DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus ASHA JAIN & ORS.

[2022] 15 S.C.R.

ADELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

ASHA JAIN & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 8088 of 2022)

BNOVEMBER 09, 2022

[M. R. SHAH AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in LandAcquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2) –High Court relying on Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v.CHarakchand Misirimal Solanki and Ors. reported as [2014] 1 SCR 783,and observing that as compensation has not been paid and/ortendered to the recorded owners/petitioners, declared that theacquisition w.r.t the land in question is deemed to have lapsed byvirtue of s.24(2) – On appeal, held: The case relied upon by HighDCourt has been overruled in the Constitution Bench case of IndoreDevelopment Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors. (2020) 8 SCC 129wherein it has been held that the deemed lapse of land acquisitionproceedings u/s.24(2) takes place where due to inaction ofauthorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the2013 Act, the possession of land has not been taken norEcompensation has been paid – Thus, in case possession has beentaken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse –Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not beentaken then there is no lapse – In the present case, possession of theland in question was taken over in 2005, as also observed by HighFCourt – Further, according to the original writ petitioner, sheacquired the right in the land in question pursuant to Agreement toSell dtd. 09.05.05 – Agreement to Sell by itself does not confer anyright, title, or interest – Original writ petitioner can be said to besubsequent purchaser and/or has acquired the right subsequently– Subsequent purchaser has no right to claim lapse of acquisitionGproceedings – Impugned judgment set aside – Writ petition filed bythe original writ petitioner before High Court, dismissed – LandAcquisition Act, 1894 – s.4.

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors.(2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1 – followed.

Delhi Development Authority v. Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd.& Ors., Decision of Supreme Court in Civil appealNo. 3073 of 2022 – relied on.

Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. v. HarakchandMisirimal Solanki and Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 183 : [2014]1 SCR 783; Meera Sahni v. Lieutenant Governor ofDelhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 173 and M. Venkatesh &Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority(2015) 17 SCC 1 : [2015] 11 SCR 454; Shiv Kumar &Anr. v. Union of India & Ors. (2019) 10 SCC 229 –referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8088of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.08.2017 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 2987 of 2016.

Ms. Sunieta Ojha, Adv. for the Appellant.

Aakash Dubey, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, Atul Kumar,Ms. Sweety Singh, Rahul Pandey, Rajiv Ranjan, Advs. for theRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Writ Petition(C) No. 2987 of 2016 by which the High Court has allowed the said writpetition preferred by the respondent No. 1 herein and has declared thatthe acquisition with respect to the land in question is deemed to havelapsed by virtue of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation andTransparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,2013 (hereinafter referred to as “Act, 2013”), the Delhi DevelopmentAuthority (DDA) has preferred the present appeal.

A2. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective partiesat length.

3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the present caseand even as observed by the High Court, the possession of the land inquestion was taken over in the year 2005, however, observing that asBthe compensation has not been paid and/or tendered to the recordedowners/petitioners, relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of

Pune Municipal Corporation and Anr. Vs. Harakchand MisirimalSolanki and Ors., (2014) 3 SCC 183, the High Court has allowed thewrit petition and has declared that the acquisition with respect to theland in question is deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of theCAct, 2013.

3.1 The decision of this Court in the case of Pune MunicipalCorporation and Anr. (supra) relied upon by the High Court whilepassing the impugned judgment and order has been subsequently overruledby this Court in the Constitution Bench decision of this Court in the caseDof Indore Development Authority Vs. Manoharlal and Ors. (2020)8 SCC 129. In paragraph 365 and 366, the Constitution Bench of thisCourt has observed and held as under:-

“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune MunicipalCorpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki,E(2014) 3 SCC 183] is hereby overruled and all other decisions inwhich Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v.Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183] has beenfollowed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji NagarResidential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. StateFof T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353] cannot be said to be laying downgood law, is overruled and other decisions following the same arealso overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra[(2018) 3 SCC 412], the aspect with respect to the proviso toSection 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as“and” was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decisionGtoo cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the presentjudgment.

366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer thequestions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case theaward is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement ofthe 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation hasto be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act.

366.2. In case the award has been passed within thewindow period of five years excluding the period covered by aninterim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue asprovided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894Act as if it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) betweenpossession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”.The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction ofauthorities for five years or more prior to commencement of thesaid Act, the possession of land has not been taken norcompensation has been paid. In other words, in case possessionhas been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is nolapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession hasnot been taken then there is no lapse.366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include deposit of compensationin court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the provisoto Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect tothe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case person has been tendered the compensationas provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open tohim to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due

to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. Theobligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensationor who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claimthat the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is tobe treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Actand as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquestreport/memorandum. Once award has been passed on takingpossession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests inState there is no divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapseunder Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for adeemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authoritieshave failed due to their inaction to take possession and paycompensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act cameinto force, in proceeding for land acquisition pending with theauthority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence ofinterim orders passed by court has to be excluded in thecomputation of five years.

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise tonew cause of action to question the legality of concludedproceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to proceedingpending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014.It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopenconcluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question thelegality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings ormode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of courtto invalidate acquisition.”

In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment and order passedby the High Court is unsustainable.

4. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that in the presentcase, the notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894Hwas issued on 25.11.1980; acquisition was for public purpose, namely,

planned development of Delhi by which the large chunk of land in 13villages of South Delhi including Village Neb Sarai was sought to beacquired. As per the record, the land in question originally is the part ofKhasra No. 675 recorded in the name of M/s. Laxmichand BhagajiLimited - non-banking company. Therefore, M/s. Laxmichand BhagajiLimited was the recorded owner. From the material on record, it appearsthat even according to the original writ petitioner, she acquired the rightin the land in question pursuant to the Agreement to Sell dated 09.05.2005.Thus, the original writ petitioner was claiming the right in the land inquestion pursuant to the Agreement to Sell dated 09.05.2005.4.1 As per the settled position of law, Agreement to Sell by itselfdoes not confer any right, title, or interest. In any case, the original writpetitioner can be said to be subsequent purchaser and/or has acquiredthe right subsequently. In the recent decision of this Court in the case ofDelhi Development Authority Vs. Godfrey Phillips (I) Ltd. & Ors.,Civil appeal No. 3073 of 2022 after considering the other decisionson the right of the subsequent purchaser to claim lapse of acquisitionproceedings, i.e., Meera Sahni Vs. Lieutenant Governor of Delhi& Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 173 and M. Venkatesh & Ors. Vs.Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, (2015) 17 SCC1, it is specifically observed and held that subsequent purchaser has noright to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings. Similar view has beenexpressed by the Larger Bench judgment of this Court in the case ofShiv Kumar & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., (2019) 10 SCC229.

4.2 Under the circumstances also, the High Court has erred inentertaining the writ petition at the instance of the original writ petitionerbeing subsequent purchaser, praying for declaration that the acquisitionis deemed to have lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013.Under the circumstances also, the impugned judgment and order passedby the High Court is unsustainable.

5. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, presentappeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt, declaring that the acquisition with respect to the land in questionis deemed to have lapsed under Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013, is herebyquashed and set aside. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the originalwrit petitioner before the High Court being Writ Petition (C) No. 2987 of2016 stands dismissed.

632SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 15 S.C.R.

APresent appeal is accordingly allowed. No costs.

Pending application, if any, also stands disposed of.

Divya Pandey

(Assisted by : Roopanshi Virang, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.