AURELIANO FERNANDES versus STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS

[2023] 7 S.C.R.

AURELIANO FERNANDES

STATE OF GOA AND OTHERS

(Civil Appeal No. 2482 of 2014)

BMAY 12, 2023

[A. S. BOPANNA AND HIMA KOHLI, JJ.]

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)Rules, 1965 – r. 11(IX), r. 14(2) – Central Civil Services (Conduct)Rules, 1964 – r. 3C – Allegation of sexual harassment at work placeC– Defying the principles of natural justice – Appellant was appointedby the respondent no.2-Goa University – Appellant was accused ofsexual harassment by several girl students – Appellant was servedwith notice to explain charges levelled against him – Inquiryproceedings took place thereafter, in the month of May 2009, whenD12 hearings, most of them back to back, were conducted by theCommittee – Appellant was unable to appear due to health reasons,however, he had sought extension of time, which was denied –Proceedings proceeded ex-parte and submitted its report establishingsexual harassment by the appellant – Committee recommended histermination from service – The Executive Council (EC) acceptedEthe report submitted by the Committee and the appellant was placedunder suspension with immediate effect – EC proposed to conductan inquiry against him under Rule 14 of CCS (CCA) Rules – However,appellant was informed that in the light of an order passed by theSupreme Court in Medha Kotwal’s case, the report of the ComplaintsFCommittee for Prevention of Sexual Harassment of Women atWorkplace shall be deemed to be an Inquiry Report under the CCS(CCA) Rules which shall be binding on the disciplinary authorityfor initiating disciplinary action against the government servant –Disciplinary Authority dismissed the appellant from service –Appellant filed writ petition before the High Court, which wasGdismissed – On appeal, held: It is an admitted position that theinquiry proceedings were aborted at the initial stage itself and itwas the Report of the Committee submitted earlier, that was actedupon by the EC – The Committee itself was unclear as to the scopeof its inquiry, the appellant cannot be blamed for harbouring anHimpression that the remit of the Committee was confined to fact

finding alone and it was not discharging the functions of adisciplinary committee, as contemplated under the service Rules –It is also noteworthy that the time span prescribed under the CCS(CCA) Rules for concluding an inquiry is ordinarily within periodof six months from the date of receipt of the order of appointment –In the instant case, the entire process was wrapped up in flat 39days – This shows the tearing hurry in which the Committee was tosubmit its Report – The undue haste demonstrated by the Committeefor bringing the inquiry to closure, cannot justify curtailment ofthe right of the appellant to fair hearing – When the legitimacy ofthe decision taken is dependent on the fairness of the process andthe process adopted itself became questionable, then the decisionarrived at cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and is wide open tointerference – The discretion vested in the Committee for conductingthe inquiry has been exercised improperly, defying the principles ofnatural justice – As consequence thereof, the impugned judgmentupholding the decision taken by the EC of terminating the servicesof the appellant, duly endorsed by the Appellate Authority cannotbe sustained.

Constitution of India – Art. 309 – Conditions of service –Scope – Art. 309 does not by itself provide for recruitment orconditions of service of Government servants, but confers this poweron the appropriate legislature to make the laws and on the Presidentand the Government of State to make rules relating to these matters– However, any Act or Rule that violates the rights guaranteed to agovernment servant under Article 311, would be void – Similarly,such an Act or Rule would be treated as void if it violates any of thefundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.Constitution of India – Art. 310 – Doctrine of Pleasure –Article 310 embodies the “Doctrine of Pleasure” and in the contextof Government servants, relates to their tenure of service – Theorigin of Government servants may be contractual, once appointedto the post or office, they acquire status and their rights andobligations are no longer determined by the consent of both theparties, but are governed by the Statute or Statutory Rules.

Constitution of India – Art. 311 – Manifestation of thePrinciple of Natural Justice – To provide sense of security oftenure to Government servants, the framers of the Constitution have

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Aincorporated safeguards in respect of the punishment or dismissalor removal or reduction in their rank as provided for in Clauses (1)and (2) of Article 311 – At the same time, being mindful of the verysame public interest and public good which does not permit thatGovernment servants found to be corrupt, dishonest or inefficientbe continued in service, remedy is provided under the secondBproviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 whereunder their services canbe dispensed with, without conducting disciplinary inquiry.

Constitution of India – Art.14 – Bedrock of Principles ofNatural Justice – Principles of natural justice that are reflected inArticle 311, are not an empty incantation – They form the veryCbedrock of Article 14 and any violation of these principlestantamounts to violation of Article 14 of the Constitution – Denialof the principles of natural justice to public servant can invalidatea decision taken on the ground that it is hit by the vice of arbitrarinessand would result in depriving public servant of equal protectionDof law.

Principles/Doctrines – Principle of Natural Justice – Twinanchors : Nemo Judex In Causa Sua and Audi Alteram Partem – Thetwin anchors on which the principles of natural justice rest in thejudicial process, whether quasi-judicial or administrative in nature,Eare Nemo Judex In Causa Sua, i.e., no person shall be judge in hisown cause as justice should not only be done, but should manifestlybe seen to be done and Audi Alteram Partem, i.e. person affectedby judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative action must beafforded an opportunity of hearing before any decision is taken.FAdministration of Justice – Fair action and impartiality inservice jurisprudence – Courts interpret statutory provisions in syncwith the aforesaid principles of natural justice on premise that nostatutory authority would violate the fundamental rights enshrinedin the Constitution – Further when it comes to authorities that areexpected to discharge judicial and quasi-judicial functions, the ruleGof audi alteram partem applies with equal force – Reasonablenessinfuses lifeblood in procedural matters, be it elements of the notice,the contents of the notice, the scope of inquiry, the material availableor an adequate opportunity to rebut such material and all of this isto avoid miscarriage of justice at any stage.

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal)Rules, 1965 – r. 14 – Expression “as far as is practicable” – Theuse of the expression “as far as is practicable” indicates play inthe joints available to the Complaints Committee to adopt fairprocedure that is feasible and elastic for conducting an inquiry ina sensitive matter like sexual harassment at the workplace, withoutcompromising on the principles of natural justice.

Administration of Justice – Reasonableness into theprocedural regime in Service Matter – The cardinal principlerequired to be borne in mind is that the person accused of misconductmust be informed of the case, must be supplied the evidence insupport thereof and be given reasonable opportunity to presenthis version before any adverse decision is taken – Similarly, theconcerned employer is also expected to act fairly and adopt aprocedure that is just, fair and reasonable – The whole purpose isto breathe reasonableness into the procedural regime but, the testof reasonableness cannot be abstract – It has to be pragmatic andgrounded in the realities of the facts and circumstances of case.

Sexual Harassment of Women at Work Place (Prevention,Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 – To fulfil the promise that thePoSH Act holds out to working women all over the country –Appropriate directions issued.

Allowing the appeal and issuing directions, the Court

HELD: 1. The plea of the appellant that the Committeeunderstood the remit of its inquiry as ‘fact-finding proceeding’,can be discerned from the contents of the letters dated 17thMarch 2009 and 20th April 2009 addressed to the appellant. Theimpression carried by the Committee that it was only required tosubmit fact- finding report to the University was no different forthe EC as is borne out from perusal of the Memorandum dated8th September 2009, issued by the Chairman of the EC who,after receiving the Committee’s Report, informed the appellantthat an inquiry was proposed to be conducted against him underRule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. This was the first time whenthe respondents informed the appellant that the EC had decidedto follow the procedure prescribed under the rules of drawing upa Statement of Articles of Charge, imputation of misconduct insupport of each Article of Charge and other documents and had

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Agranted the appellant time to submit his reply in defence. Theappellant did submit reply. But it is an admitted position thatthe said inquiry proceedings were aborted at the initial stage itselfand it was the Report of the Committee submitted earlier, thatwas acted upon by the EC in terms of decision taken on 28thJanuary 2010. when the Committee itself was unclear as to theBscope of its inquiry, the appellant cannot be blamed for harbouringan impression that the remit of the Committee was confined tofact finding alone and it was not discharging the functions of adisciplinary committee, as contemplated under the service Rules.[Para 61][817-E-H; 818-A]

2. It is also noteworthy that the time span prescribed underthe CCS (CCA) Rules for concluding an inquiry is ordinarily withina period of six months from the date of receipt of the order ofappointment. But, here, the entire process was wrapped up inflat 39 days. This shows the tearing hurry in which the CommitteeDwas to submit its Report. One such glaring instance of the overanxiety to conclude the proceedings is apparent from the letterdated 5th May 2009, addressed by the Committee to the appellantinforming him that the next date for filing his reply and forrecording further depositions was 12th June 2009. Surprisingly,on the very next day, the Committee issued yet another letterEadvancing the said dates by claiming that an error had crept intothe previous letter and informing the appellant that the date forfiling his reply should be read as ‘12th May 2009’ and the datefor recording further depositions should be read as ‘14th May,2009’, thus moving the dates back by whole month. AnotherFegregious example of the hurry and scurry shown by theCommittee can be gathered from the fact that on 20th May 2009,the Committee had written to the appellant giving him lastopportunity to present himself on 20th May 2009, not only tocomplete his deposition, but also to cross- examine thecomplainants and other witnesses. Simultaneously, the CommitteeGforwarded six more depositions to the appellant and directed himto furnish his reply within 48 hours i.e. by 22nd May, 2009. [Para63][818-E-H; 819-A]

3. The undue haste demonstrated by the Committee forbringing the inquiry to closure, cannot justify curtailment of theH

right of the appellant to fair hearing. The due process, animportant facet of the principles of natural justice was seriouslycompromised due to the manner in which the Committee wentabout the task of conducting the inquiry proceedings. As notedabove, when the proceedings, subject matter of the present appealhad taken place, the PoSH Act was nowhere on the horizon andthe field was occupied by the Vishaka Guidelines. The saidGuidelines also did not exclude application of the principles ofnatural justice and fair play in making procedural compliances.The silence in the Guidelines on this aspect could not have givena handle to the Committee to bypass the principles of naturaljustice and whittle down reasonable opportunity of affording afair hearing to the appellant. This Court has repeatedly observedthat even when the rules are silent, principles of natural justicemust be read into them. In its keen anxiety of being fair to thevictims/complainants and wrap up the complaints expeditiously,the Committee has ended up being grossly unfair to the appellant.It has completely overlooked the cardinal principle that justicemust not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done.The principles of audi alterem partem could not have been thrownto the winds in this cavalier manner. [Para 65][819-D-G]

4. When the employer itself was oblivious to the remit ofthe Committee and the Committee remained under the very sameimpression having described its proceedings as fact-finding innature, it was all the more incumbent for the respondents to havepaused on receiving the Report of the First Committee and verifythe legal position before taking the next step. In all this back andforth, it was the procedure prescribed under Rule 14 forconducting an inquiry of sexual harassment at the workplace thatcame to be sacrificed at the alter of expeditious disposal, whichcan neither be justified nor countenanced. The intent and purposeof the proviso inserted in Rule 14(2) of CCS (CCA) Rules andRule 3C of CCS (Conduct) Rules is that the procedure requiredto be adopted for conducting an inquiry into the complaint of sexualharassment that can lead to imposition of major penalty underthe Rules, must be fair, impartial and in line with the Rules.Pertinently, the emphasis on adhering to the principles of naturaljustice during an inquiry conducted by Complaints Committeefinds specific mention in Rule 7(4) of the subsequently enacted

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ARules of 2013. But the spirit behind the due process could neverbe suppressed or ignored even in the absence of the Statute orthe Rules inasmuch as the principles of natural justice is the veryessence of the decision-making process and must be read intoevery judicial or even quasi-judicial proceeding. [Paras 67,68][820-D-G]B

5. This is not to say that the Committee even if describedas an Inquiring authority, by virtue of the ruling in Medha Kotwal’scase and required to follow the procedure prescribed under Rule14, was expected to conduct the inquiry as if it was full-fledgedtrial. The expression used in the proviso to Rule 14(2), ‘as far asCpracticable’ has to be read and understood in pragmatic manner.In any such proceedings initiated by the Disciplinary Authority, acalibrated balance would have to be struck between the rights ofa victim of sexual harassment and those of the delinquentemployee. At the same time, fairness in the procedure wouldhave to be necessarily adopted in the interest of both sides. AfterDall, what is sauce for the goose, is sauce for the gander. [Para69][820-H; 821-A-B]

6. In fact, the glaring defects and the procedural lapses inthe inquiry proceedings took place only thereafter, in the monthof May, 2009, when 12 hearings, most of them back-to-back, wereEconducted by the Committee at lightning speed. On the onehand, the Committee kept on forwarding to the appellant,depositions of some more complainants received later on andthose of other witnesses and called upon him to furnish his replyand on the other hand, it directed him to come prepared to cross-examine the said complainants and witnesses as also record hisFfurther deposition, all in span of one week. Even if the medicalgrounds taken by the appellant seemed suspect, the Committeeought to have given him reasonable time to prepare his defence,more so when his request for being represented through lawyerhad already been declined. It was all this undue anxiety that hadled to short-circuiting the inquiry proceedings conducted by theGCommittee and damaging the very fairness of the process. [Para71][821-E-H]

7. For the above reasons, the appellant cannot be faultedfor questioning the process and its outcome. There is no doubtthat matters of this nature are sensitive and have to be handledHwith care. The respondents had received as many as seventeen

complaints from students levelling serious allegations of sexualharassment against the appellant. But that would not be groundto give complete go by to the procedural fairness of the inquiryrequired to be conducted, more so when the inquiry could leadto imposition of major penalty proceedings. When the legitimacyof the decision taken is dependent on the fairness of the processand the process adopted itself became questionable, then thedecision arrived at cannot withstand judicial scrutiny and is wideopen to interference. It is not without reason that it is said that afair procedure alone can guarantee fair outcome. In this case,the anxiety of the Committee of being fair to the victims of sexualharassment, has ended up causing them greater harm. [Para72][822-A-C]8. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that theproceedings conducted by the Committee with effect from themonth of May, 2009, fell short of the “as far as practicable” normprescribed in the relevant Rules. The discretion vested in theCommittee for conducting the inquiry has been exercisedimproperly, defying the principles of natural justice. As aconsequence thereof, the impugned judgment upholding thedecision taken by the EC of terminating the services of theappellant, duly endorsed by the Appellate Authority cannot besustained and is accordingly quashed and set aside with thefollowing directions: (i) The matter is remanded back to theComplaints Committee to take up the inquiry proceeding as theystood on 5 th May 2009; (ii) The Committee shall afford adequateopportunity to the appellant to defend himself; (iii) The appellantshall not seek any adjournment of the proceedings; (iv) Reportshall be submitted by the Committee to the Disciplinary Authorityfor appropriate orders; (v) Having regard to the long passage oftime, the respondents are directed to complete the entire processwithin three months from the first date of hearing fixed by theCommittee; (vi) The procedure to be followed by the Committeeand the Disciplinary Authority shall be guided by the principlesof natural justice; (vii) The Rules applied will be as were applicableat the relevant point of time; (viii) The decision taken by theCommittee and the Disciplinary Authority shall be purely onmerits and in accordance with law; (ix) The appellant will not beentitled to claim immediate reinstatement or back wages till the

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Ainquiry is completed and decision is taken by the DisciplinaryAuthority. [Para 73][822-D-H; 823-A-B]

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India and Another (1978)1 SCC 248 : [1978] 2 SCR 621; Rustom CavasjeeCooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3SCR 530; Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C.Mazdoor Congress and Others (1991) Supp (1) SCC600 : [1990] 1Suppl. SCR 142; Union of India andAnother v. Tulsiram Patel (1985) 3 SCC 398 : [1985] 2Suppl. SCR 131 – followed.

Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India (2013) 1 SCC297 : [2012] 9 SCR 895; Hira Nath Mishra and Othersv. Principal, Rajendra Medical College, Ranchi andAnother (1973) 1 SCC 805; P.D. Agrawal v. State Bankof India and Others (2006) 8 SCC 776 : [2006] 1 Suppl.SCR 454; Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthanand Others (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR404; A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950) SCC 228;Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India &Others (2023) SCC Online 366; A.K. Kraipak andOthers v. Union of India and Others (1969) 2 SCC 262: [1970] 1 SCR 457; In re: H.K. (All Infant) (1967) 1All ER 226; Mangilal v. State of M.P. (2004) 2 SCC447 : [2004] 1 SCR 1; Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinhaand Another (1970) 2 SCC 458 : [1971] 1 SCR 791;Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India (1981) 1 SCC664 : [1981] 2 SCR 533; Medha Kotwal Lele and Othersv. Union of India and Others (2013) 1 SCC 311; Dr.Vijaykumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala andOthers, (2020) 12 SCC 426 : [2020] 3 SCR 374 – reliedon.

Sandeep Khurana v. Delhi Transco Ltd. And Others ILR2006 (11) Del 1313; Professor Giridhar Madras v.Indian Institute of Science represented by Chairman andOthers (2019) SCC Online Kar 3508; Avinash Mishrav. Union of India 2014 SCC Online Del 1856 – referredto.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2482of 2014.

From the Judgment and Order dated 15.03.2012 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay Bench at Panaji in WP No.602 of 2011.

Bishwajit Bhattacharyya, Sr. Adv., Atul Jha, Pragyan PradipFSharma, Surya Narayan Patro, N. B. V. Srinivasa Reddy, PriyonkooAnjan Gogoi, P. V. Yogeswaran, Advs. for the Appellant.

Ms. Ruchira Gupta, Shishir Deshpande, Ms. Urvi Kapoor, DeepNarayan Sarkar, Advs. for the Respondents.

The following Judgment of the Court was delivered:

A.Scope of the Appeal

B.Sequence of Events1-8

Ed. Note : Pagination in the Index is as per the original judgment

HIMA KOHLI, J.

A. SCOPE OF THE APPEAL

1. challenge has been laid by the appellant to the judgmentdated 15[th] March, 2012, passed by the High Court of Judicature at

ABombay Bench, at Goa, dismissing writ petition[1] preferred by himagainst an order[2] passed by the Executive Council[3] of Goa University(Disciplinary Authority) accepting the Report[4] of the Standing Committeefor Prevention of Sexual Harassment at Work Place[5] and imposing uponhim, major penalty of dismissal from services and disqualification fromthe future employment under Rule 11(IX) of the Central Civil ServicesB(Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965[6] which was duly upheldby the Governor and the Chancellor of Goa University, being the AppellateAuthority[7].

B. SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

C(a) PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE FIRST COMMITTEE:

2. The factual matrix of the case needs to be placed in achronological sequence. The appellant commenced his career in therespondent no. 2 – Goa University as Temporary Lecturer in theDepartment of Political Science, in the year 1996. He was appointed asDthe Head of the said Department, in the year 2003. It is the appellant’sversion, which is strongly refuted by the other side, that aggrieved by thepassing of resolution by the Departmental Council of the Departmentof Political Science against them, two girl students along with their friendssubmitted complaint to the respondent no.2 – University, alleging physicalharassment at his hands. The said complaints[8] were the starting point ofEan inquiry initiated by the Committee on receiving complaints by theRegistrar of the respondent no. 2 – University[9]. The Committee serveda notice[10] on the appellant calling upon him to explain the charges levelledagainst him in nine complaints and to appear before it for personalhearing on 24[th] April, 2009, date that was subsequently changed toF27[nd] April, 2009. Contemporaneously, the Registrar of the respondentno. 2 – University directed the appellant to hand over charge and proceedon leave till the conclusion of the inquiry.

1 W.P. No. 602 of 2011

2 Dated 10th May, 2010

3 For short ‘EC’

4 Dated 05th June, 2009

5 For short ‘ The Committee’

6 For short the CCS (CCA) Rules

7 Vide Order dated 19th April, 2011

8 Complaint dated 11.03.2009 & 17.03.2009

9 Under cover of letter dated 08.04.2009

10 Dated 17th April, 2009

3. The appellant furnished detailed reply to the Committee,running into fifty-three pages wherein he raised some preliminaryobjections to the inquiry being conducted by the Committee, alleged awell-organized conspiracy against him by some wayward students inconnivance with the members of the faculty and refuted the contents offourteen depositions of girl students forwarded to him by the Committee.He concluded by stating that the charges of sexual harassment levelledagainst him were completely false and baseless. The appellant alsoaddressed letter to the Registrar seeking removal of two Members ofthe Committee on the ground of bias and on plea that being hissubordinates, they were prone to bias.4. The Committee called the appellant for hearing on 27[th] April,2009. It was alleged by the appellant that the deposition of all thecomplainants including the witness named by him were recorded whilehe was made to wait outside the Committee room. He was called lateron and the Committee recorded his statement. Even on the next hearing,on 28[th] April, 2009, similar procedure was adopted by the Committee.On 30[th] April, 2009, the appellant received notice from the Committeeenclosing therewith another complaint of sexual harassment receivedagainst him to which he was directed to respond and present himself on6[th] May, 2009. Vide letter 2[nd] May 2009, the appellant sought more timeto submit reply to the additional complaint and permission to engage anAdvocate to appear for him before the Committee.

5. The appellant submitted his reply to the notice on 8[th] May, 2009.On 6[th] May, 2009, the request of the appellant to engage lawyer wasdeclined by the Committee. On the same day, corrigendum was issuedby the Committee to the earlier letter[11] informing him that the next datefixed for filing his reply should be read as “12[th] May, 2009” instead of“12[th] June, 2009” and the date for further deposition should be read as“14[th] May, 2009” instead of “12[th] June, 2009”.

6. Vide letter dated 8[th] May, 2009, the appellant objected to theinquiry being conducted by the Committee on complaint[12] receivedfrom an ex-student of the respondent no. 2 – University on the groundthat she was neither student nor an employee of the University.Additionally, he asked for copy of the said complaint, besides thestatement of deposition that had already been furnished to him.

11 Dated 5th May, 2009

12 Signed on 27th April, 2009

A7. On 12[th] May, 2009, the appellant forwarded an affidavit of awitness to refute some of the allegations levelled against him by thecomplainants. Vide letter of even date, the Committee forwarded anadditional deposition of member of the Faculty, Dr. Rahul Tripathi,who had stepped down from the Committee constituted to look into thecomplaints against the appellant and deposed as witness.B

8. The appellant wrote letter dated 13[th] May, 2009 to theCommittee seeking some time to appear before it on plea that he wasadmitted in the hospital with severe back-ache. Vide notice dated 14[th]May, 2009, the Committee directed the appellant to appear before it on19[th] May, 2009 for recording his deposition and for submitting his writtenCreply to the fresh deposition of the other complainant. Further extensionof time, as requested, was however declined by the Committee.

9. In the meantime, vide letter dated 13[th] May, 2009, the appellantapplied to the respondent no.2 – University seeking voluntary retirementon health grounds. However, the said application was withdrawn by himDon 18[th] May, 2009. On the same date, an advocate engaged by theappellant’s brother issued notice to the respondents no.2 and 3 seekingextension of time by one month for the appellant to appear before theCommittee.

10. In its letter dated 20[th] May, 2009, the Committee noted thatEthough the appellant had failed to appear before it on 19[th] May, 2009 forrecording his further deposition, he was being granted one last opportunityto present himself on 23[rd] May, 2009, for completing his deposition andfor cross-examining the witness including the complainants. Alongside,six more depositions were forwarded to the appellant, seeking his replyFby 22[nd] May, 2009.

11. The appellant addressed yet another letter[13] to the Committeeexpressing his inability to attend the proceedings on 23[rd] May, 2009, onhealth grounds and requested for postponement of the proceeding by 3-4 weeks. However, his request was turned down by the Committee onGthe very same day and the appellant was directed to remain present on23[rd] May, 2009, failing which, he was informed that the Committee wouldproceed further with the inquiry. second request[14] made by the appellantfor seeking postponement of the proceedings of the Committee, met thesame fate.

13 Dated 22nd May, 2009H14 Dated 23rd May, 2009

12. After about ten days, the appellant sent letter[15] to theChairperson of the Committee stating inter alia that he had partiallyrecovered from his ailment and was in position to depose. He soughtfresh dates to enable him to furnish reply to the additional depositionsreceived by him. However, by then the Committee had proceeded ex-parte against the appellant and submitted its Report[16] to the Registrar ofthe respondent no. 2 – University stating that 18 meetings had takenplace in connection with the inquiry that had established sexual harassmentof the complaints by the appellant which act amounted to gravemisconduct and was in gross violation of Rule 3(1)(III) of the CCSConduct Rules and consequently, recommended termination of hisservices.

(b) PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE EXECUTIVECOUNCIL

13. The EC held meeting on 13[th] June, 2009 wherein the Reportsubmitted by the Committee was accepted and the appellant was placedunder suspension with immediate effect. Vide Memorandum dated 8[th]September, 2009, the Chairman of the EC informed the appellant thatthe EC proposed to conduct an inquiry against him under Rule 14 of theCCS (CCA) Rules. Enclosed with the said Memorandum, was thestatement of the Articles of Charge, statement of the imputation of themisconduct in support of each Article of Charge, list of documents and alist of witnesses for sustaining the said charges. The appellant was giventen days’ time to submit written statement of his defence and statewhether he desired to be heard in person.

14. The appellant submitted detailed reply to the aforesaidMemorandum, running into twenty pages and also demanded severaldocuments and information relating to the complaints of sexualharassment made against him, on the plea that they were relevant forsubmitting his written statement which was turned down by the ViceChancellor of the respondent no. 2 – University[17] and he was grantedtwenty days to respond.

15. On 15[th] October, 2009 the EC appointed former Judge ofthe Bombay High Court to conduct an inquiry into the charges framedagainst the appellant and he was informed that the Inquiry Officer will

15 Dated 4th June, 2009

16 Dated 5th June, 2009

17 vide letter 17th September, 2009

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Ahold preliminary inquiry into the charges framed against him on 9[th]November, 2009. The first sitting of the Inquiry Committee conductedon 9[th] November, 2009, was duly attended by the appellant and hisAdvocate. The second meeting was scheduled on 7[th] December, 2009on which date when the Presenting Officer appearing on behalf of therespondent no. 2 – University referred to the judgment dated 26[th] March,B2004, passed by this Court in the case of Medha Kotwal Lele andOthers v. Union of India and Others18 and the amendment19 to theproviso to Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules that provides that wherethere is complaint of sexual harassment within the meaning of Rule 3Cof the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964[20], the ComplaintsCCommittee shall be deemed to be the inquiring authority for the purposeof imposing major penalties, the Inquiry Officer decided to keep theinquiry in abeyance, so as to ascertain as to whether any further directionshad been issued by the Supreme Court inMedha Kotwal’scase (supra).

16. On 15[th] December, 2009, the Registrar of the respondent no.D2 - University informed the appellant that the disciplinary proceedingsinitiated against him on the recommendations made by the EC in itsmeeting held on 12[th] December, 2009, stood terminated and the orderappointing the Inquiry Officer had also been withdrawn in the light ofthe order dated 26[th] April, 2004, passed by the this Court in MedhaKotwal’s case holding that the report of the Complaints Committee forEPrevention of Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace shall bedeemed to be an Inquiry Report under the CCS (CCA) Rules whichshall be binding on the disciplinary authority for initiating disciplinaryaction against the government servant. Describing the decision taken bythe EC on 14[th] June, 2009 of appointing an Inquiry Officer to inquire intoFthe charges framed against the appellant as inadvertent, the Registrarinformed the appellant that the disciplinary authority will decide the furthercourse of action against him under the extant rules.

C. DECISION OF THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITYAND THE APPELLATE AUTHORITY

G17. This was followed by issuance of Memorandum[21] by theVice-Chancellor of the respondent no. 2 – University on behalf of the

18 (2013) 1 SCC 297

19 Dated 1st July, 2004

20 CCS (Conduct) RulesH21 Dated 17th February, 2010

EC informing the appellant that in its meeting conducted on 28[th] January,2010, the EC had accepted the report of the Committee and decidedthat he was unfit to be retained in service in view of the gravity of thecharges levelled against him. Proposing to impose major penalty ofdismissal thereby disqualifying him from future employment ascontemplated under the Rules[22], the appellant was granted two weeksto submit his representation.

18. The appellant submitted his reply on 13[th] March, 2010. Afterexamining his reply, the disciplinary authority dismissed the appellantfrom service vide order dated 10[th] May, 2010. The appeal[23] preferredby the appellant against the said dismissal order was rejected by theorder[24] of the Appellate Authority[25].

D. DECISION OF THE HIGH COURT

19. The said orders were challenged before the Bombay HighCourt. The High Court observed that the Committee had granted ampleopportunities to the appellant to cross-examine the complainants and thewitnesses, but he had deliberately elected not to appear before it. Insuch circumstances, the Committee could not be blamed for proceedingex-parte against him and submitting its Report. It was also held that theCommittee was justified in discarding the medical certificates submittedby the appellant as he kept on making flimsy excuses to stay away fromthe enquiry proceedings. The plea of the appellant that the Committeewas improperly constituted or its composition was questionable as itcomprised of persons who were junior to him in the Department, wasrejected as meritless. Further, the contention that the enquiry had beenconducted with undue haste, without giving fair and reasonableopportunity to the appellant to defend himself, was also turned down. Asa result, the High Court did not see any merits in the said writ petitionwhich was dismissed holding that there was no breach of the principlesof natural justice and the Service Rules in the case.

E. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED BY COUNSEL FOR THEPARTIES :

(a) COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLANT

22 Rule 11 (IX) CCS CCA, 1965

23 Appeal dated 25th June, 2010

24 Dated 19th April, 2010

25 Governor of Goa and Chancellor of Goa University

DEF

A20. Arguing on behalf of the appellant, Mr. BishwajeetBhattacharya, learned Senior counsel has assailed the impugned judgmenton several counts. The main thrust of his arguments is that the dismissalorder[26] passed by the Disciplinary Authority and upheld by the AppellateAuthority is based solely on the Report submitted by the Committeewhich was nothing more than fact-finding proceeding that hadBcommenced on 17[th] March, 2009 and concluded on 5[th] June, 2009; thatthough the inquiry had purportedly commenced on 17[th] March, 2009, thefirst hearing had actually taken place only on 27[th] April, 2009 and theentire proceedings were hurriedly closed within span of thirty-ninedays, by relying on forty-eight documents and forty-three depositions inCthe course of eighteen meetings without affording the appellant adequateopportunity to defend himself and present his case. It was argued thatthough the Committee had acceded to the request of the appellant forextension of time[27] and had granted him time till 12[th] June, 2009, theperiod was abruptly curtailed by almost one month and the date wasadvanced to 14[th] May, 2009, without any justification and unmindful ofDthe appellant’s indisposition, as was conveyed. Only when the appellantwrote to the Committee seeking new date for his further depositionand for conducting further proceedings, did he come to know that theCommittee had concluded its proceeding and submitted its Report on 5[th]June, 2009 itself. It is thus contended that the principles of natural justicehave been grossly violated by the respondents and the appellant hasEbeen deprived of reasonable opportunity of fair trial, before passingthe order of dismissal from service thereby causing him serious prejudice.21. Citing the decision of this Court inUnion of India and Anotherv. Tulsiram Patel28, learned Senior counsel argued that none of thethree clauses to the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the ConstitutionFof India that mandates that no person employed by the Union or theState shall be dismissed or removed from the service except after aninquiry, could have been resorted to by the respondents for having electednot to conduct proper inquiry before proceeding to dismiss the appellant.It was vehemently contended that contrary to the procedure prescribedunder the CCS (CCA) Rules, no proper inquiry was conducted by theGrespondents and no charges were framed by the first Committee till thedate it had submitted its Report[29] and that the Articles of Charge that

26 Order dated 10th May, 2010

27 Vide Letter dated 5th May, 2009

28 (1985) 3 SCC 398

H29 Vide letter dated 5th June, 2009

were framed by the respondents vide Memorandum dated 8[th] September,2009, were subsequently dropped and the inquiry ordered was abandonedin favour of the Report submitted by the first Committee which was onlya fact finding report that could not have been relied on as final inquiry,particularly when it entailed serious consequences. Learned Seniorcounsel cited decision of learned Single Judge of the Delhi HighCourt in Sandeep Khurana v. Delhi Transco Ltd. And Others30 andof Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court in Professor GiridharMadras v. Indian Institute of Science represented by Chairman andOthers31 to urge that the Report of the Committee could not be equatedwith the report of an Inquiry officer, as contemplated in the procedureprescribed in Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules. This non-adherence tothe procedure prescribed has caused grave injustice to the appellant, itbeing serious infraction of the principles of natural justice. Allegationsof bias were also levelled by the appellant against some members of thefirst Committee.

22. Learned counsel further argued that none of the three clausesappended to the second proviso of Article 311(2) of the Constitution ofIndia have been pressed against the appellant to justify the impracticabilityof holding proper inquiry and that failure on the part of the Committeeto follow the procedure as prescribed in the CCS (CCA) Rules itselfvitiates the entire proceedings. In fact, it is the case of the appellant thatat no stage was he informed by the Committee that the proceeding beingconducted by it were disciplinary proceedings and therefore, the reportsubmitted by the said Committee could not have been treated by therespondents as an Inquiry Report under CCS (CCA) Rules.

(b) COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENTS NO. 2 AND 3

23. On the other hand, Ms. Ruchira Gupta, learned counselappearing for the respondents no.2 and 3 strongly refuted the argumentsadvanced on behalf of the appellant. She submitted that the appellanthaving failed to challenge the decision taken by the respondent no.2 –University of dispensing with the inquiry contemplated in theMemorandum dated 8[th] September, 2009 at the appropriate stage, he isprecluded from doing so belatedly. To substantiate this submission, shereferred to the preliminary objections taken by the appellant in his letterdated 18[th] April, 2009 where he had raised five preliminary objections

30 ILR 2006 (11) Del 1313

31 (2019) SCC Online Kar 3508

Arelating to the reconstitution of the Committee and its composition, theprejudice allegedly harboured against him by two members of theCommittee and the fact that he was denied access to the records soughtby him. But the grievance subsequently sought to be raised about thecompetence or jurisdiction of the Committee to conduct the inquiry andthe procedure adopted by it, was never questioned by the appellant.

24. Referring to the correspondence exchanged between theCommittee and the appellant, learned counsel submitted that the appellantwas granted at least three opportunities to submit his reply and eighteenhearings were conducted by the Committee but he did not participate inthe proceedings on several dates. Only after the appellant failed to turnCup and made flimsy excuses of indisposition and repeatedly soughtadjournments, did the Committee proceed ex parte against him andsubmitted its Report to the Registrar on 5[th] June, 2009. It was thus soughtto be argued that the situation would not have changed in any mannerhad another opportunity been afforded to the appellant, as requested byDhim vide letter dated 4[th] June, 2009. In this context, the attention of theCourt was drawn to the proviso to Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules,which enjoins the Complaints Committee to hold an inquiry into thecomplaint of sexual harassment, “as far as practicable”, in accordancewith the procedure laid down in the Rules. The decision of the DivisionBench of the Delhi High Court in Avinash Mishra v. Union of India32Ehas been cited to justify the stand of the respondents that the expression“as far as practicable” itself indicates that the Committee is vestedwith the discretion not to strictly follow the entire procedure as long asthe officer charged has been afforded adequate opportunity to explainhis stand in respect of the complaint and the relevant material has beenFdisclosed to him.

25. Learned counsel for respondents no. 2 and 3 went on to statethat the Committee had afforded adequate opportunities to the appellantto cross-examine the witnesses, produce his witnesses and complete hisown deposition but he kept on delaying the proceedings under one pretextGor the other. Referring to the Report, she stated that it shows that theCommittee had taken note of the detailed reply submitted by the appellanton 25[th] April, 2009 and had dealt with the same at considerable length.Reliance has also been placed on the decisions of this Court in HiraNath Mishra and Others v. Principal, Rajendra Medical College,

Ranchi and Another33 and P.D. Agrawal v. State Bank of India andOthers34 to argue that principles of natural justice is not an inflexibledoctrine and the facts and circumstances of each case have to beexamined to see whether the requirements of natural justice standsatisfied. In the present case, having regard to the sensitivity of thematter where no less than seventeen students of the respondent no. 2 –University had submitted complaints of sexual harassment against theappellant, the Committee exercised its discretion by keeping balanceand conducted the proceedings without violating the principles of naturaljustice, which is amply borne out from perusal of the Report itself.26. Learned counsel also refuted the submission made by theother side that failure on the part of the Committee to frame Articles ofCharge before conducting the inquiry had caused serious prejudice tothe appellant. She submitted that the sum and substance of the complaintswere well known to the appellant from the very beginning and all therelevant depositions of the complainants and other witnesses were dulyfurnished to him. He was afforded ample opportunity to respond to thesaid complaints, cross-examine the witnesses and produce his ownwitnesses in defence. Explaining the decision of the respondent no.2 –University to terminate the subsequently constituted inquiry proceedingsagainst the appellant by virtue of the Memorandum dated 8[th] September,2009, learned counsel alluded to the order dated 26[th] April, 2004, passedby this Court inMedha Kotwal’s case (supra), which had clarified thatthe Complaints Committee as contemplated inVishaka and Others v.State of Rajasthan and Others35, will be the Inquiry Authority for thepurposes of the CCS (CCA) Rules and the report of the said Committeewill be deemed to be an Inquiry Report on which the Disciplinary Authorityshall act in accordance with the Rules. It was submitted that the EC hadmade bona fide error by appointing an Inquiry Authority to inquireinto the charges framed against the appellant and the said decision torecall the order dated 15[th] October, 2009 was duly communicated to theappellant on 15[th] December, 2009. Only thereafter, did the EC issue afresh Memorandum[36] to the appellant calling upon him to submit hisrepresentation on the decision to accept the Report submitted by theCommittee and impose on him, major penalty of dismissal from service.

33 (1973) 1 SCC 805

34 (2006) 8 SCC 776

35 (1997) 6 SCC 241

36 dated 17th February, 2010

A27. It was thus submitted that no prejudice was caused to theappellant and the Committee had observed the principles of natural justice“as far as was practical”, in the given facts and circumstances of thecase. Adequate opportunity was afforded to the appellant not just by theCommittee, but also by the Disciplinary Authority and the AppellateAuthority before taking any action against him. Therefore, this was notBa case of “no opportunity” or “no hearing” but case of “adequateopportunity” and “fair hearing” afforded to the appellant before imposinga major penalty of dismissal from service on him, as specified in Section11 (9) of the CCS (CCA) Rules.

F. THE TRIAD : ARTICLES 309, 310 AND 311 OF THECCONSTITUTION OF INDIA

28. Services under the Union and the States are governed underPart XIV of the Constitution. Article 309 of the Constitution that providesfor recruitment and conditions of service of persons serving the Unionor State, Article 310 that refers to the tenure of office of personsDserving the Union or State and Article 311 that deals with dismissal,removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacitiesunder the Union or State are inter-linked and “form an integrated whole,there being an organic and thematic

unity running through them”[37].E(a) ARTICLE 309: CONDITIONS OF SERVICE

29. Article 309 does not by itself provide for recruitment orconditions of service of Government servants, but confers this power onthe appropriate legislature to make the laws and on the President andthe Government of State to make rules relating to these matters. TheFexpression “conditions of service” in Article 309 takes in its sweep allthose conditions that regulate holding of post by person which beginsfrom the time he enters the service till his retirement and even post-retirement, in relation to matters like pension, pending disciplinaryproceedings, etc. This expression also includes the right to dismiss sucha person from service[38]. Statute can be enacted by the appropriateGLegislature or Rules can be made by the appropriate Executive underArticle 309 for prescribing the procedure and the authority who caninitiate disciplinary action against Government servant[39]. It has further

37 Union of India and Another v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398

38 State of Madhya Pradesh and Others v. Shardul Singh, (1970) 1 SCC 108

H39 Bk. Sardari Lal v. Union of India and Others, (1971) 1 SCC 411

been held that any Act or Rule that violates the rights guaranteed to agovernment servant under Article 311, would be void[40]. Similarly, suchan Act or Rule would be treated as void if it violates any of thefundamental rights guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution.

(b) ARTICLE 310: DOCTRINE OF PLEASURE

30. Article 310 embodies the “Doctrine of Pleasure” and in thecontext of Government servants, relates to their tenure of service. Article310(1) makes the tenure of Government servants subject to the pleasureof the President or the Governor of State except as expressly providedfor by the Constitution. This Article is analogous to the rights of theCrown in England where all public officers and servants of the Crownare appointed at the pleasure of the Crown and their services can beterminated at will, without assigning any cause[41]. That is the reason whythe tenure of the Government servant is subject to the pleasure of thePresident or the Governor of State, except as expressly provided forunder the Constitution. All members of such services who receive theirstipend from the public exchequer, whether at the top of the hierarchy orat the very bottom, are finally answerable to the public and expected todischarge their duties responsibly, efficiently, effectively and above all,for the higher good of the public. It can, therefore, be seen that thoughthe origin of Government servants may be contractual, once appointedto the post or office, they acquire status and their rights and obligationsare no longer determined by the consent of both the parties, but aregoverned by the Statute or Statutory Rules[42].

(c) ARTICLE 311 : MANIFESTATION OF THEPRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

31. This Court has held that in matters of dismissal, removal orreduction in rank of public servants, Article 311 of the Constitution is amanifestation of the essential principles of natural justice. It imposes aduty on the Government to ensure that any such decision against thepublic servant is preceded by an inquiry that contemplates an opportunityof hearing to be granted to the public servant, who is also entitled tomake representation against such decision[43]. Article 311 reads asunder :

40 Moti Ram Deka v. The General Manager, North East Frontier Railway, (1964) 5SCR 683

41 Union of India and Another v. Tulsi Ram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398

42 Roshan Lal Tandon v. Union of India, (1968) 1 SCR 185

43 Nisha Priya Bhatia v. Union of India and Another, (2020) 13 SCC 56

“311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of personsemployed in civil capacities under the Union or State.—(1)No person who is member of civil service of the Union or anall India service or civil service of State or holds civil postunder the Union or State shall be dismissed or removed by anauthority subordinate to that by which he was appointed.

(2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed orremoved or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which hehas been informed of the charges against him and given areasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges:

Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry, toimpose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposedon the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and itshall not be necessary to give such person any opportunity ofmaking representation on the penalty proposed:

Provided further that this clause shall not apply—

(a) where person is dismissed or removed or reduced inrank on the ground of conduct which has led to his convictionon criminal charge; or

(b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove aperson or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for somereason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is notreasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or

(c) where the President or the Governor, as the case maybe, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of theState it is not expedient to hold such inquiry.

(3) If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, question ariseswhether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as isreferred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authorityempowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him inGrank shall be final.”

32. To provide sense of security of tenure to Governmentservants, the Framers of the Constitution have incorporated safeguardsin respect of the punishment or dismissal or removal or reduction in theirrank as provided for in Clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311. At the sametime, being mindful of the very same public interest and public good

which does not permit that Government servants found to be corrupt,dishonest or inefficient be continued in service, remedy is providedunder the second proviso to Clause (2) of Article 311 whereunder theirservices can be dispensed with, without conducting disciplinary inquiry.

33. Thus, the golden thread that weaves through Articles 309, 310and 311 is public interest, directed towards larger public good. Together,they form triad and symbolize the overarching Doctrine of Public Policy.

G. ARTICLE 14 : BEDROCK OF THE PRINCIPLES OFNATURAL JUSTICE

34. Principles of natural justice that are reflected in Article 311,are not an empty incantation. They form the very bedrock of Article 14and any violation of these principles tantamounts to violation of Article14 of the Constitution. Denial of the principles of natural justice to apublic servant can invalidate decision taken on the ground that it is hitby the vice of arbitrariness and would result in depriving public servantof equal protection of law.

35. Article 14, often described as the ‘Constitutional Guardian’ ofthe principles of natural justice, expressly forbids the State, as defined inArticle 12, from denying to any person, equality before the law or equalprotection of the laws. Article 14 provides an express guarantee of equalitybefore the law to all persons and extends protection to them againstdiscrimination by any law. Article 13(3)(a) defines law to include anyordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usageshaving in the territory of India, the force of law. Thus, principles ofnatural justice guaranteed under Article 14, prohibit decision-makingadjudicatory authority from taking any arbitrary action, be it substantiveor procedural in nature. These principles of natural justice, that are anatural law, have evolved over period of time and been continuouslyrefined through the process of expansive judicial interpretation.

H. THE TWIN ANCHORS : NEMO JUDEX IN CAUSASUA AND AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM

36. The twin anchors on which the principles of natural justicerest in the judicial process, whether quasi-judicial or administrative innature, are Nemo Judex In Causa Sua, i.e., no person shall be judgein his own cause as justice should not only be done, but should manifestlybe seen to be done and Audi Alteram Partem, i.e. person affected by

Aa judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative action must be afforded anopportunity of hearing before any decision is taken.

37. How deeply have Courts internalised and incorporated theprinciples of natural justice into the Constitution can be perceived fromthe seven Judge Bench decision in the case of Maneka Gandhi v.BUnion of India and Another44. In this case, where challenge was laidto the order of impounding the passport of the appellant, which wassilent on the reasons for such an action and the respondent–State haddeclined to furnish the reason therefor, it was held that life and liberty ofa person cannot be restricted by any procedure that is established bylaw, but only by procedure that is just, fair and reasonable. Quoting theCaudi alteram partem rule and equating it with “fair play in action”,Justice P.N. Bhagwati (as he then was) had authored the judgment forthe majority and had observed that:

“14. ……The audi alteram partem rule is not cast in rigidmould and judicial decisions establish that it may suffer situationalDmodifications. The core of it must, however, remain, namely, thatthe person affected must have reasonable opportunity of beingheard and the hearing must be genuine hearing and not an emptypublic relations exercise. That is why Tucker, L.J., emphasised inRussel v. Duke of Norfolk[45] that “whatever standard of naturalEjustice is adopted, one essential is that the person concerned shouldhave reasonable opportunity of presenting his case”. Whatopportunity may be regarded as reasonable would necessarilydepend on the practical necessities of the situation. It may be asophisticated full-fledged hearing or it may be hearing which isvery brief and minimal : it may be hearing prior to the decisionFor it may even be post-decisional remedial hearing. The audialteram partem rule is sufficiently flexible to permit modificationsand variations to suit the exigencies of myriad kinds of situationswhich may arise……….”

38. In the captioned case, citing the judgment of ConstitutionGBench of this Court in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India46,wherein it was held that fundamental rights are not water tightcompartment, the Court observed as under:-

44 (1978) 1 SCC 24845 1949 1 ALL ER 109H46 (1970) 1 SCC 248

“The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well asphilosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Article 14 like brooding omnipresenceand the procedure contemplated by Article 21 must answer thetest of reasonableness in order to be in conformity with Article14”

The emphasis was on the Court‘s attempt to expand the reachand ambit of the fundamental rights guaranteed in the Constitution ratherthan attenuate their meaning and content by process of judicialconstruction. Relying on the minority judgment rendered by Justice FazalAli in the case of A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras47, this Court wenton to hold inManeka Gandhi’s case(supra) that the procedure requiredto be prescribed under Article 21 must include four essentials namely,notice, opportunity to be heard, impartial tribunal and ordinary course ofprocedure. It was observed that even on principle, having regard to theimpact of Article 14 on Article 21, the concept of reasonableness mustbe projected in the procedure contemplated by Article 21.

39. In Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor

Congress and Others48, five-Judge Bench of this Court highlightedhow essential it is to afford reasonable opportunity to an employee toput forth his case in domestic inquiry and the requirement of an employerto comply with the principles of natural justice and fair play, in thefollowing words :

“202. ……It is now well settled that the ‘audi alteram partem’rule which in essence, enforces the equality clause in Article 14of the Constitution is applicable not only to quasi-judicial ordersbut to administrative orders affecting prejudicially the party-in-question unless the application of the rule has been expresslyexcluded by the Act or Regulation or Rule which is not the casehere. Rules of natural justice do not supplant but supplementthe Rules and Regulations. Moreover, the Rule of Lawwhich permeates our Constitution demands that it has tobe observed both substantially and procedurally.…... Ruleof law posits that the power is to be exercised in mannerwhich is just, fair and reasonable and not in an unreasonable,

47 1950 SCC 228

48 (1991) Supp (1) SCC 600

capricious or arbitrary manner leaving room fordiscrimination…...

[emphasis added]

xxx xxx xxx

316. Thus it could be held that Article 14 read with Article 16(1)accords right to an equality or an equal treatment consistent withthe principles of natural justice. Any law made or action taken bythe employer, corporate statutory or instrumentality under Article12 must act fairly, justly and reasonably. Right to fair treatment isan essential inbuilt of natural justice. Exercise of unbridled anduncanalised discretionary power impinges upon the right of thecitizen; vesting of discretion is no wrong provided it is exercisedpurposively judiciously and without prejudice. Wider the discretion,the greater the chances of abuse. Absolute discretion is destructiveof freedom than of man’s other inventions. Absolute discretionmarks the beginning of the end of the liberty. The conferment ofabsolute power to dismiss permanent employee isantithesis to justness or fair treatment. The exercise ofdiscretionary power wide off the mark would breed arbitrary,unreasonable or unfair actions and would not be consistentwith reason and justice. The provisions of statute,regulations or rules that empower an employer or themanagement to dismiss, remove or reduce in rank of anemployee, must be consistent with just, reasonable and fairprocedure. It would, further, be held that right to publicemployment which includes right to continued publicemployment till the employee is superannuated as per rulesor compulsorily retired or duly terminated in accordancewith the procedure established by law is an integral part ofright to livelihood which in turn is an integral facet of rightto life assured by Article 21 of the Constitution. Anyprocedure prescribed to deprive such right to livelihood orcontinued employment must be just, fair and reasonable procedure.In other words an employee in public employment also must notbe arbitrarily, unjustly and unreasonably be deprived of his/herlivelihood which is ensured in continued employment till it isterminated in accordance with just, fair and reasonable procedure.Otherwise any law or rule in violation thereof is void.”

[emphasis added]

40. The significant role played by procedural fairness in thebackdrop of internalising the principles of natural justice into theConstitution cannot be overstated. This aspect has been highlighted by aDivision Bench of this Court of which one of us, [Hima Kohli, J], was amember, in Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India &49Others. Speaking for the Bench, Chief Justice D. Y. Chandrachudstated :

“53. The judgment of this Court in Maneka Gandhi (supra)spearheaded two doctrinal shifts on procedural fairness becauseof the constitutionalising of natural justice. Firstly, proceduralfairness was no longer viewed merely as means to secure justoutcome but requirement that holds an inherent value in itself.In view of this shift, the Courts are now precluded from solelyassessing procedural infringements based on whether theprocedure would have prejudiced the outcome of the case.Instead, the courts would have to decide if the procedurethat was followed infringed upon the right to fair andreasonable procedure, independent of the outcome. Incompliance with this line of thought, the courts have read theprinciples of natural justice into an enactment to save it from beingdeclared unconstitutional on procedural grounds. Secondly, naturaljustice principles breathe reasonableness into the procedure.Responding to the argument that the principles of natural justiceare not static but are capable of being moulded to thecircumstances, it was held that the core of natural justiceguarantees reasonable procedure which is constitutionalrequirement entrenched in Articles 14, 19 and 21. The facet ofaudi alterum partem encompasses the components ofnotice, contents of the notice, reports of inquiry, andmaterials that are available for perusal. While situationalmodifications are permissible, the rules of natural justicecannot be modified to suit the needs of the situation to suchan extent that the core of the principle is abrogated becauseit is the core that infuses procedural reasonableness. Theburden is on the applicant to prove that the procedure that wasfollowed (or not followed) by the adjudicating authority, in effect,infringes upon the core of the right to fair and reasonable hearing.”

- [emphasis supplied]

DEF

802SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2023] 7 S.C.R.

A41. In A.K. Kraipak and Others v. Union of India and Others50quoting with approval the judgmentIn re:H.K. (All Infant)51, this Courtheld that :

“20. The aim of the rules of natural justice is to secure justice orto put it negatively to prevent miscarriage of justice. These rulesBcan operate only in areas not covered by any law validly made. Inother words they do not supplant the law of the land but supplementit. The concept of natural justice has undergone great deal ofchange in recent years. In the past it was thought that it includedjust two rules nameny: (1) no one shall be judge in his own case(Nemo debet esse judex propria causa) and (2) no decisionCshall be given against party without affording him reasonablehearing (audi alteram partem). Very soon thereafter third rulewas envisaged and that is that quasi-judicial enquiries must beheld in good faith, without bias and not arbitrarily or unreasonably.But in the course of years many more subsidiary rules came to beDadded to the rules of natural justice. Till very recently it was theopinion of the courts that unless the authority concerned wasrequired by the law under which it functioned to act judiciallythere was no room for the application of the rules of natural justice.The validity of that limitation is now questioned. If the purposeof the rules of natural justice is to prevent miscarriage of

justice one fails to see why those rules should be madeinapplicable to administrative enquiries. Often times it isnot easy to draw the line that demarcates administrativeenquiries from quasi-judicial enquiries. Enquiries whichwere considered administrative at one time are now beingFconsidered as quasi-judicial in character. Arriving at justdecision is the aim of both quasi- judicial enquiries as wellas administrative enquiries. An unjust decision in anadministrative inquiry may have more far reaching effectthan decision in quasi- judicial inquiry……….”

- [Emphasis supplied]

I. FAIR ACTION AND IMPARTIALITY IN SERVICEJURISPRUDENCE:

50 (1969) 2 SCC 262

51 (1967) 1 All ER 226

42. In the context of service law, it is, therefore mandatory toafford Government servant or an employee, reasonable opportunityof being heard before an order is passed. InMangilal v. State of M.P.[52],this Court declared that even if Statute is silent and there are no positivewords in the Act or the Rules made thereunder, principles of naturaljustice must be observed. This is what the Court has held:

“10….Where the statute is silent about the observance of theprinciples of natural justice, such statutory silence is taken to implycompliance with the principles of natural justice where substantialrights of parties are considerably affected. The application ofnatural justice becomes presumptive, unless found excluded byexpress words of statute or necessary intendment. (See SwadeshiCotton Mills v. Union of India53) Its aim is to secure justice orto prevent miscarriage of justice. Principles of natural justice donot supplant the law, but supplement it. These rules operate onlyin areas not covered by any law validly made. They are meansto an end and not an end in themselves…..”

43. In Tulsiram Patel’s case (supra), observing that violation ofthe rules of natural justice would result in arbitrariness which wouldamount to discrimination, the Constitution Bench made the followingobservations :

“95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to berecognized as being part of the guarantee contained inArticle 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretationgiven by this Court to the concept of equality which is thesubject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runsthus: violation of rule of natural justice results in arbitrarinesswhich is the same as discrimination; where discrimination is theresult of State action, it is violation of Article 14: therefore, aviolation of principle of natural justice by State action is aviolation of Article 14. Article 14, however, is not the sole repositoryof the principles of natural justice. What it does is to guaranteethat any law or State action violating them will be struck down.The principles of natural justice, however, apply not onlyto legislation and State action but also where any tribunal,authority or body of men, not coming within the definition

52 (2004) 2 SCC 447

53 (1981) 1 SCC 664

of State in Article 12, is charged with the duty of deciding amatter. In such case, the principles of natural justicerequire that it must decide such matter fairly and impartially.

96. The rule of natural justice with which we are concernedin these appeals and writ petitions, namely, the audi alteramBpartem rule, in its fullest amplitude means that personagainst whom an order to his prejudice may be passedshould be informed of the allegations and charges againsthim, be given an opportunity of submitting his explanationthereto, have the right to know the evidence, both oral ordocumentary, by which the matter is proposed to be decidedCagainst him, and to inspect the documents which are reliedupon for the purpose of being used against him, to havethe witnesses who are to give evidence against himexamined in his presence and have the right to cross-examine them, and to lead his own evidence, both oral andDdocumentary, in his defence. The process of fair hearingneed not, however, conform to the judicial process in Court oflaw, because judicial adjudication of causes involves number oftechnical rules of procedure and evidence which are unnecessaryand not required for the purpose of fair hearing within themeaning of audi alteram partem rule in quasi-judicial orEadministrative inquiry. If we look at clause (2) of Article 311 inthe light of what is stated above, it will be apparent that that clauseis merely an express statement of the audi alteram partem rulewhich is implicitly made part of the guarantee contained in Article14 as result of the interpretation placed upon that article byFrecent decisions of this Court. Clause (2) of Article 311 requiresthat before government servant is dismissed, removedor reduced in rank, an inquiry must be held in which he isinformed of the charges against him and given reasonableopportunity of being heard in respect of those charges…….”

- [emphasis supplied]

At the same time, note of caution was added in the captionedcase and the Court observed that the rules of natural justice are neitherstatutory rules nor are they cast in stone. They are flexible and can beadapted and modified by statutes, depending on the exigencies of different

situations, the facts and circumstances of the case and the frameworkof the law[54].

44. In Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India55, in hisdissenting judgment, Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy, had made the followingpertinent observations :-

“106. The principles of natural justice have taken deep root in thejudicial conscience of our people, nurtured by Dr. Binapani[56], A.K. Kraipak[57], Mohinder Singh Gill[58], ManekaGandhi[59]. They are now considered so fundamental as to be“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and, therefore, implicitin every decision-making function, call it judicial, quasi-judicial oradministrative. Where authority functions under statute andthe statute provides for the observance of the principles ofnatural justice in particular manner, natural justice willhave to be observed in that manner and in no other. Nowider right than that provided by statute can be claimednor can the right be narrowed. Where the statute is silentabout the observance of the principles of natural justice,such statutory silence is taken to imply compliance withthe principles of natural justice. The implication of naturaljustice being presumptive it may be excluded by express words ofstatute or by necessary intendment. Where the conflict is betweenthe public interest and the private interest, the presumption mustnecessarily be weak and may, therefore, be readily displaced……”

- [emphasis supplied]

45. Thus, ordinarily, courts interpret statutory provisions in syncwith the aforesaid principles of natural justice on premise that nostatutory authority would violate the fundamental rights enshrined in theConstitution. When it comes to authorities that are expected to dischargejudicial and quasi-judicial functions, the rule of audi alteram partemapplies with equal force. Reasonableness infuses lifeblood in procedural

54 Also refer : A.K.Kraipak and others v. Union of India and Others, (1969) 2 SCC262 and Union of India v. Col. J.N. Sinha and Another, (1970) 2 SCC 45855 (1981) 1 SCC 66456 AIR 1967 SC 126957 (1969) 2 SCC 26258 (1978) 1 SCC 40559 (1978) 1 SCC 248

Amatters, be it elements of the notice, the contents of the notice, thescope of inquiry, the material available or an adequate opportunity torebut such material. All of this is to avoid miscarriage of justice at anystage. This is of course fluid and subject to adapting to the demands of asituation in the given facts of case.

BJ. THE STATUTORY REGIME

(a) GOA UNIVERSITY STATUTE

46. In the above background, we may now proceed to examinethe relevant Rules that govern the conditions of service of the appellantherein. The Statutory regime in respect of teachers employed in theCrespondent no. 2 – University is governed by the Goa University StatuteSSB-1 (XXVI). SC-6(i) of the Statute contemplates as follows–

“For disciplinary and departmental action, the teachers shall begoverned under the CCS (CCA) Rules, 1965, Fundamental Rulesand Supplementary Rules as applicable to the employees of theDGoa Government”.

(b) CCS (CCA) RULES :

47. The CCS (CCA) Rules mentioned above, have been enactedby the President of India in exercise of the powers conferred by theproviso to Article 309 and Clause 5 of Article 148 of the Constitution ofEIndia. Part VI of the CCS (CCA) Rules lays down the procedures forimposing penalties. Rule 3(C) has been incorporated in the CCS (CCA)Rules vide GSR 49 dated 7[th] March, 1998 and subsequently, vide GSR823 (E) dated 19[th] November, 2014. The said provision states as follows:-

“3C. Prohibition of sexual harassment of working womenF

(1) No Government servant shall indulge in any act of sexualharassment of any women at any work place.

(2) Every Government servant who is incharge of work placeshall take appropriate steps to prevent sexual harassment to anywoman at the work place.

Explanation – (1) For the purpose of this rule –

(a) “sexual harassment” includes any one or more of the followingacts or behaviour (whether directly or by implication), namely –

(i) physical contact and advances; or

(ii) demand or request for sexual favours; or

(iii) making sexually coloured remarks; or

(iv) showing pornography; or

(v) any other unwelcome physical, verbal or non-verbal conductof sexual nature.”

(c) PRAGMATIC APPLICATION OF THE “AS FAR ASIS PRACTICABLE” RULE

48. Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules stipulates the procedure forimposing major penalties and is extracted below :

“14. Procedure for imposing major penalties

(1)No order imposing any of the penalties specified in clauses(v) to (ix) of Rule 11 shall be made except after an inquiryheld, as far as may be, in the manner provided in this ruleand rule 15, or in the manner provided by the Public Servants(Inquiries) Act, 1850 (37 of 1850), where such inquiry isheld under that Act.

(2)Whenever the disciplinary authority is of the opinion thatthere are grounds for inquiring into the truth of any imputationof misconduct or misbehaviour against Governmentservant, it may itself inquire into, or appoint under this ruleor under the provisions of the Public Servants (Inquiries)Act, 1850, as the case may be, an authority to inquire intothe truth thereof.

Provided that where there is complaint of sexualharassment within the meaning of rule 3 of theCentral Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964, theComplaints Committee established in each Ministryor Department or Office for inquiring into suchcomplaints, shall be deemed- to be the inquiringauthority appointed by the disciplinary authority forthe purpose of these rules and the ComplaintsCommittee shall hold, if separate procedure has notbeen prescribed for the Complaints Committee forholding the inquiry into the complaints of sexualharassment, the inquiry as far as practicable in

EFG

808SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aaccordance with the procedure laid down in theserules.”

- [emphasis supplied]

49. As can be seen from the above, when the misconduct relatesto complaint of sexual harassment at the work place, the ComplaintsBCommittee constituted by the respondent no.2-University to examinesuch complaint, dons the mantle of the inquiring authority and isexpected to conduct an inquiry in accordance with the procedureprescribed in the rules, as far as may be practicable. The use of theexpression “as far as is practicable” indicates play in the joints availableCto the Complaints Committee to adopt fair procedure that is feasibleand elastic for conducting an inquiry in sensitive matter like sexualharassment at the workplace, without compromising on the principles ofnatural justice. Needless to state that the fact situation in each case willvary and therefore no set standards or yardstick can be laid down forconducting the inquiry in complaints of this nature. However, havingDregard to the serious ramifications with which the delinquent employeemay be visited at the end of the inquiry, any discordant note orunreasonable deviation from the settled procedures required to befollowed, would however strike at the core of the principles of naturaljustice, notwithstanding the final outcome.

E“”K. JOURNEY FROM VISHAKA CASE TO THE PoSHACT

(a) VISHAKA GUIDELINES : FILLING IN THEVACUUM:

F48. The occasion to amend Rule 14 (2) of the CCS (CCA) Rulesand append proviso thereto was direct consequence of judicialintervention by this Court in the case of Vishaka(supra), where thepowers vested under Article 32 of the Constitution of India were exercisedby three-Judge Bench to enforce the fundamental rights of women to“gender equality and right to life and liberty”, bestowed under ArticlesG14, 15, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution of India. Treating set of writpetitions filed by some social activists and NGOs, who were agitatingthe brutal gang rape of social worker in village of Rajasthan as aclass action, this Court worked towards filling in the vacuum in the existinglegislation. Noting the absence of any Statute enacted to provide foreffective enforcement of the basic human right of gender equality andHguarantee against sexual abuse, particularly against sexual harassmentat work places, the Court drew strength from several provisions of theConstitution of India including Article 15[60], Article 42[61] and Article51(A)[62] and with the aid of the relevant International Conventions andnorms including the General Recommendations of the CEDAW[63] thathad passed Resolution on 25[th] June, 1993, resolving that an effectivecomplaint mechanism be put in place to address sexual harassment inthe work place, laid down set of Guidelines and norms with directionthat they would be strictly adhered to at all work places and shall bebinding and enforceable in law till the vacuum was filled and legislationwas enacted to occupy the field. The Guidelines directed creation of acomplaints mechanism to ensure time bound treatment of complaints,constitution of Complaints Committee and recommended, disciplinaryaction where such conduct amounted to misconduct in employment ‘asdefined by the relevant service rules’. The momentous judgment inVishaka’s case(supra) was delivered on 13[th] August,1997 and theGuidelines declared by the Court continued to hold the field till the SexualHarassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition andRedressal) Act, 2013[64] was enacted on 22[nd] April, 2013.

(b) MEDHA KOTWAL LELE’S CASE : FOLLOW UPTHROUGH CONTINUING MANDAMUS :

49. AfterVishaka’s case (supra), came the case ofMedha KotwalLele and Others v. Union of India and Others65 (supra) where agrievance was raised by several petitioners that the ComplaintsCommittees directed to be constituted in terms of the Guidelines laiddown by this Court, had not been established to deal with cases of sexualharassment. Treating the said petition as Public Interest Litigation,notices were issued to several parties including the Union of India andthe State Governments and the following directions were issued :

60 Article 15: The State shall not discriminate against any citizen on grounds ofreligion, race, caste, sex, place of birth of any of them.

61 Article 42: The State shall make provisions for securing just and humaneconditions of work and for maternity relief.

62 Article 51(A): (e) ……. It shall be the duty of every citizen of India to, amongstothers, renounce practices derogatory to the dignity of women.

63 The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination AgainstWomen

64 For short ‘PoSH Act’

65 (2013) 1 SCC 311

ABC

A“2……”Complaints Committee as envisaged by the Supreme Courtin its judgment in Vishaka case SCC at para 53, will be deemedto be an inquiry authority for the purposes of the Central CivilServices (Conduct) Rules, 1964 (hereinafter called the CCS Rules)and the report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed tobe an inquiry report under the CCS Rules. Thereafter theBdisciplinary authority will act on the report in accordance with theRules.”

similar amendment was also directed to be carried out in theIndustrial Employment (Standing Orders) Rules.

C50. On 17[th] January, 2006, in the very same case ofMedha KotwalLele66, noting that there was no information available regardingimplementation of the directions issued in Vishaka’s case(supra), thisCourt issued the following directions :

“2. It is not known whether the committees as suggestedDin Vishaka case have been constituted in all the departments/institutions having members of staff of 50 and above and in mostof the district-level offices in all the States, members of the staffworking in some offices would be more than 50. It is not knownwhether the committees as envisaged in Vishaka case have beenconstituted in all these offices. The number of complaints receivedEand the steps taken in these complaints are also not available. Wefind it necessary to give some more directions in this regard:2.1. We find that in order to coordinate the steps taken in thisregard, there should be State-level officer i.e. either the Secretaryof the Women and Child Welfare Department or any other suitableFofficer who is in charge and concerned with the welfare of womenand children in each State. The Chief Secretaries of each Stateshall see that an officer is appointed as nodal agent to collectthe details and to give suitable directions whenever necessary.

2.2. As regards factories, shops and commercial establishmentsGare concerned, the directions are not fully complied with. TheLabour Commissioner of each State shall take steps in thatdirection. They shall work as nodal agency as regards shops,factories and commercial establishments are concerned. They

shall also collect the details regarding the complaints and also seethat the required committee is established in such institutions.”

51. Exercising its powers of writ of continuing mandamus, theaforesaid petition was again taken up after the passage of over six years,on 19[th] October, 2012[67] when this Court examined the affidavits filed byeach State Government to satisfy itself on the compliance of theGuidelines laid down in Vishaka’s case(supra). On examining theposition regarding amendments required to be carried out in theCCS(CCA) Rules and the Standing Orders as also the establishmentand composition of the Complaints Committees, the Court noted withgreat dismay that several State Governments had failed to makecompliances. Extracted below are the observations made in this regard:

“43. As the largest democracy in the world, we have to combatviolence against women. We are of the considered view that theexisting laws, if necessary, be revised and appropriate new lawsbe enacted by Parliament and the State Legislatures to protectwomen from any form of indecency, indignity and disrespect atall places (in their homes as well as outside), prevent all forms ofviolence—domestic violence, sexual assault, sexual harassmentat the workplace, etc.—and provide new initiatives for educationand advancement of women and girls in all spheres of life. Afterall they have limitless potential. Lip service, hollow statementsand inert and inadequate laws with sloppy enforcement are notenough for true and genuine upliftment of our half most preciouspopulation—the women.

44. In what we have discussed above, we are of the consideredview that guidelines in Vishaka should not remain symbolic andthe following further directions are necessary until legislativeenactment on the subject is in place:

44.1. The States and Union Territories which have not yet carriedout adequate and appropriate amendments in their respective CivilServices Conduct Rules (by whatever name these Rules arecalled) shall do so within two months from today by providing thatthe report of the Complaints Committee shall be deemed to be aninquiry report in disciplinary action under such Civil ServicesConduct Rules. In other words, the disciplinary authority shall

treat the report/findings, etc. of the Complaints Committee as thefindings in disciplinary inquiry against the delinquent employeeand shall act on such report accordingly. The findings and thereport of the Complaints Committee shall not be treated as merepreliminary investigation or inquiry leading to disciplinary actionbut shall be treated as finding/report in an inquiry into themisconduct of the delinquent.

44.2. The States and Union Territories which have not carriedout amendments in the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders)Rules shall now carry out amendments on the same lines, as notedabove in para 44.1 within two months.

44.3. The States and Union Territories shall form adequate numberof Complaints Committees so as to ensure that they function attaluka level, district level and State level. Those States and/orUnion Territories which have formed only one committee for theentire State shall now form adequate number of ComplaintsCommittees within two months from today. Each of suchComplaints Committees shall be headed by woman and as faras possible in such committees an independent member shall beassociated.

44.4. The State functionaries and private and public sectorEundertakings/organisations/ bodies/institutions, etc. shall put in placesufficient mechanism to ensure full implementation of Vishakaguidelines and further provide that if the alleged harasser is foundguilty, the complainant victim is not forced to work with/undersuch harasser and where appropriate and possible the allegedFharasser should be transferred. Further provision should be madethat harassment and intimidation of witnesses and the complainantsshall be met with severe disciplinary action.

44.5. The Bar Council of India shall ensure that all Bar Associationsin the country and persons registered with the State Bar Councilsfollow Vishaka guidelines. Similarly, the Medical Council of India,Council of Architecture, Institute of Chartered Accountants,Institute of Company Secretaries and other statutory institutesshall ensure that the organisations, bodies, associations, institutionsand persons registered/affiliated with them follow the guidelineslaid down by Vishaka. To achieve this, necessary instructions/

circulars shall be issued by all the statutory bodies such as theBar Council of India, Medical Council of India, Council ofArchitecture, Institute of Company Secretaries within two monthsfrom today. On receipt of any complaint of sexual harassment atany of the places referred to above the same shall be dealt withby the statutory bodies in accordance with Vishaka and Othersv. State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241, guidelinesand the guidelines in the present order.”

(c) ENACTMENT OF THE PoSH ACT AND RULES:

52. After the passage of fifteen years from the date of the verdictdelivered in Vishaka’s case (supra), the PoSH Act, was legislated on22[nd] April, 2013 and finally notified on 9[th] December, 2013. The Act laysdown comprehensive mechanism for constitution of Internal ComplaintsCommittee, Local Committee and Internal Committees, the manner ofconducting an inquiry into complaint received, duties of an employer,duties and powers of the District Officer and others, penalties for non-compliance of the provisions of the Act, etc. Accompanying the Act arethe Rules, 2013[68] that have been framed in exercise of powers conferredunder Section 29 of the PoSH Act and amongst others, lays down themanner in which an inquiry into complaint of sexual harassment oughtto be conducted (Rule 7), the interim reliefs that can be extended to theaggrieved women during the pendency of the inquiry (Rule 8), the mannerof taking action for sexual harassment (Rule 9) etc. It is noteworthy thatsub-rule (3) of Rule 7 provides that the respondent shall file his reply tothe complaint within stipulated time along with the relevant documentsand give details of the witnesses and sub-rule (4) stipulates that theComplaints Committee shall make an inquiry into the complaints “inaccordance with the principles of natural justice”.

(d) BREATHING REASONABLENESS INTO THEPROCEDURAL REGIME:

53. Thus, it can be seen that the journey from Vishaka’s case(supra) that acted as springboard and sowed the seeds of futurelegislation by structuring Guidelines to deal with cases of sexualharassment, blossomed into comprehensive legislation with theenactment of the PoSH Act and Rules. At the same time, however,

68 The Sexual Harassment of Women at Work Pace (Prevention, Prohibition andRedressal) Act, 2013

Awomen centric the Guidelines and the Act may have been, they bothrecognize the fact that any inquiry into complaint of sexual harassmentat the workplace must be in accordance with the relevant rules and inline with the principles of natural justice. The cardinal principle requiredto be borne in mind is that the person accused of misconduct must beinformed of the case, must be supplied the evidence in support thereofBand be given reasonable opportunity to present his version before anyadverse decision is taken. Similarly, the concerned employer is alsoexpected to act fairly and adopt procedure that is just, fair andreasonable. The whole purpose is to breathe reasonableness into theprocedural regime. But, the test of reasonableness cannot be abstract.CIt has to be pragmatic and grounded in the realities of the facts andcircumstances of case. When conducting an inquiry, it is the duty ofthe Inquiring Authority to proceed in manner that is visibly free fromthe taint of arbitrariness, unreasonableness or unfairness. An inquirythat can culminate into imposition of major penalty like termination ofservice of an employee, must doubly conform to just, fair and reasonableDprocedure. Any displacement of the principles of natural justice can onlybe in exceptional circumstances, as contemplated in the proviso to Article311(2) of the Constitution of India and not otherwise. Wherever therules are silent, principles of natural justice must be read into them and ahearing be afforded to the person who is proposed to be punished with aEmajor penalty[69].54. The four predominant purposes sought to be achieved byreading the principles of natural justice into law and into the conduct ofjudicial and administrative proceedings to achieve the underlying objectof securing fairness have been concisely expressed by this Court as anFassurance of fair outcome by following the procedural Rules, anassurance of equality in the proceedings, legitimacy of the decision anddecision- making authority thereby preserving the integrity of the systemand finally, with the idea of preserving the dignity of individuals wherecitizens are treated with respect and the dignity they deserve in societygoverned by the Rule of Law[70].GL. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION:

55. In the present case, the incidents in question relate to the

69 State Bank of India and Others v. Ranjit Kumar Chakraborty and Another, (2018)12 SCC 807

70 Madhyamam Broadcasting Limited v. Union of India decided on 5th April 2023

period when the Vishaka Guidelineswere in place and it had beenclarified inMedha Kotwal Lele (supra) that the Complaints Committeewill be deemed to be an inquiry authority for the purposes of the CCSRules. Keeping this in mind, we may now proceed to ascertain as towhether the procedure adopted by the respondents No. 2 and 3 hereinviolated the principles of natural justice and thereby caused prejudice tothe appellant, as has been alleged, for this Court to interfere in theimpugned judgment.

(a) SCOPE OF INTERFERENCE BY THE HIGH COURTIN JUDICIAL REVIEW:

56. It may be clarified at the outset that to satisfy itself that noinjustice has been meted out to the appellant, the High Court was requiredto examine the decision-making process and not just the final outcome.In other words, in exercise of powers of judicial review, the High Courtdoes not sit as an Appellate Authority over the factual findings recordedin the departmental proceedings as long as those findings are reasonablysupported by evidence and have been arrived at through proceedingsthat cannot be faulted on account of procedural illegalities or irregularitiesthat may have vitiated the process by which the decision was arrived at.

57. The purpose of judicial review is not only to ensure that theindividual concerned receives fair treatment, but also to ensure that theauthority, after according fair treatment, reaches, conclusion, which iscorrect in the eyes of law[71]. Notably, in Apparel Export PromotionCouncil vs. A.K. Chopra, matter related to sexual harassment at theworkplace[72] where, aggrieved by the decision taken by the DisciplinaryAuthority of accepting the report of the Inquiry Officer and removingthe respondent therein from service on the ground that he had tried tomolest lady employee, this Court had set aside the order of the HighCourt that had narrowly interpreted the expression “sexual harassment”and held that in departmental proceedings, the Disciplinary Authority isthe sole judge of facts and once findings of fact, based on appreciationof evidence are recorded, the High Court in its writ jurisdiction shouldnot normally interfere with those factual findings unless it finds that therecorded findings were based either on no evidence or that the findingswere wholly perverse and/or legally untenable. The Court is under

71 (1999) 1 SCC 759

72 Chief Constable of the North Wales Police v. Evans, (1982) 3 ALL ER 141 HL.Also refer : B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749.

Aduty to satisfy itself that an inquiry into the allegations of sexualharassment by Committee is conducted in terms of the service rulesand that the concerned employee gets reasonable opportunity tovindicate his position and establish his innocence[73].

(b) EXTENT OF ADHERENCE TO THE “AS FAR ASBPRACTICABLE” NORM

58. Assuming as correct, the submission made by learned counselfor the respondents no.2 and 3 that the Committee was not bound tostrictly follow step by step procedure for conducting an inquiry havingdue regard to the proviso to Rule 14(2) of the CCS (CCA) Rules thatCpermits Committee to enquire into complaint of sexual harassment‘as far as practicable’, in accordance with the procedure laid down inthe Rules, the question that would still beg an answer is whether theinquiry conducted by the Committee in the instant case, would meet the‘as far as practicable’ norm?D59. Rule 14 prescribes the procedure required to be followed forconducting an inquiry by Public Authority which entails issuance of acharge sheet, furnishing details of the Articles of Charge, enclosingstatements of imputations in respect of each article of charge, forwardingof list of witnesses and the documents sought to be relied upon by theManagement/employer. The said procedure may not have been strictlyEfollowed by the Committee in the present case, but it is not in disputethat all the complaints received from time to time and the depositions ofthe complainants were disclosed to the appellant. He was, therefore,well aware of the nature of allegations levelled against him. Not onlywas the material proposed to be used against him during the inquiryFfurnished to him, he was also called upon to explain the said material bysubmitting his reply and furnishing list of witnesses, which he did.Furthermore, on perusing the Report submitted by the Committee, ittranspires that depositions of some of the complainants were recordedaudio-visually by the Committee, wherever consent was given and theappellant was duly afforded an opportunity to cross-examine the saidGwitnesses including the complainants. The charges levelled by all thecomplainants were of sexual harassment by the appellant with narrationof specific instances. Therefore, in the given facts and circumstances,non-framing of the Articles of Charge by the Committee cannot be treated73 Dr. Vijaykumaran C.P.V. v. Central University of Kerala and Others, (2020) 12HSCC 426

as fatal. Nor can the appellant be heard to state that he was completelyin the dark as to the nature of the allegations levelled against him andwas not in position to respond appropriately. So far, so good.

(c) THE COMMITTEE’S UNDERSTANDING OF ITSMANDATE :

60. As noted above, when the Registrar of the respondent No. 2–University addressed letter to the Chairperson of the Committee, heforwarded nine complaints of sexual harassment that had been receivedby the Vice Chancellor of the University. The process of the inquiry wasset into motion on 17[th] March 2009 when the appellant was informedthat on receiving complaints of sexual harassment against him, theCommittee had conducted preliminary verification of the complaintsby recording the statements of the concerned students. Till then, nospecific Articles of Charge were framed by the Committee and noimputation of charges were forwarded to the appellant. At the sametime, copies of all the complaints received and the statements recordedwere forwarded directly to the appellant calling upon him to explain thecharges levelled against him.61. The plea of the appellant that the Committee understood theremit of its inquiry as ‘fact-finding proceeding’, can be discerned fromthe contents of the letters dated 17[th] March 2009 and 20[th] April 2009addressed to the appellant. The impression carried by the Committeethat it was only required to submit fact-finding report to the Universitywas no different for the EC as is borne out from perusal of theMemorandum dated 8[th] September 2009, issued by the Chairman of theEC who, after receiving the Committee’s Report, informed the appellantthat an inquiry was proposed to be conducted against him under Rule 14of the CCS (CCA) Rules. This was the first time when the respondentsinformed the appellant that the EC had decided to follow the procedureprescribed under the rules of drawing up Statement of Articles ofCharge, imputation of misconduct in support of each Article of Chargeand other documents and had granted the appellant time to submit hisreply in defence. The appellant did submit reply. But it is an admittedposition that the said inquiry proceedings were aborted at the initial stageitself and it was the Report of the Committee submitted earlier, that wasacted upon by the EC in terms of decision taken on 28[th] January 2010.We are of the opinion that when the Committee itself was unclear as tothe scope of its inquiry, the appellant cannot be blamed for harbouring an

Aimpression that the remit of the Committee was confined to fact findingalone and it was not discharging the functions of disciplinary committee,as contemplated under the service Rules.

(d) WHIRLWIND PROCEEDINGS

62. On examining the records, it emerges that the point at whichBthe Committee fell into an error was when it attempted to fast forwardthe entire proceedings after the first few hearings and declined to granta reasonable time to the appellant to effectively participate in the saidproceedings. It is noteworthy that the proceedings of the Committeehad commenced on 16[th] April 2009 and stood concluded on 5[th] June,C2009. During this period, 18 meetings were conducted by the Committee.Following is the month-wise details of the dates on which the meetingsof the Committee were conducted :

(i) April 2009 – On 16[th],27[th] and 29[th]

(ii) May 2009 – On 6[th],12[th],13[th],14[th],19[th],20[th], 22[nd],23[rd],25[th],27[th],28[th]Dand 29[th]

(iii) June, 2009 – On 3[rd],4[th] and 5[th]

63. It is also noteworthy that the time span prescribed under theCCS (CCA) Rules for concluding an inquiry is ordinarily within periodof six months from the date of receipt of the order of appointment. But,Ehere, the entire process was wrapped up in flat 39 days. This shows thetearing hurry in which the Committee was to submit its Report. Onesuch glaring instance of the over anxiety to conclude the proceedings isapparent from the letter dated 5[th] May 2009, addressed by the Committeeto the appellant informing him that the next date for filing his reply andFfor recording further depositions was 12[th] June 2009. Surprisingly, onthe very next day, the Committee issued yet another letter advancing thesaid dates by claiming that an error had crept into the previous letter andinforming the appellant that the date for filing his reply should be read as‘12[th] May 2009’ and the date for recording further depositions should beread as ‘14[th] May, 2009’, thus moving the dates back by whole month.GAnother egregious example of the hurry and scurry shown by theCommittee can be gathered from the fact that on 20[th] May 2009, theCommittee had written to the appellant giving him last opportunity topresent himself on 20[th] May 2009, not only to complete his deposition,but also to cross-examine the complainants and other witnesses.HSimultaneously, the Committee forwarded six more depositions to the

appellant and directed him to furnish his reply within 48 hours i.e. by22[nd] May, 2009.

64. Even if this Court was to accept the submission made bylearned counsel for the respondents that the appellant was offering flimsyexcuses to somehow prolong the proceedings and the health groundtaken by him was not genuine, it does not explain the approach of theCommittee which was well aware of the fact that at least six moredepositions had been handed over to the appellant as late as on 20[th] May2009. Even if he had been hale and hearty, he would still have requireda reasonable time to respond to the additional depositions andsimultaneously, prepare himself for cross-examining the complainantsand completing his deposition. This can only be termed as an unreasonableand unfair direction by the Committee.

65. The undue haste demonstrated by the Committee for bringingthe inquiry to closure, cannot justify curtailment of the right of theappellant to fair hearing. The due process, an important facet of theprinciples of natural justice was seriously compromised due to the mannerin which the Committee went about the task of conducting the inquiryproceedings. As noted above, when the proceedings, subject matter ofthe present appeal had taken place, the PoSH Act was nowhere on thehorizon and the field was occupied by theVishakaGuidelines. The saidGuidelines also did not exclude application of the principles of naturaljustice and fair play in making procedural compliances. The silence inthe Guidelines on this aspect could not have given handle to theCommittee to bypass the principles of natural justice and whittle down areasonable opportunity of affording fair hearing to the appellant. ThisCourt has repeatedly observed that even when the rules are silent,principles of natural justice must be read into them. In its keen anxiety ofbeing fair to the victims/complainants and wrap up the complaintsexpeditiously, the Committee has ended up being grossly unfair to theappellant. It has completely overlooked the cardinal principle that justicemust not only be done, but should manifestly be seen to be done. Theprinciples of audi alterem partem could not have been thrown to thewinds in this cavalier manner.

(e) HOW DID THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL FALTER?

66. The error committed on the part of the EC, is no less grave. Itis apparent that the EC continued to remain under an impression that theFirst Committee to which the complaints were forwarded, was only

ABC

A‘fact-finding Committee’ and that full-fledged inquiry was still requiredto be conducted subsequently, in the manner prescribed under Rule 14of the CCS (CCA) Rules. The result was that though the Report of theFirst Committee was accepted and the EC proceeded to place theappellant under suspension, for the very first time, it decided to issue himMemorandum detailing the Articles of Charge and the imputation ofBcharges and further appointed Former Judge of the High Court as anInquiry Officer to conduct the inquiry in terms of the Rules. RespondentNos. 2 and 3 got wiser only when the said proceedings commenced andthe Inquiry Officer was appraised of the directions issued in MedhaKotwal’scase where it had been clarified by this Court that the ComplaintsCCommittee contemplated in Vishaka’scase (supra), will be deemed tobe an Inquiry Authority for the purposes of the CCS (Conduct) Rulesand its report shall be deemed to be Report under the CCS (CCA)Rules.

67. When the employer itself was oblivious to the remit of theDCommittee and the Committee remained under the very same impressionhaving described its proceedings as fact-finding in nature, it was all themore incumbent for the respondents to have paused on receiving theReport of the First Committee and verify the legal position before takingthe next step. In all this back and forth, it was the procedure prescribed

under Rule 14 for conducting an inquiry of sexual harassment at theEworkplace that came to be sacrificed at the alter of expeditious disposal,which can neither be justified nor countenanced.68. The intent and purpose of the proviso inserted in Rule 14(2)of CCS (CCA) Rules and Rule 3C of CCS (Conduct) Rules is that theprocedure required to be adopted for conducting an inquiry into theFcomplaint of sexual harassment that can lead to imposition of majorpenalty under the Rules, must be fair, impartial and in line with the Rules.Pertinently, the emphasis on adhering to the principles of natural justiceduring an inquiry conducted by Complaints Committee finds specificmention in Rule 7(4) of the subsequently enacted Rules of 2013. But the

spirit behind the due process could never be suppressed or ignored evenGin the absence of the Statute or the Rules inasmuch as the principles ofnatural justice is the very essence of the decision-making process andmust be read into every judicial or even quasi-judicial proceeding.69. This is not to say that the Committee even if described as anInquiring authority, by virtue of the ruling inMedha Kotwal’scase (supra)Hand required to follow the procedure prescribed under Rule 14, was

expected to conduct the inquiry as if it was full-fledged trial. Theexpression used in the proviso to Rule 14(2), ‘as far as practicable’has to be read and understood in pragmatic manner. In any suchproceedings initiated by the Disciplinary Authority, calibrated balancewould have to be struck between the rights of victim of sexualharassment and those of the delinquent employee. At the same time,fairness in the procedure would have to be necessarily adopted in theinterest of both sides. After all, what is sauce for the goose, is sauce forthe gander.

M. CONCLUSION

70. In the instant case, though the Committee appointed by theDisciplinary Authority did not hold an inquiry strictly in terms of the step-by-step procedure laid down in Rule 14 of the CCS (CCA) Rules,nonetheless, we have seen that it did furnish copies of all the complaints,the depositions of the complainants and the relevant material to theappellant, called upon him to give his reply in defence and directed himto furnish the list of witnesses that he proposed to rely on. Records alsoreveal that the appellant had furnished detailed reply in defence. Hehad also submitted list of witnesses and depositions. This goes to showthat he was well-acquainted with the nature of allegations levelled againsthim and knew what he had to state in his defence. Given the aboveposition, non-framing of the articles of charge cannot be said to bedetrimental to the interest of the appellant.71. In fact, the glaring defects and the procedural lapses in theinquiry proceedings took place only thereafter, in the month of May,2009, when 12 hearings, most of them back-to-back, were conducted bythe Committee at lightning speed. On the one hand, the Committeekept on forwarding to the appellant, depositions of some morecomplainants received later on and those of other witnesses and calledupon him to furnish his reply and on the other hand, it directed him tocome prepared to cross-examine the said complainants and witnessesas also record his further deposition, all in span of one week. Even ifthe medical grounds taken by the appellant seemed suspect, theCommittee ought to have given him reasonable time to prepare hisdefence, more so when his request for being represented through lawyerhad already been declined. It was all this undue anxiety that had led toshort-circuiting the inquiry proceedings conducted by the Committee anddamaging the very fairness of the process.

A72. For the above reasons, the appellant cannot be faulted forquestioning the process and its outcome. There is no doubt that mattersof this nature are sensitive and have to be handled with care. Therespondents had received as many as seventeen complaints from studentslevelling serious allegations of sexual harassment against the appellant.But that would not be ground to give complete go by to the proceduralBfairness of the inquiry required to be conducted, more so when the inquirycould lead to imposition of major penalty proceedings. When the legitimacyof the decision taken is dependent on the fairness of the process and theprocess adopted itself became questionable, then the decision arrived atcannot withstand judicial scrutiny and is wide open to interference. It isCnot without reason that it is said that fair procedure alone can guaranteea fair outcome. In this case, the anxiety of the Committee of being fairto the victims of sexual harassment, has ended up causing them greaterharm.

73. This Court is, therefore, of the opinion that the proceedingsDconducted by the Committee with effect from the month of May, 2009,fell short of the “as far as practicable” norm prescribed in the relevantRules. The discretion vested in the Committee for conducting the inquiryhas been exercised improperly, defying the principles of natural justice.As consequence thereof, the impugned judgment upholding the decisiontaken by the EC of terminating the services of the appellant, duly endorsedEby the Appellate Authority cannot be sustained and is accordingly quashedand set aside with the following directions:

(i) The matter is remanded back to the Complaints Committee totake up the inquiry proceeding as they stood on 5[th] May 2009.

(ii) The Committee shall afford adequate opportunity to theFappellant to defend himself.

(iii) The appellant shall not seek any adjournment of theproceedings.

(iv) Report shall be submitted by the Committee to theDisciplinary Authority for appropriate orders.

G(v) Having regard to the long passage of time, the respondentsare directed to complete the entire process within three monthsfrom the first date of hearing fixed by the Committee.

(vi) The procedure to be followed by the Committee and theDisciplinary Authority shall be guided by the principles of naturalHjustice.

(vii) The Rules applied will be as were applicable at the relevantpoint of time.

(viii) The decision taken by the Committee and the DisciplinaryAuthority shall be purely on merits and in accordance with law.

(ix) The appellant will not be entitled to claim immediatereinstatement or back wages till the inquiry is completed and adecision is taken by the Disciplinary Authority.

N. EPILOGUE

74. Just as we celebrate decade of the PoSH Act being legislated,it is time to look back and take stock of the manner in which the mandateof the Act has been given effect to. The working of the Act is centredon the constitution of the Internal Complaints Committees(ICCs) by everyemployer at the workplace and constitution of Local Committees(LCs)and the Internal Committees(ICs) by the appropriate Government, ascontemplated in Chapters II and III, respectively of the PoSH Act. Animproperly constituted ICC/LC/IC, would be an impediment in conductingan inquiry into complaint of sexual harassment at the workplace, asenvisaged under the Statute and the Rules. It will be equallycounterproductive to have an ill prepared Committee conduct half-baked inquiry that can lead to serious consequences, namely, impositionof major penalties on the delinquent employee, to the point of terminationof service.

75. It is disquieting to note that there are serious lapses in theenforcement of the Act even after such long passage of time. Thisglaring lacuna has been recently brought to the fore by National dailynewspaper that has conducted and published survey of 30 nationalsports federations in the country and reported that 16 out of them havenot constituted an ICC till date. Where the ICC have been found to be inplace, they do not have the stipulated number of members or lack themandatory external member. This is indeed sorry state of affairs andreflects poorly on all the State functionaries, public authorities, privateundertakings, organizations and institutions that are duty bound toimplement the PoSH Act in letter and spirit. Being victim of such adeplorable act not only dents the self-esteem of woman, it also takes atoll on her emotional, mental and physical health. It is often seen thatwhen women face sexual harassment at the workplace, they are reluctantto report such misconduct. Many of them even drop out from their job.One of the reasons for this reluctance to report is that there is an

Auncertainty about who to approach under the Act for redressal of theirgrievance. Another is the lack of confidence in the process and itsoutcome. This social malady needs urgent amelioration through robustand efficient implementation of the Act. To achieve this, it is imperativeto educate the complainant victim about the import and working of theAct. They must be made aware of how complaint can be registered,Bthe procedure that would be adopted to process the complaint, the objectivemanner in which the ICC/LC/IC is expected to function under the Statute,the nature of consequences that the delinquent employee can be visitedwith if the complaint is found to be true, the result of lodging false or amalicious complaint and the remedies that may be available to aCcomplainant if dissatisfied with the Report of the ICC/LC/IC etc.76. However salutary this enactment may be, it will never succeedin providing dignity and respect that women deserve at the workplaceunless and until there is strict adherence to the enforcement regime anda proactive approach by all the State and non-State actors. If the workingDenvironment continues to remain hostile, insensitive and unresponsive tothe needs of women employees, then the Act will remain an emptyformality. If the authorities/managements/employers cannot assure thema safe and secure work place, they will fear stepping out of their homesto make dignified living and exploit their talent and skills to the hilt. It is,therefore, time for the Union Government and the State Governments toEtake affirmative action and make sure that the altruistic object behindenacting the PoSH Act is achieved in real terms.

O. DIRECTIONS

77. To fulfil the promise that the PoSH Act holds out to workingwomen all over the country, it is deemed appropriate to issue the followingFdirections :

(i) The Union of India, all State Governments and Union Territoriesare directed to undertake timebound exercise to verify as to whetherall the concerned Ministries, Departments, Government organizations,authorities, Public Sector Undertakings, institutions, bodies, etc. haveGconstituted ICCs/LCs/ICs, as the case may be and that the compositionof the said Committees are strictly in terms of the provisions of thePoSH Act.

(ii) It shall be ensured that necessary information regarding theconstitution and composition of the ICCs/LCs/ICs, details of the e-mailIDs and contact numbers of the designated person(s), the procedureH

prescribed for submitting an online complaint, as also the relevant rules,regulations and internal policies are made readily available on the websiteof the concerned Authority/Functionary/ Organisation/Institution/Body,as the case may be. The information furnished shall also be updatedfrom time to time.

(iii) similar exercise shall be undertaken by all the Statutorybodies of professionals at the Apex level and the State level (includingthose regulating doctors, lawyers, architects, chartered accountants, costaccountants, engineers, bankers and other professionals), by Universities,colleges, Training Centres and educational institutions and by governmentand private hospitals/nursing homes.

(iv) Immediate and effective steps shall be taken by the authorities/managements/employers to familiarize members of the ICCs/LCs/ICswith their duties and the manner in which an inquiry ought to be conductedon receiving complaint of sexual harassment at the workplace, fromthe point when the complaint is received, till the inquiry is finally concludedand the Report submitted.

(v) The authorities/management/employers shall regularly conductorientation programmes, workshops, seminars and awarenessprogrammes to upskill members of the ICCs/LCs/ICs and to educatewomen employees and women’s groups about the provisions of the Act,the Rules and relevant regulations.

(vi) The National Legal Services Authority(NALSA) and the StateLegal Services Authorities(SLSAs) shall develop modules to conductworkshops and organize awareness programmes to sensitize authorities/managements/employers, employees and adolescent groups with theprovisions of the Act, which shall be included in their annual calendar.

(vii) The National Judicial Academy and the State JudicialAcademies shall include in their annual calendars, orientationprogrammes, seminars and workshops for capacity building of membersof the ICCs/LCs/ICs established in the High Courts and District Courtsand for drafting Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) to conduct aninquiry under the Act and Rules.

(viii) copy of this judgment shall be transmitted to the Secretariesof all the Ministries, Government of India who shall ensure implementationof the directions by all the concerned Departments, Statutory Authorities,Institutions, Organisations etc. under the control of the respectiveMinistries. copy of the judgment shall also be transmitted to the Chief

ASecretaries of all the States and Union Territories who shall ensure strictcompliance of these directions by all the concerned Departments. Itshall be the responsibility of the Secretaries of the Ministries, Governmentof India and the Chief Secretaries of every State/Union Territory toensure implementation of the directions issued.

B(ix) The Registry of the Supreme Court of India shall transmit acopy of this judgment to the Director, National Judicial Academy, MemberSecretary, NALSA, Chairperson, Bar Council of India and the RegistrarGenerals of all the High Courts. The Registry shall also transmit copyof this judgment to the Medical Council of India, Council of Architecture,Institute of Chartered Accountants, Institute of Company SecretariesCand the Engineering Council of India for implementing the directionsissued.

(x) Member-Secretary, NALSA is requested to transmit copyof this judgment to the Member Secretaries of all the State Legal ServicesAuthorities. Similarly, the Registrar Generals of the State High CourtsDshall transmit copy of this judgment to the Directors of the State JudicialAcademies and the Principal District Judges/District Judges of theirrespective States.

(xi) The Chairperson, Bar Council of India and the Apex Bodiesmentioned in sub-para (ix) above, shall in turn, transmit copy of thisjudgment to all the State Bar Councils and the State Level Councils, asEthe case may be.

78. The Union of India and all States/UTs are directed to file theiraffidavits within eight weeks for reporting compliances. List after eightweeks.79. The appeal is allowed on the above terms while leaving theFparties to bear their own costs. Pending applications, if any, shall standdisposed of.

Ankit Gyan

(Assisted by : Mahendra Yadav, LCRA)

Appeal allowed and directions issued.