HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

[2022] 15 S.C.R.

HAR NARAINI DEVI & ANR

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 22957 of 2017)

BSEPTEMBER 20, 2022

[HEMANT GUPTA AND VIKRAM NATH, JJ.]

Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 – s.50(a) – Hindu SuccessionAct, 1956 – s.4(2) – Constitution of India – Article 254 – HinduSuccession (Amendment) Act, 2005– General Clauses Act – ss.6(b),C6(c) –Person had three sons, all of them pre-deceased him – Disputew.r.t his agricultural property – His inheritance relating to the branchof one of his son was succeeded by his grandsons (respondent nos.3, 4) u/s.50(a), 1954 Act – Appellants are their mother and sisterwho challenged the validity of s.50(a), 1954 Act having been deniedDany rights in the inheritance along with respondent nos.3 and 4,also contended that the 1956 Succession Act would prevail overthe 1954 Act – Writ petition dismissed by High Court – On appeal,held: Question of repugnancy arises only if both the Parliamentand the State legislature have made law with respect to any one ofthe matters enumerated in the Concurrent list (List III) – In the presentEcase, 1954 Act is not referable to any matter enumerated in List IIIbut it is referable to Entry 18 of List II – Thus, no question ofrepugnancy would arise in view of Article 254 – Further, the propertyin question is agricultural property – Thus, succession is governedby the 1954 Act, hence, any amendment in the 1956 Act even if itFhas retrospective effect will have no bearing or impact on theprovisions of succession governed by the 1954 Act – On facts,deletion of s.4(2) of the 1956 Act would not help the appellants –Also, 1954 Act is special law whereas the 1956 Act is generallaw – The existence or absence of s.4(2) in the 1956 Act would beimmaterial – Appeal fails – Interpretation of Statutes.G

Interpretation of Statutes – Amendments – Operation of –Deemed to apply prospectively – Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 –Hindu Succession Act, 1956 –s.4(2) – Hindu Succession(Amendment) Act, 2005 – Deletion of s.4(2) – Effect, if any, onsuccession opening prior to 2005 – General Clauses Act – ss.6(b),H

6(c) – Person had three sons who pre-deceased him – He died in1997 – Dispute w.r.t his agricultural property – Held: Till 09.09.2005,when the 2005 (Amendment) Act was enacted, s.4(2) remained on thestatute – In the present case, succession opened in 1997 i.e. prior to09.09.2005 and the rights of the descendants in terms of s.50 becamecrystallized on account of the said section r/w s.4(2) of the 1956 Act– On account of ss.6(b) and 6(c) of General Clauses Act, the omissionof s.4(2) of 1956 Act cannot affect the previous operation of s.4(2) –Effect of the deletion can only be in respect of successions whichopened on or after 09.09.05 – All amendments are deemed to applyprospectively unless expressly specified to apply retrospectively orintended to have been done so by the legislature.

Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 – Hindu Succession Act, 1956– State enactment relating to Agricultural land tenures, speciallaw – Held: The argument relating to 1956 Act being special lawand 1954 being general law is completely misconceived as anyState enactment relating to Agricultural land tenures is speciallaw.

Dismissing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Repugnancy- Article 254 of the Constitution

The question of repugnancy arises only if both theParliament and the State legislature have made law with respectto any one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent list (ListIII). In the present case two enactments of 1956 and 1954 arerelatable to Entries in List III and List II respectively. Therelevant Entries in List III is Entry Nos.5 and 7 whereas relevantEntry of List II is Entry No.18. Apart from the fact that barereading of Article 254 reflects that it refers to repugnancy in lawmade with respect to matters enumerated in the Concurrent list(List III), this Court has also laid down that question of repugnancywould not come into existence unless it is first established thatboth enactments are under the Concurrent list (List III). In thepresent case, 1954 Act is not referable to any matter enumeratedin List III but it is referable to Entry 18 of List II. Thus, noquestion of repugnancy would arise in view of Article 254 of theConstitution. The other part of the argument relating to 1956Act being special law and 1954 being general law is completelymisconceived. In series of judgments, not only of this Court

Abut also of different High Courts, it has been expressed that anyState enactment relating to Agricultural land tenures is speciallaw. [Paras 18-20][509-G-H; 510-E-F; 511-B-C]

2.1 Deletion of Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act:

Till 2005, to be specific 09.09.2005, when the HinduBSuccession (Amendment) Act of 2005 was enacted, Section 4(2)of the 1956 Act remained on the statute. It is not in dispute thatthe property in question is agricultural property, and therefore,in 1997 at the time when Mukhtiyar Singh died, the devolution ofinterest (inheritance) would be determinable on the said date, inCaccordance with the law existing at that time. In 1997 Section4(2) of the 1956 Act, was very much on the statute, its subsequentdeletion would not have any impact on the rights of inheritance,which had already accrued and crystallised, prior to theamendment. Therefore, on facts deletion of Section 4(2) of the1956 Act would not help the appellants. All amendments areDdeemed to apply prospectively unless expressly specified to applyretrospectively or intended to have been done so by thelegislature. In the present case there is no such intentionreflecting from the amending Act. By virtue of Section 6 of theGeneral Clauses Act, the repeal of an enactment would not affectEthe previous operation of such an enactment. On account ofSections 6(b) and 6(c) of General Clauses Act, the omission ofSection 4(2) of 1956 Act cannot affect the previous operation ofthe said Section 4(2). The deletion of Section 4(2) took placew.e.f 09.09.2005. Therefore, the effect of the deletion can onlybe in respect of successions which opened on or after 09.09.2005.FThis is because under Section 6(b) and 6(c) of the General ClausesAct repeal cannot affect the previous operation of any enactmentso repealed and cannot affect the previous operation of anyenactment so repealed and cannot affect any right which may havebeen acquired or accrued. In the present case, it is to be heldGthat succession has opened prior to 09.09.2005, the rights of thedescendants in terms of Section 50 became crystallized on accountof the said Section read with Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act.Therefore, the deletion of Section 4(2) cannot have retrospectiveeffect. There is one more reason, why the existence of Section

4(2) in the 1956 Act and its deletion will not have any impact inthe present case. The reason is that the 1954 Act is special law,dealing with fragmentation, ceiling, and devolution of tenancyrights over agricultural holdings only, whereas the 1956 Act is ageneral law, providing for succession to Hindu by religion asstated in Section 2 thereof. The existence or absence of Section4(2) in the 1956 Act would be immaterial. [Paras 22-26][511-F-G; 512-A-D; 513-G-H; 514-A-B]

3. Once it is held that succession in the present case withrespect to the property in question is governed by the 1954 Act,any amendment even if it has retrospective effect in the 1956Act will have no bearing or impact on the provisions of successiongoverned by the 1954 Act. Moreover, this Court in the judgmentof Vineeta Sharma has given retrospective application only toSection 6 of the 1956 Act as amended in 2005. There is nodeclaration regarding deletion of Section 4(2) being retrospective.[Para 27][514-D-E]

Waman Rao and Ors. vs. Union of India 1981 2 SCC362 : [1981] 2 SCR 1; M/s. Innoventive Industries Ltd.vs. ICICI Bank and Ors. (2018) 1 SCC 407 : [2017] 8SCR 33; L.R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd. v. Commissionerof Central Excise (2020) SCC Online SC 705; HitendraVishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC602 : [1994] 1 Suppl. SCR 360; Union of India v. ZoraSingh (1992)1 SCC 673 : [1991] 2 Suppl. SCR 478;Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v. CCE (2016) 3 SCC643 : [2015] 12 SCR 332 – relied on.

Babu Ram vs. Santokh Singh and others (2019) 14 SCC162 – held inapplicable.

Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala 1973 (4) SCC225 : [1973] Suppl. SCR 1; I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs.Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. (2007) 2 SCC 1;Parshanti Vs. Deputy Director of Consolidation (1997)11 SCC 157 : (1998) 9 JT 504; Vineeta Sharma vs.Rakesh Sharma & Ors. (2020) 9 SCC 1 : [2020] 10SCR 135 – referred to.

CThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

VIKRAM NATH, J.

1. This civil appeal by the original writ petitioners before the HighCourt, assails the correctness of the judgment and order dated 11.09.2009Dpassed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissing WritPetition (Civil) No. 2887 of 2008 whereby challenge was made to declareSection 50(a) of the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954[1] unconstitutionalbeing ultra vires Articles 14, 15, 254 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

FACTS:E2. Genealogy (pedigree) relevant for the case is as follows:

GFrom the above pedigree it is clear that the appellants are thewidow and daughter of Ishwar Singh whereas the contesting respondentnos. 3 and 4 are the sons of Ishwar Singh. The dispute relates to the

1 Hereinafter referred to as “1954 Act”

agricultural property held by Mukhtiar Singh. He had three sons vizMahinder Singh, Jagdish Singh and Ishwar Singh. All of them pre-deceased him. Mukhtiar Singh died on 06.06.1997 and his inheritancerelating to the branch of Ishwar Singh was succeeded by his grandsons(sons of Ishwar Singh i.e. Jaidev and Amit - respondent nos. 3 and 4)under Section 50(a) of the 1954 Act. Revenue records were correctedaccordingly.

3. It would be appropriate to reproduce Section 50 of the 1954

Act:

”50. General order of succession from males. - Subject tothe provisions of Section 48 and 52, when Bhumidhar or Asamibeing male dies, his interest in his holding shall devolve inaccordance with the order of the succession given below:

a)Male lineal descendants in the male line of the descent:

Provided that no member of this class shall inherit if anymale descendant between him and the deceased is alive:

Provided further that the son or sons of predeceased on howlow so ever shall inherit the share which would have devolvedupon the deceased if he had been then alive:

b)Widow

c)Father

d)Mother, being widow;

e)Step mother, being widow;

f)Father’s father

g)Father’s mother, being widow;

h)Widow of male lineal descendant in the male line ofdescent;

i)Brother, being the son of same father as the deceased;

j)Unmarried sister;

k)Brother’s son, the brother having been son of the samefather as the deceased;

l)Father’s father’s son;

Am) Brother’s son’s son;

n)Father’s father’s son’s son;

o)Daughter’s son.”

4. The appellants by way of petition under Article 226 of theConstitution of India challenged the validity of Section 50(a) of the 1954BAct as they were denied any rights in the inheritance along withrespondent Nos.3 and 4.

5. The relief as claimed before the High Court in the writ petitionis reproduced below:

“a) To declare clause (a) of S.50 of the Delhi Land Reforms Act,1954 unconstitutional being ultravires Articles 14, 15, 254 and 21of the Constitution of India;

(b) To declare the Petitioners “bhumidhar” having equal rights ofsuccession at par with the respondent Nos. 3-4 in the propertyDinherited by them detailed in Annexure P-3;

(c) To grant any other relief in the interest of justice.;

(d) To grant cost of litigation.”

6. The challenge before the High Court was on the grounds of: (i)violation of Article 14; (ii) women being discriminated despite world overEthe rights of women were being empowered; (iii) Hindu Succession Act,1956[2]would prevail over the 1954 Act.

7. Division Bench of the High Court considered the varioussubmissions advanced and placing reliance on the fact that 1954 Acthad been placed in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution much prior toFthe judgment in the case of Kesavananda Bharati vs. State of Kerala[3],and also in view of Article 31(B) of the Constitution of India extendingimmunity to such legislation, dismissed the writ petition by the impugnedjudgment dated 11.09.2009. Aggrieved by the same, the present appealhas been preferred.

8. Initially, respondent Nos.3 and 4 had put in appearance. It isthereafter an I.A. was filed by the Advocate on Record to seek dischargefrom the case. Such I.A. was allowed on 05.05.2022. Shri Anand Yadav,Advocate was appointed as Amicus Curiae to assist the Court.

2 Hereinafter referred to as the “1956 Act”

H3 1973 (4) SCC 225

9. We may briefly note the submissions advanced by the learnedcounsel for the appellants as also the learned Amicus.

Appellant’s arguments:

10. Briefly stated the following arguments were raised on behalfof appellants:

a.Succession provided in 1956 Act will prevail over thesuccession provided in 1954 Act in view of Article 254 ofthe Constitution, as there is clear repugnancy.

b.Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act having been deleted by anamendment in 2005, there would be no justification to applyCthe provisions of succession given in the 1954 Act as thesame would now be governed by the 1956 Act.

c.After the judgement in the case of Vineeta Sharma vs.Rakesh Sharma & Ors.[4], the repeal of Section 4(2) of1956 Act would relate back being retrospective and alsothat the amendment in Section 6 of 1956 Act would be heldto be retrospective.

d.The provisions of Section 50(a) of the 1954 Act are violativeof Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution of India as there isclear discrimination on the ground of sex.

e.Reliance was placed upon the judgment in the case of BabuRam vs. Santokh Singh and others[5 ]for the propositionthat provisions of 1956 Act will apply.

Respondent’s (Amicus) arguments:

11. On behalf of the respondents, learned Amicus made thefollowing submissions, which are briefly recorded herein:

a.Sections 51 to 53 of the 1954 Act cannot be challengedbeing violative of Articles 14 and 15 of the Constitution inview of the Articles 31(A) and 31(B) of the Constitutionand the 1954 Act falling in the Ninth Schedule to theConstitution since 1964.

b.The provisions in the 1954 Act are in consonance with thesettled succession of agricultural land throughout the country

4 (2020) 9 SCC 1

5 (2019) 14 SCC 162

Afor various reasons laid down in the preamble and theStatement of Objects and Reasons of the statute.

c.Provisions of the 1954 Act are not at all affected by deletionof Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act.

d.1956 Act is general law whereas 1954 Act is specialBlaw and therefore, 1954 Act will govern the succession inrespect of agricultural land.

e.The succession provided under the 1954 Act is movetoward the Uniform Civil Code inasmuch as the successionapplies across the board to all land holders irrespective ofCreligion, caste or creed and personal laws of any religion donot carve out any exception.

f.A settled law for decades should not be disturbed.

12. Before the High Court the validity of Section 50(a) of the1954 Act was challenged on the ground that it ultra vires Articles 13, 14,D19, 21 and 254 of the Constitution.

13. In support of the submissions, the appellants who were thepetitioners before the High Court relied upon the judgments in the casesof (i) Kesavananda Bharati(ii) Waman Rao and Ors. vs. Union ofIndia[6] and (iii) I.R. Coelho (Dead) by Lrs. Vs. State of Tamil NaduE& Ors.[7]. The High Court dealt with the judgments in detail and its ultimateanalysis was that none of the judgments relied upon were of any help tothe appellants. The consistent stand of this Court was that all thelegislations included in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution before theJudgment in the case of Kesavananda Bharati that is 24.04.1973, wouldstand protected under Article 31B of the Constitution and, therefore, theFchallenge to the validity of provisions of the 1954 Act must fail.

14. The reasoning given by the High Court, as stated above, is thecorrect interpretation of the judgments of the Court referred to aboveand as such does not warrant any interference. We may also make anote that, before us learned counsel for the appellants has neither raisedGthis argument nor there is any challenge to the aforesaid reasoning ofthe High Court. It may also be pertinent to note that before the HighCourt other arguments were not addressed. However, as the same havebeen raised, they are being dealt with hereinafter.

6 1981 2 SCC 362H7 (2007) 2 SCC 1

15. We will now deal with the arguments raised by the counselfor the appellants and the respondents in response thereto.

I. Repugnancy - Article 254 of the Constitution

16. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently urged thatthe 1954 Act would be hit by Article 254 of the Constitution for thereason that the 1956 Act is enacted by the Parliament whereas the 1954Act is State Act. It is also submitted that the 1956 Act is special lawand the 1954 Act general law.

17. Article 254 of the Constitution reads as follows:

“254. Inconsistency between laws made by Parliament and lawsmade by the Legislatures of States

(1) If any provision of law made by the Legislature of State isrepugnant to any provision of law made by Parliament whichParliament is competent to enact, or to any provision of an existinglaw with respect to one of the matters enumerated in theConcurrent List, then, subject to the provisions of clause (2), thelaw made by Parliament, whether passed before or after the lawmade by the Legislature of such State, or, as the case may be, theexisting law, shall prevail and the law made by the Legislature ofthe State shall, to the extent of the repugnancy, be void

(2) Where law made by the Legislature of State with respectto one of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List containsany provision repugnant to the provisions of an earlier law madeby Parliament or an existing law with respect to that matter, then,the law so made by the Legislature of such State shall, if it hasbeen reserved for the consideration of the President and hasreceived his assent, prevail in that State:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall prevent Parliamentfrom enacting at any time any law with respect to the same matterincluding law adding to, amending, varying or repealing the lawso made by the Legislature of the State.”

18. The question of repugnancy arises only if both the Parliamentand the State legislature have made law with respect to any one of thematters enumerated in the Concurrent list (List III). In the present casetwo enactments of 1956 and 1954 are relatable to Entries in List III andList II respectively. The relevant Entries in List III is Entry Nos.5 and 7

Awhereas relevant Entry of List II is Entry No.18. The said Entries arereproduced below:

“List II – State List

Entry 18: Land, that is to say, right in or over land, land tenuresincluding the relation of landlord and tenant, and the collection ofBrents; transfer and alienation of agricultural land; land improvementand agricultural loans; colonization.

List III – Concurrent List

Entry 5: Marriage and divorce; infants and minors; adoption; wills,Cintestacy and succession; joint family and partition; all matters inrespect of which parties in judicial proceedings were immediatelybefore the commencement of this Constitution subject to theirpersonal law.

xxxxxxxxx

DEntry 7: Contracts, including partnership, agency, contracts ofcarriage, and other special forms of contracts, but not includingcontracts relating to agricultural land.”

19. Apart from the fact that bare reading of Article 254 reflectsthat it refers to repugnancy in law made with respect to mattersEenumerated in the Concurrent list (List III), this Court has also laid downthat question of repugnancy would not come into existence unless it isfirst established that both enactments are under the Concurrent list (ListIII). In this respect it would be appropriate to refer to the law laid downby this Hon’ble Court in the case of M/s. Innoventive IndustriesLtd. vs. ICICI Bank and Ors.[8]. It is held therein that the question ofFexamining repugnancy would not apply at all unless it is first establishedthat both enactments under the Central and the State are with respect tomatters enumerated under the Concurrent list (List III). Consequently, itis submitted that Article 254 would have no application to the presentcase at all. Paragraph 51 lays down the propositions after discussing inGdetail the law on the point. For the present case, the proposition 51.1 isrelevant which reads as follows:

“51. The case law referred to above, therefore, yields the followingpropositions:

H8 (2018) 1 SCC 407, page 450, para 50-51.

51.1. Repugnancy under Article 254 arises only if both theParliamentary (or existing law) and the State law are referable toList III in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India.”

In the present case, 1954 Act is not referable to any matterenumerated in List III but it is referable to Entry 18 of List II. Thus, noquestion of repugnancy would arise in view of Article 254 of theConstitution.

20. The other part of the argument relating to 1956 Act being aspecial law and 1954 being general law is completely misconceived. Ina series of judgments, not only of this Court but also of different HighCourts, it has been expressed that any State enactment relating toAgricultural land tenures is special law. Reference may be had to ajudgment of this Court in the case of Parshanti Vs. Deputy Directorof Consolidation[9].

II. Deletion of Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act:

21. Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act read as follows:

“4. Overriding effect of Act:

(1) ………………

(2) For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that nothingcontained in this Act shall be deemed to affect the provisions ofany law for the time being in force providing for the prevention offragmentation of agricultural holdings or for the fixation of ceilingsor for the devolution of tenancy rights in respect of such holdings.”

22. Till 2005, to be specific 09.09.2005, when the HinduSuccession (Amendment) Act of 2005 was enacted, the aforesaidprovision remained on the statute. It is not in dispute that the propertyin question is agricultural property, and therefore, in 1997 at the timewhen Mukhtiyar Singh died, the devolution of interest (inheritance)would be determinable on the said date, in accordance with the lawexisting at that time. In 1997 Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act, was verymuch on the statute, its subsequent deletion would not have any impacton the rights of inheritance, which had already accrued and crystallised,prior to the amendment. Therefore, on facts deletion of Section 4(2)of the 1956 Act would not help the appellants.

A23. It is well settled that all amendments are deemed to applyprospectively unless expressly specified to apply retrospectively orintended to have been done so by the legislature. Reference may be hadto the following decisions:

[L.R. Brothers Indo Flora Ltd. v. Commissioner of CentralBExcise[10]; Hitendra Vishnu Thakur v. State of Maharashtra[11];Union of India v. Zora Singh[12].]

In the present case there is no such intention reflecting from theamending Act.

24. By virtue of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, the repealCof an enactment would not affect the previous operation of such anenactment. In Shree Bhagwati Steel Rolling Mills v. CCE[13], thisCourt has held that repeal is to be treated similarly as an omission andSection 6 of the General Clauses Act would apply equally to an omissionas it would apply to repeal. On account of Sections 6(b) and 6(c) ofDGeneral Clauses Act, the omission of Section 4(2) of 1956 Act cannotaffect the previous operation of the said Section 4(2). Paragraphs 12and 13 of the aforesaid report are reproduced below:

“12. From this it is clear that when Section 6 of the General ClausesAct speaks of the repeal of any enactment, it refers not merely toEthe enactment as whole but also to any provision contained inany Act. Thus, it is clear that if part of statute is deleted,Section 6 would nonetheless apply. Secondly, it is clear, as hasbeen stated by referring to passage in Halsbury’s Laws ofEngland in Fibre Board judgment, that the expression “omission”is nothing but particular form of words evincing an intention toFabrogate an enactment or portion thereof. This is made furtherclear by the Legal Thesaurus (Deluxe Edition) by William C.Burton, 1979 Edition. The expression “delete” is defined by theThesaurus as follows:“Delete:- Blot out, cancel, censor, cross off, cross out, cut, cutGout, dele, discard, do away with, drop, edit out, effect, elide,eliminate, eradicate, erase, excise, expel, expunge, extirpate, get

10 (2020) SCC Online SC 705, para 27;

11 (1994) 4 SCC 602 para 26;

12 (1992)1 SCC 673, para 12;

H13 (2016) 3 SCC 643, para 12.

rid of, leave out, modify by excisions, obliterate, omit, remove, rubout, rule out, scratch out, strike off, take out, weed, wipe out.”

Likewise the expression “omit” is also defined by this Thesaurusas follows:

“Omit:- Abstain from inserting, bypass, cast aside, count out,cut out, delete, discard, dodge, drop, exclude, fail to do, fail toinclude, fail to insert, fail to mention, leave out, leave undone, letgo, let pass, let slip, miss, neglect, omittere, pass over,praetermittere, skip, slight, transire.”

And the expression “repeal” is defined as follows:

“Repeal:- Abolish, abrogare, abrogate, annul, avoid, cancel,countermand, declare null and void, delete, eliminate, formallywithdraw, invalidate, make void, negate, nullify, obliterate, officiallywithdraw, override, overrule, quash, recall, render invalid, rescind,rescindere, retract, reverse, revoke, set aside, vacate, void,withdraw.”

13. On conjoint reading of the three expressions “delete”, “omit”,and “repeal”, it becomes clear that “delete” and “omit” are usedinterchangeably, so that when the expression “repeal” refers to“delete” it would necessarily take within its ken an omission aswell. This being the case, we do not find any substance in theargument that “repeal” amounts to an obliteration from the verybeginning, whereas an “omission” is only in futuro. If the expression“delete” would amount to “repeal”, which the appellant’s counseldoes not deny, it is clear that conjoint reading of Halsbury’sLaws of England and the Legal Thesaurus cited hereinabove bothlead to the same result, namely, that an “omission’ beingtantamount to “deletion” is form of repeal.”

25. The deletion of Section 4(2) took place w.e.f 09.09.2005.Therefore, the effect of the deletion can only be in respect of successionswhich opened on or after 09.09.2005. This is because under Section6(b) and 6(c) of the General Clauses Act repeal cannot affect the previousoperation of any enactment so repealed and cannot affect the previousoperation of any enactment so repealed and cannot affect any rightwhich may have been acquired or accrued. In the present case, it is tobe held that succession has opened prior to 09.09.2005, the rights of thedescendants in terms of Section 50 became crystallized on account of

Athe said Section read with Section 4(2) of the 1956 Act. Therefore, thedeletion of Section 4(2) cannot have retrospective effect.

26. There is one more reason, why the existence of Section 4(2)in the 1956 Act and its deletion will not have any impact in the presentcase. The reason is that the 1954 Act, as held above is special law,Bdealing with fragmentation, ceiling, and devolution of tenancy rights overagricultural holdings only, whereas the 1956 Act is general law, providingfor succession to Hindu by religion as stated in Section 2 thereof. Theexistence or absence of Section 4(2) in the 1956 Act would be immaterial.

III. Effect of the judgment given in the case of VineetaCSharma:

27. The argument advanced by the learned counsel for theappellants is that the applicability of amendment in Section 6 and thedeletion of Section 4(2) from the 1956 Act would have retrospectiveeffect, which is also of no help to the appellants. Once we are holdingDthat succession in the present case with respect to the property in questionis governed by the 1954 Act, any amendment even if it has retrospectiveeffect in the 1956 Act will have no bearing or impact on the provisions ofsuccession governed by the 1954 Act. Moreover, this Court in thejudgment of Vineeta Sharma has given retrospective application onlyto Section 6 of the 1956 Act as amended in 2005. There is no declarationEregarding deletion of Section 4(2) being retrospective. This argument,therefore, also fails.

IV. Gender bias/ women empowerment:

28. Once it is upheld that there can be no challenge to the 1954

FAct as the said legislation is included in the Ninth Schedule of theConstitution of India, this argument also has no legs to stand.

V. Effect of the judgment in the case of Babu Ram:

29. Reliance placed upon the judgment in the case of Babu Ramis of no help to the appellant. The case of Babu Ram related to State ofGHimachal Pradesh where there is no State enactment legislated coveringthe matters mentioned in Entry 18 of List II that is to say that the Stateof Himachal Pradesh has no local enactment covering agricultural landtenures. It was in such circumstances that this Court held that successionof agricultural land would be governed by the 1956 Act. It would be

worthwhile to mention that in the judgment of Babu Ram itself thisCourt clarified that had there been state enactment covering the fieldof Entry 18 List II of Seventh Schedule, the rights over agricultural landwould have been governed by the same. Paragraphs 21 and 22 whichare relevant are reproduced hereunder:

“21. In the present case, it is nobody’s case that the matter relatingto succession to an interest in agricultural lands is in any waydealt with by any State legislation operating in the State of HimachalPradesh or that such legislation must prevail in accordance withthe principles under Article 254 of the Constitution of India. Thefield is occupied only by Section 22 of the Act insofar as the Stateof Himachal Pradesh is concerned. The High Court was, therefore,absolutely right in holding that Section 22 of the Act would operatein respect of succession to agricultural lands in the State.

22. Though, succession to an agricultural land is otherwise dealtwith under Section 22 of the Act, the provisions of Section 4(2) of theAct, before its omission, had made it clear that the provisions of the Actwould not apply in cases inter alia of devolution of tenancy rights inrespect of agricultural holdings. Thus, the effect of Section 4(2) of theAct before its deletion was quite clear that, though the general field ofsuccession including in respect of agricultural lands was dealt with underSection 22 of the Act, insofar as devolution of tenancy rights with respectto agricultural holdings were concerned, the provisions of Section 22would be inapplicable. The High Court of Bombay was, therefore,absolutely right in its conclusion. However, with the deletion of Section4(2) of the Act, now there is no exception to the applicability of Section22 of the Act. But we are not called upon to consider that facet of thematter.”

30. For all the reasons recorded above, the appeal fails and isaccordingly dismissed. No order as to costs.

Divya Pandey(Assisted by : Deepak Panwar, LCRA)

Appeal dismissed.