HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. & ORS. versus MR. DEEPAK AGGARWAL & ORS.

HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTUREDEVELOPMENT CORPORATION LTD. & ORS.

MR. DEEPAK AGGARWAL & ORS.

(Special Leave Petition (C) No. 16631-16632 of 2018)

JULY 28, 2022

[A. M. KHANWILKAR, ABHAY S. OKA AND

C. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in LandAcquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(1)–”initiated” – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.4 –Meaning andinterpretation of”initiated” in s.24(1) of the 2013 Act, with referenceto land acquisition proceedings under the L.A Act – Held: For thepurposes of sub-section (1) of s.24 of the 2013 Act, the proceedingsunder the L.A. Act shall be treated as initiated on publication of anotification under sub-section (1) of s.4 of the L.A. Act –Further,when Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of s.24 of the 2013 Act isapplicable, the proceedings shall continue as per the L.A. Act –However, only for the determination of compensation amount, theprovisions of the 2013 Act shall be applied – Interpretation ofStatutes –Purposive construction.

Directing the appeals to be listed before appropriate Benchfor disposal on merits, the Court

HELD : 1.1 perusal of Section 24 would reveal thatpassing of an Award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act is the keyfactor in deciding the manner and nature of continuance of theland acquisition proceedings. scanning of Section 24(1)(a) wouldreveal that if land acquisition proceeding was initiated under theL.A. Act, but no award was passed under Section 11 thereof, then,all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the “determination ofcompensation” would apply. At the same time, if upon initiationof acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act, an award underSection 11 of the L.A. Act was passed, then, such proceedingsshall continue under the provisions of the L.A. Act itself, as if thesame had not been repealed. [Para 8][1093-C-E]

CDEFG

A1.2 The legislative intention behind bringing up the 2013Act was to have unified enactment facilitating land acquisitionfor industrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in atimely and transparent manner and at the same time, providingfor just and fair compensation, to make adequate provision forrehabilitation and resettlement mechanism for affected personsBand their families. The word ‘initiated’ has to be construed with aview to implement the aforesaid twin purposes of providing fairand just compensation and facilitating acquisition of land forindustrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects. Theimpact of ‘initiation’ of land acquisition proceedings and itsCculmination in an award under Section 11 of the L.A Act and alsonon-culmination in such an award has already been referred to.For proper and purposive construction of the word ‘initiated’,in the contextual situation it will not be inappropriate to look intothe legislative history of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as well, asexplained in the written submission filed on behalf of HSIIDC/DSTATE/COMMITTEE dated 11.04.2022. However, it is notdeemed necessary to refer to or to deal with it, in detail. In short,it is stated therein that the events happened prior to the draftingof Section 24, as it exists on the statute book today, is safeguide to cull out the legislative intent in formulating Section 24Ein the 2013 Act, by the legislature. Furthermore, it is statedtherein that the legislature was fully aware of the fact that landsacquired under the L.A. Act were already being used for severalpublic purposes and more particularly for infrastructural projectsand large number of acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act,relating large number of public projects for various publicFpurposes, are in progress at various stages. Hence, lapsing ofeverything would be seriously detrimental to public interest andat the same time, the interest of land holders is also taken intoaccount. The consideration of all such relevant aspects and thepros and cons made the legislature to come up with balancingGprovision under Section 24(1)(a) and clauses therein, in the 2013Act. This was incorporated as balancing provision for controllingthe extent of retrospectivity and for curtailing the erosion of rightsof land holders. [Paras 22-24][1098-D-E; 1099-A-C]

Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat (1987) 1HSCC 213 : [1987] 1 SCR 562 – relied on.

1.3 Right to property had ceased to be fundamental right.True that it is human right as also constitutional right. Hence,compulsory acquisition by scrupulous adherence to theprocedures authorised by law would not violate Article 300-A ofthe Constitution. Article 21 mandates that no person shall bedeprived of life or personal liberty, except according to proceduresestablished by law. Bearing in mind the twin purposes mentionedhereinbefore, this Court is of the view that they can only beachieved if the word ‘initiated’ is taken as the point of time whensection 4 (1) notification is issued and published under the L.A.Act, in the Official Gazette. Such construction would embracemore number of affected persons within the fold of affectedpersons entitled to higher amount of compensation by applicationof the 2013 Act in the matter of determination of compensation.As necessary sequel more extent of land in respect of whichacquisition proceedings have been initiated, for public purposes,under the L.A. Act for the various ongoing and proposed projects,would remain protected from lapsing. In this context, it is to benoted that all the parties in all the appeals in unison would admitthe fact that determination of compensation based on the 2013Act would be beneficial to the persons affected by acquisitionand entitled to be compensated. The words ‘initiate’ or ‘initiated’are not defined under the L.A. Act and also under the 2013 Act.Hence, to ascribe its meaning the dictionary meaning of the wordhas to be looked into. In the light of the above discussion andtaking note of the legislative intention this Court has no hesitationto hold that the point of initiation of land acquisition proceedingsunder the L.A. Act for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013Act, is issuance and publication of Section 4(1) notification in theofficial gazette of the appropriate Government. [Paras 26,27][1100-B, F-H; 1101-A-D]

State of M.P. Vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan (2011) 7

SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443 – relied on.

1.4 perusal of Section 4 of the L.A. Act would reveal thata preliminary Notification under Section 4(1) is issued wheneverit appears to the appropriate Government that land in any localityis needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. The saidformal expression of the decision takes concrete shape and forms

DEF

Aonly on its Publication in the Official Gazette. It is only uponissuance and publication of Notification under Section 4(1) thatany officer, either generally or specially authorised by theappropriate Government and his servants and workmen couldlawfully enter upon and survey and take levels of any land in suchlocality in terms of sub-Section (2) thereof. Section 4(2) wouldBreveal that besides entering upon and surveying and taking levelsof any land in the locality concerned, the officer authorised by theGovernment through the Notification is also empowered to digor bore into the sub-soil, to do all other acts necessary toascertain whether the land is adapted for all purposes; to set outCthe boundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intendedline of work (if any) proposed to be made thereon; to mark suchlevels, boundaries and line by placing marks and cutting trenchesand such other activities mentioned under sub-Section (2) thereof.In such circumstances, the fact is that it is the issuance andpublication of Section 4(1) notification that will empower theDauthorised officer and workmen to enter into and do suchpermissible acts and activities. [Paras 28, 29][1101-E-G; 1102-

Babu Barkya Thakur vs. State of Bombay & Ors. AIR1960 SC 1203 : [1961] SCR 128 – referred to.E

1.5 Now, this Court will consider the other commonquestions involved in the captioned appeals. They pertain to thequestions as to whether Section 4 notification issued under theL.A. Act prior to 01.01.2014 (date of commencement of 2013Act) could continue or survive after 01.01.2014 and, as to whetherFSection 6 notification under the L.A. Act could be issued after01.01.2014. While considering those questions, the purposes andthe legislative history of the 2013 Act will have to be borne inmind and also the intention of the legislature in drafting the samein the manner in which it now exists. One crucial aspectGdiscernible from Section 24(1)(a) has also to be taken note of inthis context. The combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause (a)thereof is that if land acquisition proceeding under the L.A. Actwas initiated prior to 01.01.2014, the date of coming into force ofthe 2013 Act, and if it was not culminated in an award under Section11 of the L.A. Act, then all the provisions of the 2013 Act relatingH

to the determination of compensation should apply to suchacquisition proceedings. Thus, it is obvious that in case of non-passing of an award in terms of Section 11 of the L.A. Act wherethe acquisition proceedings have been initiated prior to01.01.2014, all provisions under the 2013 Act relating to thedetermination of compensation alone would apply to suchacquisition proceedings. In other words, it would mean that insuch circumstances the land acquisition proceedings shouldcontinue, but all the provisions relating to the determination ofcompensation under the 2013 Act alone will be applicable to suchproceedings, meaning thereby, the 2013 Act would come intoplay only at that stage. There can be no doubt with respect to theposition that between the initiation of land acquisition proceedingsby issuance and publication of notice under Section 4(1) of theL.A. Act and the stage at which compensation for the acquisitioncalls for determination, there are various procedures to befollowed to make the acquisition in accordance with the law. Thequestion is when Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clearwith necessary implication that all provisions of the 2013 Actrelating to the determination of compensation alone would beapplicable to such proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act but,not culminated in an award, how the procedures are to beregulated during the intervening period till the proceedings reachthe stage of determination of compensation. There cannot be anyuncertainty on that aspect. The procedures to be undertaken andthe manner in which they are to be regulated cannot remainuncertain. They are conducted either in the manner providedunder the L.A. Act or in the manner provided under the 2013Act. But then, in view of Section 24(1)(a), the provisions relatingto the determination of compensation alone can be applied tosuch proceedings or in other words, there is only restrictedapplication of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation to suchproceedings. The inevitable conclusion can only be that what isapplicable to the various procedures to be undertaken duringthe period up to the stage of determination of compensation arethose prescribed under the L.A. Act. Without such construction,the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) would not work out, in viewof the restrictive application of the 2013 Act. Any construction ofthe said provision without taking into the legislative intention,

ABC

Areferred hereinbefore would defeat the legislative intention asalso the very objects of the 2013 Act. Certainly, it would not be inpublic interest to allow such proceedings to lapse or allow theauthorities to follow the procedures during such period accordingto their sweet will. uniform procedure has to be followed inrespect of such proceedings. The acquisitions initiated for publicBpurposes should go on in fair and transparent manner with aview to achieve the intent and purport of the 2013 Act and at thesame time, the persons affected shall have definite idea aboutthe manner in which procedures would be conducted. The Party‘B’ would not be justified in describing such situations of necessityCand the consequential application of provisions which are actuallysaved on account of the construction of Section 24 as an attemptto bring the words expressly employed in Section 24(1)(b) andabsent in Section 24(1)(a), by indirect method to Section 24(1)(a)of the 2013 Act. The aforesaid conclusions and findings wouldmake the contentions of Party ‘B’ that Section 4(1) notificationDissued prior to 01.01.2014 could not survive after 01.01.2014and also that Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could notbe issued after 01.01.2014, unsustainable. In fact, all suchprocedures and formalities shall be continued till thedetermination of compensation by applying all the provisions forEdetermination of compensation, under the 2013 Act. contra-construction, in view of the restrictive application of the provisionsto such proceedings during its continuance, would make theprovisions under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Actunworkable.[Paras 31, 32][1103-D-H; 1104-A-H; 1105-A-C]

FShiv Kumar and Anr. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (2019)10 SCC 229 – referred to.

1.6 For the purposes of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the2013 Act, the proceedings under the L.A. Act shall be treated asinitiated on publication of notification under sub-section (1) ofGSection 4 of the L.A. Act. When Clause (a) of sub-section (1) ofSection 24 of the 2013 Act is applicable, the proceedings shallcontinue as per the L.A. Act. However, only for the determinationof compensation amount, the provisions of the 2013 Act shall beapplied. [Para 34][1105-E]

HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVEL.CORP. LTD. v. MR. DEEPAK AGGARWAL

Laxman Lal (Dead) Through LRs. & Anr. V. State ofRajasthan Civil Appeal No.6392 of 2003;OffshoreHoldings Private Limited V. Bangalore DevelopmentAuthority(2011) 3 SCC 139;Maharashtra VidarbhaIrrigation Development Corpn. Vs. Mahesh &Ors.(2022) 2 SCC 772, Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs.Ashalatha S. Guram (1986) 4 SCC 447 : [1986] SCR866; Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs.State of Rajasthan (1975) 4 SCC 296: [1975] 2 SCR68; V.K.M. Kattha Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. State ofHaryana (2013) 9 SCC 338 : [2013] 10 SCR 33; M/s.Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd. Vs. Gustavo Ranato DaCruz Pinto & Ors. (1985) 2 SCC 152 : [1985] 2 SCR937– referred to.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition (C)NOS.16631-16632 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.08.2017 and 15.09.2017of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No.4371of 2015.

With

Slp (C) Nos.13883, 16585, 16569, 16612, 16628 of 2018, Slp (C)D.no.32828 of 2018, Slp (C) Nos.26059, 28961, 28941, 28959, 28949 of2018, 2886, 7504 of 2019, Slp (C) D.no.8299 of 2019, Slp (C) Nos. 9194,14181, 15674 of 2019, 13884, 16583, 16580, 16613, 16574, 16562, 16564,16607, 16604, 18939, 16595, 16560, 16582, 16573, 16591, 16587, 16558,16610, 16614, 16570, 16567, 22288, 18942, 16629 of 2018, Slp (C)

AD.no.33145 of 2018, Slp (C) Nos.28962, 28954, 28940, 28939, 28956,28953, 28951, 28948 of 2018, Slp (C) D. No.37195 of 2018, Slp (C)Nos.28952, 18950, 19705, 16626, 16622, 16621, 18947, 16620, 18973,18969, 19703, 18945, 18968, 18962, 19697, 18957, 18958, 18960, 18964,19706, 18949, 22291, 24221, 24218, 24227, 24224 of 2018, Slp (C)D.nos.31330, 31858, 32821 Of 2018, Slp (C) No.26058 of 2018, Slp (C)BD.nos.33273, 33276 of 2018, Slp (C) No.28946 of 2018, Slp (C)Nos.2881-2883 of 2019, Slp (C) D.no.171 of 2020, Slp (C) Nos.18943,18938, 18948, 24219, 18975, 16609, 18946, 23433-23444, 19711, 22292,22294, 22295, 22290, 22298, 23446, 23445 of 2018, Slp (C) Nos.2880,2988-2990, 2884, 2877, 2878, 2885, 2887, 2879, 2888-2890, 3775-3778,C3782, 3780, 3786, 3788, 6496, 5149, 5148, 7496-7498, 6729, 7469, 7505,7506, 6732, 7471, 6735, 7499, 7909, 7912, 5939, 7490, 7501, 7466, 7715,7915, 7916, 7907, 7908, 8380, 7910, 7911, 7906, 7914, 7917, 9186-9187,9188, 8381, 9197, 9180, 9191, 8600, 8379, 10001, 10000 of 2019, Slp (C)D.no.9289 of 2019, Slp (C) Nos.9176, 9189, 10002, 10604, 10003, 9196,10995, 9202, 10063, 14490, 14551, 14533, 14466, 17439, 16415, 14556,D14594, 19500, 14271, 16423, 17933-17934, 19012, 24752 of 2019, Slp(C) No.14253 of 2020, Slp (C) No.22217 of 2019, Slp (C) D.no.10499 of2019, Slp (C) No.14262 of 2019, Slp (C) D.no.21828 of 2019, Slp (C)Nos.23354, 23357 of 2019, Slp (C) D.no.22667 of 2019, Slp (C) No.20183of 2019, Slp (C) D.nos.26930, 26936 of 2019, Slp (C) Nos.24751, 24754,E23704, 27500 of 2019, Slp (C) No.15601 of 2020, Slp (C) D.nos.410,524, 530, 11217, 11218, 11219, 11220, 11221, 11222, 11379, 22557, 23618,25048 of 2020, Slp (C) No.113 of 2022

Tushar Mehta, SG , N. Venkataraman, ASG, B. K. Satija, Addl.AG, Anil Grover, Alok Sangwan, Sr. AAGs, Saurabh Mishra, B.K. Stija,

FAjay Bansal, AAGs, Manoj Swarup, Ranjit Kumar, Shyam Divan, Mrs.Deepika V. Marwaha, Narender Hooda, Anil K. Kher, Aashish Chopra,Rameshwar Singh Malik, Neeraj Jain, D.N. Goburdhun, Neeraj KumarJain, Sr. Advs., Vishwa Pal Singh, Rajat Nair, Sanjay K. Visen, MrinalMazumdar, Ms. Vanshaja Shukla, Ms. Prathiba Yadav, Parfull Singh,

Rahul Kuurana, Navin Gupta, Suresh Kumar Bhan, Sanjay Kumar Visen,GAnkit Swarup, Neelmani Pant, Ms. Vidisha Swarup, Raghav Bhatia,Siddharth Batra, Ms. Archna Yadav, Ms. Shivani Chawla, ChinmayDubey, Rishabh Sancheti, Ms. Padma Priya, Anchit Bhandari, SudiptoSircar, Ms. Saloni Bhandari, K. Paari Vendhan, Amir Singh Pasrich,Karan Bahmani, Ms. Meera Mathur, Ms. Shraddha Deshmukh, AdityaHBhattacharya, Ms. Charanya Lakshmikumaran, S. S. Jauhar, Ms. Sunieta

Ojha, Ms. Smita Maan, Amrendra Kumar Mehta, Gagan Gupta, VinayK. Shalimdira, Saksham Maheshwari, Ms. Rounika Johar, Ms. WorthingKasar, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Ms. Aastha Mehta, Ms. Vishakha, Ms.Deepanwita Priyanka, Vaibhav Manu Srivastava, Ashwani Kumar, RaviBharuka, Ankit Agarwal, Siddhartha Jha, B. K. Satija, Gaurav Yadava,Ms. Veena Bansal, R. C. Kaushik, Sumit Kumar Sharma , AnuragKulharia, Apoorv Yadav, Vipul Dahiya, Sandeep, Dr. Monika Gusain,Aditya Soni, Nasir Ahmad, Mohd. Muzahir Husain, Emamuddin Azmi,Syed Rehan, Ms. Sundri, Ms. Kajal Kumari, Dr. Surender Singh Hooda,Ms. Aadiya Siddiqui, Vedant Pardhan, M.L. Sharma, Rajat Sharma, SushilK. Sharma, Ms. Minakshi Sharma, Subhasish Bhowmick, Rohit KumarSingh, Syed Hasan Isfahani, Syed Mohd. Hasan, V. Jayraman, PaevezZaidi, Rahul Kumar Gupta, Ms. Chandni Arora, Shubham V. Gawande,Siddharth Mittal, Prabhat Kumar, Kshitiz Chuhan, Shoeb Alam, D.S.Parmar, Bijender S. Choudhury, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S.K. Rajora,Akhileshwar Jha, Ms. Deepali Hooda, Ms. Abha R. Sharma, DeepakGoel, Dr. M. S. Verma, Ms. Richa Verma, Mahender Kumar, DeepakBansal, Rajnish Kumar Jha, Ramesh Lal Bhatia, Deepender Hooda,Ms. Jyoti, Atishi Dipankar, Ms. Vernika Tomar, Sukant Vikram,Anshumaan Sahni, Aditya Singh, Tathagat Harshvardhan, Shubham Singh,Rajiv Dalal, Pankaj Yadav, Shubham Singh, C. Solomon, Ms.NayanMaggo, S. Nagarajan, Daya Krishan Sharma, Rohit Vats, Ms. NishaGaur, Shubham Rana, Dr. Shiva Sharma, Ashok Kumar Gupta Ii,Bhargava V. Desai, Kapil Kher, Kunal Kher, Utkaras Vats, Ms. AditiDiwan, Bharat Beriwal, Rajiv Ranjan Dwivedi, Ajay Bhargava, Ms. VanitaBhargava, Ms. Trishala Trivedi, Pratyush, M/S. Khaitan & Co., NavneetChaudhary, Robin David, Dheeraj A. Philip, Samuel David, Atul Kumar,Ms. Sweety Singh, Ms. Archana Kumari, Rajiv Ranjan, Tarun Pilania,Dr. Ajay Kumar, Kaushal Yadav, Vivekanand Rana, Pramod Kumar,Ms. Akansha Rai, Ms. Apeksha Rai, Ms. Yashoda Kaiyar, Ms. KritiyaPandey, Ms. Shweta Yadav, Shafik Ahmad, Ms. Seema Patnaha, NandLal Kumar Mishra, Pawan Singh, Prithvi Pal, Aftab Ali Khan, M.Z.chaudhary, Syed Imtiyaz Ali, Ali Safeer Farooqui, Tehsheena Z. Husain,Ali Safeer Farooq, Shoaib Khan, Arvind Kumar Kanva, K. Paari Vendhan,S. K. Verma, Somiran Sharma, Ms. Nitika Sharma, Ms. Rupa Pathania,Ms. Swati Dayalan, Mohit Chaudhary, Ms. Puja Sharma, Kunal Sachdeva,Chowdhary Zulfkar Ali, Balwinder Singh Suri, Paras Mithal, Ms. MahimaAhuja, Parveen Kumar, Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Tushar Bathija,Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Ms. Anjali Dubey, Narender Kumar Verma,

AAbhay Kumar, Kumar Milind, Shagun Ruhil, Shankar Divate, Ms. Anzu.K. Varkey, Jitesh Malik, Ms. Anisha Dahiya, Ms. Beena, Satish Kumar,Praveen Swarup, Chanchal Kumar Ganguli, Ms. Gunjan Sinha Jain,Ramkrishna Veerendra, G.D. Shrama, Ram Naresh Yadav, Amit K. Nain,Veerendra Kumar, Vaibhav Niti, Devashish Bharuka, Ms. MadhaviAgrawal, Ranbir Singh Yadav, Prateek Yadav, Mrs. Pratima Yadav, PuranBMal Saini, Ms. Anzu K. Varkey, D. Subramanyam, Pati Raj Yadav, RiteshPatil, Kasoju Mahesh Chary, Ms. Divya Jyoti Singh, Mohit Kumar Gupta,Ms. Ruma Pathak, Ms. Sarika Verma, Karan Kapoor, Manik Kapoor,Shubham Bhalla, Bijender S. Chaudhary, Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S.K.Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, Ms. Deepali Hooda, S. L. Aneja, ParmanandCYadav, Ms. Sajal Singhai, Ms. Astha Tyagi, Dinesh Chander Trehan,Siddharth Raj Agarwal, Arvind Kumar Sharma, Manish, Anmol Chandan,Ms. Swarupama Chaturvedi, R.K. Chourasia, A.K. Sharma, GaganGupta, Kunal Tandon, Shashank Shekher, Ms. Niti Jain, MayankKshirsagar, Ravinder Kumar Yadav, Vinay Mohan Sharma, SameerYadav, Ms. Aarti Anupriya, Kartikey, Raghav Anthwal, Baljeet, AmirDYadav, Vineet Yadav, Vinayak Sharma, Jasbir Singh Malik, Ms. UshaNandini V., Anshuman Srivastava, Mahesh Agarwal, Ankur Saigal, Ms.Parul Shukla, Yojit Mehra, Ms. Kamakshi Sehgal, Karan Verma, AbhinavGarg, Niraj Jain, E. C. Agrawala, Shree Prakash Sinha, Rakesh Mishra,N. Kumar, Ms. M. Sinha, Shekhar Kumar, Mohd. Zahid Hussain, CamranEIqbal, Comred Iqbal, Ms. Sahista Aslam, Kamal Mohan Gupta, PraveenBahadur, Ms. Ruby Ahuja, Ashutosh P. Shukla, Ms. K. Sachdeva, AkshayAgarwal, Ms. Garima Singh, M/S. Karanjawala & Co., Gopal Jha, Ms.Sujeeta Srivastava, Rakesh Kumar Yadav, Rameshwar Prasad Goyal,Anil Mittal, Vibhuti Sushant Gupta, Ms. Anjali Dubey, Raj Singh, Suryavir,Sushant, Nitin Mishra, Ms. Niharika Ahluwalia, Ms. Sneha Botwe, Ms.FSneha Kohli, Anshay Dhatwalia, Vishnu Mohan Nair, Ms. KumudNijhawan, Ashwani Kumar, Yash Pal Dhingra, Ms. Arti Singh,Aakashdeep Singh, Ms. Pooja Singh, Basant Pal Singh, Nishit Agrawal,Harsh Mishra, Amrendra Kumar Mehta, Ms. Manika Tripathy Pandey,Ashutosh Kaushik, Shubham Hasija, Manish Vashist, Karunakar Mahalik,GManoranjan Mishra, Gouranga Biswal, Sarbendra Kumar, Dr. BrijBhushan K. Jauhari, O.P. Singh, Harsh Mahan, Aman Garg, Ms. PurnimaJauhari, Shree Pal Singh, Aakarsh Kamra, Ms. Gauri Goburdhun, IshKaran Singh Chhabra, Shiv Singh Yadav, Ms. Shefali Mitra, Ms. PujaSethi, Mrs. Rani Chhabra, Tarun Gupta, Abhishek Sharma, DharmendraKumar Sinha, Tarun Johri, Ankur Gupta, Roopansh Purohit, Rohit Yadav,H

HARYANA STATE INDUSTRIAL AND INFRASTRUCTURE DEVEL.CORP. LTD. v. MR. DEEPAK AGGARWAL

Harsh Panwar, Neeraj Shekhar, Nasir Ahmed, Zakir Hussain, Syed, M.M.Hussain, Ms. Naseema Khatoon, Ms. Prabha Mishra, Imran Khan, Ms.Garima Prasad, Syed Hasan, V. Jayaraman Ispahani, P. Srinivasan, C.Solomon, S. Navgarajan, Sharangouda Patil, Amankant Mishra, Ms.Supreeta Sharangouda, L.B. Rai, Kartik Rai, Anish Jain, Nikhil Singhvi,Abhishek Gupta, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

C. T. RAVIKUMAR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Overlapping issues are involved in this bunch of cases. Thepoint of polemics, which is common in all these cases, pertain to themeaning and interpretation of the word “initiated” employed in Section24(1) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in LandAcquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (for brevity “the2013 Act”) with reference to land acquisition proceedings under theLand Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity “the L.A. Act”). Going by theappellants in the appeals arising from SLP(C)Nos.16631-16632 of 2018,including the State of Haryana, the Haryana State Industrial andInfrastructure Development Corporation and the appellants orrespondents in certain other appeals sailing along with them (hereinafterreferred to as Party ‘A’), for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013Act, issuance and publication of Notification under Section 4(1) of theL.A. Act, 1894 alone would amount to initiation of acquisition proceedingsthereunder. Per contra, the contesting parties, viz., the respondents thereinand appellants in other appeals who hold the contra view, (hereinafterreferred to as Party ‘B’) would contend that it is the declaration that theland is required for public purpose under Section 6(1) of the L.A. Actthat would mark the point of initiation of acquisition proceedingsthereunder. To buttress the respective contentions, the parties rely onvarious decisions of this Court as also of different High Courts. We mayhasten to add that the decisions of various High Courts cited before uswould also reflect the cleavage in opinion among the High Courts on thisissue.

Legal background

3. The legal background from which the stated question stemsmay be encapsulated thus:

CDEF

AThe L.A. Act was general law relating to acquisition of land forpublic purposes and also for companies, and for determination of amountof compensation to be made to the owner/holder of the propertyconcerned upon acquisition. Inadequacy of the provisions in the L.A.Act in addressing various issues such as rehabilitation and resettlementof affected parties of such acquisition led to the enactment of the 2013BAct and the consequent repeal of the L.A. Act. However, Section 114of the 2013 Act carries provisions not only for repeal but also for savingthe L.A. Act to certain extent in given circumstances, from the prejudicialeffect of repeal under sub-section (1) thereof, in the manner providedspecifically in the 2013 Act. Section 114 of the 2013 Act reads thus:C“Repeal and saving.-

(1) The Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894) is hereby repealed.

(2) Save as otherwise provided in this Act the repeal under sub-section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the generalDapplication of section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of1897) with regard to the effect of repeals.”

When an enactment is repealed, normally some of its provisionsare saved by repealing provision. The extent and scope of suchprovisions under the repealed Act would depend upon the ‘Repeal andESaving’ provision under the repealing Act.

4.Thus, as per sub-section (1) of Section 114 of the 2013 Act, theL.A. Act was repealed and at the same time, sub-Section (2) thereofcarries saving clause. As per sub-Section (2) thereof, the repeal undersub-Section (1) shall not be held to prejudice or affect the generalFapplication of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, with respectto the effect of repeals. Hence, to know the actual impact of the savingclause it is only proper and profitable to refer to Section 6 of the GeneralClauses Act before entering into the task of interpretation of theprovisions under the L.A. Act which remains saved for the purpose ofSection 24(1) of the 2013 Act and the scope of further operation of suchGprovisions.

5. Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (Act 10 of 1897)deals with the effect of repeals. It reads thus :-

“S.6 Effect of repeal.- Where this Act, or any [Central Act] orRegulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals

any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unlessa different intention appears, the repeal shall not-

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at whichthe repeal takes effect; or

(b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealedor anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired,accrued or incurred under any enactment so repealed; or

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred inrespect of any offence committed against any enactment sorepealed; or

(e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy inrespect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty,forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and any such investigation,legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued orenforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may beimposed as if the repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed.”

(emphasis added)

6. Section 24 of the New 2013 Act is also to be extracted for aproper consideration of the common question(s) involved in the aboveappeals. It provides thus :-

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1 of 1894 shallbe deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.– (1)Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case ofland acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894,—

(a)where no award under section 11 of the said Land AcquisitionAct has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relatingto the determination of compensation shall apply; or

G(b)where an award under said section 11 has been made, thensuch proceedings shall continue under the provisions of thesaid Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not beenrepealed.

A(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in caseof land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land AcquisitionAct, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11has been made five years or more prior to the commencement ofthis Act but the physical possession of the land has not been takenor the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shallBbe deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if itso chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisitionafresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:Provided that where an award has been made and compensationin respect of majority of land holdings has not been deposited inCthe account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specifiedin the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said LandAcquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordancewith the provisions of this Act.”

7. At this juncture it is only appropriate to refer to the decision ofDthis Court in Maharashtra Vidarbha Irrigation Development Corpn.Vs. Mahesh & Ors. reported in (2022) 2 SCC 772. It was held thereinthat in terms of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act, Section 114 of 2013Act as well as Section 6 of the General Clauses Act would not apply tothe extent hindered by Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act for the followingEreasons:

(i) Section 114 of the 2013 Act while accepting the applicabilityof Section 6 of the General Clauses Act made its application subjectto ‘save as otherwise provided’ in the 2013 Act;

(ii) Section 6 of the General Clauses Act itself provided thatFthe general savings would not apply when legislative intent iscontrary.

In this context it is also apposite to refer to the decision of thisCourt in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao vs. Ashalatha S. Guramreported in (1986) 4 SCC 447 explaining the effect of non-obstanteGclause. This Court held:

“A Clause beginning with the expression “notwithstanding anythingcontained in this Act or in some particular provision in the act or insome particular act or in any law for the time being in force, orany contract” is often than not appended to Section in theHbeginning with view to give the enacting part of this Section in

case of conflict an overriding effect over the provision of theAct or the contract mentioned in the non-obstante clause. It isequivalent to saying that inspite of the provision of the Act or anyother Act mentioned in the non-obstante clause or any contract ordocument mentioned in the enactment following it will have itsfull operation or that the provisions embraced in the non-obstanteclause would not be an impediment for operation of theenactment”.

(emphasis supplied)

8. In the light of the aforesaid decisions what needs to be lookedinto is the extent and scope of the applicability of the provisions underthe L.A. Act, despite its repeal, by virtue of section 24 of the 2013 Act.A perusal of Section 24 would reveal that passing of an Award underSection 11 of the L.A. Act is the key factor in deciding the manner andnature of continuance of the land acquisition proceedings. scanning ofSection 24(1)(a) would reveal that if land acquisition proceeding wasinitiated under the L.A. Act, but no award was passed under Section 11thereof, then, all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the “determinationof compensation” would apply. At the same time, if upon initiation ofacquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act, an award under Section 11of the L.A. Act was passed, then, such proceedings shall continue underthe provisions of the L.A. Act itself, as if the same had not been repealed.9. Party ‘B’ who canvass the position against the view thatissuance and publication of notice under Section 4(1) is the point ofinitiation, would contend that land acquisition proceedings could not beheld as initiated, for the purpose of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act,unless Section 6 declaration under the L.A. Act was issued in respect ofthe land proposed to be acquired before 01.01.2014, the date on whichthe 2013 Act came into force. At the same time, the contention of Party‘A’ is that land acquisition proceedings should be taken as initiated underthe L.A. Act when Section 4(1) Notification under the L.A. Act wasissued and published in the official gazette of the appropriate Government.Obviously, when land acquisition proceedings have been initiated and anaward was also passed under section 11 of the L.A. Act, suchproceedings, thereafter, could be continued only under the provisions ofthe L.A. Act, as if had not been repealed. It is in the aforesaid rivalcontentions and the impact of ‘initiation’ of land acquisition proceedingsin the context and purpose of Section 24 of the 2013 Act that the

Aconstruction of the word “initiated” used under Section 24(1) becamenecessary.

10. We have already noted the stand of the parties on the questionof point of initiation of acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act, forthe purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act. To buttress the contention,BParty ‘A’ mainly reliance is placed on the decisions in Indrapuri GrihaNirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. Vs. State of Rajasthan [(1975) 4 SCC296)]; and V.K.M. Kattha Industries (P) Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana[(2013) 9 SCC 338]. In the light of those decisions, they would contendthat without issuance of Section 4(1) Notification acquisition under theL.A. Act could not be effected. It is further contended that without suchCa notification, it would not be lawful for any officer, either generally orspecially authorised by the appropriate Government on their behalf, andalso for his/her servants and workmen to enter upon and survey andtake levels of any land in the locality concerned or lawfully do suchfurther actions specified and permissible under Section 4(2) of the L.A.DAct. The sum and substance of their manifold contentions is that issuanceof Section 4(1) Notification for acquisition under the L.A. Act is not amere formality and it is the point of initiation of acquisition proceedingsunder the L.A. Act.

11. On the other hand, Party ‘B’ would contend that issuance andEpublication of Section 4(1) Notification is mere formality only to enablethe authorised officer and workmen for carrying out preliminary stepsfor acquisition of the land proposed to be acquired. Nonetheless, theywould admit that without the issuance of notification thereunderacquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act would not be possible. TheirFcontention is that Section 4(1) notification carries only formal decisionas to whether any particular land is needed or likely to be needed for apublic purpose and it is only under Section 6 of the L.A. Act that ultimatelya firm declaration would be made as to the requirement of the landmentioned in the preliminary notification for public purpose. Hence,according to Party ‘B’, for all purposes, it alone could be and should beGtreated as the point of initiation of acquisition proceedings under theL.A. Act. To drive home their contention, reliance is mainly placed onthe decisions in Babu Barkya Thakur vs. State of Bombay & Ors.(AIR 1960 SC 1203) and M/s. Fomento Resorts & Hotels Ltd.Vs. Gustavo Ranato Da Cruz Pinto & Ors. [(1985) 2 SCC 152.

12. The succinct narration of the rival contentions itself wouldreveal the diverse contentions of the parties made relying on differentdecisions to support their respective stand on the question relating towhat would amount to initiation of acquisition proceedings under theL.A. Act, for the purpose of Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act.

13. In Indrapuri Griha Nirman Sahakari Samiti Ltd. case(supra)a Constitution Bench held thus: -

“Land acquisition proceedings commence with the notification”under Section 4 of the Act.

It is true that the Constitution Bench was not considering thequestion whether it is issuance and publication of notification underSection 4(1) of the L.A. Act or the declaration that the land is requiredfor public purpose under Section 6 of the L.A. Act, that tantamounts toinitiation or commencement of the land acquisition proceedings underL.A. Act. In fact, the Constitution Bench was considering the challengeagainst the notifications under Sections 4 and 6 of the Rajasthan LandAcquisition Act, 1953. But then, two-Judge Bench of this Court inCivil Appeal No.6392 of 2003 titled as ‘Laxman Lal (Dead) ThroughLRs. & Anr. V. State of Rajasthan’ held that Section 4 of RajasthanLand Acquisition Act is identical to Section 4 of the L.A. Act and Section6 of Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act is similar to Section 6 of the L.A.Act. Therefore, the declaration of the position of Section 4 of the L.A.Act by the Constitution of Bench that land acquisition proceedingscommence with the notification under Section 4 of the Act cannot beignored neither on the ground that it was held so while considering thesaid provisions in the Rajasthan Land Acquisition Act nor on the groundthat it was not made upon consideration of the question as to whether itis Section 4 or Section 6, of the L.A. Act that marks the point of initiationof land acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act.

14. As noted hereinbefore, the decision in V.K.M. KatthaIndustries (P) Ltd. case (supra) is by three-Judge Bench of thisCourt. Paragraphs 13 to 14 (both inclusive) therein would reveal thatafter extracting Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the L.A. Act, in paragraph 14the three-Judge Bench held: “Among the above provisions, Section 4 ofthe Act empowers the appropriate Government to initiate proceedingsfor the acquisition of land”. It was so held by the Bench while consideringthe contention of the appellant therein that publication of notificationunder Section 4 (1) of the L.A. Act was not in accordance with the

Amandate provided in the statute and while looking into the scheme of theL.A. Act for answering the same.

15. Now, we will look into the decisions cited by the Party ‘B’viz., in Babu Barkya Thakur’s case and in M/s Fomento Resorts& Hotels Ltd. In Babu Barkya Thakur’s case (supra), this Courtconsidered the purpose and object of the notification under Section 4 ofthe L.A. Act. The same was explained in paragraph 17 therein thus:-

“The purpose of the notification under Section 4 is to carryon preliminary investigation with view to finding out afternecessary survey and taking of levels, and, if necessary, diggingor boring into the sub-soil whether the land was adapted for thepurpose for which it was sought to be acquired. It is only underSection 6 that firm declaration has to be made by Governmentthat land with proper description and area so as to be identifiableis needed for public purpose or for Company. What was amere proposal under Section 4 becomes the subject matter of adefinite proceeding for acquisition under the Act. Hence, it is notcorrect to say that any defect in the notification under Section 4 isfatal to the validity of the proceedings, particularly when theacquisition is for Company and the purpose has to be investigatedunder Section 5-A or Section 40 necessarily after the notificationunder Section 4 of the Act.”

16. That apart, in paragraph 7 in Babu Barkya’s case it is stated

thus:

“The proceedings begin with Government notification underSection 4 that land in any locality is needed or is likely to be neededFfor any public purpose. On the issue of such notification it ispermissible for public servant and workmen to enter upon theland to do certain acts specified therein, with view to ascertainingwhether the land is adapted for the purpose for which it wasproposed to be acquired as also to determine the boundaries ofthe to be included in the scheme of acquisition”.

In Babu Barkya Thakur’s case, the Constitution Bench wasconsidering the challenge to the constitutionality of the land acquisitionproceedings with particular reference to the notification under Section 4of the L.A. Act. The contentions of the appellant therein, as can be seenfrom paragraph 6 therein, were that notification under section 4 of the

L.A. Act was illegal, that the land acquisition proceedings were in violationof Articles 14, 19 and 31 of the Constitution and that the acquisition wasnot for public purpose and was malafide. It was in the said circumstancesthat in paragraph 17 the Constitution Bench held as above.

17. In Fomento Resorts’ case (supra) the above extracted recitalfrom Babu Barkya Thakur’s case was quoted with agreement andthen, held thus:- “…Though preliminary steps for initiation of acquisitionproceedings are necessary and those can only be taken by the authorityof the notification under Section 4 as mentioned in the decision of BabuBarkya Thakur Vs. State of Bombaythe initiation of the acquisitionproceedings for all practical purposes being after Section 6 notification.Satisfaction is necessary for proceedings for acquisition under Section 6of the Act but Section 4 unlike Section 6 does not require for the issuanceof the notice to be satisfied but it might act only “when it appears” to itthen the land is needed or is likely to be needed for any public purpose”.It is relying on the aforesaid decisions that Party ‘B’ would contend thatfor all practical purposes, Section 6 declaration is the initiation ofacquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act. In other words, the contentionof Party ’B’ is that Section 6 declaration is the point of initiation of landacquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act is founded on what this Courtobserved in the above extracted portions of the said decisions.

18. It is to be noted that in Fomento Resort’s case (supra) inparagraph 13, it is stated that ‘to complete the acquisition proceedings,notification under Section 6 of the Act is required.’

19. careful scanning of all the decisions cited by both sideswould thus reveal that all those decisions hold that land acquisitionproceedings under the L.A. Act begin with the publication of notificationunder sub-section (1) of Section 4. declaration under Section 6 of theL.A. Act is one of the steps under the L.A. Act which ultimately culminatesinto the conclusion of the proceedings by making an Award and takingover possession of the acquired land. declaration under Section 6 cannotbe made without holding an inquiry unless urgency clause under Section17 is applied. Publication of notification under sub-section (1) of Section4 of the L.A. Act is condition precedent for taking further steps. Hence,such notification is the starting point of acquisition proceedings underthe L.A. Act. The initiation of the proceedings is by the publication ofthe notification under sub-section (1) of Section 4 of the L.A. Act.

A20. Bearing in mind the aforesaid position and also the observationin another Constitution Bench decision viz., in Offshore HoldingsPrivate Limited V. Bangalore Development Authority [(2011) 3SCC 139 that ‘a statute should be construed with reference to the contextand its provisions to make consistent enactment i.e. ex visceribusactus’. We will consider the question as to what exactly is the purport ofBemploying the expression ‘initiate’, with reference to the L.A. Act, underSection 24(1) of the 2013 Act.

21.We are of the considered view that while construing theexpression ‘initiated’ used in Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act with referenceto commencement of acquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act, theCdecision in Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1SCC 213 is also to be borne in mind. In Ambica Quarry Works’ casewhile construing the words ‘may be renewed’ this Court held that allinterpretations must subserve and help implementation of the intentionof the Act concerned.

22. The legislative intention behind bringing up the 2013 Act wasto have unified enactment facilitating land acquisition forindustrialization, infrastructure and urbanization projects in timely andtransparent manner and at the same time, providing for just and faircompensation, to make adequate provision for rehabilitation andEresettlement mechanism for affected persons and their families. As apreamble its objects and reasons have been given in the 2013 Act thus:

“An Act to ensure, in consultation with institutions of local self-government and Gram Sabhas established under the Constitution,a humane, participative, informed and transparentprocess for landFacquisition for industrialisation, development of essentialinfrastructural facilities and urbanisation with the least disturbanceto the owners of the land and other affected families and providejust and fair compensation to the affected families whose landhas been acquired or proposed to be acquired or are affected bysuch acquisition and make adequate provisions for such affectedGpersons for their rehabilitation and resettlement and for ensuringthat the cumulative outcome of compulsory acquisition should bethat affected persons become partners in development leading toan improvement in their post acquisition social and economic statusand for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto.”

23. Bearing in mind the aforesaid legislative intention we will haveto construe Section 24 and also the word ‘initiated’ employed in section24(1), of the 2013 Act. The word ‘initiated’ has to be construed with aview to implement the aforesaid twin purposes of providing fair and justcompensation and facilitating acquisition of land for industrialization,infrastructure and urbanization projects. We have already referred tothe impact of ‘initiation’ of land acquisition proceedings and its culminationin an award under Section 11 of the L.A. Act and also non-culminationin such an award.24. For proper and purposive construction of the word ‘initiated’,in the contextual situation it will not be inappropriate to look into thelegislative history of Section 24 of the 2013 Act as well, as explained inthe written submission filed on behalf of HSIIDC/STATE/COMMITTEEdated 11.04.2022. However, we do not deem it necessary to refer to orto deal with it, in detail. In short, it is stated therein that the eventshappened prior to the drafting of Section 24, as it exists on the statutebook today, is safe guide to cull out the legislative intent in formulatingSection 24 in the 2013 Act, by the legislature. Furthermore, it is statedtherein that the legislature was fully aware of the fact that lands acquiredunder the L.A. Act were already being used for several public purposesand more particularly for infrastructural projects and large number ofacquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act, relating large number ofpublic projects for various public purposes, are in progress at variousstages. Hence, lapsing of everything would be seriously detrimental topublic interest and at the same time, the interest of land holders is alsotaken into account. The consideration of all such relevant aspects andthe pros and cons made the legislature to come up with balancingprovision under Section 24(1)(a) and clauses therein, in the 2013 Act.This was incorporated as balancing provision for controlling the extentof retrospectivity and for curtailing the erosion of rights of land holders.

25. However, in resistance, all the learned counsel appearing forParty ‘B’ would contend that the question requires to be considered ona totally different angle. It is contended that Section 24 of the 2013 Actand the word ‘initiated’ used under clause (a) of sub-section (1) thereofmust be read and understood consistent with and in view of Article 21 ofthe Constitution of India. It is also contended that permitting continuanceof proceedings initiated under the L.A. Act would violate Article 300-Aof the Constitution.

A26. The contentions raised by Party ‘B’ based on violation ofArticles 21 and 300-A of the Constitution of India are only to be repelled.Right to property had ceased to be fundamental right. True that it is ahuman right as also constitutional right. Hence, compulsory acquisitionby scrupulous adherence to the procedures authorised by law would notviolate Article 300-A of the Constitution. Article 21 mandates that noBperson shall be deprived of life or personal liberty, except according toprocedures established by law. In this context the decision in State ofM.P. Vs. Narmada Bachao Andolan [(2011) 7 SCC 639] assumesrelevance. Paragraph 28 therein reads thus:-

“28. However, in case of land acquisition, “the plea of deprivationCof right to livelihood under Article 21 is unsustainable”. (VideChameli Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Samantha vs. State ofA.P.). This Court has consistently held that Article 300-A is notonly constitutional right but also human right. (Vide LachhmanDass Vs. Jagat Ram and Amarjit Singh Vs. State of Punjab).

DHowever, in Jilubhai Nanbhai Khachar Vs. Stte of Gujaratthis Court held:

30. Thus it is clear that right to property under Article 300-A is nota basic feature or structure of the Constitution. It is only aconstitutional right…E

58. … The principle of unfairness of the procedure attractingArticle 21 does not apply to the acquisition or deprivation ofproperty under Article 300-A giving effect to the directiveprinciples.”F27. Bearing in mind the twin purposes mentioned hereinbefore,we are of the view that they can only be achieved if the word ‘initiated’is taken as the point of time when section 4 (1) notification is issued andpublished under the L.A. Act, in the Official Gazette. Such constructionwould embrace more number of affected persons within the fold ofaffected persons entitled to higher amount of compensation by applicationGof the 2013 Act in the matter of determination of compensation. As anecessary sequel more extent of land in respect of which acquisitionproceedings have been initiated, for public purposes, under the L.A. Actfor the various ongoing and proposed projects, would remain protectedfrom lapsing. In this context, it is to be noted that all the parties in all theappeals in unison would admit the fact that determination of compensationH

based on the 2013 Act would be beneficial to the persons affected byacquisition and entitled to be compensated. The words ‘initiate’ or‘initiated’ are not defined under the L.A. Act and also under the 2013Act. Hence, to ascribe its meaning the dictionary meaning of the wordhas to be looked into.

In Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. The word“initiate” has inter alia been defined thus:-

“to begin or set going; make beginning of; perform orfacilitate the first actions, steps, or stages of;”

In Shorter Oxford English Dictionary the word “initiate”is defined as:

“to begin, commence, enter upon, to introduce, set going,originate.”

In the light of the above discussion and taking note of the legislativeintention we have no hesitation to hold that the point of initiation of landacquisition proceedings under the L.A. Act for the purpose of Section24(1) of the 2013 Act, is issuance and publication of Section 4(1)notification in the official gazette of the appropriate Government.

28. We think it only befitting to supplement further reasons forsupporting our conclusion as above. perusal of Section 4 of the L.A.Act would reveal that preliminary Notification under Section 4(1) isissued whenever it appears to the appropriate Government that land inany locality is needed or likely to be needed for any public purpose. Thesaid formal expression of the decision takes concrete shape and formsonly on its Publication in the Official Gazette. It is only upon issuanceand publication of Notification under Section 4(1) that any officer,either generally or specially authorised by the appropriate Governmentand his servants and workmen could lawfully enter upon and survey andtake levels of any land in such locality in terms of sub-Section (2) thereof.In the circumstances, it is only worthy to refer to Section 4 as whole.They read thus :-

“S.4.Publication of preliminary notification and power ofofficers thereupon. –

Whenever it appears to the [appropriate Government] the landin any locality [is needed or] is likely to be needed for any publicpurpose [or for company], notification to that effect shall be

Apublished in the Official Gazette [and in two daily newspaperscirculating in that locality of which at least one shall be in theregional language], and the Collector shall cause public notice ofthe substance of such notification to be given at convenient placesin the said locality [(the last of the dates of such publication andthe giving of such public notice, being hereinafter referred to asBthe date of the publication of the notification)].

Thereupon it shall be lawful for any officer, either generally orspecially authorized by such Government in this behalf, and forhis servants and workman, - to enter upon and survey and takelevels of any land in such locality; to dig or bore into the sub-soil;Cto do all other acts necessary to ascertain whether the land isadapted for such purpose; to set out the boundaries of the landproposed to be taken and the intended line of the work (if any)proposed to be made thereon; to mark such levels, boundariesand line by placing marks and cutting trenches; and, whereDotherwise the survey cannot be completed and the levels takenand the boundaries and line marked, to cut down and clear awayany part of any standing crop, fence or jungle;”

29. Section 4(2) would reveal that besides entering upon andsurveying and taking levels of any land in the locality concerned, theEofficer authorised by the Government through the Notification is alsoempowered to dig or bore into the sub-soil, to do all other acts necessaryto ascertain whether the land is adapted for all purposes; to set out theboundaries of the land proposed to be taken and the intended line ofwork (if any) proposed to be made thereon; to mark such levels, boundariesand line by placing marks and cutting trenches and such other activitiesFmentioned under sub-Section (2) thereof. In such circumstances, thefact is that it is the issuance and publication of Section 4(1) notificationthat will empower the authorised officer and workmen to enter into anddo such permissible acts and activities. This fact was noted in BabuBarkya Thakur’s case as well.

30. In the decision in Shiv Kumar and Anr. Vs. Union of Indiaand Ors. [(2019)] 10 SCC 229] three-Judge Bench of this Courtheld that purchaser of land in respect of which notification under Section4(1) of the L.A. Act issued and published (after the issuance of Section4 notification under the L.A. Act) did not acquire any right in the landHconcerned and such sale is ab initio void and such person would have

no right to claim that land under the policy of law. Section 23 of the L.A.Act deals with matters to be considered in determining compensation.Going by the said provision, the market value of the land in question wasto be decided taking the market value at the date of the publication ofthe notification under Section 4. Going by the settled position, vitaldefect in the Section 4(1) notification under the L.A. Act cannot becured by issuing and publishing declaration under Section 6 of the L.A.Act and in such circumstances, it would entail annulment of both thenotifications and also the acquisition proceedings. All the aforesaid aspectswould reveal that issuance and publication of valid Section 4(1)Notification, was the foundation for acquisition of land in any localityunder the L.A. Act. All the above reasons will fortify our conclusion andjustify the rejection of the contention that Section 4(1) notification isnothing but mere formality and got no real relevance or importance inthe process of land acquisition under the L.A. Act.

31. Now, we will consider the other common questions involvedin the captioned appeals. They pertain to the questions as to whetherSection 4 notification issued under the L.A. Act prior to 01.01.2014 (dateof commencement of 2013 Act) could continue or survive after 01.01.2014and, as to whether Section 6 notification under the L.A. Act could beissued after 01.01.2014.

32. We think that while considering those questions we will haveto bear in mind the purposes and the legislative history of the 2013 Actand also the intention of the legislature in drafting the same in the mannerin which it now exists. We have already dealt with those aspects. Onecrucial aspect discernible from Section 24(1)(a) has also to be takennote of in this context. The combined effect of Section 24(1) and clause(a) thereof is that if land acquisition proceeding under the L.A. Act wasinitiated prior to 01.01.2014, the date of coming into force of the 2013Act, and if it was not culminated in an award under Section 11 of theL.A. Act, then all the provisions of the 2013 Act relating to thedetermination of compensation should apply to such acquisitionproceedings. Thus, it is obvious that in case of non-passing of an awardin terms of Section 11 of the L.A. Act where the acquisition proceedingshave been initiated prior to 01.01.2014, all provisions under the 2013 Actrelating to the determination of compensation alone would apply to suchacquisition proceedings. In other words, it would mean that in suchcircumstances the land acquisition proceedings should continue, but all

Athe provisions relating to the determination of compensation under the2013 Act alone will be applicable to such proceedings, meaning thereby,the 2013 Act would come into play only at that stage. There can be nodoubt with respect to the position that between the initiation of landacquisition proceedings by issuance and publication of notice underSection 4(1) of the L.A. Act and the stage at which compensation forBthe acquisition calls for determination, there are various procedures tobe followed to make the acquisition in accordance with the law. Thequestion is when Section 24(1) of the 2013 Act makes it clear withnecessary implication that all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to thedetermination of compensation alone would be applicable to suchCproceedings initiated under the L.A. Act but, not culminated in an award,how the procedures are to be regulated during the intervening period tillthe proceedings reach the stage of determination of compensation. Therecannot be any uncertainty on that aspect. The procedures to be undertakenand the manner in which they are to be regulated cannot remain uncertain.They are conducted either in the manner provided under the L.A. Act orDin the manner provided under the 2013 Act. But then, in view of Section24(1)(a), the provisions relating to the determination of compensationalone can be applied to such proceedings or in other words, there is onlya restricted application of the provisions of the 2013 Act in relation tosuch proceedings. The inevitable conclusion can only be that what isEapplicable to the various procedures to be undertaken during the periodup to the stage of determination of compensation are those prescribedunder the L.A. Act. We have no doubt that without such construction,the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) would not work out, in view of therestrictive application of the 2013 Act. It is in this context that the decisionin Ambica Quarry Works’ case (supra) assumes relevance. AnyFconstruction of the said provision without taking into the legislativeintention, referred hereinbefore would defeat the legislative intention asalso the very objects of the 2013 Act. Certainly, it would not be in publicinterest to allow such proceedings to lapse or allow the authorities tofollow the procedures during such period according to their sweet will.GA uniform procedure has to be followed in respect of such proceedings.The acquisitions initiated for public purposes should go on in fair andtransparent manner with view to achieve the intent and purport of the2013 Act and at the same time, the persons affected shall have definiteidea about the manner in which procedures would be conducted. TheParty ‘B’ would not be justified in describing such situations of necessityH

and the consequential application of provisions which are actually savedon account of the construction of Section 24 as an attempt to bring thewords expressly employed in Section 24(1)(b) and absent in Section24(1)(a), by indirect method to Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. Theaforesaid conclusions and findings would make the contentions of Party‘B’ that Section 4(1) notification issued prior to 01.01.2014 could notsurvive after 01.01.2014 and also that Section 6 notification under theL.A. Act could not be issued after 01.01.2014, unsustainable. In fact, allsuch procedures and formalities shall be continued till the determinationof compensation by applying all the provisions for determination ofcompensation, under the 2013 Act. contra-construction, in view of therestrictive application of the provisions to such proceedings during itscontinuance, would make the provisions under Section 24(1)(a) of the2013 Act unworkable.

33. Having decided the common questions as above we are ofthe view that all the other issues involved in the individual appeals haveto be considered on their own merits and subject to this judgment inrespect of all the stated common questions.

34. To conclude, we hold that for the purposes of sub-section (1)of Section 24 of the 2013 Act, the proceedings under the L.A. Act shallbe treated as initiated on publication of notification under sub-section(1) of Section 4 of the L.A. Act. We further hold that when Clause (a)of sub-section (1) of Section 24 of the 2013 Act is applicable, theproceedings shall continue as per the L.A. Act. However, only for thedetermination of compensation amount, the provisions of the 2013 Actshall be applied.

35. We have already observed that other issues are also involvedin the captioned appeals besides the common questions and issues whichwe have answered in this judgment. Hence taking note of involvementof other legal and factual issues in these appeals shall be listed beforeappropriate Bench for disposal on their own merits.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by : Bodhi Ramteke, LCRA)

Appeals to be listed for disposal on merits.