BHARATI REDDY versus THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

[2018] 3 S.C.R. 137

BHARATI REDDY

THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 1763 of 2018)

MARCH 06, 2018

[DIPAK MISRA, CJI, A. M. KHANWILKAR AND

DR. D.Y. CHANDRACHUD, JJ.]

Constitution of India: Art. 226 – Writ of quo warranto –Issuance of, when – On facts, appellant got elected to the post ofAdhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat – Writ petition before the High Courtalleging that the appellant played fraud on the government bysubmitting false affidavit for issuance of Income and CasteCertificate – Prayer seeking issuance of writ of quo warrantodirecting appellant to vacate the office of Adhyaksha, allowed bythe Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court – Asregards the Income and Caste Certificate, directions to CasteVerification Committee to proceed with the matter – On appeal, held:Unless the Court is satisfied that the incumbent was not eligible atall as per the statutory provisions for being appointed or elected tothe public office or that he/she has incurred disqualification tocontinue in the said office, which satisfaction should be foundedon the indisputable facts, the High Court ought not to entertain theprayer for issuance of writ of quo warranto – Thus, the HighCourt could not have issued writ of quo warranto until the Incomeand Caste Certificate issued in favour of the appellant, on the basisof which she participated in the election for the post of Adhyakshaand got elected, was to be declared void or invalidated by the CasteScrutiny Committee – Mere fact that the certificate was issued in ashort span of five days from the date of the application, per se,does not lead to an inference that the required procedure has notbeen followed and can be no basis to invalidate the certificate –For person possessing an Income and Caste Certificate issued bythe jurisdictional Authority and so long as it is valid and in force,treating such person as usurper of the public office and occupyingit without legal authority, cannot be accepted – Order passed bythe High Court set aside – Caste Verification Committee directed toexpedite the enquiry regarding validity of the Income and CasteCertificate.

AAllowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The post of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat is apublic office in relation to which writ of quo warranto can beissued, if the post is occupied by person who is not eligible tobe so appointed or incurs disqualification to continue to occupyBthe post. Indeed, when statutory remedy is provided for removalof disqualified person from the public office who is allegedlyusurper of public office, the writ court would be ordinarily slow ininterfering, much less, issuing writ of quo warranto. [Para 13][160-B-C]C1.2 The concurrent finding recorded by the Single Judgeand the Division Bench of the High Court is that the process ofissuance of the certificate to the appellant by the jurisdictionalAuthority was done in mortal hurry. The Court also noted thatthere was some overwriting in relation to the date. After advertingto these circumstances, the High Court opined that there wasDsomething seriously wrong about the process adopted by therespondent No.5 for issuance of caste certificate, which wasobviously done to favour the appellant who could then contestthe election. The High Court also noted that the respondent No.5who had issued the stated certificate was later on suspended,Epending departmental enquiry against him in reference to theselfsame certificate issued to the appellant. Additionally, the HighCourt has found that there was discrepancy in the two affidavitsfiled by the appellant, which is in the nature of suppression andnon-disclosure of material financial information. Finally, the HighCourt concluded that since the issue regarding the validity ofFIncome and Caste Certificate was pending before the CasteVerification Committee, which was fact finding Committee, theCommittee would decide the same on its own merits. Notably,the High Court did not quash the caste certificate as being voidbut left it open to the Caste Verification Committee to proceedGin accordance with law. [Para 16] [162-D-H; 163-A]

1.3 Interfering in exercise of writ jurisdiction is limited tojudicial review of the decision making process and not of thedecision itself. In the instant case, the final decision regardingthe validity of Income and Caste Certificate issued to theHappellant has been advisedly kept open, thereby the same, in law

and in fact, is still valid and in force. There is statutorypresumption that such caste certificate shall be valid until it iscancelled by the Competent Authority. However, the only logicthat can be deduced from the contemplation done by the SingleJudge and the Division Bench of the High Court, is that theprocess followed by the respondent No.5 for issuing the statedcertificate to the appellant is replete with serious doubt and,therefore, is prima facie fraudulent. In other words, theexistence of the caste certificate or for that matter the fact that ithas been so issued by the respondent No.5, is not doubted or indispute. It is not case of appellant relying on non-existing orofficially non-issued caste certificate. Thus, enquiry will have tobe made about the circumstances warranting issuance of statedcertificate in tearing hurry by the respondent No.5, allegedly tofavour the appellant. The other aspect is about the discrepanciesin the two affidavits submitted by the appellant and including thesuppression and non-disclosure of her truthful financialinformation. [Paras 18-19] [163-D-H]1.4 Indubitably, both these aspects would be the subjectmatter of the enquiry before the Caste Verification Committee,being intrinsically mixed with the question of validity of the statedcertificate. Appellant had offered explanation on both thesematters. Regarding the factum of mortal hurry allegedly displayedby the respondent No.5 in issuing the caste certificate, shecontended that it was not issued on the same day as alleged butafter due enquiry. That is evinced from the original official fileproduced before the Court. The explanation certainly would haveto be examined by the Caste Verification Committee, beforeinvalidating the caste certificate on the ground that properprocedure was not followed. For the present, suffice it toobserve that the mere fact that the certificate was issued in ashort span of five days from the date of the application, per se,does not lead to an inference that the required procedure hasnot been followed. The mere fact that the caste certificate hasbeen issued within short span of five days albeit after followingdue procedure, can be no just basis to invalidate the certificateby the Caste Verification Committee. The said Committee willbe obliged to record clear finding of fact about the eligibility ofthe appellant in reference to her financial status and income,

Akeeping in mind the purport of Clause (ii) of the Note toNotification dated 13[th] January, 1995. While considering thatmatter, the Committee will have to make an enquiry as to whetherthe appellant or her parent(s)/guardian(s) “is” an income taxassessee /wealth tax assessee on the date of issuance ofthe certificate. As regards this fact, Caste Verification CommitteeBwould have to examine the correctness and efficacy of the twoaffidavits in its proper perspective known to law. It is alsocontended by the appellant that Clause (ii) of the Note posits twoaspects:- the first is that the incumbent or either of his/herparents/guardian should not be an income tax or wealth taxC“assessee” at the relevant time. The expression used in thisclause, “is” an income tax assessee/wealth tax assessee, presupposes that it is in praesenti and for the relevant period.Secondly, the incumbent must necessarily fall within theexpression “assessee” given in the concerned tax laws. That

means only person, by whom any tax or any other sum of moneyDis payable under the Act for the concerned period and not other-wise. No material has been produced or is forthcoming that theappellant, or for that matter, her husband, had paid any tax or areliable to pay tax or sum of money under the concerned taxlegislation, for the relevant period i.e. Financial Year 2015-16.EAbsence of such evidence, the Income and Caste Certificateissued to the appellant cannot be invalidated. Furthermore, theincome of her husband / spouse is not relevant fact for issuanceof the Income and Caste Certificate. For, Clause (ii) excludesbenefit only if the incumbent or either of his/her parent/guardianis an income tax assessee or wealth tax assessee. This provisionFwill have to be interpreted strictly, as in the case of provision forany other disqualification. The appellant also asserts that thereis no discrepancy or for that matter suppression ornon-disclosure of financial information in the declarationssubmitted by her. In any case, that would be disputed questionGof fact and per se concerning the issue of validity of Income andCaste Certificate. [Para 20-21] [164-A-H; 165-A-F]

1.5 There is force in the submission of the appellant thatall these issues will be the subject matter during the enquiry intothe question of validity of the stated Income and Caste

Certificate, which is pending before the Caste VerificationCommittee. Even the High Court was conscious of this positionand perhaps, therefore, did not quash or set aside the Incomeand Caste Certificate as being void. writ of quo warrantocannot be issued on the basis of assumptions, inferences orsuspicion regarding the factum of fulfillment of eligibility criteria.Being an extraordinary power, ordinarily such writ ought to beissued only on the basis of indisputable facts leading to singularconclusion that the incumbent was in fact or in law disqualified tooccupy the public office or has incurred disqualification tocontinue to remain therein. Only whence such person wouldfall within the description of an usurper of public office withoutlegal authority. On the other hand, for person possessing anIncome and Caste Certificate issued by the jurisdictional Authorityand so long as it is valid and in force, in fact and in law, treatingsuch person as usurper of the public office and occupying itwithout legal authority, cannot be countenanced. The High Courthad plainly erred in engaging itself in an enquiry into prohibitedarea which is already the subject matter of the proceedingspending before the Caste Verification Committee, withoutrealizing that the observations made by it were inherently boundto influence the Committee from taking just and properdecision in accordance with law irrespective of its observation todecide without being influenced by its decision. [Para 22] [165-G-H; 166-A-D]

1.6 Strikingly, neither the Single Judge nor the DivisionBench of the High Court thought it appropriate to quash and setaside the Income and Caste Certificate as being void. If the HighCourt was to allow that relief or other reliefs claimed by the writpetitioners in entirety after full-fledged enquiry, thecorrectness of that approach could have been tested on adifferent scale. It should not be understood to have stated thatsuch course was open to the High Court. The High Courtstopped short of concluding that the Income and CasteCertificate issued to the appellant is void. It merely expressed aprima facie opinion that the process adopted by the respondentNo.5 to issue the Income and Caste Certificate to the appellantcreated serious doubt. At best, it observed that the appellantwas instrumental in playing fraud upon the jurisdictional

ABC

AAuthority and/or the said Authority colluded with the appellant,by surreptitiously issuing the Income and Caste Certificate tothe appellant. But, finally, it has left the question regarding thevalidity of the certificate open to be decided by the CasteVerification Committee, in the pending proceedings, dealing withthe factum of validity of the certificate issued to the appellant.BHaving said this, the High Court could not have issued writ ofquo warranto. That writ could be issued only if the Income andCaste Certificate was held to be void or after it was invalidatedby the Competent Authority. [Paras 23- 24] [166-E-H; 167-A-B]1.7 What the writ petitioners (respondents 6 to 9) hadCquestioned was the correctness of the declarations submitted bythe appellant about her financial status and income which,according to them was beyond the prescribed limit anddisentitled the appellant to get the Income cum Caste Certificate.The firm stand taken by the appellant is that there was noDdiscrepancy between the two declarations muchless indicative ofexcess income of the appellant at the relevant time. There is nolittle of material forthcoming to show that in fact, the appellant orher parents/guardians had paid income tax or wealth tax duringthe relevant Financial Year 2015-16. That indeed could havedisentitled the appellant from getting an Income and CasteECertificate. This submission of the appellant is founded on thesetting in which Clause (ii) of the Note has been placed and isattracted only to an income tax assessee/wealth tax assessee asper the relevant taxation laws during the current period. Anassessee is person who pays taxes or is liable to pay tax or anyFother sum of money payable by him/her. The argument is that thefact that the appellant has been issued PAN number or has filedtax return and paid tax in the past will be of no consequence anddoes not impair or impinge upon the eligibility of the appellant toget an Income and Caste Certificate for the relevant period in

any manner. These are matters to be considered by the CasteGVerification Committee and only if rejected, the caste certificatein question could be invalidated. Until final decision is taken bythe Caste Verification Committee, in law, it will have to bepresumed that subject certificate is valid and in force in view ofthe statutory provision making it explicit to that effect.H[Para 28] [169-E-G; 170-A-B]

1.8 Unless the Court is satisfied that the incumbent wasnot eligible at all as per the statutory provisions for beingappointed or elected to the public office or that he/she hasincurred disqualification to continue in the said office, whichsatisfaction should be founded on the indisputable facts, the HighCourt ought not to entertain the prayer for issuance of writ ofquo warranto. [Para 34] [174-E]

1.9 The High Court had justly negatived the argument ofthe appellant which was founded on the interim relief granted bythe High Court in the stated writ petition on the ground that thesame cannot validate an action which was illegal so as to alter theeligibility criteria for contesting the election of Adhyaksha. TheHigh Court is free to deal with that writ petition on its ownmerits in accordance with law. [Para 35] [175-E-F]

1.10 This, however, would make no difference to theconclusion which must be reached in this case that the High Courtcould not have issued writ of quo warranto until the Income andCaste Certificate issued in favour of the appellant, on the basisof which she participated in the election for the post of Adhyakshaand got elected, was to be declared void or invalidated by theCaste Scrutiny Committee. [Para 36] [175-G-H]

1.11 In matter of this nature, the High Court, having keptopen the issue regarding the validity of the Income and CasteCertificate to be decided by the jurisdictional Caste VerificationCommittee and finding no legal basis to declare the certificate asvoid ab initio or choosing to do so, ought to have insteaddirected the Caste Verification Committee to expedite theenquiry and conclude the same in time bound manner. Thecourse adopted by the High Court has only prolonged theconsideration of that issue by the competent authority andembroiled the parties in avoidable proceedings. [Para 37] [176-A-B]

1.12 The decisions of the Single Judge and the DivisionBench of the High Court impugned in the present appeal are setaside. The writ petition filed by the respondents 6 to 9 isdisposed of only by directing the Caste Verification Committeeto expedite the enquiry regarding the validity of the Income andCaste Certificate issued to the appellant by respondent no.5 and

Aconclude the same preferably within the stipulated period. [Para38] [176-C-D]

Kurapati Maria Das v.. Ambedkar Seva Samajan[2009] 6 SCR 498 : [2009] 7 SCC 387 – relied on.

K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) and Others v. Union of Indiaand Another [2010] 6 SCR 972 : (2010) 7 SCC 202and Indra Sawhney and Others v. Union of India(1992) 3 Suppl. SCC 210 ; The University of Mysoreand Another v.. C.D. Govinda Rao and Another[1964] 4 SCR 575 ; Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v.. Stateof Gujarat. [1974] 3 SCR 427 : (1974) 2 SCC 121;K. Venkatachalam v. A. Swamickan 1999 AIR 1723 :[1999] 2 SCR 857 : (1999) 4 SCC 526 ; Arun Singhalias Arun Kr. Singh v.. State of Bihar and Others[2006] 2 SCR 1058 : (2006) 9 SCC 375 ; B.R. Kapurv.. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. [2001] 3 Suppl. SCR191 : (2001) 7 SCC 231 ; High Court of Gujarat andAnr. v. Gujarat Kishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Ors.[2003] 2 SCR 799 : (2003) 4 SCC 712 ; Mor ModernCoop. Transport Society Ltd. v. Financial Commr. & Secy.To Government of Haryana [2002] 1 Suppl. SCR 87 :(2002) 6 SCC 269 ; R.K. Jain Vs. Union of India[1993] 3 SCR 802 : (1993) 4) SCC 119 ; Chairmanand Managing Director, Food Corporation of India andOthers v. Jagdish Balaram Bahira and Others(2017) 8 SCC 670 : Madhuri Patil Vs. Commr., TribalDevelopment [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 50 : (1994) 6 SCC241; Rajesh Awasthi v. Nand Lal Jaiswal and Ors.[2012] 10 SCR 883 : (2013) 1 SCC 501 ; B. SrinivasaReddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply andDrainage Board Employees Asson. [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR462 : (2006) 11 SCC 731 ; and Hari Bansh Lal v..Sahodar Prasad Mahto [2010] 10 SCR 561 : (2010) 9SCC 655 ; Centre for PIL v.. Union of India [2011] 4SCR 445 : (2011) 4 SCC 1 – referred to.

Permanent Edn., at p. 647 ; Halsbury’s Laws of England,4th Edn., Reissue Vol. I, p. 368, para 265 – referredto.

BHARATI REDDY v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1763of 2018

From the Judgment and Order dated 04.12.2017 of the High Courtof Karnataka, Dharwad Bench in W. A. No. 5872 of 2017 (LB-RES).

C. A. Sundaram, Sr. Adv, H. Chandra Sekhar, Ms. Rekha Patil,Ms. Rohini Musa, Abhishek Gupta, Zafar Inayat, Apoorv Tripathi, Advsfor the Appellant.

Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, S. M. Chander Shekhar, Sr. Advs, S. B.Mahapathi, Sharanagouda Patil, Giris M. N., Ms. Supreeta Sharanagouda(for M/s. S-legal Associates), Advs for the Respondents.

AThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. This appeal, by special leave,takes exception to the judgment and order passed by the Division Benchof the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench dated 04.12.2017 inWrit Appeal No.5872 of 2017.B

2. Briefly stated, pursuant to notification dated 04.12.2015,elections were held and the appellant was elected on 28.03.2016 as amember of the Zilla Panchayat from 13-Badanahatti Constituency, BallariDistrict, Karnataka which was reserved for General (Women) Category.Later, the State Government published notification on 15.04.2016Cdeclaring the reservation for the post of Adhyaksha and Upa-Adhyakshaof Zilla Panchayats in the State. In Ballari Zilla Panchayat, the post ofAdhyaksha was reserved for the category of Backward Caste-B(Women). After the said notification, since the appellant intended tocontest the election to the post of Adhyaksha of Ballari Zilla Panchayat,she made an application on 22.04.2016 to the jurisdictional TahshildarDfor issuance of Income and Caste Certificate, certificate which was aprerequisite for submitting the nomination form for the election to thepost of Adhayaksha. That certificate was issued by the Tahshildar on26.04.2016 on the basis of which the appellant contested the electionheld on 29.04.2016 and was declared elected. As required in terms ofEthe Karnataka Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OtherBackward Classes (Reservation of Appointment etc.) Act, 1990 and theRules framed thereunder, the Income and Caste Certificate has beenforwarded to the District Caste Verification Committee Ballari. Theprocess of verification thereof is still in progress.F3. According to the appellant, at the behest of the unsuccessfulcandidates who could not file any election petition to challenge theelection of the appellant, respondent Nos.6 to 9 filed writ petitionbefore the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad being Writ PetitionNo.106417 of 2016, about 3 months after the election of the appellant asAdhyaksha. The substance of the allegation made in the said writGpetition against the appellant was that she played fraud on theGovernment and public by submitting false affidavit before theTahshildar for issuance of Income and Caste Certificate, on the basis ofwhich she contested the election for the post of Adhyaksha ZillaPanchayat and got elected to the said post, to which she was otherwiseHnot entitled to or qualified for. The allegation about the nature of fraud

committed by the appellant can be discerned from the assertions madein paragraphs 6 and 7 of the writ petition, which read thus:

“6. It is submitted that the 6[th] Respondent in order to grabthe post of Adhyaksha of Zila Panchayat has submitted abogus and false caste certificate to show that she belongsto the Backward community-B Category obtained from the5[th] Respondent. It is further submitted that in the applicationfiled by 6[th] Respondent to 5[th] Respondent for issuance of castecertificate, she filed an affidavit stating that her livelihood isagriculture and that she owns 1.03 acres of agricultural land inBadanahatti village and 3.50 Acres of land in Sy. No. 36A inYarrangaligi village. Further she also declared that her familyincome is not more than Rs.3,50,000/- per annum from all othersources and that she and her husband are not assessed to IncomeTax and Commercial Tax. The said declaration made by the6[th] Respondent is totally false to the knowledge of herself,which is clear from the Affidavit filed by the 6[th] Respondent beforethe 2[nd] Respondent while contesting for the member of BellaryZilla Panchayat General Elections. It is further submitted that the6[th] Respondent in her affidavit dated 06.02.2016 declared thatshe is getting rent of Rs.1,40,000/- per annum and her husbandgetting 4,80,000/- per annum, which details are found in paragraph4-A. This itself shows that her family income from one sourceonly is more than 3,50,000/- as declared in the affidavit dated26.04.2016 filed before the 5[th] Respondent for issuance of Casteand Income Certificate. That apart she has also declared in thesaid affidavit dated 26.04.2016 that she and her husband are notassessed to the Income Tax and Commercial Tax, which are alsocontrary to the declaration made in the affidavit dated 06.02.2016filed before 2[nd] Respondent that she has been assessed to IncomeTax and has paid Income Tax, the said details are stated inparagraph 5 of the said affidavit. It is also reliably learnt that thehusband of the 6[th] Respondent is Class-I contractor and is havingmore than income of Rs. 1,00,00,000/- per annum and is assessedto Income Tax and Commercial Taxes. True copies of the Affidavitdated 06.02.2016, 26.04.2016 and Caste and Income Certificateissued by the 5[th] Respondent dated 26.04.2016 are producedherewith as Annexure-E,F and respectively.

148SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A7. It is further submitted that in the proceedings held on29.04.2016 under the Chairmanship of RegionalCommissioner, Kalburgi Division, Kalburgi, the 6[th]Respondent was successful in getting elected as Adhyakshaunder the Category-Backward Community-B based on theabove said false Caste and Income Certificate which wasBissued by the 5[th] Respondent on the same day of applicationwithout any proper enquiry as required under the law. Atrue copy of the said proceedings dated 29.04.2016 is producedherewith as Annexure-H.”

(emphasis supplied)

On the basis of these allegations, the respondent Nos.6 to 9 prayedfor the following reliefs in the said writ petition:

“PRAYER

Wherefore, this Hon’ble Court may be pleased to

a. Issue writ of Quo Warranto directing the 6[th] Respondent tovacate the office of the Adhyaksha, Zilla Panchayat, Bellary.

b. set aside the proceedings dated 29.04.2016 bearing No. SUM./KAM/Pra HaGu/chunavana/05/2016-17 declaring the 6[th] Respon-dent as Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Bellary vide Annexure-H.

c. consequently quash the caste certificate issued to the 6[th]Respondent vide order dated 26-04-2016 in application No.01/16-17 issued by the 5[th] Respondent vide Annexure-G.

d. pass such other or further orders or directions as this Hon’bleFCourt may deem fit, in the interest of justice”.

(emphasis supplied)

4. This writ petition was contested by the appellant inter alia onthe ground that the same was not maintainable in view of the barcontained in Article 243-O of the Constitution of India. Further, the writGpetitioners were only voters and therefore, had no locus to challenge theelection of the appellant as Adhyaksha, which was an indirect election.Rule 7 of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Rules explicitly envisages thatonly member of the Panchayat may challenge the validity of theelection of Adhyaksha and Upa-Adhyaksha. It was also pointed out that

the writ petition filed by the said respondents was politically motivatedpetition and filed at the behest of unsuccessful candidates who could notprevent the appellant from getting elected as Adhyaksha. As regardsthe allegations in the writ petition that the appellant had made falsedeclarations and filed incorrect affidavits, the appellant contended thatthe Income and Caste Certificate was issued in favour of the appellantby the competent authority after completing all the formalities andprocedure. So long as the said certificate was valid and in force,issuance of writ of quo warranto was misplaced. For, there is legalpresumption about the validity of the said certificate in terms of Rules 3-C of the Rules of 1992 framed under the 1990 Act. The said Rule makesit amply clear that the certificate would remain valid until it is cancelledby the jurisdictional Caste Verification Committee. The appellant alsopointed out that the allegation made in the writ petition, regarding thefalse or incorrect income disclosure made by the appellant, was wrongand ill-founded. Such allegation was based on far-fetched logic anduntenable assumptions. The affidavit dated 06.02.2016 submitted alongwith the nomination form filed for contesting elections from 13-Badanahatti Constituency was in reference to the factual position statedtherein. Similarly, the affidavit filed by the appellant dated 26.04.2016was also true, faithful and accurate as it disclosed facts in reference tothe qualification required for contesting the election of Adhyaksha at therelevant time, in respect of post reserved for “B” Category (Women)Backward Caste. In other words, both the affidavits and the informationdisclosed therein were truthful, accurate and contextual, as noted in therespective affidavit. The appellant also asserted that the fact that theIncome and Caste Certificate was issued within five days from the dateof application for the said certificate or on the same date the affidavitdated 26[th] April, 2016 was filed before the Tahshildar, could not give riseto presupposition, inference or assumption that the same was issuedwithout necessary and proper enquiry. On the other hand, there is legalpresumption that the same was valid, having been issued by thejurisdictional Tahshildar competent in that regard. The circumstances,of the time of issue of E-stamps at about 5:27 P.M. or the date ofaffidavit being 26.04.2016, cannot be just basis to assume that thecertificate was fraudulent, in the face of the statutory provision makingit explicit that it would be valid until cancelled by the Caste VerificationCommittee. Thus, the circumstances relied upon by the writ petitioners

CDEFG

Awere neither relevant nor sufficient to draw any inference on fact, muchless legal inference, so as to conclude that the certificate wasfraudulently issued. The fact that the appellant belongs to “Kapu Caste”,which is notified as Category Backward Class; and the declarationregarding income made by the appellant, are issues which are intrinsicallymixed with the issuance of the Income and Caste Certificate. It is notBopen to question the validity of the said certificate much less to entertainthe prayer for issuance of writ of quo warranto on the assumptionthat the said certificate was fraudulent because of some fortuitouscircumstances. It was pointed out by the appellant that the writ of quowarranto is not an ordinary power to be exercised by the High CourtCand moreso, in the matter involving disputed questions of fact. The HighCourt may be justified in issuing such writ only if it is indisputable thatthe elected public representative was ineligible or disqualified to contestthe election or had incurred disqualification at later point of time. Ineither case, such person cannot justify holding on to the public postsuch as that of Adhyaksha. That situation will arise only if the CasteDVerification Committee was to invalidate and cancel the Income andCaste Certificate issued in favour of the appellant and not otherwise.On these contentions, the appellant prayed for dismissal of the writpetition.

5. Preliminary objection regarding bar of jurisdiction in terms ofEArticle 243-O of the Constitution of India and locus of the writpetitioners raised by the appellant commended to the learned Single Judge,who dismissed the writ petition vide judgment and order dated 21.10.2016.

6. Being aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition, the writpetitioners (respondent Nos.6 to 9 herein) carried the matter in WritFAppeal No.101459 of 2016. The Division Bench reversed the judgment ofthe learned Single Judge and allowed the writ appeal vide judgment andorder dated 05.06.2016. It remanded the matter to the learned SingleJudge for fresh decision.

7. The appellant therefore, approached this Court by way ofGSpecial Leave Petition (Civil) No.17059 of 2017 (converted to CivilAppeal No.10587 of 2017) wherein the preliminary objection regardingthe bar under Article 243-O of the Constitution of India and locus of thewrit petitioners, as also the contention that the only remedy to challengethe election of the appellant would be an election petition, was reiterated.H

The two-Judge Bench of this Court disposed of the appeal preferred bythe appellant on the finding that the voter of the Panchayat cannot berendered remediless and if he is aggrieved by the election of theAdhyaksha of the Panchayat, it is open to him to seek the remedy ofjudicial review under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of the India. Insuch proceedings, it is open to the High Court to undertake judicialreview of the subject matter. In paragraph 13 of its judgment, this Courtobserved thus:

“13. It is thus clear that power of judicial review under Articles226/227 of the Constitution is an essential feature of the Constitutionwhich can neither be tinkered with nor eroded. Even theConstitution cannot be amended to erode the basic structure ofthe Constitution. Therefore, it cannot be said that the writ petitionfiled by respondent Nos. 6 to 9 under Article 226 of the Constitutionis not maintainable. However, it is left to the discretion of thecourt exercising the power under Articles 226/227 to entertainthe writ petition.”

Again in paragraph 15, the Court observed thus:

“15. As noticed above, though respondent Nos. 6 to 9 are thevoters are not the members of the Zilla Panchayat. They areaggrieved by the election of the appellant to the office of theAdhyaksha. They cannot challenge the election of the appellantto the office of Adhyaksha by filing an election petition as theyare not the members of the Zilla Panchayat in question. In ourview, voter of the Zilla Panchayat who is not member cannotbe denied an opportunity to challenge the election to the office ofAdhyaksha under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution. Therefore,we hold that the writ petition filed by respondent Nos. 6 to 9before the High Court is maintainable.”

After this decision, the preliminary objections regarding themaintainability of writ petition stood concluded. An attempt was madeby the appellant to question the correctness of the view expressed bythis Court in the aforesaid decision. Concededly, even if the argumentsof the appellant may appear to be attractive, it cannot be entertained inrelation to the decision inter partes.

A8. Be that as it may, in light of the view expressed by this Court,the parties were relegated before the learned Single Judge of the HighCourt. Before the remanded writ petition was taken up for hearing bythe learned Single Judge, the appellant filed writ petition bearing WritPetition No.108700 of 2017 (LB-RES) before the High Court ofKarnataka, Dharwad Bench, challenging the note appended to theBnotification dated 13.01.1995. That notification had been issued by theState Government in exercise of powers conferred under Section 2(2)of the Karnataka Panchayat Raj Act, 1993, for classifying and notifyingthe classes of citizens as Backward Class, for the purpose ofreservation of seats and office of Chairperson in Zilla Panchayat, TalukCPanchayat and Gram Panchayat. The note predicates that no personfalling under category “B” would be entitled to the benefit of reservationin the seats and office of Adhyaksha and Upa-Adhyaksha of ZillaPanchayat, Taluk Panchayat and Gram Panchayat if, inter alia, he/she or either of his/her parents/guardians was an income tax assessee/wealth tax assessee (Clause ii). This stipulation has been assailed byDthe appellant as being in the teeth of the exposition of this Court in K.Krishna Murthy (Dr.) and Others Vs. Union of India and Another[1]and Indra Sawhney and Others Vs. Union of India[2]. The High Courtbeing prima facie convinced with the said contention granted interimstay to the said stipulation (Clause ii) in the notification dated 13.01.1995.E

9. Reverting to the remanded writ petition from which the presentappeal arises as aforesaid, the same was to be heard by the learnedSingle Judge on merits of the controversy for grant of reliefs prayed inthe writ petition including for issuance of writ of quo warranto. Thelearned Single Judge, after examining the rival contentions and afterFtaking note of the original documents forming part of the original fileproduced by the Government advocate, opined vide judgment and orderdated 21.09.2017 as under:

“11. Learned AGA appearing for respondents 1,3 to 5 filedfollowing documents pertaining to issuance of caste and incomeGcertificate to respondent No. 6-Smt. Bharati Reddy w/oSri Thimmareddy for perusal of this Court.

1. Application dated 22.04.2016 for issue of caste and incomecertificate (Xerox copy).

1(2010) 7 SCC 202H2(1992) Supp (3) SCC 210

2. Notice dated 23.04.2016 issued by the Revenue Inspector.

3. Report of the Revenue Inspector dated 26.04.2016 bearingNo. Sam.Kam.Jaa and Aa Zi. Pam.Chu/01/16-17 dated26.04.2016.

4. Mahazar

5. Statement

6. Affidavit of the applicant sworn before the Advocate Notary

7. Applicant’s identity card (Xeroxcopy)

8. Applicant’s voter identity card (Xerox copy)

9. Transfer Certificate (certified copy)

10. Study Certificate (certified copy)

11.Original Caste and Income Certificate bearingNo. Sam.Kam.01/06-07 dated 26.04.2016.

12. Form No. 24 regarding applicant’s land holding.

12. On perusal of the documents it is seen that on 22.04.2016 therespondent No. 6 has filed application for issue of caste andincome certificate; on 23.04.2016 the jurisdictional RevenueInspector has issued notice to respondent No. 6 pointing out thediscrepancies with regard to issuance of caste and incomecertificate; on 26.04.2016 the Revenue Inspector has submitted areport recommending to issue caste certificate to the petitioner inBackward Caste II(B); revenue inspector had conducted mahazaralong with the Village Accountant and opined that there is noobjection for issue of caste certificate to the petitioner inBackward Caste II(B); statement of Smt. C. Bharathi w/o V.C.Thimma Reddy before the Revenue Inspector; affidavit ofSmt. C. Bharathi w/o V.C. Thimma Reddy sworn before theAdvocate Notary, Ballari Tq. Rev. Area on 26.04.2016; Xeroxcopy of the original voters’ list of the year 2015; Xerox copy ofthe voter’s identity card; certified copy of the transfer certificate;certified copy of the study certificate and also the originalcertificate issued by the Special Tahasildar, Kurugodu, declaringthe caste of the respondent No. 6 as Kapu which comes underBackward Category ‘B’ on 26.04.2016 so also the original of FormNo. 24 regarding holding of land by the respondent No. 6.

EFG

13. The entire process of issuance of caste certificate isconcluded in five days, i.e., application was filed on 22.04.2016and the caste certificate was issued on 26.04.2016, which cannotbe said to be illegal, as contended by the learned counselfor respondent No.6. However, on perusal of the affidavit filedby the respondent No. 6 before the Notary it is seen thatthe e-stamp paper is purchased at 5.27 PM on 26.04.2016and after purchase affidavit was sworn before the Notaryand on that day itself the caste certificate is issued. It isalso seen that the date 26.04.2016 is over-written. Thiscreates serious doubt about the process of issuance ofcaste certificate by the respondent No.5.

14. The respondent No. 5 being responsible officer of theRevenue Department has issued the caste certificate in amortal hurry. The respondent No. 6 who purchased the E-stamppaper on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 PM and on the same day she filesthe affidavit on the E-Stamp paper before the Advocate Notaryand the same is submitted before the Special Tahsildar and theTahsildar after verification has issued caste certificate to therespondent No.6, being the contested candidate for the post ofAdhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Ballari. The same is found in thedocuments produced by the learned AGA. From this process

it can be said that the respondent No. 5 being responsibleofficer has not taken care and diligence in issuing the castecertificate and had adopted casual working nature.Whether this casual attitude of the respondent No.5 canbe said as illegality or negligence is to be considered in

Fseparate proceedings”.

(emphasis supplied)

Again, while dealing with the factual matrix of the case, the learnedSingle Judge, in the same judgment, analysed the issue as follows:

“35. In this writ petition the core issue relates to the holding of theoffice of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat, Ballari, by therespondent No.6 and also seeking quashing of Annexure-H thenotification declaring the respondent No. 6 as Adhyaksha of ZillaPanchayat Ballary. Therefore, the concept of creamy layer asstated supra, does not come in the way of disposal of this writ

petition which is filed for issue of writ of quo warranto against therespondent No. 6 to vacate the office of the Adhyaksha of ZillaPanchayat, Ballary and also to quash Annexure-H. In view ofthe same, the contention of the respondent No.6 does not holdsubstance.

36. In the instant petition it is relevant to state that the procedureof writ of quo warranto confers jurisdiction and authority on theCourt to control executive action in the matter of making anappointment of person to the public office against the relevantstatutory provisions. In the instant case, the petitioners are thevoters/electorates and so also the whistle blowers. It is alsorelevant to state that, the writ of Quo Warranto protectsfrom illegal deprivation of public office to which they mayhave right and also it relates to protect the public fromusurping of public office by person who is not entitled tohold the public office as result of connivance of executiveor that its active help, wherein the respondent No. 5 beingthe responsible Tahasildar, Kurugodu, issued castecertificate to respondent No. 6, on the basis of which shewas able to contest and elect for the post of Adhyaksha ofZilla Panchayat, Ballari. The respondent No.6 was contestedand elected for post of Zilla Panchayat Member from13-Badanahatti Constituency which was reserved for GeneralCategory (Woman). In her affidavit (Annexure-E dated06.2.2016) itself she has stated that she is an income taxassessee and has even furnished PAN (permanent accountnumber). However, the said fact is suppressed in thesubsequent affidavit vide Annexure-F dated 26.04.2016submitted before the Tahasildar, Kurugodu (respondentNo. 5) along with her application for obtaining BackwardClass Community certificate.

xxxxxxxxxxxx

38…However, the respondent No.5 is under suspensionpending enquiry with regard to the procedure adopted byhim in issuing the caste certificate to the respondent No.6.

39. The respondent No.6 who is elected by democraticprocess, she belonged to Kapu caste, which caste falls under

Backward Class-B category, which is indicated in theGovernment Notification dated 13.01.1995 of the Government ofKarnataka. However, now the issue is pending before theCaste Verification Committee and that issue cannot bedecided under the jurisdiction of this court under Article226 of the Constitution of India.

40…. whereas in the instant writ petition the Income TaxReturns filed by the respondent No. 6 pertains to the year2013-14. But she sworn in the affidavit that she is not anassessee for the year 2015-16. It reflects the conduct ofthe respondent No.6.”

(emphasis supplied)

Finally, the learned Single Judge concluded as under:

“42. It cannot be lost sight of the fact that, the E-stamp paper waspurchased at 5.57 pm on 26.04.2016 and the caste cum incomecertificate was issued on the same day, which fact reveals thatthe certificate was issued in mortal hurry. Accordingly, this writpetition is filed for issue of writ of Quo Warranto in respect ofquashing the proceedings vide Annexure-H dated 29.04.2016 andalso to direct the respondent No. 6 to vacate the office ofAdhyaksha of Zilla Panchyat, Ballari.

43. Respondent No. 6 being responsible member of ZillaPanchayat, Ballari as she was the successful candidate electedfrom 13 Badanahatti constituency which was reserved for GeneralCategory (Woman) as per the notification dated 28.03.2016published in Karnataka Gazatee. The post of Adhyaksha of ZillaFPanchayat was reserved for Backward Category Woman. Therespondent No.6 belonged to Kapu community which belongs toCategory Community. However, the declaration regardingher family income reveals that it is more thanRs.3,50,000/- p.a. that too only from the rental income. ThisGshows that the respondent No. 6 files an affidavit to securethe caste and income certificate from the respondent No.5,who issued the certificate in mortal hurry. This createsserious doubt about the genuinity or otherwise of theprocess of issuing the caste certificate. However, theissue is now pending before the Caste Verification

Committee, which is fact finding committee and would bedecided in its own course. Hence, the question of fact asregarding the caste of respondent No. 6 in this writpetition does not arise for consideration.

In view of the aforesaid reasons, I am of the opinion, since therespondent No. 6 has not declared her correct and proper familyincome only with an intention to hold the post of Adhyaksha whichis public office, must be prevented from holding the office.”

(emphasis supplied)

On the said finding and after recording its opinion, the learnedSingle Judge passed the following order:

“ORDER

Writ Petition is allowed in part. Accordingly, the proceddings dated29.04.2016 bearing No. SUM./KAM/PraHaGu/ chunavana/05/2016-17 declaring the 6[th] respondent as Adhyaksha of ZillaPanchayat, Ballari, vide Annexure-H is hereby quashed.Consequently, writ of quo warranto is issued directing the6[th] respondent to vacate the office of Adhyaksha, Zilla Panchayat,Ballari. Rest of the prayers do not arise for considerationand accordingly they are rejected.

The records submitted by the learned A.G.A. before this courton 07.09.2017 are directed to be returned by substituting themwith Xerox copies.

The observations made in this Writ Petition is restrictedfor disposal of this case and shall not have any bearingregarding the pending litigation before the CasteVerification Committee. The Caste VerificationCommittee shall independently hold an enquiry anddispose of the case in accordance with law”.

(emphasis supplied)

10. Aggrieved by the aforesaid decision, the appellant filed WritAppeal No.5872 of 2017. The writ petitioners (respondent Nos.6 to 9herein) also filed cross appeal being Writ Appeal No.100657 of 2017.Both the appeals were heard and decided together by the Division Benchof the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench vide judgment and

Aorder dated 04.12.2017. The Division Bench broadly reiterated the viewexpressed by the learned Single Judge and affirmed the conclusion ofthe learned Single Judge both on factual and legal matters. While analysingthe factual matrix, the Division Bench observed as follows:

35… “As narrated in the preceding paragraph Nos. 12 and 13,Bsupra, the appellant filed an application before the jurisdictionalTahsildar for issue of Caste cum Income Certificate on 22.04.2016in the prescribed format as per the Notification dated 13.01.1995.On considering the same, the jurisdictional Revenue Inspectorhas issued notice to the appellant calling upon her to rectify thedefects pointed out, pursuant to which, the appellant filed anCaffidavit on India, Non-Judicial, Government of Karnataka,e-stamp paper issued on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 p.m. declaringthat the appellant and her husband are neither income taxassesses nor sales tax assesses. Annexure-G to the WritPetition No. 106417/2016 is the application filed by theDappellant in the prescribed format in terms of thenotification dated 13.1.1995, whereby in Clause - 11, it isstated that the applicant or their father/mother/guardian arenot the assessee of income tax/wealth tax. This is the mootpoint which requires to be considered to decide whetherthe appellant has played any fraud on the constitution.”

(emphasis supplied)

11. Again in paragraph 36, the Division Bench noted as follows:

“36. It is not in dispute that any affidavit filed before the authoritieshas sanctity in the eye of law and the same, if found to be falsestatement and misrepresentation, it is case of perjury punishableunder criminal law. Based on the statement declared by theappellant, the jurisdictional Tahasildar has issued verificationcertificate certifying that the appellant belongs to backwardClass-B Category in terms of the notification dated 13.1.1995. Itis not in dispute that the statements were made by the appellanton the E-stamp paper issued on 26.04.2016 at 5.27 p.m. and thejurisdictional Tahasildar has issued the certificate on the very sameday i.e. 26.04.2016, based on the application bearing No. 01/16-17,dated 25.04.2016. Fraud played by the appellant is manifestfrom the certificate issued by the jurisdictional Tahasildar.

Based on these facts, the Government of Karnataka hasnow suspended the jurisdictional Tahasildar for providingfalse certificate. On 06.02.2016, the appellant swearing toan affidavit that she is an income-tax assessee, furnishingthe PAN card details, subsequently giving statementsbefore the Revenue Inspector that she is not PAN cardholder and not an income tax assessee prima facie provesthe fraudulent act of the appellant. In addition to that filing afalse affidavit in order to usurp public office is highlydeplorable. In such circumstances, if the appellant is continued tochair and hold the office of Adhyaksha, her action would be fraudon the constitution….”

(emphasis supplied)

The other relevant extract of the impugned judgment of the DivisionBench in paragraph 44, reads thus:

“44. The issue relating to the caste, whether the appellantbelongs to Kapu caste or not is disputed question of fact.It is true that there is no absolute bar under Articles 226 and 227of the Constitution of India to consider annulment of castecertificate de hors alternative statutory remedy available providedthe disputed question of facts are not involved and thecircumstances warrant invoking of the extraordinary writjurisdiction. The judgments relied upon by the respondents on thispoint do not assist the respondents since the matter is alreadypending before the Caste Verification Committee, considering thisprayer at this stage would be, entertaining the parallel proceedingswhich is not tenable. The determination of caste requires afull-fledged enquiry, as such the learned single judgedirecting the caste verification committee, to proceed withthe matter cannot be found fault with. Confirming the order ofthe learned single Judge, we direct the Caste Verification Committeeto proceed with the matter in accordance with law without beinginfluenced by any of the observations made above. All rights andcontentions of the parties are left open. Caste VerificationCommittee shall decide the matter in an expedite manner.

In the result, both the appeals stand dismissed.”

(emphasis supplied)

160SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A12. We have heard Mr. C.A. Sundaram, learned Senior Counselappearing for the appellant and Dr. Rajeev Dhawan & Mr. S.M. ChanderShekhar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondents.

13. It is indisputable that the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayatis public office in relation to which writ of quo warranto can beBissued, if the post is occupied by person who is not eligible to be soappointed or incurs disqualification to continue to occupy the post.Indeed, when statutory remedy is provided for removal of disqualifiedperson from the public office who is allegedly usurper of public office,the writ court would be ordinarily slow in interfering, much less, issuinga writ of quo warranto. The Constitution Bench of this Court in theCcase of The University of Mysore and Another Vs. C.D. GovindaRao and Another[3] has observed thus.

“6. The judgment of the High Court does not indicate thatthe attention of the High Court was drawn to the technicalnature of the writ of quo warranto which was claimed by theDrespondent in the present proceedings, and the conditionswhich had to be satisfied before writ could issue in suchproceedings.

7. As Halsbury has observed :

E‘An information in the nature of quo warranto took theplace of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which layagainst person who claimed or usurped an office,franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority hesupported his claim, in order that the right to the office orfranchise might be determined.’F

8. Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords ajudicial remedy by which any person, who holds anindependent substantive public office or franchise or liberty,is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office,franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be dulyGdetermined, and in case the finding is that the holder of theoffice has no title, he would be ousted from that office byjudicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo warrantogives the Judiciary weapon to control the Executive from

3(1964) 4 SCR 575H

making appointment to public office against law and to protecta citizen from being deprived of public office to which he hasa right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public fromusurpers of public office, who might be allowed to continueeither with the connivance of the Executive or by reason ofits apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before person caneffectively claim writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy theCourt that the office in question is public office and is heldby usurper without legal authority, and that inevitably wouldlead to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of thealleged usurper has been made in accordance with law ornot.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. The moot question in the present case is: whether the HighCourt, in the facts of the present case, was justified in invoking itsextraordinary jurisdiction to issue writ of quo warranto? Let usadvert to the assertion made in the writ petition in support of such arelief claimed by the respondent Nos.6 to 9. The relevant paragraphshave been extracted in paragraph 3 of this judgment, being paragraphs 6and 7 of the writ petition. The case of the writ petitioners was that theappellant, in order to grab the post of Adhyaksha of Zilla Panchayat,submitted bogus and false certificate indicating that she belongs to thebackward community-B category, which was surreptitiously obtainedfrom respondent No.5. In support of this plea, the crux of the allegationis that false, incorrect and misleading declaration was given by theappellant in respect of her financial status and income. In that, in thefirst affidavit dated 6[th] February, 2016 she had declared that she wasreceiving rent of Rs. One lakh forty thousand per annum and herhusband was receiving rent of Rs. Four lakh eighty thousand perannum. Whereas in the second affidavit dated 26[th] April, 2016 filed insupport of the application for grant of Income and Caste Certificate, shehas stated that the annual income of her family was only Rs. Three lakhfifty thousand; and that she and her husband were not paying incometax and commercial tax. According to the writ petitioners, thisdeclaration was false to the knowledge of the appellant. Further, thecaste certificate was issued on the same day of the application withoutany proper inquiry as required under the law. On these assertions, the

Amatter proceeded before the High Court. We will advert to theexplanation offered by the appellant little later.

15. First, we must notice the other material which had come onrecord during the hearing of the writ petition and which weighed withthe High Court. During the hearing, the original official file relating toBthe grant of caste certificate to the appellant was produced by theGovernment Advocate, as noted in paragraph 11 of the judgment of thelearned Single Judge and extracted in paragraph 9 above. On analyzingthe documents contained in the original file, it is noticed that thecertificate was not granted to the appellant on the same day of theapplication as alleged but it took almost five days’ time for processingCthe application and for its issuance. In that, first, notice was issued bythe Revenue Inspector, then, report of the Revenue Inspector wasobtained, Mahazar was prepared, statement was recorded, and thenaffidavit of the appellant came to be filed along with other documents,as has been noted in the original file.

16. The concurrent finding recorded by the learned Single Judgeand the Division Bench of the High Court is that the process of issuanceof the certificate to the appellant by the jurisdictional Authority was donein mortal hurry. This inference has been drawn by the High Court inlight of the facts revealed from the original official file - that the appellantEpurchased stamp paper for preparing affidavit at 5.27 p.m. on 26[th] April,2016 and used the same for notarization and also submitted it to therespondent No.5, who then issued the caste certificate on the same dayi.e. 26[th] April, 2016. The Court has also noted that there was someoverwriting in relation to the date. After adverting to these circumstances,the High Court opined that there was something seriously wrong aboutFthe process adopted by the respondent No.5 for issuance of castecertificate, which was obviously done to favour the appellant who couldthen contest the election. The High Court also noted that the respondentNo.5 who had issued the stated certificate was later on suspended,pending departmental enquiry against him in reference to the selfsameGcertificate issued to the appellant. Additionally, the High Court has foundthat there was discrepancy in the two affidavits filed by the appellant,which is in the nature of suppression and non-disclosure of materialfinancial information. Finally, the High Court concluded that since theissue regarding the validity of Income and Caste Certificate waspending before the Caste Verification Committee, which was fact finding

Committee, the Committee would decide the same on its own merits.Notably, the High Court did not quash the caste certificate as being voidbut left it open to the Caste Verification Committee to proceed inaccordance with law.

17. It is pertinent to mention that the Division Bench of the HighCourt, while deciding Writ Appeal No.101459 of 2016, vide judgmentdated 5[th] June, 2017, has recorded in Para 12 of the judgment that thereis no dispute as to the caste status of the appellant herein; that shebelongs to “Kapu” Caste is not at all in dispute. Considering the above,the issue before the Caste Verification Committee would essentially beone relating to the income eligibility of the appellant. That may be amixed question of fact and law. Presumably, therefore, the High Courtstopped short of quashing the Income and Caste Certificate issued infavour of the appellant as being void.

18. In this backdrop, the controversy will have to be analysed soas to determine whether the High Court was justified in issuing writ ofquo warranto in such situation. Interfering in exercise of writjurisdiction is limited to judicial review of the decision making processand not of the decision itself. In this case, the final decision regardingthe validity of Income and Caste Certificate issued to the appellant hasbeen advisedly kept open, thereby the same, in law and in fact, is stillvalid and in force. There is statutory presumption that such castecertificate shall be valid until it is cancelled by the Competent Authority.However, the only logic that can be deduced from the contemplationdone by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the HighCourt, is that the process followed by the respondent No.5 for issuingthe stated certificate to the appellant is replete with serious doubt and,therefore, is prima facie fraudulent.

19. In other words, the existence of the caste certificate or forthat matter the fact that it has been so issued by the respondent No.5, isnot doubted or in dispute. It is not case of appellant relying on anon-existing or officially non-issued caste certificate. Thus, enquiry willhave to be made about the circumstances warranting issuance of statedcertificate in tearing hurry by the respondent No.5, allegedly to favourthe appellant. The other aspect is about the discrepancies in the twoaffidavits submitted by the appellant and including the suppression andnon-disclosure of her truthful financial information.

DEF

A20. Indubitably, both these aspects will be the subject matter ofthe enquiry before the Caste Verification Committee, being intrinsicallymixed with the question of validity of the stated certificate. Appellanthad offered explanation on both these matters. Regarding the factum ofmortal hurry allegedly displayed by the respondent No.5 in issuing thecaste certificate, she contends that it was not issued on the same day asBalleged but after due enquiry. That is evinced from the original officialfile produced before the Court. In that, the application was made on 22[nd]April, 2016 whence the process commenced and then concluded on 26[th]April, 2016. The process was required to be completed expeditiously asthe certificate was required for contesting the impending election ofCAdhyaksha scheduled on 29[th] April, 2016. This explanation certainlywill have to be examined by the Caste Verification Committee, beforeinvalidating the caste certificate on the ground that proper procedurewas not followed. For the present, suffice it to observe that the merefact that the certificate was issued in short span of five days from thedate of the application, per se, does not lead to an inference that theDrequired procedure has not been followed.

21. The fact as to whether necessary procedure has beencomplied with or not will be one aspect of the enquiry before the CasteVerification Committee, apart from the core aspect of whether in factthe appellant fulfills the income and financial criteria. The mere factEthat the caste certificate has been issued within short span of five daysalbeit after following due procedure, can be no just basis to invalidatethe certificate by the Caste Verification Committee. The said Committeewill be obliged to record clear finding of fact about the eligibility of theappellant in reference to her financial status and income, keeping inFmind the purport of Clause (ii) of the Note to Notification dated 13[th]January, 1995. While considering that matter, the Committee will haveto make an enquiry as to whether the appellant or her parent(s)/guardian(s) “is” an income tax assessee /wealth tax assessee on thedate of issuance of the certificate. As regards this fact, CasteVerification Committee will have to examine the correctness andGefficacy of the two affidavits in its proper perspective known to law.According to the appellant, there is no discrepancy in the disclosuresmade by her in the two declarations concerning her financial matters atthe relevant time. The first affidavit dated 6[th] February, 2016, correctlydiscloses the fact that the appellant possessed PAN Card and was anHincome tax assessee, having paid income tax for the Financial Year 2013-14. The second affidavit dated 26[th] April, 2016 is also accurate anddiscloses the correct financial position wherein it is stated that theannual income of her family is Rs. Three lakh fifty thousand from all thesources; and neither she nor her husband are income tax andcommercial tax payers in reference to the Financial Year (2015-16), forwhich the affidavit was sworn on 26[th] April, 2016. It is also contendedby the appellant that Clause (ii) of the Note posits two aspects:- the firstis that the incumbent or either of his/her parents/guardian should not bean income tax or wealth tax “assessee” at the relevant time. Theexpression used in this clause, “is” an income tax assessee/wealth taxassessee, pre supposes that it is in praesenti and for the relevantperiod. Secondly, the incumbent must necessarily fall within theexpression “assessee” given in the concerned tax laws. That meansonly person, by whom any tax or any other sum of money is payableunder the Act for the concerned period and not otherwise. No materialhas been produced or is forthcoming that the appellant, or for thatmatter, her husband, had paid any tax or are liable to pay tax or sum ofmoney under the concerned tax legislation, for the relevant period i.e.Financial Year 2015-16. Absence of such evidence, the Income and CasteCertificate issued to the appellant cannot be invalidated. Furthermore,the income of her husband / spouse is not relevant fact for issuance ofthe Income and Caste Certificate. For, Clause (ii) excludes benefit onlyif the incumbent or either of his/her parent/guardian is an income taxassessee or wealth tax assessee. This provision will have to beinterpreted strictly, as in the case of provision for any otherdisqualification. The appellant also asserts that there is no discrepancyor for that matter suppression or non-disclosure of financial informationin the declarations submitted by her. In any case, that would be adisputed question of fact and per se concerning the issue of validity ofIncome and Caste Certificate.

22. According to the appellant, as long as the Income and CasteCertificate is valid and in force, which has only been doubted by theHigh Court having been issued by the respondent No.5 in mortal hurry,the matter must rest at that. We find force in the submission of theappellant that all these issues will be the subject matter during theenquiry into the question of validity of the stated Income and CasteCertificate, which is pending before the Caste Verification Committee.

CDEF

AEven the High Court was conscious of this position and perhaps, therefore,did not quash or set aside the Income and Caste Certificate as beingvoid. writ of quo warranto cannot be issued on the basis ofassumptions, inferences or suspicion regarding the factum of fulfillmentof eligibility criteria. Being an extraordinary power, ordinarily such awrit ought to be issued only on the basis of indisputable facts leading toBa singular conclusion that the incumbent was in fact or in lawdisqualified to occupy the public office or has incurred disqualification tocontinue to remain therein. Only whence such person would fall withinthe description of an usurper of public office without legal authority. Onthe other hand, for person possessing an Income and Caste CertificateCissued by the jurisdictional Authority and so long as it is valid and inforce, in fact and in law, treating such person as usurper of the publicoffice and occupying it without legal authority, cannot be countenanced.In our opinion, the High Court had plainly erred in engaging itself in anenquiry into prohibited area which is already the subject matter of theproceedings pending before the Caste Verification Committee, withoutDrealizing that the observations made by it were inherently bound toinfluence the Committee from taking just and proper decision inaccordance with law irrespective of its observation to decide withoutbeing influenced by its decision.23. Strikingly, neither the learned Single Judge nor the DivisionEBench of the High Court thought it appropriate to quash and set asidethe Income and Caste Certificate as being void. If the High Court wasto allow that relief or other reliefs claimed by the writ petitioners inentirety after full-fledged enquiry, the correctness of that approachcould have been tested on different scale. We must immediately clarifyFthat we may not be understood to have said that such course was opento the High Court. That issue does not arise in this appeal.

24. As aforementioned, the High Court stopped short of concludingthat the Income and Caste Certificate issued to the appellant is void. Itmerely expressed prima facie opinion that the process adopted by theGrespondent No.5 to issue the Income and Caste Certificate to theappellant created serious doubt. At best, it observed that the appellantwas instrumental in playing fraud upon the jurisdictional Authority and/or the said Authority colluded with the appellant, by surreptitiouslyissuing the Income and Caste Certificate to the appellant. But, finally, it

has left the question regarding the validity of the certificate open to bedecided by the Caste Verification Committee, in the pendingproceedings, dealing with the factum of validity of the certificate issuedto the appellant. Having said this, the High Court could not have issueda writ of quo warranto. That writ could be issued only if the Incomeand Caste Certificate was held to be void or after it was invalidated bythe Competent Authority.

25. The distinction between void and voidable order was con-sidered in the case of Nawabkhan Abbaskhan Vs. State of Gujarat.[4]The Court noted the dictum of Rubinstein that, when an act is notvoidable but void, it is nullity and can be disregarded and impeached inany proceedings, before any Court or Tribunal and whenever it is reliedupon. In other words, it is made subject to ‘collateral attack’. The Courtobserved that illegal act of authorities, if can be defied on self-determinedvoidness, startling consequences will follow. It, however, made anexception of cases where the order is passed by the jurisdictionalauthority without hearing the party affected, which entails injury to aConstitutionally guaranteed right to the affected party. It held that suchorders may be treated as void and ineffectual to bind the parties fromthe beginning. That is not the case on hand. The underlying principle isthat, in cases such as the one under consideration, the Income and CasteCertificate can only be invalidated after affording opportunity to the holderof the certificate. It will be useful to reproduce the legal position summedup by the Court in paragraph 18 as follows:

“18.…………Decisions are legion where the conditions forthe exercise of power have been contravened and the order treatedas void. And when there is excess or error of jurisdictionthe end product is semblance, not an actual order, althoughwhere the error is within jurisdiction it is good, particularlywhen finality clause exists. The order becomes ‘infallible inerror’, peculiar legal phenomenon like the hybrid beast ofvoidable voidness for which, according to learned author, LordDenning is largely responsible. The legal chaos in this branchof jurisprudence should be avoided by evolving simplerconcepts which work in practice in Indian conditions.Legislation, rather than judicial law-making will meet theneeds more adequately. The only safe course, until simple

Aand sure light is shed from legislative source, is to treatas void and ineffectual to bind parties, from the beginning,any order made without hearing the party affected if theinjury is to constitutionally guaranteed right. In othercases, the order in violation of natural justice is void in thelimited sense of being liable to be avoided by Court withBretroactive force.”

(emphasis supplied)

As the subject certificate still holds the field and until it is invalidatedby the Competent Authority, it is unfathomable as to how the appellantCcan be said to have occupied the public office without legal authority soas to invoke the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of issuing writ of quowarranto.

26. In K. Venkatachalam Vs. A. Swamickan[5], the challenge wasto the election of the appellant to the Legislative Assembly in TamilDNadu by way of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution filed by thecontesting candidate (respondent therein) for declaration that theappellant was not qualified to be Member of Tamil Nadu LegislativeAssembly, since he was not enrolled as an elector in the electoral roll inthe concerned constituency for the general elections in question. TheCourt analysed the factual matrix which pointed out that, admittedly, theEincumbent was not an elector of the concerned constituency and that heblatantly and fraudulently impersonated himself as another elector in theconstituency. Accepting that indisputable position, the Court proceededto conclude that the appellant was not eligible to contest elections fromthe concerned constituency, not being voter in that constituency. ItFthus held that the appellant therein lacked the basic qualification underClause (c) of Article 173 of the Constitution of India read with Section 5of the 1951 Act, which was quintessential to be elected from theconstituency. On such finding, the Court entertained the writ petitionunder Article 226 and declared the appellant to be occupying the publicoffice without legal authority and issued writ of quo warranto. InGother words, the matter was decided on the basis of indisputable andestablished facts. This judgment will be of no avail to the writ petitionersin the present case, so long as the Income and Caste Certificate issuedto the appellant is in force.5 AIR 1999 SC 1723 = (1999) 4 SCC 526H

27. In Kurapati Maria Das Vs. Ambedkar Seva Samajan[6]theCourt distinguished the decision in K. Venkatachalam (supra) being onthe facts of that case and reversed the judgment of the High Courtunder challenge, whereby writ of quo warranto was issued againstthe appellant therein. The reason for doing so may have some bearingon the matter in issue as in that case, there was dispute about the castestatus of the appellant. The Court opined that the issue regarding thecaste status can be decided only by the Competent Authority under therelevant enactment and not by the High Court. The Court accepted thecontention of the appellant that continuance of the post of Chairpersondepended directly on his election, firstly, as ward member andsecondly as the Chairperson, which election was available only to theperson belonging to the Scheduled Caste. In paragraph 32 of thereported decision, the Court while accepting the contention of theappellant noted that the question of caste and his election are soinextricably connected that they cannot be separated and therefore,when the writ petitioners challenged the continuation of the appellant onthe ground of his not belonging to particular caste what they actuallychallenged was the validity of the election of appellant though,apparently, the petition was for writ of quo warranto.28. We agree with this exposition. It applies on all fours to thecase on hand. Inasmuch as, what the writ petitioners (respondents 6 to9) had questioned was the correctness of the declarations submitted bythe appellant about her financial status and income which, according tothem was beyond the prescribed limit and disentitled the appellant to getthe Income cum Caste Certificate. The firm stand taken by theappellant is that there was no discrepancy between the two declarationsmuchless indicative of excess income of the appellant at the relevanttime. In our opinion, there is no tittle of material forthcoming to showthat in fact, the appellant or her parents/guardians had paid income taxor wealth tax during the relevant Financial Year 2015-16. That indeedcould have disentitled the appellant from getting an Income and CasteCertificate. This submission of the appellant is founded on the setting inwhich Clause (ii) of the Note has been placed and is attracted only to anincome tax assessee/wealth tax assessee as per the relevant taxationlaws during the current period. An assessee is person who pays taxesor is liable to pay tax or any other sum of money payable by him/her.

AThe argument is that the fact that the appellant has been issued PANnumber or has filed tax return and paid tax in the past will be of noconsequence and does not impair or impinge upon the eligibility of theappellant to get an Income and Caste Certificate for the relevant periodin any manner. As noted earlier, these are matters to be considered bythe Caste Verification Committee and only if rejected, the casteBcertificate in question could be invalidated. Until final decision is takenby the Caste Verification Committee, in law, it will have to be presumedthat subject certificate is valid and in force in view of the statutoryprovision making it explicit to that effect.

29. In the case of Arun Singh alias Arun Kr. Singh Vs. State ofCBihar and Others[7], this Court over turned the decision of the HighCourt issuing writ of quo warranto, on the ground that it was unclearfrom the orders passed by the Superintendence of Police or the DistrictMagistrate, or for that matter, the State Election Commissioner,suggestive of the fact that the appellant therein was held to haveDcommitted any misconduct within the meaning of the Service Rules. Inparagraph 13, the Court observed thus:

“13.……..No cogent or sufficient reasons have been givenby the High Court for setting aside the well-considered order ofthe State Election Commission. Furthermore, issuance of writEof quo warranto is discretionary and such writ should beissued only upon clear finding that the appointment to apublic office was contrary to the statute. For the said purposeit was obligatory on the part of the High Court to arrive at afinding that the disqualifying clause contained in Section 139(1)(f)was squarely attracted in the case of the appellant, in the light ofFthe order of the State Election Commission. Evidently, theappellant was not disqualified.”

30. In B.R. Kapur Vs. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr.[8]theConstitution Bench was called upon to consider the situation where aperson convicted for criminal offence and whose conviction has notGbeen suspended pending appeal, could be sworn in as the Chief Ministerof State and continue to function as such. The Court was called uponto answer the controversy on the basis of indisputable fact that theincumbent Chief Minister had already been convicted of criminal

6 (2009) 7 SCC 387H7(2006) 9 SCC 375

offence and such conviction had not been suspended in the pendingcriminal appeal. After considering the purport of Article 164 and Article173 of the Constitution, the Court concluded that the appointment of thesecond respondent in the appeal as the Chief Minister was in clearviolation of the constitutional provisions and thus writ of quowarranto was inevitable. The substratum of the exposition was thefactum of basic ineligibility of the person to be appointed or continue asChief Minister. In concurring judgment by Brijesh Kumar, J. (as HisLordship then was) the nature of writ of quo warranto has beenexplicated in the following words:

“79. ……A writ of quo warranto is writ which lies against theperson, who according to the relator is not entitled to hold anoffice of public nature and is only usurper of the office. It is theperson, against whom the writ of quo warranto is directed, who isrequired to show, by what authority that person is entitled to holdthe office. The challenge can be made on various grounds,including on the grounds that the possessor of the office does notfulfil the required qualifications or suffers from any disqualification,which debars the person to hold such office. So as to have anidea about the nature of action in the proceedings for writ of quowarranto and its original form, as it used to be, it would be beneficialto quote from Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn., Vol. 35-A,p. 648. It reads as follows:

“The original common law writ of quo warranto was civilwrit at the suit of the Crown, and not criminal prosecution. Itwas in the nature of writ of right by the King against one whousurped or claimed franchises or liabilities, to inquire by whatright he claimed them. This writ, however, fell into disuse inEngland centuries ago, and its place was supplied by aninformation in the nature of quo warranto, which in its originwas criminal method of prosecution, as well as to punish theusurper by fine for the usurpation of the franchise, as to ousthim or seize it for the Crown. Long before our revolution,however, it lost its character as criminal proceeding ineverything except form, and was applied to the mere purposesof trying the civil right, seizing the franchise, or ousting thewrongful possessor, the fine being nominal only; and such,without any special legislation to that effect, has always been

CDE

Aits character in many of the States of the Union, and it is thereforea civil remedy only.”

80. In the same volume of Words and Phrases, Permanent Edn.,at p. 647 we find as follows:

“The writ of ‘quo warranto’ is not substitute for mandamusor injunction nor for an appeal or writ of error, and is not tobe used to prevent an improper exercise of power lawfullypossessed, and its purpose is solely to prevent an officer orcorporation or persons purporting to act as such from usurpinga power which they do not have. State ex inf. McKittrick v.Murphy[9]

Information in the nature of ‘quo warranto’ does not commandperformance of official functions by any officer to whom itmay run, since it is not directed to officer as such, but to personholding office or exercising franchise, and not for purposeDof dictating or prescribing official duties, but only toascertain whether he is rightfully entitled to exercisefunctions claimed. State ex inf. Walsh v. Thatcher[10].”

(emphasis supplied)

81. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edn., Reissue Vol. I, p.E368, para 265 it is found as follows:

“265. In general.—An information in the nature of quowarranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warrantowhich lay against person who claimed or usurped anoffice, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority hesupported his claim, in order that the right to the office orfranchise might be determined.”

31. In the case of High Court of Gujarat and Anr. Vs. GujaratKishan Mazdoor Panchayat and Ors.[11](supra) in concurringjudgment S.B. Sinha, J. (as His Lordship then was) noted that the HighGCourt in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in matter of this nature isrequired to determine at the outset as to whether case has been madeout for issuance of writ of certiorari or writ of quo warranto.However, the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writ of quo

9 148 SW 2d 527, 529, 530 : 347 Mo 484

10 102 SW 2d 937, 938 : 340 Mo 865H11(2003) 4 SCC 712

warranto is limited one. While issuing such writ, the Court merelymakes public declaration but will not consider the respective impact ofthe candidates or other factors which may be relevant for issuance of awrit of certiorari. The Court went on to observe that writ of quowarranto can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to thestatutory rules as held in Mor Modern Coop. Transport Society Ltd.Vs. Financial Commr. & Secy. To Government of Haryana[12]. TheCourt also took notice of the exposition in R.K. Jain Vs. Union ofIndia[13]. The Court noted that with view to find out as to whether acase has been made out for issuance of quo warranto, the onlyquestion which was required to be considered was as to whether theincumbent fulfilled the qualifications laid down under the statutoryprovisions or not. This is the limited scope of inquiry. Applying theunderlying principle, the Court ought not to enquire into the merits ofthe claim or the defence or explanation offered by the appellantregarding the manner of issuance of Income and Caste Certificate bythe jurisdictional Authority or any matter related thereto which may bematter in issue for scrutiny concerning the validity of the CasteCertificate issued by the jurisdictional statutory authority constituted underthe State Act of 1990 and the rules framed thereunder. That inquiry mayrequire examination of all factual aspects threadbare including thelegality of the stand taken by the appellant herein.

32. In the case of Chairman and Managing Director, FoodCorporation of India and Others Vs. Jagdish Balaram Bahira andOthers[14], the question was in reference to the Caste Certificate whichwas invalidated after the verification done by the jurisdictional ScrutinyCommittee. The observations in the said decision may be of someimport, if the Caste Verification Committee was to invalidate the CasteCertificate issued to the appellant after due verification. As matter offact, the enquiry before the Caste Verification Committee ought toproceed in terms of the procedure prescribed by the Act of 1990 andRules framed thereunder and including the dictum of this Court in,amongst others Madhuri Patil Vs. Commr., Tribal Development[15].

33. In Rajesh Awasthi Vs. Nand Lal Jaiswal and Ors.[16], theCourt noted that writ of quo warranto will lie when the appointment12(2002) 6 SCC 26913(1993) 4 SCC 11914(2017) 8 SCC 67015(1994) 6 SCC 24116(2013) 1 SCC 501

Ais made contrary to the statutory provisions as held in the case of MorModern Coop. Transport Society Ltd. (supra) Further, relying on thedecision in the cases of B. Srinivasa Reddy Vs. Karnataka UrbanWater Supply and Drainage Board Employees Asson.[17]and HariBansh Lal Vs. Sahodar Prasad Mahto[18], wherein the legal positionhas been restated that the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writ ofBquo warranto is limited one which can only be issued if the appointmentis contrary to the statutory rules and the Court has to satisfy itself thatthe appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. In that case, the Courtafter analysing the factual matrix found, as of fact, that there was non-compliance of sub-Section (5) of Section 85 of the Electricity Act, 2003,Cin the matter of appointment of the incumbent to the post ofChairperson of the Commission for which it became necessary to issuea writ of quo warranto. In the supplementing judgment by one of usDipak Misra, J. (as His Lordship then was), the settled legal positionexpounded in B.R. Kapur (supra), University of Mysore (supra), HighCourt of Gujarat (supra), Centre for PIL Vs. Union of India[19]hasDbeen recapitulated in paragraphs 29 to 33 of the reported decision.

34. We have adverted to some of those decisions in the earlierpart of this judgment. Suffice, it to observe that unless the Court issatisfied that the incumbent was not eligible at all as per the statutoryprovisions for being appointed or elected to the public office or that he/Eshe has incurred disqualification to continue in the said office, whichsatisfaction should be founded on the indisputable facts, the High Courtought not to entertain the prayer for issuance of writ of quowarranto.

35. In the case of K. Krishna Murthy (Dr.) (supra) theFConstitution Bench of this Court examined two questions as noted inparagraph 9 of the reported judgment, which read thus:

“9. In light of the submissions that have been paraphrased in thesubsequent paragraphs, the contentious issues in this case can beframed in the following manner:G

(i) Whether Article 243-D(6) and Article 243_T(6) areconstitutionally valid since they enable reservations in favour of

17(2006) 11 SCC 73118(2010) 9 SCC 65519(2011) 4 SCC 1H

backward classes for the purpose of occupying seats andchairperson positions in panchayats and municipalities respectively?

(ii) Whether Article 243-D(4) and Article 243-T(4) areconstitutionally valid since they enable the reservation ofchairperson positions in panchayats and municipalitiesrespectively?”

The Court opined that the objectives of democratic decentralisationare not only to bring governance closer to the people, but also to make itmore participatory, inclusive and accountable to the weaker sections ofsociety. The Court went on to observe that reservations in local self-government are intended to directly benefit the community as whole,rather than just the elected representatives. It is for this very reason thatthere cannot be an exclusion of the “creamy layer” in the context ofpolitical representation. It also noted that while exclusion of the “creamylayer” may be feasible as well as desirable in the context of reservationsfor education and employment, the same principle cannot be extendedto the context of local self-government. We may note that this decisionmay be of relevance to the appellant to pursue his remedy before theHigh Court in the writ petition No.108700 of 2017, questioning thevalidity of Clause (ii) of the notification dated 13.01.1995 providing forexclusion of “creamy layer” against the reserved category. We may,however, without any hesitation record that the High Court had justlynegatived the argument of the appellant which was founded on the interimrelief granted by the High Court in the stated writ petition on the groundthat the same cannot validate an action which was illegal so as to alterthe eligibility criteria for contesting the election of Adhyakshaconducted on 26[th] April, 2016. We do not intend to express any opinioneither way on the pending issues in that proceedings, which are not thesubject matter of this appeal. The High Court is free to deal with thatwrit petition on its own merits in accordance with law.

36. This, however, will make no difference to the conclusion whichwe must reach in this case that the High Court could not have issued awrit of quo warranto until the Income and Caste Certificate issued infavour of the appellant, on the basis of which she participated in theelection for the post of Adhyaksha and got elected, was to be declaredvoid or invalidated by the Caste Scrutiny Committee. We do not wish todilate on other incidental aspects/arguments as the same will not haveany bearing on the conclusion noted above.

37.In matter of this nature, the High Court, having kept openthe issue regarding the validity of the Income and Caste Certificate tobe decided by the jurisdictional Caste Verification Committee and findingno legal basis to declare the certificate as void ab initio or choosing to doso, ought to have instead directed the Caste Verification Committee toexpedite the enquiry and conclude the same in time bound manner.BThe course adopted by the High Court has only prolonged theconsideration of that issue by the competent authority and embroiled theparties in avoidable proceedings.38. Accordingly, we allow this appeal and set aside the decisionsof the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High CourtCwhich are impugned in the present appeal. We, however, dispose of thewrit petition filed by the respondents 6 to 9 being Writ Petition No.106417of 2016 only by directing the Caste Verification Committee to expeditethe enquiry regarding the validity of the Income and Caste Certificateissued to the appellant by respondent no.5 and conclude the sameDpreferably within two months and also intimate its final decision to theappellant within the same time. Needless to observe that the CasteScrutiny Committee will decide the matter on its own merit and withoutbeing influenced whatsoever by any observations made in the impugnedjudgments but in accordance with law. Besides, it shall deal with everycontention raised before it by recording tangible reasons.E

39. The appeal is allowed in the aforementioned terms with noorder as to costs.

Nidhi Jain Appeal allowed.