WPSS/2222/2022 of MOHAN GIRI Vs STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITALHON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR TIWARIWrit Petition Service Single No. 2222 of 202212 September, 2025

Mohan Giri --Petitioner

Versus

State of Uttarakhand & others --Respondents

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Mr. Karmanya Pandey, Advocate, holding brief of Mr. Dharmendra Barthwal, Advocate for the petitioner.

Mr. Rajeev Singh Bisht, Additional Chief Standing Counsel for the State of Uttarakhand/respondents.

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JUDGMENT

Petitioner is challenging the termination order dated 29.11.2021 passed by Regional Director of Education (Secondary), Nainital. He has also challenged the order dated 06.04.2022 passed by Director, Secondary Education, whereby his appeal against termination order was dismissed.

2. The facts, on which there is no dispute is that petitioner was initially appointed as Group ‘D’ employee in the year 1985 in Government School. While serving as Group ‘D’ employee, petitioner obtained B.Ed. Degree from Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh in the year 1994 and on the strength of B.Ed. Degree, he was appointed as Assistant Teacher (L.T. Grade), vide order dated 01.03.2006. It may be stated that B.Ed. is essential qualification for appointment as

Assistant Teacher (L.T. Grade), as per the applicable Service Rules.

3. On 11.11.2020, charge-sheet was issued to petitioner stating that Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) is included in the list of fake Universities, published by University Grants Commission and Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 56637/15 has held that B.Ed. Degree issued by Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) is not valid. It was mentioned in the charge-sheet that petitioner was asked to show cause regarding validity of his B.Ed. Degree, vide notice dated 13.01.2020, but he failed to give any reply, therefore, there are reasons to believe that petitioner was appointed based on fake B.Ed. Degree.

4. In his reply to charge-sheet, petitioner submitted that in the year 1994, Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) was recognized for awarding B.Ed. Degree, however, he could not substantiate the said contention by adducing evidence during course of enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority i.e. Regional Additional Director, Secondary Education, Kumaon terminated the services of petitioner by holding that Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) was not recognized by University Grants Commission in the year 1994 when petitioner obtained B.Ed. Degree and held that without valid B.Ed. Degree, petitioner was not eligible for appointment as Assistant Teacher (L.T.

Grade). The appeal filed by petitioner was dismissed by Director, Secondary Education, vide order dated 06.07.2022.

5. counter affidavit is filed by Mr. Leeladhar Vyas, Additional Director, Secondary Education, Kumaon stating that petitioner was appointed as Assistant Teacher - L.T. Grade (Hindi) on the strength of B.Ed. Degree obtained from Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.); the said institution is not recognized by University Grants Commission, therefore, B.Ed. Degree possessed by petitioner is not valid for appointment as Teacher. The order dated 06.10.2015 passed by Hon’ble Allahabad High Court in Writ Petition No. 56637/15 is enclosed as Annexure No. 2 to the counter affidavit, in the said order, Hon’ble Allahabad High Court held that Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) is not recognized by University Grants Commission, therefore, its degrees are not recognisable. It is further alleged in the counter affidavit that since petitioner secured appointment as Teacher by playing fraud, therefore, his services were rightly terminated.6. Annexure-4 to the counter affidavit is communication received by respondent no. 3 from University Grants Commission, wherein it is mentioned that name of Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) is not included in the list of Universities recognized by University Grants Commission.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioner relies upon judgment rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dr.M.S. Mudhol & another vs. S.D. Halegkar & others, reported in (1993) 3 SCC 591, for contending that there was no suppression of fact by the petitioner and he produced B.Ed. Degree obtained from Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) with his application for appointment as Assistant Teacher (L.T. Grade) and the authorities, after examining the qualifications possessed by petitioner, offered appointment to him therefore, the issue of validity of B.Ed. Degree cannot be raked up after such long period of time

8. Learned State Counsel, however, submits that the aforesaid judgment relied by learned counsel for the petitioner was distinguished in the case of Pramod Kumar vs. U.P. Secondary Education Services Commission & others, reported as (2008) 7 SCC 153. He has relied upon para 16 to 23 of the said judgment, which are extracted below:-

“16. The qualifications for holding post have been laid down under statute. Any appointment in violation thereof would be nullity.

17. It is matter of some concern that appointments are being offered by the authorities of the State without verifying the fact as to whether the degree(s) possessed by the candidate(s) are valid or not. It was an ad hoc appointment. Why despite the same, he was allowed to obtain degree from another university is not known.

18. If the essential educational qualification for recruitment to post is not satisfied, ordinarily the

same cannot be condoned. Such an act cannot be ratified. An appointment which is contrary to the statute/statutory rules would be void in law. An illegality cannot be regularised, particularly, when the statute in no unmistakable term says so. Only an irregularity can be. [See Secy., State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) [(2006) 4 SCC 1 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753] , National Fertilizers Ltd. v. Somvir Singh [(2006) 5 SCC 493 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1152] and Post Master General, Kolkata v. Tutu Das (Dutta) [(2007) 5 SCC 317 : (2007) 2 SCC (L&S) 179] .]

19. Various institutions have sprung up in different parts of India representing that their degrees are recognised. However, even no such representation appears to have been made to the appellant by the said institution. The Directory of Institutions for Higher Education merely gives details of the institutions. No statement was made therein that it was recognised university.

20. Maithili Vishwa Vidyapeeth, Sankat Mochan Dham was name given to an institution. It was not university. It is said to have been founded in the year 1962. Admittedly, it is privately managed institution. Although it offered large number of courses like Madhyama, Visarad, Shastri, Acharya, Vidyabhaskar, Vidyaratna, Vidyavaridhi, Vidyavachaspati, Mahamahopadhyaya, the number of teachers therein were nine only. What sort of education was imparted therein is not known. How an institution could be run with teacher strength of nine can very well be imagined.

21. It is not in dispute that the said institution was not recognised by any university. degree is recognised only if it is granted by university constituted in terms of the University Grants Commission Act, 1956 or under any State or parliamentary Act. No university can be established by private management without any statutory backing.

22. The management of the school, when it came to learn that the appellant did not possess degree of BEd from recognised university, should have terminated his services forthwith. It did not do so for reasons best known to it. It has not been shown to us that the management of the school had any authority to allow the appellant to obtain the

requisite degree from any other university during the tenure of his services. Even the Commission in its counter-affidavit, although otherwise supports the case of the appellant, did not say so.

23. Our attention has been drawn to decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ram Bhagat Sharma v. State of Haryana [(1997) 4 RSJ 134 (P&H)] wherein it was directed:

“With view to protect the interest of the students community, we direct the Government of Haryana to take steps to prevent future recruitment of persons possessing qualifications awarded by Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad, and/or Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Prayag, Allahabad, and at the same time take appropriate measures to dispense with the services of the unqualified teachers. For this purpose, the Government of Haryana is directed to issue written instructions to all concerned that in future no appointment be given to the persons possessing qualifications by the institutions referred to hereinabove. We also direct the Government of Haryana to take steps for terminating the services of all such teachers who have secured employment on the basis of degrees/diplomas/certificates issued by Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Allahabad and/or Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, Prayag, Allahabad. However, those who have completed three years service should be given an opportunity to acquire the requisite qualification within stipulated time. In case they fail to acquire such qualification, then appropriate order be passed to dispense with the services of such persons.”

We, with respect, do not subscribe to the said view. In any event, it is not case where, this Court is to protect the interest of the students. The question herein is as to whether the services of the appellant can be said to have been illegally terminated or not.”

9. The judgment rendered in the case of Dr.M.S. Mudhol (supra) is distinguishable on facts. In that case, the Rules required Master’s Degree with 2[nd]Division marks for appointment as Principal. The person, who was appointed had Master’s Degree with 3[rd] Division marks. Hon’ble Supreme Court refused to

interfere with his appointment as Principal by issuing writ of quo warranto by holding that post of Principal in private school, though aided, is not of such sensitive public importance that the Court should find itself impelled to interfere with the appointment by writ of quo warranto, even assuming that such writ is maintainable.

10. In the present case, B.Ed. Degree, possessed by petitioner, is from an Institution which is not recognized by University Grants Commission. Only recognized University or Deemed to be University can award Degree, including B.Ed. Degree. In the absence of recognition by University Grants Commission, Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) had no authority to award B.Ed. Degree to anyone. As corollary to this, the degree possessed by petitioner is nullity, therefore it shall be deemed that petitioner lacks the essential qualification i.e. B.Ed., therefore, he is not qualified for appointment.

11. Learned Single Judge of this Court in WPSS No. 254 of 2023 considered issue of appointment as Teacher, based on fake educational certificates and held that person, who secured appointment under the State by playing fraud, cannot claim protection of Article 311 of the Constitution.

12. In the case of M/s Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. vs. Rajendra D. Harmalkar, reported as (2022) 17 SCC 361, Hon’ble Supreme Court considered the scope of interference by Courts in the matter of disciplinary proceedings. Para 19 to 22, which are relevant to the present case, are extracted below:-

“19. In Om Kumar [Om Kumar v. Union of India, (2001) 2 SCC 386 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 1039] , this Court, after considering the Wednesbury principles and the doctrine of proportionality, has observed and held that the question of the quantum of punishment in disciplinary matters is primarily for the disciplinary authority to order and the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution or of the Administrative Tribunals is limited and is confined to the applicability of one or other of the well-known principles known as “Wednesbury principles”. In Wednesbury Case [Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 (CA)], it was said that when statute gave discretion to an administrator to take decision, the scope of judicial review would remain limited. Lord Greene further said that interference was not permissible unless one or the other of the following conditions was satisfied, namely, the order was contrary to law, or relevant factors were not considered, or irrelevant factors were considered, or the decision was one which no reasonable person could have taken. 20. In B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India [B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80] , in para 18, this Court observed and held as under : (SCC p. 762)

“18. review of the above legal position would establish that the disciplinary authority, and on appeal the appellate authority, being fact-finding authorities have exclusive power to consider the evidence with view to maintain discipline. They are invested with the discretion to impose appropriate punishment keeping in view the magnitude or gravity of the misconduct. The High Court/Tribunal, while exercising the power of judicial review, cannot normally substitute its own conclusion on penalty and impose some other penalty. If the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority or the appellate

authority shocks the conscience of the High Court/Tribunal, it would appropriately mould the relief, either directing the disciplinary/appellate authority to reconsider the penalty imposed, or to shorten the litigation, it may itself, in exceptional and rare cases, impose appropriate punishment with cogent reasons in support thereof.”

21. In Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh [Lucknow Kshetriya Gramin Bank v. Rajendra Singh, (2013) 12 SCC 372 : (2013) 3 SCC (L&S) 159] , in para 19, it was observed and held as under : (SCC p. 382)

“19. The principles discussed above can be summed up and summarised as follows:

19.1. When charge(s) of misconduct is proved in an enquiry the quantum of punishment to be imposed in particular case is essentially the domain of the departmental authorities.

19.2. The courts cannot assume the function of disciplinary/departmental authorities and to decide the quantum of punishment and nature of penalty to be awarded, as this function is exclusively within the jurisdiction of the competent authority.

19.3. Limited judicial review is available to interfere with the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority, only in cases where such penalty is found to be shocking to the conscience of the court.

19.4. Even in such case when the punishment is set aside as shockingly disproportionate to the nature of charges framed against the delinquent employee, the appropriate course of action is to remit the matter back to the disciplinary authority or the appellate authority with direction to pass appropriate order of penalty. The court by itself cannot mandate as to what should be the penalty in such case.

19.5. The only exception to the principle stated in para 19.4 above, would be in those cases where the co-delinquent is awarded lesser punishment by the disciplinary authority even when the charges of misconduct were identical or the co-delinquent was foisted with more serious charges. This would be on the doctrine of equality when it is found that the employee concerned and the co-delinquent are equally placed. However, there has to be complete parity between the two, not only in respect of nature

of charge but subsequent conduct as well after the service of charge-sheet in the two cases. If the co-delinquent accepts the charges, indicating remorse with unqualified apology, lesser punishment to him would be justifiable.”

22. In the present case, the original writ petitioner was dismissed from service by the disciplinary authority for producing the fabricated/fake/forged SSLC. Producing the false/fake certificate is grave misconduct. The question is one of trust. How can an employee who has produced fake and forged marksheet/certificate, that too, at the initial stage of appointment be trusted by the employer? Whether such certificate was material or not and/or had any bearing on the employment or not is immaterial. The question is not of having an intention or mens rea. The question is producing the fake/forged certificate. Therefore, in our view, the disciplinary authority was justified in imposing the punishment of dismissal from service.”

13. Learned counsel for the petitioner was asked to produce any document to show that Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) is recognized by University Grants Commission. Learned counsel referred to the Prospectus of Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.), which only reveals that instructions are imparted under Open University System.

14. There is nothing in the Prospectus to indicate that Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad, Lucknow (U.P.) is recognized by University Grants Commission. Whether B.Ed. Degree can be awarded through Distance Education Mode, that too, after enforcement of National Council for Teachers Education Act, 1993 is another aspect, which goes to the root of the matter. There is nothing to show that National Council for Teachers Education has recognized Bhartiya Shiksha Parishad,

Lucknow (U.P.) for conducting B.Ed. Course.

15. Thus, this Court do not find any reason to interfere with the termination order passed by Additional Director, as affirmed by Director of School Education.

16. Learned counsel for the petitioner then submitted that since petitioner was appointed as Class-IV employee under the State in the year 1985 and he served in that capacity upto 2006, therefore, he may be permitted to make representation to the Competent Authority for pension and other retiral benefits admissible for the services rendered against Class-IV post.

17. Learned State Counsel submits that if petitioner makes representation, then his claim shall be examined, as per law.

18. Accordingly, the writ petition is disposed of with liberty to petitioner to make representation, regarding pension and other retiral dues admissible for services rendered against Class-IV post, to the Competent Authority. If petitioner makes such representation within three weeks from today, decision thereupon shall be taken by the Competent Authority, within three months thereafter.

Dt: 12.09.2025 NavinNAVEEN CHANDRADigitally signed by NAVEEN CHANDRA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=3be23325146e76a0642bdf4943fb9046f487df006da82a131bb4e4403d3c0a15, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=18167EEFB5CA8CFFD421A103819DA875643AF56D653D095C6ED9A86DAAB21CE5, cn=NAVEEN CHANDRA Date: 2025.09.24 18:40:20 +05'30'NavinNAVEEN CHANDRADigitally signed by NAVEEN CHANDRA DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, ou=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND, 2.5.4.20=3be23325146e76a0642bdf4943fb9046f487df006da82a131bb4e4403d3c0a15, postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND, serialNumber=18167EEFB5CA8CFFD421A103819DA875643AF56D653D095C6ED9A86DAAB21CE5, cn=NAVEEN CHANDRA Date: 2025.09.24 18:40:20 +05'30'

(Manoj Kumar Tiwari, J.)