THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR versus UMESH

[2022] 2 S.C.R.

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR

UMESH

(Civil Appeal Nos. 1763-1764 of 2022 )

BMARCH 22, 2022

[DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD ANDSURYA KANT, JJ.]

Service Law: Disciplinary Enquiry – Respondent working asa village accountant was charged for demanding bribery – CriminalCcomplaint registered against him under the Prevention of CorruptionAct 1988 – Special Judge granted benefit of doubt to him andacquitted him of all charges – However, disciplinary authority heldthat the misconduct was proved and imposed penalty of compulsoryretirement – Tribunal upheld the order of compulsory retirement –DHigh Court, however, u/Art.226 set aside compulsory retirement –On appeal, held: While exercising judicial review, Court does notact as an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinaryauthority – Court does not re-appreciate the evidence which formsthe basis of finding of misconduct in the course of disciplinaryenquiry – The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrictEits review to determine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice werecomplied with; (ii) the finding of misconduct was based on someevidence; (iii) the statutory rules were observed; and (iv) the findingsof the disciplinary authority suffered from perversity; and (vi) thepenalty was disproportionate to the proven misconduct – None ofFthe above tests were applied by High Court – High Court exceededits jurisdiction under Art.226 and trenched upon domain whichfell within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer – Enquirywas conducted in accordance with natural justice – The acquittalof the respondent in the course of the criminal trial did not impingeupon the authority of the disciplinary authority – Judgment of HighGcourt set aside – Finding of misconduct and punishment ofcompulsory retirement restored.

Service Law: Principles governing disciplinary enquiry:Distinction between disciplinary enquiry and criminal trial –Purpose of disciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquireH

into an allegation of misconduct by an employee which results ina violation of the service rules governing the relationship ofemployment – Unlike criminal prosecution, charge ofmisconduct has to be established on preponderance ofprobabilities – The acquittal of the accused in criminal casedoes not debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise ofdisciplinary jurisdiction.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. The principles which govern disciplinary enquiryare distinct from those which apply to criminal trial. In aprosecution for an offence punishable under the criminal law, theburden lies on the prosecution to establish the ingredients of theoffence beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is entitled to apresumption of innocence. The purpose of disciplinaryproceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation ofmisconduct by an employee which results in violation of theservice rules governing the relationship of employment. Unlikea criminal prosecution where the charge has to be establishedbeyond reasonable doubt, in disciplinary proceeding, chargeof misconduct has to be established on preponderance ofprobabilities. The rules of evidence which apply to criminal trialare distinct from those which govern disciplinary enquiry. Theacquittal of the accused in criminal case does not debar theemployer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinaryjurisdiction. [Para 13][585-E-H]2. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not actas an appellate forum over the findings of the disciplinaryauthority. The court does not re-appreciate the evidence on thebasis of which the finding of misconduct has been arrived at inthe course of disciplinary enquiry. The Court in the exercise ofjudicial review must restrict its review to determine whether: (i)the rules of natural justice have been complied with; (ii) the findingof misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) the statutory rulesgoverning the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry have beenobserved; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinaryauthority suffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is

CDE

576SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 2 S.C.R.

Adisproportionate to the proven misconduct. However, none ofthe above tests for attracting the interference of the High Courtwere attracted in the present case. The Administrative Tribunalhaving exercised the power of judicial review found no reason tointerfere with the award of punishment of compulsory retirement.The Division Bench of the High Court exceeded its jurisdictionBunder Article 226 and trenched upon domain which falls withinthe disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. The enquiry wasconducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice.The findings of the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authorityare sustainable with reference to the evidence which was adducedCduring the enquiry. The acquittal of the respondent in the courseof the criminal trial did not impinge upon the authority of thedisciplinary authority or the finding of misconduct in thedisciplinary proceeding. [Para 17][589-G-H; 590-A-D]

State of Haryana v. Rattan Singh (1977) 2 SCC 491;DState of Rajasthan v. K Meena; (1966) 6 SCC 417;Krishnakali Tea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya ChahMazdoor Sangh (2004) 8 SCC 200; Ajit Kumar Nag v.Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.; (2005) 7 SCC 764 : [2005]3 Suppl. SCR 314; CISF v Abrar Ali (2017) 4 SCC507; Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar (2009) 12ESCC 78 : [2009] 10 SCR 124; State of Karnataka v. N.Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423; Union of India v. G.Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR549; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC749 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 644; R.S. Saini v State ofFPunjab (1999) 8 SCC 90 – relied on.Commissioner of Police, Delhi v. Narender Singh AIR2006 SC 1800 : [2006] 3 SCR 872; State of Punjab v.Madan Mohan Lal Verma (2013) 14 SCC 153 : [2013]7 SCR 113 – referred to.

GCase Law Reference

[2006] 3 SCR 872[2013] 7 SCR 113

referred to

Para 5

referred toPara 10

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 1763-1764 of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.11.2017 of the High Courtof Karnataka at Kalaburagi Bench in Writ Petition No.202250-251 of2016 (S-KAT).

V. N. Raghupathy, Md. Apzal Ansari, Advs. for the Appellants.

Ashwin V. Kotemath, Ms. E. R. Sumathy, Nishant Bhardwaj, Advs.for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHADRACHUD, J.

1. The appeals arise from judgment dated 29 November 2017of Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka at the KalaburagiBench. The High Court set aside the judgment of the KarnatakaAdministrative Tribunal dated 25 April 2016 directing the compulsoryretirement of the respondent from service following disciplinary enquiryon charges of bribery.

2. The respondent was working as Village Accountant atRevathagao in Indi Taluka of Bijapur District in Karnataka. The chargeagainst the respondent is that he demanded bribe for deleting the nameof person from Column No. 11 of the RTC with regard to land bearingSurvey No. 54, situated at Shirdona Village. criminal complaint wasregistered with the Lokayukta police against the respondent for the

Acommission of an offence punishable under Sections 7 and 13(1) (d)read with Section 13 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 1988. Afterthe investigation, charge sheet was submitted against the respondentby the Lokayukta police in Special Case No. 20 of 2011 in the Court ofSpecial Judge at Bijapur. During the course of the trial before the SpecialJudge at Bijapur, the prosecution examined seven witnesses. Twenty-Btwo exhibits were marked in evidence. The respondent examined onewitness and an exhibit was marked at his behest. By judgment dated23 October 2013, the Special Judge gave the benefit of doubt to therespondent and acquitted him of all charges.

C3. disciplinary enquiry was initiated under Section 7(2) of theKarnataka Lokayukta Act 1984. Taking note of the complaint, and thefact that the phenolphthalein powdered currency notes were seized fromthe respondent, the Karnataka Upa Lokayukta-1 held that prima faciecase was established. By an order dated 23 April 2012, exercising powersunder Section 12(3) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act 1984 and Rule 14-DA of the Karnataka Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)Rules 1957[1], the Upa Lokayukta-1 recommended the initiation ofdisciplinary proceedings against the respondent. On 7 August 2012, theGovernment of Karnataka entrusted the case to the Upa-Lokayukta forenquiry under Rule 14 (A) of 1957 Rules. By an order dated 14 AugustE2012, the Upa Lokayukta nominated the Additional Registrar of Enquiriesin the Karnataka Lokayukta as the inquiry officer for framing the chargeand conducting the inquiry. The following article of charge was framedin the course of the enquiry:“That you, Sri Umesh Vittala Biradara (here in after referred toFas Delinguent Government Official, in short DGO), while workingas the village Accountant Revathagao Saja, Indi Taluk, BijapurDistrict demanded and accepted bribe of Rs 5000/- on 11/05/2011 from complainant Sri. Gajana S/o Shireppa Poojari, R/o:Shiradona, Indi Taluk, Bijapur District for getting deleted the nameof one Sri. Nagappa S/o Annappa Muttinavar from Col. No. 11 ofGRTC in respect of the land bearing Sy. No. 54 measuring 4 acres3 guntas of Shirdona Village of Indi Taluk, that is for doing anofficial act, and thereby you failed to maintain absolute integrityand devotion to duty and committed an act which is unbecoming

H1 “1957 Rules”

of Government Servant and thus you are guilty of misconductunder Rule 3(1)(1) to (iii) of KCS (Conduct) Rules 1966.

(Anand R Deshpande)Additional Registrar (Enquiries-3)Karnataka Lokayukta, Bangalore”

4. By an order dated 22 January 2015, the Lokayukta held thatthe charge against the respondent was proved and recommended thepenalty of compulsory retirement from service under Rule 8(vi) of the1957 Rules. On 20 February 2015, the disciplinary authority issued ashow cause notice to the respondent. The respondent contended in hisreply that the money seized was not received as bribe but was forrepayment of loan borrowed by the brother-in-law of the complainant.The respondent also contended that since the Special Judge acquittedhim on the same set of facts and evidence, there was no ground for himto hold him guilty of misconduct in the disciplinary proceedings. On 25June 2015, the disciplinary authority held that the misconduct was provedand imposed penalty of compulsory retirement. Aggrieved by the penalty,the respondent moved the Karnataka Administrative Tribunal. Beforethe Tribunal, the respondent urged that:

(i)The prosecution before the Special Judge, Bijapur was onthe same set of facts on which he was acquitted by thejudgment dated 23 October 2013;E

(ii)The Upa-Lokayukta is not conferred with the power torecommend the quantum of punishment;

(iii)The Upa-Lokayukta and disciplinary authority had ascribedundue weight to the evidence of the investigating officerand the shadow witness which resulted in miscarriage ofjustice; and

(iv)The disciplinary authority did not consider the explanationsubmitted by the respondent in proper perspective.5. By its order dated 5 April 2016, the Tribunal upheld the order ofcompulsory retirement. The Tribunal held that:

(i)Disciplinary proceedings are not dependant on the verdictin parallel criminal case ( Commissioner of Police,Delhi v. Narender Singh[2]);

2 AIR 2006 SC 1800

A(ii)Strict rules of evidence do not apply to disciplinaryproceedings and even hearsay evidence is acceptable if ithas nexus with the facts of the case. (State of Haryana v.Rattan Singh[3]); and

(iii)The contention of the respondent that his reply to the secondBshow cause notice was not considered by the disciplinaryauthority before passing the order dated 25 June 2015 iserroneous.

6. This led to the institution of proceedings before the High Courtunder Article 226 of the Constitution. The Division Bench framed theCprincipal issue in the following terms:

“Whether the order of the Disciplinary authority in holding thepetitioner guilty of charges despite finding by criminal Courtacquitting him of the similar charges on the basis of similar set ofevidence was justified.”D

7. The petition was allowed by the Division Bench on the ground

that:

(i)The Disciplinary authority while observing that therespondent had improved his statement while deposing thatEthe money was from DW1, did not properly assess theevidentiary material;

(ii)After the ‘hand wash’ of the respondent turned pink,indicating that he touched the tainted currency, hisexplanation was that the money was loan being returned;F

(iii)There is no corroborative evidence to prove the commissionof the offence; and

(iv)The exercise undertaken by the Enquiry Officer was basedon the averments made in the complaint and the depositionGof the shadow witness. The respondent did not dispute thepossession of the tainted notes. The finding of the enquiryofficer and the competent authority is not based on tangibleevidence.

8. Mr V N Raghupathy, learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe appellant submitted that:

(i)An acquittal in criminal proceeding will not preclude theexercise of the jurisdiction of the disciplinary authority in adepartmental enquiry in view of the consistent position oflaw enunciated in the judgments of this Court;

(ii)In interfering with the award of penalty following thedisciplinary enquiry, the Division Bench of the High Courthas transgressed the limitation on the power of judicialreview;

(iii)The High Court noted that the finding of guilt recorded bythe inquiry officer was based on the complaint and theevidence of the shadow witness. Though the respondenthad not disputed the possession of the tainted currency notes,the explanation furnished by the respondent has erroneouslybeen accepted; and

(iv)In the course of the criminal trial, the complainant turnedhostile. Moreover, PW2 stated that the respondent was nota competent person to pass an order for deletion in therevenue record. On the other hand, in the course of thedisciplinary enquiry there was sufficient evidence which wasbrought on the record to sustain the finding of misconduct.

9. Mr Ashwin V Kotemath, learned counsel, on the other hand,has urged that the finding of misconduct is without an application ofmind and is perverse for the following reasons:

(i)In the course of the disciplinary enquiry, the respondentexamined DW 1 who is the brother-in-law of thecomplainant. He stated that the amount of rupees fivethousand represented loan which was received by him fromthe respondent for the purchase of manure in March 2011;

(ii)The defence and explanation of the respondent on 11 May2011, and on the date of trap before the Inquiry Officerwas that in the month of March 2011, hand loan of rupeesfive thousand was given to the brother-in-law of thecomplainant and it was the repayment of the loan whichwas demanded and accepted by the respondent;

A(iii)The inquiry officer had no authority to recommend thequantum of punishment;

(iv)Since 11 May 2011, the respondent has been out of service.The High Court has correctly appreciated the nature ofmisconduct while directing reinstatement without backBwages; and

(v)In the alternative, the punishment of compulsory retirementmay be substituted by any other punishment such as thestopping of increments in the interest of justice.

10. During the course of the criminal trial, among other witnesses,Cthe prosecution led the evidence of PW1 (the complainant), PW2 (theshadow witness), and PW4 (the Village Assistant who was workingunder the respondent). PW 1 and PW 4 turned hostile and did not supportthe case of the prosecution. The respondent led the evidence of DW1,the brother-in-law of the complainant. The trial judge came to theDconclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove the charges levelledagainst the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Among other reasons,the Special Judge also weighed the fact that the investigating officerassisted the complainant in the trap which is contrary to the law laiddown in State of Punjab v. Madan Mohan Lal Verma[4].The SpecialJudge, Bijapur by the judgment dated 23 October 2013 held that:E“20. In this case paying the amount of Rs.5,000/- to the accusedin his private office room by the complainant is not in dispute. Theaccused has stated that he has not demanded and accepted anybribe amount from the complainant. By seeing the photos it isclear that there was an altercation between the accused and theFcomplainant at the time of trap. So considering the principles statedin the said decisions and the evidence placed before this Court,come to the conclusion that the prosecution has failed to provethat the accused demanded and accepted the bribe amount ofRs.5,000/- as gratification from the complainant. In this case thereGis no trustworthy evidence regarding the demand and acceptanceof bribe amount by the accused as gratification.”

11. During the course of the disciplinary enquiry, the complainantdeposed as PW 1 but did not support the article of charge. However,

H4 (2013) 14 SCC 153

PW2 who was the shadow witness furnished detailed account of therecovery of the tainted notes from the possession of the respondent.Besides this, he furnished an account of the tape recorded conversationwith the accused. During the course of the disciplinary enquiry, therespondent urged in his defense that the amount of rupees five thousandrecovered from him on the date of the trap represented the loan whichwas advanced by him to DW1. The complainant stated in the course ofhis evidence that he got lands in his village in survey No.54 admeasuring4.03 acres and that he had met the respondent in connection with thedeletion of the name of the holder from column 11 of the RTC. Thoughthe complainant did not support the case of the department in regard tothe demand of bribe, he admitted his signatures on the complaint (ExhibitP1), the signature on the pre-trap mahazar (Exhibit P2) and the trapmahazar (Exhibit P3). The complainant also admitted that the police hadtaken photographs of the scene (Exhibit P4). In this backdrop, the inquiryofficer noticed that the evidence of PW2 who was the shadow witnesswas “very important” as he was present at the time of the demand andacceptance of the bribe by the respondent. The investigating officerwas examined as PW3 in the disciplinary enquiry. The investigating officercorroborated the version of PW2 about the filing of complaint by PW1,conducting of pre-trap formalities in the presence of panchas and the trapformalities. The relevant extract from the enquiry report is extracted below:

“In the light of the said evidence of PW.1, the evidence of PW.2is very important. PW.2 is the shadow panch witness, who is saidto have been present at the time of demand and acceptance ofbribe by DGO from CW .1. He has categorically stated in hisevidence that on 11. 05.2011, Bijapur police secured him to theiroffice and at that time CW.1 and 3 were there and the policeintroduced CW.1 to them and told about the contents of thecomplaint given by PW.1 and the complaint was against the OGO.Then CW.1 produced Rs.5000/- in the denomination of 3 notes ofRs.1000/- and 4 notes of Rs.500/- and then police smearedphenolphthalein powder to the said notes and they were kept inthe left side shirt pocket of CW.1. He also speaks about furtherprocedure of conducting pre-trap formalities by writing mahazaras per Ex.P.2.

PW.2 further goes to say in his evidence that Lokayukta policetook them all to the village Chadachana at about 1.00 PM and he

and CW.1 went to the office of OGO and OGO was in the office.The police and others were waiting outside. He was standingnear the door, then CW.1 asked DGO about his work, then DGOasked CW.1 whether he has brought the money which he hadtold yesterday, then CW.1 took the amount from his shirt pocketand handed over to DGO requesting to do his work, then DGOreceived the bribe amount from right hand and kept in his shirtpocket and he observed the said transaction. Then CW.1 wentand gave pre-arranged signal to the police. Then police and CW.3came and CW. 1 showed DGO to the police, police washed bothhands of DGO with some solution and said wash turned into pinkcolour and the same was collected in bottle and sealed. ThenDGO took out the bribe amount from his shirt pocket and notenumbers were compared with the numbers recorded and theywere tallying. Then police seized the said amount. He also saysthat then by providing alternate shirt, police got removed the shirtof DGO and shirt pocket was washed in some solution and saidwash turned into pink colour. Then police conducted mahazar asper Ex.P.5PW. 3 is the Investigating Officer who corroborated the versionof PW.2 about filing of complaint by PW.1 and conducting of pre-trap formalities in the presence of panchas and also about thetrap formalities. He made clear in his evidence after conductingpre-trap procedure, he took CW.1 to 3 in their vehicle to the privateoffice of DGO. CW1 and 2 went inside the private office of DGOand after receipt of signal from CW.1, he and CW.3 went insideand CW.1 showed that DGO has accepted the bribe. Then he washedboth hands of DGO in sodium carbonate solution seperately andthe said wash turned into pink colour and same was collected inbottle and sealed. He has speaks about washing of shirt pocket ofDGO with sodium carbonate solution and other formalities.

On careful perusal of evidence of PW.2 and PW.3, it can be heldthat PW.1 (CW.1) has intentionally turned hostile and not supportedthe case of the disciplinary authority to held the DGO. The evidenceof DW.1 appears to be story created for the purpose of thiscase to escape from the clutches of law. PW.1 in his evidencehas admitted the signature found on the complaint. If really DGOhas not demanded any bribe and PW.1 returned the loan amountto DGO as stated by DW.1, there was no necessity for PW.1 to

go Lokayukta office and give and sign the complaint. He wasalso present for the pre-trap and trap mahazars and put hissignatures. PW.2 has made clear in his evidence that explanationgiven by DGO as per Ex. P.3 with regard to the alleged loan isfalse. PW.2 and 3 have nothing against DGO to depose falselybefore this authority. Their evidence appears to be cogent andreliable and I do not find any reason to disbelieve their evidence.In their cross-examination also, defense counsel failed to elicitany material contradictions to discard their evidence. The defenseof DGO that he received loan amount from PW.1 advanced byhim to his brother-in-law cannot be accepted.”

12. The enquiry report concluded in this backdrop that themisconduct was established on the basis of the evidence of PW2 andPW3. Referring to the evidence of the complainant, the inquiry officerheld that if in truth the respondent had not demanded bribe and PW1was returning loan amount to the respondent as stated by DW 1, therewas no necessity for the complainant to visit the office of the Lokayuktaand to sign complaint. The complainant was also present for the pre-trap and trap mahazar and appended his signatures. The enquiry reportfinds that there was no reason for PW2 and PW3 to depose falsely. Nomaterial inconsistencies were elicited during the cross examination bythe respondent. Consequently, the defense that the amount which wasrecovered from the respondent represented loan was disbelieved andthe misconduct was held to be proved.

13. The principles which govern disciplinary enquiry are distinctfrom those which apply to criminal trial. In prosecution for an offencepunishable under the criminal law, the burden lies on the prosecution toestablish the ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Theaccused is entitled to presumption of innocence. The purpose of adisciplinary proceeding by an employer is to enquire into an allegation ofmisconduct by an employee which results in violation of the servicerules governing the relationship of employment. Unlike criminalprosecution where the charge has to be established beyond reasonabledoubt, in disciplinary proceeding, charge of misconduct has to beestablished on preponderance of probabilities. The rules of evidencewhich apply to criminal trial are distinct from those which govern adisciplinary enquiry. The acquittal of the accused in criminal case doesnot debar the employer from proceeding in the exercise of disciplinaryjurisdiction.

A14. In judgment of three judge Bench of this Court in State ofHaryana v. Rattan Singh[5], Justice V R Krishna Iyer set out the principleswhich govern disciplinary proceedings as follows:

“4. It is well settled that in domestic enquiry the strict andsophisticated rules of evidence under the Indian Evidence Actmay not apply. All materials which are logically probative fora prudent mind are permissible. There is no allergy to hearsayevidence provided it has reasonable nexus and credibility. Itis true that departmental authorities and Administrative Tribunalsmust be careful in evaluating such material and should not gliblyswallow what is strictly speaking not relevant under the IndianEvidence Act. For this proposition it is not necessary to citedecisions nor text books, although we have been taken throughcase-law and other authorities by counsel on both sides. Theessence of judicial approach is objectivity, exclusion of extraneousmaterials or considerations and observance of rules of naturaljustice. Of course, fairplay is the basis and if perversity orarbitrariness, bias or surrender of independence of judgment vitiatethe conclusions reached, such finding, even though of domestictribunal, cannot be held good. However, the courts belowmisdirected themselves, perhaps, in insisting that passengers whohad come in and gone out should be chased and brought beforethe tribunal before valid finding could be recorded. The ‘residuum’rule to which counsel for the respondent referred, based uponcertain passages from American Jurisprudence does not go tothat extent nor does the passage from Halsbury insist on suchrigid requirement. The simple point is, was there someevidence or was there no evidence — not in the sense of thetechnical rules governing regular court proceedings but in faircommonsense way as men of understanding and worldly wisdomwill accept. Viewed in this way, sufficiency of evidence in proofof the finding by domestic tribunal is beyond scrutiny. Absenceof any evidence in support of finding is certainly available forthe court to look into because it amounts to an error of law apparenton the record. We find, in this case, that the evidence of Chamanlal,Inspector of the Flying Squad, is some evidence which has

relevance to the charge levelled against the respondent. Therefore,we are unable to hold that the order is invalid on that ground.”

(emphasis supplied)

These principles have been reiterated in subsequent decisions ofthis Court including State of Rajasthan v. K Meena[6]; KrishnakaliTea Estate v. Akhil Bharatiya Chah Mazdoor Sangh[7]; Ajit KumarNag v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd.[8]; and CISF v Abrar Ali[9].

15. In the course of the submissions, the respondents placedreliance on the decision in the Union of India v. Gyan Chand Chattar[10].In that case, six charges were framed against the respondent. One ofthe charges was that he demanded commission of 1% for paying therailway staff. The enquiry officer found all the six charges proved. Thedisciplinary authority agreed with those findings and imposed thepunishment of reversion to lower rank. Allowing the petition underArticle 226 of the Constitution, the High Court observed that there wasno evidence to hold that he was guilty of the charge of bribery since thewitnesses only said that the motive/reason for not making the paymentcould be the expectation of commission amount. The respondent placedreliance on the following passages from the decision:

“21. Such serious charge of corruption requires to be proved tothe hilt as it brings both civil and criminal consequences upon theemployee concerned. He would be liable to be prosecuted andwould also be liable to suffer severest penalty awardable in suchcases. Therefore, such grave charge of quasi-criminal naturewas required to be proved beyond the shadow of doubt and to thehilt. It cannot be proved on mere probabilities.

31. […] wherein it has been held that the punishment shouldalways be proportionate to the gravity of the misconduct. However,in case of corruption, the only punishment is dismissal fromservice. Therefore, the charge of corruption must always be dealtwith keeping in mind that it has both civil and criminalconsequences.”

6 (1966) 6 SCC 417

7 (2004) 8 SCC 200

8 (2005) 7 SCC 764

9 (2017) 4 SCC 507

10 (2009) 12 SCC 78

AThe observations in paragraph 21 are not the ratio decidendi ofthe case. These observations were made while discussing the judgmentof High Court. The ratio of the judgment emerges in the subsequentpassages of the judgment, where the test of relevant material andcompliance with natural justice as laid down in Rattan Singh (supra)was reiterated:B

“”35. …an enquiry is to be conducted against any person givingstrict adherence to the statutory provisions and principles of naturaljustice. The charges should be specific, definite and giving detailsof the incident which formed the basis of charges. No enquiryCcan be sustained on vague charges. Enquiry has to be conductedfairly, objectively and not subjectively. Finding should not beperverse or unreasonable, nor the same should be based onconjectures and surmises. There is distinction in proof andsuspicion. Every act or omission on the part of the delinquentcannot be misconduct. The authority must record reasons forDarriving at the finding of fact in the context of the statue definingthe misconduct.”

36. In fact, initiation of the enquiry against the respondent appearsto be the outcome of anguish of superior officers as there hadbeen an agitation by the railway staff demanding the payment ofpay and allowances and they detained the train illegally and therehas been too much hue and cry for several hours on the railwaystation. The enquiry officer has taken into consideration thenon-existing material and failed to consider the relevantmaterial and finding of all facts recorded by him cannot besustained in the eye of the law.”

(emphasis supplied)

On the charge of corruption, the Court observed in the abovedecision that there was no relevant material to sustain the conviction ofthe respondent since there was only hearsay evidence where theGwitnesses assumed that the motive for not paying the railway staff “couldbe” corruption. Therefore, the standard that was applied by the Courtfor determining the validity of the departmental proceedings was whether(i) there was relevant material for arriving at the finding; and (ii) theprinciples of natural justice were complied with.

16. In Karnataka Power Transmission Corporation Ltd. v.C. Nagaraju, this Court has held:

“9. Acquittal by criminal court would not debar an employerfrom exercising the power to conduct departmental proceedingsin accordance with the rules and regulations. The two proceedings,criminal and departmental, are entirely different. They operate indifferent fields and have different objectives. In the disciplinaryproceedings, the question is whether the Respondent is guilty ofsuch conduct as would merit his removal from service or lesserpunishment, as the case may be, whereas in the criminalproceedings, the question is whether the offences registered againsthim under the PC Act are established, and if established, whatsentence should be imposed upon him. The standard of proof, themode of inquiry and the rules governing inquiry and trial in boththe cases are significantly distinct and different.”

The Court also held that:

“Having considered the submissions made on behalf of theAppellant and the Respondent No.1, we are of the view thatinterference with the order of dismissal by the High Court wasunwarranted. It is settled law that the acquittal by Criminal Courtdoes not preclude Departmental Inquiry against the delinquentofficer. The disciplinary authority is not bound by the judgment ofthe Criminal Court if the evidence that is produced in theDepartmental Inquiry is different from that produced during thecriminal trial. The object of Departmental Inquiry is to find outwhether the delinquent is guilty of misconduct under the conductrules for the purpose of determining whether he should becontinued in service. The standard of proof in DepartmentalInquiry is not strictly based on the rules of evidence. The order ofdismissal which is based on the evidence before the Inquiry Officerin the disciplinary proceedings, which is different from the evidenceavailable to the Criminal Court, is justified and needed nointerference by the High Court.”

17. In the exercise of judicial review, the Court does not act as anappellate forum over the findings of the disciplinary authority. The courtdoes not re-appreciate the evidence on the basis of which the finding ofmisconduct has been arrived at in the course of disciplinary enquiry.The Court in the exercise of judicial review must restrict its review to

Adetermine whether: (i) the rules of natural justice have been compliedwith; (ii) the finding of misconduct is based on some evidence; (iii) thestatutory rules governing the conduct of the disciplinary enquiry havebeen observed; and (iv) whether the findings of the disciplinary authoritysuffer from perversity; and (vi) the penalty is disproportionate to theproven misconduct.[11] However, none of the above tests for attractingBthe interference of the High Court were attracted in the present case.The Karnataka Administrative Tribunal having exercised the power ofjudicial review found no reason to interfere with the award of punishmentof compulsory retirement. The Division Bench of the High Courtexceeded its jurisdiction under Article 226 and trenched upon domainCwhich falls within the disciplinary jurisdiction of the employer. The enquirywas conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Thefindings of the inquiry officer and the disciplinary authority are sustainablewith reference to the evidence which was adduced during the enquiry.The acquittal of the respondent in the course of the criminal trial did not

impinge upon the authority of the disciplinary authority or the finding ofDmisconduct in the disciplinary proceeding.

18. For these reasons, we allow the appeals and set aside theimpugned judgment and order of the High Court of Karnataka at theKalaburagi Bench dated 29 November 2017 in Writ Petition Nos. 202250-251/2016 (S-KAT). The Petition instituted by the respondent under ArticleE226 of the Constitution shall stand dismissed. The finding of misconductand the punishment of compulsory retirement are restored.

19. There shall be no order as to costs.

20. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Devika Gujral

Appeals allowed.

11 State of Karnataka v. N. Gangaraj, (2020) 3 SCC 423; Union of India v. G.Ganayutham (1997) 7 SCC 463; B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC749; R.S. Saini v State of Punjab (1999) 8 SCC 90; and CISF v Abrar Ali (2017) 4HSCC 507.