C482/281/2013 of ATIKURRAHMAN and ANOTHER Vs SMT. FARHA SAIFI
Parties
- Atikurrahman & Anr (PETITIONER)
- U. C. Dhyani, J. (Oral (RESPONDENT)
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Criminal Misc. Application (C-482) No.281 of 2013
Atikurrahman & Anr
Smt. Farha Saifi
… Applicants
… Respondent
Mr. Mohd. Umar, Advocate, present for the applicants. Mr. Mohd. Azim, Advocate, present for the respondent.
U. C. Dhyani, J. (Oral)
1.The applicants were summoned to face the trial for the offences punishable under Sections 498-A, 323, 325, 504, 506 of IPC and Section ¾ Dowry Prohibition Act on complaint filed by the respondent.
2.A compounding application is filed by the parties to indicate that they have buried their differences and have settled their disputes amicably. Compounding application is supported by the affidavits of Atikurrahman (applicant no. 1) and Farha Saifi (respondent no. 2). Respondent no. 2 is present in person, duly identified by her counsel Sri. Mohd Azim, who says that she is no more interested in prosecuting the applicants, who are her husband and mother in law respectively. She prayed that she should be permitted to compound the offences alleged against the applicants. She has no objection if the criminal proceedings pending against the applicants before the Court below are set aside and quashed.
3.Offences punishable under Sections 323, 325, 504, 506 IPC are compoundable offences within the scheme of Section 320 Cr.P.C. Offences punishable under Sections 498-A IPC and ¾ Dowry Prohibition Act are non compoundable offences. The question which arises for consideration of this Court is-whether
the respondent no. 2 should be permitted to compound such offences against the applicants or not ?
4.Reliance is placed upon the pronouncements of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Dimpey Gujral vs. Union Territory through Administrator U.T, Chandigarh and others 2013 (123) AIC 119, Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab and another, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, and B. S. Joshi vs. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675. Hon’ble Apex Court in B. S. Joshi’s case (supra) and Nikhil Merchant vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2008) 9 SCC 667, has held that Section 320 Cr.P.C. will not come in the way of High Court in exercising it’s inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.
5.In Gian Singh’s case (supra), Hon’ble Apex Court has observed as below:-
“The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz; (i) to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint of F.I.R. may be exercised where the offender and victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and offender in relation to the offences under special statues like Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity etc; cannot provide for any basis forquashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and pre-dominatingly civil flavour stand on different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, High Court may quash criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal case would put accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceedings or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
6.The reply to the question posed above is in para 3 of this judgment is, therefore, in the ‘affirmative’. Since the complainant has buried all her differences against the applicants, therefore, she should be permitted to compound such offences against the applicants in the interest of justice. judgment is, therefore, in the ‘affirmative’. Since the complainant has buried all her differences against the applicants, therefore, she should be permitted to compound such offences against the applicants in the interest of justice.
7.Compounding application (being CRMA No. 707 of 2014) is allowed in the interest of justice. As consequence thereof, the Criminal Case No. 1820 of 2012, captioned as Farha Saifi vs. Atkurrahman and another, under Sections 498-A, 323, 325, 504 & 506 of IPC and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Kashipur, 2014) is allowed in the interest of justice. As consequence thereof, the Criminal Case No. 1820 of 2012, captioned as Farha Saifi vs. Atkurrahman and another, under Sections 498-A, 323, 325, 504 & 506 of IPC and Section ¾ of the Dowry Prohibition Act, pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Kashipur,
Distrcit Udham Singh Nagar are hereby quashed quaapplicants.
8. Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is thus disposed of in terms of compromise arrived at between the parties.
(U. C. Dhyani, J.)
Dt. 21.05.2014