W.P.(CRL)/2692/2017 of SH NEERAJ DALAL & ORS Vs STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR
Parties
- SH NEERAJ DALAL & ORS (PETITIONER)
- STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR (RESPONDENT)
Cites (1 resolved of 6 detected)
Statutes cited (5)
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*IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI
+W.P.(CRL) 2692/2017
SH NEERAJ DALAL & ORS..... PetitionersThroughMr. Rahul Sharma with Mr. RajKishor Garg & Mr. Kanth Nath,Advs.
versus
STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR..... RespondentsThroughMr. Ashish Aggarwal, ASCSI Ajay Kumar, P.S. BawanaMr. Sandeep Khatri, Adv. for R-2
..... Respondents
CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHUTOSH KUMARO R R%15.09.2017
CRL. M.A.15446/2017 (Exemption)
Exemption allowed subject to all just exceptions.
Application stands disposed of.
W.P.(CRL) 2692/2017
The petitioners seek quashing of FIR No.313/16 dated 28.07.2016(P.S. Bawana) instituted for offences under Sections 498A/406/34 of theIPC.
The petitioner No.1 is the husband of respondent No.2 whereas theother petitioners are closely related to petitioner No.1. The petitioner No.1was married to respondent No.2 on 17.07.2013. However, the marriagecould not subsist for long and within few years of the marriage, the spouses
could not live together as man and wife and started living separately.Thereafter, the subject FIR came to be registered on 28.07.2016
During the investigation of the subject FIR, settlement was arrivedat between the parties.Pursuant to the aforesaid agreement/settlement, itwas agreed upon that respondent No.2 would be paid Rs. 16 lakhs towardsall her matrimonial claims as against the petitioner No.1.It was furtheragreed that the petitioner No.1 and respondent No.2 shall obtain divorce bymutual consent. This court has been informed that divorce has been grantedon mutual consent by decree of the competent court. The respondent No.2has been paid Rs.12 lakhs uptil now. The balance amount of Rs.4 lakhs hasbeen handed over to respondent No.2 by way of demand draft No.035426dated 06.09.2017 which has been accepted by respondent No.2 on hersatisfaction.
The parties are present and have been identified by their respectivecounsels.
Taking into account the aforesaid facts, this Court feels inclined toquash the subject FIR as no useful purpose would be served in keeping theinvestigation in the aforesaid case pending.
In Gian Singh vs. State of Punjab & Another, (2012) 10 SCC 303,the Supreme Court has held that cases which are not compoundable underSection 320 of the Cr.P.C. could also be quashed, when continuation of anycriminal proceeding would be an exercise in futility and where justicedemands that the dispute between the parties should be put to an end andpeace is restored. But ending of such criminal proceedings could only beordered for securing the ends of justice.
The Supreme Court has further observed in Gian Singh vs. State of
Punjab & Another (Supra):
“58............................ No doubt, crimes are acts which haveharmful effect on the public and consist in wrongdoing thatseriously endangers and threatens the well-being of thesociety and it is not safe to leave the crime-doer onlybecause he and the victim have settled the dispute amicablyor that the victim has been paid compensation, yet certaincrimes have been made compoundable in law, with orwithout the permission of the court. In respect of seriousoffences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc., or other offences ofmental depravity under IPC or offences of moral turpitudeunder special statutes, like the Prevention of Corruption Actor the offences committed by public servants while workingin that capacity, the settlement between the offender and thevictim can have no legal sanction at all. However, certainoffences which overwhelmingly and predominantly bearcivilflavourhavingarisenoutofcivil,mercantile,commercial, financial, partnership or such like transactionsor the offences arising out of matrimony, particularlyrelating to dowry, etc. or the family dispute, where thewrong is basically to the victim and the offender and thevictim have settled all disputes between them amicably,irrespective of the fact that such offences have not beenmade compoundable, the High Court may within theframework of its inherent power, quash the criminalproceeding or criminal complaint or FIR if it is satisfiedthat on the face of such settlement, there is hardly anylikelihood of the offender being convicted and by notquashing the criminal proceedings, justice shall be casualtyand ends of justice shall be defeated. The above list isillustrative and not exhaustive. Each case will depend on itsownfactsandnohard-and-fastcategorycanbeprescribed.”
[RefertoB.S.Joshi, (2003)4SCC675;NikhilMerchant, (2008) 9 SCC 677 and Manoj Sharma, (2008) 16SCC 1.]
In Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. 2014 6 SCC
466. The pertinent observations of the Apex Court are as under:-
29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and laydown the following principles by which the High Courtwould be guided in giving adequate treatment to thesettlement between the parties and exercising its powerunder Section 482 of the Code while accepting thesettlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing toaccept the settlement with direction to continue with thecriminal proceedings:
29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of the Code is tobe distinguished from the power which lies in the Court tocompound the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Nodoubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the High Court hasinherent power to quash the criminal proceedings even inthose cases which are not compoundable, where the partieshave settled the matter between themselves. However, thispower is to be exercised sparingly and with caution.
29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and onthat basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings isfiled, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:(vii)ends of justice, or(viii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form anopinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such power is not to be exercised in thoseprosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences ofmental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.Such offences are not private in nature and have seriousimpact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged tohave beencommitted under special statute like thePrevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed bypublic servants while working in that capacity are not to bequashed merely on the basis of compromise between thevictim and the offender.
29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases havingoverwhelminglyandpredominantlycivilcharacter,particularly those arising out of commercial transactionsor arising out of matrimonial relationship or family
disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolvedtheir entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is toexamine as to whether the possibility of conviction isremote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases wouldput the accused to great oppression and prejudice andextreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashingthe criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in thecategory of heinous and serious offences and therefore areto be generally treated as crime against the society and notagainst the individual alone. However, the High Courtwould not rest its decision merely because there is amention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge isframed under this provision. It would be open to the HighCourt to examine as to whether incorporation of Section307 IPC is there for the sake of it or the prosecution hascollected sufficient evidence, which if proved, would lead toproving the charge under Section 307 IPC. For thispurpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by thenature of injury sustained, whether such injury is inflictedon the vital/delegate parts of the body, nature of weaponsused, etc. Medical report in respect of injuries suffered bythe victim can generally be the guiding factor. On the basisof this prima facie analysis, the High Court can examine asto whether there is strong possibility of conviction or thechances of conviction are remote and bleak. In the formercase it can refuse to accept the settlement and quash thecriminal proceedings whereas in the latter case it would bepermissible for the High Court to accept the pleacompounding the offence based on complete settlementbetween the parties. At this stage, the Court can also beswayed by the fact that the settlement between the parties isgoing to result in harmony between them which mayimprove their future relationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power underSection 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play acrucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at
immediately after the alleged commission of offence andthe matter is still under investigation, the High Court maybe liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminalproceedings/investigation. It is because of the reason thatat this stage the investigation is still on and even thecharge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those caseswhere the charge is framed but the evidence is yet to startor the evidence is still at infancy stage, the High Court canshow benevolence in exercising its powers favourably, butafter prima facie assessment of the circumstances/materialmentioned above. On the other hand, where the prosecutionevidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of theevidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normallythe High Court should refrain from exercising its powerunder Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trialcourt would be in position to decide the case finally onmerits and to come to conclusion as to whether theoffence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not.Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is alreadyrecorded by the trial court and the matter is at theappellate stage before the High Court, mere compromisebetween the parties would not be ground to accept thesame resulting in acquittal of the offender who has alreadybeen convicted by the trial court. Here charge is provedunder Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recordedof heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question ofsparing convict found guilty of such crime.”
In the case of Jitendra Raghuvanshi & Ors. Vs. Babita Raghuvanshi& Anr. (2013) 4 SCC 58, wherein the Supreme Court in respect of thematrimonial disputes has specifically held as follows:-
“15. In our view, it is the duty of the courts to encouragegenuine settlements of matrimonial disputes, particularly,when the same are on considerable increase. Even if theoffencesarenon-compoundable,iftheyrelatetomatrimonial disputes and the Court is satisfied that theparties have settled the same amicably and without any
pressure, we hold that for the purpose of securing ends ofjustice, Section 320 of the Code would not be bar to theexercise of power of quashing of FIR, complaint or thesubsequent criminal proceedings.
16. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes inrecent times. They institution of marriage occupies animportant place and it has an important role to play in thesociety. Therefore, every effort should be made in theinterest of the individuals in order to enable them to settledown in life and live peacefully. If the parties ponder overtheir defaults and terminate their disputes amicably bymutual agreement instead of fighting it out in court oflaw, in order to do complete justice in the matrimonialmatters, the courts should be less hesitant in exercisingtheir extraordinary jurisdiction. It is trite to state that thepower under Section 482 should be exercised sparinglyand with circumspection only when the Court is convinced,on the basis of material on record, that allowing theproceedings to continue would be an abuse of process ofcourt or that the ends of justice require that theproceedings ought to be quashed….”
For the reasons afore-recorded, the FIR No. 313/16 dated 28.07.2016(P.S. Bhawana) instituted for offences under Sections 498A/406/34 of theIPC and all the emanating proceedings therefrom are quashed.
The petition is disposed of.
ASHUTOSH KUMAR, J
SEPTEMBER 15, 2017ns