DEVENDER SINGH & ORS. versus THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

DEVENDER SINGH & ORS.

THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

(Criminal Appeal No. 383 of 2018)

APRIL 21, 2022

[N. V. RAMANA, CJI, A. S. BOPANNA ANDHIMA KOHLI, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: ss. 304B, 498A & 120B –Evidence Act,1872 – s. 113B – Dowry death – Presumption of dowry death – Onfacts, complaint against appellants-husband, mother-in-law andbrother-in-law of the victim-wife that the victim was repeatedlyharassed for dowry and she died unnatural death within six monthsof the marriage – Victim went missing from her matrimonial homeand her body was subsequently found in the river after 10 days –Conviction and sentence of the appellants u/s. 498A, 304B and120B by the High Court – On appeal, held: s. 304B r/w s. 113B ofthe 1872 Act makes it clear that once the prosecution has succeededin demonstrating that woman has been subjected to cruelty orharassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry soonafter her death, presumption shall be drawn against the saidpersons that they have caused dowry death as contemplated u/s.304B – Said presumption can be rebutted by the accused ondemonstrating during the trial that all the ingredients of s. 304Bhave not been satisfied – Phrase ‘soon before her death’ in s. 304B,ought to be interpreted to mean proximate and to be linked with butnot to be understood to mean immediately prior to the death – Onfacts, basic ingredients of s. 304B that death being not normal anddeath occurring within 7 years of marriage established – Alsoestablished that deceased was residing at her matrimonial homeand had gone missing in circumstances where all the ingredients ofs. 304B stood satisfied – Testimonies of prosecution witnesses-closerelatives of the victim corroborates the fact of the dowry demandand harassment and cruelty being caused to the victim-deceased –Furthermore, the testimony of doctor that death occurred due to theinjuries received before falling into the river – Failure of appellantsto rebut the presumption drawn against them u/s.113B, as regardsoffence u/s. 304B – However, it has been established the mother

CDEF

Ain-law and brother in-law of the deceased were residing in differenthouse, and the demand for dowry was essentially for the benefit ofthe husband only, and no specific evidence led to show conspiracyhatched by the appellants – Thus, the conviction of the mother in-law and the brother in-law not justified and set aside – Order ofconviction and sentence as regards the husband of the victim by theBHigh Court, upheld.

Bansi Lal vs. State of Haryana (2011) 11 SCC 359 :[2011] 1 SCR 724; Maya Devi and Anr. v. State ofHaryana (2015) 17 SCC 405 : [2015] 11 SCR 903 ;G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka (2010) 3 SCCC152 : [2010] 2 SCR 380; Ashok Kumar v. State ofHaryana (2010) 12 SCC 350 : [2010] 7 SCR 1119– referred to.

Case Law Reference

ECRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.383 of 2018.

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.09.2017 of the High Courtof Uttarakhand at Nainital in Govt. Appeal No.57 of 2010.

Robin R. David, Dhiraj Abraham Philip, Febin Mathew Vargeshe,FSamuel David, Amit Negi, Saurabh Sachdeva, Aftab Ali Khan, Advs.for the Appellants.

Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Krishaam Mishra, Advs. for theRespondent.

GThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

HIMA KOHLI, J.

1. The appellants have assailed the judgment dated 14[th] September,2017, passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in GovernmentAppeal No.57 of 2010, whereby the judgment dated 17[th] April, 2010Hpassed by the learned Sessions Judge, Rudraprayag acquitting them from

the charges under Section 498A, 304B and 120B of the Indian PenalCode[1] has been reversed and they have been sentenced to undergorigorous imprisonment for period of seven year with fine of 10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand) and in default, to undergo simple imprisonmentfor three months for the offence under Section 304B IPC. The appellantshave also been sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for oneyear under Section 120B IPC and two years under Section 498A IPC.Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order of conviction, theappellants are before this Court, in this appeal by way of special leave.

2. The brief facts leading to the case are that the appellant No.1,Devender Singh, son of appellant No. 3, Smt. Kunja Devi and BhawanSingh was married to the deceased, Sushila, the wedding having beensolemnized on 20[th] October, 2007. Sushila is stated to have gone missingfrom her matrimonial home since 24[th] April, 2008. This came to theknowledge of the mother of the deceased when the appellant No.2 herein,Jagdish Singh, brother of the appellant No. 1 called her on 25[th] April,2008, at 7.00 p.m. to inform her and enquire as to whether Sushila hadgone to the parental home. The mother of the deceased in turn informedher son, the complainant, who resided at Haridwar. On returning to hishouse, the complainant went to the matrimonial home of the deceasedon 28[th] April, 2008. It has been alleged by the complainant that keepingin view the fact that there were repeated demands for dowry made bythe appellants and the manner in which they had behaved with him whenhe had gone to visit them, made him suspect that his sister had beenkilled by the appellants but they were feigning ignorance and acting as ifhis sister had gone missing.

3. Based on the complaint, investigation was carried out by thelocal police and the body of Sushila was subsequently found in Gangariver. Having regard to the fact that an unnatural death had taken placewithin about six months of the marriage and since there was an allegationof cruelty relating to demand of dowry, case was registered againstthe appellants under Sections 498A, 304B and 120B of IPC. Theappellants having denied the allegations levelled against them, trial wasconducted in Sessions Trial No.18/2008 before the District and SessionsJudge, Rudraprayag. In support of their case, the prosecution examined14 witnesses arrayed as PW-1 to PW-14. Besides denying their rolewhile recording their statements under Section 313 of the Criminal

1 for short “IPC”

AProcedure Code, the appellants/accused also examined DW-1 to DW-3as their witnesses. On considering the evidence, the trial Court recordedfindings in favour of the appellants and acquitted all of them vide judgmentdated 17[th] April, 2010.

4. Being aggrieved by the judgment dated 17[th] April, 2010, StateBof Uttarakhand preferred an appeal before the High Court of Uttarakhandat Nainital vide Government Appeal No.57 of 2010. On reappreciatingthe entire evidence exhaustively and on applying the legal principles, theHigh Court has allowed the said appeal. Consequently, the judgment andorder dated 17[th] April, 2010 passed by the Sessions Judge in SessionsTrial No.18 of 2018 was set aside. The appellants have been convictedCunder Sections 498A, 304B and 120B of IPC and sentenced to undergorigorous imprisonment for period of seven years and pay fine of10,000/- (Rupees Ten thousand) and in default, to undergo three monthssimple imprisonment under Section 304B IPC. The appellants have alsobeen sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment of one year underDSection 120B IPC and two years under Section 498A IPC. The sentencewas handed down by separate order dated 05[th] October, 2017. Claimingto be aggrieved by the judgment of conviction and sentence handeddown by the High Court, the appellants are before this Court.

5. Mr. Robin R. David, learned counsel for the appellants whileEassailing the judgment passed by the High Court has taken us throughthe records. It is his contention that the High Court has committed anerror by misdirecting itself to note the conduct of the appellants incommitting delay in registering the missing complaint relating to thedeceased. He contended that contradictory view has been taken bythe High Court while arriving at the conclusion that the complaint wasFfiled after more than 48 hours of the incident despite noticing the factthat the appellant No.1 had telephonically informed the Patwari of thevillage on 26[th] April, 2008 and the appellant No.2 had informed the motherof the deceased of the latter going missing from the matrimonial homesince 24[th] April, 2008 itself. He submitted that such an assumption onGthe part of the High Court has led to wrong conclusion. Further, it hasbeen argued that the High Court has fallen into an error by holding thatthere is material on record to indicate that the appellants had beenharassing the deceased for bringing insufficient dowry. He pointed outthat the mother of the deceased (PW-1) had admitted to the fact that thedeceased was staying at the parental home only to continue her studies.H

Therefore, the claim of dowry demand being made, as stated, isunacceptable. He further pointed out that DW-3 in whose presence themarriage talks had been held, had deposed in her evidence that therewas no demand for dowry and that the marriage expenses had alsobeen shared between the parties.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that thefact of the appellant No.1 having opened bank account in the name ofthe deceased wherein he was depositing sum of 100/- (Rupees Onehundred) on alternate days would go to show that there was no reasonfor the appellants to have made any monetary demands on her. He alsocontended that the High Court has erred in arriving at the findings relatingto the cause of death of Sushila. He alluded to the deposition of PW-10,the doctor who had indicated that the cause of death was due to shockand blood flow received from the injuries sustained and opined that suchinjuries could occur if person falls down from standing rock. Judicialnotice taken by the High Court that villagers would go in groups to theforest to bring fodder and fuelwood, is stated to be unwarranted in thefacts and circumstances of the present case, without there being anycogent evidence in this regard. It was argued that the trial Court had infact taken note of the evidence in its correct perspective and arrived ata valid conclusion, which ought not to have been disturbed by the HighCourt more so, when there was no strong basis for doing so. It was thussubmitted that the appeal be allowed and the impugned judgment be setaside.

7. Mr. Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, learned counsel for the State wouldseek to sustain the judgment passed by the High Court. It was hiscontention that the trial Court had in fact proceeded to analyse the evidenceas if it was considering matter where the charge framed was forcommitting murder under Section 302 IPC, whereas, in the instant case,the charges framed against the appellants was under Sections 304B and498A read with Section 120B IPC, in respect of “dowry death”. Thesaid provision itself raises certain presumptions against the accused. Ina matter where the death of the wife of the appellant No.1 had occurredwithin few months of her marriage when she was residing at thematrimonial home and such death is an unnatural one, it was for theappellants to have explained the circumstance under which the deathhad occurred when prima-facie, the prosecution had succeeded inproving the basic ingredients of the section. In that light, it was sought to

Abe urged that the trial Court had in fact completely misdirected itself. Itwas further submitted that the High Court while deciding an appeal wasrequired to re-appreciate the evidence which has been meticulously doneby referring to the evidence tendered by each of the witnesses. LearnedState counsel contended that on analyzing the evidence brought on recordin the context of the legal position, as enunciated in various decisions ofBthis Court which were taken note of, the High Court has arrived at justconclusion and has found the judgment of the trial Court to be erroneous,resultantly setting aside the same.

8. In the light of the rival contentions and the charges levelledagainst the appellants and to place the matter in its correct perspective,Cit is considered necessary to take note of the provision as contained inSection 304B of IPC which reads as follows :-

“304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of woman iscaused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise thanunder normal circumstances within seven years of her marriageDand it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected tocruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of herhusband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, suchdeath shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relativeshall be deemed to have caused her death.

EExplanation.—For the purposes of this sub-section, “dowry” shallhave the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry ProhibitionAct, 1961 [28 of 1961].

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished withimprisonment for term which shall not be less than seven yearsFbut which may extend to imprisonment for life.”

9. perusal of the above provision would indicate that the mainingredients of the offence required to be established are :-

(i)that soon before the death, the deceased was subjected tocruelty and harassment in connection with the demand ofGdowry;

(ii)the death of the deceased was caused by any burn or bodilyinjury or some other circumstance which was not normal;

(iii)such death has occurred within 7 years from the date ofHher marriage;

(iv)that the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment byAher husband or any relative of her husband;

(v)such cruelty or harassment should be for, or in connectionwith the demand of dowry; and

(vi)it should be established that such cruelty and harassmentwere made soon before her death.10. The presumption drawn relating to dowry death has beencontemplated in Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, whichstates as follows :

“113B. Presumption as to dowry death - When the question iswhether person has committed the dowry death of womanand it is shown that soon before her death such woman has beensubjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or inconnection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presumethat such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation - For the purposes of this section, “dowry death”shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the IndianPenal Code (45 of 1860).”

11. Section 304B IPC read along with Section 113B of the IndianEvidence Act, 1872 makes it clear that once the prosecution has succeededin demonstrating that woman has been subjected to cruelty orharassment for or in connection with any demand for dowry soon afterher death, presumption shall be drawn against the said persons thatthey have caused dowry death as contemplated under Section 304BIPC. The said presumption comes with rider inasmuch as thispresumption can be rebutted by the accused on demonstrating duringthe trial that all the ingredients of Section 304B IPC have not been2satisfied. [Ref.: Bansi Lal vs. State of Haryana, Maya Devi and34Anr. vs. State of Haryana, G.V. Siddaramesh v. State of Karnataka5and Ashok Kumar vs. State of Haryana].

2 (2011) 11 SCC 359

3 (2015) 17 SCC 405

4 (2010) 3 SCC 152

5 (2010) 12 SCC 350

A12. Having taken note of the relevant provision and the ingredientsthereof, the facts of the instant case would disclose that the deceasedand the appellant No.1 had got married on 20[th] October, 2007. Sushila,wife of the appellant No.1 had gone missing from the matrimonial homefrom 24[th] April, 2008 and her dead body was fished out on the 10[th] dayfrom river Alakhnanda near Naragasu. From the basic facts noted above,Bthe basic ingredients of Section 304B IPC such as the death not beingnormal and such death having occurred within 7 years from the dateof her marriage would stand fully established. The question, therefore, isas to whether the evidence tendered by the prosecution would besufficient to establish the remaining ingredients of Section 304B IPCCwith regard to the demand for dowry and perpetration of cruelty andharassment in connection with such demand. Further, whether suchcruelty and harassment were suffered by the deceased soon before herdeath so as to constitute dowry death. As to the phrase ‘soon beforeher death’, it is well-settled that the same ought to be interpreted toDmean proximate and to be linked with but not to be understood to meanimmediately prior to the death.13. While taking note of the evidence and the other aspects of thematter, what is also to be borne in mind in the instant case is that thedeath which did not take place in normal circumstances, had occurredEwithin just about 6 months from the date of the marriage. In that context,a perusal of the evidence of Smt. Thapa Devi (PW-1), mother of thedeceased gains significance. She had categorically stated that when thedeceased had for the first time come to the parental home from her in-laws, she had said that her in-laws and husband were demanding dowryand had been harassing her. The nature of the demand was also specifiedFto say that they were seeking payment of sum of 2,00,000/- (RupeesTwo lakhs) as dowry and in the alternative, to get house constructed inHaridwar. PW-1 further stated that on 10[th] April, 2008, when she hadgone to her daughter’s house, the appellants had at that stage quarrelledwith her and placed demand before her for ¹ 2,00,000/- (Rupees TwoGlakhs) or to have house constructed for them in Haridwar. She howevercame back on 11[th] April, 2008, leaving her daughter behind. Within 2-4days thereafter, the deceased is stated to have called PW-1 indicatingthat she was disturbed as the appellants were harassing her badly andalso beating her. PW-1 stated that she had conveyed this to her brother-in-law, Mr. Rajendra Singh and shared with him about such demandH

and harassment faced by the deceased. Her brother-in-law had assuredher that he would come over after 2-3 days and attempt to sort out thematter.

14. When this was the position, on 25[th] April, 2008, PW-1 receiveda phone call, from appellant No.2, brother of her son-in-law (appellantNo.1) who had enquired as to whether the deceased had come to theparental home as she was missing from the matrimonial home. PW-1thereafter informed her sons, who came from Haridwar and thereafterwent to the in-laws’ place. It is undisputed that the body was tracedafter 10 days. The evidence tendered by PW-1 was not discredited inthe cross-examination. It was suggested to PW-1 that the deceasedwas staying for most of the time at the parental home within about 10-11days after the marriage so as to complete her education and the saidsuggestion was made to indicate that there was no scope for demandingdowry. However, this was clarified by PW-1 who stated that though itwas so, the deceased had gone back to the matrimonial home on thevery next day when her inter-examination was over. The furthersuggestion made that the appellants No.2 and 3 were residing in separatehouse away from that of the appellant No.1 was also denied.

15. In addition to the aforesaid evidence, the High Court has notedthe evidence of Balbir Singh (PW-2), brother of the deceased, whocorroborated the version of the mother of the deceased (PW-1). In fact,PW-2 has also stated with regard to the deceased having telephoned onthe morning of 24[th] April, 2008 and informed them that she was pregnantand had pain in her abdomen and when she told her husband to bringmedicine and blouse piece, she was beaten by saying that she shouldget it from her parents. The evidence of Smt. Mira Bhandari (PW-3),sister-in-law of the deceased and Sh. Tajwar Singh (PW-4), brother ofthe deceased, was also taken note of by the High Court in reasonabledetail wherein the sequence of the events as narrated by PW-1 andPW-2 stood corroborated by them. Further, Sh. Rishipal Singh (PW-5),and Sh. Rajendra Singh (PW-7), uncles of the deceased had also deposedwith regard to the incident and that they were told about the dowrydemand and harassment caused to the deceased. Sh. Vijaypal Singh(PW-8), the Pradhan of the village deposed that he was aware that thedeceased had gone missing on 24[th] April, 2008 and they were searchingfor her subsequently. He had also visited the spot from where the bodyhad been recovered.

A16. Though, it was contended on behalf of the appellants that thePatwari had been informed immediately, Sh. Jagdish Prasad Gairola (PW-9) who was the Patwari, stated that appellant No.1 had informed him onthe telephone only on 26[th] April, 2008, that his wife had gone missing,which he is stated to have entered in the G.D. The contention as putforth by learned counsel for the appellants regarding no delay in makingBthe complaint as noted by the High Court, loses significance in the lightof the other related aspects.

17. Though, the High Court has also referred to the evidence ofthe remaining witnesses produced by the prosecution, keeping in viewthe fact that the evidence as required for establishing the demand ofCdowry and harassment is to be noted from the evidence as taken note ofhereinabove, it would be clear that even though the appellants have soughtto urge that at the time of fixing the marriage, no dowry was exchangedor demand placed and that the wedding expenses were also shared byboth sides, the categorical oral testimony of PW-1 to PW-4 that remainedDunshaken would indicate that soon after the marriage, when the deceasedfor the first time came to her parental home, she had stated about thedemand for dowry made on her and specified the demand, i.e., sum of2,00,000/- (Rupees Two lakhs) or to construct house in Haridwar.Even though it has been contended on behalf of the appellant that thedeceased was staying at her parental house to complete her studies, asEper the version of PW-1 while accepting that position, she had assertedthat about 10-11 days after the wedding, Sushila had gone to her parentalhome but soon after sitting for the intermediate examination, she hadgone back to the matrimonial home. The fact however remains that shewent missing from the matrimonial home and the body was recoveredFfrom the river in the vicinity of the matrimonial home. In that regard,apart from the testimony of the witnesses who deposed that the deceasedhad told them about the dowry demand and harassment during her firstvisit to the parental home, PW-1 referred to the incident that took placeon 10[th] April, 2008, when she herself had gone with her daughter to the

in-laws’ house to drop her and all of them had quarrelled with her on theGaspect relating to dowry in the same terms, i.e., demand of ¹ 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two lakhs) or for house to be built in Haridwar. She hadthereafter returned on 11[th] April, 2008 which was about two weeks priorto the date on which the deceased had gone missing. Further, PW-1 hasalso stated that within 2-4 days from 11[th] April, 2008, after she hadHreturned, the deceased had made phone call and was very disturbed

since she was being harassed badly and was being beaten. She hadshared this with her brother-in-law, Sh. Rajendra Singh, who has beenexamined as PW-7. In addition, PW-2 also deposed with regard to thecomplaint made by the deceased over the phone in the morning of thefateful day, i.e., 24[th] April, 2008, about her husband treating her withcruelty when in her pregnant state, she had asked for medicine for thepain in her abdomen.

18. In the above background, even if in the evidence, Smt. MayaDevi (DW-3) who was the go-between for finalizing the marriage, hadstated that there was no demand for dowry at that point in time, it is ofno consequence since what is relevant is the demand which was madesubsequent to the marriage and soon before the incident to which thesaid witness was in any event, not privy.

19. Further, the evidence of Sh. Rakesh Bisht (DW-1) to the effectthat the appellant No.1 had opened Bank account in the name of thedeceased and was depositing 100/- (Rupees one hundred) every otherday in the said account with effect from 07[th] December, 2007, cannotalter the situation since that, in any event, cannot take away the specificnature of the dowry demand that was referred to by PW-1 to PW-4, ashaving been made by the appellant No.1. The evidence of Shri PremSingh (DW-2) who stated that while he was travelling in bus on 24[th]May, 2008, he had noticed girl wearing red clothes falling from thecliff, has rightly been held to be unreliable in as much as if such anincident had been noticed by him, admittedly the said witness did nottake any further steps in that regard.

20. perusal of the impugned judgment would disclose that theHigh Court has appreciated the evidence in the correct perspective.Though the trial Court also referred to the very same evidence and theanalysis commenced from para 27 of the judgment, it indicates that theobservation made by the trial Court that there was no such evidenceavailable on the file that the murder of the deceased, Sushila had beencommitted, will disclose that the trial court was appreciating the evidencefrom the prism of assessing the charge under Section 302 IPC, whenthe evidence on record ought to have been analyzed and appreciatedkeeping in mind the requirements of Section 304B and 498A IPC andthe ingredients thereof.

21. In the above backdrop and keeping in view the fact that thedeceased was residing at the matrimonial home and had gone missing in

Acircumstances where all the ingredients of Section 304B stood satisfied,the evidence of Dr. Digvijay Singh (PW-10) becomes relevant. The natureof injuries found on the body of the deceased at the time of the post-mortem was adverted to and PW-10 has deposed that the death hadoccurred about week earlier to the examination. He opined that deathhad occurred due to shock and blood flow from the injuries receivedBbefore the death. The doctor was categorical that the cause of deathwas not from drowning as there was no water inside the lungs andabdomen. Though learned counsel for the appellants referred to thisaspect to contend that the High Court has erred in not properlyconsidering the same, in our opinion, when it is indicated that the deceasedChad suffered injuries before her death and there was loss of blood andalso when it is medically indicated that the death was not caused due todrowning as there was no water in her lungs and abdomen, the naturalcorollary and fair conclusion would be that the said death had occurredeven before falling into the river, which would rule out any accidental

fall, as sought to be claimed by the appellants. In fact, this would onlyDincrease the burden cast upon the appellants to explain the situation.

22. Though, the appellants have attempted to set up story thatthe deceased had gone to hills to cut grass, as rightly noted by the HighCourt, she could not have gone alone. Be that as it may, except for abald statement, the appellants have not brought any material on recordEto demonstrate that it was normal practice for the deceased to go tothe hills for cutting grass more so in circumstances where she was lessthan six months at her matrimonial home, pregnant and also during thatvery period, she had been going to her parental house for continuing hereducation, as has been contended by the appellants themselves.FTherefore, in such situation, we have no hesitation in observing thatthe appellants have miserably failed to rebut the presumption drawnagainst them under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, in matter relatingto an offence under Section 304B of IPC.

23. Having arrived at the above conclusion, the issue before us isGas to whether in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, theappellants No.2 and 3 should also be held equally guilty as the appellantNo.1. It is no doubt true that the evidence of PW-1 indicates that thedeceased had informed her that the husband and the in-laws had beenharassing her and when PW-1 had gone to drop her daughter back tothe matrimonial home on 10[th] April, 2008, the in-laws had raised dowryH

demand. However, what has also been brought on record is that theappellants No.2 and 3 were residing separately, in different house. Inthe cross-examination of PW-1, suggestion was made to her about thedistance between the two houses. Further, fact remains that the trialCourt also referred to this aspect in para 31 of the judgment wherelearned counsel for the defence had brought to the notice of the Courtthat there were two ration cards and the ration card of the appellantsNo.2 and 3 is separate from that of the appellant No.1 which mentionshis name and that of the deceased. That apart, the nature of the demandmade was for lumpsum amount of 2,00,000/- (Rupees Two lakhs) orfor constructing house in Haridwar, either of which was essentially forthe benefit of the appellant No.1. Therefore, there is no specific rolewith regard to the demand of dowry and nor has any specific instance ofcruelty and harassment been ascribed to the appellants No.2 and 3 exceptfor the general assertion. Moreover, in circumstance where the chargewas also under Section 120B IPC, there is no specific evidence led bythe prosecution relating to the conspiracy allegedly hatched by theappellants. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the opinion thatthe appellants No.2 and 3 deserve to be given the benefit of doubt andtheir conviction would not be justified.

24. In the above backdrop, the conviction and sentence handeddown by the High Court to the appellant No.1 (husband of the deceased)is upheld. However, the conviction and sentence handed down by theHigh Court to the appellants No.2 and 3 is set aside. The judgment dated14[th] September, 2017 passed in Government Appeal No.57/2010 standsmodified to the said extent. It is ordered that the appellant No.2 and 3who were released on bail on 12[th] March, 2008, be set free. The bailbonds executed by the appellants No.2 and 3 are, accordingly, cancelled.Appellant No.1 shall, however, surrender within two weeks and servethe remaining part of the sentence imposed on him.

25. The appeal is partly allowed on the above terms.

26. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Appeal partly allowed.