STATE OF RAJASTHAN versus BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER

STATE OF RAJASTHAN

BANWARI LAL AND ANOTHER

(Criminal Appeal No. 579 of 2022)

APRIL 08, 2022

[M. R. SHAH AND B. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]

Appeal by State: Conviction of accused-B by the trial Courtfor the offence u/s.307 IPC for having caused serious injuries onthe vital part of the body of the victim/injured – Trial Court sentencedaccused-B to undergo three years’ rigorous imprisonment – In anappeal before the High Court, the accused did not challenge theconviction, but only prayed the Court to reduce the sentence to theperiod already undergone by him by submitting that occurrencetook place about 26 years ago; that they were facing trial sincethen; and when the occurrence took place, they were young andnow they are aged persons – High Court, without any detailedanalysis of the facts of the case, nature of injuries caused, weaponused, simply reduced the sentence to the period already undergone(44 days) – Held: The manner in which the High Court dealt withthe appeal and has reduced the sentence, without adverting to therelevant facts and without considering the gravity and nature ofoffence, is unsustainable – High Court has dealt with the appeal ina most casual and cavalier manner – The judgment and order passedby the High Court reducing the sentence is nothing but an instanceof travesty of justice and against all the principles of law on imposingappropriate punishment/suitable punishment – As per s.307 IPC,whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge, and undersuch circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, he wouldbe guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of eitherdescription for term which may extend to ten years and shall alsobe liable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act,the offender shall be liable either to imprisonment for life or tosuch punishment as mentioned in s.307 IPC – In the instant case,accused-B could have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonmentand/or at least up to ten years – Trial court sentenced him to undergothree years rigorous imprisonment – Therefore, as such, trial courtalready took very lenient view while imposing the sentence of

DEF

Aonly three years’ rigorous imprisonment – Therefore, High Courtought not to have interfered with the same – Merely because longperiod lapsed by the time the appeal is decided cannot be groundto award the punishment which is disproportionate and inadequate– High Court did not at all advert to the relevant factors whileimposing appropriate/suitable punishment/sentence – The mannerBin which the High Court has dealt with and disposed of the appealis highly deprecated – Penal Code, 1860 – s.307 – Judicialdeprecation.

Appeal: Appeal preferred by the State against order ofprobation passed in favour of accused-M – Trial court grantedCbenefit of probation to accused-M, against which the State did notprefer any appeal before the High Court and it was the accusedwho preferred appeal, which came to be dismissed – State oughtnot to have preferred the instant appeal against the accused-M,when his appeal before the High Court was dismissed and theDconviction was confirmed – If the State was aggrieved againstgranting the benefit of probation, in that case, in the first instance,the State ought to have preferred an appeal before the High Court.

Appeal: Delay on part of State in filing appeal – Condonationof – Plea by accused that they have resettled in their lives and haveEnot indulged in any criminal activity and therefore, substantial delayon part of State in filing appeal should not be condoned – Held:Merely on the technical ground of delay and merely on the groundthat the accused have resettled in their lives and their conduct hassince been satisfactory and they have not indulged in any criminalactivity, is no ground not to condone the delay and not to considerFthe appeal on merits – The delay of 1880 days in preferring appealis condoned.

Partly allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.The approach of the High Court is most cavalier.GTherefore, the order of the High Court merits interference bythis Court. Merely on the technical ground of delay and merelyon the ground that after the impugned judgment and order, whichis unsustainable, the accused have resettled in their lives andtheir conduct has since been satisfactory and they have notindulged in any criminal activity, is no ground not to condone theH

delay and not to consider the appeal on merits. Hence, thedelay of 1880 days in preferring the appeal is condoned.[Para 8][625-F-G]

2.1 In the matter on hand, it is proved that the victim hassustained grievous injury on vital portion of body, i.e, head andthere was fracture on the skull. Doctor has also opined that theinjury was life-threatening and the injury suffered by the injuredwas, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death.As per Section 307 IPC, whoever does any act with such intentionor knowledge, and under such circumstances that, if he by thatact caused death, he would be guilty of murder, shall be punishedwith imprisonment of either description for term which mayextend to ten years and shall also be liable to fine; and if hurt iscaused to any person by such act, the offender shall be liableeither to imprisonment for life or to such punishment asmentioned in Section 307 IPC. Thus, in the present case, theaccused could have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonmentand/or at least up to ten years. The trial Court sentenced theaccused-B to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment.Therefore, as such, the trial Court had already taken very lenientview while imposing the sentence of only three years’ rigorousimprisonment. Therefore, the High Court ought not to haveinterfered with the same. Though the High Court has not statedanything, from the impugned judgment and order passed by theHigh Court, it appears that what weighed with the High Court isthe submission on behalf of the accused that the occurrence tookplace on 31.03.1989, i.e., about 26 years ago; that they were facingtrial since last 26 years; and when the occurrence took place,they were young and now they are aged persons. The aforesaidcannot be the sole consideration while awarding an appropriateand/or adequate sentence. Even with regard to the submissionon behalf of the accused that there is no minimum sentence underSection 307 IPC and that the sentence would be up to ten years,the same is answered by holding that discretion has to beexercised judiciously and the sentence has to be imposedproportionately and looking to the nature and gravity of the offencecommitted and by considering the principles for imposingsentence. [Para 9][625-H; 626-A-F]

AState of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal (2018) 18 SCC 535;State of Madhya Pradesh v. Udham (2019) 10 SCC 300;Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v. State of Gujarat(2015) 7 SCC 359 : [2015] 2 SCR 751 – relied on.

2.2 Merely because long period has lapsed by the timeBthe appeal is decided cannot be ground to award the punishmentwhich is disproportionate and inadequate. The High Court hasnot at all adverted to the relevant factors which were required tobe while imposing appropriate/suitable punishment/sentence. TheHigh Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal in mostcavalier manner. The High Court has disposed of the appeal byCadopting shortcuts. The manner in which the High Court has dealtwith and disposed of the appeal is highly deprecated. [Para10][626-G-H]2.3 In cases, like the present one, the accused did not pressany challenge to the conviction and prayed for reduction inDsentence and the same is considered and an inadequate andinappropriate sentence has been imposed without assigning anyfurther reasons and without adverting to the relevant factorswhich are required to be considered while imposing appropriatepunishment/sentence. Such practice of disposing of criminalEappeals by adopting shortcuts is deprecated. Therefore, theimpugned judgment and order passed by the High Court reducingthe sentence to the period already undergone (44 days) from threeyears rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Courtin respect of accused-B is absolutely unsustainable and the samedeserves to be quashed and set aside. [Para 10][627-B-D]F

3. Now so far as the appeal preferred by the State againstthe accused-M is concerned, even the trial Court granted thebenefit of probation to the said accused, against which the Statedid not prefer any appeal before the High Court and it was theaccused who preferred appeal, which came to be dismissed.GTherefore, the State ought not to have preferred the presentappeal against the accused-M, when his appeal before the HighCourt came to be dismissed and the conviction came to beconfirmed. If the State was aggrieved against granting the benefitof probation, in that case, in the first instance, the State ought to

have preferred an appeal before the High Court. [Para 11][627-E-F]

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.579 of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.05.2015 of the High Courtof Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur Bench, Jaipur in S.B. CriminalAppeal No.36 of 1993.

Vishal Meghwal, Milind Kumar, Advs. for the Appellant.

Abhishek Gupta, Ms. Rohini Musa, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

M. R. SHAH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentand order dated 06.05.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature forRajasthan at Jaipur in S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 36/1993, by which theHigh Court has partly allowed the said appeal and while maintaining theconviction of respondent no.1 herein for the offence under Section 307IPC, has reduced the sentence from three years rigorous imprisonmentto the period already undergone by him in confinement (44 days), and sofar as the accused – Mohan Lal is concerned, the High Court has notinterfered with the order of the trial Court convicting him under Section324 IPC, and releasing him on probation under Section 360 Cr.P.C., theState has preferred the present appeal.

3. That the respondents herein and others were tried by the learnedtrial Court for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 447 & 323 IPCand also under Section 307 IPC (so far as accused Banwari Lal –respondent no.1 herein is concerned). Respondent No.1 herein – BanwariLal was tried for the offence under Section 307 IPC for having causedgrievous injuries on the skull/middle of the head of the injured person –Phool Chand. That the injured Phool Chand sustained one lacerated

Awound of size 10 x 1 cms bone deep extending up to brain membrane inthe centre of the skull and the bone was emerging out. He also sustainedother injuries.

3.1 On appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court held thatthe prosecution has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the injuriesBsuffered by the injured Phool Chand which were caused by the accused– Banwari Lalwere sufficient for causing death, in the ordinary courseof nature. By observing so, the learned trial Court convicted therespondent – Banwari Lal for the offence under Section 307 IPC andsentenced him to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment. However,so far as the accused Mohan Lal is concerned, the learned trial Court,Cthough convicted him, but granted the benefit of probation.3.2 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the judgment and orderof conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court, therespondents – accused Banwari Lal and Mohan Lal, both, preferred anappeal before the High Court. Before the High Court, the mainDsubmissions were made on behalf of the accused – Banwari Lal, inwhich the respondents did not challenge their conviction but prayed toreduce the sentence so far as the accused Banwari Lal is concerned, onthe grounds that occurrence took place on 31.03.1989, i.e., about 26years ago; that they were facing trial since last 26 years; and when theEoccurrence took place, they were young and now they are old/agedpersons. It was also submitted on behalf of the accused Banwari Lalthat as the benefit of probation has been given to the accused MohanLal, he may also be given the benefit of probation. Thereafter, withoutassigning any further reasons whatsoever and without considering thenature or gravity of offence and the serious injuries caused by the accusedFBanwari Lal on the injured Phool Chand, the High Court has partly allowedthe said appeal and while maintaining the conviction, has reduced thesentence to the period already undergone by him (44 days). The HighCourt has dismissed the appeal in respect of the accused Mohan Lal.

3.3 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgmentGand order passed by the High Court, interfering with the sentence imposedby the learned trial Court and reducing it to the period already undergone(44 days) from three years rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learnedtrial Court insofar as accused Banwari Lal is concerned, as also,confirming the order of probation insofar as accused Mohan Lal isHconcerned, the State has preferred the present appeal.

3.4 There is huge delay of 1880 days in preferring the appealand therefore separate criminal miscellaneous application is filed bythe State, praying to condone the delay.

4. Shri Vishal Meghwal, learned Advocate appearing on behalf ofthe State has vehemently submitted that in the facts and circumstancesof the case, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Courtreducing the sentence to the period already undergone (44 days) fromthree years’ rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court isunsustainable.

4.1 It is vehemently submitted that as such there are no specificreasons assigned by the High Court while reducing the sentence imposedby the trial Court.

4.2 It is contended that while reducing the sentence the HighCourt has not at all dealt with and/or considered the mitigating andaggravating circumstances, which are relevant for the purpose of imposingan appropriate punishment/sentence.

4.3 It is submitted that the High Court has not at all consideredthe gravity of the offence and the serious injuries sustained by the victim/injured Phool Chand.

4.4 It is further submitted that when the judicial discretion wasexercised by the learned trial Court sentencing the accused to undergothree years’ rigorous imprisonment (Banwari Lal) for the offence underSection 307 IPC, the same ought not to have been interfered with by theHigh Court, more particularly, when the appeal challenging the convictionwas not pressed.

4.5 Making the above submissions and relying upon the decisionsof this Court in the cases of State of Rajasthan v. Mohan Lal, reportedin (2018) 18 SCC 535; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Udham, reportedin (2019) 10 SCC 300; and Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar v.State of Gujarat, reported in (2015) 7 SCC 359, it is prayed to allowthe present appeal, quash and set aside the impugned judgment and orderpassed by the High Court and restore the judgment of the learned trialCourt.

5. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Shri AbhishekGupta, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the respondents.

A5.1 Shri Abhishek Gupta, learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe accused has vehemently submitted that there is huge delay of 1880days in preferring the appeal against the impugned judgment and orderpassed by the High Court. That the accused have resettled in their livesand their conduct has since been satisfactory and after the impugnedjudgment is passed, they have not indulged in any criminal activity andBthe occurrence is of the year 1989, to revive the proceedings would beextremely harsh and unjustified. Therefore, it is prayed not to condonethe huge delay of 1880 days in preferring the appeal.

5.2 On merits, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accusedhas vehemently submitted that while reducing the sentence the HighCCourt has considered the submissions on behalf of the accused BanwariLal that the occurrence took place about 26 years ago and that theaccused were facing trial since last 26 years and that when theoccurrence took place in the year 1989, the accused were young andnow they are aged persons. It is submitted that the aforesaid can be saidDto be relevant considerations while reducing the sentence to the periodalready undergone (44 days).

5.3 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the accused has furthersubmitted that insofar as granting the benefit of probation to the accusedMohan Lal is concerned, the same was granted by the learned trialECourt against which the State did not prefer any appeal before the HighCourt. It is therefore submitted that when the High Court by theimpugned judgment and order has dismissed the appeal preferred by theaccused Mohan Lal, it is not open for the State to now challenge theorder granting benefit of probation to the accused Mohan Lal, when thesame was not challenged by the State before the High Court.F

5.4 Making the above submissions, it is prayed to reject theapplication for condonation of delay as well as the appeal even on merits.

6. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties atlength.GAt the outset, it is required to be noted that the accused BanwariLal was convicted by the learned trial Court for the offence under Section307 IPC for having caused serious injuries on the vital part of the bodyof the victim/injured Phool Chand. That the injured Phool Chand sustainedone lacerated wound of size 10 x 1 cms bone deep extending up to brainmembrane in the centre of the skull and the bone was protruding.H

Thereafter, having found the accused Banwari Lal guilty, the learnedtrial Court sentenced him to undergo three years’ rigorous imprisonment.In an appeal before the High Court, the accused did not challenge theconviction, but only prayed the Court to reduce the sentence to the periodalready undergone by him by submitting that occurrence took place on31.03.1989, i.e., about 26 years ago; that they were facing trial since last26 years; and when the occurrence took place, they were young andnow they are aged persons. The High Court, without any detailed analysisof the facts of the case, nature of injuries caused, weapon used, hassimply reduced the sentence to the period already undergone (44 days).Relevant part of the impugned judgment reads as under:

“I have heard learned counsel for the parties and carefully perusedthe relevant material on record.

Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, I do not thinkit just and proper to interfere in the impugned judgment and orderpassed by the trial court qua appeal filed by appellant Mohan Lalis concerned.

So far as the appeal filed by accused appellant Banwari Lal isconcerned, keeping in mind the arguments of learned counsel forthe appellants that accused appellant Banwari Lal is facing thetrial for the last 26 years; he has remained in custody for 44 daysduring trial; he is not the previously convicted person, in my view,ends of justice would be met if the sentence awarded to theappellant Banwari is reduced to the period already undergone byhim in confinement, as indicated herein-above. Hence, this appealis disposed of with the following directions:

i) The appeal filed by the appellant Banwari is partly allowed;

ii) His conviction is maintained. His sentence is reduced andhe is released for the period already undergone by him inconfinement, as indicated above.

iii) The sentence of the accused appellant Banwari Lal wassuspended and he is on bail. He need not to surrender and hisbail bonds stand cancelled.

iv) So far as appeal filed by accused Mohan Lal is concerned,since he has already been given the benefit of probation, I donot find any force in his appeal and consequently, the appeal,

622SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aqua accused Mohan Lal, is dismissed after confirming thejudgment and order passed by the trial court.

Impugned judgment stands modified, as indicated hereinabove.”

6.1 The manner in which the High Court has dealt with the appealand has reduced the sentence, without adverting to the relevant factsBand without considering the gravity and nature of offence, is unsustainable.The High Court has dealt with the appeal in most casual and cavaliermanner. The judgment and order passed by the High Court reducing thesentence is nothing but an instance of travesty of justice and against allthe principles of law laid down by this Court in catena of decisions onCimposing appropriate punishment/suitable punishment.

7. At this stage, few decisions of this Court on principles forsentencing and tests for awarding an appropriate sentence in givencase are required to be referred to and considered.

i) In the case of Mohan Lal (supra), the High Court modified theDjudgment and order passed by the learned trial Court and sentenced theaccused to the period already undergone by him, which was only sixdays and absolutely no reasons, much less valid reasons, were assignedby the High Court. While setting aside the order passed by the HighCourt, this Court has observed in paragraphs 9 to 13 as under:

“9. The High Court simply brushed aside the aforementionedmaterial facts and sentenced the accused to the period alreadyundergone by him, which is only 6 days in this case. In our view,the trial court and the High Court have taken lenient view byconvicting the accused for offences under Sections 325 and 323FIPC. Absolutely no reasons, much less valid reasons, are assignedby the High Court to impose the meagre sentence of 6 days. Suchimposition of sentence by the High Court shocks the judicialconscience of this Court.

10. Currently, India does not have structured sentencing guidelinesGthat have been issued either by the legislature or the judiciary.However, the courts have framed certain guidelines in the matterof imposition of sentence. Judge has wide discretion in awardingthe sentence within the statutory limits. Since in many offencesonly the maximum punishment is prescribed and for some offencesthe minimum punishment is prescribed, each Judge exercises his

discretion accordingly. There cannot, therefore, be any uniformity.However, this Court has repeatedly held that the courts will haveto take into account certain principles while exercising theirdiscretion in sentencing, such as proportionality, deterrence andrehabilitation. In proportionality analysis, it is necessary to assessthe seriousness of an offence in order to determine thecommensurate punishment for the offender. The seriousness ofan offence depends, apart from other things, also upon itsharmfulness.

11. This Court in Soman v. State of Kerala [Soman v. State ofKerala, (2013) 11 SCC 382 : (2012) 4 SCC (Cri) 1] observedthus: (SCC p. 393, para 27)

“27.1. Courts ought to base sentencing decisions on variousdifferent rationales — most prominent amongst which wouldbe proportionality and deterrence.

27.2. The question of consequences of criminal action can berelevant from both proportionality and deterrence standpoint.

27.3. Insofar as proportionality is concerned, the sentence mustbe commensurate with the seriousness or gravity of theoffence.

27.4. One of the factors relevant for judging seriousness ofthe offence is the consequences resulting from it.

27.5. Unintended consequences/harm may still be properlyattributed to the offender if they were reasonably foreseeable.In case of illicit and underground manufacture of liquor, thechances of toxicity are so high that not only its manufacturerbut the distributor and the retail vendor would know its likelyrisks to the consumer. Hence, even though any harm to theconsumer might not be directly intended, some aggravatedculpability must attach if the consumer suffers some grievoushurt or dies as result of consuming the spurious liquor.”

12. The same is the verdict of this Court in Alister AnthonyPareira v. State of Maharashtra [Alister Anthony Pareira v.State of Maharashtra, (2012) 2 SCC 648 : (2012) 1 SCC (Civ)848 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 953] wherein it is observed thus: (SCCp. 674, para 84)

“84. Sentencing is an important task in the matters of crime.One of the prime objectives of the criminal law is imposition ofappropriate, adequate, just and proportionate sentencecommensurate with the nature and gravity of crime and themanner in which the crime is done. There is no straitjacketformula for sentencing an accused on proof of crime. Thecourts have evolved certain principles: the twin objective ofthe sentencing policy is deterrence and correction. Whatsentence would meet the ends of justice depends on the factsand circumstances of each case and the court must keep inmind the gravity of the crime, motive for the crime, nature ofthe offence and all other attendant circumstances.”13. From the aforementioned observations, it is clear that theprinciple governing the imposition of punishment will depend uponthe facts and circumstances of each case. However, the sentenceshould be appropriate, adequate, just, proportionate andcommensurate with the nature and gravity of the crime and themanner in which the crime is committed. The gravity of the crime,motive for the crime, nature of the crime and all other attendingcircumstances have to be borne in mind while imposing thesentence. The court cannot afford to be casual while imposingthe sentence, inasmuch as both the crime and the criminal areequally important in the sentencing process. The courts must seethat the public does not lose confidence in the judicial system.Imposing inadequate sentences will do more harm to the justicesystem and may lead to state where the victim loses confidencein the judicial system and resorts to private vengeance.”

ii) In the case of Udham (supra), in paragraphs 11 to 13, it isobserved and held as under:

“11. We are of the opinion that large number of cases are beingfiled before this Court, due to insufficient or wrong sentencingundertaken by the courts below. We have time and again cautionedagainst the cavalier manner in which sentencing is dealt in certaincases. There is no gainsaying that the aspect of sentencing shouldnot be taken for granted, as this part of Criminal Justice Systemhas determinative impact on the society. In light of the same, weare of the opinion that we need to provide further clarity on thesame.

12. Sentencing for crimes has to be analysed on the touchstoneof three tests viz. crime test, criminal test and comparativeproportionality test. Crime test involves factors like extent ofplanning, choice of weapon, modus of crime, disposal modus (ifany), role of the accused, anti-social or abhorrent character ofthe crime, state of victim. Criminal test involves assessment offactors such as age of the criminal, gender of the criminal,economic conditions or social background of the criminal,motivation for crime, availability of defence, state of mind,instigation by the deceased or any one from the deceased group,adequately represented in the trial, disagreement by Judge inthe appeal process, repentance, possibility of reformation, priorcriminal record (not to take pending cases) and any other relevantfactor (not an exhaustive list).

13. Additionally, we may note that under the crime test,seriousness needs to be ascertained. The seriousness of the crimemay be ascertained by (i) bodily integrity of the victim; (ii) loss ofmaterial support or amenity; (iii) extent of humiliation; and (iv)privacy breach.”

In the said decision, this Court again cautioned against the cavaliermanner in which sentencing is dealt with in certain cases.

iii) In the case of Satish Kumar Jayanti Lal Dabgar (supra),this Court has observed and held that the purpose and justification behindsentencing is not only retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation butdeterrence as well.

8. Applying the law laid down by this Court on principles forsentencing, to the facts of the case on hand, we are of the opinion thatthe approach of the High Court is most cavalier. Therefore, the order ofthe High Court merits interference by this Court. Merely on the technicalground of delay and merely on the ground that after the impugnedjudgment and order, which is unsustainable, the accused have resettledin their lives and their conduct has since been satisfactory and they havenot indulged in any criminal activity, is no ground not to condone thedelay and not to consider the appeal on merits. Hence, the delay of 1880days in preferring the appeal is condoned.

9. In the matter on hand, it is proved that the victim Phool Chandhas sustained grievous injury on vital portion of body, i.e, head and

Athere was fracture on the skull. Doctor has also opined that the injurywas life-threatening and the injury suffered by the injured Phool Chandwas, in the ordinary course of nature, sufficient to cause death. As perSection 307 IPC, whoever does any act with such intention or knowledge,and under such circumstances that, if he by that act caused death, hewould be guilty of murder, shall be punished with imprisonment of eitherBdescription for term which may extend to ten years and shall also beliable to fine; and if hurt is caused to any person by such act, the offendershall be liable either to imprisonment for life or to such punishment asmentioned in Section 307 IPC. Thus, in the present case, the accusedcould have been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment and/or at leastCup to ten years. The learned trial Court sentenced the accused BanwariLal to undergo three years rigorous imprisonment. Therefore, as such,the learned trial Court had already taken very lenient view whileimposing the sentence of only three years’ rigorous imprisonment.Therefore, the High Court ought not to have interfered with the same.Though the High Court has not stated anything, from the impugnedDjudgment and order passed by the High Court, it appears that whatweighed with the High Court is the submission on behalf of the accusedthat the occurrence of the incident took place on 31.03.1989, i.e., about26 years ago; that they were facing trial since last 26 years; and whenthe occurrence took place, they were young and now they are aged

Epersons. The aforesaid cannot be the sole consideration while awardingan appropriate and/or adequate sentence. Even with regard to thesubmission on behalf of the accused that there is no minimum sentenceunder Section 307 IPC and that the sentence would be up to ten years,the same is answered by holding that discretion has to be exercisedjudiciously and the sentence has to be imposed proportionately and lookingFto the nature and gravity of the offence committed and by consideringthe principles for imposing sentence, referred to hereinabove.

10. Merely because long period has lapsed by the time the appealis decided cannot be ground to award the punishment which isdisproportionate and inadequate. The High Court has not at all advertedGto the relevant factors which were required to be while imposingappropriate/suitable punishment/sentence. As observed hereinabove, theHigh Court has dealt with and disposed of the appeal in most cavaliermanner. The High Court has disposed of the appeal by adopting shortcuts.The manner in which the High Court has dealt with and disposed of theHappeal is highly deprecated. We have come across number of judgments

of different High Courts and it is found that in many cases the criminalappeals are disposed of in cursory manner and by adopting truncatedmethods. In some cases, the convictions under Section 302 IPC areconverted to Section 304 Part I or Section 304 Part II IPC withoutassigning any adequate reasons and solely recording submissions on behalfof the accused that their conviction may be altered to Section 304 Part Ior 304 Part II IPC. In cases, like the present one, the accused did notpress any challenge to the conviction and prayed for reduction in sentenceand the same is considered and an inadequate and inappropriate sentencehas been imposed without assigning any further reasons and withoutadverting to the relevant factors which are required to be consideredwhile imposing appropriate punishment/sentence. We deprecate suchpractice of disposing of criminal appeals by adopting shortcuts. Therefore,the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court reducingthe sentence to the period already undergone (44 days) from three yearsrigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court in respect ofaccused Banwari Lal is absolutely unsustainable and the same deservesto be quashed and set aside.11. Now so far as the appeal preferred by the State against theaccused Mohan Lal is concerned, it is required to be noted that even thelearned trial Court granted the benefit of probation to the said accused,against which the State did not prefer any appeal before the High Courtand it was the accused who preferred appeal, which came to be dismissed.Therefore, the State ought not to have preferred the present appealagainst the accused Mohan Lal, when his appeal before the High Courtcame to be dismissed and the conviction came to be confirmed. If theState was aggrieved against granting the benefit of probation, in thatcase, in the first instance, the State ought to have preferred an appealbefore the High Court.

12. In view of the aforesaid discussion and for the reasons statedabove, the present appeal is allowed insofar as the accused Banwari Lalis concerned. The impugned judgment and order passed by the HighCourt interfering with the order of sentence imposed by the learned trialCourt and sentencing the accused Banwari Lal to undergo the sentenceto the period already undergone by him (44 days) from three years’rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned trial Court under Section307 IPC is hereby quashed and set aside. The judgment and order passedby the learned trial Court sentencing the accused Banwari Lal to undergo

Athree years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 IPC is herebyrestored. The accused Banwari Lal is directed to surrender before theappropriate jail authority/concerned Court, within period of four weeksfrom today, to undergo the remaining sentence.

Insofar as the appeal preferred by the State against the accusedBMohan Lal is concerned, the same is hereby dismissed.

Devika Gujral

Partly allowed.