MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU versus PEDDIREDDIGARI RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS.

[2018] 9 S.C.R.

AMADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU

PEDDIREDDIGARI RAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 9466-9468 of 2016)

BMARCH 21, 2018

[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR ANDDR. D. Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]

Representation of People Act, 1951 – ss. 83 and 100(1)(a)and (d)(i), 101 and 125A(i) – Appellant challenged the election ofCrespondent no.1 by filing election petition before the High Courtalleging that respondent no.1 had grossly violated severalinstructions issued by the Election Commission and also theprovisions of the Representation of People Act – Respondent no.1,in turn, filed two applications and sought to strike out paragraphsD2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition u/Or. VI, r.16 and to dismiss theelection petition in limine u/Or. VII, r.11, both of which were allowedby the High Court – Propriety of – On appeal, held: Not proper –The approach of the High Court in considering the two applicationswas manifestly erroneous – It had ventured into the area of analysisof the matter on merit – That was prohibited area at that stage –EHigh Court misdirected itself in concluding that the election petitiondid not disclose any cause of action with or without paragraphs 2& 9 to 11 of election petition – There was discernible pleading as towhat objections were taken before the Returning officer and as towhy he was in error in not rejecting the nomination of respondentFno.1 – The said paragraphs plainly disclosed the facts, which werematerial facts for adjudicating the grounds for declaring the electionof respondent no.1 as being void, because of improper acceptanceof his nomination form by the Returning officer – Averments madein the concerned paragraphs of the election petition were notfrivolous and vexatious – The election petition would have to beGexamined as whole without subtracting any portion thereform –Not possible to take view that the same did not disclose any causeof action – Thus, applications filed by the respondent No.1 in thesubject election petition rejected – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 –Or. VI, r.17 and Or. VII, r.11 – Election Laws.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. It is well settled that the election petition willhave to be read as whole and cannot be dissected sentence-wise or paragraph-wise to rule that the same does not disclose acause of action. Cause of action embodies bundle of facts whichmay be necessary for the plaintiffs to prove in order to get arelief from the Court. The reliefs claimed by the appellant arefounded on grounds inter alia ascribable to Section 100(1)(d)(i)of the Representation of People Act, 1951. Further relief hasbeen claimed to declare the appellant as having been electedunder Section 101 of the 1951 Act. The cause of action for filingthe election petition, therefore, was perceptibly in reference tothe material facts depicting that the nomination form of respondentNo.1 was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer. [Para21] [187-D-E]

2. The High Court misdirected itself in concluding that theelection petition did not disclose any cause of action with orwithout paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition. Indeed,the pleadings of the election petition should be precise and clearcontaining all the necessary details and particulars as requiredby law. ‘Material facts’ would mean all the basic facts constitutingthe ingredients of the grounds stated in the election petition inthe context of relief to declare the election to be void. It is wellestablished that in an election petition, whether particular factis material or not and as such required to be pleaded, is questionwhich depends on the nature of the grounds relied upon and thespecial circumstances of the case. [Para 22] [187-G-H; 188-A-B]3. The averments in the concerned paragraphs of theelection petition, by no standard can be said to be frivolous andvexatious as such. The High Court committed manifest error inentering into the tenability of the facts and grounds urged insupport thereof by the appellant on merit, as is evident from thecogitation in paragraphs 16 to 22 of the impugned judgment. [Para29] [195-C-D]

4. The High Court has opined that the contents ofparagraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition did not furnish“any” material facts but were only in the nature of fulminating

Aand lampooning order of the Returning Officer for having undulyrejected the objections taken by the appellant whilst acceptingthe nomination form submitted by respondent No.1. The HighCourt broadly referred to the contents of the concernedparagraphs of the election petition, but the analysis of the HighCourt in that behalf is not correct. Paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of theBelection petition plainly disclose the facts, which are material factsfor adjudicating the grounds for declaring the election ofrespondent No.1 as being void, because of improper acceptanceof his nomination form by the Returning Officer (respondentNo.8). [Para 30] [195-E-G]

5. The approach of the High Court in considering the twoapplications is manifestly erroneous, if not perverse. For, it hasventured into the arena of analysis of the matter on merit. That isa prohibited area at this stage. Since the conclusion reached bythe High Court that the pleadings in paragraphs 2 and 9 to 11 ofDthe election petition are frivolous and vexatious is untenable, itwould necessarily follow that the election petition, as filed, willhave to be examined as whole without subtracting any portiontherefrom. If so read, it is not possible to take view that thesame does not disclose any cause of action at all. On this finding,the application preferred by respondent no.1 for rejection ofEelection petition in limine under Order VII Rule 11, cannot becountenanced and must also fail. [Para 33] [199-D-F]

6. In light of the above, both applications filed by respondentNo.1 in the subject election petition, deserve to be rejected.Further, the Election Petition shall stand restored to the file ofFthe High Court to its original number for being proceeded furtherin accordance with law. Similarly, the applications filed by theappellant shall stand restored (except the application for earlyhearing), to their original numbers to be decided by the HighCourt in accordance with law. [Para 42] [203-A-B]

GMohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba (1994) 2 SCC 392 :[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 850; Harkirat Singh v. AmrinderSingh (2005) 13 SCC 511 : [2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 817– relied on.

MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARIRAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS.

Azhar Hussain v. Rajiv Gandhi 1986 (Supp) SCC 315 :[1986] SCR 782; Ram Sukh v. Dinesh Aggarwal (2009)10 SCC 541 : [2009] 14 SCR 836; Pendyala VenkataKrishna Rao v. Pothula Rama Rao 2005 (3) ALD 47;Hari Shanker jain v. Sonia Gandhi (2001) 8 SCC 233 :[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 38; Nandiesha Reddy v. KavithaMahesh (2011) 7 SCC 721 : [2011] 8 SCR 154; PothulaRama Rao v. Pendyala Venkata Krishna Rao and Ors.(2007) 11 SCC 1 : [2007] 8 SCR 982; Kisan ShankarKathore v. Arun Dattatray (2014) 14 SCC 162 : 2014(7) SCR 258; Krishnamoorthy v. Siva Kumar and others(2015) 3 SCC 467 : [2015] 4 SCR 987; ResurgenceIndia v. Election Commission of India (2014) 14 SCC189 : [2013] 9 SCR 360; Duni Chand v. State ofHimachal Pradesh & Ors. (2014) 16 SCC 152; KuldeepSingh Pathania v. Bikram Singh Jaryal (2017) 5 SCC345; D. Ramachandran v. RV Jankiraman & Ors. (1999)3 SCC 267 : [1999] 1 SCR 983; Asharaf Kokkur v. KVAbdul Khader & Ors. (2015) 1 SCC 129 : [2014]7 SCR 1123; Virender Nath Gautam v. Satpal Singh &Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 617 : [2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 413;Mohd. Akbar v. Ashok Sahu & Ors. (2015) 14 SCC519; RK Roja v. US Rayudu & Anr. (2016) 14 SCC 725;Mairembam Prithviraj v. Pukhrem SharathchandraSingh (2017) 2 SCC 487 : [2016] 9 SCR 687; ShriBalwant Singh v. Sri Laxmi Narain AIR 1960 SC 770 :[1960] SCR 91; Samant N. Balkrishna & Anr. v. GeorgeFernandez & Ors. 1969 (3) SCC 238 : [1969] 3 SCR603; L.R. Shivaramagowda & Ors. v. T.M.Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs & Ors. (1999) 1 SCC666 : [1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 241; , Ram Sukh v. DineshAggarwal (2009) 10 SCC 541 : [2009] 14 SCR 836;Mangani Lal Mandal v. Bishnu Deo Bhandari (2012) 3SCC 314 : [2012] 1 SCR 527; Shambhu Prasad Sharmav. Charandas Mahant & Ors. (2012) 11 SCC 390 :[2012] 6 SCR 356; Hukumdev Narain Yadav v. LalitNarain Mishra (1974) 2 SCC 133 : [1974] 3 SCR 31;K. Venkateswara Rao & Anr. v. Bekkam NarasimhaReddi & Ors. [1969] 1 SCR 679; Harmohinder Singh

APradhan v. Ranjeet Singh Talwandi & Ors. (2005) 5SCC 46 : [2005] 3 SCR 952; Hari Shanker Jain v. SoniaGandhi (2001) 8 SCC 233 : [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 38;Tek Chank v. Dile Ram (2001) 3 SCC 290 : [2001]1 SCR 527; M. Kamalam v. V.A. Syed Mohammed (1978)2 SCC 659 : [1978] 3 SCR 446; G.M. Siddeshwar v.BPrasanna Kumar(2013) 4 SCC 776 : [2013]4 SCR 1107; V. S. Achuthanandan v. P. J. Francis(1999) 3 SCC 737 : [1999] 2 SCR 99; PonnalaLakshmaiah v. Kommuri Pratap Reddy (2012) 7 SCC788 : [2012] 6 SCR 851; Samant N. Balkrishna v.CGeorge Fernandez (1969) 3 SCC 238 : [1969] 3 SCR603; Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Ors. v. Owners and PartiesVessel M.V. Fortune Express and Ors. (2006) 3 SCC100 : [2006] 1 SCR 860; Virendra Nath Gautam v.Satpal Singh and Ors. (2007) 3 SCC 617 : [2006] 10Suppl. SCR 413; People’s Union for Civil Liberties v.DUnion of India(2003) 4 SCC 399 : [2003]2 SCR 1136; Durai Muthuswami v. N. Nachiappan andOrs. (1973) 2 SCC 45 : [1974] 1 SCR 40; Jagjit Singhv. Dharam Pal Singh and Ors. (1995) Suppl (1) SCC422; Vashist Narayan Sharma v. Dev Chandra & Ors.E[1955] 1 SCR 509 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

MADIRAJU VENKATA RAMANA RAJU v. PEDDIREDDIGARIRAMACHANDRA REDDY & ORS.

(2017) 5 SCC 345[1999] 1 SCR 983[2014] 7 SCR 1123[2006] 10 Suppl. SCR 413[2005] 5 Suppl. SCR 817(2015) 14 SCC 519(2016) 14 SCC 725[2016] 9 SCR 687[1960] SCR 91[1969] 3 SCR 603[1998] 3 Suppl. SCR 241[2009] 14 SCR 836[2012] 1 SCR 527[2012] 6 SCR 356[1974] 3 SCR 31[1969] 1 SCR 679[2005] 3 SCR 952[2001] 3 Suppl. SCR 38[2001] 1 SCR 527[1992] 3 Suppl. SCR 850[1978] 3 SCR 446[2013] 4 SCR 1107[1999] 2 SCR 99[2012] 6 SCR 851[1969] 3 SCR 603[2006] 1 SCR 860[2006] 10 Suppl.SCR 413

BCIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 9466-9468 of 2016.

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2016 of the High Courtof Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State ofAndhra Pradesh in E. P. No. 8 of 2014, E. A. No. 329 and 330 of 2015Cand E. P. No. 8 of 2015

Sidharth Luthra, Sr. Adv., Anand, K. S. Mahadevan, Ms. RajeshriNivuratirao Reddy, Advs. for the Appellant.

Raju Ramachandran, Sr. Adv., V. R. N. Prasanth, Sridhar Potaraju,Prabhat Kumar, Ms. Sindoora VNL, Ms. Ankita Sharma, GunturDPrabhakar, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. The present appeals emanatefrom the judgment and order dated 2[nd] August, 2016 of the High CourtEof Judicature at Hyderabad for Telangana and Andhra Pradesh, strikingoff paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition as also dismissing theelection petition, being Election Petition No.8 of 2014 filed by the appellantchallenging the election of respondent No.1.

F2. The election in relation to Andhra Pradesh State LegislativeAssembly was held on 7[th] May, 2014. The appellant and respondentNo.1 contested the election from the Punganur Assembly Constituency.The respondent No.1 was declared as an elected candidate. By way ofan election petition, the appellant challenged the election of respondentNo.1 on the ground that respondent No.1 had grossly violated severalGinstructions issued by the Election Commission as also the provisions ofThe Representation of the People Act, 1951 (for short, “the Act”).Respondent No.1, in turn, took out two applications seeking to strike outparagraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the said election petition and to dismiss theelection petition in limine, both of which were ultimately allowed by theHigh Court.H

3. The background to the present conflict is set out as under:

a. On 12[th] April, 2014, notice of election was issued, inter aliafor seat from the Punganur Assembly Constituency to the AndhraPradesh State Legislative Assembly;

b. Respondent No.1, member of the Yuvajana Shramika RythuCongress Party (YSRCP) filed his initial nomination form for theaforesaid elections on 12[th] April, 2014 along with two affidavitsand again, second nomination form on 17[th] April, 2014 with twofresh affidavits. Appellant, member of the Telugu Desham Party(TDP), filed his nomination form on 17[th] April, 2014.

c. After scrutiny of the nomination forms, on 21[st] April, 2014, atotal of 8 (eight) candidates, including the appellant and respondentNo.1, were found eligible to contest the elections;

d. Appellant had filed objections on the same day i.e. 21[st] April,2014, objecting to the acceptance of nomination forms ofrespondent No.1 on the ground that he had failed to sign everypage of the affidavits in support of his nomination forms and hadalso failed to fill up all the columns in his forms, contrary to therules prescribed in that regard. Respondent No.1 filed his counterto the said objection petition;

e. The Returning Officer rejected the objection petition on theground that the said petition needed no consideration and washence over-ruled;

f. The elections were held on 7[th] May, 2014, and results weredeclared on 16[th] May, 2014. Respondent No.1 was declared asthe elected candidate, having secured the highest number of validvotes. Appellant finished second while the remaining 6 (six)candidates lost their deposits;

g. Appellant then challenged the election of respondent No.1 byway of an election petition dated 25[th] June, 2014, under Section81 read with Sections 83, 100(1)(a) and (d)(i) of the Act beforethe High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad. He also sought adeclaration that he was the duly elected member of the StateLegislative Assembly of the 284-Punganur Assembly constituency;

h. Respondent No.1 then took out two applications in the saidpetition viz. E.A. No. 329 of 2015 under Order VI Rule 16 of theCode of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short “CPC”) for striking outthe averments made in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the electionpetition as being frivolous and vexatious, followed by E.A. No.330 of 2015 under Order VII Rule 11 of CPC seeking to dismissthe election petition for failing to disclose cause of action;

i. Appellant also took out miscellaneous applications for permissionto file rejoinder affidavit, expediting the election petition and fortaking note of suppression of material facts by respondent No.1;

j. The High Court vide its judgment dated 2[nd] August, 2016,(“impugned judgment”) allowed both the applications ofrespondent No.1, eventually dismissing the election petition forwant of cause of action. The High Court broadly considered threepoints. First, the sweep of the terms “material facts” and “causeof action” in reference to an election petition; second, whethermaterial facts and cause of action have been pleaded in the subjectelection petition necessitating trial; and, third, whether the electionpetition as filed deserved to be rejected in limine withoutconducting trial. While dealing with the first point, the HighCourt first discussed about the inter-play between Sections 81,83, 100 and 101 of the 1951 Act. It held that the mandate of theseprovisions is that the election petition must contain concisestatement of material facts on which the appellant relies and thatfor the election petition to succeed, the appellant should establishthat the nomination of the returned candidate was improperlyaccepted and further, due to such improper acceptance, the electionof the returned candidate has been materially affected. The HighCourt relied upon the cases of Azhar Hussain vs. Rajiv Gandhi,[1]Ram Sukh Vs. Dinesh Aggarwal,[2]Pendyala Venkata KrishnaRao Vs. Pothula Rama Rao,[3]Hari Shanker jain Vs. SoniaGandhi,[4]and Nandiesha Reddy Vs. Kavitha Mahesh[5] andculled out the principles as follows:-

1 1986 (1) (Supp) SCC 315

2 (2009) 10 SCC 541

3 2005 (3) ALD 47

4 (2001) 8 SCC 233

5 (2011) 7 SCC 721

“15) So, on compendious study of above precedentialjurisprudence we will understand:

(i) The phrase material facts employed in Section 83(1)(a)of R.P.Act has not been defined and its meaning is contextualone in given election petition.

(ii) Material facts or facta probanda are those basic,elementary and prime facts which the election petitioner shall pleadand if traversed prove for the Court to afford decree.

(iii) Whereas material particulars or facta probantia are theparticulars in the form of evidence further vivify, refine and makemore clear the material facts.

(iv) Material facts are the entire bundle of facts whichconstitute complete cause of action for the petitioner and totaldefence for the respondent.”

Having said this, the Court then analysed the averments in the electionpetition in the following words:-

“16) POINT No.2: I have carefully scrutinized the contents ofthe election petition to know whether the 1[st] respondent/electionpetitioner had pleaded all the relevant material facts and theyconstitute cause of action to proceed with trial. It is observed thatin his pleadings he has reproduced the five objections taken byhim before the 8[th] respondent/Returning Officer at the time ofscrutiny of nomination and reiterated that the Returning Officerhas rejected his objections contrary to the Conduct of the ElectionRules and guiding principles. He has given the table showing thevotes polled to each contesting candidate and pleaded that hestood second highest in the tally. As rightly contended by thepetitioner except fulminating that the Returning Officer hasunduly rejected his objections, the 1[st] respondent has notfurnished the material facts in his pleadings as to how inhis perception and in the eye of law, the order of theReturning Officer is impugnable. mere scourging of theorder of the Returning Officer howsoever fiercely, it mustbe said, will not constitute material facts and give rise tocause of action unless the pleadings are balanced with thefactual and legal reasons projecting where and how the

impugned order suffered perversity and illegality. In theinstant case, in my considered view, unfortunately thepleadings are totally bereft of such material facts. Oncompletion of reading of pleadings one fails to understandhow the order of the Returning Officer was at fault.

a) Paras-2, 9 to 11 are specifically attacked by the petitioner onthe ground that pleadings in those paras are not supported by anymaterial facts and hence they are liable to be struck out. In para-2 the 1[st] respondent narrated the five objections taken by him. Inpara-9 he expressed his grievance that 8[th] respondent has notconsidered his objection and his order is contrary to the judgmentof the Apex Court in Resurgence Indias case (10 supra). He furthermentioned in that para that as per the aforesaid judgment, filing ofan affidavit with blank particulars will render the affidavit nugatory.In para-10 he pleaded that in the light of the Apex Courts judgment8[th] respondent ought to have rejected the improper nomination ofthe instant petitioner. He also pleaded that instant petitionermisrepresented the Election Commission as well as 8[th] respondentas he has not added Rs.21 lakhs to the gross total of his assetsand showed the gross total of his assets and showed the grosstotal as Rs.2,79,67,680/- instead of Rs.3,00,67,680/-. Whereas inpara-11 under the caption Grounds 1[st] respondent reiterated that8[th] respondent has made improper acceptance of nomination. Thecumulative effect of paras-2, 9 to 11 is nothing but againlampooning the order of 8[th] respondent as erroneous withoutdemonstrating as to how his order was factually and legallyperverse and wrong. Even the mentioning of the judgmentin Resurgence Indias case (10 supra) and the allegationthat the petitioner suppressed Rs.21 lakhs from the totalassets, we will presently see, will not constitute any materialfacts so as to strengthen the allegations in paras-2, 9 to11.”

(emphasis supplied)

4. Relying on the decision in Pothula Rama Rao Vs. PendyalaVenkata Krishna Rao and Ors.,[6] the High Court concluded that thepleadings in paragraphs 2 and 9 to 11 were frivolous and vexatious and

6 (2007) 11 SCC 1H

not containing any material facts and cause of action, for which thesame were liable to be struck off. The High Court then proceeded toexamine the third point with an opening remark that the election petitionfiled by the appellant was woefully silent about the material factsconstituting cause of action. It then proceeded to consider the argumentof the appellant as to how the order of the Returning Officer was factuallyand legally incorrect. It first considered objection Nos.1 and 3 taken bythe appellant that respondent No.1 had not signed at the bottom of eachand every page of the affidavit in Form No.26, which was violative ofRule 35 of Civil Rule of Practice and that mere signing the last page ofaffidavit was not enough. After adverting to Rule 35 of Civil Rule ofPractice, the High Court concluded that the said Rule was inapplicableto the Form of affidavit filed before the statutory authority such as theReturning Officer. It then referred to the Hand-book for the ReturningOfficer-2014 issued by the Election Commission of India prescribingform of affidavit to be submitted by the contesting candidates. As perthe said instructions, the candidate is required to sign on the last page ofthe affidavit. On this finding, the objection of the appellant was negatived.While dealing with the objection No.2(a) taken by the appellant that inSerial No.2 of Item No.4 in one of respondent No.1’s affidavits, thespace under the heading of Total Income shown in IT returns relating towife of petitioner was left blank. Further, the candidate is not entitled tofile two affidavits in Form 26 in terms of Notification No.3/4/2012/SDRdated 24[th] August, 2012, issued by the Election Commission of India.Furthermore, respondent No.1 did not disclose the crucial informationrelating to criminal background if any, assets, liabilities and educationalqualifications etc., which rendered the nomination form invalid as perKisan Shankar Kathore Vs. Arun Dattatray[7]. The High Court rejectedeven this objection. While dealing with the instructions issued by theElection Commission of India, the High Court opined that the candidateswere required to declare the information about the criminal backgroundif any, assets, liabilities, educational qualification etc. The amended Form26 was comprehensive form to include all the information that wassought in the two separate affidavits. The revised form of Form 26 wasnotified in the official gazette on 1[st] August, 2012, whereafter, the ElectionCommission of India made it clear by its Notification dated 24[th] August,2012, that the candidate shall file only one affidavit in the revised Form

ABCDEFG

A26. At the same time, the High Court held that the Notification did notput any embargo on the candidate to file multiple nomination paperscontrary to Section 33(6) of the 1951 Act. On this basis, the decision inKisan Shankar Kathore (supra) was distinguished. While dealing withobjection Nos.2(b) and 4 raised by the appellant, that in Item No.6 therespondent No.1 did not strike-out the inapplicable words in the FormBand thus suppressed crucial facts relating to his involvement in offence,if any, the High Court noted that mere failure to strike out the inapplicablewords would not lead to an inference that there was suppression of anymaterial facts. For, the respondent No.1 had placed on record the samefacts against columns (a), (b), (c) and (d) being not applicable. TheCHigh Court distinguished the decision of this Court in the case ofKrishnamoorthy Vs. Siva Kumar and others[8]. In examining objectionNo.2(c) regarding Item No.8(III) of Part-B of the affidavit under theheading ‘Approximate Current Market Price’, which was left blank byrespondent No.1, the High Court accepted the plea of respondent No.1that the said information was disclosed against the columns (a) and (b).DIt held that the candidate is required to give the same particulars againstcolumns (a) and (b) and not against the heading. The decision of thisCourt in the case of Resurgence India Vs. Election Commission ofIndia[9]was thus distinguished. While dealing with the fifth objectionregarding the proxy of the respondent No.1, namely, P. DwarakanathEReddy, regarding failure to put his signature on each and every page ofaffidavit and Form 26 and later withdrawal of his nomination, the HighCourt found that respondent No.1 has nothing to do with the nominationof P. Dwarakanath Reddy. In other words, the High Court examinedeach objection raised by the appellant before the Returning Officer andreiterated in the election petition on its own merit to conclude as follows:-F

“23) Thus, none of the objections raised by the 1[st] respondentbefore the 8[th] respondent and repeated in his election petition meritconsideration. Apart from the above, the 1[st] respondent in para-10 of the election petition has taken new ground to the effectthat the petitioner has concealed Rs.21 lakhs worth of movableGassets of his wife and showed his gross total value asRs.2,79,67,680/- instead of Rs.3,00,67,680/-. It must be held thatthis objection also does not hold water. In Item No.VII the petitioner

8 (2015) 3 SCC 467

9 (2014) 14 SCC 189H

has shown item wise moveable assets of his wife-G. Swarnalathaand showed their gross total value as Rs.2,79,67,680/-. However,the total value comes to Rs.3,00,67,680/-. It is only mistake intotaling the items of moveable properties. Since there is noconcealment of any item, the clerical error in totaling cannot betaken as felony.

24) Thus, on conspectus, the election petition is liable tobe dismissed in limine without necessity of conducting trialfor two reasons – firstly, the petition is bereft of materialfacts and cause of action and secondly, the objections raisedbefore the 8[th] respondent and repeated in the electionpetition do not merit consideration, which can be and infact, have been, decided without necessity of conductingtrial. It is true that in Ashraf Kokkurs case (5 supra) cited by the1[st] respondent the Apex Court held that when the facts disclosematerial facts and cause of action though not complete cause ofaction, the election petition need not be dismissed at the threshold.However, in the instant case, as already observed supra,the election petition totally lacks material facts exceptrepetition of the objections raised before the 8[th] respondent.Therefore, election petition merits dismissal.a) As already stated supra, the 1[st] respondent has raised somenew objections with regard to alleged suppression of assets of thepetitioner and his wife in his counter for the first time but notpressed the said objection. Hence, the said objection is not takeninto consideration. So, at the outset, the two petitions filed by thepetitioner deserve to be allowed and consequently the electionpetition is liable to be dismissed in limine.

This point is answered accordingly.”

(emphasis supplied)

On this basis, the High Court allowed EA No. 329 of 2015 filed byrespondent No.1 for striking out the pleadings in paragraphs 2 and 9 to11 of the election petition being frivolous and vexatious and not containingmaterial facts and cause of action therein. The High Court also allowedthe second application filed by respondent No.1 being EA No.330 of2015 and rejected the Election Petition No.8 of 2014 in limine.

A5. We have heard Mr. Siddharth Luthra, learned senior counselappearing for the appellant and Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned seniorcounsel appearing for the contesting respondent.

6. The principal contention of the appellant is that whilst dismissinghis election petition, the High Court has overlooked the cause of actionBstated in the election petition, which arose from the fact that two differentsets of nomination forms and affidavits were filed by respondent No.1containing several material deficiencies and discrepancies and whichwas fatal. In other words, the nomination form of respondent No.1 waswrongly accepted and it materially affected the election results of theappellant. According to the appellant, the affidavits filed by respondentCNo.1 in support of his nomination forms admittedly contained blankcolumns and did not contain his signature on every page, which was notonly in contravention of several judgments of this Court, but also violatedSection 125A(i) of the Act and additionally, was also against severalcirculars issued by the Election Commission. Respondent No.1 also filed

Dtwo affidavits along with each one of his nomination forms, in directcontravention of the mandate in the instructions issued by the ElectionCommission permitting for only one affidavit to be filed. Further, perusalof the said affidavits would reveal that respondent No.1 had suppressedcrucial information relating to movable and immovable assets owned byhim and his family members and in fact, filed conflicting affidavit beforeEthe Speaker of the State Legislative Assembly. In light of respondentNo.1’s suppression of significant information, the matter in issue requireda full-fledged trial and the High Court committed manifest error indismissing the election petition in limine. The High Court also erred instriking off paragraphs 2 and 9 to 11 of the election petition on the groundFthat the averments contained therein were vexatious and frivolous, withoutgiving any legal justification for the same. The High Court also took intoaccount pleadings made in the counter/reply submitted by respondentNo.1 as opposed to only considering the averments made in the electionpetition. Further, respondent No.1 had failed to specifically deny theallegations/averments in the election petition.G

7. Mr. Siddharth Luthra relies upon the judgments of this Court inResurgence India (supra), Krishna Murthy (supra), Duni Chand Vs.State of Himachal Pradesh & Ors.[10], Kuldeep Singh Pathania Vs.

10 (2014) 16 SCC 152H

Bikram Singh Jaryal[11], D. Ramachandran Vs. RV Jankiraman &Ors.[12], Asharaf Kokkur Vs. KV Abdul Khader & Ors.[13], VirenderNath Gautam Vs. Satpal Singh & Ors.[14], Kishan Shankar Kathore(supra), Harkirat Singh Vs. Amrinder Singh[15], Mohd. Akbar Vs.Ashok Sahu & Ors.[16], RK Roja Vs. US Rayudu & Anr.[17],Mairembam Prithviraj Vs. Pukhrem Sharathchandra Singh[18] andShri Balwant Singh Vs. Sri Laxmi Narain[19].

8. Per contra, Mr. Raju Ramachandran, learned senior counselappearing for respondent no.1, submits that the findings of the ReturningOfficer, as regards the objections taken by the appellant to respondentNo.1’s nomination form, were just and proper. He submits that everyelection petition is not required to go for trial, merely for performing aformal exercise. The present case was purely based on documents onrecord and there was no requirement of leading evidence in that regard.Even before the High Court, only technical pleas were argued, none ofwhich were borne out by the record. As per Section 36(4) of the Act,respondent No.1’s nomination paper could be rejected merely on technicalpleas. Since it is well settled that an election petition was statutoryproceeding and not an action at law or suit in equity, the determinationof such petition had to be in consonance with Section 36(4) of the Act.Further, the sine qua non for declaring an election void under Section100(1)(d) of the Act was to plead and also establish that improperacceptance of nomination had materially affected the results of theelection, which, in the present case, appellant had failed to assert. Nosuch pleading of material fact had been made by appellant. Similarly, theelection petition, as filed, failed to disclose even the material particularsof facts to establish cause of action warranting trial. Finally, appellanthad introduced fresh allegations into his petition, including suppressionof assets and fraud, by way of counter affidavits to the application filedby respondent No.1. This clearly went against the established law thatnew facts could not be introduced in an election petition beyond period

11 (2017) 5 SCC 34512 (1999) 3 SCC 26713 (2015) 1 SCC 12914 (2007) 3 SCC 61715 (2005) 13 SCC 51116 (2015) 14 SCC 51917 (2016) 14 SCC 72518 (2017) 2 SCC 48719 AIR 1960 SC 770

Aof 45 days after declaration of the result of the impugned election. For,the election petition had been filed in June 2014, whereas the counteraffidavits were filed around year later i.e. June 2015 and, therefore,the averments contained therein could not be taken into consideration.

9. Mr. Ramachandran relied upon the following judgments:BPothula Rama Rao (supra), Samant N. Balkrishna & Anr. Vs. GeorgeFernandez & Ors.[20], L.R. Shivaramagowda & Ors. Vs. T.M.Chandrashekar (Dead) by LRs & Ors.[21], Ram Sukh Vs. DineshAggarwal[22], Mangani Lal Mandal Vs. Bishnu Deo Bhandari[23],Shambhu Prasad Sharma Vs. Charandas Mahant & Ors.[24],CHukumdev Narain Yadav Vs. Lalit Narain Mishra[25], K.Venkateswara Rao & Anr. Vs. Bekkam Narasimha Reddi & Ors.[26],Harmohinder Singh Pradhan Vs. Ranjeet Singh Talwandi & Ors.27, Hari Shanker Jain Vs. Sonia Gandhi28 and Tek Chank Vs. DileRam[29].

10. The central issue in these appeals is: whether the contents ofDthe subject election petition disclose cause of action warranting trial?The High Court by composite judgment allowed the two applicationsfiled by respondent No.1 (returned candidate) praying for striking outparagraphs 2 & 9 to11 of the election petition, being frivolous andvexatious and not containing any material facts and not disclosing anyEcause of action; and the second application for rejecting the electionpetition in limine for non-disclosure of cause of action.11. Ordinarily, an application for rejection of election petition inlimine, purportedly under Order VII Rule 11 for non-disclosure of causeof action, ought to proceed at the threshold. For, it has to be consideredFonly on the basis of institutional defects in the election petition in referenceto the grounds specified in clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11. Indeed, non-disclosure of cause of action is covered by clause (a) therein. Concededly,

20 1969 (3) SCC 23821 (1999) 1 SCC 66622 (2009) 10 SCC 541G23 (2012) 3 SCC 31424 (2012) 11 SCC 39025 (1974) 2 SCC 13326 (1969) 1 SCR 679; AIR 1969 SC 87227 (2005) 5 SCC 4628 (2001) 8 SCC 233H29 (2001) 3 SCC 290

Order VII of the CPC generally deals with the institution of plaint. Itdelineates the requirements regarding the particulars to be contained inthe plaint, relief to be specifically stated, for relief to be founded onseparate grounds, procedure on admitting plaint, and includes return ofplaint. The rejection of plaint follows the procedure on admitting plaintor even before admitting the same, if the court on presentation of theplaint is of the view that the same does not fulfill the statutory andinstitutional requirements referred to in clauses (a) to (f) of Rule 11. Thepower bestowed in the court in terms of Rule 11 may also be exercisedby the court on formal application moved by the defendant after beingserved with the summons to appear before the Court. Be that as it may,the application under Order VII Rule 11 deserves consideration at thethreshold.

12. On the other hand, the application for striking out pleadings interms of Order VI Rule 16 may be resorted to by the defendant(s)/respondent(s) at any stage of the proceedings, as is predicated in thesaid provision. The pleading(s) can be struck off by the Court on groundsspecified in clauses (a) to (c) of Rule 16.

13. Indeed, if the defendant moves two separate applications atthe same time, as in this case, it would be open to the court in givencase to consider both the applications together or independent of eachother. If the court decides to hear the application under Order VII Rule11 in the first instance, the court would be obliged to consider the plaintas filed as whole. But if the court decides to proceed with the applicationunder Order VI Rule 16 for striking out the pleadings before considerationof the application under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of the plaint, onallowing the former application after striking out the relevant pleadingsthen the court must consider the remainder pleadings of the plaint inreference to the postulates of Order VII Rule 11, for determining whetherthe plaint (after striking out pleadings) deserves to be rejected in limine.

14. In the present case, the High Court has presumably adoptedthe latter course. It first proceeded to examine the application for strikingout the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition beingfrivolous and vexatious and also because the same did not disclose anycause of action. And having accepted that prayer, it proceeded to rejectthe election petition on the ground that it did not disclose any cause of

ABCD

Aaction. However, we find that the High Court has muddled the analysisof the pleadings. It merely focused on the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9to 11 of the election petition. It is one thing to strike out the statedpleadings being frivolous and vexatious but then it does not follow thatthe rest of the pleadings which would still remain, were not sufficient toproceed with the trial or disclose any cause of action, whatsoever, forBrejecting the plaint as whole in limine or to hold that it did not warranta trial. No such finding can be discerned from the judgment under appeal.Be that as it may, the High Court committed manifest error in strikingout the pleadings in paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition, beingfrivolous and vexatious by considering the factual matrix noted thereinCas untenable on merit. For striking out the pleadings or for that matter,rejecting the plaint (election petition), the High Court is not expected todecide the merits of the controversy referred to in the election petition.We shall elaborate on this aspect little later.

15. Reverting to the contents of the election petition in paragraphD1, it is asserted that the election petition was to challenge the declarationof election of respondent No.1 to the 284-Punganur AssemblyConstituency of Andhra Pradesh. The election petitioner has then giventhe other factual details relating to the election process, which concludedwith the declaration of results on 16[th] May, 2014. In paragraph 2, theelection petitioner (appellant herein) has asserted that he was challengingEthe election on the ground of improper acceptance of nomination ofrespondent No.1 by the Returning Officer (respondent No.8). It is pointedout that the Returning Officer entertained two sets of nominations ofrespondent No.1, despite the written objections taken by the appellant.The nature of five objections taken by the appellant before the ReturningFOfficer have been mentioned, including the violation of Rule 35 of CivilRules of Practice and also Rule 4A of Election Rule, 1961 and non-signing of each and every page at the bottom of the nomination form.The five objections taken before the Returning Officer have beenreproduced as follows:

G“Objection No.1: The 1[st] Respondent who filed nominationshas failed to sign on bottom of each and every page of theaffidavits in Form-26 as contemplated under Civil Rules ofPractice and also deliberately violated the conduct of ElectionRules.

Objection No.2: The 1[st] respondent as candidate failed to fillup the affidavit at

a. The Column No.4 and Column No.2 under the head of totalIncome shown in Income Tax returns.

b. The two sets of affidavits at Column No.6 have not properlystrike off which ever not applicable.

c. The Respondent No.1 in his two sets of affidavits kept blankat Column No.8 (B) (III), where the words stand of“Approximate Current market Price of …” at Part-B of (11)abstract of the details given in (1) to (10) of Part-A. This ismandatory as per the Conduct of Election Rules and also therecent Apex Court judgment, circulated under Instruction No.18to the Returning Officer.

Objection No.3: The Respondent No.1 has not singed on eachand every page in the affidavit of Form-26 as contemplatedunder Civil Rules of Practice and also contemplated under HandBook of Returning Officers-2014 under Chapter 5.20.1.

Objection No.4: The Respondent No.1 in his affidavit at ColumnNo.6 has not properly struck off “which ever not applicable.

Objection No.5: The proxy of the 1[st] respondent namely P.Dwarakanath Reddy did not file his affidavit properly and alsonot put his signatures and date on each and every page ofForm-26. Later he has withdrawn his nomination.”

16. In paragraph 3 of the election petition, it has been assertedthat the appellant had raised objections before the Returning Officer on21[st] April, 2014. Further, respondent No.1 had given authorization to oneShri V. Sreerami Reddy to answer the objections, who then filed replyto the objections taken by the appellant by merely denying and assertingthat the same were purely technical grounds and, therefore, to reject thesame. In paragraph 4 of the election petition, reference is made to theproceedings before the Returning Officer as to how the objections wererejected by him. It is then asserted that the rejection was for the reasonsbest known to the Returning Officer and contrary to the mandatoryConduct of Election Rules and governing provisions and instructions givento the Returning Officer by way of Compendium Instructions, Volume-2

Asupplied to the Returning Officer(s) in light of the Supreme Court judgmentregarding the affidavits and blank columns. It is then stated that theReturning Officer had also circulated “do’s and dont’s” along with thecheck-list to every candidate contesting the election which clearly statedthat the candidates must strictly follow the procedure stipulated underthe Election Rules. The said instructions were supplied to the candidatesBalong with the set of nomination papers highlighting the decision of thisCourt in Resurgence India (supra), regarding the consequence of keepingthe relevant columns in the nomination Form-26, blank. In paragraph 5of the election petition, it is stated that the appellant had applied for acertificate of its objection, authorization given to the third party andCcounter, respectively. In paragraph 6, it is asserted that the appellantsecured second highest votes and respondent No.1 was declared electedcandidate. The tally of votes secured by the 8 candidates who contestedthe election has been given in this paragraph. In paragraph 7, it is pointedout that the Government of India issued notification in its extraordinary

Gazette published on 1[st] August, 2012 and amended Form-26 under RuleD4A of the Conduct of Election (Amendment) Rules, 2012. In the footnoteof the Gazette Notification, Note-1 to Note-4 have been given whichare relevant instructions for accepting valid Form-26 given to theReturning Officer. Those notes have been reproduced as follows:

“Note: 1: Affidavit should be filed latest by 3.00 PM on the lastEday of filing nomination.

Note: 2: Affidavit should be sworn before on Oath Commissioneror Magistrate of the First Class or before Notary Public.

Note: 3: All column should be filled up and no column to be leftFblank. If there is no information to furnish in respect of any item,either ‘Nil’ or ‘Not applicable’ as the case may be, should bementioned.

Note: 4: The Affidavit should be either typed or written legiblyand neatly.”

17. In paragraph 8 of the election petition, it is asserted that afterthe aforementioned Government Notification, the Election Commissionof India issued proceedings bearing No.3/4/2012/SDR dated 24.8.2012,Annexure-X directing all the State Election Commissions, political parties

and other organizations to follow the single affidavit strictly in accordancewith Form-26.

18. In paragraph 9 of the election petition, the appellant has assertedthat the objections taken by the appellant were not considered by theReturning Officer, for which reason the decision of the Returning Officerwas contrary to the decision of this Court in the case of ResurgenceIndia (supra). Paragraph 27 of the said judgment has been highlightedby the appellant. It is then asserted that the contents of paragraph 27were circulated along with the nomination papers by the Returning Officerto every candidate. Thus, respondent No.1 was aware about the same.Further, respondent No.1 did not sign each page of Form-26 in both thesets of nomination papers filed before the Returning Officer. The twosets of nomination papers were attested by the same Notary on the lastpage of both the sets of nomination papers filed by respondent No.1, andso the omission of signature and blank columns are “not in the nature oftechnical mistakes at all”. This assertion is followed by the averments inparagraph 10 that the Returning Officer ought to have rejected thenomination form of respondent No.1 at the threshold in light of the decisionof this Court. This is to assert that it was improper nomination ofrespondent No.1, wrongly accepted by the Returning Officer ascontemplated under Section 100(1)(d)(i) of the 1951 Act. It is thenstated that the Returning Officer was fully aware about the requirementsas per the decision of this Court, including the election material such asHandbook for Returning Officer-2014, General Elections-2014,Compendium Instructions, Volume-2 and Form-26 circulated by him. Itis then asserted that in spite of that the Returning Officer accepted thenomination of respondent No.1, which enabled the respondent No.1 tocontest the election and eventually get elected. The declaration of electionof respondent No.1 by the Returning Officer (respondent No.8) wasthus clear abuse of the process of law in light of the decision of thisCourt. It is also asserted that respondent No.1 misrepresented theElection Commission as well as the Returning Officer (respondent No.8)by giving false information in casual manner, at paragraph 7A regardingthe details of Immovable Assets in the two sets of affidavits in Form-26,by showing the gross total value of Rs.2,79,67,680/- instead ofRs.3,00,67,680/- and deliberately did not count the column amount at7(vii) of Rs.21,00,000/-.

A19. In paragraph 11 of the election petition, it is stated that thenomination forms (Form-26) filed by the appellant and respondent No.1in two sets, may be treated as forming part of the election petition alongwith the grounds of the election petition. Indeed, the opening part ofparagraph 11 is not happily worded but it certainly conveys that thenomination form of the respective candidates be treated as forming partBof the election petition and by reference thereto, the same would becomean integral part of the election petition. The grounds have been articulatedin paragraph 11 which reads thus:

“GROUNDS

a). Whether the 8[th] Respondent has ignored the ConstitutionalSpirit of Representation of the People Act (Act 43 of 1950) andAct 43 of 1951 with allied Acts, Rules, Orders, Model Code ofConduct for Guidance of Candidates supplied by the ElectionCommission for the Election 284, Punganur AssemblyConstituency failing to conduct fair scrutiny in accordance withthe law while conducting fair scrutiny of the nomination of theRespondent No.1 Form-26 in accordance with law?

b). Whether the 8[th] Respondent acceptance of the impropernomination of Forum-26 application as contemplated despite thefatal omission of blank column under Section 100 (1) (d) (i) ofRepresentation of the People Act, 1951 of the two sets of affidavitsof the Respondent No.1 kept in blank at Column No.8 (B) (III),where the words stand of “Approximate Current market Price of…” at Part-B of (11) abstract of the details given in (1) to (10) ofPart-A?

c). Whether the Respondent No.1 election to 284, PunganurAssembly Constituency can be set aside on the grounds that theRespondent No.8/Returning Officer has accepted the impropernomination Form vide Form-26 with omissions of not signing oneach and every page of the affidavit and not keep intact of fillingof the blanks contrary to the spirit of the Apex Court judgmentrendered in Resurgence India Vs. Election Commission of India& Anr., held in Writ Petition (Civil) No.121 of 2008 dt. 13.09.2013?

d). Whether the Respondent No.1 Affidavit with blank particularswill render the affidavit nugatory and hit by Section 125 A(i) of

Representation of Peoples Act, 1951 directly and has to set asidethe election?”

20. On the basis of these pleadings, the appellant has prayed for

the following reliefs in the election petition:

“17. Under these circumstances it is prayed that this Hon’bleCourt may be pleased to:

a) declare the election of Peddireddigari Ramachandra Reddy(Respondent No.1) to the 284 Punganur Assembly Constituencyto be null and void and set-aside the same:

b) Further declare that the Petitioner has been duly elected asMember of State Legislative Assembly of the 284 PunganurAssembly Constituency under Section 84 of the Representationof the People Act 1951.

c) Award the costs of the petition

d) And pass such other order or orders as it may deem fit andproper in the circumstances of the case.”

21. It is well settled that the election petition will have to be readas whole and cannot be dissected sentence-wise or paragraph-wise torule that the same does not disclose cause of action. Cause of actionembodies bundle of facts which may be necessary for the plaintiffs toprove in order to get relief from the Court. The reliefs claimed by theappellant are founded on grounds inter alia ascribable to Section100(1)(d)(i). Further relief has been claimed to declare the appellant ashaving been elected under Section 101 of the 1951 Act. The cause ofaction for filing the election petition, therefore, was perceptibly inreference to the material facts depicting that the nomination form ofrespondent No.1 was improperly accepted by the Returning Officer.

22. On reading the election petition as whole, we have nohesitation in taking view that the High Court misdirected itself inconcluding that the election petition did not disclose any cause of actionwith or without paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition. Indeed,the pleadings of the election petition should be precise and clear containingall the necessary details and particulars as required by law. ‘Materialfacts’ would mean all the basic facts constituting the ingredients of the

Agrounds stated in the election petition in the context of relief to declarethe election to be void. It is well established that in an election petition,whether particular fact is material or not and as such required to bepleaded, is question which depends on the nature of the grounds reliedupon and the special circumstances of the case. Particulars, on theother hand, are the details of the case set up by the party. The distinctionBbetween “material facts” and “full particulars” has been delineated inthe case of Mohan Rawale v. Damodar Tatyaba[30]. This judgment hasbeen adverted to in the reported decision relied by the parties. The Courtnoted thus:

“10. We may take up the last facet first. As Chitty, J. observed,C“There is some difficulty in affixing precise meaning to” theexpression “discloses no reasonable cause of action or defence”.He said: “In point of law … every cause of action is reasonableone.” (See Republic of Peru v. Peruvian Guano Co.[31]) Areasonable cause of action is said to mean cause of action withDsome chances of success when only the allegations in the pleadingare considered. But so long as the claim discloses some causeof action or raises some questions fit to be decided by aJudge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely tosucceed is no ground for striking it out. The implicationsof the liability of the pleadings to be struck out on the groundEthat it discloses no reasonable cause of action are quiteoften more known than clearly understood. It doesintroduce another special demurrer in new shape. Thefailure of the pleadings to disclose reasonable cause ofaction is distinct from the absence of full particulars. TheFdistinctions among the ideas of the “grounds” in Section 81(1); of“material facts” in Section 83(1)(a) and of “full particulars” inSection 83(1)(b) are obvious. The provisions of Section 83(1)(a)and (b) are in the familiar pattern of Order VI, Rules 2 and 4 andOrder 7, Rule 1(e) Code of Civil Procedure. There is distinctionamongst the ‘grounds’ in Section 81(1); the ‘material facts’ inGSection 83(1)(a) and “full particulars” in Section 83(1)(b).

11. Referring to the importance of pleadings learned author says:

30 (1994) 2 SCC 39231 (1887) 36 Ch 489 (1887) 36 Ch 489H

31 (1887) 36 Ch 489 (1887) 36 Ch 489

“Pleadings do not only define the issues between the parties forthe final decision of the court at the trial, they manifest and exerttheir importance throughout the whole process of the litigation.… They show on their face whether reasonable cause of actionor defence is disclosed. They provide guide for the proper modeof trial and particularly for the trial of preliminary issues of law orfact. They demonstrate upon which party the burden of prooflies, and who has the right to open the case. They act as measurefor comparing the evidence of party with the case which he haspleaded. They determine the range of the admissible evidencewhich the parties should be prepared to adduce at the trial. Theydelimit the relief which the court can award. …”

[See: Jacob: “The Present Importance of Pleadings” (1960)Current Legal Problems, at pp. 175-76].

12. Further, the distinction between “material facts” and “fullparticulars” is one of degree. The lines of distinction are not sharp.“Material facts” are those which party relies upon and which, ifhe does not prove, he fails at the time.

13. In Bruce v. Odhams Press Ltd.[32] Scott L.J. said: “The word‘material’ means necessary for the purpose of formulating acomplete cause of action; and if any one ‘material’ statement isomitted, the statement of claim is bad.” The purpose of “materialparticulars” is in the context of the need to give the opponentsufficient details of the charge set up against him and to give hima reasonable opportunity.

14. Halsbury refers to the function of particulars thus:

“The function of particulars is to carry into operation the overridingprinciple that the litigation between the parties, and particularlythe trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprises,and incidentally to reduce costs. This function has been variouslystated, namely either to limit the generality of the allegations inthe pleadings, or to define the issues which have to be tried andfor which discovery is required.”

(See: Pleadings Vol. 36, para 38)

32 (1936) 1 KB 697 : (1936) 1 All ER 287

[2018] 9 S.C.R.

15. In Bullen and Leake and Jacob’s “Precedents of Pleadings”1975 Edn. at p. 112 it is stated:

“The function of particulars is to carry into operation the overridingprinciple that the litigation between the parties, and particularlythe trial, should be conducted fairly, openly and without surprisesand incidentally to save costs. The object of particulars is to ‘openup’ the case of the opposite party and to compel him to reveal asmuch as possible what is going to be proved at the trial, whereas,as Cotton L.J. has said, ‘the old system of pleading at commonlaw was to conceal as much as possible what was going to beproved at the trial’.”

16. The distinction between ‘material facts’ and ‘particulars’ whichtogether constitute the facts to be proved — or the facta probanda— on the one hand and the evidence by which those facts are tobe proved — facta probantia — on the other must be kept clearlydistinguished. In Philipps v. Philipps[33], Brett, L.J. said:

“I will not say that it is easy to express in words what are thefacts which must be stated and what matters need not be stated.… The distinction is taken in the very rule itself, between thefacts on which the party relies and the evidence to prove thosefacts. Erle C.J. expressed it in this way. He said that there werefacts that might be called the allegata probanda, the facts whichought to be proved, and they were different from the evidencewhich was adduced to prove those facts. And it was upon theexpression of opinion of Erle C.J. that Rule 4 [now Rule 7(1)]was drawn. The facts which ought to be stated are the materialfacts on which the party pleading relies.”

17. Lord Denman, C.J. in Willians v. Wilcox[34] said:

“It is an elementary rule in pleading that, when state of facts isrelied it is enough to allege it simply, without setting out thesubordinate facts which are the means of proving it, or the evidencesustaining the allegations.”

18. An election petition can be rejected under Order VIIRule 11(a) CPC if it does not disclose cause of action.

33 (1878) 4 QBD 127, 133

34 (1838) 8 Ad & EI 331

Pleadings could also be struck out under Order VI Rule16, inter alia, if they are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious.The latter two expressions meant cases where the pleadingsare obviously frivolous and vexatious or obviouslyunsustainable.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. In the case of Harkirat Singh (supra), this Court once againreiterated thus:

“46. From the above provisions, it is clear that an election petitionmust contain concise statement of “material facts” on whichthe petitioner relies. It should also contain “full particulars” of anycorrupt practice that the petitioner alleges including full statementof names of the parties alleged to have committed such corruptpractice and the date and place of commission of such practice.Such election petition shall be signed by the petitioner and verifiedin the manner laid down in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(hereinafter referred to as “the Code”) for the verification ofpleadings. It should be accompanied by an affidavit in the prescribedform in support of allegation of such practice and particularsthereof.

47. All material facts, therefore, in accordance with the provisionsof the Act, have to be set out in the election petition. If the materialfacts are not stated in petition, it is liable to be dismissed on thatground as the case would be covered by clause (a) of sub-section(1) of Section 83 of the Act read with clause (a) of Rule 11 ofOrder 7 of the Code.

48. The expression “material facts” has neither been definedin the Act nor in the Code. According to the dictionarymeaning, “material” means “fundamental”, “vital”, “basic”,“cardinal”, “central”, “crucial”, “decisive”, “essential”,“pivotal”, “indispensable”, “elementary” or “primary”.Burton’s Legal Thesaurus (3rd Edn.), p. 349.] The phrase“material facts”, therefore, may be said to be those factsupon which party relies for its claim or defence. In otherwords, “material facts” are facts upon which the plaintiff’s

cause of action or the defendant’s defence depends. Whatparticulars could be said to be “material facts” would dependupon the facts of each case and no rule of universalapplication can be laid down. It is, however, absolutelyessential that all basic and primary facts which must beproved at the trial by the party to establish the existence ofa cause of action or defence are material facts and must bestated in the pleading by the party.”

(emphasis supplied)

Again in paragraphs 51 & 52, this Court observed thus:

“51. distinction between “material facts” and“particulars”, however, must not be overlooked.“Material facts” are primary or basic facts which mustbe pleaded by the plaintiff or by the defendant in supportof the case set up by him either to prove his cause ofDaction or defence. “Particulars”, on the other hand, aredetails in support of material facts pleaded by the party.They amplify, refine and embellish material facts by givingdistinctive touch to the basic contours of picturealready drawn so as to make it full, more clear and moreinformative. “Particulars” thus ensure conduct of fair trialEand would not take the opposite party by surprise.

52. All “material facts” must be pleaded by the party in supportof the case set up by him. Since the object and purpose is toenable the opposite party to know the case he has to meetwith, in the absence of pleading, party cannot be allowed tolead evidence. Failure to state even single material fact, hence,will entail dismissal of the suit or petition. Particulars, on theother hand, are the details of the case which is in the nature ofevidence party would be leading at the time of trial.”

And again in paragraph 72, the Court noted thus:

“72. The Court, however, drew the distinction between “materialfacts” and “particulars”. According to the Court, “materialfacts” are facts, if established would give the petitionerthe relief prayed for. The test is whether the Court couldhave given direct verdict in favour of the election

petitioner in case the returned candidate had notappeared to oppose the election petition on the basis ofthe facts pleaded in the petition.”

(emphasis supplied)

24. In Ashraf Kokkur (supra), this Court adverted to the expositionin M. Kamalam Vs. V.A. Syed Mohammed,[35]and G.M. SiddeshwarVs. Prasanna Kumar[36]and in paragraph 21 noted that the pleadingsmust be taken as whole to ascertain whether the same constitute thematerial facts involving triable issues. In paragraph 22, the Court observedas follows:

“22. After all, the inquiry under Order 7 Rule 11(a) CPC is onlyas to whether the facts as pleaded disclose cause of action andnot complete cause of action. The limited inquiry is only tosee whether the petition should be thrown out at thethreshold. In an election petition, the requirement under Section83 of the RP Act is to provide precise and concise statement ofmaterial facts. The expression “material facts” plainly meansfacts pertaining to the subject-matter and which are reliedon by the election petitioner. If the party does not provethose facts, he fails at the trial.”

(emphasis supplied)

25. The Court then went on to analyse the decision of three-Judge Bench in the case of V.S. Achuthanandan Vs. P.J. Francis[37],wherein it has been observed that an election petition was not liable tobe dismissed in limine merely because full particulars of corrupt practicealleged were not set out. Further, material facts are such primary factswhich must be proved at the trial by party to establish existence of acause of action. It has also observed that so long as the claim disclosessome cause of action or raises some questions fit to be decided by aJudge, the mere fact that the case is weak and not likely to succeed is noground for striking it out. Further, the implications of the liability of thepleadings to be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonablecause of action are generally more known than clearly understood andthat the failure of the pleadings to disclose reasonable cause of action

35 (1978) 2 SCC 659

36 (2013) 4 SCC 776

37 (1999) 3 SCC 737

Ais distinct from the absence of full particulars. This decision also advertsto the case of Ponnala Lakshmaiah Vs. Kommuri Pratap Reddy,[38]wherein the Court observed that the Courts need to be cautious in dealingwith request for dismissal of the petition at the threshold and exercisetheir power of dismissal only in cases where on plain reading of thepetition no cause of action is disclosed.B

26. The counsel for the contesting respondent has relied on thedecisions in Pendyala Venkata Krishna Rao Vs. Pothula Rama Rao(supra), particularly paragraphs 8-10, 11 and 16 of the reported decision.In that case, on facts, the Court found that necessary material facts inrelation to the ground of improper acceptance of nomination form wereCnot pleaded by the election petitioner. In the present case, we have heldthat there is discernible pleading as to what objections were taken beforethe Returning Officer and as to why he was in error in not rejecting thenomination of respondent No.1.

27. The counsel for the contesting respondent also relied on theDdecision in Samant N. Balkrishna Vs. George Fernandez[39]. No doubtthis decision predicates that election petition is statutory proceedingsand not an action at law or suit in equity. There can be no debate withregard to this proposition. At the same time, we cannot be obliviousabout the scope of the enquiry permissible at this stage by the electionEcourt/tribunal while considering the application under Order VII Rule11(a) of C.P.C.

28. In Kuldeep Singh Pathania (supra), the decision of the HighCourt which is similar to one under consideration (namely the impugnedjudgment) had accepted the explanation offered by the respondents andFmeticulously dealt with it to conclude that the petition did not discloseany cause of action since it lacked material facts. The High Court passedthat order purportedly in exercise of power under Order XIV Rule 2.This Court pointed out the distinction between an order under Order VIIRule 11 to reject the election petition in limine for non disclosure ofcause of action and an order under Order XIV Rule 2 for disposal of theGpetition on preliminary issue. In that case, the order passed by theHigh Court was relatable only to Order VII Rule 11. This Court advertedto the decisions in Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. and Ors. Vs. Owners and Parties

38 (2012) 7 SCC 78839 (1969) 3 SCC 238H

Vessel M.V. Fortune Express and Ors.[40]and Virendra Nath GautamVs. Satpal Singh and Ors.,[41]and explicated that under Order VIIRule 11(a), only the pleadings of the plaintiff-petitioner can be looked atas threshold issue. Whereas, entire pleadings of both sides can belooked into for considering the preliminary issue under Order XIV Rule2. Neither the written statement nor the averments or case pleaded bythe opposite party can be taken into account for answering the thresholdissue for rejection of election petition in terms of Order VII Rule 11 (a)of the Act.

29. Whether the material facts as asserted by the appellant canstand the test of trial and whether the appellant would be able to bringhome the grounds for declaring the election of respondent No.1 to bevoid, is not matter to be debated at this stage. Suffice it to observe thatthe averments in the concerned paragraphs of the election petition, byno standard can be said to be frivolous and vexatious as such. The HighCourt committed manifest error in entering into the tenability of the factsand grounds urged in support thereof by the appellant on merit, as isevident from the cogitation in paragraphs 16 to 22 of the impugnedjudgment.

30. It is not necessary to multiply authorities on this point. TheHigh Court has opined that the contents of paragraphs 2 & 9 to 11 of theelection petition did not furnish “any” material facts but were only in thenature of fulminating and lampooning order of the Returning Officer forhaving unduly rejected the objections taken by the appellant whilstaccepting the nomination form submitted by respondent No.1. The HighCourt broadly referred to the contents of the concerned paragraphs ofthe election petition, but the analysis of the High Court in that behalf isnot correct. We have elaborately adverted to the contents of paragraphs2 & 9 to 11 of the election petition. We find force in the argument of theappellant that the said paragraphs plainly disclose the facts, which arematerial facts for adjudicating the grounds for declaring the election ofrespondent No.1 as being void, because of improper acceptance of hisnomination form by the Returning Officer (respondent No.8): To wit;

(i) The Returning Officer has improperly accepted the nominationpaper of the respondent No.1 despite the categorical objections

40 (2006) 3 SCC 100

41 (2007) 3 SCC 617

Araised, being contrary to Rule 35 of Civil Rules of Practice,Rule 4A of the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961 and alsocontrary to the judgment of this Court in Resurgence India(supra).

(ii) Respondent No.1 failed to sign each and every page of theBaffidavit (Form No.26), which is in violation of Civil Rules ofPractice, Conduct of the Election Rules and Hand Book ofReturning Officer-2014 under Chapter 5.20.1.

(iii) Respondent No.1 failed to fill up the Column No.4 and ColumnNo.2 under the head of Total Income shown in Income TaxCReturns, of the said affidavit (Form No.26).

(iv) The Column No.6 of said two sets of affidavit has not beenproperly struck off, whichever is not applicable.

(v) Column No.8(B)(III), where the words stand for “ApproximateCurrent Market Price of…” at Part-B of 11 abstracts of theDdetails given in (1) to (10) of Part of the said affidavits,which is mandatory as per Election Rules, judgments of thisCourt and Circular and Instructions issued by the ReturningOfficer.

(vi) Omission and blank Columns left in the said affidavits are notEat all technical mistake. The respondent No.1 was verymuch aware of the said rules and the law.

(vii) The Returning Officer did not follow the stated Rules andlaw, and has favoured the respondent No.1 by accepting theimproper nomination/affidavit filed by him, enabling him toFcontest the election, which is abuse of the processes of lawin light of the judgment of this Court (Resurgence India).

(viii)The Returning Officer (R-8) ought to have rejected theimproper nomination of the respondent no.1 on 21.04.2014itself at the threshold as contemplated under SectionG100(1)(d)(i) of the Representation of People Act.

(ix) The respondent No.1 misrepresented the Election Commissionas well as the Returning Officer (R-8) in casual manner bygiving false information at Para 7A of details of Immovable

Assets in his two set of affidavits under Form-26 by showingthe gross total value of Rs.2,79,67,680 instead of 3,00,67,680and deliberately did not count the Column amount at 7(vii) ofRs.21,00,000/-.

(x) Form No.26 of two sets of nomination paper of RespondentNo.1 be read as Annexure-XIII for prosecution of the electionpetition along with the grounds mentioned in the petition. Inthe grounds at para 11 of the election petition, the appellanthas re-agitated these contentions.

31. Indubitably, the requirement of putting one’s signature on eachand every page on the affidavit has been restated in the case ofResurgence India (supra). It is held that when candidate files anaffidavit with blank particulars it renders the affidavit itself nugatory.Inasmuch as, the purpose of filing affidavit (form No.26) along withnomination papers is to effectuate the fundamental right of the citizensunder Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India, who are entitled tohave the necessary information of the candidate at the time of his filingof the nomination papers in order to make choice of their voting. InParagraphs 25 and 26 of this judgment, the Court clarified that theobservations made in paragraph 73 of the judgment in People’s Unionfor Civil Liberties Vs. Union of India,[42]will not come in the way ofthe Returning Officer to reject the nomination paper if the said affidavitis filed with blank columns. It further observed that the candidate musttake the minimum effort to explicitly remark as “NIL” or “Not Applicable”or “Not Known” in the columns and not to leave the particulars blank, ifhe desires that his nomination paper be accepted by the Returning Officerduring the scrutiny of nomination in exercise of powers under Section 36(6) of the 1951 Act being invalid nomination found and hit by Section125-A (i) of the 1951 Act. In paragraph 27 of the judgment, the Courtobserved thus:“27. If we accept the contention raised by the Union of India viz.the candidate who has filed an affidavit with false information aswell as the candidate who has filed an affidavit with particularsleft blank should be treated on par, it will result in breach offundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1) (a) of theConstitution viz. “right to know”, which is inclusive of freedom of

198SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2018] 9 S.C.R.

Aspeech and expression as interpreted in Assn. for DemocraticReforms.”

The conclusions and directions articulated in paragraph 29 of the decision,read thus:

“29. What emerges from the above discussion can beBsummarized in the form of the following directions:

29.1. The voter has the elementary right to know full particularsof candidate who is to represent him in Parliament/Assembliesand such right to get information is universally recognized. Thus,it is held that right to know about the candidate is natural rightflowing from the concept of democracy and is an integral part ofArticle 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.

29.2. The ultimate purpose of filing of affidavit along with thenomination paper is to effectuate the fundamental right of thecitizens under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. Thecitizens are supposed to have the necessary information at thetime of filing of nomination paper and for that purpose, theReturning Officer can very well compel candidate to furnishthe relevant information.

29.3. Filing of affidavit with blank particulars will render theEaffidavit nugatory.

29.4. It is the duty of the Returning Officer to check whetherthe information required is fully furnished at the time offiling of affidavit with the nomination paper since suchinformation is very vital for giving effect to the “right toknow” of the citizens. If candidate fails to fill the blankseven after the reminder by the Returning Officer, thenomination paper is fit to be rejected. We do comprehendthat the power of the Returning Officer to reject the nominationpaper must be exercised very sparingly but the bar should not belaid so high that the justice itself is prejudiced.

29.5. We clarify to the extent that para 73 of People’s Unionfor Civil Liberties case will not come in the way of theReturning Officer to reject the nomination paper when theaffidavit is filed with blank particulars.

29.6. The candidate must take the minimum effort toexplicitly remark as “NIL” or “Not Applicable” or “Notknown” in the columns and not to leave the particularsblank.

29.7. Filing of affidavit with blanks will be directly hit bySection 125-A(i) of the RP Act. However, as the nominationpaper itself is rejected by the Returning Officer, we find noreason why the candidate must be again penalized for thesame act by prosecuting him/her.”

(emphasis supplied)

32. The purport of assertions made in the election petition was tohighlight this aspect in support of the ground for declaring the election ofrespondent No.1 as being void on account of improper acceptance ofhis nomination form by the Returning Officer (respondent No.8).

33. To put it differently, the approach of the High Court inconsidering the two applications is, in our opinion, manifestly erroneous,if not perverse. For, it has ventured into the arena of analysis of thematter on merit. That is prohibited area at this stage. Since theconclusion reached by the High Court that the pleadings in paragraphs 2and 9 to 11 of the election petition are frivolous and vexatious is untenable,it would necessarily follow that the election petition, as filed, will have tobe examined as whole without subtracting any portion therefrom. If soread, it is not possible to take view that the same does not disclose anycause of action at all. On this finding, the application preferred byrespondent no.1 for rejection of election petition in limine under OrderVII Rule 11, cannot be countenanced and must also fail.

34. The only other plea of respondent No.1 that needs examinationis about the absence of averment in the election petition that because ofimproper acceptance of nomination form of respondent No.1, it hasmaterially affected the election results of respondent No.1. Even thiscontention should not detain us in light of the exposition in the recentdecision of this Court in M. Prithviraj (supra). For, the case of DuraiMuthuswami Vs. N. Nachiappan and Ors.,[43] noticed in this judgment,it has been observed that in the case of election to single memberconstituency, if there are more than 2 candidates and the nomination ofone of the defeated candidates had been improperly accepted, question

Amight arise as to whether the result of the election of the returnedcandidate had been materially affected by such improper reception. Thatwould not be so in the case of challenge to the election of the “returnedcandidate” himself on the ground of improper acceptance of hisnomination. In paragraph 23 of the judgment in M. Prithviraj (supra),after analysing the exposition in Durai Muthuswami (supra), the CourtBobserved thus:

“23. It is clear from the above judgment in Durai Muthuswamithat there is difference between the improper acceptance of anomination of returned candidate and the improper acceptanceof nomination of any other candidate. There is also differenceCbetween cases where there are only two candidates in the frayand situation where there are more than two candidatescontesting the election. If the nomination of candidate otherthan the returned candidate is found to have been improperlyaccepted, it is essential that the election petitioner has to pleadDand prove that the votes polled in favour of such candidate wouldhave been polled in his favour. On the other hand, if theimproper acceptance of nomination is of the returnedcandidate, there is no necessity of proof that the electionhas been materially affected as the returned candidate wouldnot have been able to contest the election if his nominationEwas not accepted. It is not necessary for the respondent to provethat result of the election insofar as it concerns the returnedcandidate has been materially affected by the improper acceptanceof his nomination as there were only two candidates contestingthe election and if the appellant’s nomination is declared to haveFbeen improperly accepted, his election would have to be set asidewithout any further enquiry and the only candidate left in the frayis entitled to be declared elected.”

(emphasis supplied)

35. The Court then noted that the decision in Durai MuthuswamiG(supra), has been followed in Jagjit Singh Vs. Dharam Pal Singh andOrs.[44]. This Court then adverted to its earlier decision in Vashist NarayanSharma Vs. Dev Chandra & Ors.[45], paragraph 9 thereof. That hasbeen extracted in paragraph 25 of the judgment in M. Prithviraj (supra).

44 (1995) Supple (1) SCC 42245 (1955) 1 SCR 509 = AIR 1954 SC 513H

36. In Duni Chand (supra), this Court was called upon to considerwhether the nomination paper submitted by the appellant therein wasimproperly accepted by the Returning Officer. It observed that if theReturning Officer had rejected the nomination paper of the appellanttherein at the time of scrutiny, the order of rejection would have beenvalid. As result, the appellant could not have participated in the electionprocess and there would have been no occasion for him to be elected. Itwould therefore, follow that improper acceptance of his nomination bythe Returning Officer has inevitably materially affected his result of theelection.

37. The respondent No.1 on the other hand, has relied on thedecision in Mangani Lal Mandal (supra). In this case, the electionwas challenged by invoking the ground under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) andin that context the Court observed that it was essential for the electionpetitioner to plead material facts that the result of the election in so faras it concerned the returned candidate has been materially affected, bysuch observance or non-observance. In the present case, the election ischallenged by invoking ground of improper acceptance of nomination ofthe respondent No.1 – returned candidate under Section 100(1)(d)(i).Even the other case i.e. Shambhu Prasad (supra), relied by respondentNo.1 will be of no avail. In that case, 22 candidates had filed theirnomination papers for election from the concerned constituency, out ofwhich only 17 candidates were left in the fray besides the electionpetitioner, after withdrawal of nomination papers of 4 of such candidates.The margin of victory between respondent No.1 and Karuna Shukla,who emerged as his nearest rival, was more than 20,000 votes. Theappellant in that case had polled 21,000 votes. He filed an electionpetition before the High Court seeking declaration about his havingbeen elected. Notably, the ground for declaring the election to be voidwas not because of improper acceptance of nomination form of thereturned candidate per se but because of improper acceptance ofnomination papers of other defeated candidates.

38. Our attention has also been invited by the learned counsel toL.R. Shivaramagowda (supra), with particular emphasis on paragraph10 and 11, wherein the Court observed that in order to declare an electionto be void under Section 100(1)(d)(iv) it is absolutely necessary for theelection petitioner to plead that the result of the election insofar as it

Aconcerns the returned candidate has been materially affected. In thepresent case, the election petition is in reference to the ground of improperacceptance of nomination form of respondent No.1 – the returnedcandidate under Section 100(1)(d)(i). Thus, if that plea is accepted andthe election of respondent No.1 is declared to be void, it would necessarilyfollow that the election result of the returned candidate has been materiallyBaffected.

39. The respondents had then contended that the election petitionercannot be permitted to bring or introduce new ground or cause ofaction beyond limitation period of 45 days of declaration of the result ofthe election. We do not wish to dwell upon this issue. In our opinion, thisCcontention will have to be addressed by the High Court in the first instance.

The High Court, without recording any reason has disposed of theapplications filed by the election petitioner (appellant) as the electionpetition itself was dismissed in limine. Since the election petition willstand restored before the High Court, to subserve the ends of justice,Dthe applications preferred by the election petitioner (appellant) will alsostand restored for being heard by the High Court on its own merit and todecide it in accordance with law. As result, it is not necessary for us todilate on the decision relied by the respondents in the case ofHarmohinder Singh (supra). We leave this contention open to bedecided by the High Court at the appropriate stage.E

40. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the impugnedjudgment of the High Court in allowing both the applications filed byrespondent no.1 cannot stand the test of judicial scrutiny. For, we do notfind any merit in the plea of the respondent No.1 that paragraphs 2 & 9to 11 of the election petition are frivolous and vexatious, which contentionFerroneously commended to the High Court. On the other hand, we areof the considered opinion that the subject election petition plainly disclosescause of action for filing of the election petition to declare the election ofrespondent No.1 to be void on the ground of improper acceptance of hisnomination.

41. We make it clear that we may not be understood to haveexpressed any opinion on the merits of the other issues to be decided bythe High Court. In other words, our analysis is limited to the thresholdmatter considered in this judgment about the striking off of the pleadingsand rejection of the election petition in limine.

42. In light of the above, we hold that E.A. No.329 of 2015 andEA No.330 of 2015, both filed by respondent No.1 in the subject electionpetition, deserve to be rejected. Further, the Election Petition No.8 of2014 shall stand restored to the file of the High Court to its originalnumber for being proceeded further in accordance with law. Similarly,the applications filed by the appellant shall stand restored (except theapplication for early hearing), to their original numbers to be decided bythe High Court in accordance with law.

43. As regards the application for early hearing of the electionpetition filed by the appellant before the High Court, the same be treatedas disposed of in terms of this order. The imperativeness of expeditiousdisposal of the election petition is underscored in Section 86(7) of the1951 Act. As per the said provision, the trial of the election petition isrequired to be disposed of preferably within six months from the date ofits presentation before the High Court. Besides, this Court in the caseof Mohd. Akbar (supra) has highlighted the necessity of discharging thepious hope expressed by the Parliament. Therefore, we may only requestthe High Court to expeditiously dispose of the election petition preferablywithin three months from the production of copy of this judgment byeither party before it.

44. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed in the above termswith no order as to costs.

Ankit Gyan

Appeals allowed.