JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER HARI SINGH) versus C.B.S.E. (CENTRAL BOARD OF SECONDARY EDUCATION) & ORS

[2021] 4 S.C.R.

AJIGYA YADAV (MINOR)(THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHER HARI SINGH)

C.B.S.E. (CENTRAL BOARD OFSECONDARY EDUCATION) & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 3905 of 2011)

JUNE 03, 2021

[A. M. KHANWILKAR, B. R. GAVAI ANDKRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]

Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board ofSecondary Education (CBSE) – Examination Byelaws of the Board,if having the force of law – Held: The CBSE Examination Byelawsare couched in the form of code – They provide for all essentialaspects relating to formal education of student includingDadmission, examination, migration, transfer, curriculum, fee forvarious services, issuance of verified certificates, modifications incertificates etc. – The Byelaws, therefore, bind the parties and areduly enforceable in court of law, even by way of writ remedies –The Byelaws of the Board have the force of law and must be regardedas such for all legal purposes – It would serve no meaningfulEpurpose to hold these authoritative set of rules originating from aninstrumentality of the State as mere contractual terms despite therebeing overwhelming public interest in their just application –Arguendo, the Examination Byelaws are not “law” under Art.13, itwould not affect the power of the Court to scrutinize them in referenceFto Part-III of the Constitution of India as CBSE is “State” within themeaning of Art.12 and all its actions are consequently subject toPart-III – Constitution of India – Part III – Arts. 12 and 13 – CentralBoard of Secondary Education (CBSE) Examination Byelaws of2007.

GEducation/Educational Institutions: Central Board ofSecondary Education (CBSE) – Correction/change in certificatesissued by the Board – Scope of permissible corrections/ changes –The CBSE Examination Byelaws restrict, both qualitatively andquantitatively, the corrections/changes that can be carried out inthe certificates issued by the Board – Test of rationality – WhetherH

Examination Byelaws of CBSE / Board impose reasonablerestrictions – Held: The identity of an individual is one of the mostclosely guarded areas of the constitutional scheme in India – Namecan be regarded as one of the foremost indicators of identity – Goingby the very nature of rights under Article 19, the right to get changedname recorded in the official (public) records cannot be an absoluteright and as matter of public policy and larger public interestcalls for certain reasonable restrictions to observe consistency andobviate confusion and deceptive attempt – On facts, the Byelawspermit change of name only if permission from the Court has beenobtained prior to the publication of result – The provision isproblematic on certain counts – There can be numerouscircumstances wherein change of name could be legitimaterequirement and keeping the ultimate goal of preserving the standardof education in mind, the Board must provide for reasonableopportunity to effect such changes – Balance of convenience wouldtilt in favour of students for, they stand to lose more due toinaccuracies in their certificates than the Board whose sole worryis increasing administrative burden – CBSE maintains its officialrecords in respect of candidates on the basis of foundationaldocuments being the school records – Therefore, CBSE is obligedto carry out all necessary corrections to ensure that CBSE certificateis consistent with the relevant information furnished in the schoolrecords as it existed at the relevant time and future changes theretoincluding after the publication of results by the CBSE – However,when it comes to recording any information in the original certificateissued by the CBSE which is not consistent with the school records,it is essential that the CBSE must insist for supporting publicdocument which has presumptive value and in the given casedeclaration by Court of law to incorporate such change – Inthat regard, the CBSE can insist for additional conditions to reassureitself and safeguard its interest against any claim by third party/body because of changes incorporated by it pursuant to applicationmade by the candidate – Central Board of Secondary Education(CBSE) Examination Byelaws of 2007 – Constitution of India –Art.19.

Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board ofSecondary Education (CBSE) – Correction/change in certificatesissued by the Board – Whether the CBSE / Board is obliged to carry

Aout corrections/changes in the certificates issued by it owing tocorrection/updation of public records/ documents which havestatutory presumption of genuineness – Held: There is no reasonfor the CBSE Board to not take notice of the public documents reliedupon by the candidate and to record change on that basis in thecertificate issued by it, for being consistent with the relied uponBpublic documents – It matters not if the information furnished in thepublic documents is not entirely consistent with the school recordsof the incumbent – CBSE while accepting those documents asfoundational documents for effecting changes consistent therewithmay insist for additional conditions and at the same time whileCretaining the original entry make note in the form of caption/annotation in the fresh certificate to be issued by it while callingupon the incumbent to surrender the original certificate issued by itto avoid any misuse thereof at later point of time – It would bepermissible for the CBSE to insist for sworn affidavit to be givenby the incumbent making necessary declaration and also toDindemnify the CBSE – The fresh certificate to be issued by the CBSEmay also contain disclaimer of the Board clearly mentioning thatchange has been effected at the behest of the incumbent in light ofthe public documents relied upon by him – In addition, the incumbentcan be called upon to notify about the change in the Official GazetteEand by giving public notice as precondition for recording the changeby way of abundant precaution – When student applies to Courtof law for prior permission and/or declaration and produces publicdocument(s), the Court would enter upon an inquiry wherein thelegal presumption would operate in favour of the public document(s)and burden would shift on the party opposing the change to rebutFthe presumption or oppose the claim on any other ground – Thequestion of genuineness of the document including its contents wouldbe adjudicated in the same inquiry and the Court of law wouldpermit the desired change only upon verifying the official recordsand upon being satisfied of its genuineness – At the same time, theGquestion of justiciability of the requested changes would beconsidered and only upon being satisfied with the need demonstratedby the student, the Court would grant its permission – The saidpermission can then be placed before the Board along with copy ofpublication in the official gazette and requisite (prescribed) fee (ifany) – The Board would then have no locus to make further enquiryH

nor would be required to enter upon any further verification exercise– While considering requests for changes in certificates, CBSEcannot act as court and it cannot effectively consider any requestover and above those requests that merely require bringing thecertificates in conformity with the school records or publicdocuments, as the case may be – Central Board of SecondaryEducation (CBSE) Examination Byelaws of 2007.

Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board ofSecondary Education (CBSE) – Examination Byelaws of the Board– Corrections/changes in certificates issued by the Board – Periodof limitation for correction of the certificates – Whether theExamination Byelaws in force on the date of examination conductedby CBSE or the date of consideration of the application forrecording correction/change would be relevant – And, whether theeffect of correction or change, as the case may be, will haveretrospective effect from the date of issue of the original certificate– Held: The Byelaws existing on the date of declaration/publicationof result and issue of certificate would be relevant for the purposeof effecting changes in the certificates – If the limitation ofapplicability of Byelaws was to be reckoned from the date ofapplication for correction/change and not the date of result of theexamination conducted by CBSE, that would be leaving things to astate of uncertainty – Once changes are permitted in the documentsof CBSE, it does not ipso facto mean that the changes are given aretrospective effect – The changes are indeed prospective and tosignify that remedial measure is provided in the Byelaws, as existingpresently – They provide for the requirement of adding caption/annotation with the date of such change along with the changedparticulars so as to indicate within the certificate that the changeshave been made on date subsequent to the date of publishing thecertificates – The requirement of caption/annotation is indeed asufficient safeguard to prevent the usage of subsequently altereddocuments as unchanged original records – Central Board ofSecondary Education (CBSE) Examination Byelaws of 2007.

Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board ofSecondary Education (CBSE) – Correction/change in certificatesissued by the Board – Whether writ of mandamus issued for effectingcorrections in CBSE certificates can be in the teeth of explicit

Aprovisions in the examination byelaws, without examining validityof the byelaws – Held: The High Courts, being constitutional Courts,are duly vested with the power to review any law in light of Part-III– There cannot be mechanical directions by way of mandamus to apublic authority without going into the veracity of the claims andwithout sufficiently explaining why the case demands extraordinaryBtreatment – The Courts need to be extra cautious and alive to theimmediate factual position before permitting changes – No tworequests for change of name or change in date of birth can beviewed with the same judicial eye – Sometimes, change of namecould be necessity, sometimes it could be pure exercise of freewillCwithout any need – As long as Byelaws or the applicable rules permitso, there is no occasion for any court to deny such relief – Butwhen Byelaws do not permit for the same, the Court must becircumspect before issuing directions, that too without commentingupon the validity of the Byelaws and without demonstrating the rightswhich are at stake – constitutional or legal – Central Board ofDSecondary Education (CBSE) Examination Byelaws of 2007 –Constitution of India – Part III.Education/Educational Institutions: Central Board ofSecondary Education (CBSE) – Correction/change in certificatesissued by the Board – Nature of correction or change, as the caseEmay be, permissible to be carried by the CBSE at the instance of thestudent including past student – Held: Broadly, two situations wouldarise – The first is where the incumbent wants “correction” in thecertificate issued by the CBSE to be made consistent with theparticulars mentioned in the school records – There is no reasonFfor the CBSE to turn down such request or attach any preconditionexcept reasonable period of limitation and keeping in mind theperiod for which the CBSE has to maintain its record under theextant regulations – CBSE cannot impose precondition of applyingfor correction consistent with the school records only before

publication of results – Such condition would be unreasonableGand excessive – However, if the request for recording change isbased on changed school records post the publication of resultsand issue of certificate by the CBSE, the candidate would be entitledto apply for recording such change within the reasonable limitationperiod prescribed by the CBSE – As regards request for “change”Hof particulars in the certificate issued by the CBSE, it presupposes

that the particulars intended to be recorded in the CBSE certificateare not consistent with the school records – Such request could bemade in two different situations – The first is on the basis of publicdocuments like Birth Certificate, Aadhaar Card/Election Card, etc.and to incorporate change in the CBSE certificate consistenttherewith – The second possibility is when the request for change isdue to the acquired name by choice at later point of time – Thatchange need not be backed by public documents pertaining to thecandidate – Reverting to the first category, there is legalpresumption in relation to the public documents as envisaged in the1872 Act – Such public documents, therefore, cannot be ignored bythe CBSE – Taking note of those documents, the CBSE may entertainthe request for recording change in the certificate issued by it –This, however, need not be unconditional, but subject to certainreasonable conditions to be fulfilled by the applicant as may beprescribed by the CBSE – The fresh certificate may contain disclaimerand caption/annotation against the original entry (except in respectof change of name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten)indicating the date on which change has been recorded and thebasis thereof – However, in the latter situation where the change isto be effected on the basis of new acquired name without anysupporting school record or public document, that request may beentertained upon insisting for prior permission/declaration by aCourt of law in that regard and publication in the Official Gazetteincluding surrender/return of original certificate (or duplicateoriginal certificate, as the case may be) issued by CBSE and uponpayment of prescribed fees – Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.76 r/w ss.79,80 and 81.

Disposing of the cases with directions to the CBSE, theCourt

HELD:

Whether the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE)Examination Byelaws of 2007 have the force of law.

1.1. For the nature of activities undertaken by the CBSE/Board including the powers and functions of the Board, it can besafely assumed that the Board is State within the meaning ofArticle 12 of the Constitution of India and as corollary thereof,

Aits actions would be amenable to Part-III of the Constitution ofIndia. The fact that the Board can be treated as State within themeaning of Article 12 of the Constitution does not mean that thebyelaws framed by it would necessarily become law within themeaning of Article 13 of the Constitution of India. Only “law”under Article 13 can be reckoned as restriction in respect ofBrights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution. [Para101][1155-C-E]

1.2. The underlying purpose of defining “law” under Article13 is to encompass practical administrative reality that therecan be laws other than ordinary statutory laws. It, therefore, takesCwithin its sweep those matters (declaration in the form of Byelawsin this case) as having the “force of law” albeit not enacted by thelegislature as such. For, it defines “law” to include ordinances,orders, byelaws, rule, regulation or notification issued/made bythe State. The precise meanings of these terms cannot be confinedDin the rigidity of language and the same is neither desirable norrequired in the present case. [Paras 103, 104][1156-E-G]

1.3 Law made by State refers to body of rules which shapesthe rights and liabilities of persons in universal sense as opposedto private transaction between parties. Such law has the abilityEto bind people by providing for all prominent aspects of theirconduct as the subjects of law. Therefore, any rule/notification/order/byelaw issued/made by the State or its instrumentalitieswould have the force of law and bind all entities subjected to itand operates as code of conduct to regulate their functioning.Yet another crucial characteristic would be enforceability in courtFof law. [Para 105][1157-A-B]

1.4 CBSE, despite being packaged as registered society,is performing an essential public function for the governmentsince its establishment in 1929. The principles associated with apublic function can be illustratively culled out as follows: a.GExtension of collective benefit to public by public authority; b.Participation in social or economic affairs including health,education, social services etc.; c. Private bodies or charitableinstitutions performing public functions could also be regulatedin the same manner as public authority. In the school education

structure as we have it, there are state government boards limitedto respective states. There are central boards having its area ofoperation throughout India, namely, Council for the Indian SchoolCertificate Examinations (ICSE), private board; InternationalBaccalaureate (IB), formerly known as InternationalBaccalaureate Organization (IBO) non-profit foundation/organization having headquarter in Geneva, Switzerland; andCBSE. [Para 106][1157-D; 1158-E-H]

Binny Ltd. & Anr. v. V. Sadasivan & Ors. (2005) 6 SCC657 – relied on.

1.5 CBSE is the only central body for conductingexaminations in the country created by resolution of the CentralGovernment. All the bodies constituted at various levels areworking in the direction of just educational governance. Article41 of the Constitution, couched as directive, is the source behindthe basic functioning of the CBSE Board as it secures nothingbut right to education. It is participating in educational affairswhich form an intrinsic part of social affairs. The CBSE Board isa public authority functioning in public interest for the performanceof public function. [Para 107][1159-A-B]1.6 The constitution of the CBSE/Board reaffirms the publiccharacter of the Board as the ultimate control over the functioningof the Board is exercised by the Ministry of Education (nowMinistry of Education & Social Welfare). Reverting to the CBSEExamination Byelaws, the same are couched in the form of code.They provide for all essential aspects relating to formal educationof student including admission, examination, migration, transfer,curriculum, fee for various services, issuance of verifiedcertificates, modifications in certificates etc. This Byelaws,therefore, bind the parties and are duly enforceable in court oflaw, even by way of writ remedies. To put it differently, theByelaws of the Board have the force of law and must be regardedas such for all legal purposes. It would serve no meaningfulpurpose to hold these authoritative set of rules originating froman instrumentality of the State as mere contractual terms despitethere being overwhelming public interest in their just application.[Paras 108, 109, 110][1159-C; 1159-F-G; 1160-A]

A1.7 The argument that Byelaws of the Board are contractualelements as CBSE is registered society unbacked by statutecannot be accepted for at least four reasons – first, CBSE is not aprivate corporate body. It is juristic person and “State” withinthe meaning of Article 12, which in itself warrants its amenabilityto the courts including constitutional writ courts; second, theBfunctions performed by the CBSE Board are public functions andnot private functions; third, the test of “force of law” takes withinits sweep the nature of rule, its authoritative impact on thesubjects, nature of function performed by the rule making body,the origin of the body, the binding value of the rules, existence ofCany competing set of rules and fourth, absence of statute doesnot automatically render the rules to be contractual terms. [Para111][1160-B-C]

1.8 As in the ultimate analysis, the Byelaws operate as law,the scrutiny of this Court cannot be undermined by giving themDan artificial colour. For student enrolled with the CBSE, thereis no other body of rules but the subject Byelaws for dealing withall significant aspects of her education. By now it is an establishedtenet that even body corporates, co-operative societies,registered societies etc. can be declared as instrumentalities ofthe State, for the only reason that the outer form of organizationEmust not be allowed to defeat the ultimate constitutional goal ofprotection of fundamental rights as and when they suffer at thehands of the State, directly or indirectly. The Court ought tointervene with circumspection even when the public body derivesits authority from government resolution. [Para 112][1160-D-FF]

1.9 One says so because there is an evolving body ofjurisprudence enunciating that the principle of presumption ofconstitutionality attached with statutes ought not to be extendedto subordinate legislations with the same vigour. For, theGlegislature enjoys the sacred backing of people’s will and naturally,every act of legislature is presumed to be constitutional. In otherwords, the Courts generally do not look upon duly enacted lawswith suspicion at the first glance as they enjoy legal presumptionof its validity. Nevertheless, circumspect intervention on the partof the Court is to advance constitutional protection for guaranteesH

under Part-III of the Constitution. Arguendo, the ExaminationByelaws are not “law” under Article 13, it would not affect thepower of the Court to scrutinize them in reference to Part-III ofthe Constitution of India as CBSE is “State” within the meaningof Article 12 and all its actions are consequently subject to Part-III. [Paras 113, 114][1160-F-H; 1161-A]

Whether examination byelaws of CBSE / Board imposereasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights under Article19 of the Constitution including fail the test of rationality forexcessively restricting the scope of permissible corrections/changes?

2.1 The core existence of an individual is not exemplifiedby her outer characteristics but by her inner self-identificationand also about the significance of the acquired identity in theform of name. The identity of an individual is one of the mostclosely guarded areas of the constitutional scheme in India. Thesanctity of identity has been recognized by this Court in plethoraof cases. The core existence of an individual is not exemplifiedby her outer characteristics but by her inner self-identification.[Para 115][1161-B-D]

National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India &Ors. (2014) 5 SCC 438 : [2014] 5 SCR 119; NavtejSingh Johar & Ors. v. Union of India through Secretary,Ministry of Law and Justice (2018) 10 SCC 1 : [2018]7 SCR 379; K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. v. Union of India& Ors. (2017) 10 SCC 1 : [2017] 10 SCR 569 – reliedon.

2.2 Identity is an amalgam of various internal and externalincluding acquired characteristics of an individual and name canbe regarded as one of the foremost indicators of identity. Andtherefore, an individual must be in complete control of her nameand law must enable her to retain as well as to exercise suchcontrol freely “for all times”. Such control would inevitably includethe aspiration of an individual to be recognized by different namefor just cause. Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution provides fora guaranteed right to freedom of speech and expression. Thisfreedom would include the freedom to lawfully express one’sidentity in the manner of their liking. In other words, expression

Aof identity is protected element of freedom of expression underthe Constitution. [Para 116][1162-B-D]

2.3 Any change in identity of an individual has to go throughmultiple steps and it cannot be regarded as complete withoutproper fulfilment of those steps. An individual may self-identifyBoneself with any title or epithet at any point of time. But the changeof identity would not be regarded as formally or legally completeuntil and unless the State and its agencies take note thereof intheir records. After all, in social sphere, an individual is not onlyrecognized by how an individual identifies oneself but also byhow his/her official records identify him/her. For, in every publicCtransaction of an individual, official records introduce the personby his/her name and other relevant particulars. [Para 118][1162-F-G]

2.4 Going by the very nature of rights under Article 19, theright to get changed name recorded in the official (public) recordsDcannot be an absolute right and as matter of public policy andlarger public interest calls for certain reasonable restrictions toobserve consistency and obviate confusion and deceptive attempt.The test of reasonableness requires that the impugned law isintelligently crafted in such manner that it is able to justify theEultimate impact of the law on its subjects. If it restricts, it mustrestrict on the basis of reason and if it permits, it must permit onthe basis of reason. Similarly, if law draws classification, itmust classify intelligently i.e., backed by reason. Reason is thefoundation of all laws and their validity is immensely dependenton the availability of sound reason. Equally crucial is theFavailability of legitimate object. Reasonableness is adjudged inthe specific context of the case and is not confined to the wordsof definition. [Paras 120, 122][1163-B, D-E]

Om Prakash & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (2004) 3SCC 402 : [2004] 2 SCR 900; State of Madras v. V. G.GRow, AIR 1952 SC 196 – relied on.

2.5 The Byelaws permit change of name only if permissionfrom the Court has been obtained prior to the publication of result.It puts clear embargo on any change of name sans priorpermission before the publication. The provision is problematicH

on certain counts. Firstly, it is not mere restriction on the right,it is complete embargo on the right post publication of result ofthe candidate. It fails to take into account the possibility of needfor change of name after the publication of result including theuncertainty of timeline required to obtain such declaration fromthe Court of law due to law’s delay and upon which the candidatehas no control whatsoever. Whereas, while amending the Byelawsin 2007, the CBSE itself had noted that children are not of matureage while passing school examinations and they may not be in aposition to decide conclusively on issues concerning their identity.The Byelaws completely overlook this possibility when it ordainsseeking declaration from the Court prior to the publication ofresults of the concerned examination conducted by it. [Para123][1164-F-H; 1165-A]

2.6 The overriding state interest, as per the Board, to retainthis stringency is nothing but efficiency of administration.Administrative efficiency, despite being crucial concern, hasnot been and cannot be elevated to standard that it is used tojustify non-performance of essential functions by aninstrumentality of the State. To use administrative efficiency tomake it practically impossible for student to alter her identityin the Board certificates, no matter how urgent and important itis, would be highly disproportionate and can in no manner betermed as reasonable restriction. Reasonableness woulddemand proper balance between student’s right to be identifiedin the official (public) records in manner of her choice and theBoard’s argument of administrative efficiency. To sustain thisbalance, it would be open to the Board to limit the number oftimes such alterations could be permitted including subject toavailability of the old records preserved by it as per the extantregulations. But to say that post the publication of examinationresults and issuance of certificates, there can be no way to alterthe record would be case of total prohibition and not reasonablerestraint. [Para 124][1165-B-D]

2.7 The limitation as regards maximum period upto whichchanges can be permitted also requires different approach.Upon receiving the certificates, the student would naturally beput to notice of the particulars of certificates. Due to young age

Aand inadvertence including being casual and indolent, studentmay fail to identify the errors or to understand the probable impactof those errors and accordingly, may not apply for rectificationimmediately. It is also possible that student may not have touse the certificates immediately after passing out and by the timeshe uses them, the limitation period for correction may elapse.BTherefore, realistic time for permitting corrections is veryimportant. Indeed, it can be commensurate with the statutory ormandatory period upto which CBSE is obliged to preserve itsold record. [Para 125][1165-E-G]2.8 In case of any ordinary civil rights, it is important thatCthe action for enforcement of such rights is initiated in prescribedtime and consistency is maintained, but is it permissible to saythe same about fundamental rights? The rights which arerecognised as fundamental under the Constitution are “preferredor chosen freedoms” and very sensitive and realistic approachDhas to be taken in such matters. One wonders whether after thelapse of prescribed time, let us say 3 years, there could be noreasonable and legitimate circumstances to warrant change ofname. At the same time, there is merit in CBSE’s argument thatfrequent changes cannot be permitted as there is scope of abuseand misuse, apart from administrative burden. This argumentEcannot be lightly brushed aside. The same concerns could applyto other bodies as well, like Unique Identification Authority ofIndia and Passport Authority. [Paras 126, 127][1165-G-H; 1166-A-B]

2.9 As regards the argument of misuse, no doubt, thereFare instances of misuse of provisions that permit change of identityin criminal matters. However, mere possibility of abuse cannotdeter the Board from fulfilling their essential functions. Apossibility of abuse cannot be used to deny legitimate rights tocitizens. The balance simply does not tilt in favour of such aGproposition. The course of law cannot choose to change its streammerely because there are apprehensions of abuse on the way.The Board’s concern is only to regulate and maintain efficienteducational standards. It is not penal authority. If any of theprovisions of Byelaws are subjected to misuse or abuse by anyone,the Board would be well within its rights to approach theH

appropriate body for necessary penal or civil action. As nodalagency made for specific public purpose, CBSE can only use itsmeans and resources to put proper safeguards in place whileperforming its functions. More so, when it is not even the job ofthe Board to verify anything, as changes are made after grant ofpermission by Court of law. There is involvement of judicialapplication of mind. The Board only has to give effect to the Courtorder granting permission, as and when it is so pronouncedirrespective of publication of examination results in earlier pointof time. [Para 128][1166-C-F]

2.10 Administrative efficiency cannot be the sole concernof CBSE. Every institution desires efficiency in their functioning.But it does not mean that efficiency is achieved by curbing theirbasic functions. Regulation of standard of education wouldempower the Board to take all necessary steps, as permissibleunder the Resolution and Regulations, to control all possibleaspects of school education that may have bearing on itsstandard. Quality of curriculum, services extended to thestudents, effective grievance redressal mechanism, oversightover affiliated schools etc. are some of the essential elementstouching upon the standard of education. Maintenance of thosestandards would demand constant upgradation of rules andservices of the Board in tune with changing needs of the studentsand the ultimate goal of education. [Para 129][1166-G; 1167-C-D]

2.11 One of the primary functions of the Board is to grantcertificates to its students. Effective maintenance and regulationof standard of education would include complete accountabilityof the Board in grant of such certificates and its duty does not getextinguished after publication of examination results and issueof certificates. Rather, it extends to taking care of post-publicationconcerns of students as and when they emerge, as students seekto use their certificates for purposes of higher education andcareer opportunities. narrow reading of the functions of theBoard would leave glaring gaps in the field of school educationand may jeopardize the welfare of students with legitimateconcerns. [Para 130][1167-E-F]

A2.12 The concerned Byelaw has been framed on theassumption that there can be no situation wherein legitimateneed for change of name could arise for student after publicationof results. It is presumed that only typographical/factual errorscould come in the certificates and they can be corrected usingthe provision for corrections. The presumption is erroneous,Babsurd and distances itself from the social realities. There canbe numerous circumstances wherein change of name could be alegitimate requirement and keeping the ultimate goal ofpreserving the standard of education in mind, the Board mustprovide for reasonable opportunity to effect such changes. [ParaC131][1167-G-H; 1168-A]

2.13 The two parties here – the Board and students – arenot in an equal position of impact. In other words, the balance ofconvenience would tilt in favour of students. For, they stand tolose more due to inaccuracies in their certificates than the BoardDwhose sole worry is increasing administrative burden. Theobligation of Board to take additional administrative burden isno doubt onerous but the propensity of student losing careeropportunities due to inaccurate certificate is unparalleled. Boarddealing with maintenance of educational standards cannotarrogate to itself the power to impact identity of students whoEenrol with it. The right to control one’s identity must remain withthe individual, subject, of course, to reasonable restrictions. [Para132][1168-B-C, E-F]

2.14 The utility of certificates issued by the Board is notconfined to educational purposes anymore. They serve socialFpurpose today and are often used to cross verify particulars likename and date of birth while applying for other governmentidentity documents. They assume immense relevance whileapplying for various jobs, both public and private. Interestingly,CBSE itself has argued at length on the importance andGauthoritative value of their certificates. In such circumstances,an inaccuracy or denial of change could be fatal to student’sfuture prospects and all these concerns cannot be brushed asidein the name of administrative exigencies. [Para 133][1168-G-H]

2.15 Pertinently, the Parliament is also alive to the socialrealities having bearing on identity documents. There are variousstatutory enactments wherein detailed provisions are made forchange of identity. The government(s) is cognizant of its duty toupgrade its identity records in tune with changing requirementsof the citizens. From reasons purely personal to reasons flowingfrom life events such as marriage, death or migration, theauthorities are responsive to the changing needs of citizens. Asper the nature of identity, changes are permissible. It is boundenduty of all state instrumentalities to play the role of enablers inthe exercise of rights by the citizens, including to correct theirrecords owing to purely personal choices of the citizens. Though,in an ultimate analysis, this exercise of examining the reasonshas to be left to the court of law empowered to permit changes ina specific factual scenario. [Paras 134, 136][1169-A-B; 1172-E-G; 1173-A]2.16 No doubt, it is true that CBSE certificates are notstrictly meant to be considered as identity documents, however,the same are being relied upon for corroborative purposes in allacademic and career related transactions as foundationaldocument. In fact, the CBSE itself has conceded to this fact thattheir certificates are relied for all official purposes, as noted above.The date of birth in matriculation certificate, in particular, is reliedupon as primary evidence of date of birth of citizen. Therefore,as regards the information contained in CBSE certificate, theBoard must afford opportunity to the students to modify it subjectto complying with requisite formalities which are reasonable innature. If all other State agencies could allow it for the preservanceof consistency and accuracy, alongside being enablers in freeexercise of rights by the citizens, there is no reason for the CBSEto not uphold that right of the students. More so, it would be inthe interest of CBSE’s own credibility that their records areregarded as accurate and latest records of student worthy ofbeing relied upon for official purposes. Therefore, this approachwould serve twin purposes – enabling free exercise of rights andpreservance of accuracy. However, the justiciability of therequested changes can of course be gone into. Law gives norecognition to an act of shunning essential duties by an entity of

Athe State. body entrusted with essential public functions cannotunduly put fetters on its powers. [Paras 137, 138, 139][1173-B-E; G]

Indian Aluminium Company v. Kerala State ElectricityBoard (1975) 2 SCC 414 : [1976] 1 SCR 70; J.K.BAggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development CorporationLtd. & Ors. (1991) 2 SCC 283 : [1990] 3 Suppl. SCR13 – relied on.

2.17 There are no restrictions on the power of CBSE topermit change of name. The Constitution, Resolution andCRegulations are functional documents of the Board and none ofthese documents provide for any such fetters. Therefore, in theexercise of its discretion, the Board cannot put fetters on itsduties so as to cause grave prejudice to the students withlegitimate causes for changing their certificates. The exercise ofdiscretion in this negative manner would be arbitrary andDunreasonable, at best. [Para 139][1175-C]

2.18 The provision regarding change of name “postpublication of examination results” is excessively restrictive andimposes unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights underArticle 19. [Para 140][1175-D]

2.19 On perusal of the examination byelaws from 1995 to2018, as they sailed through multiple amendments over the courseof time, it is seen that there is hardly any consistency in theExamination Byelaws operating during the relevant period, eitherin the scope of permissible changes or in the timelines providedFfor effecting such changes. Presumably, drawing upon experiencesand judicial pronouncements, the Board had to carry out frequentamendments in the Byelaws, sometimes to do somersault andgo back to the earlier position. By and large, the impressiongathered from the analysis is that the Board has been groping inGthe dark without having an all-purpose long term objective policyin place as regards permissible changes. [Paras 141, 143][1175-E-F; 1177-A-B]

3. The CBSE maintains its official records in respect ofcandidate on the basis of foundational documents being the school

records. Therefore, the CBSE is obliged to carry out all necessarycorrections to ensure that CBSE certificate is consistent withthe relevant information furnished in the school records as itexisted at the relevant time and future changes thereto includingafter the publication of results by the CBSE. However, when itcomes to recording any information in the original certificateissued by the CBSE which is not consistent with the schoolrecords, it is essential that the CBSE must insist for supportingpublic document which has presumptive value and in the givencase declaration by Court of law to incorporate such change.In that regard, the CBSE can insist for additional conditions toreassure itself and safeguard its interest against any claim by athird party/body because of changes incorporated by it pursuantto application made by the candidate. [Para 150][1179-E-H]

Whether the CBSE / Board is obliged to carry outcorrections/changes in the certificates issued by it owing tocorrection/updation of public records/ documents which havestatutory presumption of genuineness?

4.1. The Byelaws provide for two-tier mechanism forrecording change of name or other details. One of them is priorpermission or declaration by Court of law to be obtained. Asregards public documents like Birth Certificate, Official Gazette,Aadhaar Card, Election Card, etc., the same enjoy legalpresumption of its correctness in terms of explicit provisionscontained in Chapter V of the 1872 Act. The 1872 Act extendssuch presumption in terms of Section 76 read with Sections 79and 80 of the 1872 Act and as in the case of Official Gazette underSection 81 of the same Act. Even other legislations concerningpublic documents attach equal importance to the authenticity ofsuch documents including while making changes in theircertificates to which we have alluded to in this judgment.Understood thus, there is no reason for the CBSE Board to nottake notice of the public documents relied upon by the candidateand to record change on that basis in the certificate issued by it,for being consistent with the relied upon public documents. Itmatters not if the information furnished in the public documentsis not entirely consistent with the school records of the incumbent.

EFG

AThe CBSE while accepting those documents as foundationaldocuments for effecting changes consistent therewith may insistfor additional conditions and at the same time while retaining theoriginal entry make note in the form of caption/annotation in thefresh certificate to be issued by it while calling upon the incumbentto surrender the original certificate issued by it to avoid anyBmisuse thereof at later point of time. It would be permissiblefor the CBSE to insist for sworn affidavit to be given by theincumbent making necessary declaration and also to indemnifythe CBSE. The fresh certificate to be issued by the CBSE mayalso contain disclaimer of the Board clearly mentioning thatCchange has been effected at the behest of the incumbent in lightof the public documents relied upon by him. In addition, theincumbent can be called upon to notify about the change in theOfficial Gazette and by giving public notice as precondition forrecording the change by way of abundant precaution. [Para152][1180-D-H; 1181-A-B]DCIDCO v. Vasudha Gorakhnath Mandevlekar (2009)7 SCC 283 : [2009] 9 SCR 427 – relied on.4.2. When student applies to Court of law for priorpermission and/or declaration and produces public document(s),Ethe Court would enter upon an inquiry wherein the legalpresumption would operate in favour of the public document(s)and burden would shift on the party opposing the change to rebutthe presumption or oppose the claim on any other ground. Thequestion of genuineness of the document including its contentswould be adjudicated in the same inquiry and the Court of lawFwould permit the desired change only upon verifying the officialrecords and upon being satisfied of its genuineness. At the sametime, the question of justiciability of the requested changes wouldbe considered and only upon being satisfied with the needdemonstrated by the student, the Court would grant itsGpermission. The said permission can then be placed before theBoard along with copy of publication in the official gazette andrequisite (prescribed) fee (if any). The Board would then have nolocus to make further enquiry nor would be required to enterupon any further verification exercise. While considering requestsfor changes in certificates, CBSE cannot act as court and itH

cannot effectively consider any request over and above thoserequests that merely require bringing the certificates in conformitywith the school records or public documents, as the case may be.[Paras 156, 157][1183-B-D; 1184-B-C]

Subin Mohammed v. Union of India 2016 (1) KLT 340– referred to.

Whether the examination byelaws in force on the date ofexamination conducted by CBSE or the date of consideration ofthe application for recording correction/change would be relevant?And, whether the effect of correction or change, as the case maybe, will have retrospective effect from the date of issue of theoriginal certificate?

5.1. Considered in the context of the Byelaws, thecontroversy is actually simple in nature. The Byelaws consistentlyprovide that the period of limitation is to be calculated from thedate of declaration of the result and issue of certificate. It meansthat the period of limitation begins to run against the studentafter declaration of result and publication of certificates as thestudent is put to notice of the contents of the document, upon itsissue. The student can now be said to be in position to verifythe correctness of the certificate(s). The irresistible outcome ofthis legal position is that the Byelaws existing on the date ofsuch declaration/publication of result and issue of certificate wouldbe relevant for the purpose of effecting changes in the certificates.The express language of the Byelaws would be defeated if onesays that the law existing on the date of application for recordingchange would be relevant. That would negate the very importanceof having period of limitation for correction of the certificates.[Para 159][1185-F-H; 1186-A]

Kalpana Thakur & Anr. v. Central Board of SecondaryEducation & Anr. (2015) SCC OnLine Del 12156 andVyshnav @ Vishnu Viswam V. v. Central Board ofSecondary Education & Ors. (2017) SCC OnLine Ker39806 – referred to.

5.2. If the limitation of applicability of Byelaws was to bereckoned from the date of application for correction/change andnot the date of result of the examination conducted by CBSE,

Athat would be leaving things to state of uncertainty. [Para160][1186-B]

5.3. Once changes are permitted in the documents of CBSE,it does not ipso facto mean that the changes are given aretrospective effect. The changes are indeed prospective and toBsignify that remedial measure is provided in the Byelaws, asexisting presently. They provide for the requirement of adding acaption/annotation with the date of such change along with thechanged particulars so as to indicate within the certificate thatthe changes have been made on date subsequent to the date ofpublishing the certificates. The requirement of caption/annotationCis indeed sufficient safeguard to prevent the usage ofsubsequently altered documents as unchanged original records.[Para 161][1187-A-C]Rayaan Chawla v. University of Delhi & Anr. 275 (2020)DLT 314 – referred to.D

Whether writ of mandamus issued for effecting correctionsin CBSE certificates can be in the teeth of explicit provisions inthe examination byelaws, without examining validity of thebyelaws?

E6.1. The High Courts, being constitutional Courts, are dulyvested with the power to review any law in light of Part-III.Despite being called upon to do so, if they choose not to do it,the same cannot be countenanced. There cannot be mechanicaldirections by way of mandamus to public authority without goinginto the veracity of the claims and without sufficiently explainingFwhy the case demands extraordinary treatment. [Para 165][1190-D]

6.2. The Courts need to be extra cautious and alive to theimmediate factual position before permitting changes. No tworequests for change of name or change in date of birth can beGviewed with the same judicial eye. Sometimes, change of namecould be necessity, sometimes it could be pure exercise offreewill without any need. As long as Byelaws or the applicablerules permit so, there is no occasion for any court to deny suchrelief. But when Byelaws do not permit for the same, the Court

must be circumspect before issuing directions, that too withoutcommenting upon the validity of the Byelaws and withoutdemonstrating the rights which are at stake – constitutional orlegal. [Para 166][1191-A-B]

DIRECTIONS TO CBSE

7.1. In the ultimate analysis the real dispute requiringresolution is about the nature of correction or change, as thecase may be, permissible to be carried by the CBSE at the instanceof the student including past student. Broadly, two situationswould arise. [Para 169][1194-E-F]

7.2. The first is where the incumbent wants “correction”in the certificate issued by the CBSE to be made consistent withthe particulars mentioned in the school records. There is noreason for the CBSE to turn down such request or attach anyprecondition except reasonable period of limitation and keepingin mind the period for which the CBSE has to maintain its recordunder the extant regulations. While doing so, it can certainly insistfor compliance of other conditions by the incumbent, such as, tofile sworn affidavit making necessary declaration and to indemnifythe CBSE from any claim against it by third party because of suchcorrection. The CBSE would be justified in insisting forsurrender/return of the original certificate (or duplicate originalcertificate, as the case may be) issued by it for replacing it withthe fresh certificate to be issued after carrying out necessarycorrections with caption/annotation against the changes carriedout and the date of such correction. It may retain the originalentries as it is except in respect of correction of name effected inexercise of right to be forgotten. The fresh certificate may alsocontain disclaimer that the CBSE cannot be held responsible forthe genuineness of the school records produced by the incumbentin support of the request to record correction in the original CBSEcertificate. The CBSE can also insist for reasonable prescribedfees to be paid by the incumbent in lieu of administrative expensesfor issuing fresh certificate. At the same time, the CBSE cannotimpose precondition of applying for correction consistent withthe school records only before publication of results. Such acondition would be unreasonable and excessive. If the applicationfor recording correction is based on the school records as it

Aobtained at the time of publication of results and issue of certificateby the CBSE, it will be open to CBSE to provide for reasonablelimitation period within which the application for recordingcorrection in certificate issued by it may be entertained by it.However, if the request for recording change is based on changedschool records post the publication of results and issue ofBcertificate by the CBSE, the candidate would be entitled to applyfor recording such change within the reasonable limitation periodprescribed by the CBSE. In this situation, the candidate cannotclaim that she had no knowledge about the change recorded inthe school records because such change would occur obviouslyCat her instance. If she makes such application for correction ofthe school records, she is expected to apply to the CBSEimmediately after the school records are modified and which oughtto be done within reasonable time. Indeed, it would be open tothe CBSE to reject the application in the event the period forpreservation of official records under the extant regulations hadDexpired and no record of the candidate concerned is traceable orcan be reconstructed. In the case of subsequent amendment ofschool records, that may occur due to different reasons includingbecause of choice exercised by the candidate regarding changeof name. To put it differently, request for recording of correctionEin the certificate issued by the CBSE to bring it in line with theschool records of the incumbent need not be limited to applicationmade prior to publication of examination results of the CBSE.[Para 170][1194-F-H; 1195-A-H]

7.3. As regards request for “change” of particulars in theFcertificate issued by the CBSE, it presupposes that the particularsintended to be recorded in the CBSE certificate are not consistentwith the school records. Such request could be made in twodifferent situations. The first is on the basis of public documentslike Birth Certificate, Aadhaar Card/Election Card, etc. and to

incorporate change in the CBSE certificate consistent therewith.GThe second possibility is when the request for change is due tothe acquired name by choice at later point of time. That changeneed not be backed by public documents pertaining to thecandidate. [Para 171][1196-A-B]

7.4. Reverting to the first category, there is legalpresumption in relation to the public documents as envisaged inthe 1872 Act. Such public documents, therefore, cannot be ignoredby the CBSE. Taking note of those documents, the CBSE mayentertain the request for recording change in the certificate issuedby it. This, however, need not be unconditional, but subject tocertain reasonable conditions to be fulfilled by the applicant asmay be prescribed by the CBSE, such as, of furnishing swornaffidavit containing declaration and to indemnify the CBSE andupon payment of prescribed fees in lieu of administrativeexpenses. The CBSE may also insist for issuing Public Noticeand publication in the Official Gazette before recording the changein the fresh certificate to be issued by it upon surrender/returnof the original certificate (or duplicate original certificate, as thecase may be) by the applicant. The fresh certificate may containdisclaimer and caption/annotation against the original entry(except in respect of change of name effected in exercise of rightto be forgotten) indicating the date on which change has beenrecorded and the basis thereof. In other words, the freshcertificate may retain original particulars while recording thechange along with caption/annotation referred to above (exceptin respect of change of name effected in exercise of right to beforgotten). [Para 171][1196-C-F]7.5. However, in the latter situation where the change is tobe effected on the basis of new acquired name without anysupporting school record or public document, that request maybe entertained upon insisting for prior permission/declaration bya Court of law in that regard and publication in the Official Gazetteincluding surrender/return of original certificate (or duplicateoriginal certificate, as the case may be) issued by CBSE and uponpayment of prescribed fees. The fresh certificate as in othersituations referred to above, retain the original entry (except inrespect of change of name effected in exercise of right to beforgotten) and to insert caption/annotation indicating the date onwhich it has been recorded and other details including disclaimerof CBSE. This is so because the CBSE is not required toadjudicate nor has the mechanism to verify the correctness ofthe claim of the applicant. [Para 171][1196-G-H; 1197-A-B]

A8. In light of the above, in exercise of plenary jurisdiction,the CBSE is directed to process the applications for correctionor change, as the case may be, in the certificate issued by it inthe respective cases under consideration. Even other pendingapplications and future applications for such request be processedon the same lines and in particular the conclusion and directionsBrecorded hitherto in paragraphs 170 and 171, as may beapplicable, until amendment of relevant Byelaws. Additionally,the CBSE shall take immediate steps to amend its relevantByelaws so as to incorporate the stated mechanism for recordingcorrection or change, as the case may be, in the certificates alreadyCissued or to be issued by it. [Para 172][1197-B-C]

Board of Secondary Education of Assam v. Md. SarifuzZaman & Ors. (2003) 12 SCC 408 : [2003] 6 Suppl.SCR 1273 – distinguished.

State of NCT of Delhi & Anr. v. Sanjeev @ Bittoo (2005)D5 SCC 181 : [2005] 3 SCR 151; Sanjeev Kumar Guptav. State of Uttar Pradesh & Anr. (2019) 12 SCC 370: [2019] 9 SCR 735; Somdev Kapoor v. State of WestBengal & Ors. (2014) 14 SCC 486 : [2013] 10 SCR452; and State of Kerala & Ors. v. Palakkad HeritageEHotels (2017) 13 SCC 672 : [2017] 3 SCR 239 –referred to.

Dhruva Parate v. CBSE & Anr. ILR 2009 V Delhi 371;Mazhar Saleem Chandroth (Minor) Thr. SaleemChandroth (father and natural guardian) v. CentralFBoard of Secondary Education [Decision of DelhiHigh Court in LPA 315/2017]; Abhishek Kumar @ BalKishan v. Union of India & Ors. (2014) SCC OnLineDel 3459; Kabir Jaiswal v. Union of India & Ors. (2020)SCC OnLine All 1488 – referred to.

York Corporation v. Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd., (1924)1 Ch 557; Ayr Harbour’s case, (1883) 8 App 623;Straffordshire and Worcestershire Canal Navigation v.Birmingham Canal Navigation, 1866 LR 1 HL 254; andSouthend-on-Sea Corporation v. Hodgson (Wickford)Ltd., 1961 2 All ER 46 – referred to.

JIGYA YADAV (MINOR) (THROUGH GUARDIAN/FATHERHARI SINGH) v. C.B.S.E. (CBSE)

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3905of 2011.

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.12.2010 of the High Courtof Delhi in Writ Petition No. 3774 of 2010.

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 3572 of 2019, 1822, 1823,1824, 1825, 1826,1827, 1828, 1829, 1830, 1831, 1832, 1833, 1834, 1835, 1836, 1837, 1838,1839, 1840 of 2021 and T.P. (C) Nos. 1139-1140 of 2020.

Ms. Indira Unninayar, Sanjay Jain, Rupesh Kumar, Rajeev Sharma,Ms. Neelam Sharma, Ms. Pankhuri Shrivastava, Alekshendra Sharma,Pravesh Bahuguna, Somanatha Padhan, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave,Kumar Prashant, Ms. Vanya Gupta, Parmod Vishnoi, Sushil KumarSharma, Pahlad Singh Sharma, Krishna Kant Shukla, Dr. N. PradeepSharma, Kiran Kumar Patra, Ram Lal Roy, G. Prakash, Ms. PriyankaPrakash, Ms. Beena Prakash, Jishnu M. L., K. P. Rajagopal, JaimonAndrews, Piyo Harold Jaimon, Sandeep Thakur, Farid Abbas, Naresh

AKumar, Renjith B. Marar, Ms. Lakshmi N. Kaimal, Biju Vigneswar,Ms. Surabhi Santosh, Arun Poomulli, Ms. Meera M., Aabhas Kshetarpal,Siddhartha Jha, Gazab Singh Chauhan, P. A. Noor Muhamed, Ms. GiffaraS., Bilal Niamathulla, Ms. Ruxana P. N., Anil Soni, Harish Pandey, Advs.for the appearing parties.BThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.

1. “What’s in name? that which we call rose by any othername would smell as sweet”, said Juliet. This quote from WilliamShakespeare’s “Romeo and Juliet” is unarguably one of the most iconicCdialogues in classical literature. It conveys that the natural characteristicsof an individual are more important than his/her artificial/acquiredcharacteristics. poetic statement as it certainly is, it does not go in tunewith the significance of name in marking the identity of an individual inhis/her societal transactions. To put it differently, name is an intrinsicDelement of identity.

2. The seminal issue in these cases is: whether an individual’scontrol over such cardinal element of identity could be denied to him/herby the Central Board of Secondary Education[1] on the specious groundthat its Examination Byelaws of 2007[2] must prevail over the claim of theEcandidate, which are merely intended to regulate such claim and todelineate the procedure for correction/change in the contents ofcertificate(s) issued by it including regarding maintenance of its officerecords?

3. The CBSE Examination Byelaws restrict, both qualitatively andFquantitatively, the corrections/changes that can be carried out in thecertificates issued by the Board. Various students with need-basedrequests approached different High Courts resulting into inconsistentoutcomes leading up to this batch of appeals. Apart from the fact thatthe judgments have produced conflicting outcomes, the petitions raisesome peculiar questions on the constitutional validity of CBSEGExamination Byelaws (as amended from time to time) and interpretationthereof.

4. The present case involves batch of 22 petitions whereinquestions relating to correction/change in name/surname/date of birth of

1 for short, “CBSE” or “Board”, as the case may beH2 for short, “Byelaws”

candidates or their parents in the certificates issued by the Board havebeen raised.5. In order to identify the precise scope of challenge, we maynow delineate the factual matrix in individual petitions.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3905 OF 2011

6. The appellant in this case, Ms. Jigya Yadav, has assailed thedecision of the High Court of Delhi, dated 20.12.2010 in W.P. (C) No.3774/2010, wherein the High Court rejected the prayer for direction tothe Board to carry out correction of her parents’ name in the marksheetsissued by it. The appellant’s case was that the name of her parents wasincorrectly recorded as “Hari Singh Yadav” instead of “Hari Singh” (asrecorded in the identity documents of father) and “Mamta Yadav” insteadof “Mamta” (as recorded in the identity documents of mother). Relyingupon Byelaw 69.1 of the CBSE Examination Bye-laws, 2007, the HighCourt affirmed the decision of the Board in refusing the desiredcorrections/changes. The Court relied upon the nursery application form,school admission form and stream allotment form for class XI filled bythe parents of the appellant to conclude that the errors were notinadvertent, and they had consciously chosen and retained the said namesdespite having opportunity to rectify before the X[th] standard. It observedthus:“15. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that despite the parents ofthe petitioner having mentioned their names as “Hari Singh” and“Mamta” in the petitioner’s birth certificate, they have consciouslyand consistently chosen to record their names as “Hari SinghYadav” and “Mamta Yadav” in the school record. Consequently,we are of the opinion that this Court in the present petition shouldnot deal with the challenge of constitutional validity as it is thepetitioner’s parents who are at fault and the error, if any, has beenrepeated on number of occasions by the petitioner’s parentsthemselves. In fact, we are of the view that for the fault of thepetitioner’s parents, the impugned Bye-law of the respondent no.1 cannot be set aside ...”

The Court, however, made an avoidable observation that in acountry with caste-based reservations, changes in name cannot bepermitted readily. It noted thus:

1128SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A“17. We are also of the view that in country where there isreservation on caste and religious grounds, change of names ofparents or ward’s name cannot be allowed at the drop of thehat.”

The Court then observed that Byelaw 69.1 permits CBSE to carryBout corrections only to the extent of bringing the record in conformitywith the school record. In paragraph 21, the Court noted thus:

“21. Even if one were to apply the aforesaid test one finds thatthe respondent no. 1 essentially records what has been mentionedin the school records consistently and that too, upto Class X, thatCmeans, for more than 10 years the child and/or her parents havethe liberty to rectify the record. Consequently, we are of the opinionthat the impugned Bye-law is perfectly reasonable.”

While concluding, the Court observed that the Courts must bewary of interfering in academic matters and should refrain from givingDan expansive interpretation to statutory rules/byelaws as it may renderthe system unworkable. It noted in paragraph 22:

“22. Moreover, we are of the view that the Court should beextremely reluctant to substitute its own views as to what is wise,prudent and proper in relation to academic matters in preferenceEto those formulated by professional men possessing technicalexpertise and rich experience of actual day-to-day working ofeducational institutions and the departments controlling them. Itwill be wholly wrong for the Court to take pedantic and purelyidealistic approach to the problems of this nature, isolated fromthe actual realities and grass root problems involved in the workingFof the system and unmindful of the consequences which wouldemanate if purely idealistic view as opposed to pragmatic onewere to be propounded. It is equally important that the Court shouldalso, as far as possible, avoid any decision or interpretation of astatutory provision, rule or bye-law which would bring about theGresult of rendering the system unworkable in practice – ascontended by the respondent no. 1 in its counter affidavit.”

7. Assailing the decision, the appellant contends that Byelaw 69.1(after 2007 amendment) is invalid as being unreasonable and arbitrary,thereby violative of Article 14 of the Constitution, as it puts blanketembargo on corrections other than those which are necessary for bringingH

the documents in conformity with the school record. It is contended thatthe amended byelaw does not address the possibility of error in the schoolrecord itself, and leaves the student with no opportunity to correct theerror committed by the parents in the school records. To buttress thissubmission, the appellant has submitted that the resultant hardship causedto her is infringement of her right guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g), right tofreely express one’s identity as per Article 19(1)(a) and right to dignityin Article 21 of the Constitution.8. In the written submissions, the appellant has urged that CBSEcertificates are public records of the Board and they carry presumptionof genuineness which must be respected by preserving the accuracy ofsuch certificates. It is further urged that the 2007 Byelaws place schoolrecords above public documents which carry presumption of genuinenessunder the Indian Evidence Act, 1872[3]. To buttress this submission, it isstated that it would be contrary to the objectives of CBSE if it refuses tocorrect its documents despite having verified the genuineness of thesupporting public documents (like Aadhar card, Passport, Birth Certificateetc.) and continues to perpetuate the obvious errors in the school records.

9. The appellant has further submitted that by amending Byelaw69.1 in this manner, CBSE has acted in violation of Regulation 10 andobjectives of CBSE by rendering itself incapable of rectifying errors inthe certificates and issuing accurate certificates, which is basic functionof the Board. The CBSE has, the appellant submitted, exceeded itspowers by effecting the said amendment as it was never meant to exercisesuch authority of putting fetters on its basic duties. Reliance has beenplaced upon Dhruva Parate vs. CBSE & Anr.[4], State of NCT of Delhi& Anr. vs. Sanjeev @ Bittoo[5], Indian Aluminium Company vs. KeralaState Electricity Board[6]and J.K. Aggarwal vs. Haryana SeedsDevelopment Corporation Ltd. & Ors.[7] to urge that CBSE cannotcircumscribe its own powers with self-imposed limitation in this manner.

10. The appellant has further submitted that the impugned judgmenterroneously connects the subject matter of the case with caste-basedreservations which displays stereotype prejudice of the Court towards

3 For short, “1872 Act”

4 ILR 2009 V Delhi 371

5 2005 (5) SCC 181

6 1975 (2) SCC 414

7 1991 (2) SCC 283

Aher cause. The appellant also takes exception to the observationsregarding wrongful conduct of the appellant’s parents in failing to getthe records rectified before X[th] standard. It is stated that the impugnedjudgment overlooked the fact that the parents had no choice of gettingthe application form corrected in XI[th] standard as it necessarily reflectedthe details of X[th] standard without offering choice of alteration.B

11. In response, the Board has relied upon Byelaw 69.1 to submitthat the appellant’s request for rectification was considered and thecertificates were found to be matching with the school records and thus,no case for rectification was made out. It is submitted that beforeamendment Byelaw 69.1 permitted different procedure for rectificationC– approval by Court of law and notification in the gazette. Under thisprocedure, umpteen number of cases were filed, even after more thanten years of declaration of result, for rectification of name/surname andCourts were constantly approached for seeking leave to get therectification done. As result, objections were raised by variousDgovernment authorities questioning the power of the Board to carry outchanges in the identity of the students even after they have passed theexaminations conducted by the Board. It is submitted that various Courtsalso expressed displeasure and suggested rephrasing of Byelaw 69.1.Resultantly, the 2007 amendment was effected permitting correctionsonly to the extent of bringing the certificates in conformity with the schoolErecord.

12. To buttress the above submission, it is urged that CBSE, beingan autonomous society registered under the Societies Registration Act,1860, has the power to make, amend or delete its Rules, Regulations andByelaws. Accordingly, Byelaw 69.1 was amended as the basic recordFof student is kept by the school and the Board has no option but to relyupon the school record. It is further submitted that the parents of theappellant had ample opportunity to correct the school record and theychose not to do so. In fact, the respondent adds, they repeatedly filledthe same particulars of their names in all the school forms from time toGtime.13. The Board has also filed elaborate written submissions tosupport their case. It is submitted that the Examination Byelaws of theBoard are statutory in nature as they were framed in furtherance of thepowers granted to the Board as per Government of India ResolutionHdated 1.7.1929 and deviation cannot be permitted from the Byelaws.

As regards the argument of violation of fundamental rights, the Boardhas submitted that there may be fundamental right to be identified asper the choice of an individual, but there can be no fundamental right toclaim that the changed identity must be operative since birth therebycompelling all including statutory bodies to carry out changes in documentsissued by them. It is urged that any other view would amount to misuseof liberty and cause serious confusion at different level. Reliance hasbeen placed upon Rayaan Chawla vs. University of Delhi & Anr.[8] tosupport this position.

14. The Board has further submitted that the restrictions/conditionsfor change of name and date of birth are reasonable as all the details aresupplied by the students/parents at various stages of admissions whichoffers prima facie guarantee of genuineness. It is submitted that changeof name and date of birth in reckless manner could have seriousrepercussions – misuse for employment, manipulating age of the accusedetc. Reliance has been placed upon Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. State ofUttar Pradesh & Anr.[9] to illustrate this.

15. The written submissions also touch upon the question of relevantdate for the applicability of 2007 Byelaws. It is submitted that the relevantdate would be the date of passing X[th] standard examination and not thedate of making application for changes. Lastly, it is submitted that theremedy of writ petition may not be appropriate for effecting changes inCBSE certificates as usually, students come up with independentdocuments for supporting their claim and the writ Courts are not expectedto adjudicate disputed facts concerning the relied upon documents. Tobuttress this submission, it is stated that despite presumption in favour ofcertified copies of public documents, they cannot be accepted at facevalue without providing an opportunity to rebut them as per Section 4 ofthe 1872 Act.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3572 OF 2019

16. In this appeal, the appellant (CBSE) has assailed the judgmentdated 6.2.2019 passed by the High Court of Delhi in L.P.A. No. 128/2017, reversing the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 6996/2016, wherein the prayer of the respondent (father of the student) tochange the mother’s name in the certificate was rejected. The respondent

8 275 (2020) Delhi Law Times 314

9 (2019) 12 SCC 370

Ahad applied to CBSE for the change of mother’s name from “KiranKhan” to “Fakiha Khan” stating that “Kiran Khan”, being the nicknameof the mother, was inadvertently recorded in the school record of thestudent at the time of her admission in class I in 2005.

17. The Division Bench granted the prayer primarily on the groundBthat the stated change was mere correction of name and not changeof name per se as per the language of Rules 69.1(i) and 69.1(ii) of theByelaws (as amended in 2015). To reach this conclusion, the Court reliedupon the birth certificate of the student, educational certificates of mother,passport etc. which revealed that the mother’s name was recorded as“Fakiha Khan” in all these documents and it was nothing but anCinadvertent error on the part of parents to have used the nickname ofthe mother while filling her school forms. The High Court noted that thecase is neither change of name as per Rule 69.1(i) nor correction oftypographical nature as per Rule 69.1(ii). It is relevant to reproduceparagraph 4 of the impugned judgment, which reads thus:D“4. Having considered the diverse aspects and the admitted factualconspectus on record, we find, the case in hand, is not case ofany change of name, but, mere correction in the mother’s nameof the child Ms. Filza Khan. Apparently, an inadvertent mistake inmentioning the mother’s nickname “Ms. Kiran Khan” in theEadmission form in the year 2005, got transmitted by the respondentNo.2 school to the respondent No.1 Board. The application madeby the petitioner was not for any change of name, but, for correctionof an inadvertent mistake in mentioning the name of the mother inthe admission form as “Kiran Khan” instead of “Fakiha Khan”,which fact, undisputedly, finds support from the birth certificateFdated 17.12.02, copy whereof forms part of the record asAnnexure-P1. This birth certificate clearly mentions that Ms. FilzaKhan was born to the petitioner and Ms. Fakiha Khan. Theapplicant has placed on record other documents, such as theeducational certificates of the mother Fakiha Khan, her passportGetc., which show that her name always was Fakiha Khan. Thus,it is not case of change of name of the mother to Kiran Khan,from Fakiha Khan, post the filling up of the examination form ofthe appellant’s daughter. Pertinently, even in the documents relatingto the daughter of the appellant Filza Khan, such as her BirthCertificate, the name of the mother is recorded as “Fakiha Khan”H

and not “Kiran Khan”. Thus, the case in hand is certainly not acase of change of name as contemplated under Rule 69.1(i). It isalso not case of correction in spelling errors and factualtypographical errors as contemplated under Rule 69.1(ii). The casein hand is completely founded on the premise of an inadvertentmistake in mentioning the name of the mother in the admissionform, which was filled way back in the year 2005 at the time ofadmission of the child in class -I. …”

The Court, relying upon Mazhar Saleem Chandroth (Minor)Thr. Saleem Chandroth (father and natural guardian) vs. CentralBoard of Secondary Education[10], also observed that the ExaminationByelaws of the appellant (CBSE) are not of statutory nature. TheCourt, before parting, further noted that restrictive and strict approachis not warranted in matters involving correction or change of name bythe Board merely on ground of administrative inconvenience. It notedthus:

“6. The adoption of strict and restrictive approach in the matterof change or correction of name of the candidate or his/her parents,in the certificates issued by the respondent No.1, cannot be justifiedon the foundation that such changes, when made later, may beexploited to mislead all concerned about the identity of thecandidate. Such strict and restrictive approach cannot be justifiedmerely on the ground of some administrative inconvenience. Afterall, respondent No.1 charges the fee to cover its costs forundertaking such an exercise. ...”

Observing that the subject change in the mother’s name wouldnot result into an alteration of identity of the student as the name “FakihaKhan” was part of the documents all along, it noted thus:

“6. ...In the present case, there is no possibility of the identity ofthe candidate Filza Khan being changed by permitting the changeof name of her mother from “Kiran Khan” to Fakiha Khan”, sincethe name of the child/candidate; the name of the father; the dateand place of birth, continue to remain the same. Even the name ofthe mother – which is now sought to be brought on record, is thereal name of the mother which has always remained so and thesame name of the mother is also reflected in the Birth Certificate

1134SUPREME COURT REPORTS

of the child/candidate Filza Khan. In fact, the non-amendment ofthe name of the mother of the child/candidate from “Kiran Khan”to “Fakiha Khan” would, in future, lead to confusion and may marthe future prospects of the child/candidate while seeking admissionsto institutions of higher education, or employment.”

B18. The appellant (CBSE), in this appeal, has submitted that theimpugned judgment has incorrectly treated the subject change in mother’sname as mere correction born out of an inadvertent error. It is submittedthat the said change is complete change of name which was continuouslyretained in the school records for period of 11 years. It is urged thatthe impugned judgment has failed to give effect to Rules 69.1(i) andC69.1(ii) of the Board as such change of name without an order of theCourt and followed by notification in the official gazette was outrightlyprohibited. Justifying the said Rules, it is submitted that the Board has nopower or independent sources to verify the identity of the students andowing to the nature of its functioning, it has to rely upon the schoolDrecords to furnish certificates.

19. The appellant (CBSE) further submits that the records weresent by the school in the academic year 2014-2015 when the studentfilled the examination form for submission to the Board and the saidform not only recorded the mother’s name as “Kiran Khan” but alsoEcarried the signature of the mother in the verification portion of the form.To buttress this submission, it is urged that the said mistake (if any)could not have been treated as inadvertent as it was retained as such fora long period of 11 years. It is added that parents themselves were thesource of information regarding the name and thus, there could be noreason to regard it as inadvertent.F

20. The appellant has further submitted that the impugned judgmentis in conflict with another judgment of co-ordinate bench of the HighCourt in Mazhar Saleem Chandroth[11] wherein the prayer for additionof word “Saleem” in the name was not held to be correction ortypographical error and was rejected stating that such change would beGinconsistent with the school record and thus, impermissible. It is addedthat in such situation, the Division bench ought to have sent the matterfor consideration by larger bench.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S) 1822/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No(s) 7381/2021

(@ Diary No. 9445/2020)

21. In this appeal, the appellant (CBSE) has assailed the judgmentdated 5.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2225/2019 affirming the decision of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No.5287/2019 dated 28.2.2019. The respondent student had approachedthe Board for correction of his father’s name in the CBSE certificatefrom “P.P. Abdul Latheef” to Latheef P.A.”. The said request was deniedby the Board citing Byelaw 69.1 of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable.The Board stated that the respondent’s case does not meet the conditionsstipulated in the said byelaw and thus, change in name cannot bepermitted. Aggrieved by this denial, the respondent moved the High Court.The correction or change of name was then permitted by the High Courtupon payment of Rs. 5,000 by the student to the Board for availing itsservice. The Board appealed against that decision. Affirming the decision,the High Court observed that the decision is in accordance with thedecision of co-ordinate bench of the same High Court in SubinMohammed vs. Union of India[12] wherein change in date of birth ofa student was permitted by the Court. While recognising that the case athand involved the change of father’s name (and not date of birth), theCourt noted the similarity of grounds raised by the appellant before it,and relied upon Subin Mohammed[13] to reject the same. It observedthus:“6. Though the issue relates to correction of the petitioner’s father’sname in the CBSE certificate, the grounds on which the appellantshad assailed the correctness of the judgment of the writ court aremore or less similar, based on the bye-law of the CBSE and thedelay in making the application for correction. Except the above,there is no variance. Though Mr. Nirmal S., learned counsel forthe appellants, made submissions on the grounds extracted supraassailing the correctness of judgment of the writ court, we are notinclined to accept the said contentions for the reason that Hon’bleDivision Bench of this Court in Subin Mohammed S. v. Union ofIndia and others reported in 2016 (1) KLT 340, has consideredthe said contentions and rejected the same. ...”

12 2016 (1) KLT 340

13 supra at Footnote No.12

A22. The impugned judgment relied upon the respondent’s BirthCertificate dated 25.7.2013 and his father’s Death certificate dated12.8.2009 to conclude that the father’s name was indeed “Latheef P.A.”in statutory records and there could be no objection in permitting the saidchange.B23. In its challenge, the primary ground of the appellant is that thereliance placed by the High Court upon Subin Mohammed[14] is misplaced.For, the said judgment is inapplicable in the factual matrix of the case. Itis submitted that in Subin Mohammed[15], the case involved change indate of birth and the Court had recorded specific finding that CBSEByelaws would not permit the said change. It is further submitted thatCthe Court failed to acknowledge that CBSE Byelaws, though not strictlystatutory, have regulatory colour and must bind those who have chosento comply with them while participating in the examinations conductedby the Board.

24. The appellant has further submitted that neither Byelaw 69.1(i)Dnor 69.1(ii) apply to the facts of the case. It is stated that Byelaw 69.1(i)would apply only when change of name is approved by Court of lawfollowed by notification in the official gazette, that too before thedeclaration of result by the Board. To buttress this submission, it is addedthat the respondent obtained his birth certificate in 2013, one year beforeEthe matriculation examination in 2014 and thus, there was no difficultyfor the respondent in applying for the said change as per Byelaw 69.1(i).According to the appellant (CBSE), the conditions of the aforesaidByelaws have not been fulfilled by the respondent and in absence thereof,no such changes can be permitted.

F25. The appellant has also urged that the reliance upon BirthCertificate and Death Certificate is unwarranted as both these documentswere not proved before any Court of law and there is no material onrecord to establish that “P.P. Abdul Latheef” and “Latheef P.A.” is thesame person. The appellant has placed reliance upon Board ofSecondary Education of Assam vs. Md. Sarifuz Zaman & Ors.[16] toGfurther argue that correction of entries in certificate duly issued by theBoard cannot be claimed as matter of legal right and frequent corrections

14 supra at Footnote No.1215 supra at Footnote No.12H16 (2003) 12 SCC 408

cannot be permitted readily as it would have the effect of rendering thispower arbitrary, in addition to reducing the credibility of certificates issuedby the Board.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1823/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7382/2021

(@ Diary No. 9482/2020)

26. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated20.11.2019 of the Kerala High Court in W.A. No. 2354/2019 affirmingthe decision of learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 11876/2018, whereinthe respondent student’s prayer for change in date of birth was grantedby the Court. The respondent passed her matriculation examination in2011. The concerned certificate issued by the Board recorded her dateof birth as 28.11.1995. Thereafter, in 2013, the respondent applied forthe issuance of Birth Certificate which was issued on 28.6.2013 bearingher date of birth as 21.11.1995.

27. The respondent applied to the Board for change in date ofbirth. It was rejected by the Board. The High Court allowed her prayerafter placing reliance on Subin Mohammed[17]. The observations of theHigh Court are similar to those in civil appeal arising from SLP (C)No(s). 7381/2021 (@Diary No. 9445/2020) and are not being discussedagain for brevity.

28. The appellant (CBSE) has assailed the decision on the groundthat the respondent’s case does not fulfil the criteria/conditions for changein date of birth under Byelaws 69.2 and 69.3 of the 2007 Byelaws, asapplicable. It is submitted that as per Byelaw 69.2, change in date ofbirth is permissible only before the same is recorded in the record of theBoard and despite having sufficient time, the respondent did not approachthe Board for any correction on or before 2011. Afterwards, under Byelaw69.3, corrections of merely typographical or other similar errors arepermissible to bring the particulars in consonance with the school record.It is stated that the respondent’s case does not fulfil any of these criteria.

29. It is further submitted that the impugned judgment was passedwithout granting an opportunity to the appellant for ascertaining thegenuineness of the request for change in date of birth, which is

17 supra at Footnote No.12

Amandatory requirement as per Subin Mohammed[18]. The appellant hasraised question on the genuineness of the request by stating that evenif the incorrect date of birth is treated as an error, it is inconceivable thatthe appellant or her parents could not notice the error for period of 23years.

B30. The submissions regarding the inapplicability of the dictum inSubin Mohammed[19] are similar to those made in civil appeal arisingfrom SLP (C) No(s). 7381/2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/2020) and are notbeing repeated for brevity.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1824/2021

C(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7383/2021

(@ Diary No. 14737/2020)

31. In this appeal, the appellant (CBSE) has assailed the judgmentdated 13.12.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature for RajasthanDin D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 838/2019 confirming the orderof the learned Single Judge in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18013/2018 interms of the Byelaws (as amended in 2015 and as applicable to thecase).

32. The case involves request for change of mother’s name ofthe student in CBSE certificates from “Seema Manak” to “SanyogetaEManak”. The respondent participated in the matriculation examinationconducted by the Board in May, 2016. In October, 2016, the said requestwas made when the mother changed her name. The Board denied therequest for change of name citing their inability under the Byelaws.Another request was made by the respondent which was met with theFsame response from the Board. The matter went to the High Court byway of writ petition and the Court granted the prayer for change ofname by holding that the Board failed to perform its duty in denying therequest for change of name. The Court took note of the birth certificateof the respondent, copy of passport and copy of Aadhar card of themother, and also noted that the requirements of newspaper publicationGand gazette notification were fulfilled. It then directed the Board to effectthe change. The Court observed that the CBSE rules cannot prohibit anindividual from having his/her identity recognized through the parents

18 supra at Footnote No.12

H19 supra at Footnote No.12

and if they are applied for denying such corrections, it would be ultravires the rules as they are not statutory in nature. It observed thus:

“In the opinion of this Court such rules framed by CBSE go contraryto the basic principles laid down in the circumstances regardingindividual to have his identity recognized from his/her parents, theCBSE cannot be allowed to force any individual to have hismother’s name or his father’s name different from what his/hermother’s name or father’s name is known in the Society as wellas in the records. If such rules are applied for denying candidatefrom getting correction done in the mark sheet or certificates, thesame have to be declared as ultra vires to the rules since the rulesnot statutory.”

33. In order to assail the above decision, the appellant has reliedupon Byelaws 69.1(i) and 69.1(ii) to contend that Byelaw 69.1(i) providesfor change of name of the student only and change of name of parentsis not envisaged in it. It is submitted that Byelaw 69.1(ii) provides forcorrections and the present case is not one of corrections, rather, itinvolves material change of name. Similar to the submissions advancedin previous appeals, it is submitted that the Board cannot act in violationof their byelaws and permit corrections when the same are not permittedunder them. The appellant has urged that they duly applied their mind tothe request of the respondent twice and there was no occasion for theCourt to pass an order in complete ignorance of the byelaws.

34. It is further submitted that the impugned judgment holds thebyelaws as ultra vires despite the fact that their validity was not even inquestion before the Court. Reliance has been placed by the appellantupon Md. Sarifuz Zaman[20] to urge that there is no vested right to claimcorrections in certificates at any point of time.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1825/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7384/2021

(@ Diary No. 16291/2020)

35. The challenge in this appeal is against the decision dated20.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2340/2019confirming the order passed by learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No.8540/2019, wherein the High Court allowed the prayer for change of the

ABC

Arespondent student’s name from “Mohammed Shafeek” to “MohammedShafeek S.” in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable. The respondentpassed matriculation examination in 2014. During school, the name ofthe respondent was recorded as “Mohammed Shafeek” in accordancewith the birth certificate issued in 2002. After passing matriculation,another birth certificate was issued in 2017 wherein different nameBi.e., “Mohammed Shafeek S.” was recorded. In accordance with thesecond birth certificate, the respondent approached the Board for changeof name which was denied by the Board citing failure to fulfil theconditions envisaged in the Byelaws. The High Court granted the prayerby placing reliance upon the dictum in Subin Mohammed[21].C36. The reasoning adopted by the High Court is similar to that incivil appeals arising from SLP (C) No(s). 7381/2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/2020) and SLP (C) No(s).7382/2021 (@ Diary No. 9482/2020), and weare not reiterating the same.

37. Assailing the decision, the appellant’s submissions are largelyDsimilar to those in previous appeals. Other than grounds already urgedbefore, the appellant has submitted that the Court failed to consider thepresence of two birth certificates and went on to grant the prayer withoutweighing the genuineness of the certificates and without seeking anexplanation from the respondent for bringing two birth certificates onErecord.

38. It is submitted that in 2004, while taking admission in class I,the respondent’s name was recorded as “Mohammed Shafeek”. Thesame name was carried forward while filling the admission form againin 2008 for different school. It is further submitted that even at theFtime of filling the form for class XI, the same name was recorded and itwas duly communicated by the school to the Board. The name recordedin the certificate, therefore, is in complete accordance with the schoolrecord. To buttress this submission, it is urged that the record clearlyshows that there is no possibility of typographical error in the record ofthe respondent and subsequent substantial change of name cannot beGpermitted in the certificates of the Board in this manner.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1826/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10927/2020)

39. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated24.8.2020 passed by the Delhi High Court in L.P.A. No. 219/2020confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 10841/2019 wherein the respondent student’s prayer for addition of surnamewas granted in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable. The respondentpassed the examinations conducted by the Board under the name “Jyoti”.The name was consistently recorded as such in all her school recordsand accordingly, the CBSE certificates carried the same name.Thereafter, she completed her MBBS and applied for education in aforeign institution. As part of her application, she was asked to mentionher surname. Since none of her documents carried this information, sheapplied to the Board for addition of surname and change her name from“Jyoti” to “Jyoti Dalal” in the certificates. The Board refused and therespondent approached the High Court.

40. The High Court considered the applicability of Byelaws 69.1(i)and 69.1(ii) and ruled that the said byelaws are inapplicable to the factsof the case as the respondent’s case is not one for change of name butfor incorporation of surname which existed throughout in the recordsof her parents and for which no ambiguity could be alleged. It observedthus:

“8. Looking to the peculiar facts and circumstance of the presentcase, we are of the opinion that the same does not fall under theambit of Clause 69(1)(i) of the Examination Bye-Laws as:-

a) This is not case of change of name, but of incorporation ofthe surname of the person concerned,

b) This is not case where something which was altogetheromitted is to be added, as the parents’ names were available infull in the records of the appellant-Board,

c) The respondent (original petitioner) in this case carries thesurname of the father and the mother which she wanted tomention after her name. There is no dispute about her identityor confusion about the veracity of the name which she seeksto incorporate.”

Before parting, the High Court specifically noted that its decisionmust not be treated as precedent and would operate on the specificfacts of the case.

A41. The appellant has assailed the decision by contending that anyrequest for change of name is to be examined as per Byelaw 69.1(i) andnot beyond it. If such change is not permissible under the said byelaw,then it would be wholly improper for the Court to direct such changes.It is contended that there was no challenge to the validity of the byelaws,and until and unless the byelaws are declared to be invalid, the CourtBcannot direct any action in complete contravention thereof. As urged inprevious cases, it is added that the respondent’s case failed to fulfil thecondition precedent in the said byelaw – prior approval by Court oflaw followed by publication in gazette – and the impugned order had theeffect of diluting these conditions.C

42. The appellant has submitted that the relief claimed by therespondent is highly delayed in time and in law, delay defeats discretion.It is urged that the respondent was always aware of the absence ofsurname in her records and she kept on sleeping on her rights for aperiod of seven years and therefore, the loss of limitation must bar anyDlegal remedy for her. It is further submitted that such changes cannot bepermitted in routine manner as the credibility attached with CBSEcertificates would be compromised and subsequent changes would createanomalies in the record. Reliance has been placed upon Abhishek Kumar@ Bal Kishan vs. Union of India & Ors.[22] to urge that subsequentissuance of revised certificates would create discrepancy in the recordEand reflect status which did not even exist at the time of makingcertificates.

43. The appellant has submitted that exercise of jurisdiction underArticle 226 of the Constitution in this manner is unwarranted as it amountsto substitution of the views of the Court in the place of byelaws formulatedFon the basis of technical advice. It is urged that the Court must be reluctantto venture into academic matters in this manner.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1827/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10948/2020)

44. The challenge in this appeal is against the decision dated13.7.2020 by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 863/2020 confirmingthe order of the learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 21357/2019, whereinthe respondent student’s prayer for change in date of birth was grantedon the basis of the birth certificate in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as

applicable. The observations of the High Court are similar to those incivil appeals arising from SLP (C) No(s).7381/2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/2020), SLP (C) No(s).7382/2021 (@ Diary No. 9482/2020) and SLP(C) No(s).7384/2021 (@ Diary No. 16291/2020). We are not reiteratingthe same for the sake of brevity.

45. On perusal of the submissions, we find that the grounds urgedfor assailing the decision are also similar to those taken in previous appealsand we are not repeating the same.

46. In addition to grounds already advanced, the respondent hasfiled elaborate written submissions and additional written submissions towhich we may make brief reference. It is submitted that as per Byelaw7 of the Examination Byelaws, the admission procedure upto class VIIIis to be regulated by rules/regulations/orders of the concerned StateGovernment. Accordingly, reference has been made to the KeralaEducation Act, 1958 and Chapter-VI of Rules framed thereunder whichprovides that the primary source for determining date of birth is birthcertificate. It is submitted that even under the Right to Education Act,the primary proof of age is the birth certificate and therefore, primacyhas to be accorded to birth certificate for determination of correct dateof birth and CBSE’s Byelaws must provide for bringing their certificatesin accord with such official or public documents.

47. In additional written submissions, the respondent has answeredthis Court’s query as to what would be the relevant point of time fordetermining the application of byelaws. It is submitted that the relevantdate would be the date of considering the application i.e., the Byelaws inforce at the time of considering the application for recording correction/change. The date of examination would be irrelevant for this purpose.Reliance has been placed upon Somdev Kapoor vs. State of West Bengal& Ors.[23]and State of Kerala & Ors. vs. Palakkad Heritage Hotels[24]to advance the legal proposition that rules standing on the date of finaldecision by the competent authority would be applicable.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1828/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No(s).7385/2021

(@ Diary No. 18711/2020)

23 (2014) 14 SCC 486

24 (2017) 13 SCC 672

A48. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated19.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2328/2019confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 8465/2019wherein the respondent student’s request for change in date of birthwas allowed. The case of the respondent is that his date of birth wasrecorded as 16.4.1994 instead of 16.4.1995 in the school records. OnBthe basis of the birth certificate and other supporting documents, therespondent applied for change in date of birth which was rejected by theappellant Board citing the 2007 Examination Byelaws.

49. The High Court allowed the change on grounds similar tothose in the previous appeals. We are not repeating the same.C

50. The submissions of the appellant Board are also similar tothose in previous appeals and there is no need to reiterate the same.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1829/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10959/2020)

51. The appellant Board has assailed the decision dated 3.7.2020passed by D.B. Special Appeal Writ No. 450/2020 confirming the orderof learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 8808/2019 allowing therespondent student’s prayer for change of her father’s and mother’snames in the certificates issued by the CBSE. Citing it as an error, aErequest was made by the respondent for change of name of father from“Vinod Mittal” to “Vinod Kumar Jain” and mother from “MeenakshiMittal” to “Meenakshi Agarwal”.

52. The High Court did not consider the permissibility of this changeunder the applicable Byelaws (as amended in 2018) and instead notedFthat no prejudice would be caused to the Board if the said changes areallowed. It observed thus:

“It is noticed that in the writ petition, respondent seeks only toamend the surname of her parents and not their names. On aquery by this Court from the counsel for the appellants that onGaccount of change of surname, what prejudice was going to becaused to the appellants, he has failed to give any response.”

53. The submissions advanced by the appellant are substantiallysimilar to those adopted in previous appeals. Non-applicability of Byelaws,absence of any typographical error, consonance between school recordHand certificates, and lapse of substantial time despite knowing the alleged

errors are primary submissions which form the basis of this challenge.We are not elaborating upon the same to avoid repetition.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1830/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10801/2020

54. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated4.6.2020 passed by the Kerala High Court in W.A. No. 697/2020confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 11791/2019, wherein the respondent student’s request for change in date ofbirth was allowed in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable. Therespondent’s case was that her date of birth was incorrectly recordedas 22.3.1990 instead of 21.6.1989. The High Court allowed the prayeron grounds similar to those in appeals arising from SLP (C) No(s). 7381/2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/2020), SLP (C) No(s). 7382/2021 (@ DiaryNo. 9482/2020), SLP (C) No(s). 7384/2021 (@ Diary No. 16291/2020)and SLP (C) No(s). 7385/2021 (@ Diary No. 18711/2020). We are notreiterating the same.

55. Having gone through the appeal memo, we note that thesubmissions are similar to those in previous appeals and we are notrepeating them.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1831/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10795/2020)

56. In this appeal, the challenge is against the decision dated6.8.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 987/2020confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 25663/2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change of name ofhis mother and father was allowed and accordingly, CBSE was directedto modify the certificates.

57. Originally, the school records and CBSE certificates recordedthe father’s name as “Shaji” and mother’s name as “Jijimol”. Thesenames were in also in accordance with the old birth certificate of therespondent dated 27.10.2002. As stated by the respondent, they noticedthis mistake for the first time in 2018 after CBSE released therespondent’s Secondary School Examination certificate on 29.5.2018.Thereafter, the respondent applied for issuance of fresh birth certificatewherein father’s name was changed from “Shaji” to “Shaji P.” andmother’s name from “Jijimol” to “Jijimol S.”. It was issued on 27.10.2018

Aand in furtherance thereof, the respondent applied to the appellant Boardfor changing the certificates in light of the changed names. The Boardrefused that request citing the Byelaws (as amended in 2018) and thematter reached the High Court.

58. The grounds that weighed upon the High Court while grantingBthe prayer are substantially similar to those in civil appeals arising fromSLP (C) No(s). 7381/2021 (@ Diary No. 9445/2020), SLP (C) No(s).7382/2021 (@ Diary No. 9482/2020), SLP (C) No(s). 7384/2021 (@Diary No. 16291/2020), SLP (C) No(s). 7385/2021 (@ Diary No. 18711/2020) and SLP (C) No. 10801/2020.

C59. The grounds urged by the appellant are similar to those inprevious appeals and we are not reiterating the same.

60. The respondent has filed written submissions to submit thatthe present case does not involve any delay in applying for change ofname as they took prompt action upon receiving the CBSE certificatesDand realizing the defect, and applied for new birth certificate so thatchanges could be made at the earliest. It is also submitted that it is not acase of change of name or correcting mistake in name per se. Rather,it is case of merely including initials of mother and father in theirrespective names in accordance with duly modified birth certificatewhich leaves no question as regards the genuineness of record.ECIVIL APPEAL NO. 1832/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 10796/2020)

61. In this appeal, the appellant (Board) has challenged the decisiondated 19.12.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2513/F2019 confirming the decision of learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No.14384/2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change of namefrom “Vaibhav R.” to “Vaibhav D.” in certificates issued by the Boardwas allowed in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable.

62. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasonedGin similar terms, as already delineated above.

63. The grounds urged by the appellant have already been urgedin previous appeals and we need not repeat them.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1833/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7386/2021

(@ Diary No. 19181/2020)

64. The appellant Board herein has impugned the decision dated8.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2207/2019confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P. (C) No. 10410/2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change in his date ofbirth was allowed on the basis of the birth certificate issued by theappropriate authority in terms of the 2007 Byelaws, as applicable.

65. The impugned judgment requires no elaboration as it is reasonedin similar terms, as already delineated above.

66. The grounds urged by the appellant have already been urgedin previous appeals and we need not repeat them.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1834/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 11320/2020)

67. The appellant (CBSE) has approached this Court for assailingthe decision dated 12.5.2020 passed by the High Court of Punjab &Haryana at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 499/2020 declining to interferewith the decision of the District Judge, Karnal who upheld the decisionof the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Judge), Assandh in Civil Suit No.204/2018 wherein, declaratory relief was granted in favour of therespondent student declaring his date of birth as 7.5.2004 instead of15.2.2001, father’s name as “Joginder” instead of “Joginder Singh” andmother’s name as “Darshan” instead of “Darshan Devi” (as mentionedin the CBSE certificate). The declaratory relief was coupled with amandatory injunction directing the appellant Board to effect necessarychanges in the certificates of the respondent.

68. The High Court referred to the birth certificate issued by theauthorities under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 andnoted that correctness of the certificate is not under dispute and thus,the information recorded in the certificate cannot be questioned. Itobserved thus:

“As far as correctness of the certificate issued by the authoritiesunder the 1969 Act, identity of the plaintiff as also correctness inthe names of his parents are not disputed.”

DEF

ANoting thus, the High Court declined to interfere with theconcurrent findings of fact by the two Courts below.

69. In addition to the grounds already advanced by the Board inlight of the applicable Byelaws (as amended in 2018), it is submitted thatthe relief of declaration and mandatory injunction could not have beenBgranted by the Court due to non-joinder of necessary parties in the case.It is submitted that Registrar of Births and Deaths (owing to change indate of birth) and the concerned school (owing to changes in theirrecords) were necessary parties in the case and ought to have beenjoined. It is urged that the non-joinder would be fatal.

C70. It is further submitted that the respondent’s claim was barredby the principle of estoppel as he was mandatorily required to submit hisbirth certificate in school at the time of admission as per Byelaw 6 of theExamination Byelaws, 1995 so that the school record could be inconsonance with the birth certificate. Since the respondent failed toproduce the same at the time of admission, it is urged, the school recordDcarried the information voluntarily supplied in the admission form and nochange can be permitted at this stage.

71. The respondent has further submitted that the relief ofmandatory injunction was barred due to Sections 41(g) and 41(i) of theSpecific Relief Act, 1963 which specifically provide that no such reliefEcould be provided if the plaintiff when he/she has acquiesced of rights.In the instant case, it is stated, the respondent failed to apply for changein date of birth for 15 years, despite there being long gap of three yearsbetween the recorded date and modified date, and such conduct mustbar any such relief.

FCIVIL APPEAL NO. 1835/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 11558/2020)

72. The appellant Board has approached this Court in appeal againstthe judgment dated 29.7.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala inW.A. No. 724/2020 confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P.GNo. 24214/2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change indate of birth from 30.5.1992 to 23.7.1991 was granted and original recordwas held to have recorded an incorrect date. For reaching this conclusion,reliance was placed by the High Court upon subsequently obtainedbirth certificate.H

73. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasonedin similar terms, as already delineated above.

74. The appellant has placed reliance upon the Byelaws (existingbefore 2007) to assail the decision. The grounds urged by the appellanthave already been urged in previous appeals and we need not repeatthem.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1836/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7387/2021

(@ Diary No. 21923/2020)

75. The present appeal involves challenge against the judgmentdated 13.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 2267/2019 confirming the order of learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 8034/2019, wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change of name from“Ganga” to “Ganga S” and father’s name from “Rajendran C” to“Rajendran Pillai C” was allowed in terms of the Byelaws (as amendedin 2018).

76. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasonedin similar terms, as already delineated above.

77. The grounds urged by the appellant have already been urgedin previous appeals and we need not repeat them.

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 1837/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No(s). 7388/2021

(@ Diary No. 25053/2020)

78. In this appeal, the appellant (Board) has assailed the judgmentdated 26.11.2019 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras inW.A. No. 4077/2019 affirming the order of learned Single Judge withslight modification. The respondent student had prayed for change of hisfather’s name from “Fazal Rehmaan” to “Shaik Fazul Rahiman” whichwas permitted by the learned Single Judge. In writ appeal before theHigh Court, the learned counsel for the Board, citing the applicableByelaws (as amended in 2018), submitted that appropriate precautionsought to be taken while issuing such directions for change of name asthere is possibility of misuse. The High Court observed that suchcorrections must not be permitted for ulterior or extraneous reasons. In

Aorder to prevent such possibility, the Board was permitted to obtain anaffidavit in the nature of indemnity against any such exigency. It observedthus:

“2. We find that the request made by the learned counsel to thatextent is appreciable, inasmuch as person should not be allowedBto carry out corrections if the same is for any ulterior motive orfor any extraneous considerations that may have itself roots eitherin any form of impersonation arising out of any civil or criminalactivity. In this regard, it will be open to the appellant Board toobtain an affidavit from the candidate in the nature of indemnityagainst any such exigency as referred to above and correction beCcarried out subject to such conditions as may be necessary.”

79. As regards cases wherein the request for change of name isbona fide and there is no scope for prejudice, the decision of learnedSingle Judge directing such changes was held to be correct. The Courtobserved thus:D

“3. On the other hand, we find that if correction has been genuinelyand bona fide sought and no prejudice is caused, then in that eventthe conclusion arrived at by the learned Single Judge cannot besaid to suffer from any infirmity.”

E80. The grounds urged by the appellant herein (CBSE) have sincebeen adverted to and require no reiteration.

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1838/2021(arising out of SLP (C) No. 15089/2020)

81. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment datedF25.9.2020 passed in W.A. No. 1102/2020 affirming the order of learnedSingle Judge wherein the respondent student’s prayer for change in dateof birth from 17.1.1992 to 17.1.1991 was allowed upon payment of costof Rs.1000 to the school authority and Rs.5000 to the Board. Like previouscases, the prayer was granted on the basis of subsequently obtainedGbirth certificate and in light of the applicable 2007 Byelaws.

82. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasonedin similar terms, as already delineated above.

83. The grounds urged by the appellant have also been urged inprevious appeals and we need not repeat them.H

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1839/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 15124/2020)

84. This appeal involves challenge to the judgment dated25.9.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 1037/2020affirming the order of learned Single Judge, wherein the respondentstudent’s prayer for change in date of birth in the certificates issued bythe Board was allowed upon payment of certain costs to the school andthe Board. Reliance was again placed upon subsequently obtainedbirth certificate for ordering the said changes and on the applicable 2007Byelaws.

85. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasonedin similar terms, as already delineated above.

86. The grounds urged by the appellant have also been urged inprevious appeals and we need not repeat them.

CIVIL APPEAL NO.1840/2021

(arising out of SLP (C) No. 15625/2020)

87. The challenge in this appeal is against the judgment dated7.9.2020 passed by the High Court of Kerala in W.A. No. 1155/2020confirming the order of learned Single Judge, wherein the respondentstudent’s prayer for change of his father’s name from “Hashim Abdulla”to “Hashim A.” and mother’s name from “Shahina Duneera” to “ShahinaBeegum D.S.” was allowed in terms of the applicable Byelaws (asamended in 2018).

88. In the facts of the case, the respondent obtained the certificateissued by the Board on 29.5.2018 after passing the Secondary SchoolExamination, 2018 wherein the names of his parents were recorded inaccordance with the school records and old birth certificate. Contrary tothe names in these documents, the names of father and mother of therespondent were recorded as “Hashim A.” and “Shahina Beegum D.S.”respectively in their school leaving certificates. In light of this conflict,the respondent applied to the Registering Authority for issue of correctedbirth certificate under Section-15 of the Registration of Births and DeathsAct, 1969 read with Rule-11 of the Kerala Registration of Births andDeaths Rules, 1999. The High Court permitted the changes in accordancewith this subsequently obtained birth certificate.

A89. The impugned judgment requires no discussion as it is reasonedin similar terms, as already delineated above.

90. The grounds urged by the appellant have also been urged inprevious appeals and we need not repeat them.

91. Apart from grounds already advanced in previous cases, theBrespondents have advanced certain additional grounds in support of theimpugned decision. It is submitted that the CBSE has no jurisdiction orpower to deny correction of records belonging to student after duechanges by competent public authorities and acceptance of the same byschool. It is further submitted that CBSE is society and its ByelawsCcannot be treated as equivalent to law made by competent legislature.Thus, they cannot be invoked to deny the fundamental rights of thestudents much less being reasonable restriction.

92. The respondents have further questioned the vires of theByelaws on the ground that the government resolution providing for theDpower to frame Byelaws does not permit the Board to impose suchconditions for denying corrections in certificates. Relying upon Sections76 and 77 of the 1872 Act, it is lastly submitted that the certified copiesof public records are duly admissible and the Board ought to ensure thattheir certificates are corrected in light of such updated public records.

ET.P. (C) NOS. 1139-1140 OF 2020

93. The petitioner (CBSE) herein seeks direction from this Courtto withdraw before itself two proceedings, namely – W.P. (C) No. 5828/2016 pending before the Jharkhand High Court and L.P.A. No. 423/2020 pending before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh,Fas similar questions are involved in these proceedings.

94. The former proceeding before the Jharkhand High Court isfor change of name of the student from “Saddam Hussain” to “SajidHussain” on the basis of changes effected in Official Gazette, Passport,Aadhar card, Driving License and PAN card. The proceeding beforethe High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh is against the decisionGof learned Single Judge in CWP No. 21388/2018, wherein the student’sprayer for change of name in the certificates issued by the Board from“Satish Kumar s/o Rampal” to “Shrey s/0 Rampal” was allowed on thebasis of public notices in two local newspapers, official gazette notificationnotifying change of name, Aadhar card and PAN card.H95. The Board submits that it is already contesting multiple casesbefore this Court in which similar questions touching upon the power ofCourts to issue directions for changing particulars in CBSE certificatesis being examined, despite there being clear prohibition against thesame in the Examination Byelaws. The Board submits that identicalarguments are required to be advanced by it at multiple forums and it iscausing grave harm to it including in passing of conflicting directions.

96. Respondent No. 6 (Satish Kumar @Shrey) has filed “Note onsubmissions” wherein various grounds have been advanced to questionthe prohibitory Byelaws of the Board and support the case for permittinggenuine changes in certificates. It has been submitted that the Byelawsare not statutory in nature and thus, they cannot be made as “law” withinthe meaning of Article 19(2) of the Constitution and cannot be the basisto deprive the students of their fundamental right to express their identityunder Article 19(1)(a). Reliance has been placed upon Kabir Jaiswalvs. Union of India & Ors.[25] to support this position.

97. It is then submitted that there is conflict between KalpanaThakur & Anr. vs. Central Board of Secondary Education & Anr.[26]and Vyshnav @ Vishnu Viswam V. vs. Central Board of SecondaryEducation & Ors.[27] as regards the relevant point of time for determiningthe applicability of Byelaws, as amended from time to time. Supportingthe view taken in Vyshnav[28], it is urged that the relevant point of timeought to be the date of issuance of certificate.

98. Having gone through the elaborate set of submissions anddocuments on record in the respective matter, the following broad pointsemerge for our consideration:

(i)Whether the CBSE Examination Byelaws have the force oflaw?

(ii)Whether examination byelaws impose reasonable restrictionson the exercise of rights under Article 19 of the Constitutionincluding fail the test of rationality for excessively restrictingthe scope of permissible corrections/changes?

25 2020 SCC OnLine All 1488

26 2015 SCC OnLine Del 12156

27 2017 SCC OnLine Ker 39806

28 supra at Footnote No.27

A(iii) Whether the Board is obliged to carry out corrections/changesin the certificates issued by it owing to correction/updationof public records/documents which have statutorypresumption of genuineness?

(iv) Whether the examination byelaws in force on the date ofBexamination conducted by CBSE or the date of considerationof the application for recording correction/change would berelevant? And, whether the effect of correction or change,as the case may be, will have retrospective effect from thedate of issue of the original certificate?

C(v) Whether writ of mandamus issued for effecting correctionsin CBSE certificates can be in the teeth of explicit provisionsin the examination byelaws, without examining validity of thebyelaws?

Point No. 1D

99. Indubitably, the CBSE Board came to be established videGovernment of India resolution dated 1.7.1929 with view to “enable itto play useful role in the field of Secondary Education” and “make theservices of the Board available to various educational institutions in thecountry”, as stated in the Constitution of the Board. Article 9[29] of theEsaid Constitution deals with the “Powers and Functions of the Board”,which include to do all such things as may be necessary for furtheringthe objectives of the Board. One of the functions or so to say power ofthe Board is to make regulations for giving effect to the afore-statedresolution as predicated in Article 16[30 ]of the Constitution. Clause (2)thereof envisages that the Regulation so framed may provide forFconditions for issuing certificates for examination conducted by the Board.29 “9. The Board shall have the following powers: - xxxxxxxxx (xvi) To do all such or other things as may be necessary in order to further theGobjectives of the Board as body constituted for regulating and maintainingthe standard of secondary education.”30 “16.POWERS OF THE BOARD TO MAKE REGULATIONSxxxxxxxxx(2) In particular and without prejudice to any generality of the foregoing powers,the Board may make Regulations for all or any of the following matters, namely:…..H(f) The conditions for the award of certificates of the Board;”

We may also take note of Article 18[31] of the Constitution of the Board,which makes it amply clear that the byelaws to be framed by the Boardought to be consistent with and subservient to the Regulations and theResolution establishing the Board. This Article also indicates that byelawsmay be made for the purposes referred to in clauses (a) to (c) pertainingto procedural aspects. Indisputably, the constitution/organisation orstructure of CBSE is not backed by statute. It is, therefore, misnomerto characterise byelaws framed by the Board as statutory.

100. The real question is: whether byelaws so framed have theforce of law?

101. To have the force of law, it must qualify the test predicatedin Article 13 of the Constitution, else it would be mere contractual termsof engagement. For the nature of activities undertaken by the Boardincluding the powers and functions of the Board, it can be safely assumedthat the Board is State within the meaning of Article 12 of theConstitution of India and as corollary thereof, its actions would beamenable to Part-III of the Constitution of India. The fact that the Boardcan be treated as State within the meaning of Article 12 of theConstitution does not mean that the byelaws framed by it wouldnecessarily become law within the meaning of Article 13 of theConstitution of India. Only “law” under Article 13 can be reckoned asa restriction in respect of rights guaranteed under Article 19 of theConstitution.

102. Before we proceed to analyse any further, it would be appositeto reproduce Article 13 of the Constitution of India to answer the pointunder consideration. Article 13 of the Constitution reads thus:-

“13. Laws inconsistent with or in derogation of the fundamentalrights.— (1) All laws in force in the territory of India immediatelybefore the commencement of this Constitution, in so far as they

31 “18.The Board and its Committees may make Bye-laws, consistent with thisResolution and the Regulations, for the following purposes, namely:

(a) Laying down the procedure to be observed at their meetings and the numberof members required to form quorum;

(b) Providing for all matters which, consistent with this Resolution and theRegulations, are to be prescribed by Bye-laws; and

(c) Providing for all other matters solely concerning the Board and its Committeesand not provided for by the Resolution and the Regulations.”

CDE

Aare inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall, to the extentof such inconsistency, be void.

(2) The State shall not make any law which takes away or abridgesthe rights conferred by this Part and any law made in contraventionof this clause shall, to the extent of the contravention, be void.

(3) In this article, unless the context otherwise requires, —

(a) “law” includes any Ordinance, order, bye-law, rule,regulation, notification, custom or usage having in theterritory of India the force of law;

(b) “laws in force” includes laws passed or made by aLegislature or other competent authority in the territory of Indiabefore the commencement of this Constitution and notpreviously repealed, notwithstanding that any such law or anypart thereof may not be then in operation either at all or inparticular areas.

(4) Nothing in this article shall apply to any amendment of thisConstitution made under article 368.”

(emphasis supplied)

103. The tenor of Article 13 clearly suggests that it was not enactedEto restate the obvious proposition that all statutory laws are “laws” inany legal system. For, it requires no restatement that laws enacted bythe legislature are “laws”. The underlying purpose of defining “law”under Article 13 is to encompass practical administrative reality thatthere can be laws other than ordinary statutory laws. It, therefore, takeswithin its sweep those matters (declaration in the form of Byelaws inFthis case) as having the “force of law” albeit not enacted by the legislatureas such.

104. For, it defines “law” to include ordinances, orders, byelaws,rule, regulation or notification issued/made by the State. The precisemeanings of these terms cannot be confined in the rigidity of languageGand the same is neither desirable nor required in the present case.

105. The examination revolves around the expression “having inthe territory of India the force of law”, irrespective of the packagingin which the said provision is formally couched. The text impels us tofocus on the substance of the provision, and not its form. Broadly speaking,H

law made by State refers to body of rules which shapes the rights andliabilities of persons in universal sense as opposed to privatetransaction between parties. Such law has the ability to bind people byproviding for all prominent aspects of their conduct as the subjects oflaw. Therefore, any rule/notification/order/byelaw issued/made by theState or its instrumentalities would have the force of law and bind allentities subjected to it and operates as code of conduct to regulatetheir functioning. Yet another crucial characteristic would be enforceabilityin court of law. Needless to observe, we are not talking about bindingcodes or set of rules decided by parties for themselves as they fall underthe realm of law of contract. We are dealing with rules which flow fromthe instrumentality of the “State” during the performance of essentialpublic functions.

106. CBSE, despite being packaged as registered society, isperforming an essential public function for the government since itsestablishment in 1929. In Binny Ltd. & Anr. vs. V. Sadasivan & Ors.[32],this Court laid down certain characteristics of public functions thus:

“11. ...It is difficult to draw line between public functions andprivate functions when they are being discharged by purelyprivate authority. body is performing “public function” when itseeks to achieve some collective benefit for the public or sectionof the public and is accepted by the public or that section of thepublic as having authority to do so. Bodies therefore exercisepublic functions when they intervene or participate in social oreconomic affairs in the public interest. In book on Judicial Reviewof Administrative Action (5th Edn.) by de Smith, Woolf & Jowellin Chapter 3, para 0.24, it is stated thus:

“A body is performing ‘public function’ when it seeksto achieve some collective benefit for the public or sectionof the public and is accepted by the public or that section ofthe public as having authority to do so. Bodies thereforeexercise public functions when they intervene or participate insocial or economic affairs in the public interest. This may happenin wide variety of ways. For instance, body is performing apublic function when it provides ‘public goods’ or other collectiveservices, such as health care, education and personal social

Aservices, from funds raised by taxation. body may perform publicfunctions in the form of adjudicatory services (such as those ofthe criminal and civil courts and tribunal system). They also do soif they regulate commercial and professional activities to ensurecompliance with proper standards. For all these purposes, rangeof legal and administrative techniques may be deployed, includingBrule-making, adjudication (and other forms of dispute resolution);inspection; and licensing.

Public functions need not be the exclusive domain of theState. Charities, self-regulatory organizations and other nominallyprivate institutions (such as universities, the Stock Exchange,CLloyd’s of London, churches) may in reality also perform sometypes of public function. As Sir John Donaldson, M.R. urged, it isimportant for the courts to ‘recognise the realities ofexecutive power’ and not allow ‘their vision to be cloudedby the subtlety and sometimes complexity of the way inDwhich it can be exerted’. Non-governmental bodies such asthese are just as capable of abusing their powers as isGovernment.””

(emphasis supplied)

The principles associated with public function deducible fromEthe above analysis can be illustratively culled out as follows:

a. Extension of collective benefit to public by public authority;b. Participation in social or economic affairs including health,education, social services etc.;

Fc. Private bodies or charitable institutions performing publicfunctions could also be regulated in the same manner as publicauthority.

In the school education structure as we have it, there are stategovernment boards limited to respective states. There are central boardsGhaving its area of operation throughout India, namely, Council for theIndian School Certificate Examinations (ICSE), private board;International Baccalaureate (IB), formerly known as InternationalBaccalaureate Organization (IBO) non-profit foundation/organizationhaving headquarter in Geneva, Switzerland; and CBSE.

107. CBSE is the only central body for conducting examinationsin the country created by resolution of the Central Government. All thebodies constituted at various levels are working in the direction of justeducational governance. Article 41 of the Constitution, couched as adirective, is the source behind the basic functioning of the CBSE Boardas it secures nothing but right to education. It is participating in educationalaffairs which form an intrinsic part of social affairs. The CBSE Board isa public authority functioning in public interest for the performance of apublic function.

108. We may gainfully refer to the Constitution of the Board whichreaffirms the public character of the Board as the ultimate control overthe functioning of the Board is exercised by the Ministry of Education(now Ministry of Education & Social Welfare)[33]. Article 1 states that:

“1. The Board shall conduct examinations at the secondary stageof the education and such other examinations as it may considerfit, subject to the approval of the Controlling Authority or as itmay be called upon to conduct by the Government of India, Ministryof Education, (now Ministry of Education & Social Welfare) anddo such acts ancillary to the objects as may be necessary.”

Article 4 further reads thus:

“4. The Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry ofEducation (now Ministry of Education and Social Welfare) shallcontinue to be the Controlling Authority of the Board.”

109. Reverting to the CBSE Examination Byelaws, the same arecouched in the form of code. They provide for all essential aspectsrelating to formal education of student including admission, examination,migration, transfer, curriculum, fee for various services, issuance ofverified certificates, modifications in certificates etc. This Byelaws,therefore, bind the parties and are duly enforceable in court of law,even by way of writ remedies as we have seen in the present batch ofpetitions.

110. To put it differently, the Byelaws of the Board have the forceof law and must be regarded as such for all legal purposes. It wouldserve no meaningful purpose to hold these authoritative set of rules

33 Now known as “Ministry of Human Resource Development”

Aoriginating from an instrumentality of the State as mere contractual termsdespite there being overwhelming public interest in their just application.

111. The argument that Byelaws of the Board are contractualelements as CBSE is registered society unbacked by statute cannotbe accepted for at least four reasons – first, CBSE is not privateBcorporate body. It is juristic person and “State” within the meaningof Article 12, which in itself warrants its amenability to the courts includingconstitutional writ courts; second, the functions performed by the CBSEBoard are public functions and not private functions; third, the test of“force of law” takes within its sweep the nature of rule, its authoritativeimpact on the subjects, nature of function performed by the rule makingCbody, the origin of the body, the binding value of the rules, existence ofany competing set of rules and fourth, absence of statute does notautomatically render the rules to be contractual terms, as already observed.

112. As in the ultimate analysis, the Byelaws operate as law, thescrutiny of this Court cannot be undermined by giving them an artificialDcolour. For student enrolled with the CBSE, there is no other body ofrules but the subject Byelaws for dealing with all significant aspects ofher education. By now it is an established tenet that even body corporates,co-operative societies, registered societies etc. can be declared asinstrumentalities of the State, for the only reason that the outer form ofEorganization must not be allowed to defeat the ultimate constitutionalgoal of protection of fundamental rights as and when they suffer at thehands of the State, directly or indirectly. The Court ought to intervenewith circumspection even when the public body derives its authorityfrom government resolution.

F113. We say so because there is an evolving body of jurisprudenceenunciating that the principle of presumption of constitutionality attachedwith statutes ought not to be extended to subordinate legislations withthe same vigour. For, the legislature enjoys the sacred backing of people’swill and naturally, every act of legislature is presumed to be constitutional.In other words, the Courts generally do not look upon duly enacted lawsGwith suspicion at the first glance as they enjoy legal presumption of itsvalidity. Nevertheless, circumspect intervention on the part of the Courtis to advance constitutional protection for guarantees under Part-III ofthe Constitution.

114. Arguendo, the Examination Byelaws are not “law” underHArticle 13, it would not affect the power of the Court to scrutinize them

in reference to Part-III of the Constitution of India as CBSE is “State”within the meaning of Article 12 and all its actions are consequentlysubject to Part-III.

Point No. 2

115. The question whether Byelaws under consideration imposereasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights under Article 19 of theConstitution of India, may have to be understood in the context ofenunciation of this Court that the core existence of an individual is notexemplified by her outer characteristics but by her inner self-identificationand also about the significance of the acquired identity in the form ofname. The identity of an individual is one of the most closely guardedareas of the constitutional scheme in India. The sanctity of identity hasbeen recognized by this Court in plethora of cases including NationalLegal Services Authority vs. Union of India & Ors.[34], Navtej SinghJohar & Ors. vs. Union of India through Secretary, Ministry ofLaw and Justice[35] and K.S. Puttaswamy and Anr. vs. Union of India& Ors[36]. In fact, in Navtej Singh Johar[37], the Court noted how thecore existence of an individual is not exemplified by her outercharacteristics but by her inner self-identification. In the context of naturalidentity of an individual, this Court in Navtej Singh Johar[38] had notedthat:

“5. The natural identity of an individual should be treated to beabsolutely essential to his being. What nature gives is natural.That is called nature within. Thus, that part of the personality of aperson has to be respected and not despised or looked down upon.The said inherent nature and the associated natural impulses inthat regard are to be accepted. Non-acceptance of it by anysocietal norm or notion and punishment by law on some obsoleteidea and idealism affects the kernel of the identity of an individual.Destruction of individual identity would tantamount tocrushing of intrinsic dignity that cumulatively encapsulatesthe values of privacy, choice, freedom of speech and otherexpressions. It can be viewed from another angle. An individual

34 (2014) 5 SCC 438

35 (2018) 10 SCC 1

36 (2017) 10 SCC 1

37 supra at Footnote No.35

38 supra at Footnote No.35

1162SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Ain exercise of his choice may feel that he/she should be left alonebut no one, and we mean, no one, should impose solitude on him/her.”

(emphasis supplied)

116. Identity, therefore, is an amalgam of various internal andBexternal including acquired characteristics of an individual and namecan be regarded as one of the foremost indicators of identity. Andtherefore, an individual must be in complete control of her name and lawmust enable her to retain as well as to exercise such control freely “forall times”. Such control would inevitably include the aspiration of anCindividual to be recognized by different name for just cause. Article19(1)(a) of the Constitution provides for guaranteed right to freedomof speech and expression. In light of Navtej Singh Johar[39], this freedomwould include the freedom to lawfully express one’s identity in the mannerof their liking. In other words, expression of identity is protected elementof freedom of expression under the Constitution.D

117. Having recognized the existence of this right, the essentialquestion pertains to the rights that flow due to the change of name. Thequestion becomes vital because identity, as stated above, is combinationof diverse set of elements. Navtej Singh Johar[40] dealt with “naturalidentity” and here we are dealing with name, which can only be perceivedEas an ‘acquired identity’. Therefore, the precise scope of right and extentof restrictions could only be determined upon deeper examination.

118. To begin with, it is important to explain what we understandby this right to change of name as constituent element of freedom ofexpression of identity. Any change in identity of an individual has to goFthrough multiple steps and it cannot be regarded as complete withoutproper fulfilment of those steps. An individual may self-identify oneselfwith any title or epithet at any point of time. But the change of identitywould not be regarded as formally or legally complete until and unlessthe State and its agencies take note thereof in their records. Afterall, inGsocial sphere, an individual is not only recognized by how an individualidentifies oneself but also by how his/her official records identify him/her. For, in every public transaction of an individual, official recordsintroduce the person by his/her name and other relevant particulars.

39 supra at Footnote No.35H40 supra at Footnote No.35

119. Thus, the essential question is whether the aforesaid right toalter name would mean that the State and its agencies are unconditionallybound to reckon the changed identity of the individual and give recognitionto the same by altering its records, whenever such request is made byhim/her.

120. Going by the very nature of rights under Article 19, the rightto get changed name recorded in the official (public) records cannot bean absolute right and as matter of public policy and larger public interestcalls for certain reasonable restrictions to observe consistency and obviateconfusion and deceptive attempt.

121. We may now examine whether CBSE Byelaws are just andreasonable restrictions in the context of rights guaranteed under Part-IIIand in the interests of the general public.

122. The test of reasonableness requires that the impugned law isintelligently crafted in such manner that it is able to justify the ultimateimpact of the law on its subjects. If it restricts, it must restrict on thebasis of reason and if it permits, it must permit on the basis of reason.Similarly, if law draws classification, it must classify intelligently i.e.,backed by reason. Reason is the foundation of all laws and their validityis immensely dependent on the availability of sound reason. Equallycrucial is the availability of legitimate object. It is important to note thatreasonableness is adjudged in the specific context of the case and is notconfined to the words of definition. In Om Prakash & Ors. vs. Stateof U.P. & Ors.[41], this Court noted thus:

“32. The concept of “reasonableness” defies definition. Abstractdefinition like “choice of course which reason dictates” aspropounded in the earliest case of this Court in Chintamanrao[42] iselastic. In the subsequent case of V.G. Row[43] therefore, this Courthas observed that “no abstract standard or general pattern” ofreasonableness can be laid down as applicable to all cases. Legalauthor Friedmann in his book Legal Theory, 4th Edn., at pp. 83-85, comments that reasonableness is an expression used to conveybasically the natural law ideal of “justice between man and man”.The concept of “reasonable man” is also an application of the

41 (2004) 3 SCC 402

42 Chintamanrao vs. State of M.P., AIR 1951 SC 118

43 The State of Madras vs. V.G. Row, AIR 1952 SC 196

Aprinciples of natural justice to the standard of behaviour expectedof the citizen. The functional and conceptual implication of theterm “reasonableness” is that it is essentially another word usedfor public policy. It means the application of the underlying principlesof social policy and morality to an individual case. Friedmannfurther observes that the “test of reasonableness is nothingBsubstantially different from ‘social engineering’, ‘balancing ofinterests’, or any of the other formulas which modern sociologicaltheories suggest as an answer to the problem of the judicialfunction”.”

In V.G. Row[44], the Court, noting that there can be no general patternCof reasonableness, laid down certain factors to be kept in mind whiledetermining this question thus:

“(15) …It is important in this context to bear in mind that the testof reasonableness, wherever prescribed, should be applied to eachindividual statute impugned, and no abstract standard, or generalDpattern of reasonableness can be laid down as applicable to allcases. The nature of the right alleged to have been infringed,the underlying purpose of the restrictions imposed, the extentand urgency of the evil sought to be remedied thereby, thedisproportion of the imposition, the prevailing conditions atEthe time, should all enter into the judicial verdict. …”

(emphasis supplied)

123. As noted above, the Byelaws permit change of name only ifpermission from the Court has been obtained prior to the publication ofresult. It puts clear embargo on any change of name sans priorFpermission before the publication. The provision is problematic on certaincounts. Firstly, it is not mere restriction on the right, it is completeembargo on the right post publication of result of the candidate. It fails totake into account the possibility of need for change of name after thepublication of result including the uncertainty of timeline required to obtainGsuch declaration from the Court of law due to law’s delay and uponwhich the candidate has no control whatsoever. Whereas, while amendingthe Byelaws in 2007, the CBSE itself had noted that children are not ofmature age while passing school examinations and they may not be in aposition to decide conclusively on issues concerning their identity. The

Byelaws completely overlook this possibility when it ordains seekingdeclaration from the Court prior to the publication of results of theconcerned examination conducted by it.

124. The overriding state interest, as per the Board, to retain thisstringency is nothing but efficiency of administration. Administrativeefficiency, despite being crucial concern, has not been and cannot beelevated to standard that it is used to justify non-performance of essentialfunctions by an instrumentality of the State. To use administrativeefficiency to make it practically impossible for student to alter heridentity in the Board certificates, no matter how urgent and important itis, would be highly disproportionate and can in no manner be termed asa reasonable restriction. Reasonableness would demand proper balancebetween student’s right to be identified in the official (public) recordsin manner of her choice and the Board’s argument of administrativeefficiency. To sustain this balance, it would be open to the Board to limitthe number of times such alterations could be permitted including subjectto availability of the old records preserved by it as per the extantregulations. But to say that post the publication of examination resultsand issuance of certificates, there can be no way to alter the recordwould be case of total prohibition and not reasonable restraint.125. The limitation as regards maximum period upto which changescan be permitted also requires different approach. Upon receiving thecertificates, the student would naturally be put to notice of the particularsof certificates. Due to young age and inadvertence including being casualand indolent, student may fail to identify the errors or to understand theprobable impact of those errors and accordingly, may not apply forrectification immediately. It is also possible that student may not haveto use the certificates immediately after passing out and by the time sheuses them, the limitation period for correction may elapse. Therefore, arealistic time for permitting corrections is very important. Indeed, it canbe commensurate with the statutory or mandatory period upto whichCBSE is obliged to preserve its old record.

126. However, we need not explore upon the question as to whetherthe exercise of fundamental right can be foreclosed by prescribing arigid period of limitation. In case of any ordinary civil rights, it is importantthat the action for enforcement of such rights is initiated in prescribedtime and consistency is maintained, but is it permissible to say the sameabout fundamental rights? The rights which are recognised as

Afundamental under the Constitution are “preferred or chosen freedoms”and very sensitive and realistic approach has to be taken in such matters.We wonder whether after the lapse of prescribed time, let us say 3years, there could be no reasonable and legitimate circumstances towarrant change of name.

B127. At the same time, there is merit in CBSE’s argument thatfrequent changes cannot be permitted as there is scope of abuse andmisuse, apart from administrative burden. This argument cannot be lightlybrushed aside. We deem it fit to observe that same concerns could applyto other bodies as well, like Unique Identification Authority of India[45]and Passport Authority.C

128. As regards the argument of misuse, no doubt, there areinstances of misuse of provisions that permit change of identity in criminalmatters. However, mere possibility of abuse cannot deter the Boardfrom fulfilling their essential functions. possibility of abuse cannot beused to deny legitimate rights to citizens. The balance simply does not tiltDin favour of such proposition. The course of law cannot choose tochange its stream merely because there are apprehensions of abuse onthe way. The Board’s concern is only to regulate and maintain efficienteducational standards. It is not penal authority. If any of the provisionsof Byelaws are subjected to misuse or abuse by anyone, the BoardEwould be well within its rights to approach the appropriate body fornecessary penal or civil action. As nodal agency made for specificpublic purpose, CBSE can only use its means and resources to put propersafeguards in place while performing its functions. More so, when it isnot even the job of the Board to verify anything, as changes are madeafter grant of permission by Court of law. There is involvement ofFjudicial application of mind. The Board only has to give effect to theCourt order granting permission, as and when it is so pronouncedirrespective of publication of examination results in earlier point of time.

129. Administrative efficiency, we must note, cannot be the soleconcern of CBSE. Every institution desires efficiency in their functioning.GBut it does not mean that efficiency is achieved by curbing their basicfunctions. Article 9 of CBSE’s Constitution, in point (xvi), instructivelystates that CBSE is body constituted for “regulating and maintaining”the standard of secondary education. The same is reproduced again forready reference:H45 for short, “UIDAI”

“9. The Board shall have the following powers:-

xxxxxxxxx

(xvi) To do all such or other things as may be necessary in orderto further the objectives of the Board as body constituted forregulating and maintaining the standard of secondaryeducation.”

(emphasis supplied)

The terms “regulation” and “maintenance” are terms of very wideimport and signify that the functioning of the Board is not narroweddown in any manner whatsoever. Regulation of standard of educationwould empower the Board to take all necessary steps, as permissibleunder the Resolution and Regulations, to control all possible aspects ofschool education that may have bearing on its standard. Quality ofcurriculum, services extended to the students, effective grievanceredressal mechanism, oversight over affiliated schools etc. are some ofthe essential elements touching upon the standard of education.Maintenance of those standards would demand constant upgradation ofrules and services of the Board in tune with changing needs of the studentsand the ultimate goal of education.

130. One of the primary functions of the Board is to grantcertificates to its students. Effective maintenance and regulation ofstandard of education would include complete accountability of the Boardin grant of such certificates and its duty does not get extinguished afterpublication of examination results and issue of certificates. Rather, itextends to taking care of post-publication concerns of students as andwhen they emerge, as students seek to use their certificates for purposesof higher education and career opportunities. narrow reading of thefunctions of the Board would leave glaring gaps in the field of schooleducation and may jeopardize the welfare of students with legitimateconcerns.

131. The concerned Byelaw has been framed on the assumptionthat there can be no situation wherein legitimate need for change ofname could arise for student after publication of results. It is presumedthat only typographical/factual errors could come in the certificates andthey can be corrected using the provision for corrections. Thepresumption, we must note, is erroneous, absurd and distances itselffrom the social realities. There can be numerous circumstances wherein

Achange of name could be legitimate requirement and keeping the ultimategoal of preserving the standard of education in mind, the Board mustprovide for reasonable opportunity to effect such changes.

132. It would not be out of place to note that the two parties here– the Board and students – are not in an equal position of impact. InBother words, the balance of convenience would tilt in favour of students.For, they stand to lose more due to inaccuracies in their certificates thanthe Board whose sole worry is increasing administrative burden. Theobligation of Board to take additional administrative burden is no doubtonerous but the propensity of student losing career opportunities dueto inaccurate certificate is unparalleled. Illustratively, juvenile accusedCof being in conflict with the law or victim of sexual abuse whoseidentity gets compromised due to lapses by media or the investigativebody, despite there being complete legal protection for the same, mayconsider changing the name to seek rehabilitation in the society in exerciseof her right to be forgotten. If the Board, in such case, refuses toDchange the name, the student would be compelled to live with the scarsof the past. We are compelled to wonder how it would not be graveand sustained violation of fundamental rights of the student. In suchcircumstances, the avowed public interest in securing rehabilitation ofaffected persons would overwhelm the Board’s interest in securingadministrative efficiency. In fact, it would be against the human dignityEof the student, the protection whereof is the highest duty of all concerned.A Board dealing with maintenance of educational standards cannotarrogate to itself the power to impact identity of students who enrol withit. The right to control one’s identity must remain with the individual,subject, of course, to reasonable restrictions as observed above and asFfurther discussed later.

133. The utility of certificates issued by the Board is not confinedto educational purposes anymore. They serve social purpose todayand are often used to cross verify particulars like name and date of birthwhile applying for other government identity documents. They assumeGimmense relevance while applying for various jobs, both public andprivate. Interestingly, CBSE itself has argued at length on the importanceand authoritative value of their certificates. In such circumstances, aninaccuracy or denial of change could be fatal to student’s futureprospects and all these concerns cannot be brushed aside in the name ofadministrative exigencies.H

134. Pertinently, the Parliament is also alive to the social realitieshaving bearing on identity documents. There are various statutoryenactments wherein detailed provisions are made for change of identity.The UIDAI allows changes in the Aadhar card upon fulfilment of requiredconditions. Section-31 of Aadhaar (Targeted Delivery of Financial andOther Subsidies, Benefits and Services) Act, 2016 provides for changesin the records. The provision permits both demographic and biometricchanges. It reads thus:

“31. Alteration of demographic information or biometricinformation.— (1) In case any demographic information of anAadhaar number holder is found incorrect or changes subsequently,the Aadhaar number holder shall request the Authority to altersuch demographic information in his record in the Central IdentitiesData Repository in such manner as may be specified by regulations.

(2) In case any biometric information of Aadhaar number holderis lost or changes subsequently for any reason, the Aadhaarnumber holder shall request the Authority to make necessaryalteration in his record in the Central Identities Data Repository insuch manner as may be specified by regulations.

(3) On receipt of any request under sub-section (1) or sub-section(2), the Authority may, if it is satisfied, make such alteration asmay be required in the record relating to such Aadhaar numberholder and intimate such alteration to the concerned Aadhaarnumber holder.

(4) No identity information in the Central Identities Data Repositoryshall be altered except in the manner provided in this Act orregulations made in this behalf.”

Schedule II attached with Aadhar (Enrolment and Update)Regulations, 2016 provides for the list of documents acceptable for thepurpose of verification of identity when request for changes is made.Proof of Identity could be verified on the basis of following documents[46]:

a. Passport;

b. PAN Card;

c. Driving License;

46 List is merely illustrative, not exhaustive.

1170SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 4 S.C.R.

Ad. Voter ID

For proof of date of birth, following documents[47] are acceptable:

a. Birth certificate;

b. Passport;Bc. Certificate of date of birth issued by Group Gazetted Officeron letterhead.

The UIDAI website also notes why such changes could berequired and we feel it relevant to reproduce the same thus:

“Demographic data update, the need could arise from:C

• Changes in life events such as marriage may lead toresidents changing their basic demographic details such asname and address. Address and mobile number could alsochange due to migration to newer locations. Residents mayalso want changes in their relative’s details due to changes inDlife events such marriage, death of relative etc. In addition,residents could have other personal reasons to change theirmobile number, email address etc.

• Changes in various service delivery platforms may lead residentsto declaration request changes and to add mobile number to CIDREetc.

• Errors made during the enrolment process wherein the resident’sdemographic data may have been captured incorrectly. Changesto “DoB/Age” and “Gender” fields are expected primarily due toenrolment errors.F

• Since resident can enrol anywhere in India, it may happen thata native speaker of language “A” is enrolled by an operator oflanguage “B” and consequently the resident’s local language ofenrolment is “B”. Later, the resident may want to change thelocal language of enrolment to another that he/she prefers. If so,Gthen all the demographic information that is printed on the Aadhaarletter will need to be updated in the new local language.

• UIDAI may also ascertain availability of POI, POA and otherdocuments collected at the time of enrolment/update and its quality

H47 List is merely illustrative, not exhaustive.

and decide to notify resident to update their demographicinformation and submit the required document.”

(emphasis supplied)

Apart from changes required due to marriage, migration, deathetc., the authority takes into account the need for permitting changesdue to “personal reasons”. The underlying idea is to ensure accuracy ofrecord whilst ensuring free exercise of control by an individual over heridentity.

135. Similarly, Section 24 of the Passports Act, 1967 read withthe Passport Rules, 1980 permit change of name and date of birth on thebasis of certain documents. The Ministry of External Affairs[48] permitschange of name and other information, including signature, of the passportholder as part of its passport services. It allows change of name underthree categories:

“Change of name may be allowed to the applicant in thefollowing events:

1. Following marriage, divorce or Remarriage or

2. Adding surname (childhood to adulthood) or

3. Change of complete name.”

It permits such changes on the basis of certain documents whichare listed as:

“Documents required

(i) Prescribed Deed Poll

(ii) Original newspaper cutting announcing the change of namepublished in two leading daily newspapers (in the areas of residence& permanent residence) – in Indian & local Newspaper

(iii) The applicant has to furnish Sworn Affidavit(s) for thepurpose quoting the reason for name change.”

The Ministry also permits change in signature on the Passportupon fulfilment of certain conditions which read thus:

A“Change of Signature

For changing signature in the passport, application for new passporthas to be made and the applicant must append his / her old signaturealong with new signature on the second page of the passportapplication form along with the following documents.

Requirements:

1. Application form should be completely filled in and signed.

2. 4 (four) passport size (35 mm x 45 mm) identical photographsshowing frontal view of full face with white background.

3. The current passport having valid visa or residence permit isrequired to be enclosed. In case the latest passport is additionalbooklet(s) issued to the original passport, the additional booklet(s)plus the original passport must be furnished.”

Furthermore, the Ministry also permits change of appearance inDits records if it has changed significantly over time, thus:

“Change in appearance

If your appearance has changed significantly since your lastpassport was made, you can apply for fresh passport with arecent photograph.”

136. What emerges from the above analysis is that thegovernment(s) is cognizant of its duty to upgrade its identity records intune with changing requirements of the citizens. From reasons purelypersonal to reasons flowing from life events such as marriage, death ormigration, the authorities are responsive to the changing needs of citizens.FAs per the nature of identity, changes are permissible. In light of theclear dicta in National Legal Services Authority[49 ]and K.S.Puttaswamy[50], it is bounden duty of all state instrumentalities to playthe role of enablers in the exercise of rights by the citizens, including tocorrect their records owing to purely personal choices of the citizens.GFor instance, “gender” is an evolving concept which could warrantchanges in identity documents. In such cases, too much insistence ondisclosure of reasons could be invasive to privacy. Though, in an ultimate

49 supra at Footnote No.34H50 supra at Footnote No.36

analysis, this exercise of examining the reasons has to be left to thecourt of law empowered to permit changes in specific factual scenario.

137. No doubt, it is true that CBSE certificates are not strictlymeant to be considered as identity documents, however, the same arebeing relied upon for corroborative purposes in all academic and careerrelated transactions as foundational document. In fact, the CBSE itselfhas conceded to this fact that their certificates are relied for all officialpurposes, as noted above. The date of birth in matriculation certificate,in particular, is relied upon as primary evidence of date of birth of acitizen. Therefore, as regards the information contained in CBSEcertificate, the Board must afford opportunity to the students to modifyit subject to complying with requisite formalities which are reasonable innature. If all other State agencies could allow it for the preservance ofconsistency and accuracy, alongside being enablers in free exercise ofrights by the citizens, there is no reason for the CBSE to not uphold thatright of the students. More so, it would be in the interest of CBSE’s owncredibility that their records are regarded as accurate and latest recordsof student worthy of being relied upon for official purposes. Therefore,this approach would serve twin purposes – enabling free exercise ofrights and preservance of accuracy.

138. We must, however, note that the justiciability of the requestedchanges can of course be gone into. Every agency has its own methodof verification while accepting or rejecting changes in their records. Forinstance, some agencies use sworn affidavits for carrying out changes,some agencies require prior permission by court of law. The CBSEitself uses the same mechanism – prior permission by court of law andpublication in official gazette. We may discuss the relevance of priorpermission by court in deciding the questions of justiciability andgenuineness of requested changes at later stage.

139. Law gives no recognition to an act of shunning essentialduties by an entity of the State. There is settled body of cases whichexpounds that body entrusted with essential public functions cannotunduly put fetters on its powers. In Indian Aluminium Company[51],this Court noted the proposition thus:

“12. This case was followed by Russell. J. in York Corporation v.Henry Leetham & Sons Ltd.[52]. There, the plaintiff-corporation51 supra at Footnote No.652 (1924) 1 Ch 557

1174SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Awas entrusted by statute with the control of navigation in part ofthe rivers Ouse and Fose with power to charge such tolls withinlimits, as the corporation deemed necessary to carry on the twonavigations in which the public had an interest. The corporationmade two contracts with the defendants under which they agreedto accept, in consideration of the right to navigate the Ouse, aBregular annual payment of £600 per annum in place of theauthorised tolls. The contract in regard to navigation of the Fosewas on similar lines. It was held by Russell, J. that the contractswere ultra vires and void because under them the corporation haddisabled itself, whatever emergency might arise, from exercisingCits statutory powers to increase tolls as from time to time might benecessary. The learned Judge, after citing Ayr Harbour’s case[53]and another case Straffordshire and Worcestershire CanalNavigation v. Birmingham Canal Navigation[54] observed:

The same principle underlies many other cases which showDthe incapacity of body charged with statutory powers forpublic purposes to divest itself of such powers or to fetteritself in the use of such powers.

13. Finally Lord Parker, C.J. said in Southend-on-Sea Corporationv. Hodgson (Wickford) Ltd.[55]:

EThere is long line of cases to which we have not beenspecifically referred which lay down that public authoritycannot by contract fetter the exercise of its discretion.”

(emphasis supplied)

FSimilar proposition is enunciated in J.K. Aggarwal[56] In the contextof CBSE, the Delhi High Court in Dhruva Parate[57] noted how CBSEhas created self-imposed restrictions in its Byelaws by permitting nochange of name. The Court deprecated this exercise of discretion andnoted thus:

“8. The interests of efficiency of an organization ordinarilyGdetermine the guidelines that have to be administered; yet when

53 (1883) 8 App 62354 1866 LR 1 HL 25455 1961 2 All ER 4656 supra at Footnote No.7H57 supra at Footnote No.4

they constrain the authorities of the organization, which is meantto sub-serve the general public, from doing justice, in individualcases, the guidelines become self-defeating. In such cases, as inthe present one, the end result would mean that the petitionerwould be left with two certificates with different names and awhole lifetime spent possibly on explaining the difference – hardlyconducive to him, reflecting the inadequacy in the system.”

In light of the above discussion, we must note that there are norestrictions on the power of CBSE to permit change of name. TheConstitution, Resolution and Regulations are functional documents ofthe Board and none of these documents provide for any such fetters.Therefore, in the exercise of its discretion, the Board cannot put fetterson its duties so as to cause grave prejudice to the students with legitimatecauses for changing their certificates. The exercise of discretion in thisnegative manner would be arbitrary and unreasonable, at best.

140. We, thus, hold that the provision regarding change of name“post publication of examination results” is excessively restrictive andimposes unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of rights under Article19. We make it clear that the provision for change of name is clearlyseverable from those for corrections in name/date of birth and therefore,our determination shall not affect them except as regards the conditionof limitation period, in terms of the aforesaid discussion and guidelinesstated later.

141. Let us now understand the journey of examination byelawsfrom 1995 to 2018, as they sailed through multiple amendments over thecourse of time.

142. We may begin with Byelaws which were in force upto 2007i.e., upto the 2007 amendment. Byelaw 69 dealt with “Changes in Board’sCertificate” wherein Byelaw 69.1 covered “Changes and Correctionsin Name” and 69.2 covered “Change/Correction in Date of Birth”. Onan understanding of the language adopted in the Byelaws, we must noteat the very outset that the terms “correction” and “change” are not usedinterchangeably in the Byelaws. Whereas, the term “correction” denotesspelling errors, factual errors or typographical errors and the term“change” denotes complete change of name. For ready reference, asummary of the development of Examination Byelaws can be tabulatedas follows:

1176SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2021] 4 S.C.R.ABCDEFGH

143. The aforesaid table depicts that there is hardly any consistencyin the Examination Byelaws operating during the relevant period, eitherin the scope of permissible changes or in the timelines provided foreffecting such changes. Presumably, drawing upon experiences andjudicial pronouncements, the Board had to carry out frequent amendmentsin the Byelaws, sometimes to do somersault and go back to the earlierposition. By and large, the impression gathered from the above tabularanalysis is that the Board has been groping in the dark without having anall-purpose long term objective policy in place as regards permissiblechanges.EXAMINATION OF VALIDITY OF BYELAWS

144. At the outset, we note that there are certain characteristicsof changes that students usually apply for being recorded in theircertificates. Change of name of the student/father/mother, correction inname of the student/father/mother and correction in date of birth are theprimary ones. All these changes cannot be weighed with the same scale.Even in the Byelaws, all these changes are not subjected to the same setof restrictions/conditions and different changes are circumscribed bydifferent conditions.

145. The conditions regarding “correction” in name or date ofbirth are not as stringent as conditions applicable to change thereof. Forcorrection in name, the 2018 Byelaws provide for limitation period offive years and permit such corrections that can be characterized astypographical, factual or spelling mistake in comparison with schoolrecords. Understandably, correction would mean retention of the originalrecord with slight modification to make it consistent with the schoolrecords. This requirement of modification could be born out of variousreasons, namely typographical mistake at the time of publishing, spellingerror or factual error i.e., an error of fact as it existed at the time whenthe certificate was published. Thus, correction in name is done to bringunanimity between the school records (as they existed at the time ofsending information to the Board) and CBSE certificates. However, ifschool records are altered afterwards and Board is called upon to alterits certificates in light of the updated school records, the same cannot betermed as correction per se but would be in the nature of recordingchange. Therefore, substantially deviating from “correction”, theByelaws provide for an option to “change” the name, which is subject todifferent conditions.

A146. Similar provision is available for “correction” in date of birth,either on the basis of school records or on the basis of order of court.The word “change” is not used for date of birth as, unlike name, therecan only be one date of birth and there can only be correction to makeit consistent with school record or order of Court. It cannot be changedto replace the former with fresh date of one’s choice. Be it noted,Bprovisions relating to correction in date of birth and name are just andreasonable and do not impose any unreasonable restriction onpermissibility of corrections. The restriction regarding limitation periodshall be examined later, along with other provisions.

147. The provision for “change” of name is far more stringentCand calls for thorough review to settle the correct position. As per thepresent law, change of name is permissible upon fulfilment of two priorconditions – prior permission of the Court of law and publication of theproposed change in official gazette. These conditions co-exist withanother condition predicating that both prior permission and publicationDmust be done before the publication of result. What it effectively meansis that change of name would simply be impermissible after the publicationof result of the candidate even if the same is permitted by Court of lawand published in official gazette. In other words, once the examinationresult of the candidate has been published, the Board would only permitcorrections in name mentioned in the certificate. Further, changing theEname out of freewill is simply ruled out.148. Notably, the cases before us pertain to different periods. Asaforesaid, the CBSE byelaws which existed prior to 2007 were different.The summary of the journey of the examination byelaws from 2007 till2018 has been tabulated hitherto. The distinction between “correction”Fand “change” was always well-demarcated including prior to 2007. Asregards the correction which could mean to carry out modification tomake it consistent with school record but when it came to request forchange of name of the candidate or his parents, that could be done onlyafter complying with the pre-conditions specified therefor. However,Gwhen it came to change in the date of birth that was completely prohibited.Only correction regarding date of birth was permitted to be madeconsistent with the school record. And for which limitation of two yearsfrom declaration of result was specified. The requirement of two yearscannot be considered as unreasonable restriction. The candidate and hisparents are expected to be vigilant and to take remedial measuresH

immediately after declaration of result of the candidate. That too forbeing made consistent with school record. The Board must follow thediscipline of continuation of entries in the school record as it is vital forpursuing further and higher education including career opportunities bythe candidate. Significantly, the position as obtained prior to 2007 did notprovide for any time limit within which correction of candidate’s nameor of his parents was to be pursued. These restrictions are certainlyreasonable restrictions while recognising the enabling power of the Boardto alter its record in the form of certificates issued to the candidateconcerned to make it consistent with the school records or otherwise.

149. Suffice it to observe that frequent amendments in the Byelawshave been made providing for different dispensations for the relevantperiod. For the nature of final directions that we propose to issue, it maynot be necessary to dilate on the validity of the concerned Byelaw asamended from time to time. Broadly, it can be noted that the Byelawrecognises two different dispensations. First is to carry out modificationsin the original certificate on request for making it consistent with theschool records of the incumbent. The second is to incorporate particularsin the original certificate which are different from the school records.

150. Indisputably, the candidate would pursue further educationand explore future career opportunities on the basis of school recordsincluding the CBSE Board. The CBSE maintains its official records inrespect of candidate on the basis of foundational documents being theschool records. Therefore, the CBSE is obliged to carry out all necessarycorrections to ensure that CBSE certificate is consistent with the relevantinformation furnished in the school records as it existed at the relevanttime and future changes thereto including after the publication of resultsby the CBSE. However, when it comes to recording any information inthe original certificate issued by the CBSE which is not consistent withthe school records, it is essential that the CBSE must insist for supportingpublic document which has presumptive value and in the given casedeclaration by Court of law to incorporate such change. In thatregard, the CBSE can insist for additional conditions to reassure itselfand safeguard its interest against any claim by third party/body becauseof changes incorporated by it pursuant to application made by thecandidate. In the concluding paragraph, we intend to issue directions tothe CBSE Board in light of the discussion in this judgment. For the natureof uniform directions that we propose to issue so as to obviate any

Ainconsistent approach in the cases under consideration including futurecases to be dealt with by the CBSE Board, it is not necessary for us todilate on the question of validity of the respective amendments in therelevant Byelaws effected from time to time.

Point No. 3

BBINDING VALUE OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS

151. Whether CBSE is obliged to effect changes in the certificatesissued by it upon production of updated public documents (other thanschool records), is the next issue for consideration. According to theBoard, it would not be permissible as it has no independent mechanismCto verify the genuineness of the public documents. Even under theByelaws, there is no requirement for the Board to verify the genuinenessof the documents. It is simply not the job of the Board.

152. The Byelaws provide for two-tier mechanism for recordingchange of name or other details (as indicated above). One of them isDprior permission or declaration by Court of law to be obtained. Asregards public documents like Birth Certificate, Official Gazette, AadhaarCard, Election Card, etc., the same enjoy legal presumption of itscorrectness in terms of explicit provisions contained in Chapter V of the1872 Act. The 1872 Act extends such presumption in terms of Section76 read with Sections 79 and 80 of the 1872 Act and as in the case ofEOfficial Gazette under Section 81 of the same Act. Even other legislationsconcerning public documents attach equal importance to the authenticityof such documents including while making changes in their certificatesto which we have alluded to in this judgment. Understood thus, there isno reason for the CBSE Board to not take notice of the public documentsFrelied upon by the candidate and to record change on that basis in thecertificate issued by it, for being consistent with the relied upon publicdocuments. It matters not if the information furnished in the publicdocuments is not entirely consistent with the school records of theincumbent. The CBSE while accepting those documents as foundationalGdocuments for effecting changes consistent therewith may insist foradditional conditions and at the same time while retaining the originalentry make note in the form of caption/annotation in the fresh certificateto be issued by it while calling upon the incumbent to surrender theoriginal certificate issued by it to avoid any misuse thereof at laterpoint of time. It would be permissible for the CBSE to insist for swornH

affidavit to be given by the incumbent making necessary declaration andalso to indemnify the CBSE. The fresh certificate to be issued by theCBSE may also contain disclaimer of the Board clearly mentioning thatchange has been effected at the behest of the incumbent in light of thepublic documents relied upon by him. In addition, the incumbent can becalled upon to notify about the change in the Official Gazette and bygiving public notice as precondition for recording the change by way ofabundant precaution.

153. This Court in CIDCO vs. Vasudha GorakhnathMandevlekar[58], has observed that the records maintained by statutoryauthorities have presumption of correctness in their favour and theywould prevail over any entry made in the school register. The Courtobserved thus:

“18. The deaths and births register maintained by the statutoryauthorities raises presumption of correctness. Such entries madein the statutory registers are admissible in evidence in terms ofSection 35 of the Evidence Act. It would prevail over an entrymade in the school register, particularly, in absence of any proofthat same was recorded at the instance of the guardian of therespondent. (See Birad Mal Singhvi v. Anand Purohit[59].)”

The same position of law can be extended to the mandate laiddown in Right to Education Act and Chapter-3 of the CBSE Byelawsrelating to admission of students. Byelaw 6.1 is instructive and relevantextract thereof reads thus:

“6. Admission: General Conditions:

6.1 (a) student seeking admission to any class in ‘School’ willFbe eligible for admission to that Class only if he:

(iv) produces:

(c) For the purposes of admission to elementary education, theage of child shall be determined on the basis of the birth certificate

58 (2009) 7 SCC 283

59 AIR 1988 SC 1796

Aissued in accordance with the provisions of the Births, Deathsand Marriages Registration Act, 1886 or on the basis of suchother document, as may be prescribed, as stipulated in section14(1) of THE RIGHT OF CHILDREN TO FREE ANDCOMPULSORY EDUCATION ACT, 2009.

B(d) No child shall be denied admission in school for lack of ageproof, as stipulated in section 14(2) of THE RIGHT OFCHILDREN TO FREE AND COMPULSORY EDUCATIONACT, 2009.”

Therefore, even at elementary education level, there is clearClegislative intent to rely on statutory Birth Certificates for the purpose ofdate of birth. The authoritative value of these certificates is duly affirmedin this scheme.

154. There is no difficulty in correcting CBSE record to bring it inconformity with the school record. The difficulty arises when statutoryDdocument is not consistent with the school record. As observed earlier,the version supported by statutory documents could be reckoned for thepurpose of correction in CBSE certificate to make it consistent withpublic documents.

155. Post 2018 amendment of Byelaws, even in case of date ofEbirth, corrections are permitted on two basis – to bring in conformitywith school records and in pursuance of court order. The relevantprovision reads thus:

“A. “Correction as per the school records:

i. Corrections to correct typographical and other errors to makeFthe certificate consistent with the school records can be madeprovided that corrections in the school records should not havebeen made after the submission of application form for admissionto Examination to the Board.

...G...

B. Correction as per Court Orders.

Applications regarding correction in date of birth of candidateswill be considered provided the correction have been admitted bythe Court of law. In cases of correction in date of birth inH

documents after the court orders caption will be mentionedon the document “CORRECTION ALLOWED IN DATEOF BIRTH FROM _______ TO ___ ON (DATED) ____AS PER COURT ORDER NO. ____ DATED ____.”

156. When student applies to Court of law for prior permissionand/or declaration and produces public document(s), the Court wouldenter upon an inquiry wherein the legal presumption would operate infavour of the public document(s) and burden would shift on the partyopposing the change to rebut the presumption or oppose the claim onany other ground. The question of genuineness of the document includingits contents would be adjudicated in the same inquiry and the Court oflaw would permit the desired change only upon verifying the officialrecords and upon being satisfied of its genuineness. At the same time,the question of justiciability of the requested changes would be consideredand only upon being satisfied with the need demonstrated by the student,the Court would grant its permission. The said permission can then beplaced before the Board along with copy of publication in the officialgazette and requisite (prescribed) fee (if any). The Board would thenhave no locus to make further enquiry nor would be required to enterupon any further verification exercise.157. We may now advert to the dictum of the Kerala High Courtin Subin Mohammed[60]. The same has been relied upon in most of theimpugned judgments for permitting corrections. In that decision, the Courtdiscussed the inadequacies in the Byelaws and issued directions to CBSEto correct date of birth with reference to statutory Birth Certificatesprovided the request is found to be genuine. The operative directionsread thus:

“41. Hence, to meet the ends of justice, it will be appropriate forthis Court to dispose the Writ Petitions with the following directions:

(i) That CBSE shall correct the entries in the mark sheetof the petitioners with reference to their correspondingbirth certificates issued by the statutory authority, if therequest is found to be genuine.

(ii) Genuineness of the birth certificate can be ascertained fromthe respective local/statutory authority/Head of the Institutionor such other method, CBSE may deem it fit.

1184SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A(iii) CBSE can demand in advance consolidated fee, includingall expenses for processing such applications.

(iv) Each of the petitioners shall pay 5,000/- (Rupees Fivethousand only) as cost to CBSE within period of one month.”

(emphasis supplied)

Thus, the task of determining genuineness of the request was leftto the CBSE, which not only goes contrary to our discussion above butalso fails to take into account the limitations of CBSE as body. Whileconsidering requests for changes in certificates, CBSE cannot act as acourt and it cannot effectively consider any request over and aboveCthose requests that merely require bringing the certificates in conformitywith the school records or public documents, as the case may be.

Point No. 4

158. As noticed in the submissions above, there is conflict ofDopinion amongst the High Courts as regards the point of time whichwould determine the applicability of Byelaws. The frequent amendmentscarried out by the CBSE had made it imperative for the courts to grapplewith this question. The immediate question is whether the date ofdeclaration of result or the date of application for changes would bedeterminative of the applicable Byelaws. While addressing this question,Ethe Delhi High Court in Kalpana Thakur[61]took the view that the Byelawsexisting on the date of application would apply, irrespective of amendment.This view can be discerned from the following paragraphs of the judgment:

“12.2 In my view, the submission of Mr. Bansal that amendedBye-laws 69.1(i) would apply, is untenable, for simple reasonFthat the amendment to the said bye-law was notified only on25.06.2015; date which falls beyond the date on which theapplication for change of name was preferred in the instant case.The argument advanced in support of this submission by Mr. Bansalthat the Office Order was in place prior to the date of theapplication, in my view, will not sustain, as the Office Order, is anGinternal document, which could have no legal validity till the positiontaken therein is put in public realm. The very fact that notificationin respect of the amended Bye-law was issued by respondent no.

1/CBSE, would show, that the decision to amend bye-law 69.1(i)required public notice.

12.3 Consequently, all applications for change of name which arefiled prior to notification dated 25.06.2015, will be governed, inmy view, by the unamended Bye-law 69.1(i). Therefore, quitelogically, the petitioners, in my opinion, would have to be given thereliefs as sought in the writ petition.”

Notably, the question before the Court was slightly different. Itwas only whether the unamended Byelaws would continue to apply ifthe application was preferred before the date of amendment.Nevertheless, the Kerala High Court in Vyshnav[62]has taken differentview of the matter and observed that the Byelaws existing on the dateof passing out would apply. It observed thus:

“5. On an analysis of the said rule and amended provision it isevident that, the first respondent relied on an incorrect provisionin order to non-suit the petitioner by rejecting the applicationssubmitted for change of name. Therefore, Exts.P7 and P9 cannotbe sustained under law, since the same is violative of the ruleprovided for the purpose. Petitioner has passed out in the year2013 and therefore, the law as it stood then has to be taken in toaccount, since there is no retrospective operation to the amendment.Therefore, I quash Exts.P7 and P9, and direct the first respondentto re-consider the application submitted by the petitioner based onRule 69(1(i), as it stood before as is specified above.”

159. Considered in the context of the Byelaws, the controversy isactually simple in nature. The Byelaws consistently provide that the periodof limitation is to be calculated from the date of declaration of the resultand issue of certificate. It means that the period of limitation begins torun against the student after declaration of result and publication ofcertificates as the student is put to notice of the contents of the document,upon its issue. The student can now be said to be in position to verifythe correctness of the certificate(s). The irresistible outcome of thislegal position is that the Byelaws existing on the date of such declaration/publication of result and issue of certificate would be relevant for thepurpose of effecting changes in the certificates. The express languageof the Byelaws would be defeated if we say that the law existing on the

Adate of application for recording change would be relevant. That wouldnegate the very importance of having period of limitation for correctionof the certificates.

160. If the limitation of applicability of Byelaws was to be reckonedfrom the date of application for correction/change and not the date ofBresult of the examination conducted by CBSE, we would be leavingthings to state of uncertainty. For, student who could possibly havesurpassed the limitation period under unamended Byelaws would regainthe right to change the certificates if the Byelaws existing on the date ofapplication permit so and provide for longer period. Similarly, studentwho had ten years for carrying out changes under the unamendedCByelaws would lose her right if Byelaws are amended within the ten-year period so as to provide for much shorter, say two years, limitationperiod. Certainty, consistency and predictability are the hallmarks of anylegal relationship and it is in the interest of public policy that legalinterpretation preserves and protects these hallmarks. This determination,

Dhowever, is only to state the legal position and may not have any immediatebearing on the cases before us.

161. The CBSE also advanced an argument that no changes canbe permitted in its records as there is no fundamental right to claim thatchanged records be operative since birth and any change must only beEprospective and not retrospective. The crux of the argument can betraced from paragraph 23 of Rayaan Chawla[63] which has been reliedupon to buttress this submission. It reads thus:

“23. The legal position that would follow from the above conspectusof the judgments noted and cited by the learned Counsel for theFparties is that normally person would have right to have hisname changed subject to fulfilment of appropriate formalities/procedures to ensure that there is no misuse or confusion createdon account of the change in name. The change of name isprospective. ...”

GThough well-meaning argument advanced to minimise thepossibility of misuse, we are not inclined to accept it as something thatcould turn the case. The court, in Rayaan Chawla[64], accepted thatexpression of one’s name in the manner of their choice is indeed

63 supra at Footnote No.8H64 supra at Footnote No.8

fundamental right under Article 19(1)(a), but held that the right isprospective and does not extend to permitting changes in the documentsalready issued by the Board. It is pertinent to note that once changes arepermitted in the documents of CBSE, it does not ipso facto mean thatthe changes are given retrospective effect. The changes are indeedprospective and to signify that remedial measure is provided in theByelaws, as existing presently. They provide for the requirement of addinga caption/annotation with the date of such change along with the changedparticulars so as to indicate within the certificate that the changes havebeen made on date subsequent to the date of publishing the certificates.The requirement of caption/annotation is indeed sufficient safeguardto prevent the usage of subsequently altered documents as unchangedoriginal records.

Point No. 5

ISSUANCE OF MANDAMUS IN CONTRAVENTION OFBYELAWS

162. The next issue for consideration is whether it is proper forthe High Courts to issue mandamus to the CBSE for correction ofcertificates in complete contravention of the Byelaws, without examiningthe validity of the Byelaws. For issuing such directions, reliance hasbeen placed upon Subin Mohammed[65], wherein the Court noted thatthe case does not involve correction of typographical nature, aspermissible in the Byelaws, but went on to uphold the right of the studentto apply for changes on the basis of statutory certificate. It observedthus:

“35. Therefore, we have to proceed on the basis that the bye lawof CBSE cannot be applied to the fact situation. But to reconcilethe date of birth entry in the mark sheet with that of the entry inthe statutory certificate, the candidates should not be left withoutany remedy. Their right to approach the Court for redressing theirgrievance cannot be ruled out.”

The court then delineated the principles for issuance of writ ofmandamus and noted that in the strict sense, mandamus would not liebut considering the damage that the student could face as regards hiscareer prospects, the permission was granted. In paragraph 39, it notedthus:

A“39. It is contended that the future prospects of the petitioners tostudy or get employment abroad, will be substantially affected ifthe entry of date of birth in the mark sheet does not tally with thatin the birth certificate. Though writ of mandamus cannot beissued in the strict sense, we are of the view that, failure toexercise jurisdiction may put the petitioners to seriousBhardship. Hence, to render justice, it is always open for theCourt to pass appropriate orders, taking into account the factsand circumstances of each case. However, if disputed questionsof fact arises, it will not be appropriate for this Court to entertainthe matter.”

(emphasis supplied)

The law regarding the writ of mandamus is settled. The foremostrequirement for issuance of mandamus is the existence of legal rightagainst body which is either public body or non-public bodyperforming public function. In Binny Ltd.[66], this Court summed up theDprinciple thus:

“29. Thus, it can be seen that writ of mandamus or the remedyunder Article 226 is pre-eminently public law remedy and is notgenerally available as remedy against private wrongs. It is usedfor enforcement of various rights of the public or to compel public/Estatutory authorities to discharge their duties and to act withintheir bounds. It may be used to do justice when there is wrongfulexercise of power or refusal to perform duties. This writ isadmirably equipped to serve as judicial control over administrativeactions. This writ could also be issued against any private body orFperson, specially in view of the words used in Article 226 of theConstitution. However, the scope of mandamus is limited toenforcement of public duty. The scope of mandamus is determinedby the nature of the duty to be enforced, rather than the identityof the authority against whom it is sought. If the private body isdischarging public function and the denial of any right is inGconnection with the public duty imposed on such body, the publiclaw remedy can be enforced. The duty cast on the public bodymay be either statutory or otherwise and the source of such poweris immaterial, but, nevertheless, there must be the public lawelement in such action. Sometimes, it is difficult to distinguish

between public law and private law remedies. According toHalsbury’s Laws of England, 3rd Edn., Vol. 30, p.682,

“1317. public authority is body, not necessarily countycouncil, municipal corporation or other local authority, whichhas public or statutory duties to perform and which performthose duties and carries out its transactions for the benefit ofthe public and not for private profit.”

There cannot be any general definition of public authority or publicaction. The facts of each case decide the point.”

In the present case, the question is not whether CBSE wasamenable to writ of mandamus or not. For, we have already held theBoard being public body is performing public function. The questionis whether there was an enforceable legal right in favour of students toseek such direction and whether Byelaws have the force of law anddirections can be issued by the court only in conformity thereof.

163. The impugned judgments categorically note that the requestfor changes could not be permitted as per the Byelaws. Thus, there wasno demonstration or inquiry to determine the existence of any legal rightin favour of students. Even if we assume that courts issued directionspurely on the basis of fundamental rights, there is no discussion or inquiryin this regard. More so, there is no attempt to examine the vires of theByelaws in light of the breach of fundamental rights, as discussed in theinitial part of this judgment. Absent any such adverse determination onthe validity of the applicable rules, the fundamental principle of rule oflaw demands that such rules be given their intended effect. Even if aconstitutional Court feels that the case at hand is deserving of anextraordinary remedy, it may do so using its wide powers under Article226 but only upon specific appraisal of the facts of the case and afterduly demonstrating the extraordinary character of the case. Despiteholding that the prayers are impermissible under the Byelaws, the Courtsin the present set of cases went on to issue directions to the Boardwithout having any regard to the factual circumstances of the case or tothe nature of changes sought by the students, by mechanically relyingupon the dictum in Subin Mohammed[67]. We must note that SubinMohammed[68] is not in challenge before us but must be now understood

67 supra at Footnote No.12

68 supra at Footnote No.12

Ain terms of opinion recorded in this judgment. Our concern is with themanner in which mechanical reliance has been placed upon the earlierdecision for deciding cases which involved an altogether different set ofchanges.

164. Once Court of law notes that the applicable rules do notBpermit it to grant particular relief and it still goes on to grant the reliefon sympathetic grounds, such decisions can in no way be treated asprecedents. We are constrained to note that following such decision asprecedent will be in utter disregard of the well-established principle of“equity acts in personam” and, thus, courts cannot deploy equity in“rem” by replicating the same order, disregarding the personalCcharacteristics of the case at hand. There can be no application of SubinMohammed[69] to different set of facts.

165. The High Courts, being constitutional Courts, are duly vestedwith the power to review any law in light of Part-III. Despite beingcalled upon to do so, if they choose not to do it, the same cannot beDcountenanced. There cannot be mechanical directions by way ofmandamus to public authority without going into the veracity of theclaims and without sufficiently explaining why the case demandsextraordinary treatment.

166. In fact, in Md. Sarifuz Zaman[70], two-Judge Bench of thisECourt noted that such exercise of power in itself would be arbitrary. Itobserved thus:

“10. ...People, institutions and government departments, etc.— all attach very high degree of reliability, near finality, tothe entries made in the certificates issued by the Board. TheFfrequent exercise of power to correct entries in certificatesand that too without any limitation on exercise of such powerwould render the power itself arbitrary and may result ineroding the credibility of certificates issued by the Board. We,therefore, find it difficult to uphold the contention that the applicantsGseeking correction of entries in such certificates have any suchright or vested right.”

(emphasis supplied)

69 supra at Footnote No.12H70 supra at Footnote No.16

Thus, the Courts need to be extra cautious and alive to theimmediate factual position before permitting changes. No two requestsfor change of name or change in date of birth can be viewed with thesame judicial eye. Sometimes, change of name could be necessity,sometimes it could be pure exercise of freewill without any need. Aslong as Byelaws or the applicable rules permit so, there is no occasionfor any court to deny such relief. But when Byelaws do not permit forthe same, the Court must be circumspect before issuing directions, thattoo without commenting upon the validity of the Byelaws and withoutdemonstrating the rights which are at stake – constitutional or legal.

167. Before proceeding further, we must briefly note that thedictum of this Court in Md. Sarifuz Zaman[71] has been relied upon bythe Board to contend that it prohibits any change in contravention of theByelaws as it does not recognize any legal right to claim such changesbeyond the prescribed conditions. It has also been asserted thatMd. Sarifuz Zaman[72]and Subin Mohammed[73] contradict each other.Whether the two judgments are in conflict with each other is anexamination that is not called for. For, we have not placed any relianceupon Subin Mohammed[74] for deciding this case and also because Md.Sarifuz Zaman[75] is judgment of this Court as against SubinMohammed[76] is judgment of the Kerala High Court. It requires noreiteration that even if conflict exists, the judgment of this Court mustprevail under all circumstances unless there is another judgment of largerBench of this Court which takes different view.

168. Be that as it may, we must examine the dictum of this Courtin Md. Sarifuz Zaman[77]. The case involved request for correction ofclerical nature in date of birth to bring it in conformity with the correctschool records. Paragraph 3 notes thus:

“3. One of the respondents, student, having taken his educationin Government Boys Higher Secondary School, passed thematriculation examination conducted by the Board of SecondaryEducation, Assam, in the year 1991. Thereafter, he passed higher

71 supra at Footnote No.16

72 supra at Footnote No.16

73 supra at Footnote No.12

74 supra at Footnote No.12

75 supra at Footnote No.16

76 supra at Footnote No.12

77 supra at Footnote No.16

Asecondary examination and then BSc examination in the year 1998.When he filed the writ petition, he was undergoing course ofstudy in computers. At that point of time, on 12-10-1999, he movedan application to the Board complaining that his date of birth waswrongly mentioned in the school records as 30-5-1974, while hisactual date of birth was 16-8-1975. The mistaken date of birth, asBforwarded by the school, had crept into the admit card issued bythe Board. The writ petitioner student pleaded that he did notrealise the importance of the correct date of birth being enteredinto the school records, and therefore, he did not also realise theimplications thereof until he was prompted in moving theCapplication. The application moved by the respondent to thePrincipal of the school, was forwarded by the latter to the Board.The Principal indicated that the age of the respondent was enteredas 16-8-1975 in the admission register and other school records,but it was by mistake that while filling the form of the Boardexamination, the date of birth was wrongly entered as 30-5-1974.DThe Principal described the mistake as “clerical” and recommendedfor its correction. As the Board did not take any decision on theapplication, the respondent filed writ petition in the High Court.”

The Court was considering the Regulations framed under theAssam Secondary Education Act, 1961 which provided for three years’Eperiod post the declaration of result for effecting corrections in theircertificates. The student approached the Board after the expiry of threeyears and thus, the primary question before the Court was only whetherthe three years’ period would be enforced as per Regulations or anyrelaxation could be given. The Court refused to give any relaxation statingFthat expiry of limitation would extinguish the remedy. In paragraph 12, itnotes thus:

“12. Delay defeats discretion and loss of limitation destroys theremedy itself. Delay amounting to laches results in benefit ofdiscretionary power being denied on principles of equity. Loss ofGlimitation resulting into depriving of the remedy, is principle basedon public policy and utility and not equity alone. There ought to bea limit of time by which human affairs stand settled and uncertaintyis lost. Regulation 8 confers right on the applicant and powercoupled with an obligation on the Board to make correction in thedate of birth subject to the ground of wrong calculation or clerical

error being made out. reasonable procedure has been prescribedfor processing the application through the Inspector of Schoolswho would verify the school records and submit report to theBoard so as to exclude from consideration the claims other thanthose permissible within the framework of Regulation 8. Powerto pass order for correction is vested on high functionary likeSecretary of the Board. An inaccuracy creeping in at the stage ofwriting the certificates only, though all other prior documents arecorrect in all respects, is capable of being corrected within periodof three years from the date of issuance of certificate.”It, then, held the three years’ period to be reasonable time as itis sufficient time for student to notice any error in her certificates.Paragraph 13 notes thus:

“13. Three-year period provided by the Regulation, is veryreasonable period. On the very date of issuance of the certificate,the student concerned is put to notice as to the entries made in thecertificate. Everyone remembers his age and date of birth. Thestudent would realise within no time that the date of birth as enteredin the certificate is not correct, if that be so, once the certificate isplaced in his hands. Based on the certificate the applicant wouldseek admission elsewhere in an educational institution or mightseek job or career where he will have to mention his age anddate of birth. Even if he failed to notice the error on the date ofissuance of the certificate, he would come to know the sameshortly thereafter. Thus, the period of three years, as prescribedby Regulation 3, is quite reasonable. It is not something likeprescribing period of limitation for filing suit. Theprescription of three years is laying down of dividing linebefore which the power of the Board to make correction oughtto be invoked and beyond which it may not be invoked. Belatedapplications, if allowed to be received, may open Pandora’sbox. Records may not be available and evidence may have beenlost. Such evidence — even convenient evidence — may bebrought into existence as may defy scrutiny. The prescription ofthree years’ bar takes care of all such situations. The provision isneither illegal nor beyond the purview of Section 24 of the Actand also cannot be called arbitrary or unreasonable. The applicantsseeking rectification within period of three years form class

1194SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aby themselves and such prescription has reasonable nexus withthe purpose sought to be achieved. No fault can be found therewithon the anvil of Article 14 of the Constitution.”

It can be noticed that apart from wholly different factual matrix,the Court in Md. Sarifuz Zaman[78] was dealing with very narrowBquestion of reasonability of the limitation period for correcting clericalmistakes under the umbrella of statutory law. The Court had no occasionto deal with circumstances wherein person would want to change hername out of her freewill in exercise of her guaranteed fundamental rightsunder the Constitution. The Court was looking at it as purely civiltransaction and in fact, treated it like one while speaking of how theCexpiry of limitation would entirely bar the remedy. As already observedabove, we reiterate that we see difference between rights originatingunder the civil laws and rights considered to be fundamental under theConstitution and protected as such. The exercise of fundamental rightcan, at best, be regulated on reasonable grounds but not entirely foreclosedDwithout strong and legitimate purpose. Except that the dictum in Md.Sarifuz Zaman[79] pertains to the specific facts of its case and alsobecause no prejudice was actually caused to the student in that case(the changes were anyway permitted), we say no more.

CONCLUSION AND DIRECTIONS TO CBSE

169. Although we have discussed the broad issues canvassedbefore us, in the ultimate analysis the real dispute requiring resolution isabout the nature of correction or change, as the case may be, permissibleto be carried by the CBSE at the instance of the student including paststudent. As noted earlier, broadly, two situations would arise.F170. The first is where the incumbent wants “correction” in the

170. The first is where the incumbent wants “correction” in thecertificate issued by the CBSE to be made consistent with the particularsmentioned in the school records. As we have held there is no reason forthe CBSE to turn down such request or attach any precondition exceptreasonable period of limitation and keeping in mind the period for whichGthe CBSE has to maintain its record under the extant regulations. Whiledoing so, it can certainly insist for compliance of other conditions by theincumbent, such as, to file sworn affidavit making necessary declarationand to indemnify the CBSE from any claim against it by third party

78 supra at Footnote No.16H79 supra at Footnote No.16

because of such correction. The CBSE would be justified in insisting forsurrender/return of the original certificate (or duplicate original certificate,as the case may be) issued by it for replacing it with the fresh certificateto be issued after carrying out necessary corrections with caption/annotation against the changes carried out and the date of such correction.It may retain the original entries as it is except in respect of correction ofname effected in exercise of right to be forgotten. The fresh certificatemay also contain disclaimer that the CBSE cannot be held responsiblefor the genuineness of the school records produced by the incumbent insupport of the request to record correction in the original CBSEcertificate. The CBSE can also insist for reasonable prescribed fees tobe paid by the incumbent in lieu of administrative expenses for issuingfresh certificate. At the same time, the CBSE cannot impose preconditionof applying for correction consistent with the school records only beforepublication of results. Such condition, as we have held, would beunreasonable and excessive. We repeat that if the application forrecording correction is based on the school records as it obtained at thetime of publication of results and issue of certificate by the CBSE, it willbe open to CBSE to provide for reasonable limitation period within whichthe application for recording correction in certificate issued by it may beentertained by it. However, if the request for recording change is basedon changed school records post the publication of results and issue ofcertificate by the CBSE, the candidate would be entitled to apply forrecording such change within the reasonable limitation period prescribedby the CBSE. In this situation, the candidate cannot claim that she hadno knowledge about the change recorded in the school records becausesuch change would occur obviously at her instance. If she makes suchapplication for correction of the school records, she is expected to applyto the CBSE immediately after the school records are modified andwhich ought to be done within reasonable time. Indeed, it would beopen to the CBSE to reject the application in the event the period forpreservation of official records under the extant regulations had expiredand no record of the candidate concerned is traceable or can bereconstructed. In the case of subsequent amendment of school records,that may occur due to different reasons including because of choiceexercised by the candidate regarding change of name. To put it differently,request for recording of correction in the certificate issued by the CBSEto bring it in line with the school records of the incumbent need not belimited to application made prior to publication of examination results ofthe CBSE.

A171. As regards request for “change” of particulars in thecertificate issued by the CBSE, it presupposes that the particulars intendedto be recorded in the CBSE certificate are not consistent with the schoolrecords. Such request could be made in two different situations. Thefirst is on the basis of public documents like Birth Certificate, AadhaarCard/Election Card, etc. and to incorporate change in the CBSE certificateBconsistent therewith. The second possibility is when the request forchange is due to the acquired name by choice at later point of time.That change need not be backed by public documents pertaining to thecandidate.

(a) Reverting to the first category, as noted earlier, there is aClegal presumption in relation to the public documents as envisaged in the1872 Act. Such public documents, therefore, cannot be ignored by theCBSE. Taking note of those documents, the CBSE may entertain therequest for recording change in the certificate issued by it. This, however,need not be unconditional, but subject to certain reasonable conditions toDbe fulfilled by the applicant as may be prescribed by the CBSE, such as,of furnishing sworn affidavit containing declaration and to indemnify theCBSE and upon payment of prescribed fees in lieu of administrativeexpenses. The CBSE may also insist for issuing Public Notice andpublication in the Official Gazette before recording the change in thefresh certificate to be issued by it upon surrender/return of the originalEcertificate (or duplicate original certificate, as the case may be) by theapplicant. The fresh certificate may contain disclaimer and caption/annotation against the original entry (except in respect of change ofname effected in exercise of right to be forgotten) indicating the date onwhich change has been recorded and the basis thereof. In other words,Fthe fresh certificate may retain original particulars while recording thechange along with caption/annotation referred to above (except in respectof change of name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten).

(b) However, in the latter situation where the change is to beeffected on the basis of new acquired name without any supportingGschool record or public document, that request may be entertained uponinsisting for prior permission/declaration by Court of law in that regardand publication in the Official Gazette including surrender/return of originalcertificate (or duplicate original certificate, as the case may be) issuedby CBSE and upon payment of prescribed fees. The fresh certificate asin other situations referred to above, retain the original entry (except inH

respect of change of name effected in exercise of right to be forgotten)and to insert caption/annotation indicating the date on which it has beenrecorded and other details including disclaimer of CBSE. This is sobecause the CBSE is not required to adjudicate nor has the mechanismto verify the correctness of the claim of the applicant.

172. In light of the above, in exercise of our plenary jurisdiction,we direct the CBSE to process the applications for correction or change,as the case may be, in the certificate issued by it in the respective casesunder consideration. Even other pending applications and futureapplications for such request be processed on the same lines and inparticular the conclusion and directions recorded hitherto in paragraphs170 and 171, as may be applicable, until amendment of relevant Byelaws.Additionally, the CBSE shall take immediate steps to amend its relevantByelaws so as to incorporate the stated mechanism for recordingcorrection or change, as the case may be, in the certificates alreadyissued or to be issued by it.

173. Accordingly, we dispose of the cases before us with directionsto the CBSE as noted in paragraphs 170 to 172 above. No order as tocosts.

Devika Gujral

Directions issued.