V. SENTHUR AND ANOTHER versus M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADU PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANOTHER

[2021] 10 S.C.R.

V. SENTHUR AND ANOTHER

M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADUPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION AND ANOTHER

B(Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 638 of 2017)

(Civil Appeal No. 4954 of 2016)

OCTOBER 01, 2021

C[L. NAGESWARA RAO AND B.R. GAVAI, JJ.]

Contempt of Court – Service Law – Doctrine of Merger –Seniority List – Dispute w.r.t fixation of inter se seniority – Principleof law to be applied – Wilful/deliberate non-compliance of directions– Division Bench of the High Court directed the official respondentsDto consider the rank assigned to the selectees by Tamil Nadu PublicService Commission (TNPSC) as the basis for fixation of seniority –SLPs thereagainst – Dismissed by Supreme Court by speakingorder dtd. 22.01.16 – Contempt petitioners allege non-complianceof the said order, contending merger of the High Court judgmentinto it – Held: If the order of dismissal of SLPs is supported byEreasons, then also the doctrine of merger is not attracted – However,the reasons stated by the Supreme Court would attract Article 141and the law declared would be binding on all the courts/tribunalsand the parties thereto – Thus, in the present case, though thejudgment of the High Court did not merge into the order dtd.F22.01.16, still the declaration of law made in the said order wasbinding on the parties – While dismissing the SLPs, the SupremeCourt held that after the judgment in Bimlesh Tanwar v. State ofHaryana and Others reported as [2003] 2 SCR 757, the fundamentalprinciple governing the determination of seniority was that, it shouldbe based on merit list of selection and that the list made on the basisGof roster point would not be permissible in law – Respondents werebound to follow the law laid down and determine the inter se seniorityon the basis of selection by TNPSC and not on the basis of rosterpoint – Seniority list purportedly published in accordance with thesaid order is in breach of the directions of Supreme Court –HRespondents to revise and publish the seniority list– Contemnors to

V. SENTHUR v. M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADUPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

be heard on the quantum of punishment – Constitution of India –Article 141.

Contempt of Court – Contempt jurisdiction – Limit of –Discussed.

Issuing directions in the contempt petitions and disposingof the SLPs, the Court

HELD: 1. In contempt jurisdiction, the court will not travelbeyond the original judgment and direction; neither would it bepermissible for the court to issue any supplementary or incidentaldirections, which are not to be found in the original judgment andorder. [Para 14][209-C-D]

2. The High Court clearly observed that the case beforethe High Court was not individualistic in nature, depending uponindividual dates, facts and sequence of events. It further observedthat it arose out of the most fundamental question as to theprinciple of law to be applied in the matter of fixation of seniority.[Para 17][210-B]

3.1 If the order of dismissal of SLPs is supported by reasons,then also the doctrine of merger would not be attracted. Still thereasons stated by the court would attract applicability of Article141of the Constitution of India, if there is law declared by thisCourt which obviously would be binding on all the courts and thetribunals in India and certainly, the parties thereto. No court,tribunal or party would have the liberty of taking or canvassing anyview contrary to the one expressed by this Court. Such an orderwould mean that it has declared the law and in that light, the casewas considered not fit for grant of leave. [Para 22][212-F-H]

Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Kerala andAnother (2000) 6 SCC 359 : [2000] 1 Suppl. SCR 538– relied on.

3.2 This Court, while dismissing the SLPs against thejudgment clearly held that after the emergence of the judgmentin Bimlesh Tanwar, the fundamental principle governing thedetermination of seniority was that, it should be based on meritlist of selection and that the list made on the basis of roster point,

Awould not be permissible in law. Thus, while dismissing the SLPs,this Court has reiterated the legal position as laid down in thecase of Bimlesh Tanwar to the effect that while determiningseniority, what is relevant is the inter se merit in the selection listand not the roster point. It is pertinent to note that though, thethen learned Attorney General had raised an issue with regard toBa contrary view taken by the Madurai Bench of the same HighCourt, this Court clearly held that since the issue was nowcovered by the decision of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar, thependency of the SLPs challenging the judgment of Madurai Bench,would be of no consequence inasmuch as the said SLPs would beCgoverned by the judgment of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar. It isthus clear that though it cannot be said that the judgment of theMadras High Court has merged into the order of this Court dated22[nd] January 2016, still the declaration of law as made in the saidorder, would be binding on all the courts and tribunals in thecountry and in any case, between the parties. In that view of theDmatter, the respondents were bound to follow the law laid downby this Court and determine the inter se seniority on the basis ofselection by TNPSC and not on the basis of roster point. The lisbetween the parties is concerned, it has achieved finality by theorder of this Court dated 22[nd] January 2016. The seniority listEpurportedly published in accordance with the order of this Court,is totally in breach of the directions of this Court. The respondentsto revise and publish the seniority list of the selectees, who wereselected in the selection process conducted in pursuance of thenotification issued by TNPSC dated 10[th] September 1999, strictlyon the basis of the merit determined by it in the selection processFand not on the basis of the roster point. The same shall be donewithin period of 12 weeks from the date of this order. Thepersons named in order dated 11[th] February 2021 are guilty ofhaving committed contempt of order of this Court, would be heardon the quantum of punishment. [Paras 23-29][213-A-E, G;G214-F-H]

Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and Others (2003)5 SCC 604: [2003] 2 SCR 757; P.S. Ghalaut v. State ofHaryana and Others (1995) 5 SCC 625: [1995] 2 Suppl.SCR 506; Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another v. Tarak

V. SENTHUR v. M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADUPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION

Nath Ganguly and Others (2002) 5 SCC 352 : [2002]3 SCR 913; Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Limitedand Others v. Chunilal Nanda and Others (2006) 5 SCC399: [2006] 2 Suppl. SCR 986; V.M. Manohar Prasadv. N. Ratnam Raju and Another (2004) 13 SCC 610;Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and Managing Director,Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and Othersv. M.George Ravishekaran and Others (2014) 3 SCC373 : [2014] 4 SCR 27 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

INHERENT/CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: ContemptPetition (Civil) No.638 of 2017.

Civil Appeal No.4954 Of 2016.

Petition filed for Contempt of this Court Order dated 22.01.2016in SLP(C) Nos.2890-2894 of 2016 and SLP(C) No.2886 of 2016.

With

Contempt Petition (Civil) No. of 2021 [Diary No.16048 of 2020]in Slp (C) Nos.2890-2894 of 2016, Contempt Petition (Civil) No. of 2021[Diary No.6415 of 2021] in Slp (C) No.2886 of 2016, Contempt Petition(Civil) No.1848 of 2018 in Slp (C) No.2886 of 2016, Contempt Petition(Civil) No.2188 of 2018 in Slp (C) No.2886 of 2016, Slp (C) Nos.12114-12117 of 2021, Contempt Petition (Civil) No.1247 of 2019 in Slp (C)No.2886 of 2016, Contempt Petition (Civil) No.687 of 2021 in Slp (C)Nos.2890-2894 of 2016,

Nithin Saravanan, Ms. Arunima Singh, Karunakar Mahalik,Ms. Priyadarshini, Ms. Ridhima Malhotra, Prashant Bhushan, Pranav

ASachdeva, N. Subramaniyan, Jatin Bhardwaj, Ms. Shantha D. Raman,Garvesh Kabra, Arihant Jain, Ms. Neha Rathi, Advs. for the Appellants.

Amit Anand Tiwari, V. Krishnamurthy, AAGs, V. Giri, P. Wilson,C. S. Vaidyanathan, Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Advs., Vinodh Kanna B., M.Yogesh Kanna, T. R. B. Sivakumar, Ms. C. N. G. Niraimathi, Dr. JosephBAristotle S., Nitish Raj, Akshay Nagarajan, Mohammed Sadique T. A.,Ms. Preeti Singh, Ms. Ripul Swati Kumari, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Order of the Court was passed by

B. R. GAVAI, J.

C1. The present contempt petitions have been filed by the petitionerspraying for initiation of contempt proceedings against the allegedcontemnors-respondents for willfully disobeying the order passed by thisCourt dated 22[nd] January 2016 in SLP(C) Nos. 2890-2894 of 2016 andSLP(C) No. 2886 of 2016.

D2. Brief facts giving rise to the filing of the present petitions are asunder:-

The contempt petitioners had filed writ petitions before the SingleJudge of the Madras High Court being aggrieved by the fixation of interse seniority list published on 29[th] April 2004. The petitioners along withthe contesting respondents were selected in pursuance of the selectionEprocess held on the basis of the notification dated 10[th] September 1999,issued by the Tamil Nadu Public Service Commission (hereinafter referredto as “TNPSC”). Upon selection, the selectees were appointed in thePublic Works Department of the State of Tamil Nadu and the HighwaysDepartment in the year 2000.F

3. After period of 4 years from the date of joining of the selectees,the seniority list came to be notified on 29[th] April 2004. One R.Balakrishnan made representation contending therein that though hewas more meritorious candidate belonging to the Backward Classcategory, he was allotted to the General Turn (open category) and keptGat Serial No. 172 of the roster point. It was however his contention thatthe other persons belonging to the Backward Classes, who were lessmeritorious, were placed higher in the list and given seniority over andabove him since they were placed against reserved vacancies. Therepresentation of R. Balakrishnan was rejected by TNPSC vide orderdated 20[th] December 2004, on the ground that the roster point itselfH

V. SENTHUR v. M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADUPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

determined the seniority, in view of the decision of this Court in the caseof P.S. Ghalaut v. State of Haryana and Others[1]. Being aggrieved bythe said order dated 20[th] December 2004, R. Balakrishnan and fewothers filed various writ petitions before the Madras High Court. Thesaid writ petitions came to be dismissed vide judgment and order dated18[th] October 2012, passed by the Single Judge of the Madras High Court,on the ground of delay and laches.

4. Being aggrieved thereby, the original writ petitioners preferredappeals before the Division Bench of the Madras High Court. TheDivision Bench vide judgment and order dated 31[st] March 2015(hereinafter referred to as “the first judgment”), allowed the appealsand set aside the judgment and order dated 18[th] October 2012, passedby the Single Judge and directed the official respondents to take therank assigned by TNPSC to the selectees, as the basis for fixation ofseniority. The Division Bench also directed TNPSC to issue appropriateorders within period of 4 weeks from the date of receipt of copy ofthe said order. The same came to be challenged before this Court byTNPSC vide SLP(C) Nos. 2890-2894 of 2016. This Court vide itsjudgment and order dated 22[nd] January 2016, by speaking order,dismissed the same. The present contempt petitions are filed contendingnon-compliance of the order passed by this Court dated 22[nd] January2016.

5. Certain developments which took place in the meanwhile alsoneed to be noted. To overcome the first judgment of the Madras HighCourt as affirmed by this Court, the State of Tamil Nadu enacted TamilNadu Government Servants (Conditions of Service) Act, 2016 (hereinafterreferred to as “the said Act”). Section 40 of the said Act provided thatthe seniority of person in service will be determined in accordancewith the rule of reservation and the order of rotation. The same came tobe challenged in batch of writ petitions before the Madras High Court.The Division Bench of the Madras High Court vide judgment and orderdated 15[th] November 2019 (hereinafter referred to as “the secondjudgment”), allowed the said writ petitions. It declared Sections 1(2), 40and 70 of the said Act as ultra vires and unconstitutional. It further directedto redo the exercise of fixation of seniority within period of 12 weeksfrom the date of receipt of the copy of said order. The said order of theHigh Court dated 15[th] November 2019, was challenged before this Court

Aby filing SLP(C) Nos. 2861-2876 of 2020. This Court passed the followingorder on 6[th] July 2020:-

“Permission to file Special Leave Petition(s) is granted.

Application for impleadment is allowed to the extent of intervention.

BThere is absolutely no merit in these petitions. The Special LeavePetitions are, accordingly, dismissed.

Pending application(s) is/are disposed of.”

6. After dismissal of the said SLPs, the official respondents hadfiled review petitions before the Division Bench of the High Court. SoCalso, certain contempt petitions were filed by the selectees, who wereaggrieved by non-revision of the seniority list. The Division Bench of theMadras High Court vide judgment and order dated 26[th] March 2021dismissed the review petitions, so also, the contempt petitions. The sameis challenged before this Court by the selectees, who were aggrieved bynon-revision of the seniority list, by filing SLP(C) Nos. 12114-12117 ofD2021.

7. The contempt petitions have been listed before this Court onvarious dates. Vide order dated 11[th] February 2021, this Court passedthe following order:-

E“In the meanwhile, the judgment dated 22.01.2016 shall beimplemented. In case the judgment is not implemented by thatdate, the following alleged contemnors/respondents shall be presentin this court on the next date of hearing:

C.P.(C)No.638 of 2017 in C.A.No.4954 of 2016

F1) M. Vijayakumar

2) S. Thinakaran

Dy No.16048 of 2020 in SLP(C) Nos.2890-2894 of 2016:

1) Dr. S. Swarna

G2) K. Ramamoorthy

3) K. Nanthakumar

C.P.(C) No.1247 of 2019 in SLP (C) No.2886 of 2016:

1) K. Shanmugam

H2) K. Nanthakumar

V. SENTHUR v. M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADUPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

3) Dr. K.Manivasan

4) K. Ramamurthy

C.P.(C)No.1848 of 2018 and C.P.(C)No.2188 of 2018 in SLP(C)No.2886 of 2016:

1) K. Nanthakumar

2) S. K. Prabhakar

3) S. Bakthavathchalam”

8. The contempt petitions have also been listed thereafter onvarious dates. Today, we have heard Shri Prashant Bhushan, learnedcounsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners, Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan,learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of TNPSC, Shri MukulRohatgi, Shri V. Giri and Shri P. Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearingon behalf of the respondents-alleged contemnors, at length.

9. Shri Prashant Bhushan submitted that the first judgment hasbeen merged into the order passed by this Court dated 22[nd] January2016. He submitted that in the said order, this Court has categoricallyheld that in view of the judgment in the case of Bimlesh Tanwar v.State of Haryana and Others[2], the seniority list has to be prepared onthe basis of merit list of selection and that the list drawn on roster pointwould not be valid in law. He submitted that the respondent authoritieshave not implemented the said order, on the contrary, revised senioritylist is published on 13[th] March 2021, contending that the said seniority listhas been published on the basis of the orders passed by this Court. Hesubmitted that perusal of the said seniority list would further show thatthe said list is prepared totally in breach of the judgment in the case ofBimlesh Tanwar (supra). It is thus submitted that by publishing the saidlist, the respondent authorities have not only committed the aggravatedcontempt of court but have also committed perjury.

10. Shri C.S. Vaidyanathan, Shri Mukul Rohatgi, Shri V. Giri andShri P. Wilson, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of therespondents, on the contrary, submitted that the contempt petitions arewithout any merit.

11. In nutshell, the contentions as raised on behalf of the saidrespondents are thus:-

2 (2003) 5 SCC 604

A(i)In the first judgment, the Division Bench of the MadrasHigh Court had granted relief to the individual petitioners.Understanding the same, the respondent authorities hadissued fresh seniority list, thereby granting the requisiteseniority to the individual petitioners.

B(ii)Perusal of the second judgment of the Madras High Courtdated 15[th] November 2019, would further fortify that therelief granted in earlier round was restricted to individualpetitioners. Relying on certain observations in the saidjudgment, it is submitted that the Division Bench has clearlyheld that the delay, laches, acquiescence and accrued rightCwould be the relevant factors and as such, the individualswho were not petitioners in the first round, are not entitledto get the seniority as per the first judgment of the MadrasHigh Court.

(iii)That the rights of the parties have been crystallized forDmore than almost two decades and upsetting those at thisstage, would cause great heart-burn amongst the employeesin the cadre.

(iv)That some of the employees have accepted the senioritylist and now the entire exercise cannot be redone to thrustEthe revised seniority on such employees.

(v)That in any case, the judgment of the Division Bench of theMadras High Court was capable of being interpreted asapplying only to the individuals and therefore, even if theofficial respondents have incorrectly understood theFjudgment, the non-compliance of the directions cannot beconsidered to be willful or deliberate and as such, the actionfor contempt would not lie.

12. In addition, Shri Rohatgi submitted that the contempt, if any, isof the order passed by the High Court. He submitted that since by theGorder dated 22[nd] January 2016, this Court has dismissed the SLPs albeitgiving certain reasons, the same would not amount to merger, and assuch, it cannot be held that the respondents have committed contempt ofthis Court. He further submitted that if tomorrow, merely upon dismissalof SLPs against the judgments of the High Court, the contempt petitionsare entertained contending contempt of this Court, it will open floodgateH

V. SENTHUR v. M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADUPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

of contempt petitions. He submitted that such practice would not beconducive to the interest of justice.

13. Shri Vaidyanathan relied on the following judgments of thisCourt in support of his submissions that, in contempt proceedings, theCourt cannot travel beyond the original judgment and order.

Jhareswar Prasad Paul and Another v. Tarak Nath Gangulyand Others[3], Midnapore Peoples’ Coop. Bank Limited and Othersv. Chunilal Nanda and Others[4], V.M. Manohar Prasad v. N. RatnamRaju and Another[5] and Sudhir Vasudeva, Chairman and ManagingDirector, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited and Others v.M. George Ravishekaran and Others[6].

14. There can be no quarrel with the proposition that in contemptjurisdiction, the court will not travel beyond the original judgment anddirection; neither would it be permissible for the court to issue anysupplementary or incidental directions, which are not to be found in theoriginal judgment and order. The court is only concerned with the wilfulor deliberate non-compliance of the directions issued in the originaljudgment and order.

15. At the outset, we may clarify that in the present proceedings,we are only concerned with the contempt of the order passed by thisCourt dated 22[nd] January 2016.

16. Insofar as the contention of the respondents that the issuebefore the High Court in the first round was individualistic in nature isconcerned, it will be relevant to refer to the following observations passedby the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the first judgment:-

“37. …..

(ii) The cases on hand are not individualistic in nature, dependingupon individual dates, facts and sequence of events. The caseson hand arise out of most fundamental question as to the principleof law to be applied in the matter of fixation of seniority. Thegrievance of the writ petitioners was not individualistic, dependingfor their adjudication, upon distinct facts. These cases question

3 (2002) 5 SCC 352

4 (2006) 5 SCC 399

5 (2004) 13 SCC 610

6 (2014) 3 SCC 373

Athe very foundation on which seniority was sought to be determinedon principle. To such cases, the enabling provision under Rule35(f) entitling the department to summarily reject the claim of theindividuals, cannot be invoked.”

17. It can thus be seen that the High Court has clearly observedBthat the case before the High Court was not individualistic in nature,depending upon individual dates, facts and sequence of events. It hasfurther observed that it arose out of the most fundamental question as tothe principle of law to be applied in the matter of fixation of seniority.

18. Having observed this, in the operative part, the Division BenchCof the Madras High Court in the first judgment held thus:-

“85. In view of the above, the writ appeals are allowed, the orderof the learned judge is set aside and the writ petitions filed by theappellants are allowed. There will be direction to the officialrespondents to take the rank assigned by the Service CommissionDto the selectees, as the basis for fixation of seniority and issueappropriate orders within period of 4 weeks from the date ofreceipt of copy of this order. There will be no order as to costs.”

19. It could thus clearly be seen that the Division Bench of theMadras High Court in the first judgment issued direction to the officialErespondents to take the rank assigned by TNPSC to the selectees as thebasis for fixation of seniority and appropriate orders were directed to beissued by TNPSC within period of 4 weeks from the receipt of thecopy of the said order.

20. The basis for allowing the writ petitions by the High CourtFwas the judgment of this Court in the case of Bimlesh Tanwar (supra),which held that the seniority has to be determined, not on the basis ofroster point but on the basis of the seniority assigned at the time ofselection of the selectees. This Court, while dismissing the SLPs videorder dated 22[nd] January 2016, observed thus:-

“The fundamental principle which has been applied by the DivisionGBench in the cases on hand relates to the question as to whatshould be the basis for drawing seniority list. In that context, theDivision Bench has noted that at the time when the ServiceCommission drew the list in 2000 the same was in tune with thejudgment of this Court in P.S. Ghalaut v. State of Haryana &HOthers, reported in (1995) 5 SCC 625. The Court also found that

V. SENTHUR v. M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADUPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

the said list which was approved by the State Government did notachieve the finality and that ultimately when the seniority list cameto be issued on 29.2.2004, by which time the judgment of thisCourt in Bimlesh Tanwar v. State of Haryana and others, reportedin (2003) 5 SCC 604 had came into effect which reversed thejudgment in Ghalaut (supra). The Division Bench, therefore, heldthat there was no delay in the challenge made to the seniority list.After the emergence of the judgment in Bimlesh Tanwar(supra), the fundamental principle relating to drawl ofseniority list was that it should be based on merit list ofselection and that the list drawn based on roster point canhave no application for the purpose of seniority list.

As the said fundamental principle was applied by the HighCourt in passing the impugned judgment, we do not findany merit in these special leave petitions. The special leavepetitions are dismissed.

The learned Attorney General for India, appearing for the TamilNadu Public Service Commission, raised an issue that withreference to contra view taken by another Judgment of MaduraiBench of the Madras High Court, at the instance of one of theemployees an SLP is pending in this Court. Since the issue is nowcovered by the decision of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar (supra),the pendency of the said SLP will be of no consequence as thesaid SLP should also be covered by the said judgment of thisCourt, namely, Bimlesh Tanwar (supra).”

[emphasis supplied]

21. It will be relevant to refer to the following observations of thisCourt in the case of Kunhayammed and Others v. State of Keralaand Another[7]:-

“27. petition for leave to appeal to this Court may be dismissedby non-speaking order or by speaking order. Whatever be thephraseology employed in the order of dismissal, if it is non-speaking order, i.e., it does not assign reasons for dismissing thespecial leave petition, it would neither attract the doctrine of mergerso as to stand substituted in place of the order put in issue beforeit nor would it be declaration of law by the Supreme Court

7 (2000) 6 SCC 359

Aunder Article 141 of the Constitution for there is no law which hasbeen declared. If the order of dismissal be supported by reasonsthen also the doctrine of merger would not be attracted becausethe jurisdiction exercised was not an appellate jurisdiction butmerely discretionary jurisdiction refusing to grant leave to appeal.We have already dealt with this aspect earlier. Still the reasonsBstated by the Court would attract applicability of Article 141 ofthe Constitution if there is law declared by the Supreme Courtwhich obviously would be binding on all the courts and tribunals inIndia and certainly the parties thereto. The statement containedin the order other than on points of law would be binding on theCparties and the court or tribunal, whose order was under challengeon the principle of judicial discipline, this Court being the ApexCourt of the country. No court or tribunal or parties would havethe liberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary to the oneexpressed by this Court. The order of Supreme Court would meanthat it has declared the law and in that light the case was consideredDnot fit for grant of leave. The declaration of law will be governedby Article 141 but still, the case not being one where leave wasgranted, the doctrine of merger does not apply. The Courtsometimes leaves the question of law open. Or it sometimes brieflylays down the principle, may be, contrary to the one laid down byEthe High Court and yet would dismiss the special leave petition.The reasons given are intended for purposes of Article 141. Thisis so done because in the event of merely dismissing the specialleave petition, it is likely that an argument could be advanced inthe High Court that the Supreme Court has to be understood asFnot to have differed in law with the High Court.”

22. It is thus clear that this Court in unequivocal terms has heldthat if the order of dismissal of SLPs is supported by reasons, then alsothe doctrine of merger would not be attracted. Still the reasons stated bythe court would attract applicability of Article 141 of the Constitution ofGIndia, if there is law declared by this Court which obviously would bebinding on all the courts and the tribunals in India and certainly, the partiesthereto. It has been held that no court, tribunal or party would have theliberty of taking or canvassing any view contrary to the one expressedby this Court. Such an order would mean that it has declared the lawand in that light, the case was considered not fit for grant of leave.H

V. SENTHUR v. M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADUPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

23. This Court, while dismissing the SLPs against the first judgment,has clearly held that after the emergence of the judgment in BimleshTanwar (supra), the fundamental principle governing the determinationof seniority was that, it should be based on merit list of selection and thatthe list made on the basis of roster point, would not be permissible in law.It could thus be seen that while dismissing the SLPs, this Court hasreiterated the legal position as laid down in the case of Bimlesh Tanwar(supra) to the effect that while determining seniority, what is relevant isthe inter se merit in the selection list and not the roster point.24. It is pertinent to note that though, the then learned AttorneyGeneral had raised an issue with regard to contrary view taken by theMadurai Bench of the same High Court, this Court clearly held thatsince the issue was now covered by the decision of this Court in BimleshTanwar (supra), the pendency of the SLPs challenging the judgment ofMadurai Bench, would be of no consequence inasmuch as the said SLPswould be governed by the judgment of this Court in Bimlesh Tanwar(supra).

25. It is thus clear that though it cannot be said that the secondjudgment of the Madras High Court has merged into the order of thisCourt dated 22[nd] January 2016, still the declaration of law as made inthe said order, would be binding on all the courts and tribunals in thecountry and in any case, between the parties.

26. In that view of the matter, the respondents were bound tofollow the law laid down by this Court and determine the inter se seniorityon the basis of selection by TNPSC and not on the basis of roster point.

27. At the cost of repetition, we may clarify that though variousarguments were advanced with regard to the merits of the matter by thelearned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities,we cannot go into those aspects inasmuch as we are exercising limitedjurisdiction of contempt. Insofar as the lis between the parties isconcerned, it has achieved finality by the order of this Court dated 22[nd]January 2016. We find that the seniority list, which is purportedly publishedin accordance with the order of this Court, is totally in breach of thedirections of this Court. first glance at the list would reveal that variousselectees, who have received much less marks, are placed above theselectees who have received higher marks. We, therefore, have nohesitation to hold that the following persons named in our order dated

A11[th] February 2021, are guilty of having committed contempt of order ofthis Court:-

“C.P.(C)No.638 of 2017 in C.A.No.4954 of 2016

1) M. Vijayakumar

B2) S. Thinakaran

Dy No.16048 of 2020 in SLP(C) Nos.2890-2894 of 2016:

1) Dr. S. Swarna

2) K. Ramamoorthy

C3) K. Nanthakumar

C.P.(C) No.1247 of 2019 in SLP (C) No.2886 of 2016:

1) K. Shanmugam

2) K. Nanthakumar

D3) Dr. K.Manivasan

4) K. Ramamurthy

C.P.(C)No.1848 of 2018 and C.P.(C)No.2188 of 2018 in SLP

(C)No.2886 of 2016:

E1) K. Nanthakumar

2) S. K. Prabhakar

3) S. Bakthavathchalam”

28. We therefore direct the respondents to revise and publish theFseniority list of the selectees, who were selected in the selection processconducted in pursuance of the notification issued by TNPSC dated 10[th]September 1999, strictly on the basis of the merit determined by it in theselection process and not on the basis of the roster point. The same shallbe done within period of 12 weeks from the date of this order.

G29. Insofar as the issue with regard to quantum of punishment tobe imposed upon the aforesaid contemnors is concerned, the matter bekept on 10[th] January 2022. We clarify that on the said date, the personsnamed in paragraph (27) who have been held guilty of contempt of thisCourt by us, shall remain present before this Court and would be heardon the quantum of punishment.

V. SENTHUR v. M. VIJAYAKUMAR, IAS,SECRETARY, TAMIL NADUPUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION [B. R. GAVAI, J.]

30. Insofar as SLP(C) Nos. 12114-12117 of 2021 are concerned,in view of the order passed by us in the contempt petitions, no order isnecessary. Accordingly, the said SLPs are disposed of.

Divya Pandey

Directions issued.