courtconsidered the question of financial stringency in A.K. Bindal. This Courtin the said case was examining the claim of revision of pay of theemployees of public sector enterprise. The employers placed relianceupon the Office Memoranda of the Government of India that theGovernment would not provide any budgetary support for wage increaseCand the undertakings themselves would have to generate the resourcesto meet the additional expenditure which would be incurred on accountof increase in the wages. It was thus held by this Court that the non-revision of pay scale would not amount to violation of fundamental rightsguaranteed under Article 21 as it would be stretching too far and cannotDbe countenanced. It was held that even under industrial law, workmenshould get minimum wage or fair wage but not that the wages mustbe revised and enhanced periodically. The Court held as under:

“17. …Being employees of the companies, it is the responsibilityof the companies to pay them salary and if the company isEsustaining losses continuously over period and does not havethe financial capacity to revise or enhance the pay scale, thepetitioners cannot claim any legal right to ask for direction to theCentral Government to meet the additional expenditure which maybe incurred on account of revision of pay scales. It appears thatprior to issuance of the office memorandum dated 12-4-1993 theFGovernment had been providing the necessary funds for themanagement of public sector enterprises which had been incurringlosses. After the change in economic policy introduced in the earlynineties, the Government took decision that the public sectorundertakings will have to generate their own resources to meetGthe additional expenditure incurred on account of increase in wagesand that the Government will not provide any funds for the same.Such of the public sector enterprises (government companies)which had become sick and had been referred to BIFR, wereobviously running on huge losses and did not have their ownresources to meet the financial liability which would have beenHincurred by revision of pay scales. By the office memorandum

dated 19-7-1995 the Government merely reiterated its earlier standand issued caution that till decision was taken to revive theundertakings, no revision in pay scale should be allowed. We,therefore, do not find any infirmity, legal or constitutional in thetwo office memorandums which have been challenged in the writpetitions.

18. …But to hold that mere non-revision of pay scale would alsoamount to violation of the fundamental right guaranteed underArticle 21 would be stretching it too far and cannot becountenanced. Even under the industrial law, the view is that theworkmen should get minimum wage or fair wage but not thattheir wages must be revised and enhanced periodically. It is truethat on account of inflation there has been general price rise butby that fact alone it is not possible to draw an inference that thesalary currently being paid to them is wholly inadequate to lead alife with human dignity. What should be the salary structure tolead “life with human dignity” is difficult exercise and cannotbe measured in absolute terms….”

25. This Court also considered two earlier judgments[11 ]that thefinancial capacity of the employer cannot be held to be germaneconsideration for determination of the wage structure of the employees,therefore, it must be confined to the facts of the aforesaid case. It washeld that economic viability or the financial capacity of the employer isan important factor which cannot be ignored while fixing the wagestructure, otherwise the unit itself may not be able to function and mayhave to close down which will inevitably have disastrous consequencesfor the employees themselves.

26. In South Malabar Gramin Bank, one of the contentionsraised was whether financial viability could be the sole criterion in decidingthe wage structure of the Regional Rural Bank (RRB) employees. TheTribunal constituted to consider the wage structure inter alia held thatThe Regional Rural Banks Act places special emphasis on thedevelopment of rural economy by providing credit and other facilities toproductive activities in the rural areas, particularly to small and marginalfarmers, agricultural labourers, artisans and small entrepreneurs. The

11 South Malabar Gramin Bank v. Coordination Committee of South Malabar GraminBank Employees’ Union., (2001) 4 SCC 101 and Associate Bank Officers’ Associationv. State Bank of India & Ors., (1998) 1 SCC 428

Aobjects and reasons of the Act provide highway for the social welfareand common good of the rural poor living in the priority sector. TheRRBs have brought about socio-economic revolution in the hithertounbanked underdeveloped priority sector by ameliorating the povertyconditions of the underprivileged, SCs/STs and other weaker sections ofthe society. That was the paramount objective of the Act. The CourtBheld that the RRBs are in fulfilment of the hopes and aspirations arousedin the Preamble and the directive principles of the Constitution, and theperformance of such institutions in furtherance of those principles shallnot be judged from the curved angle of viability or from the point of viewof private money lender or businessman or from mere profit and lossCstatements. This Court held as under:

“12. …This conclusion of the Tribunal has become final, the awardin question not having been assailed and on the other hand havingbeen implemented. In the aforesaid premises, it is futile attempton the part of the employer as well as the Union of India to reagitateDthe dispute, which has already been resolved and has been giveneffect to. In our considered opinion, therefore, the aforesaidcontention on behalf of the appellant cannot be sustained and itwould no longer be open, either for the Bank or the Union of Indiato raise contention that in determining the wage structure of theemployees of the RRBs, the financial condition would be relevantEfactor.”27. In judgment reported as Officers & Supervisors of I.D.P.L.v. Chairman & M.D., I.D.P.L. & Ors.[12], this Court held that theemployees cannot legitimately claim that their pay-scales shouldnecessarily be revised and enhanced when the organization in whichFthey are working are making continuous losses and are deeply in thered. It was held as under:

“11. In our view, the economic capability of the employer alsoplays crucial part in it, as also its capacity to expand business orearn more profits. The contention of Mr. Sanghi, if accepted, thatGgranting higher remuneration and emoluments and revision of payto workers in other governmental undertakings and, therefore,the petitioners are also entitled for the grant of pay revision may,in our opinion, only lead to undesirable results. Enough materialwas placed on record before us by the respondents which clearlyH12 (2003) 6 SCC 490

show that the first respondent had been suffering heave lossesfor the last many years. In such situation the petitioners, in ouropinion, cannot legitimately claim that their pay-scales shouldnecessarily be revised and enhanced even though the organisationin which they are working are making continuous losses and aredeeply in the red. As could be seen from the counter affidavit, thefirst respondent company which is engaged in the manufacture ofmedicines became sick industrial company for various reasonsand was declared as such by the BIFR and the revival packagewhich was formulated and later approved by the BIFR forimplementation could not also be given effect to and that themodifications recommended by the Government of India to theBIFR in the existing revival package was ordered to be examinedby an operating agency and, in fact, IDBI was appointed as anoperating agency under Section 17(3) of SICA. It is also not indispute that the production activities had to be stopped in the majortwo units of the company at Rishikesh and Hyderabad w.e.f.October, 1996 and the losses and liabilities are increasing everymonth and that the payment of three instalments of interim reliefcould not also be made due to the threat of industrial unrest andthe wage revision in respect of other employees is also due w.e.f.1992 which has also not been sanctioned by the Government ofIndia.”

28. This Court in judgment reported as S.C. Chandra & Ors.v. State of Jharkhand & Ors.[13] was examining the question of equalpay for equal work where the claim of the appellants was to release andpay Dearness Allowance. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju in aseparate but concurring judgment held that the “Fixation of pay scale isa delicate mechanism which requires various considerations includingfinancial capacity, responsibility, educational qualification, mode ofappointment, etc. ….”

29. In Mineral Exploration Corporation Ltd.v.Arvind KumarDixit & Anr.[14],this Court was dealing with an appeal against an order ofthe High Court, which did not interfere with the award of IndustrialTribunal who had extended the actual financial benefits to the respondentsby holding that they cannot be denied benefit of ‘Wage Revision’ by

13 (2007) 8 SCC 27914 (2015) 2 SCC 535

Anotional fixation and re-computation of their retiral dues (severancepackage). This Court referred to A.K.Bindal and Officers &Supervisors of I.D.P.L. to accept the argument of the appellant that ifthe wage revision office order is interpreted to include all the employeeswho were superannuated/ voluntarily retired between 1.4.1997 to 1.4.2003,it would frustrate the measures taken, including the Voluntary RetirementBScheme, to improve the condition of Public Sector Undertaking. TheCourt thus upheld the cutoff date in view of the financial constraintsfaced by the appellant.30. In the third category of cases, in respect of Central or StateGovernment, the factor of financial constraints has been found to beCrelevant when the liberalized benefits were granted from particulardate. In Amar Nath Goyal, the question examined was whether limitingof benefits only to the employees who retired or died on or after 1.4.1995after calculating the financial implications was irrational or arbitrary, theCourt held as under:D“26. It is difficult to accede to the argument on behalf of theemployees that decision of the Central Government/StateGovernments to limit the benefits only to employees, who retireor die on or after 1-4-1995, after calculating the financialimplications thereon, was either irrational or arbitrary. FinancialEand economic implications are very relevant and germane for anypolicy decision touching the administration of the Government, atthe Centre or at the State level.”

31. In State of Haryana v. Shri Des Raj Sangar & Anr.[15],thepost of the Panchayati Raj Election Officer was abolished in view of theFextreme financial stringency. This Court held as under:

“8. …… It was also stated in another affidavit filed on behalf ofthe appellant State that the post of Panchayati Raj Election Officerand the seven posts of field Deputy Directors were abolished asan economy measure to meet financial stringency. We see noGcogent ground to question the averments made in the aboveaffidavits. The averments show that the decision to abolish thepost of Panchayati Raj Election Officer was taken because ofadministrative reasons. The question as to whether greatereconomy could have been brought about by adopting some other

course is not for the court to go into for the court cannot sit as acourt of appeal in such matters. It may be that some of thefunctions which were being previously performed by therespondent are now being performed by Deputy Directors whoseposts have not been abolished, this fact would not show that thedecision to abolish the post held by the respondent was not takenin good faith. After the posts of Deputy Directors had been createdand had been in existence along with the post of Panchayati RajElection Officer for number of months, the Government, it wouldappear, decided to abolish some of the posts to meet the financialstringency. In taking the decision as to which post to abolish andwhich not to abolish, the Government, it seems, took into accountthe relative usefulness of each post and decided to abolish theseven posts of field Deputy Directors and the one post ofPanchayati Raj Election Officer. This was matter well withinthe administrative discretion of the Government and as the decisionin this respect appears to have been taken in good faith, the samecannot be quashed by the court. The fact that the post to beabolished is held by person who is confirmed in that post and thepost which is not abolished is held by person who is not permanentwould not affect the legality of the decision to abolish the formerpost as long as the decision to abolish the post is taken in goodfaith. We would, therefore, hold that the High Court was in errorin quashing the order of the Government whereby the post ofPanchayati Raj Election Officer had been abolished.”

32. The Central or State Government is empowered to levy taxesto meet out the expenses of the state. It is always conscious decisionof the government as to how much taxes have to be levied so as to notcause excessive burden on the citizens. But the Boards and Corporationshave to depend on either their own resources or seek grant from theCentral/ State Government, as the case may be, for their expenditures.Therefore, the grant of benefits of higher pay scale to the Central/StateGovernment employees stand on different footing than grant of pay scaleby an instrumentality of the State.33. The judgment in Purshottam Lal is case where referencewas made to the Pay Commission to consider the pay revision of allCentral Government employees paid out of the Consolidated Fund ofIndia. The recommendation of the Pay Commission was accepted but

Athe benefit of revised pay scale was not given to the employees of theForest Research Institute and College, Dehradun. An argument wasraised that the report of the Pay Commission did not deal with the caseof the petitioners. The said argument was negated for the reason thatonce the Government has accepted the recommendation of the PayCommission, which included all Central Government employees, theBbenefit of revised pay scale cannot be denied to the petitioners. ThisCourt has held as under:

“15. Mr Dhebar contends that it was for the Government to acceptthe recommendations of the Pay Commission and while doing soto determine which categories of employees should be taken toChave been included in the terms of reference. We are unable toappreciate this point. Either the Government has made referencein respect of all government employees or it has not. But if it hasmade reference in respect of all government employees and itaccepts the recommendations it is bound to implement therecommendations in respect of all government employees. If itDdoes not implement the report regarding some employees only itcommits breach of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Thisis what the Government has done as far as these petitioners areconcerned.”

34. We find that the judgment in Purshottam Lal is altogether onEdifferent facts. The said judgment is in the context where the report wasin respect of all Central Government employees but the benefit of thereport was not granted to the petitioners for the reason that there wasno specific reference in the Pay Commission report. In the case of thewrit petitioners herein represented by Mr. Govind Goel, the CommitteeFhas considered that there was no work for the writ petitioners. Still further,instead of abolishing the post, the Federation granted revised pay scalewhich was better than the pay scale recommended by the PayCommission but less than the pay scale granted by the State Governmentin pursuance of the recommendations of the Anomaly Committee. Thus,it cannot be said to be discriminatory or arbitrary decision more so inGexercise of power of judicial review. There exist good reasons not togrant higher pay scale for the reason that there is no work of the post towhich they were appointed but were given alternate assignments.35. The judgment in M.M.R. Khan is in respect of workers in thecanteen in different railway establishments. It was held that theHGovernment has complete control over the canteens and the workers

employed therein are holders of civil posts within the meaning of Article311 of the Constitution. The issue was not of financial stringency on thepart of the Union to make the payment of wages to railway employees.

36. In judgment reported as The Employees of Tannery andFootwear Corporation of India Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India &Ors.[16], the employees were claiming parity in pay and allowances withthat of the Central Government employees. This Court held that payscales of the employees in the unionised cadre falling in four categoriesin the respondent corporation should be revised in way that the sameare at par with the pay scales of such employees employed with theCotton Corporation of India.

37. In G.S. Uppal, the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Sub-Divisional Engineer (SDE) and Assistant Engineer (AE) on deputationfrom the Irrigation Department were granted revised pay scale but theSDO, SDE and AE appointed in the appellant corporation were deniedthe same benefit. An argument was raised that the appellant was runningin losses and thus cannot meet the financial burden on account of revisionof pay scales. The Court while rejecting such argument held as under:

“33. The plea of the appellants that the Corporation is runningunder losses and it cannot meet the financial burden on accountof revision of scales of pay has been rejected by the High Courtand, in our view, rightly so. Whatever may be the factual position,there appears to be no basis for the action of the appellants indenying the claim of revision of pay scales to the respondents. Ifthe Government feels that the Corporation is running into losses,measures of economy, avoidance of frequent writing off of dues,reduction of posts or repatriating deputationists may provide thepossible solution to the problem. Be that as it may, such contentionmay not be available to the appellants in the light of the principleenunciated by this Court in M.M.R. Khan v. Union of India [1990Supp SCC 191 : 1990 SCC (L&S) 632 : (1991) 16 ATC 541]and Indian Overseas Bank v. Staff Canteen Workers’Union [(2000) 4 SCC 245 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 471] . However, solong as the posts do exist and are manned, there appears to be nojustification for granting the respondents scale of pay lowerthan that sanctioned for those employees who are brought ondeputation. In fact, the sequence of events discussed above clearly

422SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Ashows that the employees of the Corporation have been treatedon par with those in Government at the time of revision of scalesof pay on every occasion.”

38. The judgment in Union of India & Anr. v. S.B. Vohra &Ors.[17] is distinguished from the present matter as the issue was regardingBpay scale of the employees of the High Court on recommendation of theChief Justice. It was observed that financial implications vis-à-vis effectof grant of particular scale of pay may not always be sufficientreason and differences should be mutually discussed and tried to besolved. It is, however, again not case of financial stringency alone butalso the power of the Chief Justice to grant revised pay scales to theCemployees of the High Court.

39. General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd.,Sultanpur, U.P. v. Satrughan Nishad & Ors.[18] is judgment whichdeals with the scope of Article 12 in respect of Cooperative Sugar Mills.Mr. Patwalia has not raised any argument about the Federation beingDnot State. Therefore, the said judgment is not relevant to be examinedin the present appeals.

40. In K.T. Veerappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.[19],the Court upheld the principle that fixation of pay and parity in duties isthe function of the executive and financial capacity of the GovernmentEis also relevant factor to be considered, though on facts, it was heldthat the employees of the University were entitled to revision of pay atpar with the employees of the State. It was held as under:

“13. He next contended that fixation of pay and parity in duties isthe function of the executive and financial capacity of theFGovernment and the priority given to different types of posts underthe prevailing policies of the Government are also relevant factors.In support of this contention, he has placed reliance on State ofHaryana v. Haryana Civil Secretariat Personal StaffAssn. [(2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822] and Union ofGIndia v. S.B. Vohra [(2004) 2 SCC 150 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 363]. There is no dispute nor can there be any to the principle assettled in State of Haryana v. Haryana Civil SecretariatPersonal Staff Assn.[(2002) 6 SCC 72 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 822]

17 (2004) 2 SCC 15018 (2003) 8 SCC 639H19 (2006) 9 SCC 406

that fixation of pay and determination of parity in duties isthe function of the executive and the scope of judicial reviewof administrative decision in this regard is very limited.However, it is also equally well settled that the courts shouldinterfere with administrative decisions pertaining to pay fixationand pay parity when they find such decision to be unreasonable,unjust and prejudicial to section of employees and taken inignorance of material and relevant factors.”

(Emphasis supplied)

41. In the present case, it is contended that the Federation is astatutory Co-operative Society which is having its Common Cadre Rules.Any amendment in the Common Cadre Rules is to be approved by theRegistrar (Co-operative Societies). The State Government communicatedon 1.3.1990 and 9.7.1993 that the pay scale as applicable to the PunjabGovernment employees is not to be adopted by the Public SectorUndertakings without taking into consideration the financial health ofthe other statutory Boards and Corporations. The Federation has thustaken conscious and concerted decision to not follow the report of theAnomaly Committee of the State Government to grant revised pay scalefrom 1.1.1986 in view of precarious financial condition. Moreover,financial assistance had to be availed by the Federation from the StateGovernment as well as from the National Dairy Development Board.

42. Committee was constituted to examine the grievance of theemployees for grant of revised pay scale. The Committee alsorecommended that pay scale be given w.e.f. 1.1.1994 on account offinancial stringency being faced by the Federation. The Board ofDirectors approved the recommendation of the Committee, which wasaccepted by the Registrar (Co-operative Societies). Therefore, thedecision of not to grant revised pay scale from 1.1.1986 was taken keepingin view the financial condition of the Federation. The question now iswhether such decision could have been interfered with in writ petitionin exercise of power of judicial review.

43. The power of judicial review over the administrative decisionsof the State was examined by judgment of this Court in Tata Cellularv. Union of India[20]. Though, that is case of grant of contract, but theprinciples of law are very well applicable to the exercise of power of

Ajudicial review by the High Court in the administrative decisions of theState within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. The Courtheld as under:

“77. The duty of the court is to confine itself to the question oflegality. Its concern should be:B1. Whether decision-making authority exceeded its powers?

2. Committed an error of law,

3. committed breach of the rules of natural justice,

4. reached decision which no reasonable tribunal would havereached or,C

5. abused its powers.

Therefore, it is not for the court to determine whether particularpolicy or particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy isfair. It is only concerned with the manner in which those decisionsDhave been taken. The extent of the duty to act fairly will varyfrom case to case. Shortly put, the grounds upon which anadministrative action is subject to control by judicial review canbe classified as under:

(i) Illegality : This means the decision-maker must understandcorrectly the law that regulates his decision-making power andEmust give effect to it.

(ii) Irrationality, namely, Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(iii) Procedural impropriety.

The above are only the broad grounds but it does not rule outFaddition of further grounds in course of time. As matter of fact,in R. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, exBrind [(1991) 1 AC 696] , Lord Diplock refers specifically to onedevelopment, namely, the possible recognition of the principle ofproportionality. In all these cases the test to be adopted is that thecourt should, “consider whether something has gone wrong of aGnature and degree which requires its intervention”.

xx xx xx

94. The principles deducible from the above are:

(1) The modern trend points to judicial restraint in administrativeHaction.

(2) The court does not sit as court of appeal but merely reviewsthe manner in which the decision was made.

(3) The court does not have the expertise to correct theadministrative decision. If review of the administrative decisionis permitted it will be substituting its own decision, without thenecessary expertise which itself may be fallible.

(4) The terms of the invitation to tender cannot be open to judicialscrutiny because the invitation to tender is in the realm of contract.Normally speaking, the decision to accept the tender or awardthe contract is reached by process of negotiations through severaltiers. More often than not, such decisions are made qualitativelyby experts.

(5) The Government must have freedom of contract. In otherwords, fair play in the joints is necessary concomitant for anadministrative body functioning in an administrative sphere orquasi-administrative sphere. However, the decision must not onlybe tested by the application of Wednesbury principle ofreasonableness (including its other facts pointed out above) butmust be free from arbitrariness not affected by bias or actuatedby mala fides.

(6) Quashing decisions may impose heavy administrative burdenon the administration and lead to increased and unbudgetedexpenditure.

Based on these principles we will examine the facts of this casesince they commend to us as the correct principles.”

44. In Balco Employees’ Union (Regd.) v. Union of India &Ors.[21], the Court was examining the policy of disinvestment of publicsector undertakings. It was held that wisdom and advisability of economicpolicies of Government are not amenable to judicial review unless it canbe demonstrated that such policy is contrary to any statutory provisionor the Constitution. It is not for the Court to consider relative merits ofdifferent economic policies and consider whether wiser or better onecould be evolved. The Court held as under:

“92. In democracy, it is the prerogative of each electedGovernment to follow its own policy. Often change in

Government may result in the shift in focus or change in economicpolicies. Any such change may result in adversely affecting somevested interests. Unless any illegality is committed in the executionof the policy or the same is contrary to law or mala fide, decisionbringing about change cannot per se be interfered with by thecourt.

93. Wisdom and advisability of economic policies are ordinarilynot amenable to judicial review unless it can be demonstrated thatthe policy is contrary to any statutory provision or the Constitution.In other words, it is not for the courts to consider relative meritsof different economic policies and consider whether wiser orCbetter one can be evolved. For testing the correctness of policy,the appropriate forum is Parliament and not the courts. Here thepolicy was tested and the motion defeated in the Lok Sabha on 1-3-2001.

xx xx xxD

98. In the case of policy decision on economic matters, thecourts should be very circumspect in conducting any enquiry orinvestigation and must be most reluctant to impugn the judgmentof the experts who may have arrived at conclusion unless thecourt is satisfied that there is illegality in the decision itself.”

45. This Court in judgment reported as Jagdish Mandal v.State of Orissa & Ors.[22] examined the scope of judicial review in thematter of award of contract. The Court held as under:

“22. Judicial review of administrative action is intended to preventFarbitrariness, irrationality, unreasonableness, bias and mala fides.Its purpose is to check whether choice or decision is made“lawfully” and not to check whether choice or decision is “sound”.When the power of judicial review is invoked in matters relatingto tenders or award of contracts, certain special features shouldbe borne in mind. contract is commercial transaction.GEvaluating tenders and awarding contracts are essentiallycommercial functions. Principles of equity and natural justice stayat distance. If the decision relating to award of contract is bonafide and is in public interest, courts will not, in exercise of powerof judicial review, interfere even if procedural aberration or error

in assessment or prejudice to tenderer, is made out. The powerof judicial review will not be permitted to be invoked to protectprivate interest at the cost of public interest, or to decide contractualdisputes. The tenderer or contractor with grievance can alwaysseek damages in civil court. Attempts by unsuccessful tendererswith imaginary grievances, wounded pride and business rivalry, tomake mountains out of molehills of some technical/proceduralviolation or some prejudice to self, and persuade courts to interfereby exercising power of judicial review, should be resisted. Suchinterferences, either interim or final, may hold up public works foryears, or delay relief and succour to thousands and millions andmay increase the project cost manifold. Therefore, court beforeinterfering in tender or contractual matters in exercise of powerof judicial review, should pose to itself the following questions:

(i) Whether the process adopted or decision made by the authorityis mala fide or intended to favour someone;

Whether the process adopted or decision made is so arbitrary andirrational that the court can say: “the decision is such that noresponsible authority acting reasonably and in accordance withrelevant law could have reached”;

(ii) Whether public interest is affected.

If the answers are in the negative, there should be no interferenceunder Article 226. Cases involving blacklisting or imposition ofpenal consequences on tenderer/contractor or distribution ofState largesse (allotment of sites/shops, grant of licences,dealerships and franchises) stand on different footing as theymay require higher degree of fairness in action.”

46. In recent judgment reported as West Bengal Central SchoolService Commission & Ors. v. Abdul Halim & Ors.[23], this Court wasexamining the candidature of candidate for appointment in pursuanceof advertisement advertised by West Bengal Central School ServiceCommission. One of the essential qualifications was Bengali as subjecteither at the Secondary level or at the Higher Secondary level or at thegraduation or postgraduation level. The candidature of selected candidatewas not interfered with by the Division Bench of the High Court although23 (2019) 18 SCC 39

Asuch candidate was not possessing Bengali as language. The Courtheld as under:

“27. It is well settled that the High Court in exercise of jurisdictionunder Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not sit in appealover an administrative decision. The Court might only examinethe decision-making process to ascertain whether there was suchinfirmity in the decision-making process, which vitiates the decisionand calls for intervention under Article 226 of the Constitution ofIndia.

28. In any case, the High Court exercises its extraordinaryjurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to enforcea fundamental right or some other legal right or the performanceof some legal duty. To pass orders in writ petition, the HighCourt would necessarily have to address to itself the question ofwhether there has been breach of any fundamental or legal rightof the petitioner, or whether there has been lapse in performanceby the respondents of legal duty.

29. The High Court in exercise of its power to issue writs, directionsor orders to any person or authority to correct quasi-judicial oreven administrative decisions for enforcement of fundamentalor legal right is obliged to prevent abuse of power and neglect ofduty by public authorities.

30. In exercise of its power of judicial review, the Court is to seewhether the decision impugned is vitiated by an apparent error oflaw. The test to determine whether decision is vitiated by errorapparent on the face of the record is whether the error is self-Fevident on the face of the record or whether the error requiresexamination or argument to establish it. If an error has to beestablished by process of reasoning, on points where there mayreasonably be two opinions, it cannot be said to be an error on theface of the record, as held by this Court in SatyanarayanGLaxminarayan Hegde v. Millikarjun BhavanappaTirumale [Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. MillikarjunBhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137]. If the provision of astatutory rule is reasonably capable of two or more constructionsand one construction has been adopted, the decision would not beopen to interference by the writ court. It is only an obviousHmisinterpretation of relevant statutory provision, or ignorance or

disregard thereof, or decision founded on reasons which areclearly wrong in law, which can be corrected by the writ court byissuance of writ of certiorari.

31. The sweep of power under Article 226 may be wide enoughto quash unreasonable orders. If decision is so arbitrary andcapricious that no reasonable person could have ever arrived at it,the same is liable to be struck down by writ court. If the decisioncannot rationally be supported by the materials on record, thesame may be regarded as perverse.

32. However, the power of the Court to examine thereasonableness of an order of the authorities does not enable theCourt to look into the sufficiency of the grounds in support of adecision to examine the merits of the decision, sitting as if in appealover the decision. The test is not what the Court considersreasonable or unreasonable but decision which the Court thinksthat no reasonable person could have taken, which has led tomanifest injustice. The writ court does not interfere, because adecision is not perfect.

33. In entertaining and allowing the writ petition, the High Courthas lost sight of the limits of its extraordinary power of judicialreview and has in fact sat in appeal over the decision ofRespondent 2.”

47. Later, three-Judge Bench in judgment reported asMunicipal Council, Neemuch v. Mahadeo Real Estate & Ors.[24]followed the aforesaid judgment and held as under:

“16. It could thus be seen that an interference by the High Courtwould be warranted only when the decision impugned is vitiatedby an apparent error of law i.e. when the error is apparent on theface of the record and is self-evident. The High Court would beempowered to exercise the powers when it finds that the decisionimpugned is so arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable personwould have ever arrived at. It has been reiterated that the test isnot what the Court considers reasonable or unreasonable but adecision which the Court thinks that no reasonable person couldhave taken. Not only this but such decision must have led tomanifest injustice.”

A48. In another recent judgment reported as Harshit Agarwal &Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.[25], this Court held that judicial review ofadministrative action is permissible on grounds of illegality, irrationalityand procedural impropriety. An administrative decision is considered asflawed if it is illegal, and decision is illegal if it pursues an objectiveother than that for which the power to make the decision was conferred.BThe discretion exercised by the decision maker is subject to judicialscrutiny if purpose other than the specified purpose is pursued. TheCourt observed that:

“10. Judicial review of administrative action is permissible ongrounds of illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. AnCadministrative decision is flawed if it is illegal. decision is illegalif it pursues an objective other than that for which the power tomake the decision was conferred [De Smith’s Judicial Review,(6th Edn., p. 225)] . There is no unfettered discretion in public law[Food Corpn. of India v. Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries,D(1993) 1 SCC 71] . Discretion conferred on an authority has to benecessarily exercised only for the purpose provided in statute.The discretion exercised by the decision maker is subject to judicialscrutiny if purpose other than specified purpose is pursued. Ifthe authority pursues unauthorised purposes, its decision is renderedillegal. If irrelevant considerations are taken into account forEreaching the decision or relevant considerations have been ignored,the decision stands vitiated as the decision maker has misdirectedhimself in law. It is useful to refer to R. v. Vestry of St.Pancras [R. v. Vestry of St. Pancras, (1890) LR 24 QBD 371(CA)] in which it was held: (QBD pp. 375-76)F“… If people who have to exercise public duty by exercisingtheir discretion take into account matters which the courts considernot to be proper for the guidance of their discretion, then in theeye of the law they have not exercised their discretion.”

49. Thus, we find that the decision that the Federation was inGfinancial difficulties is based upon relevant material before the Federation.The process to arrive at such decision can be said to be flawed only onthe permissible grounds of illegality, irrationality and proceduralimpropriety. We find that neither the decision-making process, nor thedecision itself suffers from any such vice.

H25 (2021) 2 SCC 710

50. Learned counsel for the writ petitioners have referred to theinformation received under the Right to Information Act to show thatthe Federation was in profit in the year 1996-1997. We do not find thatsuch information is relevant to determine the financial condition for theperiod from 1.1.1986 to 1.1.1994. The Federation has categorically statedthat because of the remedial steps taken by the Federation, there wasturn around only after 1994. Still further, we find that the profits in thebalance sheet are not meant to be appropriated towards wages of theemployees alone. Though the profits had to be shared by the membersof the Co-operative Society, but the employees of the Federation are notits members. The income generated by the Federation is not to beexpanded only on payment of salary but is also required for upgradationof technology, renovation and expansion of plants etc. Therefore, entireprofit is not to be appropriated towards the wages of the employeesalone. The Federation was established as step towards white revolution.The objective of the Federation was not to give employment but toincrease milk production in the State. The employees are facilitators ofthe employer to achieve such objective and thus demanding enhancedwages without considering the objective and financial condition of theemployer would not be ideal. The employer and the employees have towork together to achieve the objective of the organisation i.e. whiterevolution rather frittering away the gains made by the joint efforts ofthe management and employees by giving increased wages to theemployees irrespective of its capacity to bear such expenses.

51. The submission that there will not be financial burden on thefederation in view of the fact that the High Court has ordered paymentof arrears for period of 3 years and 2 months before the date of filingof writ petitions is again not tenable. The High Court has granted revisedpay scales with effect from 01.01.1986 instead of revised pay scalesgranted to the employees of the federation with effect from 01.01.1994.Therefore, restricting it for period of 3 years and 2 months will not behelpful in respect of the financial condition of the Federation as duringthe relevant time the federation was suffering from huge losses.

52. In view of the above, we find that the order of the High Courtis unjustified and in excess of the power of judicial review conferred onthe High Court. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The orders passedby the High Court are hereby set aside and the writ petitions aredismissed.

432SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ACIVIL APPEAL NO. 7432 OF 2011

53. The present appeal is also directed against an order passed bythe Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarhon 19.3.2009 wherein it was held that the employees are entitled to payscale equivalent to their counterparts in the State of Punjab from 1.1.1986,Bthough the revised pay scale was allowed by the Federation w.e.f.1.1.1994. The argument raised is that the contention of the employeesclaiming equal pay for equal work has not been examined by the HighCourt.

54. The employees have not filed any appeal against the impugnedCjudgment of the High Court. We find that the employees cannot raiseany grievance in an appeal preferred by the Federation to claim equalpay for equal work. The employees are not aggrieved against the judgmentof the High Court. Therefore, the employees cannot raise an argumentwhich was not raised before the High Court.

D55. But still, we have examined the argument raised. It was arguedthat the claim of the employees is not of revised pay scale from 1.1.1986but that the categorization of Milk Procurement Assistants as Grade-I& II is unconstitutional and they would be entitled to the same pay as isbeing paid to Milk Procurement Assistants Grade-I on the principle ofequal pay for equal work.E

56. The said contention of the employees is controverted by theFederation, inter alia, on the ground that the Milk Procurement Assistantsare not the employees of the Apex Society i.e. Punjab State Co-operativeMilk Producers Federation but they are employees of the District Co-operative Milk Producers Union which is separate entity. The staffingFpattern for District Co-operative Milk Producers Union, as approved bythe Registrar (Co-operative Societies), shows that different educationalqualifications and experience is prescribed for appointment to MilkProcurement Assistants Grade-I & II. It has also been pointed out thatthere is qualitative difference in the responsibilities of the two sets ofGemployees. Milk Procurement Assistants Grade-II are allotted 10 to 12villages at the village-level Milk Producers Co-operative Society forsupervising their work with regard to milk collection, testing, recordkeeping, payment to producers of milk, transportation of milk and toattend the other problems of the societies whereas the duty of the MilkProcurement Assistants Grade-I is to supervise the work of MilkHProcurement Assistant Grade-II. One Milk Procurement Assistant Grade

I officer supervises the work of six to seven Milk Procurement AssistantsGrade II.

57. As per the staffing pattern, the educational qualifications forMilk Procurement Assistants Grade-I are Bachelor’s Degree withminimum three years’ experience of Organisation of Milk ProducersCo-operative Societies affiliated with Milk Producers Co-operative Unitwhereas for Milk Procurement Assistant Grade II, the qualification isGraduation preferable in Agriculture with one year experience of workingas Secretary in Co-operative Milk Supply Society. The pay scaleprescribed for the Milk Procurement Assistants Grade-I is Rs.700-1200whereas the pay scale prescribed for the Milk Procurement AssistantsGrade-II is Rs.480-880. It is sought to be contended that, in fact, MilkProcurement Assistants Grade-I is promotional avenue for MilkProcurement Assistants Grade-II.

58. As stated, the educational qualifications and the responsibilitiesof the two posts are quite different. Therefore, the principle of equal payfor equal work would not be applicable to them inasmuch as Grade I isa higher post having higher duties and responsibilities than Grade II.

59. We do not find any merit in the argument claiming equal payfor the alleged equal work. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. Theorders passed by the High Court are hereby set aside.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7434 OF 2011

60. The present appeal is also directed against an order passed bythe Division Bench of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarhon 19.3.2009 wherein it was held that the employees are entitled to payscale equivalent to their counterparts in the State of Punjab from 1.1.1986,though revised pay scale was allowed by the Federation w.e.f. 1.1.1994.It was contended that the argument of the employees claiming equalpay for equal work was not examined by the High Court.

61. The respondent Nos. 1 to 4 are Milk Procurement AssistantsGrade-I in the pay scale of Rs.700-1200 whereas respondent No. 5 isAnimal Husbandry Assistant in the same pay scale of Rs.700-1200 w.e.f.1.8.1980. Such employees are claiming parity in the matter of pay withthe Area Officers including Deputy Manager (Procurement) and DairyExtension Officer in the pay scale of Rs.850-1700. The employees havepleaded that w.e.f. 2.2.1987, the designation of Milk ProcurementAssistants Grade-I has been changed to Milk Procurement Supervisor

Aand now the workload has increased inasmuch as fifty societies are tobe supervised as against eight societies which were supervised, withoutany increase in the pay scale. It was argued that the duties and functionsof the employees and the other Area Officers including Deputy Manager(Procurement) and Dairy Extension Officer are the same as such postsare interchangeable.B

62. In the written statement filed before the High Court, the standof the Federation was that the employees have since long beenpermanently transferred to the Milk Union, Ludhiana. It was pointed outthat the employees and the Deputy Manager (Procurement)/DairyExtension Officer do not constitute one class as the posts are not similarCon the points of qualifications and duties to be performed by theincumbents. The classification on the basis of qualifications, educationalor by experience, for the fixation of pay is permissible under theConstitution. The qualifications of Milk Procurement Assistant Grade-Ior Animal Husbandry Assistant is Graduation/Matriculation with live-Dstock Diploma course whereas the essential qualifications for the postof Dairy Extension Officer and for the post of Deputy Manager(Procurement) is B.Sc. Dairy Husbandry/Dairy Technology with two tothree years’ experience.

63. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. Firstly, theEorder passed by the High Court has not been challenged in appeal by theemployees. Secondly, the classification of different pay scales ispermissible based upon educational qualifications, experience and natureof duties. In view of the said facts, we do not find that the employeesare entitled to the pay scale as claimed in the writ petition.

F64. We do not find any merit in the argument claiming equal payfor the alleged equal work. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. Theorders passed by the High Court are hereby set aside.

Nidhi Jain

Appeals allowed.