STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS versus DEV BRAT SHARMA

[2022] 2 S.C.R.

STATE OF PUNJAB AND OTHERS

DEV BRAT SHARMA

(Civil Appeal No. 2064 of 2022)

BMARCH 16, 2022

[DINESH MAHESHWARI AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]

Court Fees Act, 1870: s.7 – Computation of Fees – Moneysuit – Respondent filed suit for recovery of Rs.20 Lakhs as damageson account of denying the status of freedom fighter and affixedCcourt fees of Rs.50 – Appellant sought rejection of plaint on theground of non payment of requisite court fee – Trial Court directedthe respondent to make good the court-fees on the amount of Rs.20lakhs claimed as damages – However, High Court set aside theorder of trial court – On appeal, held: s.7 of the Act 1870 provides

Dfor computation of fees in certain suits – s.7(i) refers to MoneySuits which includes suits for damages, compensation, arrears ofmaintenance, annuities or other sums payable periodically wherethe fee payable would be according to the amount claimed – s.7(iv)which has six categories where the fees would be payable accordingto the amount at which the relief sought is valued in the plaint orEmemorandum of appeal – For s.7(iv), liberty has been given toplaintiff to value his claim for the payment of Court fee – Presentcase is of money suit for compensation/damages and would fall u/s.7(i) of the Act – Valuation for the purpose of jurisdiction andrelief has to be same in the money suit falling u/s.7(i) – Court feesFshall be payable by the respondent on the valuation, i.e., on Rs. 20lakhs – Hence, ad valorem Court-fees would have to be paid as perschedule 1 entry 1 – Order of the High Court set aside – Order ofTrial court restored.

Allowing the appeal, the CourtG

HELD: 1. Chapter III of the Act deals with ‘Fees in OtherCourts and in Public Offices.’ Section 6 thereof provides that nodocument of any kind specified as chargeable in the First orSecond Schedule of this Act would be filed, exhibited or recorded

in any Court of Justice or would be received or furnished by anypublic officer, unless in respect of such document, fee of an amountnot less than that indicated by either of the said Schedules as theproper fee for such document is paid. First Schedule lays downthe computation of ad valorem Court fees whereas SecondSchedule gives the table of fixed Court fees payable on differentcategories of plaints, documents and pleadings. [Para 18][537-F-G; 538-A-B]

2. Section 7 thereof provides for computation of fees payablein certain suits. Sub-clause (i) refers to Money Suits whichincludes suits for damages, compensation, arrears of maintenance,annuities or other sums payable periodically where the fee payablewould be according to the amount claimed. Then, there are othersub-clauses which are not relevant for the case in hand. However,sub-clause (iv) which has further six categories, namely, suits (a)for movable property of no market value; (b) to enforce right toshare in joint family property; (c) for declaratory decree andconsequential relief; (d) for an injunction; (e) for easements; and(f) for accounts. The fees on suit falling in these categorieswould be payable according to the amount at which the relief soughtis valued in the plaint or memorandum of appeal. It also statesthat in all such suits the plaintiff would state the amount at whichhe values the relief sought. [Para 19][538-B-E]3. reading of the relief clause in the plaint would make itabundantly clear that this was money suit for compensation/damages and not falling under any of the categories mentioned inclause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, there would be noquestion at all for the applicability of Section 7(iv) of the Act. Itwould be simple case of applicability of Section 7(i) of the Actand ad valorem Court-fees would have to be paid as per Schedule1 entry 1. It is only with respect to the category of suits specifiedin clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act that the plaintiff has theliberty of stating in the plaint the amount at which relief is valuedand Court-fees would be payable on the said amount. Libertygiven under clause (iv) to the specific suits of six categories isnot available to the suits falling under any other clause, be it (i),(ii), (iii) etc. Once the suit in question was money suit for

Acompensation and damages falling under clause (i) of Section 7 ofthe Act, ad valorem Court-fees would be payable on the amountclaimed. [Paras 20, 21][539-F-H; 540-A-B]

4. In the present case, the respondent has not given aseparate valuation for relief sought and rightly so, as it had noBliberty and right to give different valuation than what was beingactually claimed. As matter of fact, in Para 11 of the plaint it isclearly stated that the valuation is the same for Court-fees andjurisdiction. The valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction andrelief has to be the same in the money suits falling under category7(i). It was only in category of suits covered by Clause (iv) ofCSection 7 that there could be two different valuations for thepurposes of jurisdiction and for relief sought. [Paras 28, 29][543-B-D]

M/s Commercial Aviation & Travel Company v. VimlaPannalal (1988) 3 SCC 423 : [1988] 1 Suppl. SCRD431; M.P. Shreevastava v. Mrs. Veena[1967] 1 SCR 147;Shanbhagakannu Bhattar v. Muthu Bhattar AIR 1971SC 2468 : [1971] 2 SCR 711; S.RM. AR. S. SP.Sathappa Chettiar v. S. RM. AR. RM. RamanathanChettiar 1958 AIR 245 : 1958 (0) SCR 1024– HeldEInapplicable.

Manpreet Singh v. Gurmail Singh and others (2016) 4Civil Court Cases 503 (PLH); State of Punjab v. JagdipSingh Chowhan (2005) 1 RCR (Civil) 54; Ranjit Kaurv. PSEB6 (2006) SCC Online P&H 1095; ManjeetFSingh v. Beant Sharma 16(c) (2012) SCC Online P&H13081; Hem Raj v. Harchet Singh (1993) Civil CourtCases 48 (P&H); Subhash Chander Goel v. HarvindSagar (2003) AIR (Punjab) 248; State of Punjab v.Jagdip Singh Chowhan (2005) 1 RCR (Civil) 54;Manpreet Singh v. Gurmail Singh (2016) 3 PLR 751;GDr. B.L. Kapoor Memorial Hospital v. Balbir Aggarwal(2015) SCC Online P&H 1790; Bharpoor Singh andanother v. Lachhman Singh 2017(1) Law Herald 609 –referred to.

Case Law Reference

[1988] 1 Suppl. SCR 431referred toPara 17 (i)[1967] 1 SCR 147held inapplicablePara 17(e) (i)[1971] 2 SCR 711 held inapplicablePara 17 (e) (ii)AIR (1988) 3 SC423held inapplicablePara 22 (1)

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2064of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 11.08.2017 of the High Courtof Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CR No.291 of 2017.

Ms. Uttara Babbar, Manan Bansal, Advs. for the Appellants.

Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Ms. Filza Moonis, Advs. forthe Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VIKRAM NATH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The State of Punjab and its officers have assailed thecorrectness of the judgment and order dated 11.08.2017 passed by theHigh Court of Punjab and Haryana, whereby the High Court allowedthe revision petition filed by the respondent Dev Brat Sharma and furtherproceeded to reject the application of the appellant under Order VIIRule 11 read with Section 151 of Code of Civil Procedure[1] after settingaside the order dated 10.11.2016 passed by the Trial Court holding thatthe respondent (plaintiff before the Trial Court) was required to makegood deficiency in the Court fees on the amount of Rs. 20 Lakhs claimedby him as compensation.

FACTS:

3. The respondent instituted suit for recovery of Rs.20 Lakhs asdamages allegedly suffered by him on account of denying the status offreedom fighter by the defendants and also for the loss of reputation onaccount of non-issuance of certificate of freedom fighter along withinterest @9% per annum from the date of institution of the suit tillrealization of the amount. The State of Punjab and five others (officers

1 Code of Civil Procedure - CPC

Aof the State Government) were impleaded as defendants. This suit wasregistered as Case No.1661 of 2015 in the Court of Civil Judge (SeniorDivision), Jalandhar.

4. Briefly the facts as set out in the plaint were:

(i) that the respondent belongs to renowned family of Jalandhar.BHe had retired as DDPO and was the youngest freedom fighter in theQuit India Movement. After retirement, he was practicing as an Advocateand commanded great respect among the residents of Jalandhar. Furtherdetails regarding his family background are also stated.

(ii) that the respondent was duly recognized by the GovernmentCof Punjab as ‘freedom fighter’ but the defendant No.3, the Director,Lotteries, who was posted as Deputy Commissioner, Jalandhar at therelevant time, denied the said status.

(iii) that the respondent had filed two writ petitions before theHigh Court at Chandigarh bearing CWP No.15316 of 2013 and CWPDNo.18535 of 2013 against the rejection of his request for issuing thecertificate of ‘freedom fighter’. The High Court disposed of Writ PetitionNo.15316/2013 on 19.07.2013 and allowed Writ Petition No.18535/2013on 14.11.2014.

(iv) that the respondent had to travel to Chandigarh several times,Eengage lawyers, pay fees and expenses for the said litigation at an oldage, he had suffered great mental tension and torture on account ofillegal acts of the defendant Nos.3 to 6 (officers of State of Punjab).

(v) that the grandson of the respondent could not get admissionbecause of non-issuance of the said certificate and so he had to beFadmitted in college in the State of Tamil Nadu.

(vi) that the respondent spent approximately Rs.2 Lakhs onlitigation. He had to make several trips to Tamil Nadu for the educationof his grandson, who otherwise could have been admitted in Punjab. Assuch, he suffered damages of approximately Rs.20 Lakhs, which includedGRs.2 Lakhs for the litigation expenses, mental tension, harassment andfurther incidental damages.

5. Accordingly, legal notice dated 16.03.2015 was given underSection 80 CPC calling upon the defendants to pay sum of Rs.20Lakhs as damages suffered by him. When despite notice, the said amountHwas not paid, suit was instituted praying for the following reliefs:

“It is, therefore, respectfully prayed that the suit of theplaintiff for recovery of Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twenty lacs only)as damages suffered by the plaintiff on account of denying thestatus of Freedom Fighter to the plaintiff by the defendant No.3who was posted as Deputy Commissioner, Jalandhar at the relevanttime and loss of reputation on account of non-issuance ofCertificate of Freedom Fighter for the use of his grandson, maykindly be decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against thedefendant with costs, in the interest of justice and equity.

It is further prayed that the decretal amount may be allowedto be recovered along with interest at the rate of 9% per annumfrom the date of institution of the suit till the realization of theamount.

It is further prayed that any other relief, which this Hon’bleCourt may deem fit and proper may also be granted in favour ofthe plaintiff and against the defendant, in the interest of justiceand equity.”

6. According to the contents of paragraph 11 of the plaint, thevaluation of the suit both for the purpose of court fees and jurisdictionwas fixed at more than Rs.20 lakhs but court fees of Rs.50/- was affixedrelying upon judgment of the Punjab & Haryana High Court. Anundertaking to pay the court fees on the sum to be adjudicated as damagesby the Court in due course of time was also stated. Paragraph 11 of theplaint is reproduced below:

“11. That the value of the suit for the purpose of court feeand jurisdiction is fixed at more than Rs.20,00,000/- (Rupees twentylacs only) but in view of the latest law, laid down by the Hon’blePunjab & Haryana High Court in case titled “Ajit Singh KoharVs. Shashi Kant” (CR No.5638 of 2014, decided on August25th, 2014) that the suit for defamation for maligning reputation,the affixation of court fee of Rs.50/- is acceptable as exact valueof the relief to be granted, cannot be ascertained at initial stageand accordingly, the Hon’ble High Court left the petitioner in thatcase to pay the court fee on the sum to be adjudicated as damagesby the lower court in due course of time. The relevant portion ofthe order of the Hon’ble High Court is reproduced as under: -

“6. Sequelly, the impugned order is set asideleaving the petitioner to pay the court fee on the sumto be adjudicated as damages by the lower court indue course of time, but not at this initial stage,notwithstanding that the petitioner though, leavingthe entire matter to the court for adjudication of thequantum of damages, he himself has given thequantum of damages to be Rs.2.00 Crores”

Thus, in view of the aforesaid decision of the Hon’ble Punjab& Haryana High Court, though the plaintiff himself has given thequantum of damages to be Rs.20,00,000/- but at this initial stage,notwithstanding that the plaintiff though, leaving the entire matterto this Hon’ble Court for adjudication of the quantum of damages,is affixing the tentative court fee of Rs.50/-. However, the plaintiffundertakes to pay the court fee on the sum to be adjudicated asdamages by this Hon’ble court in due course of time.”

7. The appellants filed written statement wherein preliminaryobjections were raised, one of them being that the suit had not beenproperly stamped for the purposes of Court- fees. replication wasfiled by the respondent reiterating the contents of the plaint and alsorefuting the preliminary objection.

8. The appellants thereafter preferred an application under OrderVII Rule 11 (c) read with Section 151 CPC on the ground of non-paymentof requisite Court-fees, which was registered as IA No.00001 of 2016.

9. The Trial Court, vide order dated 10.11.2016, disposed of theFsaid application with the direction to the respondent to file the Court-fees on the amount of Rs.20 Lakhs as claimed by him and granted about10 weeks’ time to make good the deficiency.

10. The Trial Court first considered the judgment in the case ofManpreet Singh vs. Gurmail Singh and others[2], relied upon by therespondent in support of his submissions and distinguished the same asGbeing neither applicable nor helpful for the respondent on the facts of

the said case. It further took into consideration the provisions containedin Section 7(i) of the Court Fees Act, 1870[3] as being applicable and,

2 (2016) 4 Civil Court Cases 503 (PLH)H3 The Act

accordingly, directed the respondent to make good the Court- fees onthe amount of Rs.20 lakhs claimed as damages.

11. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent preferred arevision petition under Section 115 CPC before the High Court whichwas registered as CR No.291 of 2017. The High Court, vide judgmentand order dated 11.08.2017, referred to number of judgments to holdthat as the actual and specified amount of damages was still to beassessed and determined by the Trial Court, as such, the direction of theTrial Court to pay ad valorem Court fees on the amount of Rs.20 lakhswas not sustainable in law.

12. The High Court was further influenced by the pleadings in theplaint and replication to the effect that the respondent undertakes tomake good the court fees on the amount adjudicated as damages by theCourt in due course of time.

13. The High Court, accordingly, set aside the order of the TrialCourt dated 10.11.2016 and rejected the application of the appellant underOrder VII Rule 11 CPC with further direction to the Trial Court toproceed with the suit.

14. The above judgment of the High Court is under challenge.During the pendency of the Special Leave Petition, the suit was dismissedby the Trial Court on 28.02.2020. Aggrieved, the respondent has preferredan appeal under Section 96 of the CPC, which is pending.

ARGUMENTS:

15. We have heard on behalf of the appellant- Ms. Uttara Babbar,Advocate and on behalf of the respondent- Shri Abhimanyu Tiwari,Advocate.

16. Broadly, the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants

are:

(a) that the High Court fell in error in relying upon several judgmentswhich had no application to the facts of the present case;

(b) that the judgment in the case of State of Punjab Vs. JagdipSingh Chowhan[4]relied upon by the High Court was carried in appeal[5]

4 (2005) 1 RCR (Civil) 54.

5 Civil Appeal No.3987 of 2006

Abefore this Court and this Court has held that ad valorem court feeswould be payable in suit for malicious prosecution for claim of Rs. 2Crores;

(c) that the Court-fees was payable under Section 7(i) of the Actand that Section 7(iv) of the Act would have no application. Reliance isBplaced upon two judgments i.e. Ranjit Kaur vs. PSEB[6], and ManjeetSingh vs. Beant Sharma[7];

(d) that the respondent in writ petitions filed before the High Courthad also claimed damages and compensation and once such relief hasnot been granted by the High Court, the suit itself, for the same reliefCwas not maintainable and ought not to have been entertained. It was aclear abuse of process of law and such frivolous litigations ought to havebeen nipped in the bud.

17. On behalf of plaintiff-respondent, the learned counsel ShriAbhimanyu Tiwari has sought to justify the order of the High Court asDjust, valid and in accordance with law. According to learned counsel:

(a) the High Court rightly rejected the application under OrderVII Rule 11 in view of the several judgments referred to in the order;

(b) as proper valuation could not be ascertained at the time ofinstitution of the suit, there would not be any justification for charging adEvalorem court fees on tentative amount mentioned in the plaint;

(c) the High Court had left it open for the Trial Court to determinethe actual valuation after trial whereupon the court fees would berecovered from the plaintiff for which he had given an undertaking also,and hence, no error could be said to have been committed by the HighFCourt;

(d) reliance has been placed upon the following judgments insupport of the above propositions:

i) M/s Commercial Aviation & Travel Company vs. VimlaGPannalal[8].

ii) Hem Raj vs. Harchet Singh[9];

6 (2006) SCC Online P&H 1095

7 (2012) SCC Online P&H 13081

8 (1988) 3 SCC 423,

9 (1993) Civil Court Cases 48 (P&H),

iii) Subhash Chander Goel vs. Harvind Sagar[10];

(iv) State of Punjab vs. Jagdip Singh Chowhan[11 ](reversedby this Court);

(v) Manpreet Singh vs. Gurmail Singh[12];

(vi) Dr. B.L. Kapoor Memorial Hospital vs. BalbirAggarwal[13]

(e) before Trial Court issue no.3 was framed relating to propervaluation of the suit for the purposes of the Court- fees. Trial Court videjudgment and order dated 28.02.2020 although had dismissed the suitbut held that the onus to prove the said issue was placed upon thedefendants and as no evidence was led nor any argument advanced insupport of the said issue, decided the same against the defendants-appellants. The judgment dated 28.02.2020 having not been carried furtherby the appellants, it would suggest that they had abandoned the saidissue. In support of the said submission that an abandoned issue couldnot be resurrected in higher forum, reliance was placed upon followingtwo judgments: -

i) M.P. Shreevastava vs. Mrs. Veena[14];

ii) Shanbhagakannu Bhattar vs. Muthu Bhattar[15].

(f) in the event this Court was of the view that the plaintiff wasliable to pay ad valorem court fees on the amount mentioned in theplaint, then, the same would be of academic interest only as the appellantshad abandoned their plea regarding valuation by not filing any crossobjection or appeal against the judgment dated 28.02.2020.

ANALYSIS:

18. Chapter III of the Act deals with ‘Fees In Other Courts AndIn Public Offices.’ Section 6 thereof provides that no document of anykind specified as chargeable in the First or Second Schedule of this Actwould be filed, exhibited or recorded in any Court of Justice or would be

10 (2003) AIR (Punjab) 248,

11 (2005) 1 RCR (Civil) 54,

12 (2016) 3 PLR 751,

13 (2015) SCC Online P&H 1790.

14 (1967) 1 SCR 147,

15 (AIR 1971 SC 2468.

Areceived or furnished by any public officer, unless in respect of suchdocument, fee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of thesaid Schedules as the proper fee for such document is paid. First Schedulelays down the computation of ad valorem Court fees whereas SecondSchedule gives the table of fixed Court fees payable on differentcategories of plaints, documents and pleadings.B

19. Section 7 thereof provides for computation of fees payable incertain suits. Sub-clause (i) refers to Money Suits which includes suitsfor damages, compensation, arrears of maintenance, annuities or othersums payable periodically where the fee payable would be according tothe amount claimed. Then, there are other sub-clauses which are notCrelevant for the case in hand. However, sub-clause (iv) which has furthersix categories, namely, suits (a) for movable property of no market value;(b) to enforce right to share in joint family property; (c) for declaratorydecree and consequential relief; (d) for an injunction; (e) for easements;and (f) for accounts. The fees on suit falling in these categories wouldDbe payable according to the amount at which the relief sought is valuedin the plaint or memorandum of appeal. It also states that in all such suitsthe plaintiff would state the amount at which he values the relief sought.Section 6 and relevant part of Section 7 of the Act are reproducedhereunder: -

E“6. Fees on documents filed, etc., in Mofussil Courts or inpublic offices. –

Except in the Courts hereinbefore mentioned, no document ofany of the kinds specified as chargeable in the First or SecondSchedule to this act annexed shall be filed, exhibited or recordedFin any Court of Justice, or shall be received or furnished by anypublic officer, unless in respect of such document there be paid afee of an amount not less than that indicated by either of the saidSchedules as the proper fee for such document.

7. Computation of fees payable in certain suits. – The amountGof fee payable under this Act in the suits next hereinaftermentioned shall be computed as follows: -

for money.- (i) In suits for money (including suits for damages orcompensation, or arrears of maintenance, of annuities, or of othersums payable periodically) – according to the amount claimed.

……………………

……………….

(iv) In suits –

for movable property of no market-value.

-(a) for moveable property where the subject- matter has nomarket-value, as, for instance, in the case of documents relatingto title,

to enforce right to share in joint family property. – (b) toenforce the right to share in any property on the ground that it isjoint family property,

for declaratory decree and consequential relief. - (c) toobtain declaratory decree or order, where consequential reliefis prayed,

for an injunction. – (d) to obtain an injunction,

for easements. – (e) for right to some benefit (not hereinotherwise provided for) to arise out of land, and

for accounts. - (f) for accounts-

according to the amount at which the relief sought is valued in theplaint or memorandum of appeal;

In all such suits the plaintiff shall state the amount at which hevalues the relief sought;

…………………

20. The moot question for consideration is whether the suit inquestion as framed was money suit for compensation/damages fallingunder Clause (i) of Section 7 or was suit falling in any of the categoriesspecified in clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. reading of the reliefclause would make it abundantly clear that this was money suit forcompensation/damages and not falling under any of the categoriesmentioned in clause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act. Therefore, there wouldbe no question at all for the applicability of Section 7(iv) of the Act. Itwould be simple case of applicability of Section 7(i) of the Act and advalorem Court-fees would have to be paid as per Schedule 1 entry 1.

21. It is only with respect to the category of suits specified inclause (iv) of Section 7 of the Act that the plaintiff has the liberty ofstating in the plaint the amount at which relief is valued and Court-fees

Awould be payable on the said amount. Liberty given under clause (iv) tothe specific suits of six categories is not available to the suits fallingunder any other clause, be it (i), (ii), (iii) etc. Once the suit in questionwas money suit for compensation and damages falling under clause (i)of Section 7 of the Act, ad valorem Court-fees would be payable on theamount claimed.B

22. The High Court, in the impugned judgement, has referred tothe following authorities in order to support the conclusion arrived at by

1)M/s Commercial Aviation and Travel Company vs.CVimla Pannala[16];

2)Hem Raj vs. Harchet Singh[17];

3)Subhash Chander Goel vs. Harvind Sagar (supra);

4)State of Punjab vs. Jagdip Singh Chowhan (supra);

5)Manpreet Singh vs. Gurmail Singh (supra);

6)Dr. B.L.Kapoor Memorial Hospital vs. BalbirAggarwal (supra);

7)S.Ajit Singh Kohar vs. Sashi Kant (supra); and,

E8)Bharpoor Singh and another vs. Lachhman Singh,2017(1) Law Herald 609.

23. The judgment in the case of Ms. Commercial Aviation andTravel Company (supra) is of this Court and rest of the judgments areof the Punjab and Haryana High Court. The judgment in the case of M/Fs Commercial Aviation and Travel Company (supra) has been reliedupon by the High Court in the case of Hemraj (supra) which in turn hasbeen followed in other cases. In the case of Commercial Aviation andTravel Company (supra), the suit was filed for relief of dissolution ofpartnership and for accounts. For the purposes of jurisdiction, it wasvalued at Rs. 25 lacs whereas for the purposes of court fees the reliefGwas valued at Rs. 500/-. In those circumstances, an application wasmoved by the defendant under Order VII Rule 11(b) CPC for rejectionof the plaint on the ground that the suit has been grossly undervalued.

16 AIR (1988)3 SC 423H17 (1993) Civil Court Cases 48 (P&H)

24. This Court considered the provisions under Section 7(iv) ofthe Act and was of the view that suits covered by Section 7(iv) were ofsuch nature that it is difficult to lay down any standard of valuation andit was, therefore, that liberty was given to the plaintiff to give separatevaluation of the relief sought for the purposes of payment of court fees.This Court also observed that in suit for accounts, it is almost impossiblefor the plaintiff to value the relief correctly. As such the judgement in thecase of M/s Commercial Aviation (supra) has no application. The suitfor accounts and dissolution of partnership would fall in one of the sixcategories as specified in Section 7(iv) of the Act.

25. This Court further relied upon Constitution Bench decisionof this Court in the case of S.RM.AR.RM. Ramanathan Chettiar(supra)reported in AIR 1958 SC 245 equivalent of 1958 SCR 1024and quoted paragraph from the said judgment which explains why thelegislature left it open for the plaintiff to value his claim for the sixcategories of the suit falling under Section 7(iv) of the Act. The basicreason was that as it was almost difficult to value the claim for any ofthe suits covered under Section 7(iv), therefore, for the purposes ofpayment of court fees, different valuation for the relief sought couldbe given. All such suits were thus placed in Clause (iv) giving liberty tothe plaintiff to give separate valuation for relief sought. However,ultimately it would be the actual relief granted which would determinethe court fees to be paid and the same may be made good by the plaintiffin case lesser court fees was paid.

26. In the case of Chettiar (supra), the relief claimed was forpartition of the joint family properties and also for accounts in respectof the joint family assets managed by the respondent. The plaintifffurther valued the claim for accounts at Rs. 1,000/- and paid courtfees of Rs. 100/- on the said amount. However, for the purposes ofjurisdiction, the appellant gave valuation of Rs. 15 lacs as the valueof his share. The registry took objection with regard to the payment ofthe court fees and valuation, and therefore, the matter was referred tovarious authorities, officers and Court under the provisions of the Act.Ultimately after series of innings, the matter was settled by theaforesaid judgment and while dealing with the said issue regardingdifferent valuations and payment of court fees at the time of institutionof the suit, this Court discussed the scheme of Section 7 and in thatcontext, explained it as follows:

“If the scheme laid down for the computation of fees payablein suits covered by the several sub- sections of s. 7 isconsidered, it would be clear that, in respect of suits fallingunder sub-s. (iv), departure has been made and liberty hasbeen given to the plaintiff to value his claim for the purposesof court fees. The theoretical basis of this provision appearsto be that in cases in which the plaintiff is given the option tovalue his claim, it is really difficult to value the claim with anyprecision or definiteness. Take for instance the claim forpartition where the plaintiff seeks to enforce his right to sharein any property on the ground that it is joint family property.The basis of the claim is that the property in respect of whicha share is claimed is joint family property. In other words, it isproperty in which the plaintiff has an undivided share. Whatthe plaintiff purports to do by making claim for partition isto ask the court to give him certain specified propertiesseparately and absolutely on his own account for his sharein lieu of his undivided share in the whole property. Now itwould be clear that the conversion of the plaintiff’s allegedundivided share in the joint family property into his separateshare cannot be easily valued in terms of rupees with anyprecision or definiteness. That is why legislature has left it tothe option of the plaintiff to value his claim for the paymentof court fees. It really means that in suits falling under s. 7(iv)(b) the amount stated by the plaintiff as the value of hisclaim for partition has ordinarily to be accepted by the courtin computing the court fees payable in respect of the saidrelief. In the circumstances of this case it is unnecessary toconsider whether, under the provisions of this section, theplaintiff has been given an absolute right or option to placeany valuation whatever on his relief.”

27. In the case of Hem Raj (supra) and all other judgmentsreferred to in the impugned judgment, reliance is placed upon theGobservations from the judgments of Commercial Aviation(supra) andChettiar (supra) explaining the departure of difference carved out forthe categories and suits covered by Section 7(iv) of the Act. They haveerroneously proceeded to apply the same to the category of money suitsmentioned in Section 7(i) of the Act. Neither in the case of M/sHCommercial Aviation (supra) nor in the case of Chettiar (supra), this

Court ever laid down that for the purposes of suits covered by clausesother than Section 7(iv), there could be separate valuation for the purposesof court fees and jurisdiction. On completely erroneous approach, anerroneous interpretation of the judgments in the case of M/s.Commercial Aviation (supra) and Chettiar (supra), several orderswere passed by the Punjab & Haryana High Court, which have beenrelied upon in the impugned judgment. What is important to note here isthat this case related to the valuation for the purposes of relief sought.

28. In the present case, the respondent has not given separatevaluation for relief sought and rightly so, as it had no liberty and right togive different valuation than what was being actually claimed. As matterof fact, in para 11 of the plaint it is clearly stated that the valuation is thesame for Court-fees and jurisdiction.

29. The valuation for the purposes of jurisdiction and relief has tobe the same in the money suits falling under category 7(i). It was only incategory of suits covered by Clause (iv) of Section 7 that there could betwo different valuations for the purposes of jurisdiction and for reliefsought.

30. Ms Babbar referred to two judgments of the Punjab andHaryana High Court in support of her submissions, namely, Ranjit Kaur(supra) (2006) and Manjeet Singh (supra) (2012). Manjeet Singh(supra) had relied upon Ranjit Kaur (supra) which had clearly held thatin suit for damages, ad valorem Court-fees would be payable on theamount of the damages claimed.

31. Ms. Babbar also pointed out that the judgment in the case ofRanjit Kaur (supra) dealt with the case laws on the point not only ofthis Court but also of different High Courts. It specifically noted that thejudgments in the case of Subhash Chander Goel (supra), Jagdip SinghChowhan (supra) and Hemraj (supra) did not notice the statutoryprovisions and other binding precedents.

32. The High Court in the impugned judgment had also placedreliance upon judgment in the case of Jagdip Singh Chowhan (supra)which again was case for damages. This was carried to this Court bythe State. The said judgment has since been set aside by this Court videorder dated 29.05.2012 passed in Civil Appeal No.3987 of 2006,State of Punjab vs. Jagdip Singh Chowhan. copy of the said orderhas been provided by Ms.Babbar, learned counsel for the appellants.

AThis Court observed that there can be no dispute that in suit for maliciousprosecution, ad valorem Court-fees is payable. The Court proceeded togrant liberty to the counsel for the plaintiff- respondent to take appropriatesteps for amendment of the plaint or to make good the Court-fees. Thesaid order is reproduced hereunder:

“The present appeal is directed against the order dated 14.10.2004passed by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Punjaband Haryana in C.R.No.2933/2004 whereby the High Court haspermitted the plaintiffs- (respondent herein) to pay the court feeon the tentative valuation of the suit for the purpose of court fees.

CIt is worth noting, for the said purpose the suit was valued atRs.1,43,000/- though decree was sought for Rs.two croresapproximately. There can be no dispute that in suit for maliciousprosecution, ad valorem court fee is payable. Faced with thissituation, the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 could onlystate that he will file an application for amendment before the trialDCourt either restricting his claim to the amount on which the courtfee has been paid or may enhance the claim beyond the saidamount and will pay the ad valorem court fee on the same.Recording such statement of respondent No.1, we set aside theorder passed by the learned Single Judge and grant him liberty toEfile the requisite amendment to bring the plaint in order.

The appeal is accordingly disposed of with no order as to costs.”

33. On behalf of the respondent, submission was raised relatingto the final determination of issue No.3 by the Trial Court vide judgmentand order dated 28.02.2020 where the Trial Court decided the issueFagainst the defendants and in favour of the plaintiff.

34. The said submission has no legs to stand for two reasons:firstly, the said judgment had come subsequent to the filing of the presentappeal @ Special Leave Petition as the judgment of the High Court isdated 11.08.2017 and secondly, the Trial Court had dismissed the suitGvide judgment dated 28.02.2020 as such the State was not required tochallenge the finding on issue No.3. At the time when Trial Court tookthe suit for final determination, the subject-matter of issue No.3 wascovered by the impugned order of the High Court. As such, no otherdecision could have been taken by the Trial Court. Moreover, for thereason that the issue was already pending before this Court since 2018,

much before the dismissal of the suit as such it was not necessary forthe State to challenge the said finding. Any decision taken by the TrialCourt would always remain subject to final outcome of the appeal@ SpecialLeave Petition which was pending since prior in point of time. To say thatthe decision of present appeal would be purely academic is therefore notacceptable. As such we find no applicability of the two judgments in thecase of M.P. Shreevastava (supra) and Shanbhagakannu Bhattar(supra) relied upon by the respondent. Apart from the above, the findingon issue No.3 could also be questioned by the State in its capacity asrespondent during the hearing of the appeal.

35. We are not going into the other questions raised by Ms. Babbarregarding the institution of suit being abuse of the process of law and weleave it open for the Appellate Court to decide the said issue, if raised bythe State.

36. The High Court, therefore, fell in error in setting aside theorder passed by Trial Court whereby it had granted time to the plaintiff-respondent to make good the Court-fees within particular period failingwhich the plaint would stand rejected.

37. For all the reasons recorded above, the appeal is allowed. Thejudgment and order of the High Court dated 11.08.2017 is set aside andthat of the Trial Court dated 10.11.2016 is restored. Since the suit itselfhad been finally dismissed on 28.02.2020, (i) but, court fees wasnevertheless payable by the plaintiff-respondent on the valuation, i.e., onRs. 20 lakhs. Hence, it is directed that the plaintiff-respondent shall makepayment of such court fees within four weeks from today; (ii) Moreover,the plaintiff- respondent shall further be required to make payment ofcourt fees in the appeal on the value he shall put on the relief sought tobe claimed in appeal. The Appellate Court shall allow the plaintiff (whois appellant therein) to state the valuation and grant him reasonable timeto make payment of court fees before proceeding further in appeal.

38. There shall be no order as to costs.

39. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.