UDE SINGH & ORS. versus STATE OF HARYANA

[2019] 9 S.C.R. 703

UDE SINGH & ORS.

STATE OF HARYANA

(Criminal Appeal No. 233 of 2010)

JULY 25, 2019

[ABHAY MANOHAR SAPRE AND

DINESH MAHESHWARI, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: s.306 r/w s.34 – Abetment to suicide –Prosecution case was that parties were closely related to each otherand living in same village and in neighbourhood – Relations betweenthem were strained and they were engaged in several litigationsincluding complaint relating to hurt case as lodged by PW-11, motherof the deceased – Allegation against the accused was that theyabetted commission of suicide by the daughter of the complainant(PW-1) – Deceased girl was about 18 years of age – Accused Nos.1 and 2 were uncles in her relation whereas, accused Nos. 3 and 4were her cousins – The deceased girl had been complaining to herfamily about the indecent behaviour of the accused that theyaddressed her as “wife”, “chachi” (aunt) or “Bohoria” (youngerbrother’s wife) – The girl was always advised by her family to keepquiet – On the fateful day, she was found dead, hanging by herneck – On previous day, the deceased girl had complained to hermother and uncle about the indecent taunts made by accused andwhile crying told them that she would end her life as and when shewould get opportunity to do so – Trial court found appellant-accusedguilty of offence punishable under s.306 r/w s.34 and awardedfour years RI – High Court upheld conviction but modified sentenceto two and half years RI – On appeal, held: In the given set upand respective position of the parties, if accused No.1 continuouslyaddressed or called the deceased girl as his “wife”, the utterancewas not merely of teasing but of demeaning and destroying the self-esteem of the young girl whose engagement had broken and whoseuncle was mocking her to join him in matrimony – It was the act ofhumiliation of highest order for the girl, who had personally sufferedthe set-back of broken engagement – The other accused persons

Achose to join the accused No. 1 and aggravated the humiliation ofthe girl by addressing her as younger brother’s wife or aunt –Accused persons were working with the common intention to harassand humiliate the girl with reference to her broken engagement –Such taunting and humiliation of the deceased at the hands of theaccused persons was not singular event or one-off affair but hadBbeen continuous feature, as amply established by the prosecutionwitnesses – There was no reason to disbelieve the statement of PW-11 that her daughter wept the whole night after the said incidentand on being frustrated and exasperated with such humiliations,ended her life in the early morning very next day – It is not caseCof mere eve-teasing, insult or intimidation but the continuous andrepeated acts and utterances of the accused persons were calculatedto destroy her self-esteem aimed at taking her to the brink ofhelplessness and to the vanishing point of tolerance – Accused Nos.1 and 3 were rightly held guilty of offence of abetment of suicide –Interference with the order of High Court not called for.DPenal Code, 1860: s.306 r/w s.34 – Claim of juvenility byappellant no.2 – As per matriculation certificate, on the date ofincident, appellant no.2 was 16 years old – He is entitled to benefitof juvenility.EWords and phrases: Word ‘abetment’ – Meaning of in thecontext of s.107 IPC.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD : 1.1 “Abetment” involves mental process ofinstigating person in doing something. person abets the doingFof thing when: (i) he instigates any person to do that thing; or(ii) he engages with one or more persons in any conspiracy forthe doing of that thing; or (iii) he intentionally aids, by acts orillegal omission, the doing of that thing. These are essential tocomplete the abetment as crime. The word “instigate” literallyGmeans to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasionto do anything. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, theremust be proof of direct or indirect act/s of incitement to thecommission of suicide. In the case of accusation for abetment ofsuicide, the Court would be looking for cogent and convincingproof of the act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. InH

the case of suicide, mere allegation of harassment of the deceasedby another person would not suffice unless there be such actionon the part of the accused which compels the person to commitsuicide; and such an offending action ought to be proximate tothe time of occurrence. Whether person has abetted in thecommission of suicide by another or not, could only be gatheredfrom the facts and circumstances of each case. [Paras 15, 16][729-A-E]

1.2 If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteem and self-respect of the victim, which eventually drawsthe victim to commit suicide, the accused may be held guilty ofabetment of suicide. The question of mens rea on the part of theaccused in such cases would be examined with reference to theactual acts and deeds of the accused and if the acts and deeds areonly of such nature where the accused intended nothing morethan harassment or snap show of anger, particular case may fallshort of the offence of abetment of suicide. [Para 16.1][729-G-H; 730-A-B]

2. The complainant (father of the deceased) and the accusedpersons, residing in the same village in the State of Haryana,were closely related as cousins but were estranged in relations;and were involved in several civil and criminal cases against eachother. The deceased girl was about 18 years of age; she had failedto clear her 10[th] standard examination and was practically dropout from her studies; and she was engaged for the purpose ofmarriage but, six months before the incident in question, herengagement had broken. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 were unclesin her relation whereas, the accused Nos. 3 and 4 were hercousins. In the given set up and the respective position of theparties, if accused No. 1 continuously addressed or called thedeceased girl as his “wife”, the utterance was not merely ofteasing but of demeaning and destroying the self-esteem of theyoung girl whose engagement had broken and whose uncle wasmocking her to join him in matrimony. It was the act of humiliationof highest order for the girl, who had personally suffered the set-back of broken engagement, apart that she was unable to cleareven 10[th] standard examination. Obviously, she was beingridiculed and taunted for her broken engagement. The otheraccused persons chose to join the accused No. 1 and aggravated

EFGH

Athe humiliation of the girl by addressing her as younger brother’swife or aunt. There remains nothing to doubt that the accusedpersons were working with the common intention to harass andhumiliate the girl with reference to her broken engagement. Thesignificant part of the matter is that such taunting and humiliationof the deceased at the hands of the accused persons had not beenBa singular event or one-off affair but had been continuousfeature, as amply established by the prosecution witnesses.[Paras 20, 21] [731-E-F; 732-A-E]3. The intention of the accused had only been to drive thedeceased to the brink of helplessness and intolerance; they inCfact succeeded in doing so on 05.05.1996, when the girl rebukedthem for their utterances. However, the victim girl found no wayout because the humiliation at the hands of accused had beeneveryday affair; and, in the given set up of the society she belongedto, any action against the accused by her family was being avoided

Dfor the sake of her honour. The present case indeed representsa sordid state of affairs in relation to the young girl in the ruralsetting, whose honour and self-esteem got brutally violated bynone other but her own relatives, who found her to be the soft-target to settle their scores with her parents. The accused ratherexhibited their denigrating mentality while targeting the youngEgirl, who was otherwise required to be treated by them withaffection and respect, for being their niece and their cousin. Thefacts of this case lead only to the conclusion that the accusedpersons had intentionally, with their incessant acts andutterances, goaded the victim girl to commit suicide. She indeed

Fcommitted suicide within few hours of her last and unbearableencounter with the accused. The acts and deeds of the accusedin the evening of 05.05.1996 had been too proximate to the eventof suicide by 9 a.m. in the morning of 06.05.1996. As testified byPW-11,her daughter cried the whole night for being unable to

bear the daily humiliation at the hands of the accused; and endedGher life in the morning. [Paras 23, 24] [733-C-G]

Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh (2001) 9 SCC618 : [2001] 4 Suppl. SCR 247 ; Madan Mohan Singhv. State of Gujarat & Another (2010) 8 SCC 628 : [2010]

10 SCR 351 ; Pawan Kumar v. State of HimachalPradesh (2017) 7 SCC 780 : [2017] 3 SCR 458 ; S. S.Chheena v. Vijay Kumar Mahajan and Ors. (2010) 12SCC 190 : [2010] 9 SCR 1111 ; Chitresh Kumar Choprav. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) (2009) 16 SCC 605 :[2009] 13 SCR 230 ; Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B.(2010) 1 SCC 707 : [2009] 15 SCR 836 – relied on.

4. So far the appellant No. 2 (accused No. 3) is concerned,he is entitled to the benefit of Juvenile Justice (Care andProtection of Children) Act, 2000 and the proceedings qua himare required to be terminated. The matriculation certificateissued by the Board of Secondary Education, Haryana dated24.06.1994 in relation to the appellant No. 2 is placed on recordand therein, his date of birth is distinctly recorded as“20.04.1980”. This certificate has not been disputed on behalf ofthe respondents and in the given set of circumstances, we findneither any reason to doubt the correctness and veracity of thesame nor there appears any reason to hold further enquiry in thematter. [Paras 10, 11] [717-C-E]

5. The daughter of the complainant was found dead on06.05.1996 after committing suicide and the cause for her takingsuch extreme step is said to be the continuous humiliation andharassment by the accused; the last such incident being of05.05.1996. It is, therefore, evident that the appellant No. 2 wasabout 16 years of age as on the date/s of incident/s. Though thisfact was not placed for consideration before the Trial Court andthe High Court but, in the light of the law declared by this Courtin the case of Raju v. State of Haryana, he is entitled to raise thisplea even in this appeal. In view of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7A readwith Section 20 of the Act of 2000, the appellant No. 2, being ajuvenile who had not completed 18 years of age on the date ofcommission of the offence, remains entitled to the benefit ofjuvenility. [Para 11.1] [717-F-H]

Raju v. State of Haryana 2019 (4) SCALE 398 – reliedon.

ACase Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal AppealNo. 233 of 2010.

From the Judgment and Order dated 05.05.2008 of the High Courtof Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Appeal No. 964-SB/97.

DRishi Malhotra and Utkarsh Singh, Advs. for the Appellants.

Rakesh Mudgal, Kailash C. Mudgal and Dr. Monika Gusain, Advs.for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DINESH MAHESHWARI, J.E

1. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgmentand order dated 05.05.2008 in Criminal Appeal No. 964-SB of 1997whereby, the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh, whileupholding the conviction of accused-appellants for the offence underSection 306 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’), hasFmodified the sentence of four years’ rigorous imprisonment and fine ofRs. 300/- with default stipulation, as awarded by the Additional SessionsJudge, Rewari in Sessions Case No. 23 of 1997, to that of rigorousimprisonment for two and half years.

2. The relevant background aspects of the matter could be noticed,Gin brief, as follows:

2.1 The appellants Ude Singh, Manoj Kumar and Daulat Ram(accused Nos. 2 to 4) and one Hem Karan alias Hemla (accused No. 1-since deceased) were tried for the offence under Section 306/34 IPC onthe allegations that they had abetted commission of suicide by the daughter

of the complainant Pohap Singh (PW-1). The parties involved in thismatter are closely related to each other. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 hadbeen brothers and the complainant is their cousin. The accused Nos. 3and 4 Manoj and Daulat Ram are the sons of accused No. 2 Ude Singh.The witness Smt. Krishna (PW-11) is the mother of deceased girl whereasanother witness Jai Narain (PW-2) is also the cousin of the complainantand the accused Nos. 1 and 2. The parties lived in the same villageShahadatnagar (Haryana) and in the neighbourhood. However, therelations of parties were too strained and they were engaged in severallitigations against each other, including the complaint relating to hurtcase, as lodged by PW-11 Smt. Krishna(wife of the present complainant)against Hem Karan alias Hemla and Ude Singh that was pending trial atthe relevant time.

2.2 The case of prosecution in the present matter has been thatthe accused persons, Hem Karan alias Hemla, Ude Singh, Manoj andDaulat Ram, were taunting the unmarried daughter (the deceased girl)of the complainant by addressing her as “wife”, “Chachi” (aunt) and“Bohoria” (younger brother’s wife); and the deceased girl had beencomplaining to her family about the indecent behaviour of the accused.It was alleged that on 15.04.1996, when the wife of complainant andother witnesses returned to the village after completing their evidence inthe criminal case against Hem Karan and Ude Singh, Hem Karan caughthold of the daughter of the complainant; dragged her into his house;pushed her; and verbally abused her and her family members. Onreturning home, daughter of the complainant narrated this incident to hermother and stated that she was unable to tolerate such continuous insults.It was also alleged that on the advice of village elders, no report of thisincident was made, as it concerned the future and honour of an unmarriedgirl; however, the accused persons continued to taunt the girl on dailybasis and, at all the times, the girl was only advised by her family to keepquiet.

2.3. It was further alleged that on 05.05.1996, on sighting thedaughter of the complainant, who was returning after throwing garbage,Ude Singh said, “see my Bohoria is coming”; Daulat Ram and Manojsaid, “she is our Chachi”; and Hem Karan alias Hemla exclaimed, “sheis my wife”. Having heard all these taunts, daughter of the complainantbecame very upset and entered into altercation with the men. This incidentwas allegedly witnessed by Jai Narain (PW-2). The victim girl once

Aagain complained to her mother and the complainant’s elder brother RajKumar about the incident and while crying, stated that she had no rightto live and would end her life as and when she would get the opportunityto do so. Upon hearing this, the wife and the elder brother of thecomplainant tried to pacify the girl and also told her that they wouldinform the complainant (who was posted as Head Constable at PoliceBStation Beri, District Rohtak). They also advised her not to be troubledby such taunts as the prestige of the family was in her hands and shewas to be married soon. However, the very next day, i.e., on 06.05.1996at about 9:00 a.m., daughter of the complainant was found dead, hangingby her neck. Her mother was the first to see her dead. The complainant,Cwho was on duty, was informed through his nephew about his daughter’sdemise.

2.4.After noticing the unnatural death of his daughter, thecomplainant lodged the report and made his statement whereupon FIRNo. 93 dated 06.05.1996 was registered at Police Station, Jatusana;Dinvestigation was carried out; and ultimately, the accused persons werecharge-sheeted for the offence under Section 306 read with Section 34IPC.

3. In trial, the prosecution examined several witnesses in supportof its case that the accused persons were guilty of abetment of suicideEby the daughter of the complainant. In view of the questions involved inthis appeal, we may briefly take note of the statements of relevantwitnesses, being PW-1 Pohap Singh (the complainant- father of thedeceased); PW-2 Jai Narain (brother of the complainant); and PW-11Smt. Krishna (wife of the complainant – mother of the deceased).

F3.1. PW-1 Pohap Singh stated that on previous occasion, HemKaran and others had assaulted his wife and criminal proceedings werepending in that regard. He also narrated about the incidents that hadallegedly taken place on 15.04.1996 and on 05.05.1996. In his cross-examination, the complainant admitted the relationship of parties; andalso admitted that his deceased daughter, 18 years of age, could notGqualify her 10[th] standard examination and had dropped her studies. Thecomplainant PW-1 stated further that he was aware of the insults hisdaughter had faced at the hands of accused; that he had not witnessedthe incident in question himself but was made aware of the same by hiswife, his brother and Jai Narain; and that his nephew Naresh had informed

him about the demise of his daughter. In his cross-examination, thecomplainant further stated that no panchayat was ever convened toresolve the issue of harassment of his daughter as it was believed thatsuch step would eventually affect the marriage prospects of the girl.The complainant also admitted previous land dispute with the accusedthat had commenced in the year 1988 and was ultimately compromised.He also admitted that case was registered by Hem Karan under Section307 IPC against him wherein his brother Raj Kumar and the witness JaiNarain were also named as accused.3.2. PW-2 Jai Narain testified to the occurance of 05.05.1996 asalso the conduct and behaviour of the accused persons. This witnessspecifically stated that he was standing at plot with Ram Kumar andVirender when daughter of the complainant came there to throw garbageand when she was going back, the utterances were made by the accusedwith Hem Karan calling her as his wife; Ude Singh calling her as Bohoriaand Daulat and Manoj calling her as Chachi. This witness also statedthat the daughter of the complainant started crying and also rebuked theaccused for their behaviour; and that she was consoled by him and otherpersons and they walked down with her to the house and left her there.Even while disputing some part of his statement made during investigation,this witness stated that: “All the four accused are rouges and as suchwe could not dare to rebuff or rebuke them for their indecentbehaviour. It is incorrect that all the four accused are decent person.”

3.3. PW-11 Krishna, wife of the complainant and mother of thedeceased girl stated that even during the pendency of land dispute betweenthe parties, the deceased was teased by the accused and she was tauntedwith the expressions like “Chachi” and “Bohoria” etc.; that even duringthat time, none of the elders of the panchayat controlled the behaviourof the accused; and that the accused were eve-teasers and might havevictimised other girls of the village as well. She also deposed that shehad brought the repeated indecent behaviour with her daughter to thenotice of the wives of the accused persons.

3.3.1. PW-11 further deposed that 3 years prior to the incident,Hem Karan had inflicted head injury on her by using gandasa and thathe was facing trial before the Court of Judicial Magistrate, Rewari and,therefore, her daughter was targeted regularly by the accused persons.She also deposed that on the date of evidence in the hurt case i.e., on

A15.04.1996, Hem Karan dragged her daughter into his house and insultedher but, in order to protect the honour of unmarried girl, the male membersof the family were against reporting the matter to the police.

3.3.2. PW-11 also deposed that on 05.05.1996, when her daughterhad gone to throw garbage, she was intercepted by the accused andBwas again teased by all of them. PW-11 stated that her daughter wasexhausted and disgusted of all the taunts and remarks she had to bear;and throughout the night, she kept on weeping and did not have even awink of sleep. The witness deposed that on 06.05.1996, that is the verynext day, her daughter ended her life by hanging as result of continuousindecent behaviour of accused towards her; and she was the one whoCfound her daughter hanging by the neck. PW-11 also stated that herdaughter was previously engaged but the engagement was called off sixmonths before the incident.

3.3.3. For their relevance, the material parts of the deposition ofPW-11 are extracted as under:D

“ …On 5.5.96 Meena had gone to dung garbage on Kurhiin the plot at about 5.30 p.m. As she returned from the plot,she was intercepted by accused Hem Karan, Daulat, Manojand Udey Singh. Daulat and Manoj teased her by addressingher as `Chachi’. Uday Singh accused addressed her asE`Bohoria’ (younger brother’s wife). Accused Hemla alias HemKaran addressed her as ‘wife’. She then returned to her houseand wept bitterly in my presence. She told me that Virender,Jai Narain and Ram Kumar had seen he untoward behaviorof all the accused. Meena had told me that she was totallyFexhausted and disgusted from all the tautns and remarks givenoccasionally to her by the accused and that she would endher life.

On 6.5.96 my daughter ended her life by hanging as resultof the continuous indecent behavior of the accused towardsher….”

xxx Cross-examination

“…Approximately 8/9 years back there was dispute in regardsto landed property between our family and the accused.However, it was settled. Even during that land dispute, the

accused used to tease and taunt her. They used to addressMeena in these very words like Chachi and Bohdia etc. eventhen. It had become an every day affair with the accused.The entire village community knew about the indecentutterances towards Meena. We always tried to overlook thematter as the honour of an unmarried girl was involved. Noelected member of the panchayat of the village or any otherrespectable of the society rebuked the accused against theirbehavior as they are all anti-social elements and norespectable wants to take cudgels with them. I would notknow if more cases are pending against the accused otherthan the two cases involving us. Volunteered they are eve-teasers and have borrowed money from different people andquite possible that they have many more cases pertaining tothese occurrence pending with the police or in the courts butI have no definite information. I would not know the namesof the girls or their parents who have been the targets of thebehavior of the accused. May be they are involving theteasing of 10/11 girls in the village. We may have told thepolice about those incidents.

It is incorrect that I am deposing falsely against the accusedor that they have never been involved in any illegal activityin the village.

The accused and my husband are cousins. The wives of HemKaran and Uday are my ‘Jethani and Devrani’ (Sisters-in-law). I had complained to those ladies about the misbehaviorof the accused. I had complained to them repeatedly. I wouldnot know the result of my complaints to them. Our men folkhad also brought the incident to the notice of our neighboursand Mohalla-wala.

My daughter had told me that she would end her life as shewas fed up of the in decent behavior of the accused towardsher and also because of our inaction against them. Shewanted us to report the matter to the police for action againstthe accused.”

xxx xxx

xxx

A“My daughter had returned home all alone after the draggingincident on 5.5.96. It is incorrect that accused Manoj andDaulat was not present in the village on 5.5.96 or that theywere in the native village of their maternal uncle calledJainabad. I had not sent any person to call my husband afterMeena narrated all the happenings of 5.5.96 to me. MeenaBhad slept besides me on that night. She kept on weepingthroughout the night and did not have pill of sleep. In themorning at about 8.00 a.m. I had given her piece of bread(Roti) and cup of tea. I had then gone to place fodder beforethe bullocks. Even at that time she was mentally disturbed. ICreturned to the house after just 10 minutes and found Meenahanging by rope. I had gone at about 9.00 a.m. to look afterthe bullock and had returned in 10 minutes time. I had notgone to the fields (Khet) on the day but I had gone to the plotin the Abadi where the bullocks were tied. I had risen on thatday at about 6.00 a.m. It is incorrect that the entire story is aDpure concoction with nothing true in it. It is incorrect that mydaughter had ended her life or she was killed by my man onthe night intervening 5/6 May, 1996. It is also incorrect thatmy daughter may have died even at about 4.20 p.m. on 5.5.96.It is incorrect that totally false story was coined by myEhusband Pohap Singh, police man, and all the accused werefalsely implicated in this case.”4. In defence, the accused examined 11 witnesses, essentially tosuggest that on 04.05.1996, accused Nos. 3 and 4, Manoj and Daulat,had visited Jainabad and were falsely implicated in this case; and in thisFconnection, an application dated 05.06.1996 was sent to DIG Rohtak.The witnesses also suggested that daughter of the complainant was underdepression after her engagement got broken; and she committed suicidefor this reason.

5. On appreciation of evidence, the Trial Court, in its judgmentGand order dated 28.11.1997, observed that minor discrepancies in thestatements of witnesses could not be the reason to discard the case ofthe prosecution nor could the case of the prosecution be said to be doubtfulfor their failure to examine all the witnesses. The Trial Court rejectedthe suggestions made by way of defence evidence and found that thecase of the prosecution was proved against all the accused; and that theH

acts and deeds of the accused had been that of abetment of suicide.Accordingly, the accused were held guilty of the offence punishableunder Section 306 read with Section 34 IPC and each one was awardedthe punishment of rigorous imprisonment for period of four years andfine of Rs. 300/- with default stipulations.

6. In appeal by the accused, the High Court of Punjab and Haryanaobserved that the incident of 05.05.1996 was not solitary one; that theincident that had occurred on 15.04.1996 was enough to malign the villagegirl; that the deceased was teased and harassed by the accused personson several occasions; and that there was consistent attempt on thepart of the accused to hurt the girl of marriageable age. The High Court,inter alia, observed and held as under:

“In the present case, there is not solitary instance of 5[th]May, 1996 which resulted into commission of suicide on 6[th]May, 1996, but prior thereto also, witnesses have stated thataccused were eve-teasing Meena. On 15[th] April, 1996 also,when Krishana had returned from Court, Meena was caughthold of one and she was dragged. Therefore in the wholevillage, where great value is attached to the honour of thegirl, where girls are kept inside houses and are not allowedto mingle in the society, the incident dated 15[th] April, 1996was sufficient to malign girl. Furthermore, each day attemptwas made by the accused to browbeat, humiliate and insultthe girl only to assert that registration of criminal case atthe instance of her mother had no effect, and they are superiorin muscle power and they intended to belittle the girl in thevillage. In our society, to assert ‘might is right’ is notacceptable. Chain of circumstances reveal that there was aconsistent attempt on the part of the accused to hurt the girlof marriageable age. Therefore, abetment on their part tocause suicide of Meena is complete and they are held guiltyof offence under Section 306 IPC….”

6.1. With the findings aforesaid, the High Court upheld the orderof conviction but reduced the sentence to that of imprisonment for aperiod of two and half years on the ground that the accused had alreadyfaced 12 years of protracted trial.

A7. It may be pointed out that on 22.07.2009, while entertaining thepetition for Special Leave to Appeal in this matter and while issuingnotice to the respondent, this Court also issued notice to the petitioners-appellants as to why, in the event, if sufficient evidence is found acceptable,they be not suitably punished under appropriate provisions of the IndianPenal Code, even if they may not be held guilty for commission of offenceBunder Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code. We shall examine hereaftera little later the questions as to whether the accused are guilty of theacts and utterances attributed for them; and if so, they are liable for theoffence of abetment of suicide or if they are guilty of any other offenceunder the Indian Penal Code.

8. Learned counsel for the appellant-accused has strenuouslyargued that there is want of direct and cogent proof of the fact that theaccused abetted the suicide in question; that there is no evidence toshow that the deceased ended her life for the words or actions attributedto the accused; and that there are no eye-witnesses to the incident andDthe depositions of the witnesses are all nothing but hearsay. Learnedcounsel would submit that the deceased was obviously depressed onaccount of dropping out of her studies as she had failed to clear her 10[th]standard examination as also on account of her engagement having beencalled off few months prior to the incident and these being the realcauses of her committing suicide, the appellants cannot be held responsibleEtherefor. The learned counsel would submit that there had been previouslitigations including criminal cases between the parties and the accusedappellants have unnecessarily been implicated in this case because ofprevious enmity. The learned counsel has referred to and relied upon thedecisions in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh: (2001) 9 SCCF618, Madan Mohan Singh v. State of Gujarat & Another: (2010) 8SCC 628 and Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh: (2017)7 SCC 780. The learned counsel has also argued in the alternative thateven if the evidence of the prosecution is taken on its face value, theoffence against the appellants cannot travel beyond that of insulting the

modesty of woman by some utterances; and in that event too, theGappellants could only be held guilty of the offence under Section 509 butnot for abetment of suicide under Section 306 IPC. The learned counselhas also argued for appellant No. 2 that as on the day of incident i.e.,05.05.1996, the appellant No. 2 was minor, being around 16 years ofage with his date of birth as 20.04.1980 and hence, he was required toHbe treated as juvenile and could not have been sentenced in this trial.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has duly opposedthe submissions made on behalf of the appellants with reference to theevidence on record and the findings recorded by the Trial Court and theHigh Court. The learned counsel would submit that the depositions ofthe witnesses, particularly those of PW-2 and PW-11, establish beyonddoubt that the accused persons had insulted, humiliated and harassedthe victim, young girl 18 years of age, on continuous basis and theiractions led to the girl ending her life by committing suicide. Hence,according to the learned counsel, the appellants have rightly beenconvicted for the offence under Section 306 IPC.

10. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and havingexamined the record with reference to the law applicable, we are clearlyof the view that so far the appellant No. 2 (accused No. 3) is concerned,he is entitled to the benefit of Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection ofChildren) Act, 2000 [‘the Act of 2000’] and the proceedings qua himare required to be terminated.

11. The matriculation certificate issued by the Board of SecondaryEducation, Haryana dated 24.06.1994 in relation to the appellant No. 2is placed on record and therein, his date of birth is distinctly recorded as“20.04.1980”. This certificate has not been disputed on behalf of therespondents and in the given set of circumstances, we find neither anyreason to doubt the correctness and veracity of the same nor thereappears any reason to hold further enquiry in the matter.

11.1. The daughter of the complainant was found dead on06.05.1996 after committing suicide and the cause for her taking suchextreme step is said to be the continuous humiliation and harassment bythe accused; the last such incident being of 05.05.1996. It is, therefore,evident that the appellant No. 2 was about 16 years of age as on thedate/s of incident/s. Though this fact was not placed for considerationbefore the Trial Court and the High Court but, in the light of the lawdeclared by this Court in the case of Raju v. State of Haryana: 2019(4) SCALE 398, he is entitled to raise this plea even in this appeal. Inview of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7A read with Section 20 of the Act of 2000,the appellant No. 2, being juvenile who had not completed 18 years ofage on the date of commission of the offence, remains entitled to thebenefit of juvenility. In Raju’s case (supra) this Court has observed andheld as under:

“9. It is by now well-settled, as was held in Hari Ram v. Stateof Rajasthan, (2009) 13 SCC 211, that in light of Sections2(k), 2(l), 7A read with Section 20 of the 2000 Act as amendedin 2006, juvenile who had not completed eighteen years onthe date of commission of the offence is entitled to the benefitof the 2000 Act (also see Mohan Mali v. State of MadhyaPradesh, (2010) 6 SCC 669; Daya Nand v. State of Haryana,(2011) 2 SCC 224; Dharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi (supra);Jitendra Singh @ Babboo Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh,(2013) 11 SCC 193). It is equally well-settled that the claimof juvenility can be raised at any stage before any Court byan accused, including this Court, even after the final disposalof case, in terms of Section 7A of the 2000 Act (seeDharambir v. State (NCT) of Delhi, (supra), Abuzar Hossainv. State of West Bengal, (2012) 10 SCC 489; Jitendra Singh@ Babboo Singh v. State of UP, (supra); Abdul Razzaq v.State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 15 SCC 637).

10. In light of the above legal position, it is evident that theAppellant would be entitled to the benefit of the 2000 Act ifhis age is determined to be below 18 years on the date ofcommission of the offence. Moreover, it would be irrelevantthat the plea of juvenility was not raised before the Trial Court,

in light of Section 7A. As per the report of the inquiryconducted by the Registrar (Judicial) of this Court, in thiscase, the Appellant was below 18 years of age on the date ofcommission of the offence. The only question before us thatneeds to be determined is whether such report may be givenprecedence over the contrary view taken by the High Court,so that the benefit of the 2000 Act may be given to theAppellant.

xxx xxx xxx

25. Criminal Appeal hereby stands allowed and the order ofthe High Court affirming the conviction and sentence of theAppellant under Section 376(2)(g) of the IPC is set aside.Seeing that the Appellant has already spent 6 years inimprisonment, whereas the maximum period for which ajuvenile may be sent to special home is only 3 years as perSection 15(1)(g) of the 2000 Act. We direct that the Appellant

be released from custody forthwith, if he is not required to bedetained in connection with any other case.’’

11.2. In view of the above and in view of the indisputable fact thatthe appellant No. 2 was below the age of 18 years on the date ofcommission of offence, the appeal in his relation deserves to be allowed.

12. Taking up the case of other appellants, as noticed, whileentertaining the petition for Special Leave to Appeal in this matter, thisCourt also issued notice to the appellants as to why they be not suitablypunished under appropriate provisions of the Indian Penal Code, even ifthey were not held guilty for commission of offence under Section 306IPC with reference to the evidence on record. Apparently, this noticewas issued to the appellants with reference to the offence specified inSection 509 IPC, being of “word, gesture or act intended to insult themodesty of woman”. Obviously, this Court had pondered over thebroad features of this case while entertaining the prayer for leave toappeal and it was prima facie indicated that even if the acts and actionsof the accused in this case fall short of making out case of abetment ofsuicide under Section 306 IPC, they might, nevertheless, remain liableunder Section 509 IPC for insulting the modesty of woman. Evenduring the course of hearing of this matter, we have heard learned counselfor the parties at sufficient length on this question, of the offence in thealternative. However, having scanned through the entire record withreference to the law applicable, we have no hesitation in concluding thatthe present case squarely falls within the ambit of Section 306 IPC andthe appellants have rightly been held guilty thereunder.

13. The offence of abetment of suicide is specified in Section 306IPC as under:

“306. Abetment of suicide.- If any person commits suicide,whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall bepunished with imprisonment of either description for termwhich may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable tofine.”

13.1. The expression “abetment” within the meaning of IndianPenal Code is defined as follows:

“107. Abetment of thing.- person abets the doing of athing, who-

AFirst. – Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly. – Engages with one or more other person or personsin any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act orillegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy,and in order to the doing of that thing; or

Thirdly. – Intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission,the doing of that thing.

Explanation 1. – person who, by wilful misrepresentation,or by wilful concealment of material fact which he is boundto disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts tocause or procure, thing to be done, is said to instigate thedoing of that thing.

Explanation 2. – Whoever, either prior to or at the time of thecommission of an act, does anything in order to facilitate thecommission of that act, and thereby facilitate the commissionDthereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.”

13.2. The offence relating the words, gestures or acts intended toinsult the modesty of woman is specified in Section 509 IPC as under[1]:

“509. Word, gesture or act intended to insult the modesty of awoman. – Whoever, intending to insult the modesty of anyEwoman, utters any word, makes any sound or gesture, orexhibits any object, intending that such word or sound shallbe heard, or that such gesture or object shall be seen, bysuch woman, or intrudes upon the privacy of such woman,shall be punished with simple imprisonment for term whichFmay extend to three years, and also with fine.”

14. When the accusation in the present case has its genesis incertain acts and utterances attributed to the accused, the meaning andexpanse of the expression “abetment”, particularly on its operation inrelation to the offence of “abetment of suicide”, is required to be dilatedGupon. Hence, before proceeding further, apposite it shall be to take noteof the case law as cited and as relevant in this matter.

1 Section 509 IPC was amended by Act No. 13 of 2013 in the present form with enhancement of the term of simple imprisonment to three years in place of theH earlier term of one year.

14.1. In the case of Ramesh Kumar (supra), three-Judge benchof this Court held that the ingredients of Section 306 IPC were notsatisfactorily proved so as to implicate and punish the accused for thesame. The facts of the case leading to the aforementioned decision hadbeen that the deceased was married to the accused for about year.The deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene and setting herselfon fire in the kitchen. On the day of incident, the accused had refused totake the deceased to her sister’s house and in the quarrel that ensued,the accused-husband told the deceased-wife that she was free to dowhatever she wished to and to go wherever she wanted to. The accusedattempted to save her by putting bedsheet around her body and himselfsuffered burns consequently. The deceased had written letter to herhusband-accused in her diary that he had made her free to go wherevershe liked but she was not having any place to go and now she was freeof her word not to commit suicide. In her dying declaration too, shestated that she had quarrel with her husband who told her to go wherevershe wanted to and thereafter, she set herself ablaze. The accused-appellant was convicted by the Trial Court for the offences under Sections306 and 498-A IPC and his conviction was upheld by the High Court. Infurther appeal, after examining the evidence led in by the parties andtaking note of all the surrounding factors, this Court, while maintainingthe conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A IPC, set aside hisconviction for offence under Section 306. This Court observed and heldinter alia, as under:

“19. …… Presumably the accused may have said some suchthing – you are free to do whatever you wish and go whereveryou like. The deceased being pious Hindu wife felt thathaving being given in marriage by her parents to her husband,she had no other place to go excepting the house of herhusband and if the husband had “freed” her she thoughtimpulsively that the only thing which she could do was to killherself, die peacefully and thus free herself according to herunderstanding of the husband’s wish. Can this be called anabetment of suicide? Unfortunately, the trial court misspeltout the meaning of the expression attributed by the deceasedto her husband as suggesting that the accused had made herfree to commit suicide. Making the deceased free – to gowherever she liked and to do whatever she wished, does not

and cannot mean even by stretching that the accused hadmade the deceased free “to commit suicide” as held by thetrial court and upheld by the High Court.

20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite orencourage to do “an act”. To satisfy the requirement ofinstigation though it is not necessary that actual words mustbe used to that effect or what constitutes instigation mustnecessarily and specifically be suggestive of the consequence.Yet reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must becapable of being spelt out. The present one is not case wherethe accused had by his acts or omission or by continuedcourse of conduct created such circumstances that thedeceased was left with no other option except to commit suicidein which case an instigation may have been inferred. worduttered in the fit of anger or emotion without intending theconsequences to actually follow cannot be said to beinstigation.21. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [(1994) 1 SCC 73] , thisCourt has cautioned that the court should be extremely carefulin assessing the facts and circumstances of each case andthe evidence adduced in the trial for the purpose of findingwhether the cruelty meted out to the victim had in fact inducedher to end the life by committing suicide. If it transpires to theCourt that victim committing suicide was hypersensitive toordinary petulance, discord and differences, in domestic lifequite common to the society to which the victim belonged andsuch petulance, discord and differences were not expected toinduce similarly circumstanced individual in given societyto commit suicide, the conscience of the Court should not besatisfied for basing finding that the accused charged of”abetting the offence of suicide should be found guilty.

(Underling supplied for emphasis)

14.2. In the case of Pawan Kumar (supra), the allegation againstthe accused was that as he had eloped with the deceased girl, he thoughtthat she was responsible for the criminal proceedings against him by herfamily and hence, subjected her to abject teasing despite she standing

with him and having him acquitted of the offences imputed. On oneoccasion, while the deceased was staying at her parent’s home, hethreatened to kidnap her and this led to her pouring kerosene over herselfand setting herself ablaze. In her dying declaration, she wrote letternarrating that the accused was responsible for the step that she hadtaken. Though the Trial Court had acquitted the accused of all charges,on appeal, the order of acquittal was set aside by the High Court and theaccused was convicted under Section 306 IPC and was sentenced torigorous imprisonment for period of seven years together with fine. Infurther appeal, another three-Judge Bench of this Court upheld the orderof the High Court with reference to the principles relating to the offenceof abetment of suicide. This Court referred to several decisions, includingthat in the case Ramesh Kumar (supra), and observed, inter alia, asunder:

“34. The word ‘‘abetment’’ has not been explained in Section306 IPC. In this context, the definition of abetment as providedunder Section 107 IPC is pertinent. Section 306 IPC seeks topunish those who abet the commission of suicide of other.Whether the person has abetted the commission of suicide ofanother or not is to be gathered from facts and circumstancesof each case and to be found out by continuous conduct ofthe accused, involving his mental element…….

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36. The word “instigate” literally means to goad, urge forward,provoke, incite or encourage to do an act. person is said toinstigate another person when he actively suggests orstimulates him to an act by any means or language, direct orindirect, whether it takes the form of express solicitation orof hints, insinuation or encouragement. Instigation may be in(express) words or maybe by (implied) conduct.

37. The word “urge forwards” means to advise or try hard topersuade somebody to do something, to make person tomove more quickly in the particular direction, specially bypushing or forcing such person. Therefore, personinstigating another has to “goad” or “urge forward” the latterwith the intention to provoke, incite or encourage the doing

of an act by the latter. In order to prove abetment, it must beshown that the accused kept on urging or annoying thedeceased by words, taunts until the deceased reacted. casualremark or something said in routine or usual conversationshould not be construed or misunderstood as “abetment”.

xxxxxx

43. Keeping in view the aforesaid legal position, we arerequired to address whether there has been abetment incommitting suicide. Be it clearly stated that mere allegationof harassment without any positive action in proximity to thetime of occurrence on the part of the accused that led personto commit suicide, conviction in terms of Section 306 IPC isnot sustainable. casual remark that is likely to causeharassment in ordinary course of things will not come withinthe purview of instigation. mere reprimand or word in afit of anger will not earn the status of abetment. There has tobe positive action that creates situation for the victim to putan end to life.

44. In the instant case, the accused had by his acts and by hiscontinuous course of conduct created such situation as aconsequence of which the deceased was left with no otheroption except to commit suicide. The active acts of the accusedhave led the deceased to put an end to her life. That apart,we do not find any material on record which compels the Courtto conclude that the victim committing suicide washypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and differencein domestic life quite common to the society to which the victimbelonged. On the other hand, the accused has played active--role in tarnishing the selfesteem and selfrespect of the victimwhich drove the victim girl to commit suicide. The cruelty metedout to her has, in fact, induced her to extinguish her life spark.

45. As is demonstrable, the High Court has not reversed thejudgment of acquittal solely on the basis of the dyingdeclaration. It has placed reliance on the evidence of theparents and also other witnesses. It has also treated the versionof the Pradhan of the Gram Panchayat as credible. All these

witnesses have deposed that the accused after his acquittalengaged himself in threatening and teasing the girl. He didnot allow her to live in peace.

46. The harassment caused to her had become intolerableand unbearable. The father had deposed that the girl hadtold him on number of occasions and he had complained tothe Pradhan. All these amount to active part played by theaccused. It is not situation where person is insulted onbeing asked to pay back loan. It is not situation wheresomeone feels humiliated on singular act. It is differentsituation altogether. The young girl living in village wasthreatened and teased constantly. She could not bear it anylonger.There is evidence that the parents belong to the poorstrata of the society. As the materials on record would reflect,the father could not afford her treatment when case of hisdaughter was referred to the hospital at Chandigarh. Theimpecuniosity of the family is manifest. It is clearly evidentfrom the materials brought on record that the conduct of theaccused was absolutely proactive.”

(Underling supplied for emphasis)

14.3 In the case of Pawan Kumar (supra), this Court alsoexpressed serious concern over the menace of eve-teasing and itsadverse impact on the civilized society while indicating the affirmativerights of woman with reference to Articles 14, 15 and 21 of Constitutionof India. This Court referred to an earlier decision and observed asunder: -

“47. …..We are at pains to state that in civilised society eveteasing is causing harassment to women in educationalinstitutions, public places, parks, railway stations and otherpublic places which only go to show that requisite sense ofrespect for women has not been socially cultivated. womanhas her own space as man has. She enjoys as much equalityunder Article 14 of the Constitutions as man does. Theright to live with dignity as guaranteed under Article 21 ofthe Constitution cannot be violated by indulging in obnoxiousact of eve teasing. It affects the fundamental concept of gender

sensitivity and justice and the rights of woman under Article14 of the Constitution. That apart creates an incurable dentin the right of woman which she has under Article 15 of theConstitution. One is compelled to think and constrained todeliberate why the women in this country cannot be allowedto live in peace and lead life that is empowered with dignityand freedom…….

48. In civilised society male chauvinism has no room. TheConstitution of India confers the affirmative rights on womenand the said rights are perceptible from Article 15 of theConstitution. When the right is conferred under theConstitution, it has to be understood that there is nocondescension. man should not put his ego or, for thatmatter, masculinity on pedestal and abandon the conceptof civiliaty. Egoism must succumb to law. Equality has to beregarded as the summum bonum of the constitutional principlein this context. The instant case portrays the deplorabledepravity of the appellant that has led to heart-breakingsituation for young girl who has been compelled to put anend to her life. Therefore, the High Court has absolutelycorrectly reversed the judgment of acquittal and imposed thesentence. It has appositely exercised the jurisdiction and weconcur with the same.”

14.4. In the case of Madan Mohan Singh (supra), the driver ofthe accused had alleged in his suicide note that the accused had drivenhim to the extent of committing suicide. However, on evidence, it wasfound that the deceased had grudge against his superior and eventhough the deceased felt that he was wronged at some point in time,there was nothing available on record to prove that the accused haddone anything to instigate the deceased to commit suicide. Hence, thisCourt observed as under:

“10. We are convinced that there is absolutely nothing in thissuicide note or the FIR which would even distantly be viewedas an offence much less under Section 306 IPC. We could notfind anything in the FIR or in the so-called suicide note whichcould be suggested as abetment to commit suicide. In suchmatters there must be an allegation that the accused had

instigated the deceased to commit suicide or secondly, hadengaged with some other person in conspiracy and lastly,that the accused had in any way aided any act or illegalomission to bring about the suicide.“

14.5. We may also refer to the decision in S. S. Chheena v. VijayKumar Mahajan and Ors: (2010) 12 SCC 190, where this Courtreiterated on the essentials of the offence under Section 306 IPC asunder:-

“25. Abetment involves mental process of instigating aperson or intentionally aiding person in doing of thing.Without positive act on the part of the accused to instigateor aid in committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the casesdecided by this Court is clear that in order to convict personunder Section 306 IPC there has to be clear mens rea tocommit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct actwhich led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no optionand that act must have been intended to push the deceasedinto such position that he committed suicide.”

(Underling supplied for emphasis)

14.6. In Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT ofDelhi): (2009) 16 SCC 605, this Court referred to the decision inRamesh Kumar (supra) and, while pointing out the complexities relatedwith the determination of the question as to the cause of suicide,expounded on the relevant principles in the following:-

“19. As observed in Ramesh Kumar (supra), where the accusedby his acts or by continued course of conduct creates suchcircumstances that the deceased was left with no other optionexcept to commit suicide, an “instigation” may be inferred.In other words, in order to prove that the accused abettedcommission of suicide by person, it has to be establishedthat:

(i) the accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceasedby words, deeds or wilful omission or conduct which mayeven be wilful silence until the deceased reacted orpushed or forced the deceased by his deeds, words or wilful

omission or conduct to make the deceased move forwardmore quickly in forward direction; and

(ii) that the accused had the intention to provoke, urge orencourage the deceased to commit suicide while acting inthe manner noted above. Undoubtedly, presence of mensrea is the necessary concomitant of instigation.

20. ………….The question as to what is the cause of suicidehas no easy answers because suicidal ideation and behavioursin human beings are complex and multifaceted. Differentindividuals in the same situation react and behave differentlybecause of the personal meaning they add to each event, thusaccounting for individual vulnerability to suicide. Eachindividual’s suicidability pattern depends on his inner-subjective experience of mental pain, fear and loss or selfrespect. Each of these factors are crucial and exacerbatingcontributor to an individual’s vulnerability to end his own-life, which may either be an attempt for selfprotection or anescapism from intolerable self.”

(Underling supplied for emphasis)

14.7. In the case Amalendu Pal v. State of W.B.: (2010) 1 SCCE707, this Court, after reference to several past decisions, held as follows:-

“12. Thus, this Court has consistently taken the view thatbefore holding an accused guilty of an offence under Section306 IPC, the court must scrupulously examine the facts andcircumstances of the case and also assess the evidenceadduced before it in order to find out whether the cruelty andharassment meted out to the victim had left the victim with noother alternative but to put an end to her life. It is also to beborne in mind that in cases of alleged abetment of suicidethere must be proof of direct or indirect acts of incitement tothe commission of suicide. Merely on the allegation ofharassment without there being any positive action proximateto the time of occurrence on the part of the accused whichled or compelled the person to commit suicide, conviction interms of Section 306 IPC is not sustainable.”

(Underling supplied for emphasis)

15. Thus, “abetment” involves mental process of instigating aperson in doing something. person abets the doing of thing when: (i)he instigates any person to do that thing; or (ii) he engages with one ormore persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing; or (iii) heintentionally aids, by acts or illegal omission, the doing of that thing. Theseare essential to complete the abetment as crime. The word “instigate”literally means to provoke, incite, urge on or bring about by persuasion todo anything.

16. In cases of alleged abetment of suicide, there must be proofof direct or indirect act/s of incitement to the commission of suicide. Itcould hardly be disputed that the question of cause of suicide, particularlyin the context of an offence of abetment of suicide, remains vexedone, involving multifaceted and complex attributes of human behaviourand responses/reactions. In the case of accusation for abetment of suicide,the Court would be looking for cogent and convincing proof of the act/sof incitement to the commission of suicide. In the case of suicide, mereallegation of harassment of the deceased by another person would notsuffice unless there be such action on the part of the accused whichcompels the person to commit suicide; and such an offending actionought to be proximate to the time of occurrence. Whether person hasabetted in the commission of suicide by another or not, could only begathered from the facts and circumstances of each case.

16.1 For the purpose of finding out if person has abettedcommission of suicide by another, the consideration would be if theaccused is guilty of the act of instigation of the act of suicide. As explainedand reiterated by this Court in the decisions above-referred, instigationmeans to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite or encourage to do an act.If the persons who committed suicide had been hypersensitive and theaction of accused is otherwise not ordinarily expected to induce similarlycircumstanced person to commit suicide, it may not be safe to hold theaccused guilty of abetment of suicide. But, on the other hand, if theaccused by his acts and by his continuous course of conduct creates asituation which leads the deceased perceiving no other option except tocommit suicide, the case may fall within the four-corners of Section 306IPC. If the accused plays an active role in tarnishing the self-esteemand self-respect of the victim, which eventually draws the victim to commitsuicide, the accused may be held guilty of abetment of suicide. Thequestion of mens rea on the part of the accused in such cases would be

Aexamined with reference to the actual acts and deeds of the accusedand if the acts and deeds are only of such nature where the accusedintended nothing more than harassment or snap show of anger, particularcase may fall short of the offence of abetment of suicide. However, ifthe accused kept on irritating or annoying the deceased by words ordeeds until the deceased reacted or was provoked, particular caseBmay be that of abetment of suicide. Such being the matter of delicateanalysis of human behaviour, each case is required to be examined on itsown facts, while taking note of all the surrounding factors having bearingon the actions and psyche of the accused and the deceased.16.2. We may also observe that human mind could be affectedCand could react in myriad ways; and impact of one’s action on the mindof another carries several imponderables. Similar actions are dealt withdifferently by different persons; and so far particular person’s reactionto any other human’s action is concerned, there is no specific theoremor yardstick to estimate or assess the same. Even in regard to the factorsDrelated with the question of harassment of girl, many factors are to beconsidered like age, personality, upbringing, rural or urban set ups,education etc. Even the response to the ill-action of eve-teasing and itsimpact on young girl could also vary for variety of factors, includingthose of background, self-confidence and upbringing. Hence, each caseis required to be dealt with on its own facts and circumstances.E17. Having taken an overall view of the applicable principles, wemay notice that the real questions arising in this appeal are:

(i)Whether the accused persons are guilty of the actsand utterances attributed to them; and

F(ii)If the answer to the question (i) is in the affirmative, asto whether such acts and utterances had only been ofinsult or intimidation or had been of instigation; andwhether such acts and utterances amounted toabetment of suicide?G17.1 Before entering into the questions aforesaid, it may beobserved that the fact that the daughter of the complainant indeedcommitted suicide with hanging by neck is not of any dispute in thisappeal. The fact has been established on record and the Trial Court asalso the High Court have concurrently found this fact proved. No further

dilation on this aspect of the matter is requisite. Similarly, feeblesuggestion on behalf of the accused persons that accused Nos. 3 and 4were not present in the village on 05.05.1996 does not carry any substanceand the finding in that regard is also not required to be interfered with.

18. Coming to the material points for determination in the matter,the question as to whether the accused persons were guilty of the actionsand utterances imputed on them does not detain us much longer. Thefact that they indeed did so and made such utterances is amply establishedin the testimony of the prosecution witnesses, particularly PW-1, PW-2and PW-11, as noticed above. It is also established beyond doubt thatsuch utterances were not of solitary or one-off incident but the accused,working in unison, had continuously made the imputed utterances towardsthe daughter of the complainant and continuously taunted the girl, whocommitted suicide next day after her last encounter with the accused. Inthe given fact situation, the question is as to whether such actions andutterances of the accused persons lead to the offence of abetment ofsuicide or only to the offence of insult and/or intimidation?

19. Having examined the record in its totality, we are clearly ofthe view that the actions and utterances of the accused, directed towardsthe deceased on continuous basis, had driven her to suicide; and accusedpersons are guilty of the offence of abetment of suicide.

20. The relevant background aspects of the matter make it clearthat the complainant (father of the deceased) and the accused persons,residing in the same village in the State of Haryana, were closely relatedas cousins but were estranged in relations; and were involved in severalcivil and criminal cases against each other. Admittedly, there was aproperty dispute between the parties that was later on compromised but,the relations of the parties did not improve. There was criminal caseby the accused No. 1 (since deceased) against the complainant and hisbrother, allegedly involving offence under Section 307 IPC. Then, therewas another criminal case wherein wife of the complainant (PW-11Smt. Krishna) alleged that the accused No. 1 of this case had assaultedher with gandasa. The incident of 15.04.1996 (when the deceased girlwas dragged by accused No. 1) had allegedly taken place after evidencein the said criminal case lodged by the mother of the deceased girl. Theparties, therefore, were not standing on good terms and there had beenthe elements of rather abject animosity towards each other. On the other

Ahand, the position of the deceased girl had been that she was about 18years of age; she had failed to clear her 10[th] standard examination andwas practically drop out from her studies; and she was engaged forthe purpose of marriage but, six months before the incident in question,her engagement had broken. The accused Nos. 1 and 2 were uncles inher relation whereas, the accused Nos. 3 and 4 were her cousins.B

21. In the given set up and the respective position of the parties, ifthe accused No. 1 continuously addressed or called the deceased girl ashis “wife”, in our view, the utterance was not merely of teasing but ofdemeaning and destroying the self-esteem of the young girl whoseengagement had broken and whose uncle was mocking her to join him inCmatrimony. It was the act of humiliation of highest order for the girl, whohad personally suffered the set-back of broken engagement, apart thatshe was unable to clear even 10[th] standard examination. Obviously, shewas being ridiculed and taunted for her broken engagement. The otheraccused persons chose to join the accused No. 1 and aggravated theDhumiliation of the girl by addressing her as younger brother’s wife oraunt. There remains nothing to doubt that the accused persons wereworking with the common intention to harass and humiliate the girl withreference to her broken engagement. The significant part of the matteris that such taunting and humiliation of the deceased at the hands of theaccused persons had not been singular event or one-off affair but hadEbeen continuous feature, as amply established by the prosecutionwitnesses. The incident of 05.05.1996 drew the final straw when thehapless girl received the same taunts from the accused persons and sheeven rebuked them. We find no reason to disbelieve the statement ofPW-2 Jai Narain as regards the incident of 05.05.1996. Equally, there is

Fno reason to disbelieve the statement of PW-11 Smt. Krishna that herdaughter wept the whole night after the said incident; and on beingfrustrated and exasperated with such humiliations, expressed her intentionto end her life. The fact of the matter remains that the victim girl endedher life in the early morning very next day.

G22. Taking an overall view of the matter, we are satisfied that thepresent one had not been case of mere eve-teasing, insult orintimidation but the continuous and repeated acts and utterances of theaccused persons were calculated to bring disgrace to the village girl andto destroy her self-esteem; rather the acts and utterances were aimed

at taking her to the brink of helplessness and to the vanishing point oftolerance. It had not been case of mere intimidation or insult. Theincessant intimidation and insult of the innocent girl had been of instigation;and such instigation clearly answers to the description of abetment ofsuicide. Therefore, in our view, the accused Nos. 1 and 3 have rightlybeen held guilty of offence of abetment of suicide.

23. The contention of the appellants that their intention had neverbeen to make her commit suicide is required to be rejected because, asnoticed above, the hapless girl was intentionally chosen for humiliationby the accused, who were otherwise involved in several litigations withher parents. The accused persons also knew it that the father of the girlwas posted in his duty outside the village. As noticed, the intention of theaccused had only been to drive the deceased to the brink of helplessnessand intolerance; they in fact succeeded in doing so on 05.05.1996, whenthe girl rebuked them for their utterances. However, the victim girl foundno way out because the humiliation at the hands of accused had beeneveryday affair; and, in the given set up of the society she belonged to,any action against the accused by her family was being avoided for thesake of her honour.

24. The present case indeed represents sordid state of affairs inrelation to the young girl in the rural setting, whose honour and self-esteem got brutally violated by none other but her own relatives, whofound her to be the soft-target to settle their scores with her parents.The accused rather exhibited their denigrating mentality while targetingthe young girl, who was otherwise required to be treated by them withaffection and respect, for being their niece and their cousin. The facts ofthis case lead only to the conclusion that the accused persons hadintentionally, with their incessant acts and utterances, goaded the victimgirl to commit suicide. She indeed committed suicide within few hours ofher last and unbearable encounter with the accused. The acts and deedsof the accused in the evening of 05.05.1996 had been too proximate tothe event of suicide by 9 a.m. in the morning of 06.05.1996. As testifiedby PW-11 Smt. Krishna, her daughter cried the whole night for beingunable to bear the daily humiliation at the hands of the accused; andended her life in the morning.

25. For what has been discussed hereinabove and having examinedthe matter in its totality, we find no reason to consider any interference

Ain the impugned judgment and order dated 05.05.2008 in relation to theappellant Nos. 1 and 3.

26. Accordingly and in view of the above, this appeal is partlyallowed to the extent it relates to the appellant No. 2; the impugnedjudgment and order of the High Court affirming his conviction are set-Baside; and the proceedings in his relation stand terminated. However,the appeal stands dismissed in relation to the other appellants, who shallbe required to serve out the remaining part of sentence awarded by theHigh Court.

Devika Gujral

Appeal disposed of.