SARWARLAL AND OTHERS versus THE STATE OF HYDERABAD

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SARW ARLAL AND OTHERS

THE STATE OJB' HYDERABAD (B. P. SINHA, c. J., JAF'ER IMAM, A. K. SARKAR, K. C. DAS GUPTA and J.C. SHAH, JJ.)

Jagir, Abolition of-Regulations pr_omulgated by Military Governor and Prime Minister-Constitutional validity-Delegation of authority by Nizam-Nature and extent-Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation, IJS8 Fasli, s. 6(4)-Hyderabad Jagir, (Commu-tation) Regulation (XXV of IJ59 Fasli) s. 4(I)(c), 4(2)-Constitution of India, Art. 32(8).

After the Police action in the State of Hyderabad in August, 1948, the Nizam, by Farman dated September 19, 1948, invested the Military Governor "with all authority for the administration of the State " and by later Farman declared that " the said authority includes and has always included autho-rity to make Regulations." By virtue of the said powers, the Military Governor promulgated the Hyderabad (Abolition of Jagirs) Regulations of 1358 Fasli. Thereafter on the termination· of the appointment of the Military Governor, the Nizam by another Farman appointed Mr. Vellodi as his Chief Minister and directed that "all the powers of administration, vested in the Military Governor before the said date are exercisable by the Chief Minister." Thus empowered, the Chief Minister promul-gated the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commutation) Regulation XXV of 1358 Fasli. Thereafter with the commencement of the Consti-tution of India, the territory of the State of Hyde.pbad became part of the Union of India and the President certified the two Regulations under Art. 31(6) of the Constitution. By the Consti-tution (First Amendment) Act of 1951, Arts. 3r(A) and 31(B) and Sch. IX were inserted into the Constitution and the two Regula-tions were included in the said schedule. The appellant, whose properties had been taken over by the Jagir Administrator under the Abolition Regulation, and who had, in the meantime, filed writ petition in the High Court, by his amended petition after the amendment of the Constitution, claimed that ss. 4(r)(c) and 4(2) of the Commutation Regulation and s. 6(4) of the Abolition Regulation were confiscatory in nature and amounted to colour-able and fraudulent exercise of legislative power. The High Court found against him and rejected his petition:

Held, that the decision of the High Court must be affirmed.

There can be no question that the Nizam, at the time when he executed the Farmans and prior to it, was an absolute ruler vested with all authority executive, legislative and judicial and had unquestionable powers to modify or extinguish any of the rights of his subjects and the language of the Farmans leaves no manner of doubt tha.t he thereby delegated the entirety-

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for the administration of the State now vests in z96o him, I hereby enjoin all the subjects of the State . to s arwar 1 1 carry out such orders as he may deem fi t to issue v. from time to time. I appeal to all officers of the state of Hyderabad State administration a.nd subjects of the State to render faithful and unflinching obedience to the Shah J. Military Governor and conduct themselves in manner calculated to bring about the speedy restora-tion of law and order in the State".

On August 7, 1949, HiB Exalted Highness the Nizam issued an explanatory Farman in the following terms : "With reference to my Farman dated 19-9-1948, in which I referred to' i;he fact that all authority for the administration of the State now vests in the Military Governor, I hereby declare that the said authority includes and has always included authority to make Regulations". _ On August 10, 1949, the Military Governor promul-gated The Hyderabad (.Abolition of Jagirs) Regulation of 1358 Fasli, which will hereinafter be referred to as the Abolition Regulation. This Regulation was brought into force on August 15, 1949, the date of its publication in the Officfal Gazette. Section 5 of the Regulation directed that from date to be notified for the transfer of the administrations of the jagirs in the State to the Government, the jagirdars shall make over the management of the jagirs to the J agir Administrator and in default of compliance therewith the Officer appointed under the Regulation may take forcible possession. By s. 6, it was provided that the jagirs shall be included in the " Diwani " and unless and until included in district, shall be administered by the Jagir Administrator, and that the powers, rights and liabilities in relation to such jagirs shall cease to be exercisable by the jagirdars and shall be exercisable by the Jagir Administrators, and that no jagirdar shall recover or receive any customary or other dues from any tenant or resident of the jagir. By s. 14, it was declared that the jagirdars were to receive certain interim maintenance allowances until such time as the terms of the commutation of the jagirs were determined. Pursuant to the authority reserved by s. 6 of the Abolition Regulation, possession

'96° of the jagirs was taken over sometime in September Sarwarlal 1949 by the Jagir Administrator acting on behalf of v. the State of Hyderabad.

state of Hyderabad On December 1, 1949, another Farman was issued -by His Exalted Highness the Nizam which provided Shah J. as follows : " Whereas the General Officer Commanding in Chief Southern Army has as from the 1st Decem-ber, 1949, terminated the appointment of Major General Chaudary, O.B.E., to be the Military Gover-nor for the Hyderabad State ;

And whereas it is necessary to make other arrange-ments for the administration of the State as from the said date;

Now, therefore, I hereby appoint as from the said date Mr. M. K. Vellodi, C.I.E., I.C.S., to be my Chief Minister and ... I further direct that all the powers of administration, vested in the Military Governor before the said date are exercisable by the Chief Minister ".

In exercise of the powers vested in him, the Chief Minister promulgated the Hyderabad Jagirs (Commu-tation) Regulation No. XXV of 1359 Fasli-which will hereinafter be referred to as the Commutation Regula-tion. This Regulation was brought into operation on January 25, 1950. By s. 3 of the Regulation, the method of computing the commutation sum for every jagir was prescribed.

After the inauguration of the Constitution of InJia on January 26, 1950, on which date the territory of the State of Hyderabad became part of the Union of India, the President on April 25, 1950, certified the two Regulations under Art. 31(6) of the Constitution by notification published in the gazette of the Union of India. The Constitution was amended on June 18, 1951 by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act of 1951 whereby, inter alia, Arts. 3l(A) and 3l{B) and Sch. IX were incorporated in the Constitution. The Abolition Regulation and the Commutation Regula-tion were included in Schedule IX and by virtue of Art. ·3l(B), neither the Regulations nor any of the provisions thereof were to be deemed to be void or ever to have become void on the ground that the

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Regulations were inconsistent with or took away or abridged any of the rights conferred by any of the provisions of Part III of the Constitution. In the Sarwar/al meantime, the appellant had, on January 29, 1951, State of ~~yderabad filed petition in the High Court of Hyderabad for _ writ in the nature of mandamus directing the State Shah J. of Hyderabad and the ,J agir Administrator to hand over possession of the a.ppellant's properties and for an order declaring the Abolition Regulation and the Commutation Regulation ultra vires and unconstitu-tional and for certain interim orders. After the amendment of the Constitution, the petition was amended on August 14, 1952. By this petition, the appellant claimed that ss. 4(l)(c) and 4(2) of the Com-mutation R(lgulation a,nd s. 6(4) of the Abolition Regulation were invalid because by these provisions, there was " naked confiscation of the property " of the appellant and that they amounted to" colourable and fraudulent exercise of legislative power". The High Court of Hyderabad rejected the petition filed by the appellant, but certified the case under Art. 133(l)(c) as fit one for appeal to this court.

In this appeal, two principal contentions fall to be determined, viz., (1) whether legislative authority was conferred upon. the Military Governor by the Farman dated September 19, 1948 and (2) If, by the Farman, :legislative authority was delegated to the Military Governor, whether it was circumscribed by any limitations or reservations.

Was the Military Governor, by the Farman dated September 19, 1948, inveated with all the sovereign authority legislative, executive and judicial'of H.E.H. the Nizam or was he merely invested with the execu-tive authority ? By the plain words used in the Far-man, " all authority for the administration of the State was conferred upon the Military Governor" and there is nothing in the text of the Far.man which warrants the view that only executive authority was intended to be delegated thereby. Within the expres-sion, "all administrative authority" is encompassed the entirety of the authority of the sovereign, and by the delegation from His Exalted Highness the Niza:m, the Military Governor was invested with that authorit;y

'96• in all its amplitude. The injunction to the subjects of Sarw.,lal tGhe State to cardry oufit all s?ch ordedrs has the Militahry overnor may eem t to rnsue an t appea 1to t State of ;;yderabad officers of the State and the subjects to render faithful and unflinching obedience and to conduct themselves Shah J. in manner calculated to bring about the speedy restoration oflaw and order, do not detract from the amplitude of the powers delegated to the Military Governor. The expression, "orders " would include every order made in exercise of authority for the administration of the State; and the object intended to be achieved, viz., the speedy restoration of law and order in the State by His Exalted Highness the Nizam as expressed in the appeal was not restrictive of that authority. That His Exalted Highness the Nizam in and before the month of September, 1948, was an absolute ruler invested with all authority, executive, legislative and judicial is indisputable. He had supreme powers vested in him to modify, restrict take away or extinguish the rights of any of his subjects and the validity of his actions or orders was not liable to be questioned before any tribunal or authority.

The Farman promulgated on September 19, 1948, by His Exalted Highness the Nizam delegated his sovereign authority to the Military Governor and to remove all doubts as to the effect of that delegation, an explanatory Farman dated August 7, 1949, was issued. It was declared in express terms by that Far-man that the authority of the Military Governor "included and has always included the authority to make Regulations ''. In the clearest terms, the author of the Farman proclaimed the content of the authority 'delegated by him to the Military Governor.

The plea rather faintly urged by Mr. Varma that the Farman merely recited that the Military Governor had been invested with authority for administration and did not by its own force purport to invest the Military Governor with authority to administer the State is plainly inconsistent with the argument which was advanced in the High Court and the statement of the case filed in this court and was therefore rightly abandoned by him. ·,. .. ' ..... ' .. '• .. .

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Though by the delegation of authority, the Military x96o Governor was invested with all authority of His s Exalted Highness the Nizam in the matter of adminis-ar~~· 1 1 tration of the State in all its departments, the/soverei- State of Hyderabad gnty of His Exalted Highness the Nizam was, by this act of delegation, undoubtedly not extinguished. It Shah] • was open to him, notwithstanding the delegation, to issue orders or Regulatiom; contrary to those which were issued by the Milit2~ry Governor, and also to withdraw the authority of the Military Governor. There is, however, no evidence on the record to show that after September 19, 19~!8, and before the Abolition Regulation was promulgated; the authority of the Mili-tary Governor was withdrawn or that His Exalted Highness the Nizam had_issued any order or Regulation inconsistent with the Abolition Regulation. The authority of the Military Governor was withdrawn in December, 1949, and the Chief Minister was invested with the same authority of administration including expressly the power of legislation, and it was in exer-• cise of that authority that the Chief Minister issued , the Commutation Regulation.The authority of His Exa.lted Highness the Nizam as the sovereign ruler to resume the jagirs and to extinguish the interests of the jagirdars being by dele-gation vested in the Military Governor, tlie legality of the action of the latter was not open to challenge ·on any test of legislative competence. Assuming that no opportunity had arisen for exercise of the sovereign authority in the matter of resumption of jagirs or extinction of the jagirdars' interests before the promul-gation of the Abolition Regulation, an inference can-not therefrom arise that His Exalted Highness the Nizam had irrevocably placed restriction on his sovereignty, or that the delegation to the Military Governor of the sovereign authority was subject to an· implied restriction that the interests of the jagirdars in the jagirs could not in exercise of the authority be extinguished.

The authority of the Military Governor, being unres-tricted, so long as it enured, his action in issuing the Abolition Regulation could not be challenged on the plea that it was colourable exercise of legislative

The authority of the Chief Minister under the Far-man dated December 1, 1949, in its amplitude, was as extensive as that of His Exalted Highness the Nizam . and the Commutation Regulation was not liable to be challenged on the ground of want of legislative compe-tence or colourable exercise of legislative authority, the power exercised by him being the legislative power as the delegate of the Sovereign.

The plea that the fundamental rights of the appel-lant under the Constitution were infringed by the two Regulations does not require any detailed exami-nation. By' virtue of the Abolition Regulation, the rights of the appellant as jagirdar in his jagir were extinguished and by the Commutation Regulation, the quantum of compensation payable to him was determined by pre-Constitution legislation. The Regulations were competently promulgated in exercise of legislative authority in that behalf; and the Constitution does not operate retrospectively to revive the rights which had been, before it was enact-ed, extinguished. The Constitution has, except as otherwise expressly provided, no retrospective opera-tion: Keshavan Mailha.va Menon v. State of Bombay('); and rights which were by legislation extinguished, before it was enacted, are not revived thereby. At the commencement of the Constitution, the appellant had, therefore, no rights in the jagirs and he, obvious-ly, could not claim writ of mandamus directing (r\ [195t) S.C.R. 228.

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delivery of possession of the jagir, or writ directing z96° commutation otherwise than under the provisions of Sarwarlal , the Commutation Regulation. It may also be observed v. that the Parliament has, by the Constitution (1st State of Hyderabad Amendment) Act, included the Abolition and the _ -· -· · -Commutation Regulations in the ninth schedule, and Shah]. by virtue of Art. 3l(B), the two Regulations are exempt from challenge on the ground that they are inconsistent with or take away or abridge any of the fundamental rights conferred by Part III of the Constitution.The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed with costs.

Civil Appeal No. 686 of 1957.

This appeal raises the same question which has been decided in the companion Appeal No. 392of1956 and for reasons set out therein, this appeal must fail and is dismissed with costs.

Appeals dismissed.

JAIKRISHNADAS MANOHARDAS DESAI AND ANOTHER

THE STATE OF BOMBAY

(JAFER IMAM, K. N. WANCHOO and J. 0. SHAH, JJ.)

Criminal Breach of Trust-Ingredients of-(:ommon inte~tion­Meaning of-Indian Penal Code (XLV ojI86o), ss. 409, 34.

The first appellant was the Managing Director and the second appellant Director and technical expert of cloth dyeing concern known as Parikh Dyeing and Printing Mills Ltd. The company entered into contract with the Textile Commissioner undertaking to dye large quantity of cloth which was supplied to the company for'i:hat purpose. In pursuance of the contract certain quantity of cloth was dyed and delivered to the Textile Commissioner by the company but it failed to dye and deliver the balance of cloth which remained in its possession and was not returned to the Textile Commissioner in spite of repeated demands. Ultimately the two appellants were prosecuted for criminal breach of trust under s. 409 read with s. 34 of the Indian Penal Code and were convicted for the same in trial by jury.

March z6.