CRL.M.C./2680/2024 of ISLAM @ ISLAMU Vs THE STATE (GOVT OF NCT DELHI) & ANR.
Parties
- + CRL.M.C. 2680/2024 & CRL.M.A. 10186/2024 ISLAM @ ISLAMU (PETITIONER)
- THE STATE (GOVT OF NCT DELHI) & ANR (RESPONDENT)
Cites (2 resolved of 15 detected)
Statutes cited (11)
- code of criminal procedure, 482 (1973)
- indian penal code, 307 (1860)
- indian penal code, 307 (1860)
- code of criminal procedure, 482 (1973)
- indian penal code, 308 (1860)
- code of criminal procedure, 482 (1973)
- code of criminal procedure (1973)
- indian penal code (1860)
- indian penal code (1860)
- code of criminal procedure (1973)
- indian penal code (1860)
Full text
solid underline = linked page · dashed underline = case is in our corpus, page not published yet · dotted red = recognized reference, not in our corpus
IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI+ CRL.M.C. 2680/2024 & CRL.M.A. 10186/2024 ISLAM @ ISLAMU ..... Petitioner ISLAM @ ISLAMU ..... Petitioner
Through: Mr.Devinder Singh, Adv. with petitioner. petitioner.
versus
THE STATE (GOVT OF NCT DELHI) & ANR.
..... Respondents Through: Mr.Satinder Singh Bawa, APP with SI Vivek Chaudhry, PS Gandhi Nagar, ASI Pramod, PS Anand Vihar, SI Anuj Kumar, PS ODRS. with SI Vivek Chaudhry, PS Gandhi Nagar, ASI Pramod, PS Anand Vihar, SI Anuj Kumar, PS ODRS.
Mr.Rajat Vadehra, Adv. for R-2. 2.
CORAM:HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN CHAWLAO R R29.04.2024
1.This petition has been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) seeking quashing of FIR No.0251/2020 registered at Police Station: Gandhi Nagar, under Sections 307/341/201 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short, ‘IPC’), along with all other proceedings arising therefrom, on the basis of settlement.
2.Issue notice.
3.Notice is accepted by Mr.Satinder Singh Bawa, the learned APP on behalf of the State and by Mr.Rajat Vadehra, Advocate on behalf of the respondent no.2.
4.The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the subject FIR has been registered on the disputes arose out of escalation of business transaction misunderstanding and now the parties have amicably settled all their inter se disputes and have executed Settlement Deed dated 01.04.2024 and the respondent no.2 has no objection if the present FIR is quashed.
5.The respondent no.2, who is present in person in Court and has been duly identified by the Investigating Officer (IO), affirms the settlement and states that he has settled all the disputes with the petitioner out of his own free will and without any coercion. The respondent no.2 submits that he has no objection if the present FIR is quashed.
6.I have perused the contents of the FIR as also the settlement between the parties.
7.In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466, the Supreme Court has explained the principles governing the power of the High Court to quash or refuse to quash the proceedings on the basis of settlement in cases of non-compoundable offence, as under:
“29. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we sum up and lay down the following principles by which the High Court would be guided in giving adequate treatment to the settlement between the parties and exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code while accepting the settlement and quashing the proceedings or refusing to accept the settlement with direction to continue with the criminal proceedings:- 29.1 Power conferred under Section 482 of theCode is to be distinguished from the powerwhich lies in the Court to compound theoffences under Section 320 of the Code. No
doubt, under Section 482 of the Code, the HighCourt has inherent power to quash thecriminal proceedings even in those caseswhich are not compoundable, where theparties have settled the matter betweenthemselves. However, this power is to beexercised sparingly and with caution.29.2. When the parties have reached the settlement and on that basis petition for quashing the criminal proceedings is filed, the guiding factor in such cases would be to secure:
(i) ends of justice, or
(ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court.
While exercising the power the High Court is to form an opinion on either of the aforesaid two objectives.
29.3. Such power is not to be exercised in those prosecutions which involve heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in nature and have serious impact on society. Similarly, for the offences alleged to have been committed under special statute like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender. 29.4. On the other hand, those criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominantly civil character, particularly those arising out of commercial transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or family disputes should be quashed when the parties have resolved their entire disputes among themselves.
29.5. While exercising its powers, the High Court is to examine as to whether the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of criminal cases would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him
by not quashing the criminal cases.
29.6. Offences under Section 307 IPC would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be generally treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone. However, the High Court would not rest its decision merely because there is mention of Section 307 IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under this provision. It would be open to the High Courtto examine as to whether incorporation ofSection 307 IPC is there for the sake of it orthe prosecution has collected sufficientevidence, which if proved, would lead toproving the charge under Section 307 IPC.For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained,whether such injury is inflicted on thevital/delegate parts of the body, nature ofweapons used, etc. Medical report in respectof injuries suffered by the victim can generallybe the guiding factor. On the basis of thisprima facie analysis, the High Court canexamine as to whether there is strongpossibility of conviction or the chances ofconviction are remote and bleak. In the formercase it can refuse to accept the settlement andquash the criminal proceedings whereas in thelatter case it would be permissible for the HighCourt to accept the plea compounding theoffence based on complete settlement betweenthe parties. At this stage, the Court can also beswayed by the fact that the settlement betweenthe parties is going to result in harmonybetween them which may improve their futurerelationship.
29.7. While deciding whether to exercise its power under Section 482 of the Code or not, timings of settlement play crucial role. Those cases where the settlement is arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter is still under investigation, the High Court may be liberal in accepting the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings/investigation. It is because of the
reason that at this stage the investigation is still on and even the charge-sheet has not been filed. Likewise, those cases where the chargeis framed but the evidence is yet to start or theevidence is still at infancy stage, the HighCourt can show benevolence in exercising itspowers favourably, but after prima facieassessment of the circumstances/materialmentioned above.On the other hand, where the prosecution evidence is almost complete or after the conclusion of the evidence the matter is at the stage of argument, normally the High Court should refrain from exercising its power under Section 482 of the Code, as in such cases the trial court would be in position to decide the case finally on merits and to come to conclusion as to whether the offence under Section 307 IPC is committed or not. Similarly, in those cases where the conviction is already recorded by the trial court and the matter is at the appellate stage before the High Court, mere compromise between the parties would not be ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of the offender who has already been convicted by the trial court. Here charge is proved under Section 307 IPC and conviction is already recorded of heinous crime and, therefore, there is no question of sparing convict found guilty of such crime.”
(Emphasis Supplied)
8.In The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan (2019) 5 SCC 688, the Supreme Court has laid down the parameters under which the High Courts shall exercise the power conferred under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Court held that, though the Courts must be slow in exercising their jurisdiction under Section 482 for quashing the proceedings arising out of offences punishable under Section 307/308 IPC, the High Courts are not deprived of exercising the
powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in certain special circumstances. It was held that the Court shall weigh on the factors including the nature of injuries, stage of the proceedings, etc. It was held as under:
“15.4. Offences under Section 307 IPC and the Arms Act, etc. would fall in the category of heinous and serious offences and therefore are to be treated as crime against the society and not against the individual alone, and therefore, the criminal proceedings for the offence under Section 307 IPC and/or the Arms Act, etc. which have serious impact on the society cannot be quashed in exercise of powers under Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that the parties have resolved their entire dispute amongst themselves. However, the High Courtwould not rest its decision merely becausethere is mention of Section 307 IPC in theFIR or the charge is framed under thisprovision. It would be open to the High Courtto examine as to whether incorporation ofSection 307 IPC is there for the sake of it orthe prosecution has collected sufficientevidence, which if proved, would lead toframing the charge under Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would be open to the High Court to go by the nature of injury sustained,whether such injury is inflicted on thevital/delicate parts of the body, nature ofweapons used, etc. However, such an exercise by the High Court would be permissible only after the evidence is collected after investigation and the charge-sheet is filed/charge is framed and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not permissible when the matter is still under investigation. Therefore, the ultimate conclusion in paras 29.6 and 29.7 of the decision of this Court in Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466 should be read harmoniously and to be read as whole and in the circumstances stated hereinabove;”
(Emphasis Supplied)
9. In Manoj Kumar & Ors. v. State & Anr. Neutral Citation no.2016:DHC:2419, learned Single Judge of this Court has held as under: no.2016:DHC:2419, learned Single Judge of this Court has held as under:
“9. As discussed above, offence punishable under Section 308 IPC is not compoundable being of serious nature, however, if the Court feels that continuation of criminal proceedings will be an exercise in futility and justice in this case demands that the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is restored, it can order for quashing of the FIR or criminal proceedings as it is the duty of the Court to prevent continuation of unnecessary judicial process.”
10.The above view was reiterated by this Court in Mahender Singh @ Sunny & Anr. v. The State & Ors. Neutral Citation no.2021:DHC:978 while quashing FIR filed under Section 308 of the IPC.
11.Keeping in view the fact that the disputes are due to business transaction between the parties and the respondent no.2 does not wish to pursue his complaint any further, as also the Settlement arrived at between the parties, I find that no useful purpose shall be served in continuing with the proceedings of the present FIR as the chances of its success will be rather minuscule and it would rather create further acrimony between the parties and will be an unnecessary burden on the State exchequer.
12.Guided by the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in its judgments in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303; Parbatbhai Aahir @ Parbatbhai Bhimsinbhai Karmur & Ors. v. State
of Gujarat & Ors. (2017) 9 SCC 641; and, State of Haryana & Ors. v. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 6 SCC 466; The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan, (2019) 5 SCC 688, this Court deems it appropriate, in the interest of justice, to exercise its inherent powers under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C. to quash the FIR and all the proceedings emanating therefrom.
13.Accordingly, the petition is allowed. FIR No.0251/2020 registered at Police Station: Gandhi Nagar, under section 307/341/201 of the IPC and all consequential proceedings emanating therefrom against the petitioner are quashed, subject to the condition that the petitioner shall deposit costs of Rs.10,000/-, with The Delhi State Legal Services Authority within period of four weeks from today, and file proof of such deposit with the Registry of this Court and also supply copy thereof to the IO, within the said period.
14.The costs so deposited shall be utilised by the Delhi State Legal Services Authority for providing support to Acid Attack Victims requiring such assistance.
NAVIN CHAWLA, J
APRIL 29, 2024/Arya/am
Click here to check corrigendum, if any