W.P.(C)/15933/2024 of M M DHONCHAK Vs UNION OF INDIA

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IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHIDecided on: 03.03.2025Decided on: 03.03.2025+W.P.(C) 15933/2024 & CM APPLs. 66981/2024, 75074/2024,8490/20258490/2025

M M DHONCHAK

.....PetitionerMr.SatyawanKudalwal,Advocate.Advocate.

Through:

versus

UNION OF INDIA.....RespondentThrough:Ms. Pratima N. Lakra, CGSC withMr.ChandanPrajapati,Ms.Kashish G. Baweja, Advocates forUoI with Mr. Sushan Gupta, Ms.Suvarcha Mittal.Mr. Sanjeev Bhandari, AdvocateforDRTBarAssociation,Chandigarh.Through:Ms. Pratima N. Lakra, CGSC withMr.ChandanPrajapati,Ms.Kashish G. Baweja, Advocates forUoI with Mr. Sushan Gupta, Ms.Suvarcha Mittal.Mr. Sanjeev Bhandari, AdvocateforDRTBarAssociation,Chandigarh.

CORAM:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE PRATEEK JALAN

JUDGMENT

1.The challenge in this writ petition is to an order of the Union ofIndia [“UOI”] – Ministry of Finance dated 05.11.2024, by which thesuspension of the petitioner from the post of Presiding Officer, DebtsRecovery Tribunal [“DRT”]-II, Chandigarh, was extended for period of180 days beyond 09.11.2024.

A. Facts

2.The petitioner, retired Judicial Officer, was appointed as thePresiding Officer, DRT-II Chandigarh, on 20.02.2022. According to the

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respondent-UOI, various representations were received against him fromthe DRT Bar Association, Chandigarh, which were referred by the UOI tothe Chairperson, Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal [“DRAT”]-Delhi,who exercises general power of superintendence over the DRTs under hisjurisdiction. During the pendency of the complaints, however, themembers of the DRT Bar Association abstained from work on two days,and then filed writ petition before the High Court of Punjab andHaryana[1]against orders passed by the petitioner herein, dismissing theirproceedings on those days. On 27.10.2022[2], the High Court of Punjab andHaryana noted that the relationship between the DRT Bar Associationand the Presiding Officer, i.e., the petitioner herein, was severely strained.While deprecating the conduct of the Bar Association, the High Court, inexercise of its powers of superintendence under Article 227 of theConstitution, restrained the petitioner from passing adverse orders in thematters pending before him.

3.Against this order, the petitioner, in his personal capacity,filed SLP(C) No. 21138/2022, in which certain interim orders werepassed by the Supreme Court. The matter was ultimately left to thedecision of the Chairman of the DRT/DRAT. Further orders were passedby the High Court in another writ petition, and by the Supreme Court, inan SLP filed by the petitioner herein, which are referred to below.

4.The Chairman of DRAT also furnished preliminary report dated10.07.2023. The UOI thereafter referred the matter to the Search-cum-Selection Committee [“SCSC”], constituted under the Tribunals Reforms

1 Debts Recovery Tribunal Bar Association v. UOI & Ors., [CWP- 24795/2022].

2 Annexure R/2 to the Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent.

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Act, 2021, which, in its meeting held on 24.08.2023, decided that aninquiry should be conducted against the petitioner by former ChiefJustice of High Court, in accordance with Rule 9(3) of the Tribunal(Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021[3]. former Chief Justice of the HighCourt of Jharkhand, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Virender Singh, was accordinglyappointed as the Inquiry Officer. chargesheet has also been issued tothe petitioner on 26.02.2024.

5.Upon recommendation of the SCSC dated 22.11.2023, thepetitioner was placed under suspension by an order dated 13.02.2024,under Rule 16 of the Tribunal (Conditions of Service) Rules, 2021, readwith the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules,[“CCS (CCA) Rules”], 1965.

6.The petitioner made request to UOI on 05.03.2024 for changeof the Inquiry Officer. The request was declined by the UOI by orderdated 29.04.2024, and his subsequent request for review was also rejectedby order dated 04.06.2024.

7.While these requests of the petitioner were pending, his initialperiod of suspension was coming to an end, as result of which thematter was placed before the Suspension Review Committee [“SRC”] on26.04.2024, and in accordance with its recommendations, his suspensionwas extended for further period of 180 days, i.e., upto 09.11.2024.

8.In the interregnum, the learned Inquiry Officer, by letter dated

3 9. Procedure for inquiry into complaints.— (3) The Committee shall conduct an inquiry or causean inquiry to be conducted by person who is, or has been, a-

(a) Judge of Supreme Court or Chief Justice of High Court, where the inquiry is against aChairperson; orChairperson; or

(b) Judge of High Court, where the inquiry is against Member.

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29.05.2024[4], withdrew from the inquiry in view of the petitioner’sallegations against him.

9.The matter has been placed before the SCSC for nomination of anew Inquiry Officer.

10.In the meanwhile, UOI has passed the order, impugned in thispetition, extending the petitioner’s suspension by further period of 180days from 09.11.2024 to 08.05.2025.

B. Preliminary Points

11.It may be noted that the original order of suspension dated13.02.2024 and the first extension dated 13.05.2024 have been challengedby the petitioner in W.P.(C) 5143/2024 and W.P.(C) 8478/2024,respectively. Those petitions are pending and scheduled to be listed on01.04.2025.However,whenthepresentpetitionwaslistedon10.02.2025, the petitioner, who argued on that day in person, submittedthat the present petition must be taken up for hearing urgently andindependently of the other two writ petitions.

12.By an order dated 15.01.2025, this Court had declined anapplication for early hearing of this writ petition. The said order waschallenged by the petitioner before the Supreme Court in SLP(C) No.3084/2025. Although it was stated on 10.02.2025 that the Supreme Courthad granted permission to withdraw the petition with liberty to mentionthe matter before this Court, the order of the Supreme Court has sincebeen made available, and no such liberty has been granted.

13.In view of these contentions, this Court, by order dated 10.02.2025,recorded as follows:

4 Annexure R/20 to the Counter Affidavit filed on behalf of the Respondent.

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“2. The impugned order is the second extension of suspension, whichwas originally effected by order dated 13.02.2024, and first extendedby an order dated 13.05.2024. The said two orders are underchallenge in W.P.(C) 5143/2024 and W.P.(C) 8478/2024 respectively.Although those petitions are next listed on 01.04.2025, learned counselfor the petitioner has mentioned this matter, which is listed today, forout of turn hearing. He submits that the petitioner approached theSupreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition against the order ofthis Court dated 15.01.2025. It is stated at the Bar that the said SpecialLeave Petition was listed in the Supreme Court today, and thepetitioner was given permission to withdraw the petition, with libertyto mention the matter before this Court.

3. This petition has, therefore, been taken up for hearing out of turn, inthe presence of Ms. Pratima Lakra, learned Standing Counsel for therespondent-Union of India[“UoI”].

4. The petitioner, who has argued in person, has clearly submittedthat this writ petition be taken up for hearing independently, and hedoes not wish to have the writ petition listed with the earlier writpetitions filed by him. He submits that this petition only challengesthe extension order dated 05.11.2024, and the arguments will belimited to the validity of the order of extension, without raisinggrounds applicable to the original order of suspension or the firstextension order, which are the subject matter of separate challenges.

5. Ms. Lakra is directed to apprise the Court on the next date ofhearing with regard to the status of the inquiry proceedings against thepetitioner, and also to produce the record of UoI relating to theimpugned order dated 05.11.2024. Learned counsel for the petitionerand UoI will also prepare written submissions [not exceeding threepages] and compilation of judgments, with regard to the grounds ofchallenge to an order of extension of suspension.”[5]

14.Pursuant to this order, learned counsel for the parties were heard,and the record was also produced by Ms. Lakra, learned CentralGovernment Standing Counsel, in sealed cover.

15.As this petition concerns second extension of suspension,pending inquiry proceedings, I inquired of learned counsel for the parties,as to the status of the proceedings. The status, as provided by UOI, has

5 Emphasis supplied.

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been mentioned above. However, significantly, learned counsel for thepetitioner clearly submitted that the petitioner does not seek anydirections in this writ petition with regard to expediting the inquiry. Thishas been expressly reiterated in paragraph 1 of the written argumentsfiled on behalf of the petitioner, in the following terms:

“The petitioner submits that suspension of the petitioner extended forthe second time for 180 days, i.e, up to 08.05.2025 vide order dated05.11.2024 (Annexure P-1) in gross illegal manner affording freshand distinct cause of action because this extension of suspension, issomething which has to survive independent of the fate of the originalorder of suspension as well as the first extension of suspension, isunder challenge. There is no prayer for expediting the Inquiry.”[6]

C. Objection as to territorial jurisdiction

16.The respondents have taken preliminary objection with regard tothe territorial jurisdiction of the Court. Ms. Lakra submits that, as thepetitioner was the Presiding Officer of the DRT in Chandigarh, thepetition ought to have been filed before the High Court of Punjab andHaryana. However, it is undisputed that the impugned decision is of theUOI, and was taken in New Delhi. Part of the cause of action has thusclearly arisen in New Delhi, and the petitioner is entitled to move thisCourt, in terms of the Article 226(2) of the Constitution. This objectionis, therefore, rejected.

D. Analysis

17.I have perused the record, which has been produced by Ms. Lakra.It contains the Minutes of the Meeting of the SRC dated 23.10.2024, inwhich the facts of the case have been noted. It has specifically been notedthat the petitioner had expressed apprehensions against the impartiality of

6 Emphasis supplied.

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the erstwhile Inquiry Officer, as result of which the Inquiry Officer hadexpressed his inability to continue.

18.The SRC has found that the petitioner had protracted the inquiryprocess, which would take some time to complete. The SRC also tooknote of an order dated 06.02.2024[7], passed by the High Court of Punjaband Haryana, in which contempt proceedings have been initiated againstthe petitioner, for switching the audio and video of video-conferencehearings on and off at his own whims, despite orders of the High Court.The High Court has found prima facie that this robs the transparency ofjudicial dispensation.

19.The SRC was also informed of an order of the Supreme Courtdated 17.09.2024 in SLP(C) 11029/2024, in which an interventionapplication [I.A. No. 186471/2024], filed by the petitioner in his personalcapacity, was dismissed, holding it to be “completely misconceived”. Thepetitioner had sought to intervene in contempt proceedings initiatedagainst the Bar Association of DRT Vishakhapatnam, on the ground thathe had faced similar misconduct by the DRT Bar Association,Chandigarh.

20.Being of the opinion that revoking his suspension would not beconducive to the conduct of fair inquiry, the SRC recommendedextension of his suspension for further period of 180 days beyond09.11.2024. The recommendation was placed before the UOI, andapproved prior to the impugned order being issued.

21.Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the delay inconduct of the inquiry was not attributable to the petitioner, but to the

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respondent. He submitted that the petitioner had only asserted his legalright to seek redress against biased Inquiry Officer, and by filing ofproceedings in the Constitutional Courts.

22.The factual basis of the decision of the SRC does not, in my view,call for interference of this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.The most important reason for delay in the inquiry proceedings is that thelearned Inquiry Officer has recused himself. This is direct consequenceof the petitioner’s representations against him. Although the complaintmade on 05.03.2024 was rejected on 29.04.2024, the petitioner soughtreview thereof, which was also rejected on 04.06.2024. The petitioner’sapprehension led the Inquiry Officer to recuse himself from theproceedings, which has necessitated further reference to the SCSC fornomination of new Inquiry Officer. The SRC and UOI have relied uponthis factual background. In my view, such an analysis is neither arbitrarynor unreasonable, so as to justify interference under Article 226 of theConstitution.

23.The judgments of the Courts, with regard to judicial review ofsuspension orders, lay down that interference with an order of suspensionis normally unwarranted, unless the order is vitiated by breach ofprocedure, mala fide, or perversity. The Court normally considers thematter to be one within the domain of the employer, and does not enterinto relative assessment of the merits of the parties’ cases at this stage.

24.It is pertinent to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in U.P.Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v. Sanjiv Rajan[8], wherein the

7 CWP-513-2024 (O&M) and CWP-1080-2024 (O&M).

8 1993 Supp (3) SCC 483 (hereinafter, “U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad”).

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Supreme Court observed that the remedy against undue prolongation ofinquiry proceedings is to direct time-bound completion thereof andincrease in the subsistence allowance. To examine the aspect of delay,each case has to be considered on its own facts, and the writ Court shouldordinarily be slow in interfering with such orders. The relevantobservations in U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad are as under:

“5. The ground given by the High Court to stay the operation of the suspensionorder, is patently wrong. There is no restriction on the authority to pass asuspension order second time. The first order might be withdrawn by theauthority on the ground that at that stage, the evidence appearing against thedelinquent employee is not sufficient or for some reason, which is not connectedwith the merits of the case. As happened in the present case, the earlier order ofsuspension dated March 22, 1991 was quashed by the High Court on the groundthat some other suspended officer had been allowed to join duties. That orderhad nothing to do with the merits of the case. Ordinarily, when there is anaccusation of defalcation of the monies, the delinquent employees have to bekept away from the establishment till the charges are finally disposed of.Whether the charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive and are framed onlyto keep the individual concerned out of the employment is different matter.But even in such case, no conclusion can be arrived at without examiningthe entire record in question and hence it is always advisable to allowdisciplinary proceedings to continue unhindered. It is possible that in somecases, the authorities do not proceed with the matter as expeditiously as theyought to, which results in prolongation of the sufferings of the delinquentemployee. But the remedy in such cases is either to call for an explanationfrom the authorities in the matter, and if it is found unsatisfactory, to directorder, is patently wrong. There is no restriction on the authority to pass asuspension order second time. The first order might be withdrawn by theauthority on the ground that at that stage, the evidence appearing against thedelinquent employee is not sufficient or for some reason, which is not connectedwith the merits of the case. As happened in the present case, the earlier order ofsuspension dated March 22, 1991 was quashed by the High Court on the groundthat some other suspended officer had been allowed to join duties. That orderhad nothing to do with the merits of the case. Ordinarily, when there is anaccusation of defalcation of the monies, the delinquent employees have to bekept away from the establishment till the charges are finally disposed of.Whether the charges are baseless, malicious or vindictive and are framed onlyto keep the individual concerned out of the employment is different matter.But even in such case, no conclusion can be arrived at without examiningthe entire record in question and hence it is always advisable to allowdisciplinary proceedings to continue unhindered. It is possible that in somecases, the authorities do not proceed with the matter as expeditiously as theyought to, which results in prolongation of the sufferings of the delinquentemployee. But the remedy in such cases is either to call for an explanationfrom the authorities in the matter, and if it is found unsatisfactory, to directthem to complete the inquiry within stipulated period and to increase thesuspension allowance adequately. It is true that in the present case, the charge-sheet was filed after almost year of the order of suspension. However, the factspleaded by the appellants show that the defalcations were over long periodfrom 1986 to 1991 and they involved some lakhs of rupees. It also appears thatthe authorities have approached the police and in the police investigation, theamount of defalcation is found to be still more. Since the matter is of takingaccounts which are spread over from 1986 to 1991 and of correlating the entrieswith the relevant documents, and several individuals are involved, the framing ofcharges was bound to take some time.The Court has to examine each case onits own facts and decide whether the delay in serving the charge-sheet andcompleting the inquiry is justified or not.However, in the present case, theHigh Court has not quashed the order of suspension on the ground of delay inframing the charges. As stated earlier, it has set aside the order of suspension on

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the ground that the authority had no power to pass the second order ofsuspension in the same case. We are afraid that the High Court hasmisconstrued the nature and purpose of the power of suspension vested in themanagement. It is not disputed that at present all officers concerned are servedwith the charge-sheets and have been suspended, There is no discriminationbetween the officers on that account. The charges are also grave and theauthoritieshavecometotheconclusionthatduringthedisciplinaryproceedings, the officers should not continue in employment to enable them toconduct the proceedings unhindered. Hence, we are satisfied that the order inappeal was not justified.

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10. We find from the charge-sheet that the allegations against the firstrespondent are grave inasmuch as they indicate that the amounts mentionedtherein are not deposited in the bank and forged entries have been made in thepassbook of the relevant accounts and the amounts are shown as having beendeposited. In the circumstances, the High Court should not have interfered withthe order of suspension passed by the authorities. The Division Bench has givenno reason for upholding the learned Single Judge's order revoking thesuspension order. In matters of this kind, it is advisable that the concernedemployees are kept out of mischief's range. If they are exonerated, they would beentitled to all their benefits from the date of the order of suspension. Whetherthe employees should or should not continue in their office during the periodof inquiry is matter to be assessed by the authority concerned and ordinarily,the Court should not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they arepassed mala fide and without there being even prima facie evidence onrecord connecting the employees with the misconduct in question.In thepresent case, before the preliminary report was received, the Director wasimpressed by the first respondent-employee's representation. However after thereport, it was noticed that the employee could not be innocent. Since this is theconclusion arrived at by the management on the basis of the material in theirpossession, no conclusions to the contrary could be drawn by the Court at theinterlocutory stage and without going through the entire evidence on record.In the circumstances, there was no justification for the High Court to revoke”[9]the order of suspension.

25.In State of Orissa v. Bimal Kumar Mohanty[10]also, the SupremeCourt emphasized that each case has to be considered on its own facts,and not on the basis of generalised standards.

9 Emphasis supplied.10 (1994) 4 SCC 126.

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26.In Union of India v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal[11], the Courtconsidered several authorities on the point, and summarized the legalposition thus:

“26. The scope of interference by the Court with the order of suspension hasbeen examined by the Court in large number of cases, particularly in Stateof M.P. v. Shardul Singh [(1970) 1 SCC 108] , P.V. Srinivasa Sastry v.Comptroller & Auditor General [(1993) 1 SCC 419 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 206 :(1993) 23 ATC 645] , ESI v. T. Abdul Razak [(1996) 4 SCC 708 : 1996 SCC(L&S) 1061] , Kusheshwar Dubey v. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. [(1988) 4 SCC319 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 950] , Delhi Cloth & General Mills Ltd. v. KushalBhan [AIR 1960 SC 806] , U.P. Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad v.Sanjiv Rajan [1993 Supp (3) SCC 483 : 1994 SCC (L&S) 67 : (1993) 25 ATC764] , State of Rajasthan v. B.K. Meena [(1996) 6 SCC 417 : 1996 SCC(L&S) 1455] , Prohibition and Excise Deptt. v. L. Srinivasan [(1996) 3 SCC157 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 686 : (1996) 33 ATC 745] and Allahabad Bank v.Deepak Kumar Bhola [(1997) 4 SCC 1 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 897] , wherein ithas been observed that even if criminal trial or enquiry takes long time, itis ordinarily not open to the court to interfere in case of suspension as it is inthe exclusive domain of the competent authority who can always review itsorder of suspension being an inherent power conferred upon them by theprovisions of Article 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and whileexercising such power, the authority can consider the case of an employeefor revoking the suspension order, if satisfied that the criminal case pendingwould be concluded after an unusual delay for no fault of the employeeconcerned.Where the charges are baseless, mala fide or vindictive and areframed only to keep the delinquent employee out of job, case for judicialreview is made out. But in case where no conclusion can be arrived atwithout examining the entire record in question and in order that thedisciplinary proceedings may continue unhindered the court may notinterfere. In case the court comes to the conclusion that the authority is notproceeding expeditiously as it ought to have been and it results inprolongation of sufferings for the delinquent employee, the court may issuedirections. The court may, in case the authority fails to furnish properexplanation for delay in conclusion of the enquiry, direct to complete theenquiry within stipulated period. However, mere delay in conclusion ofenquiry or trial cannot be ground for quashing the suspension order, ifthe charges are grave in nature. But, whether the employee should orshould not continue in his office during the period of enquiry is matter tobe assessed by the disciplinary authority concerned and ordinarily the courtshould not interfere with the orders of suspension unless they are passed in

11 (2013) 16 SCC 147.

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mala fide and without there being even prima facie evidence on recordconnecting the employee with the misconduct in question.

27. Suspension is device to keep the delinquent out of the mischief range.The purpose is to complete the proceedings unhindered. Suspension is aninterim measure in the aid of disciplinary proceedings so that the delinquentmay not gain custody or control of papers or take any advantage of hisposition. More so, at this stage, it is not desirable that the court may find outas to which version is true when there are claims and counterclaims onfactual issues.The court cannot act as if it is an appellate forum de hors the”12powers of judicial review.

27.Learned counsel for the petitioner, with his written submissions,has placed several judgments in support of the proposition that prolongedsuspension and delay in conclusion of disciplinary proceedings may be tothedetrimentofthesuspendedemployee.Thepropositionisunexceptionable, but each case must be considered on its own facts. Inthe facts of the present case, I do not consider the view taken by the UOI,upon the recommendations of the SRC, to be arbitrary or perverse.Having regard to the materials which were before them, no conclusioncan be drawn, to discontinue the petitioner’s suspension, contrary to thedecision of the authorities. The allegations against the petitioner, and theobservations of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana and the SupremeCourt against him, make it difficult to mandate his continuation in ajudicial position, during the pendency of the inquiry.

28.As noted above, the Court would have made an attempt to ensurethat the detriment of prolonged suspension is alleviated, by consideringthe possibility of time-bound inquiry. However, such consideration wasforeclosedbylearnedcounselforthepetitionerhimself,whocategorically submitted that the petitioner does not seek expedition of the

12 Emphasis supplied.

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inquiry proceedings. As extracted above[13], he has repeated this stand inhis written submissions. The petitioner has thus expressly declined anorder of the nature indicated by the Supreme Court in U.P. Rajya KrishiUtpadan Mandi Parishad, as the appropriate order in cases of prolongedsuspension and protracted inquiries. Such stand, on the part of thepetitioner, demonstrates an additional and important factor, whichdisentitles him to relief against the impugned order.

29.For the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in the present writpetition, which is accordingly dismissed. All pending applications standdisposed of.

30.A copy of the record produced by Ms. Lakra has been placed in asealed cover to be kept on record with the Registry.

PRATEEK JALAN, J

MARCH 03, 2025“Bhupi/SS/pv/Jishnu”/

13 Paragraph 15, supra.