NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION versus PRITAM SINGH GILL AND OTHERS

NATIONAL BUILDINGS CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION

PRITAM SINGH GILL AND OTHERS March 29, 1972

[C. A. VAIDIALINGAM, I. D. DUA AND G. K. MITTER, JJ.]

industrial Disputes Act (14 of 1947), s. 33C(2)-Scope af-'Work-.111an', if includes une }Vhose services have been terminated.

The respondent, an employee of the appellant was suspended and the suspension remained in force till the date of his dismissal. He ap-plied to the Labour Court under s. 33C{2) of the Jndrutrial Disputes Act, 1947, for computation of the benefits and amounts he was entitled to receive during the period of suspemion, and the Labour Court decided .in his favour.

On the question whether the section can be invoked by dismissed workman in respect of benefits and salary due to him for the perioC prior tc the date of dismissal,

HELD: The suo-section provides that where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and if any question· arises as to the amount due, then the question may be decided by the appropriate 'Labour Court. The definition of 'workman' in s. 2(s) of the Act in-cludes within its fold, only, for the purpose of proceeding ur.der the Act in <elation to an industrial dispute. persons who have been dismissed, .discharged or retrenched in connection with or as consequence of that dispute or, whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to that dispute. The definitivn specifically excludes from its purvie•v four-catcgo'ries of perrnns •omployed in an industry, who would have otherwise been wit'1in the periphery of the definition. But, because the definition 'includes only specified types of dismissed, discharged or retrenched ·workmen for limited purposes and expressly excludes certain ·categories of persons, it cannot, on that account, be contended that the definition is precise and exact and cannot be extendod to other dismissed, discharged or retr.enched workmen, whose claim I'equiring computation 'is in respect of an existing right arising out of his relationship as an in-.dustrial workman of his employer. [501!-E, 5JA.(:J

The definition section begins with the clause, 'unless there is anything repugnant in thr.;!. subject or context.' The context and the subject matter are accordingly important factors. because, all parts of the Act have to be in harmony with the statutory intent. The object of enacting the section \vas to enable individual \vorkmen to implement, enforce or exe-cute their existing individual rights against their employers without bein~ compelled to have· :r.ecourse to s. 10 by raisin~ disputes and securing reference which is obviously lengthy process. It clothes the Labour Court with powers ·similar to those of an exeduting court so that the con-o!rncd workman eets speedv relief. It therefore calls fclr broad and 'beneficial construction, consistent with the other provisions of the Act, which should serve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mi•chief. The mischief which the section was designed to suppress was the difficulty ·faced by individual workmen in getting reliet in ·respect of their existirig

rights without ha•ing resort to s. 10 of the Act. Therefore, the term 'workman' as used in the sub-section must include all persons whose claim, requiring compuation under the sub-section, is in respect of Qll existing right arising from his relationshiP' as an industrial workman with his empley.ir. Otherwise, it would always be open to an unfair, unsym-pathetic and unscrupulous employer to terminate the services of his em-ployee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by the section and .compel hiril to have reso'rt to th,e lengthy procedure by way of re-ferenc-~ •under s. 10, the{J:by defeating the very purpose and object of enacting the provi~ion. [51E-A, 52CA-ElChief Mining Engineer, Eost In:dia Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar & Ors. [196&] 1 S.C.R. 140, UP. Electric Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla, Al.R. 1970 S.C. 237, R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand Mills Co. (P) Ltd. v. lhe Labour Court, Nagpur, A.I.R. 1972 S.C. 451 and Bennl!t Coltman & Co. (P) Ltd. v. Punya Priya Das Gupta, [1970] 1 S.C.R. 131, referred to.

Central Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopa/an, f1964] 3 S.C.R. and Ke.1>oram Cotton Mills v. Gangadhar, [1964] 2 S.C.R. 809, distin-~uished.

Tiruchi-Srirangan1 J'ra11sport Co., (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madurai, 0 11961] I L.L.J. 729, Manicka Mudaliai· (M) v. Labour CourD, Madras. ii961) 1 L.L.J. 592, Bachittar Singh v. Central Labour Court, Jul/under, A.I .R. 1969 Punjab 187, Managemeht of Government Soap Factor,r, BanJ?(llore v.. The Presiding Officer, Labour CQurt, BanKalore, .1.R. J 9i0 Mys. 225 and U.P. Electric Supply Co, Lid. ,v. Assi>tant Labour Co1111nfa·sioner, Allahabad, approved.

This judgment should not be considered as an expression- of opinion on the int·Jrpretation of .s. 20 read with '· 2 ( 1) of the Minimum Wages Act. 1948.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal N6. 1171 of 1970.

Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated February 18, 1970 of the Labour Court, Delhi in L.C.A. No. 709 of 1968.

· 0. P. Malhotra, N. S. Das Bahl, P. S. Mahindru and Sat Pa/, for the appellant. :,, D. Adlakha, Promod Swarup and S. S. Khandu;a, for respon-dent No. I. ·

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

Dua, J. Facts necessary for understanding the short but im-portant point arising for decision in this appeal by special leave are these :

The appellant is company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 with its registered office in New Delhi. Its entire share capital has been subscribed by the Central Government. Pritam Singh Gill, respondent no. 1, in this appeal was cmµloyed by the 4-Ll208Sup Cl/72

appellant as Junior Engineer at its Bhopal office with effect from the 9th November, .1962 at Rs. 280/- p.m. as basic salary with other allowances. On October 5, 1964 he was suspended and this order of suspension remained in force till September 18, 1967. He was dismissed from service on September 19, 1967. During the period of suspension, on October 7, 1965, the respondent was trans-ferred to Delhi. On June 15, 1968 the respondent applied to the Labour Court at Delhi under s. 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 194 7 (hereinafter called the Act) for computing the benefits and amount he was entitled to receive alleging that the appellant had not paid to him such amounti and benefits. The appellant contested the respondent's claim on various grounds. The Labour Court framed the following four issues :

"L Whether the application is not legally maintain-able?

2. Whether this court has no .iurisdiction to entertain

this petition ?

3. Whei!her the petitioner has been dismissed with

effect from 19-9-1967, if so its effect?

4. Whether ·the applicant is entitled to any of the

benefits claimed ?"

and decided all of them in favour of the respondent who was held entitled to Rs. 5,195/- as balance of salary at the rate of Rs. 150/-p.ni. for the period of suspension and also other allowances, the total amount computed being Rs. 10,259.98 ..

Before us the appellant only questioned the jurisci1ction of the Labo'.lr Court to entertain the respondent's application under s. 33C(2) of the Act because, according to the submission, the res-oondent, having already been dismissed, had ceased to be work-man on the date of the application. After his dismfrsal, argued Shri Malhotra learned counsd for the appellant, the respondent ceased to be workman and had, therefore, po locus standi . to approach the Labour Court under s. 3 3C(2) and the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the respondent's application, The date of the application under s. 33C (2) of the Act, contended the counsel, is the crucial ooint of time, when it is to be seen whether or not the applicant is workman. 'The respondent on the other hand emphasised that if the period, in respect of which the benefits and amount are claimed under s. 3 3C(2) of the Act, was during the course of his employment prior to his dismissal, then. the mere fact, that he was dismissed by his employer before he could apply to the Labour Court under s. 33C(2), would not deprive him of his right to claim relief under that section. The sole question we are thus called upon to decide is, whether s. 33C(2) can be invoked by dismissed workman in respect of benefits and salary due to

·' him for the period prior to the date of his dismissal. It may be stated that the appellant did not contend that workman under suspension is disentitled to seek relief under s. 33C(2) and indeed, it was specifically conceded that suspended workman could invoke this section for relief because by suspension he does not ce;i,, ~ to be workman as defi.ned in the Act. Tht! question posed is n pure qucstion of law deprnding on the construction of the relevant statutory provisions.

The Act was brought on the statute book for making provi;ion for the investigation and settlement of.industrial disputes and for certain other purposes. Section 2(s) defin~s "workman" to mean "any person (including an apprentice) employed in any indust1y · to do any skilled or unskilled manual, supervisory, technical or cleiical work for hire.or reward, whether the terms of employment be express or implied, and for the purposes of any proceeding under this Act in relation to an industrial dispute, include> any such per-son Who has been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with, or as conseque!}ce of, that dispute, or whose dismissal. discharge 9r retrenchment has led to that dispute, but does not include any such person-

(i) who is subject to the Army Act, J 950, or the Air Force Act, 1950 or the Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934; or

(ii) who is employed in the police service or as an officer or other employee of prison; or

(iii) who is employed mainly in managerial or ad-ministrative capacity; or

(iv) who, being employed in supervisory capacity, draws wages exceeding five hundred rupees per mensem or exercises, either by the nature of the duties <tltr1ched to the office or by reason of the powers vested in him, functions mainly of managerial nature."

It is norewor.thy that s. 2 by its opening words expressly includes the operation of this section in case of repugnancy in the subject or context. Section 33C provides for recovery of money due from an employer and sub·s. (2) of this section reads as under :-·

"(2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the e1.nployer any ~oney or any benefit w~ich is capable of bemg computed m terms of money and 1f any question arises as to the amount of money due or as to the amount at which such benefit should be computed, then the ques-tion may, subject to any rules that may be made under thfa Act, be decided by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government."

[1973] 1 S.C.R.

According to the appellant's submission, under s. 33C(2) the ap-plicant cannot claim that his dismissal is unlawful arid that he should, therefore, be deemed to be in service and on that basis entitled to receive salary or wages under the pre-existing contract. Now, if challenge to his dismissal is not open under this provision of law then the respondent must be considered to be dismissed workman. and, therefore, outside the purview of "workman" as defined ins. 2(s). dismissed workman, the argument proceeded, is to be considered as workman under this provision only for the purposes of that proceeding under the Act in relation to an indus-trial dispute, which has either arisen out of, or resulted in or is connected with, his dismissal. In support of this submission he relied on the Central Bank of India v. P. S. Rajagopalan('). At p. 156 of the report it was observed there that:

"If an employee is dismissed or demoted and it is his case that the dismissal or demot.ion is wrongful, it would not be open to him to make claim for the recovery of his salary or wages under s. 33C(2). His dw1otion or dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which.may be appropriately triJ:d, but once it Is shown that the em-ployer has dismissed or demoted him, claim. that the tlismissal or demotion is unlawful and, therefore, the em-ployee continues be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under pre-existing contract, cannot be made under s. 33C(2)."

Reference was also made on behalf of the appellants to Messrs Kesoram Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Gangadhar & ors. ([2 ]) where it is ob. served at p. 823 : ·

"Ordinarily, tile law is tha~ workman may be sus-pended pending enquiry and disciplinary action. If after the enquiry the mis_i;conduct is proved the workman is dis-missed and is not entitled to any wages for the suspension · period; but if the inquiry results in the reinstatement of the workman he is entitled to full wages for the suspen-sion period also along witll reinstatement unless the em-ployer instead of dismissing the employee can give hini lesser P.Unishment by way of ~ithholding of part of the wages for the suspension, period."

These observations were made in an entirely different context and have notlling to do with the narrow point on which alcne the ap-pellant based his challenge to the judgment impugned in this appeal. The case cited has not the remotest connection with s. 33C of the Act. The decision iii the Central Bank of India .v. Ra;agopa/an (1) [1964] 3 S.C.R. 140. (!) [1694] ! S.C.R. 809.

(supra) also in our opinion, does not assist us in deciding the q~es­tion requiring determination because the respondent before us clanns · relief with respect to the period of suspension prior to his dismissal and the jurisdiction of the Labour Court is not questioned by the appellant on the ground that the only relief available to the respon-dent is to raise an industrial dispute with regard to his dismissal. The respondent in the present case is not seeking relief against his dismissal as indeed consistentay with the order of dismissal his claim is confined to the benefits and amount which he was entitled to receive for the peri_od prior to his dismissal. However, the de cision irr Central Bank of India v. Rajagopalan (supra) does trace the legislative history of Chapter VA and s. 33C of the Act 3ad after doing so, the Court observed :

"In our opinion, on fair and reasonable construc-tion of sub-s. (2) it is clear that if workman's right to receive the benefit is dispute, that may have to be deter-mined by the Labour Court. Before proceeding to ~om­pute the benefit in terms of money the Labour Court in. evitably has to deal with the question as to whether the workman has right to receive that benefit. If the said right is not disputed, nothing mote needs to be done and the Labour Court can proceed to compute the value of the benefit in terms of ivoney; but if the said right is disputed, the Labour Court must deal wilh that question and decide whether the workman has the right to' receive the benefit as alleged by him and it is only if the Labour Court answers this point in favour of the workman that the next question of making necessary computation can arise."

And again,

"Besides, it seems to us that if the appellant's cons-F truction is accepted, it would necessarily mean that it would be at the option of the employer to allow the work-man to avail himself of the remedy provided by sub-s.(2) because he has merely to raise an objection on the ground that the right claimed by the workman is not admitted to oust the jurisdiction of the Labour Court to entertain the workman's application. The claim under s. 33C(2) clear-ly postulates that the determination of the question about computing the benefit in terms of money may, in some cases, have to be preceded by an enquiry into the existence of the right and such an enquiry must be held to be in-cidental to the main detennination which has been assig-ned to the Labour Court by sub-s. (2)."

Section 33C of the Act has been the subject matter of several judicial pronouncements. This Court has also dealt with this sec-1ion in several decisions. In Chief Mining Engineer, East India

Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameswar & ors.([1]) this Court deduced from three of its earlier decisions the following propositions·:-

"( 1) The legisl.ative history indicates that the legisla-ture, after providing broadly for the inve:.tigation and settlement of dispu.tes on the basis of collective bargain-ing, recognised the need of indivi.dunl workmen of speedy remedy to enforce their exis~ing individual rights and therefore inse.ted s. 33A in 1950 ands. 33C in 1956. These two sections illustrate cases in which individual workmen can enfor~e t~eir rights without having to take recourse to s. 10( !) and without having to depend on their union to espouse their case:(2) In view of this history two considerations are re-levant while construing the scope of s. 3 3C. Where in-dustrial disputes arise between workmen acting collec-tively and their employers such disputes must be adjudi-cated upon in the manner prescribed by the Act, as for instance under s. 10(1). But having regard to the legis-lative policy to provide speedy remedy to individual workmen for enforcing their existing rights, it would not be reasonable to exclude their existing rights sCJught to be implemented by individual workmen. Therefore though in determining the scope of s. 33C care should be taken not to exclude cases which legitimately fall within its purview, cases which fall, for instance, under s. 10(1), cannot be brought under s. 33C;

(3) Section 33C which is in terms similar to ~hose in s. 21) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 is provision in the nature of an executing provision;

( 4) Section. 33C(l) applies to cases where money is

due to workman under an award or settlement or under Chapter VA of the Act already calculated and ascer-tained and therefore there is no dispute about its computa-tion. But sub-section 2 applies both to non-monetary as well as m!lnetary benefits. In the case of nionetary benefi~ it applies where such· benefit though due is not calculated and there is dispute about its calculation;

(5) Section 33C(2) takes within its purview cases of workmen who claim that the benefit to which they are entitled should be computed in terms of money even. ·though the right to the benefit on which their claim is

based is dispute"d by their employers. It is open to the Labour Court to intepret the award or settlement on which the workmen's rights rests.'

( 6) The fact that the words of limitation used in s. 20(2) of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act, 1950 l\fe omitted ins. 33C(2) shows that the scope of s. 33C(2) is wider than that ;ifs. 33C(l). Therefore, whereas sub-section 1 is confined to claims arising under an award or 8ettlement or Chapter VA, claims which can be entertained under sub-section 2 are not so confined to those under an award, settlement or Chapter VA.

(7) Though the court did not indicate which cases other than those under sub-section 1 would fall under sub-section 2 it pointed out illustrative cases which would not fall under sub-section .2 viz. cases which would appropriately be adjudicated under s. 10( 1) or claims which have already been the subject-matter of £ettlement to which ss. 18 and 19 would apply.

(8) Since proceedings under s. 33C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit clanrted by workman is in such cases in the position of an executing court, the Labour Court like the ex~uting court in execu-tion proceedings governed by the Code of Civil Procedure, is competent under s. 33C(2) to interpret the award or settlement where the benefit is claimed under such award or set:lement and it would be open to it to consider the plea of nullity where the award is made without jurisdiction.

In lf_.P. Electric Supply Co. v. R. K. Shukla(') this Court ap-provmgly referred to passage fro111 the judgment in Chief Min-ing Engineer, East India Coal Co. Ltd. (supra), already repro-duced by us, in which, inter alia, it was emphasised that Labour Court had jurisdiction to entertain 'claim in respect of an exist-ing right arising from the relationship of an industrial workman and.his employer. Again in R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand Mills Co. (P) Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur(") this Court after review ?f its previous ?ecision_s, ~pheld the jurisdiction ~f the Labour Court to e~tertam appltcat1on for lay-off compensation under s. 33C observmg that such jurisdiction could not be ousted by mere pl.ea denying the workman's claim to computation of ~ad the benefit . m terms of to _go_ m_to. the question and determine whether on the facts .money, adding that the Labour Court 1t had 1unsd1cl!on to make the computation.

We now turn to so_me decisions of thl: High Courts which directly deal with this point. In Tiruchi-Srirangam Transport Co., (P) Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madurai([1]) Ramachandra Ayyar J., repelled similar contention as was raised before us by Shri Malhotra on behalf of the appellarn. In tl1e case cited one Iswaran was employed as traffic supervisor in Tiruchi-Sriran-gam Transport Co., (P) Ltd. His services were terminated in December, 1956 under scheme of retrenchment. Later, dis-putes were raised bet;ween the management and other workers regarding bonus for the years 1955-56 and 1956-57 and set-tlement was reached in April, 1958 pursuant to which the mana-gement declared additional bonus and one month's wage for each of the two years. Iswaran having not been paid anything by way of bonus though he had worked during those two years ap-plied to the Labour Court for necessary relief under s. 33C(2) of the Act. The Labour Court having granted the relief claimed. the management approached the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution questioning the _jurisdiction of the Labour Court: to entertain Iswaran's claim. The High Court repelled this chal-lenge though on an other point relating to the claimant's right to benefit under the settlement, the case was remitted back to the Labour Court for fresh decision. It was observed in that de-cision that while enacting s. 13C(2), the Legislature did not in-tend merely to provide remedy for the limited class of persons who are in actual employment on the date of the application under that section. The words "any workman" in s. 33C(2), according to that decision, would mean workman who would be entitled to benefits conferred under the Act and would necessarilv include discharged workman as well. In Manicka Mudaliar · (M) v. Labour Court, Madras(") Division Bench of the Madras High Court, while hearing writ appeal, from the decision of learned single Judge of that Court also upheld the competency of peti-tion under s. 33C(2) of the Act for arrears of salary and one month.'s salarv in lieu of notice, although at the time of the ap-plication the ·applicant was no longer in service of the employer. Following these Madras decisions learned single Judge of the Pw:jab & Haryana High Court in Bachittar Singh v. · Central Labour Court, Jullundur([8]), Division Bench of the Mysore High Court in ·The Management of Government Soap Factory, Bangalore v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court Bangalore(') and the Allahabad High Court in U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd., v. Assistant Labour Commissioner, Allahabad(") took the same view. In the Allahabad case, however, the provision which directly came up for construction was s. 6H of the U.P. Industrial

(2\ [1961] I L.L.J. 59~. (4) A.I. R. 1970 Mys. ~~>.

(I) [1961] I L.L.J. 729.

(3) A.T.R. 1%9 Punjab 187.

(5) [1966] 11 l..L.J. 715.

Disputes Act, the language of which was considered to be identi-cal with that of s. 33C of the Act. Incidentally it may be. pointed out that s. 6H of the.U.P. Industrial Disputes Act has been held to be identical with s. 3 3C of the Act even by this Court.

Shri Malhotra, learned counsel for the appellant, contended that all these decisions require reconsideration because they ignore vital point in construing ~. 2(s) which defines "workman". This definition has already been reproduced. Accor'.iing to the appel-lanfs submission these decisions have ignored the vital point that the definition of "workman" specifically includes within its fold, only for the purpose of proceeding under the Act in relation to an industrial dispute, persons who have been dismissed, discharged or retrenched in connection with or as consequence of that. dis-pute or, whose dismissal, discharge or retrenchment has led to thlit dispute. Since certain categories of persons are also '.llx-pressly stated not to be included in this definition the Legislature must, 11ccording io the argument, be c01isidered to have intended to define this word with exactitude and precision and its scope, 0 therefore, cannot be extended to the. dismissed, discharged or re-trenched persons except strictly for the purposes of the proceed-ings expressly mentioned in. the inclusive clause. The fact that the definition also specifically excludes from its purview four cate-gories of persons employed in an industry who would have other-wise been within the periphery of the definition shows that the legislature intended to be meticulously precise leaving no scope for ru1y !nt~ndment extending the literal meaning ot the language used to di<m1ssed employees for purposes of other proceedinas not spe-cified in s. 33C(2) of the Act. The definition. >aid Shri°Malhotnl, is exhaustive rendering its extension impermissible. The counsel also commented on the recent decision of this Court in R. B. Bansilal Abhirchand Mills Co. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nag-F pur (supra). Accor4ing to Shri Malhotra this decision does not touch the question whether dismissed employee can be con-sidered as workman for the purpose of approaching. the Labour Court under s. 33C(2) of the Act and he emphasised that this case should be considered to be confined. to its own facts. The further contention pressed by Shri Malhotra was that the respon-dent's claim raises an industrial dispute and, therefore, it would be more appropriate for him to claim reference under s. l 0 of the Act. This contention being based only on the appellant's denial of the claim cannot exclude the applicability of s. 33C(2). He also made reference to the decision of this Court in Bennet Coleman & Co., (P) Ltd. v. Punya Priya Das Gupta(!) which was concern~.d with the Workinl! Journalists (f'onditions of.Ser-H vice) and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 45 of 1955 and contend-ed ·that in that decision the definitions iI1 s. 2( c) and (f) of that

Act itook within t!ieir fold. persons who were no longer in the employment of the1r erstwhile employer against whom their claim ~as !flade, provided the claim related to period when they were m his employment. Shri Malhotra pointed out that in the re-ported case t~e~e was no clause in .the statutory definition including therem for bm1ted purposes certain persons otherwise not within the definition and excluding therefrom certain other categories of persons who would otherwise fall within the definition. This is how that case was sought to be distinguished from the present. The crucfal point which requires consideration on the appellant's :ugument is thus confined to the· precise scope and meaning of the word "workman" used in s. 33C(2) in the background of the definition of this word as contained in s. 2(s).Now, it is noteworthy that s. 2 of the Act, which is the de-finition section begins, as is usual with m<>St of the definition sections, with the clause, "unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context''. This clearly indicates that it is always matter for argument whether or not, this statutory definition is to apply to the word "workman" as 119"..,d in the particular clause of the Act which is under consideration,. for this word may both be restricted or expanded by its subject matter. Th~. context and the subject matter in connection with which the word "workman" is used are accordingly important factors having bearing on the question. The propriety or necessity of thus construin.e; the word "workman" is obvious because all parts of the Act have to be in ha1mony with the statutory intent. Keeping this in mind we may tum to the purpose and object of s. 33C of the Act. This section was enacted for Che purpose of enabling individual workmen to implement, enforce or execute their existing individual rights against their employers without being compelled to have recourse to s. 10 by raising disoutes and securing reference which is obvi-ously lengthy process. Section 33C of the Act ha~ accordingly been described as .provision which clothes the Labour Court with the powers similar to those of an executing court so that the work-man concerned receives speedy relief in respect of his existing indi-vidual rights. The primary purpose of the section being to pro-vide the aggrieved workman with forum similar to the executing courts, it calls for broad and beneficial construcHon consistently with other provisions. of the Act, which should ~erve to advance the remedy and to suppress the mischief. It may appropriately be pointed out that the mischief which s. 33C was designed to sup-. press was the difficulties faced by individual workinen in getting relief in respect of their existing rights without having reso1t to " l 0 of the Act. To accept the argument of the appellant, it would always h<" open to an unfair, unsympathetic and unscrupul-ous employer ro terminate the services of his employee in order to deprive him of the benefit conferred by s. 33C and compel

him to have resort to the lengthy procedure by way of reference under s. 10 of the Act thereby defeating the very purpose and object of enacting this 11rovision This, in our view, quite clearly brings out the repugnancy visualised in the opening part o: s. '1. of the Act and such position could hardly have been contem-B plated by the legislature. In order to remove this repugnancy s. 33C(2) must be so construed as to take: within its fold workman, who was employed during the period in respect of which he claims rnlief, even though he is no longer employed at the time of the application. In other words the (erm "workman" as used in s. 33C(2) includes all persons whose claim, requiring computa-tion under this sub-section, is in respect of an existing right arising . from his relationship as an industrial workman with his employer. By adopting this construction alonir can we advance the remedy and suppress the mischief in accordance with the purpose and object'of inserting s. 33C in the Act. We are, therefore, inclined to agree with the view taken by the Madras decisions and we approve of their approach. According to Shri Malhotra, in cases where there is no dispute about the emp.loyee's right which is not denied, he will be entitled to file suit. Whether or not the right of suit can b_e claimed by the employee, we are not persuaded on the basis of this argument. to ac~ept the construc-tion convassed on behalf of the appellant and deny to dis-missed employee the benefit of speedy remedy uuder s. 33C(2) of the Act.We me a,ware of conflict of decisions in some High Courts on the interpretation of s. 20 read withs. 2(i) of the Minimum Wages Act, 12 of 1948. This aspect was not canvassed before us and, therefore, we should not be deemed to express any opinion on the conectness or otherwise of either view. We are referring to this aspect only to make it clear that our deci;ion must be confined to the construction of the provisions of the Act and we must not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the construction of the Minimum Wages Act. In the Madras High Court two single Judges have taken divergent view; and the Kerala High Court agreed wi1h the view that the employees under the Minimum Wages Act need not be in the employment l)t the tim;;: of ti1eir applications under s. 20 of the Minimum Wages Act wilereas the Punjab High Court on the other hand agreed with the contrary view of the Madras High Court. The language of s. 20 of the Minimum Wages

Act is not completely identical with that of s. 33C(2)of the Act and the relevant clauses of the definition sections in the two sta-tutes are also somewhat differently worded. Without any further discussion on this aspect we are content to observe that this judg-ment should not be considered as an expression of opinion on the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Minimum Wages Act.

A!. result of the foregoing discussion, this appeal fails and is dismissed with costs.

Appeal dismissed.