VINOD KUMAR versus ASHOK KUMAR GANDHI

[2019] 10 S.C.R. 1051

VINOD KUMAR

ASHOK KUMAR GANDHI

(Civil Appeal No.3793 of 2016)

AUGUST 05, 2019

[ASHOK BHUSHAN AND K.M. JOSEPH, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:

s.14(1)(e) – Provision under – Providing for eviction ofresidential premises on the ground of bonafide requirement – Heldviolative of Art.14 of the Constitution in *Satyawati Sharma casemaking the provision applicable also to non-residential premises –In the present case application u/s.14(1)(e) filed seeking evictionof non-residential premises – Rent Controller followed summaryprocedure – Procedure when challenged, was confirmed by HighCourt – In appeal to Supreme Court, tenant sought reference of*Satyawati Sharmacase for reconsideration to larger Bench – Thegrounds for reference were that *Satyawati Sharmacase wascontrary to Constitution Bench Judgment in **Gian Devi Anandcase; that it was per incuriam Three Judge Bench judgment in [#]GauriShanker case; that without adverting to s.25-B, s.14(1)(e) couldnot have been made applicable for non-residential premises andthat it was not open to the Court to read down the provisions ofs.14(1)(e) in *Satyawati Sharmacase – Held: Judgment in*Satyawati Sharmacase cannot be said to be per incuriam orcontrary to the judgment of Constitution Bench in **Gian DeviAnandcase or three Judgment Bench judgment in [#]Gauri Shankercase – Gauri Shanker case being on different provision and premise,is distinguishable and cannot be said to be binding precedent –In **Gian Devi Anand case it was suggested to legislature toconsider making ‘bonafide requirement’ ground for eviction inrespect of commercial premises as well – Rather *Satyawati Sharmacase seeks support from **Gian Devi Anandcase – In pursuanceto the suggestion in **Gian Devi Anandcase Delhi Rent Act, 1995was enacted – The judgment in *Satyawati Sharmacase was not acase of reading down of s.14(1)(e), but was case where portionof the provision which was discriminatory and violative of Art.14

Awas struck down – s.25-B being related to only procedure forconsidering application u/s.14(1)(e), has no bearing on the issuewhich was considered in *Satyawati Sharmacase – Nothing in s.25-B can be read which runs counter to what is laid down in*Satyawati Sharma case – Therefore, non-consideration of s.25-Bin *Satyawati Sharma case cannot be ground to refer the case toBlarger Bench – Thus, there is no good ground to refer the judgmentin *Satyawati Sharmacase for reconsideration by larger Bench.

Legislation:

legislation is complete, when the Act is passed by theClegislature and receives the assent of the President, even if it is notenforced.

Judgments/Orders:

Principle of per incuriam – Meaning and applicability of.DRejecting the plea to refer the judgment in *SatyawatiSharma case to larger Bench and directing to list the matter forconsideration on merits, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The provision of Section 14(1)(e) of Delhi RentControl Act, 1958 confines to the premises let for residentialpurposes which may be required bonafide by the landlord forEoccupation as residence for himself or for any member of hisfamily dependent on him. Part of Section 14(1)(e) was struck downin *Satyawati Sharma case holding that Section 14(1)(e) isviolative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of theConstitution in so far as it discriminates between the premisesFlet for residential and non-residential purposes when the sameare required bonafide by the landlord for occupation for himselfor for any member of his family dependent on him and restrictsthe landlord’s right to seek eviction of the tenant from thepremises let for residential purposes only. [Paras 10, 11] [1063-B-D]G

1.2 Prior to *Satyawati Sharma case, the provisions ofSection 14(1)(e) were resorted to, by the landlord for seekingrecovery of possession only with regard to residential premises.After the said judgment landlords of non-residential premisesstarted filing application for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) whichH

are dealt with by the Rent Controller as per procedure containedin Chapter III-A of the Act, 1958. Chapter III-A contains‘Summary Trial of Certain Applications’. [Paras 11 and 12][1063-C; 1064-A-B]

2.1 The principle of per incuriam has been developed bythe English Courts in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. Inpractice per incuriam is per ignoratium. The above principle hasbeen developed, accepted, approved and adopted by this Courtwhile interpreting Article 141 of the Constitution which embodiesthe doctrine of precedent as matter of law. When Courtdelivers judgment ignoring the binding precedent of largerBench, the judgment so delivered is held to be per incuriam andhas no precedential value. [Paras 22 and 24] [1069-D-E;1071-C-D]

V. Kishan Rao v. Nikhil Super Specially Hospital andAnother (2010) 5 SCC 513 : [2010] 5 SCR 1 –relied on.

Punjab Land Development and ReclamationCorporation Ltd., Chandigarh v. Presiding Officer,Labour Court, Chandigarh and Another (1990) 3 SCC682 : [1990] 3 SCR 111 – followed.

2.2 *Satyawati Sharma case judgment cannot be said asper incuriam. The ratio in **Gian Devi Anand case has neitherbeen ignored nor any contrary view has been taken by *SatyawatiSharma case. **Gian Devi Anand case in paragraphs 32 and 34has noticed the provisions of Section 14(1) specifically Section14(1)(e) as existed in the Act, 1958. There was no challenge forthe classification in Section 14(1)(e) in the above case, henceneither **Gian Devi Anand case was required to pronounce onthe classification in Section 14(1)(e) nor was required to considerstriking down of the provisions. In any view of the matter, theobservation in paragraph 39, **Gian Devi Ananad case justifiedthat there is ground to seek eviction on bona fide need. Theobservation in paragraph 39 of **Gian Devi Anand’s case suggeststhat the Constitution Bench was satisfied that ground for evictionof tenant of commercial premises on bona fide requirement oflandlord should also be provided for. The basis for what has beendone in *Satyawati Sharma case was clearly laid down in **Gian

ADevi Anand case for striking down the unconstitutional part inSection 14(1)(e). Thus, *Satyadevi Sharma case seeks supportof what has been done in **Gian Devi Anand’s case. [Para 30][1077-C-E]

2.3 #Gauri Shanker case was not case in which provisionBof Section 14(1)(e) came for consideration nor any observationhad been made with regard to ground of eviction available tolandlord with regard to commercial premises. #Gauri Shankercase had dealt with entirely different provision, certain limitationwhich was attached to residential premises itself to heritability.The case of #Gauri Shanker case being on different provisionCand premise, it cannot be said that #Gauri Shanker case was abinding precedent to be followed by *Satyawati Sharma case.Therefore, the judgment of *Satyawati Sharma case cannot beheld to be per incuriam. [Para 32] [1079-D-F]

**Gauri Shanker and Others v. Union of India andDOthers(1994) 6 SCC 349 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 244– distinguished.

2.4 The ratio in *Satyawati Sharma case that Legislationwhich may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of itsenactment may with the lapse of time and due to change ofEcircumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative ofthe doctrine of equality has been affirmed in ##Super MaxInternational Pvt. Ltd. case, three Judge Bench judgment. Thethree-Judge Bench in ##Super Max International Pvt. Ltd. caseapproved limited ratio in *Satyawati Sharma case.F[Paras 39 and 40] [1083-D-E; 1084-A-B]

3.1 Non-reference of Section 25B in *Satyawati Sharmacase does not render the judgment per incuriam. Nothing in Section25B can be read which runs counter to what has been laid down in*Satyawati Sharma case. *Satyawati Sharma case was consideringGthe challenge to provisions of Section 14(1)(e) in so far as theground of bona fide need of landlord is also available forcommercial premises. Section 25B being related to onlyprocedure for considering the application under Section 14(1)(e)has no bearing on the issue which had propped up before thisCourt in *Satyawati Sharma case. [Para 35] [1081-D-E]H

3.2 It was contended that in so far as applicability of theprocedure under Section 25B is concerned, the issue needs tobe revisited to save the tenants from hardship. This cannot be aground for referring the judgment in *Satyawati Sharma case tolarger Bench for reconsideration. *Satyawati Sharma case havingnot said about the procedure, there is nothing in the judgmentwhich needs to be revisited on the above aspect. It is for theLegislature to take stock of situation and if it so decides, it canmake necessary changes in the procedure for considering theapplication under Section 14(1)(e) with regard to eviction ofcommercial tenants on the ground of bona fide need of the landlord. [Para 45] [1090-D-F]

3.3 In sofaras submission of the appellant that under Section14(1)(e) in respect of commercial tenancy leave to defend isgenerally rejected, it is suffice to say that rejection of leave for aparticular case is matter to be examined in each case and nogeneral observation can be made in this regard. [Para 45][1091-F-G]

4. In *Satyawati Sharma case, this Court did not read downthe provision of Section 14(1)(e). This Court held that Section14(1)(e) is not intravires the doctrine of equality enshrined inArticle 14 of the Constitution. After considering all the aspectsof the matter, this Court in *Satyawati Sharma case had held thatSection 14(1)(e) is violative of the doctrine of equality embodiedin Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court, thus, struck downthe discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e). The judgment of*Satyawati Sharma case was, thus, not case of reading down ofSection 14(1)(e) rather it was case where portion of Section14(1)(e) was struck down as discriminatory and violative of Article14 of the Constitution. [Paras 52, 53 and 54] [1094-E, F-H;1095-A, D-E]

5.1 In **Gian Devi Anand case in paragraph 39 theConstitution Bench observed that bona fide need of the landlordstands very much on the same footing in regard to either class ofpremises, residential or commercial. Therefore, it is suggestedthat Legislature may consider the advisability of making the bonafide requirement of the landlord ground of eviction in respectof commercial premises as well. After more than decade of the

Aabove observation, comprehensive Legislation, namely, DelhiRent Act, 1995 has been enacted to provide for the regulation ofrents, repairs and maintenance and evictions relating to premisesand of rates of hotels and lodging houses in the National CapitalTerritory of Delhi. [Para 46] [1090-G-H; 1091-A-B]

BSubramanian Swamy and Others v. Raju throughMember, Juvenile Justice Board and Another(2014) 8–SCC 390 : [2014] 9 SCR 283 distinguished.

5.2 The Legislature itself notices the need for providing aground for eviction to landlord on bona fide need with regard toCresidential as well as non-residential premises. Thus, what wassaid in **Gian Devi Anand case in paragraph 39 was duly acceptedby Legislature. It is another matter that Delhi Rent Act, 1995even though it received assent of the President could not beenforced. Even though the said Act could not be enforced, theLegislation is complete when the Act is passed by the LegislatureDand receives the assent of the President. The Parliament inenacting Act, 1995 accepts the suggestion of Constitution Benchin **Gian Devi Anand case and hence what has been held by*Satyawati Sharma case was felt both by this Court andLegislature. Thus, there is no good ground to refer the judgmentEof this Court in *Satyawati Sharma case for reconsideration by alarger Bench. [Paras 55 and 57] [1095-F; 1096-A; 1097-A-B]

Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others v. State ofMaharashtra and Another (1998) 2 SCC 1 : [1997] 6Suppl. SCR 717; Anuj Garg and Others v. HotelFAssociation of India and Others(2008) 3 SCC 1 :[2007] 12 SCR 991; SaradamaniKandappan v.S. Rajalakshmi & Ors.(2011) 12 SCC 18 : [2011] 8SCR 874;Modern Dental College and Research Centreand Others v. State of MadhyaPradesh and Others(2016) 7 SCC 353; Subramanian Swamy and Others v.GRaju through Member, Juvenile Justice Board andAnother (2014) 8 SCC 390 – relied on.

State of Kerala and Others v. Mar Appraem KuriCompany Limited and Another(2012) 7 SCC 106 :–[2012] 4 SCR 448 distinguished.

H.C.Sharma v. LIC of India (1973) ILR 1 Del 90;Satyawati Sharma (Dead) byLRs. v. Union of Indiaand Another(2008) 5 SCC 287 : [2008] 6 SCR 566;Gian Devi Anand v. Jeevan Kumar and Others (1985)2 SCC 683 : [1985] 1 Suppl. SCR 1 ;Harbilas RaiBansal v. State of Punjab and Another(1996) 1 SCC1 : [1995] 6 Suppl. SCR 178 ; Rakesh Vij v. RaminderPal Singh Sethand Others(2005) 8 SCC 504 : [2005]3 Suppl. SCR 777;State of Maharasthra andAnr. v.Super Max International (P) Ltd. and Ors. (2009) 9SCC 772 : [2009] 13 SCR 801 – referred to..

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.3793 of2016

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.03.2016 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in R.C. Revision No. 534/2015

With

C.A. No. 8972-8973/17, 6063/19, 6064/19, 6066-72/19, 6073/19,16916/17 and 6075/19

Uday Gupta, Ms. Shivani Lal, Hiren Dasan, M.K. Tripathi, VikasBansal, Ram Bhakt Aggarwal, Mohan Pandey, Uday Gupta, Ms. ShivaniLal, Hiren Dasan, M. K. Tripathi, Vikas Bansal, Ram Bhakt Aggarwal,G. L. Soni, Chand Qureshi, Amit Mishra, Mrs. Sarla Chandra, KanwalChaudhary, Bimlesh Kumar Singh, Rajinder Mathur, Ashok Kr. Rohatgi,M. K. Ravi, Shikhil Suri, Shiv Kumar Suri, Ms. Shilpa Saini, Ms. VinishmaBKaul, Prem Paul Ahuja, Nikunj Dayal, Pramod Dayal, Ms. Payal Dayal,Nitin K. Gupta, Parth Upadhyay, Ms. Manju Jetley, Advs. for theAppellant.N.K. Kaul, Sr. Adv. Jai Sahai Endlaw, Shivansh Soni, Arun K.Sinha, Sinha Shrey Nikhilesh, Mohit Chaudhary, Ms. Puja Sharma,CBalwinder Singh Suri, Kunal Sachdeva, Anup Kumar Mishra, RajeshGoyal, Siddharth Mittal, Parbhat Kumar, V. K. Monga, Parmanand Gaur,Mrs. Rachna Gupta, Gagan Gupta, Ms. Anushree Kapadia, Ms. KavitaBhardwaj, Advs. for the Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byDASHOK BHUSHAN, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals, except one where leave to defend was granted,have been filed against the judgment of Delhi High Court dismissing theERent Control Revisions filed by the appellants in which the order passedby the Rent Controller rejecting the application filed by the appellants-tenants seeking leave to defend in petition under Section 14(1)(e) ofthe Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 have been challenged.

3. The appellants are tenants occupying non-residential buildingsFfor whose eviction petitions have been filed by the landlord on the groundof bonafide need of landlord. The appellants at the very outset challengethe maintainability of eviction petitions filed by the landlord under 14(1)(e)on the ground of bonafide need. The facts are being taken fromC.A.No.3793 of 2016 (Vinod Kumar vs. Ashok Kumar Gandhi) forconsidering the issues which have been raised by the learned counselGfor the appellant at the very beginning of the submission.

C.A.No.3793 of 2016(Vinod Kumarvs. Ashok KumarGandhi)

4. The appellant is tenant of shop bearing No.J-3/188-B, NehruMarket, Rajouri Garden, New Delhi-110027. The respondent-landlord

of the premises filed an Eviction Petition on 03.01.2011 to obtainpossession of the shop on the ground that son of the landlord was withoutany job and the premises in question are bonafide required by his son tostart business of sale of readymade garments and accessories. It wasfurther pleaded in the application that the landlord has planned to makea passage of around six feet wide throughout the length of the property,from the front side, to have access to the stairs case in the rear side ofthe property. The Rent Controller after receipt of the said applicationissued notice to the appellant-tenant. On 25.01.2011, the appellant filedan application seeking leave to defend along with detailed affidavit insupport thereof. The landlord filed reply to the application alongwithcounter-affidavit. The Additional Rent Controller vide order dated05.05.2015 rejected the application seeking leave to defend filed by theappellant. Aggrieved by the order of the Additional Rent Controller dated05.05.2015 revision petition was filed by the appellant under Section25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 challenging the order orAdditional Rent Controller. The High Court vide its judgment dated14.03.2016 dismissed the revision petition filed by the appellant. Aggrievedby the judgment of the High Court, this appeal has been filed by theappellant.

5. In C.A.No.3793 of 2016 various grounds have been raised insupport of the appeal. Other appeals included in this group also raiseseveral grounds on the merits questioning the refusal to grant leave todefend by the Rent Controller. However, on the opening of thesubmissions, learned counsel for the appellants have confined theirsubmissions on the judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma (Dead)

by LRs. Vs. Union of India and another, (2008) 5 SCC 287.Questioning the correctness of judgment of Satyawati Sharma variousgrounds have been canvassed before us. Learned counsel for theappellant submits that the said judgment needs to be referred to largerBench to examine its correctness. It is the submission of the appellantthat the Eviction Petitions have been filed under 14(1)(e) for evictionfrom non-residential premises on the projected bonafide need of landlordonly on the basis of judgment of Satyawati Sharma, which had, in fact,re-written the provision of 14(1)(e). It is submitted that as per provisionof 14(1)(e) as contained in Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, the landlordwas precluded from filing application for eviction on the ground of bonafideneed regarding non-residential premises. It is submitted that application

Aunder 14(1)(e) was contemplated by the Act only with regard to premiseslet for residential purposes.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the landlord has countered thesubmission of the appellant and submits that the judgment of this Courtin Satyawati Sharma lays down the correct law and needs no referenceBto larger Bench.

7. Learned counsel for the parties have confined their submissionsonly on the question as to whether judgment of this Court in SatyawatiSharma needs reference to larger Bench or not. We, in these appeals,thus, proceed to consider limited submission as to whether judgment ofCthis Court in Satyawati Sharma needs reference to larger bench or not.The issues on merits of the order passed by the Rent Controller rejectingleave to defend application are not being examined as of now.

8. Before we notice the respective submissions of the learnedcounsel for the parties in detail, we may first notice the provisions ofDSection 14 of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 as enacted. The Delhi RentControl Act, 1958 had been enacted to provide for the regulation ofrents, repairs and maintenance and evictions relating to premises and ofrates of hotels and lodging houses in the National Capital Territory ofDelhi. The premises have been defined in Section 2(i) which is to thefollowing effect:E

“2(i) “premises” means any building or part of building whichis, or is intended to be, let separately for use as residence or forcommercial use or for any other purpose, and includes—

(i) the garden, grounds and outhouses, if any, appertaining toFsuch building or part of the building;

(ii) any furniture supplied by the landlord for use in such buildingor part of the building; but does not include room in hotel orlodging house;”

9. Chapter III of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 deals with controlGof eviction of tenants. Section 14(1) which has arisen for considerationin these cases is as follows:

“Section 14. Protection of tenant against eviction.- (1)Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any otherlaw or contract, no order or decree for the recovery of possession

of any premises shall be made by any court or Controller in favourof the landlord against tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application made tohim in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recovery ofpossession of the premises on one or more of the following groundsonly, namely:-

(a) that the tenant has neither paid nor tendered the wholeof the arrears of the rent legally recoverable from him within twomonths of the date on which notice of demand for the arrears ofrent has been served on him by the landlord in the manner providedin section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (4 of 1882).

(b) that the tenant has, on or after the 9th day of June, 1952,sub-let, assigned or otherwise parted with the possession of thewhole or any part of the premises without obtaining the consent inwriting of the landlord;

(c) that the tenant has used the premises for purpose otherthan that for which they were let-

(i) if the premises have been let on or after the 9th day ofJune, 1952, without obtaining the consent in writing of the landlord;or

(ii) if the premises have been let before the said date withoutobtaining his consent;

(d) that the premises were let for use as residence andneither the tenant nor any member of his family has been residingtherein for period of six months immediately before the date ofthe filing of the application for the recovery of possession thereof;

(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are requiredbona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himselfor for any member of his family dependent on him, if he is theowner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the premisesare held and that the landlord or such person has no otherreasonably suitable residential accommodation;

Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause, “premises letfor residential purposes” include any premises which having been

let for use as residence are, without the consent of the landlord,used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;

(f) that the premises have become unsafe or unfit for humanhabitation and are required bona fide by the landlord for carryingout repairs which cannot be carried out without the premises beingBvacated;

(g) that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord forthe purpose of building or re-building or making thereto anysubstantial additions or alterations and that such building or re-building or addition or alteration cannot be carried out without thepremises being vacated;

(h) that the tenant has, whether before or after thecommencement of this Act, built, acquired vacant possession of,or been allotted, residence:

(i) that the premises were let to the tenant for use as residenceby reason of his being in the service or employment of the landlord,and that the tenant has ceased, whether before or after thecommencement of this Act, to be in such service or employment;

(j) that the tenant has, whether before or after thecommencement of this Act, caused or permitted to be causedEsubstantial damage to the premises;

(k) that the tenant has, notwithstanding previous notice, usedor dealt with the premises in manner contrary to any conditionimposed on the landlord by the Government or the DelhiDevelopment Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi whileFgiving him lease of the land on which the premises are situate;

(l) that the landlord requires the premises in order to carry outany building work at the instance of the Government or the DelhiDevelopment Authority or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi inpursuance of any improvement scheme or development schemeand that such building work cannot be carried out without thepremises being vacated.”

10. perusal of the various grounds available to landlord torecover possession of any premises indicates that although severalgrounds are available both for residential and non-residential premises

but few grounds are available only for premises let for residentialpurposes. The provision of Section 14(1)(e) which needs considerationconfine to the premises let for residential purposes which may be requiredbonafide by the landlord for occupation as residence for himself or forany member of his family dependent on him. The explanation explainsthat premises let for residential purposes which having been let for useas residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentallyfor commercial or other purposes are also included in residential premises.

11. The provisions of Section 14(1)(e) were resorted by the landlordfor seeking recovery of possession only with regard to residential premisestill part of Section 14(1)(e) has been struck down in Satyawati Sharmacase. This Court held that Section 14(1)(e) of Act, 1958 is violative ofthe doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the Constitution in sofar as it discriminates between the premises let for residential and non-residential purposes when the same are required bonafide by the landlordfor occupation for himself or for any member of his family dependent onhim and restricts the landlord’s right to seek eviction of the tenant fromthe premises let for residential purposes only. This Court clarified that itis not totally striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the Act in its entiretybut it has struck down only the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e).In Satyawati Sharma(AIR 2008 SC 3148) this Court held that strikingdown the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) the remaining partof the Section 14(1)(e) shall be read in the manner as extracted inparagraph 39 of the judgment which is as follows:“39. However, the aforesaid declaration should not bemisunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties northe learned Counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutionalin its entirety and we feel that ends of justice will be met by strikingdown the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e) so that theremaining part thereof may read as under:

“that the premises are required bona fide by the landlord forhimself or for any member of his family dependent on him, ifhe is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefitthe premises are held and that the landlord or such person hasno other reasonably suitable accommodation.”

A12. It is on the strength of the judgment of this Court in SatyawatiSharma that after the said judgment landlords of non-residential premiseshave also filed application for eviction under Section 14(1)(e) which aredealt with by the Rent Controller as per procedure contained in ChapterIII-A of the Act, 1958. Chapter III-A contains ‘Summary Trial of CertainApplications’. The Rent Controller treating the said procedure applicableBon applications filed by the landlords under Section 14(1)(e) has issuedsummons to the tenants in the form prescribed in the Third Schedule andhave passed order either rejecting the leave to defend or granting leaveto defend which orders, were challenged in the High Court giving rise tothese appeals.C13. After noticing the brief background of one of the issues whichhas been pressed at the very outset, we now proceed to notice thesubmissions of learned counsel for the parties in detail as canvassedbefore us.

14. Shri Uday Gupta, learned counsel who led the submission onDbehalf of the appellant has very ably and persuasively put forward hissubmissions. Shri Gupta submits that validity of the provision of Section14(1)(e) was challenged in Delhi High Court more than once whichchallenge was repelled by the High Court. Shri Gupta submits that DelhiHigh court in H.C.Sharma vs. LIC of India,(1973) ILR 1 Del 90, inEwhich restriction placed on the rights of landlord to evict the tenant fromnon-residential premises as discriminatory and violative of Section 19and 14(1)(f) was considered and rejected. In Satyawati Sharmaappellant had filed an application for eviction of the tenant whichapplication was rejected by the Rent Controller on the ground thatapplication is not maintainable under Section 14(1)(e) for non-residentialFpurposes. Apart from revision challenging the said order in the Highcourt writ petition was also filed by Satyawati Sharma challengingthe constitutional validity of Section 14(1)(e) which challenge was repelledby Delhi High Court in Satyawati Sharma vs. Union of India and others,2002 (65) SRJ 615 (Full Bench), which judgment was subject matter ofGthe Civil Appeals before this Court giving rise to the judgment of thisCourt in Satyawati Sharma (supra). Shri Gupta relying on the judgmentof Constitution Bench judgment in Gian Devi Anand vs. Jeevan Kumarand others, (1985) 2 SCC 683, submits that Gian Devi Anand itselfhas noticed the distinction in provision of Section 14(1)(e) which wasconfined to residential premises and not available in case of commercialHpremises. It is submitted that Gian Devi Anand suggested thatLegislature may consider the advisability of making the bona fiderequirement of the landlord ground of eviction in respect of commercialpremises as well. The legislature having not yet enforced the Delhi RentAct, 1995 it was not open for this Court in Satyawati Sharma (supra)to read down the provision of Section 14(1)(e). Shri Gupta submits thatthe judgment of Satyawati Sharma is contrary to the Constitution Benchjudgment in Gian Devi Anand. Bench of two Hon’ble Judges couldnot have adopted the course which was not adopted by the ConstitutionBench itself in Gian Devi Anand. Shri Gupta further submits thatSatyawati Sharma failed to take notice of three-Judge Bench judgmentof this Court in Gauri Shanker and others vs. Union of India andothers, (1994) 6 SCC 349. It is submitted that view taken in paragraph41 of Satyawati Sharma is per incuriam in view of the judgment alreadyrendered in Gauri Shanker case. Alternatively, Shri Gupta submits thateven judgment of Satyawati Sharma is not held to be per incuriam, thesaid judgment necessarily needs to be revisited, in view of the fact thatthe Satyawati Sharma did not consider several relevant provisions ofAct, 1958 including Section 25B and Section 19. It is submitted thatsummary procedure which was brought in the statute by inserting ChapterIII-A by Act 18 of 1976 with effect from 01.12.1975 specially Section25B which was special procedure for the disposal of applications foreviction on the ground of bonafide requirement under Section 14(1)(e)was meant only for residential premises. Without adverting to Section25B, this Court in Satyawati Sharma could not have held that Section14(1)(e) should also be available for non-residential premises. The verypremise in Satyawati Sharma that Rent Control legislation did not makeany distinction in residential and non-residential purposes was erroneous,which led Satyawati Sharma to fall in error. The two-Judge Bench ofthis Court in Satyawati Sharma has re-written Section 14(1)(e) whichcould not have been done by the Court and matter ought to have beenleft for legislature as was said by the Constitution Bench in Gian DeviAnand case. The Constitution Bench in Gian Devi Anand itself hasobserved that there has been distinction between residential andcommercial premises in Delhi. Satyawati Sharma has relied on judgmentof this Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab and another,(1996) 1 SCC 1, and Rakesh Vij vs. Raminder Pal Singh Seth andothers, (2005) 8 SCC 504, which were the judgments on East PunjabUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1949, and could not have been applied with

Aregard to interpretation of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. In East PunjabUrban Rent Restriction Act the remedy for landlord for seekingeviction on the bonafide requirement both for residential and non-residential premises was very much available from the very beginningand it was, for the first time, sought to be taken away by 1956 Amendmentwhich amendment was struck down by this Court. Those cases wereBnot relevant for Delhi Rent Control Act. The tenants occupying non-residential premises are dependent on their livelihood. Applying summaryprocedure as prescribed under Section 25B brings hardship in denyingthem protection of law since they are not able to defend their cases onmerits. Referring to statement of Minister, Shri H.K.L. Bhagat on debateCin the House on 1976 Amendment, it is submitted that statement wasmade that Section 25B was not to apply to non-residential premisessince under Section 14(1)(e) eviction can be sought only with regard toresidential premises. It is submitted that due to Explanation to Section14(1)(e) having held to be redundant the benefit given under Section 19is also denied to the tenant. Section 19(2) has been rendered otiose. TheDprinciple of reading down was not attracted in the present case. It issubmitted that reading down cannot be used when the legislative intentis clear.15. Satyawati Sharma even does not refer to Sections 14A to14D which were also inserted by Act 18 of 1976. There is reasonableEdoubt of correctness of Satyawati Sharma, hence, it needs to be referredto larger Bench for final opinion. Legislature never intended to applySection 25B to commercial tenancy. Since, the procedure of Section25B was harsh which was made looking to bonafide need for residential

premises, Section 25B should not be ipso facto applied to commercialFtenancy. In other case, the tenant has right to file written statementwhich is now denied by applying procedure under Section 25B. Section25B having not referred to it is to be seen as to whether Section 25Bshall apply. In any view of the matter judgment of Satyawati Sharmashould be applied to the tenancy coming into the existence after thejudgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma case.G

16. Shri Neeraj Krishan Kaul, senior counsel, led arguments onbehalf of the landlord. Shri Kaul submits that this Court in SatyawatiSharma found Section 14(1)(e) to be ultra vires to Article 14 of theConstitution. However, instead of striking down the provisions altogether,this Court removed the offending part of the legislation by obliteratingH

the classification between residential and non-residential premises andholding that Section 14(1)(e) would apply equally to residential and non-residential premises. Satyawati Sharma took notice of ConstitutionalBench judgment in Gian Devi Anand(supra)which had suggested theLegislature to remove the discrimination between residential and non-residential premises in the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with regard toseeking eviction by landlord on the ground of bona fide need. When theLegislation had not acted in removing aforesaid classification, this Courtapplying the doctrine of temporal reasonableness held that Legislationwhich may have been reasonable and rational at the time of enactmentmay over passage of time become arbitrary, unreasonable and violativeof Article 14. This Court in Satyawati Sharma took judicial notice of thefact that the Delhi Rent Act, 1995 which was subsequent Legislation,but yet to be notified by the Central Government, did not distinguishbetween the residential and non-residential premises in sofaras landlord’sright to seek eviction on bona fide need is concerned. The observationsmade in Gian Devi Anand were in the background of discussion inrelation to heritability of tenancies vis-à-vis Section 2(l)of Delhi RentControl Act, 1958. The judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma hasalso been affirmed by three-Judge Bench in State of Maharasthraand Anr. Vs. Super Max International (P) Ltd. and Ors., (2009) 9SCC 772.

17. This Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal(supra) and Rakesh Vij(supra)had held no distinction can be made with regard to residentialtenancy and non-residential tenancy in sofaras eviction is concerned atthe instance of the landlord on the ground of bona fide need. The judgmentof Satyawati Sharma cannot be held to be any kind of judicial Legislation.What has been done in Satyawati Sharma is to only strike down theunconstitutional portion of Section 14(1)(e). The part of Section 14(1)(e)which is severable has been retained. The judgment of Satyawati Sharmacannot be held to be per incuriam either Gian Devi Anand case orGauri Shanker case. The observations in Gauri Shanker were in thebackground of Section 2(l)(iii) of Act, 1958 wherein heritability of tenancyis provided.

18. There can be no distinction in sofaras bona fide need of thelandlord is concerned regarding residential and commercial premises.The observations of three-Judge Bench in Super Max Internationalare not obiter but are the judicial dicta which has re-confirmed the

Aprinciples in Satyawati Sharma case. Replying the submission of theappellant in sofaras Section 25B of the Act is concerned, Shri Kaulsubmits that procedure for eviction cannot be different in sofarasresidential and commercial tenancies are concerned. Adopting differentprocedures for eviction in the above two cases itself be treated asdiscriminatory. There are various safeguards under Act, 1958 whichBamply protect the tenant. There is nothing in the Satyawati Sharmajudgment which can be said to be per incuriam. The appellant is askingthis Court to violate certainty of law and comity of the Courts. There isno ground today to refer the judgment of Satyawati Sharma case forconsideration of larger Bench. The judgment of this Court in SatyawatiCSharma case is just, reasonable and protects both landlord and tenant.The provision of Section 14(1)(e) which was enacted at the time whencircumstances were different can no longer be said to be reasonableand valid and has rightly done away with the unjust classification betweenresidential and commercial in sofaras eviction on the ground of bonafide need of the landlord was concerned.D

19. The Judgement of this Court in Satyawati Sharma has stoodtest of time and at this distance of time this Court cannot revive theunjust classification between residential and non-residential premises insofaras landlord’s right of eviction is concerned on the ground of bonafide need. Shri Kaul submits that there is absolutely no reason for referringEthe Satyawati Sharma case for consideration of larger Bench. ShriKaul further has referred to the order dated 20.07.2015 passed in SpecialLeave Petition (C) No.31687 of 2014, Jag Mohini Kaur vs. Tilak Rajand ors., where this Court after noticing the judgment of this Court in

Satyawati Sharma dismissed the petition of tenant wherein submissionFwas sought to be raised that landlord cannot file an application underSection 14(1)(e) with regard to non-residential premises. SatyawatiSharma has time and again relied by this Court and the High Courts andthere is no occasion to have any re-look in these appeals. The mere factthat the procedure under Section 25B is applicable with regard to non-residential premises also has no bearing on the unconstitutionality of partGof the provision of Section 14(1)(e). No distinction can be made withregard to procedure applicable regarding residential and non-residentialpremises. Shri Kaul submits that the prayer of the appellant to refer thejudgment of Satyawati Sharma to larger Bench be rejected and theappeals be heard and dismissed.H

20. From the submissions of learned counsel for the parties asnoted above following two questions arise for consideration by us:

(1) Whether the judgment of this Court in Satyawati Sharma(supra) is per incuriam.

(2) Whether there are any other grounds to refer the judgment ofthis Court in Satyawati Sharma for reconsideration by largerBench.

Question No.1

21. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is thatSatyawati Sharma having not followed the binding Constitution Benchjudgment in Gian Devi Anand and three-Judge Bench judgment in GauriShanker is judgment rendered per incuriam. Further, submission isthat Satyawati Sharma ignores provisions of Section 25B of the DelhiRent Control Act. Hence, the judgment in Satyawati Sharma is perincuriam.

22. The principle of per incuriam has been developed by theEnglish Courts in relaxation of the rule of stare decisis. In practice perincuriam is per ignoratium. The above principle has been developed,accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article141 of the Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedent as amatter of law. Constitution Bench in Punjab Land Developmentand Reclamation Corporation Ltd., Chandigarh vs. PresidingOfficer, Labour Court, Chandigarh and another, (1990) 3 SCC682 dealing with question of per incuriam laid down following inparagraph 40:

“40. We now deal with the question of per incuriam by reasonof allegedly not following the Constitution Bench decisions. TheLatin expression per incuriam means through inadvertence. Adecision can be said generally to be given per incuriam whenthis Court has acted in ignorance of previous decision of its ownor when High Court has acted in ignorance of decision of thisCourt. It cannot be doubted that Article 141 embodies, as ruleof law, the doctrine of precedents on which our judicial system isbased. In Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. v. State of Bihar,AIR 1955 SC 66, it was held that the words of Article 141, “binding

Aon all courts within the territory of India”, though wide enough toinclude the Supreme Court, do not include the Supreme Courtitself, and it is not bound by its own judgments but is free toreconsider them in appropriate cases. This is necessary for properdevelopment of law and justice. May be for the same reasonsbefore judgments were given in the House of Lords and ReBDawson’s Settlement Lloyds Bank Ltd. v. Dawson, (1966) 3 AllER 68, on July 26, 1966 Lord Gardiner, L.C. made the followingstatement on behalf of himself and the Lords of Appeal inOrdinary:

“Their Lordships regard the use of precedent as anCindispensable foundation upon which to decide what is the lawand its application to individual cases. It provides at least somedegree of certainty upon which individuals can rely in theconduct of their affairs, as well as basis for orderlydevelopment of legal rules. Their Lordships neverthelessDrecognise that too rigid adherence to precedent may lead toinjustice in particular case and also unduly restrict the properdevelopment of the law. They propose, therefore, to modifytheir present practice and, while treating former decisions ofthis House as normally binding, to depart from previousdecision when it appears right to do so.E

In this connection they will bear in mind the danger of disturbingretrospectively the basis on which contracts, settlements ofproperty and fiscal arrangements have been entered into andalso the especial need for certainty as to the criminal law.”

F23. In V.Kishan Rao vs. Nikhil Super Specially Hospital andanother, 2010(5) SCC 513, this Court again explaining the concept ofper incuriam laid down following in paragraph 54:

“54. When judgment is rendered by ignoring the provisions ofthe governing statute and earlier larger Bench decision on theGpoint such decisions are rendered per incuriam. This concept ofper incuriam has been explained in many decisions of this Court.Sabyasachi Mukharji, J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking forthe majority in A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602,explained the concept in the following words: (SCC p. 652, para42)

“42. … ‘Per incuriam’ are those decisions given in ignoranceor forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provision or ofsome authority binding on the court concerned, so that in suchcases some part of the decision or some step in the reasoningon which it is based, is found, on that account to be demonstrablywrong.”

Subsequently also in the Constitution Bench judgment of this Courtin Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v.Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682, similar views were expressedin para 40 at p. 705 of the report.”

24. When Court delivers judgment ignoring the binding precedentof larger Bench, the judgment so delivered is held to be per incuriamand has no precedential value. Whether the judgment of SatyawatiSharma can be said to be per incuriam. The Constitution Bench judgmentof Gian Devi Anand is first to be examined. The Constitution Benchjudgment in Gian Devi Anand(supra) was delivered by AmarendraNath Sen, J. with which opinion Bhagwati, J. concurred. The questionwhich arose for consideration was noticed in paragraph 5 of the judgment.

“Amarendra Nath Sen, J.- The question for consideration in thisappeal by special leave is whether under the Delhi Rent ControlAct, 1958 (for the sake of brevity hereinafter referred to as ‘theAct’), the statutory tenancy, to use the popular phraseology, inrespect of commercial premises is heritable or not. To state itmore precisely, the question is whether the heirs of deceasedtenant whose contractual tenancy in respect of commercialpremises has been determined, are entitled to the same protectionagainst eviction afforded by the Act to the tenant.”

25. In the above case landlord has determined tenancy of thetenant and thereafter filed petition under Section 14 for eviction of thetenant on various grounds. Tenancy was of shop situate in New Market,West Patel Nagar, New Delhi. Rent Controller had allowed the petitionof the landlord on the ground of default in payment of rent rejectingother grounds. Landlord preferred an appeal to which tenant had alsofiled cross-objection. During pendency of the appeal tenant died on05.09.1977 in whose place the appellant, the widow of deceased tenantwas impleaded. Cross-objection of tenant was allowed. Appellate Courtremanded the matter to decide the question of sub-letting. The widow of

Adeceased tenant filed an appeal before the High Court to which landlordfiled cross-objection. The High Court held that on the death of thestatutory tenant, the heirs of the statutory tenant had no right to remainin possession of the premises, as statutory tenancy was not heritableand the protection afforded to statutory tenant by the Act is not availableto the heirs and legal representatives of the statutory tenant. decreeBfor eviction was passed by the High Court which judgment was challengedby the widow of the deceased tenant before this Court. This Court heldthat Act does not make any distinction between ‘so-called statutorytenant’ and ‘contractual tenant’ but seeks to restrict the right of the heirsof such tenant in respect of residential premises. One more submissionCwas raised before this Court that in view of the amendment of definitionof ‘tenant’ under Section 2(l)(iii) right of continuing in possession inrespect of residential premises only and not with regard to so-calledstatutory tenant in respect of commercial premises, rejecting the saidsubmission the Court laid down following in paragraph 31: “31……..Section 2(1)(iii) of the Act does not create anyadditional or special right in favour of the heirs of the `so calledstatutory tenant’ on his death, but seeks to restrict the right of theheirs of such tenant in respect of residential premises. As thestatus and rights of contractual tenant even after determinationof his tenancy when the tenant is at times described as the statutoryEtenant, are fully protected by the Act and the heirs of such tenantsbecome entitled by virtue of the provisions of the Act to inheritthe status and position of the statutory tenant on his death, theLegislature which has created this right has thought it fit in thecase of residential premises to limit the rights of the heirs in theFmanner and to the extent provided in Section 2(1)(iii). It appearsthat the Legislature has not thought it fit to put any such restrictionswith regard to tenants in respect of commercial premises in thisAct.”

26. The Constitution Bench of this Court also noticed SectionG14(1)(e) which makes bona fide requirement of the landlord of thepremises let out to the tenant for residential purposes good ground foreviction of the tenant from such premises. The Constitution Benchconcluded that commercial tenancy is heritable under the scheme of theAct. In paragraph 34 following has been observed:

“34…………It may be noticed that the Legislature itself treatscommercial tenancy differently from residential tenancy in thematter of eviction of the tenant in the Delhi RentAct and also invarious other RentActs. All the grounds for eviction of tenantof residential premises are not made grounds for eviction of atenant in respect of commercial premises. S. 14(1)(d) of the DelhiRentAct provides that non-user of the residential premises by thetenant for period of six months immediately before the filing ofthe application for the recovery of possession of the premises willbe good ground for eviction, though in case of commercialpremises no such provision is made. Similarly, S. 14(1)(e) whichmakes bona fide requirement of the landlord of the premises letout to the tenant for residential purposes ground for eviction ofthe tenant, is not made applicable to commercial premises. tenantof any commercial premises has necessarily to use the premisesfor business purposes. Business carried on by tenant of anycommercial premises may be and often is, his only occupationand the source of livelihood of the tenant and his family. Out ofthe income earned by the tenant from his business in thecommercial premises, the tenant maintains himself and his family;and the tenant, if he is residing in tenanted house, may also bepaying his rent out of the said income. Even if tenant is evictedfrom his residential premises, he may with the earnings out of thebusiness be in position to arrange for some other accommodationfor his residence with his family. When, however, tenant is thrownout of the commercial premises, his business which enables himto maintain himself and his family comes to stand-still. It iscommon knowledge that it is much more difficult to find suitablebusiness premises than to find suitable premises forresidence………

We are of the opinion that in case of commercial premisesgoverned by the DelhiAct, the Legislature has not thought it fit inthe light of the situation at Delhi to place any kind of restriction onthe ordinary law of inheritance with regard to succession. It mayalso be borne in mind that in case of commercial premises theheirs of the deceased tenant not only succeed to the tenancy rightsin the premises but they succeed to the business as whole. Itmight have been open to the Legislature to limit or restrict the

right of inheritance with regard to the tenancy as the Legislaturehad done in the case of the tenancies with regard to the residentialhouses but it would not have been open to the Legislature to alterunder the RentAct, the Law of Succession regarding the businesswhich is valuable heritable right and which must necessarilydevolve on all the heirs in accordance with law. The absence ofany provision restricting the heritability of the tenancy in respectof the commercial premises only establishes that commercialtenancies notwithstanding the determination of the contractualtenancies will devolve on the heirs in accordance with law andthe heirs who step into the position of the deceased tenant willcontinue to enjoy the protection afforded by the Act and they canonly be evicted in accordance with the provisions of theAct……………”

27. After laying down above following was held in paragraph 38:

“38.We must, therefore, hold that Wasti Ram enjoyed the statuteof the premises in dispute even after determination of thecontractual tenancy and notwithstanding the termination of thecontractual tenancy, Wasti Ram had an estate or interest in thedemised premises; and tenancy rights of Wasti Ram did not cometo an end with his death but they devolved on the heirs and legalrepresentative of Wasti Ram. The heirs and legal representativesof Wasti Ram step into his position and they are entitled to thebenefit and protection of the Act. We must, accordingly, hold thatthe High Court was not right in coming to the conclusion that theheirs of Wasti Ram, the so called statutory tenant, did not haveany right to remain in possession of the tenanted premises and didnot enjoy any protection under the Act. It appears that the HighCourt passed an order for eviction against the heirs of Wasti Ramonly on this ground without going into the merits of the appealfiled by the appellant in the High Court against the order of remandand also without considering the cross-objections filed in the HighCourt by the landlord. We accordingly, set aside the judgment andorder of the High Court and we remand the case to the HighCourt for decision of the appeal and the cross objection on merits.The appeal is accordingly allowed to the extent indicated abovewith no order as to costs.”

28. The most important observations which are relevant in presentcase were made by the Constitution Bench in paragraph 39 of thejudgment. The Constitution Bench observed the landlord who let outcommercial premises under circumstances may need bona fide premisesfor his own use under changed conditions. The Constitution Benchsuggested that Legislature may consider the advisability of making thebona fide requirement of the landlord ground of eviction in respect ofcommercial premises as well. Following was observed in paragraph 39:“39.Before concluding, there is one aspect which we consider itdesirable to make certain observations. The owner of anypremises, whether residential or commercial, let out to any tenant,is permitted by the Rent Control Acts to seek eviction of the tenantonly on the ground specified in the Act, entitling the landlord toevict the tenant from the premises. The restrictions on the powerof the landlords in the matter of recovery of possession of thepremises let out by him to tenant have been imposed for thebenefit of the tenants. Inspite of various restrictions put on thelandlords right to recover possession of the premises from tenant,the right of the landlord to recover possession of the premisesfrom the tenant for the bona fide need of the premises by thelandlord is recognised by the Act, in case of residential premises.A landlord may let out the premises under various circumstances.Usually landlord lets out the premises when he does not need itfor own use. Circumstances may change and situation mayarise when the landlord may require the premises let out by himfor his own use. It is just and proper that when the landlord requiresthe premises bona fide for his own use and occupation, the landlordshould be entitled to recover the possession of the premises whichcontinues to be his property inspite of his letting out the same to atenant. The legislature in its wisdom did recognise this fact andthe Legislature has provided that bona fide requirement of thelandlord for his own use will be legitimate ground under the Actfor the eviction of his tenant from any residential premises. Thisground is, however, confined to residential premises and is notmade available in case of commercial premises. landlord wholets out commercial premises to tenant under certaincircumstances may need bona fide the premises for his own use

under changed conditions in some future date should not in fairnessbe deprived of his right to recover the commercial premises. Bonafide need of the landlord will stand very much on the same footingin regard to either class of premises, residential or commercial.We therefore, suggest that Legislature may consider the advisabilityof making the bona fide requirement of the landlord ground ofeviction in respect of commercial premises as well.”

29. Now, we revert back to Satyawati Sharma’s case. SatyawatiSharma case has noticed Gian Devi Anand case in paragraphs 20 and21. Satyawati Sharma extracted the entire paragraph 39 of ConstitutionBench judgment in paragraph 20. Satyawati Sharma in paragraph21states following:

“21. What is significant to be noted is that in para 34 of theaforementioned judgment, the distinction between residential andnon-residential tenancies was made in the context of the rights ofthe heirs of the tenant to continue to enjoy the protection envisagedunder Section 14(1). The Court was of the view that the heirs ofthe tenants of the commercial premises cannot be deprived of theprotection else the family of the tenant may be brought on road ordeprived of the only source of livelihood. The Court also opinedthat if the heirs of the individual tenants of commercial tenanciesare deprived of the protection, extremely anomalous consequenceswill ensue because the companies, corporations and juridical entitiescarrying on business or commercial activities in rented premiseswill continue to enjoy the protection even after the change ofmanagement, but the heirs of individual tenants will be denudedof similar protection. At the same time, the Court noted that thelandlord of premises let for residential purpose may bona fiderequire the same for his own use or the use of his dependentfamily members and observed that the legislature should removeapparent discrimination between residential and non-residentialtenancies when the landlord bona fide requires the same. If theobservations contained in para 34 are read in any other manner,the same would become totally incompatible with the observationcontained in the penultimate paragraph of the judgment and wedo not see any reason for adopting such course, more so, becausethe later part of the judgment has been relied in Harbilas RaiBansal v. State of Punjab, (1996) 1 SCC 1 and Rakesh Vij v.Dr. Raminder Pal Singh Sethi, (2005) 8 SCC 504.”

30. The submission which has been pressed by Shri Uday Guptais that the Constitution Bench in Gian Devi Anand did not declareprovisions of Section 14(1)(e) unconstitutional rather left it to theLegislature to amend the law. When Gian Devi Anand has itself notstruck down Section 14(1)(e) Satyawati Sharma doing the same iscontrary to the judgment of Gian Devi Anand. The observation inparagraph 39 of Gian Devi Anand’s case itself suggest that theConstitution Bench was satisfied that ground for eviction of tenant ofcommercial premises on bona fide requirement of landlord should alsobe provided for. The basis for what has been done in Satyawati Sharmawas clearly laid down in Gian Devi Anand for striking down theunconstitutional part in Section 14(1)(e). We fail to see that how canSatyawati Sharma judgment be said as per incuriam. The ratio of GianDevi Anand has neither been ignored nor any contrary view has beentaken by Satyawati Sharma. We may observe that Gian Devi Anand inparagraphs 32 and 34 has noticed the provisions of Section 14(1)specifically Section 14(1)(e) as existed in the Act, 1958. There was nochallenge for the classification in Section 14(1)(e) in the above case,hence neither Gian Devi Anand was required to pronounce on theclassification in Section 14(1)(e) nor was required to consider strikingdown of the provisions. In any view of the matter, the observation inparagraph 39, Gian Devi Ananad justified that there is ground to seekeviction on bona fide need. Thus, Satyadevi Sharma seeks support ofwhat has been done in Gian Devi Anand’s case.31. Now, we come to three-Judge Bench judgment of GauriShanker which according to appellant is binding precedent and SatyawatiSharma having not noticed the said, the judgment of Satyawati Sharmais per incuriam. Gauri Shanker was case where restriction on rightsof heir of statutory tenant of residential premises placed by explanationto Section 2(l)(iii) of Delhi Rent Control Act as introduced Act 18 of1976 while no restrictions were placed on tenants of commercial premiseswhere challenge on the ground of violation of Article 14 and 21 of theConstitution of India. Gauri Shanker has noticed the Gian Devi Anand,especially paragraphs 32 and 34. The ground of distinction was repelledand following was laid down in paragraph 12:

“12. It is evident from the above decision of the ConstitutionBench of this Court that commercial tenancy is invaluable andhas got distinct features and characteristics of its own different

from that of residential tenancy. None of the peculiar or uniquefeatures present in the case of commercial tenancies exist in thecase of residential tenancies. In the above background, if thelegislature thought it fit to afford greater and extended right orbenefit to the heirs of the statutory tenants of commercial premisesand not to extend such rights to the heirs of the statutory tenantsof residential premises, we should say that it only stands to reasonand reckons the stark realities of the prevailing situation. Theprotection afforded by the Rent Act to tenant after the terminationof the tenancy and to the heirs of the tenant is only creation ofthe Act and it is open to the Legislature to make appropriateprovisions in that behalf. It can make suitable and appropriateprovisions in the Act with regard to the nature and extent of thebenefit and protection to be so enjoyed and the manner in whichthe same is to be enjoyed. In the above perspective, we are of theview that the provisions in Section 2(l)(iii) of the Act, which seeksto restrict or limit the right of the heirs, insofar as the statutorytenants of residential premises are concerned and to the extentprovided therein, are not in any way discriminatory and do notoffend the guarantee under Article 14 of the Constitution. This isnot case where the residential tenancy and the commercialtenancy are similarly placed. They belong to two differentcategories with distinct features and characteristics of their own.No question of discrimination arises. In this context, it is only properto quote the following observations in Sakhawat Ali v. State ofOrissa, AIR 1955 SC 166, which is apposite:

“… legislation enacted for the achievement of particularobject or purpose need not be all embracing. It is for theLegislature to determine what categories it would embracewithin the scope of legislation and merely because certaincategories which would stand on the same footing as thosewhich are covered by the legislation are left out would notrender legislation which has been enacted in any mannerdiscriminatory and violative of the fundamental right guaranteedby Article 14 of the Constitution.”

(emphasis supplied)

Nor are we impressed by the plea that the right to shelter is aguarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution of India and so theabridgement or limitation placed on the rights of the legal heirs inthe case of statutory tenancy of residential premises makes aninroad into the rights of the tenant under Article 21 of theConstitution of India. We hold that the statutory tenancies regardingresidential premises are distinct and different from statutorytenancies regarding commercial premises and the limitations orthe restrictions placed by Section 2(l)(iii) of the Act on the rightsof the heirs of the statutory tenants of residential premises arereasonable, fair and just in all the circumstances of the case. Thereis no violation of the guarantee enshrined in Article 14 or Article21 of the Constitution of India.”32. Gauri Shanker upheld Section 2(l)(iii) of the Act holding itnot violating Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The observations inthe judgment with respect to residential tenancy and commercial tenancywere made in reference to heritability. In the above context, this Courtheld that they belong to two different categories with distinct featuresand characteristics of their own. Gauri Shanker was not case inwhich provision of Section 14(1)(e) came for consideration nor anyobservation has been made with regard to ground of eviction availableto landlord with regard to commercial premises. Gauri Shanker haddealt with entirely different provision, certain limitation which was attachedto residential premises itself to heritability. The case of Gauri Shankerbeing on different provision and premise, it cannot be said that GauriShanker was binding precedent to be followed by Satyawati Sharma.The judgment of Gauri Shanker being on different provision cannot besaid to be binding precedent in reference to what has been dealt inSatyawati Sharma. We, thus, conclude that the judgment of SatyawatiSharma cannot be held to be per incuriam.

33. The next limb of attack of the appellant on Satyawati Sharmais on the basis of non-consideration of Section 25B of the Act, 1958.Section 25A to Section 25C were inserted by Act 18 of 1976 w.e.f.01.12.1975. Section 25 provided for special procedure for the disposalof applications for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement.Learned counsel for the appellant has also relied on Parliamentary debateon Delhi Rent Control Amendment Bill, 1976. Learned counsel submits

Athat Hon’ble Minister of State in the Ministry of Works and Housing onthe Floor of the House stated the following:

“An apprehension was also expressed that commercial tenantswould be evicted through summary procedure. First of all, thisprocedure is confined to residential premises and secondly, it isBapplicable only to Government servants and bona fide necessities.Nothing else. It does not apply to commercial premises and,therefore, there is no question of tenants being evicted fromcommercial premises.”

34. There cannot be any dispute to the submission of the appellantCthat provision of Section 25B when it was inserted, the procedure wasconfined to residential premises as has been stated by the Hon’ble Ministeron the Floor of the House. There being no ground available to landlordfor eviction of tenant of commercial premises on bona fide need, therewas no contemplation for applying the procedure under Section 25B.

D35.The question is as to whether non-consideration of Section25B by Satyawati Sharma renders judgment of Satyawati Sharmaperincuriam.Satyawati Sharma was considering the challenge to provisionsof Section 14(1)(e) in sofaras the ground of bona fide need of landlord isalso available for commercial premises. Section 25B being related toonly procedure for considering the application under Section 14(1)(e)Ehas no bearing on the issue which had propped up before this Court inSatyawati Sharma. Nothing in Section 25B can be read which runscounter to what has been laid down by Satyawati Sharma. Whether aprocedure giving more flexibility to tenants of commercial premises shouldbe provided for is another subject but non-reference of Section 25B byFSatyawati Sharma does not render the judgment per incuriam.

36. We may also at this stage notice one submission raised by thecounsel for the respondent that judgment of Satyawati Sharma has beenaffirmed by three-Judge Bench judgment in Super Max InternationalPvt. Ltd. (supra). The submission is countered by the counsel for theGappellant who contends that Super Max was case which was dealingentirely different subject and it cannot be said that ratio of SatyawatiSharma has been affirmed in Super Max.

37. We may now notice judgment of Super Max in some detail.Super Max was case where this Court had occasion to consider BombayRents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. In the aboveH

case, the Government of Maharashtra was in occupation of sixth floorof building which used for housing the Office of the Registrar,Cooperative Societies. The appellant suffered decree of ejectmentpassed by the Court of Small Causes. The decree came to be challengedby civil revision application where the High Court stayed the executionof the decree subject to the condition that the shall depositRs. 5,40,000/- every month which amount was, however, not allowed tobe withdrawn by the appellant. In paragraph 8 this Court noticed:

“8. Of late, orders are coming to this Court where, in casesarising from ejectment proceedings, the High Courts, with viewto strike balance between the competing interests of the landlordand the tenant, pass interim orders asking the tenant to pay to thelandlord or deposit in Court, as monthly rent, certain sum fixed byit (that, according to the High Court, should be the reasonablemarket rent for the tenanted premises), far in excess of the existingmonthly rent.”

38. Three-Judge Bench in the above case noticed both thejudgments in Gian Devi Anand and Satyawati Sharma. The judgmentof Satyawati Sharma specifically paragraphs 12, 29 and 32 have beenconsidered in paragraphs 67 to 70 of the judgment which are as follows:

“67. The way this Court has been looking at the relationshipbetween the landlord and the tenant in the past and the shift in theCourt’s approach in recent times have been examined in somedetail in the decision in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India,(2008) 5 SCC 287. In that decision one of us (Singhvi, J.) speakingfor the Court referred to number of earlier decisions of theCourt and (in para 12 of the judgment) observed as follows: (SCCpp. 304-05)

“12. Before proceeding further we consider it necessary toobserve that there has been definite shift in the Court’sapproach while interpreting the rent control legislations. Ananalysis of the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicatethat in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour ofan interpretation which would benefit the tenant—MohinderKumar v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 221,Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T.N. (1987) 4 SCC 238, D.C.Bhatia v. Union of India, (1995) 1 SCC 104 and C.N.

Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan, (1998) 8 SCC 275.In these and other cases, the Court consistently held that theparamount object of every rent control legislation is to providesafeguards for tenants against exploitation by landlords whoseek to take undue advantage of the pressing need foraccommodation of large number of people looking for houseon rent for residence or business in the background of acutescarcity thereof. However, different trend is clearly discerniblein the later judgments.”

68. The learned Judge then referred to some later decisions and(in para 14 at SCC p. 306 of the judgment) quoted passage fromthe decision in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5SCC 397 to the following effect: (Joginder Pal case, SCC p.404, para 9)

“14. … ‘9. … The courts have to adopt reasonable andbalanced approach while interpreting rent controllegislations starting with an assumption that an equaltreatment has been meted out to both the sections of thesociety. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour ofthe tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as totake care of the interest of the landlord the court shouldnot hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Suchprovisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to takecare of those situations where the landlords too are weakand feeble and feel humble.’ “

(emphasis in original)

69. Commenting upon the Full Bench decision of the Delhi HighCourt that had upheld the constitutional validity of Section 14(1)(e)of the Delhi Rent Control Act and that came under challenge inSatyawati Sharma, Singhvi, J. (in para 29 of the judgment)observed as follows: (SCC p. 318)

“29. … It is significant to note that the Full Bench did not, atall, advert to the question whether the reason/cause whichsupplied rationale to the classification continued to subsist evenafter lapse of 44 years and whether the tenants of premises letfor non-residential purposes should continue to avail the benefitof implicit exemption from eviction in the case of bona fide

requirement of the landlord despite see-saw change in thehousing scenario in Delhi and substantial increase in theavailability of buildings and premises which could be let fornon-residential or commercial purposes.”

70. The decision in Satyawati Sharma then referred to the doctrineof temporal reasonableness and in para 32 observed as follows:(SCC p. 320)

“32. It is trite to say that legislation which may be quitereasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may withthe lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances becomearbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equalityand even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheldat given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation,strike down the same if it is found that the rationale ofclassification has become non-existent.”

39. The ratio which was quoted by three-Judge Bench fromSatyawati Sharma was that which was laid down in paragraph 32 ofthe Satyawati Sharma case. The ratio in Satyawati Sharma that aLegislation which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of itsenactment may with the lapse of time and due to change of circumstancesbecome arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equalityhas been affirmed which is clear from paragraph 71 of the judgment.Paragraph 71 of three-Judge Bench judgment is as follows:

“71. We reaffirm the views expressed in Satyawati Sharmaand emphasise the need for more balanced and objectiveapproach to the relationship between the landlord and tenant. Thisis not to say that the Court should lean in favour of the landlordbut merely that there is no longer any room for the assumptionthat all tenants, as class, are in dire circumstances and indesperate need of the Court’s protection under all circumstances.(The case of the present appellant who is in occupation of anarea of 9000 sq ft in building situate at Fort, Mumbai on rentalof Rs 5236.58, plus water charges at the rate of Rs 515.35 permonth more than amply highlights the point.)”

40. It is true that in the above three-Judge Bench judgment, theCourt was not directly concerned with Section 14(1)(e) of the DelhiRent Control Act. Thus, three-Judge Bench had the basis of Satyawati

ASharma and on which basis Section 14(1)(e) was struck down afterworking of the Act after more than 50 years. We, thus, are of the viewthat three-Judge Bench in Super Max approved limited ratio of SatyawatiSharma as extracted by three-Judge Bench which fully supports thesubmission that basis and reasoning on which Satyawati Sharma struckdown Section 14(1)(e) partly stood on firm footing.B

Question No.2

41 We having rejected the submission of learned counsel for theappellant that the judgment of Satyawati Sharma is per incuriam.Whether there is any ground or basis on which the judgment of SatyawatiCSharma can be referred for re-consideration is the next question to beanswered.

42. Learned counsel for the appellant has not referred to anyjudgment of this Court which has sounded different note or which hastaken contrary view to what has held in Satyawati Sharma case.DWhat is emphasised by the learned counsel for the appellant is, that asthe Legislature has never intended to apply Section 14(1)(e)forcommercial premises which was clear from legislative intendment,Satyawati Sharma could not have taken view which is contrary to thelegislative intendment. By noticing the three-Judge Bench judgment inSuper Max, we have already noticed that three-Bench has reaffirmedEratio of Satyawati Sharma that the Legislation which was quitereasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may with the lapseof time and due to change of circumstances become arbitrary,unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equality. Various judgmentpertaining to Rent Control Legislations have been referred to and reliedFin Satyawati Sharma itself. Satyawati Sharma also dealt with thereasons which were given by the Delhi High court in upholding Section14(1)(e) in paragraph 31 of the judgment. Satyawati Sharma observedfollowing in paragraph 31:

“31. In H.C. Sharma vs. Life Insurance Corporation of IndiaG(supra), the Division Bench of the High Court, after takingcognizance of the acute problem of housing created due to partitionof the country, upheld the classification by observing that theGovernment could legitimately restrict the right of the landlord torecover possession of only those premises which were let forresidential purposes. The Court felt that if such restriction was

not imposed, those up-rooted from Pakistan may not get settled intheir life. As of now period of almost 50 years has elapsed fromthe enactment of the 1958 Act. During this long span of timemuch water has flown down the Ganges. Those who came fromWest Pakistan as refugees and even their next generations havesettled down in different parts of the country, more particularly inPunjab, Haryana, Delhi and surrounding areas. They are occupyingprime positions in political and bureaucratic set up of theGovernment and have earned huge wealth in different trades,occupation, business and similar ventures. Not only this, theavailability of buildings and premises which can be let for non-residential or commercial purposes has substantially increased.Therefore, the reason/cause which prompted the Division Benchof the High Court to sustain the differentiation/classification ofthe premises with reference to the purpose of their user, is nolonger available for negating the challenge to Section 14(1)(e) onthe ground of violation of Article 14 of the Constitution, and wecannot uphold such arbitrary classification ignoring the ratio ofHarbilas Rai Bansal vs. State of Punjab(supra), which wasreiterated in Joginder Pal vs. Naval Kishore Behal(supra) andapproved by three- Judges Bench in RakeshVij vs. Dr. RaminderPal Singh Sethi (supra). In our considered view, the discriminationwhich was latent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of1958 Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years) hasbecome so pronounced that the impugned provision cannot betreated intra vires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying anyrational criteria.”

43. The judgment of this Court with regard to Rent ControlLegislation, namely, 1986 (3) SCC 385 and Malpe Vishwanath Acharyaand others vs. State of Maharashtra and another, (1998) 2 SCC 1,has been referred to and relied by Satyawati Sharma. In MalpeVishwanath Acharya, three-Judge Bench of this Court laid downfollowing in paragraphs 8 and 31:

“8. There is considerable judicial authority in support of thesubmission of learned counsel for the appellants that with thepassage of time legislation which was justified when enactedmay become arbitrary and unreasonable with the change incircumstances. In the State of M.P. v. Bhopal Sugar Industries

Ltd., AIR 1964 SC 1179, dealing with question whethergeographical classification due to historical reasons would be validthis Court at SCR p. 853 observed as follows:

“Differential treatment arising out of the application of the lawsso continued in different regions of the same reorganised State,did not therefore immediately attract the clause of theConstitution prohibiting discrimination. But by the passage oftime, considerations of necessity and expediency would beobliterated, and the grounds which justified classification ofgeographical regions for historical reasons may cease to bevalid. purely temporary provision which because of compellingforces justified differential treatment when the ReorganisationAct was enacted cannot obviously be permitted to assumepermanency, so as to perpetuate that treatment without arational basis to support it after the initial expediency andnecessity have disappeared.”

31. Taking all the facts and circumstances into consideration wehave no doubt that the existing provisions of the Bombay RentAct relating to the determination and fixation of the standard rentcan no longer be considered to be reasonable. The said provisionswould have been struck down as having now becomeunreasonable and arbitrary but we think it is not necessary tostrike down the same in view of the fact that the present extendedperiod of the Bombay Rent Act comes to an end on 31-3-1998.The Government’s thinking reflected in various documents itselfshows that the existing provisions have now become unreasonableand, therefore, require reconsideration. The new bill is underconsideration and we leave it to the legislature to frame just andfair law keeping in view the interests of all concerned and inparticular the resolution of the State Ministers for Housing of 1992and the National Model Law which has been circulated by theCentral Government in 1992. We are not expressing any opinionon the provisions of the said Model Law but as the same has beendrafted and circulated amongst all the States after due deliberationand thought, there will, perhaps, have to be very good and compellingreasons in departing from the said Model Law. Mr Nargolkarassured us that this Model Law will be taken into consideration inthe framing of the proposed new Rent Control Act.”

44. The above principles have been reiterated in followingjudgments:

(i) Anuj Garg and Others Vs. Hotel Association of India andOthers, (2008) 3 SCC 1 reiterated the principle that statute althoughcould have been held to be valid piece of legislation keeping in viewthe societal condition of those times, but with the changes occurringtherein, such law can also be declared invalid. In Paragraph Nos. 7, 8and 9, following has been laid down:-

“7. The Act is pre-constitutional legislation. Although it is savedin terms of Article 372 of the Constitution, challenge to its validityon the touchstone of Articles 14, 15 and 19 of the Constitution ofIndia, is permissible in law. While embarking on the questionsraised, it may be pertinent to know that statute although couldhave been held to be valid piece of legislation keeping in viewthe societal condition of those times, but with the changes occurringtherein both in the domestic as also in international arena, such alaw can also be declared invalid.8. In John Vallamattom v. Union of India, (2003) 6 SCC 611,this Court, while referring to an amendment made in UK in relationto provision which was in pari materia with Section 118 of theIndian Succession Act, observed: (SCC p. 624, para 28)

“28. … The constitutionality of provision, it is trite, will haveto be judged keeping in view the interpretative changes of thestatute affected by passage of time.”

Referring to the changing legal scenario and having regard tothe Declaration on the Right to Development adopted by the WorldConference on Human Rights as also Article 18 of the UnitedNations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966, it was held:(John Vallamattom case, SCC p. 625, para 33)

“33. It is trite that having regard to Article 13(1) of theConstitution, the constitutionality of the impugned legislation isrequired to be considered on the basis of laws existing on 26-1-1950, but while doing so the court is not precluded from takinginto consideration the subsequent events which have taken placethereafter. It is further trite that the law although may beconstitutional when enacted but with passage of time the same

may be held to be unconstitutional in view of the changedsituation.”

9. Changed social psyche and expectations are important factorsto be considered in the upkeep of law. Decision on relevance willbe more often function of time we are operating in. Primacy toBsuch transformation in constitutional rights analysis would not be

out of place……………………………….

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx”

(ii) In Saradamani Kandappan Vs. S. Rajalakshmi & Ors.,(2011) 12 SCC 18, Justice R.V. Raveendran speaking for the Courtreiterated the same principles in paragraph Nos. 38 and 39 in the followingwords:-

“38. It is now well settled that laws, which may be reasonableand valid when made, can, with passage of time and consequentialchange in circumstances, become arbitrary and unreasonable. InRattan Arya v. State of T.N.7this Court held: (SCC pp. 389-90,para 4)

“4. … We must also observe here that whatever justificationthere may have been in 1973 when Section 30(ii) was amendedby imposing ceiling of Rs 400 on rent payable by tenants ofresidential buildings to entitle them to seek the protection ofthe Act, the passage of time has made the ceiling utterlyunreal. We are entitled to take judicial notice of the enormousmultifold increase of rents throughout the country, particularlyin urban areas. It is common knowledge today that theaccommodation which one could have possibly got for Rs 400per month in 1973 will today cost at least five times more. Inthese days of universal, day-to-day escalation of rentals anyceiling such as that imposed by Section 30(ii) in 1973 can onlybe considered to be totally artificial and irrelevant today. Asheld by this Court in Motor General Traders v. State of A.P.8aprovision which was perfectly valid at the commencementof the Act could be challenged later on the ground ofunconstitutionality and struck down on that basis. Whatwas once perfectly valid legislation, may in course oftime, become discriminatory and liable to challenge on theground of its being violative of Article 14.”

(emphasis supplied)

39. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya v. State of Maharashtra,(1998) 2 SCC 1, three-Judge Bench of this Court consideredthe validity of determination of standard rent by freezing or peggingdown the rent as on 1-9-1940 or as on the date of first letting,under Sections 5(10)(b), 7, 9(2)(b) and 12(3) of the Bombay Rents,Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947. This Courtheld that the said process of determination under the Act, whichwas reasonable when the law was made, became arbitrary andunreasonable in view of constant escalation of prices due toinflation and corresponding rise (sic fall) in money value with thepassage of time. This Court held: (SCC pp. 22-23, paras 29 & 31)“29. Insofar as social legislation, like the Rent Control Act isconcerned, the law must strike balance between rival interestsand it should try to be just to all. The law ought not to be unjustto one and give disproportionate benefit or protection toanother section of the society. When there is shortage ofaccommodation it is desirable, nay, necessary that someprotection should be given to the tenants in order to ensurethat they are not exploited. At the same time such law has tobe revised periodically so as to ensure that disproportionatelylarger benefit than the one which was intended is not given tothe tenants…….

31. Taking all the facts and circumstances into considerationwe have no doubt that the existing provisions of the BombayRent Act relating to the determination and fixation of thestandard rent can no longer be considered to be reasonable.”

It is relevant to note that Justice Raveendran has placed relianceon earlier judgments of this Court in Rattan Arya Vs. State of TamilNadu (supra) and Malpe Vishwanath Acharya (supra), whichjudgments have already been referred to and relied by this Court inSatyawati Sharma’s case. Thus, the proposition, which was laid downin Satyawati Sharma’s case relying on above two judgments have againbeen reiterated by this Court in Sardarmani Kandappan (supra) inParagraph Nos. 38 and 39, as noted above.

(iii) The Constitution Bench of this Court in Modern DentalCollege and Research Centre and Others Vs. State of Madhya

APradesh andOthers, (2016) 7 SCC 353, speaking through Dr. JusticeA.K. Sikri in paragraph Nos. 69 and 92, following has been observed:-

“69. ………………………………………It is rightly said thatthe law is not an Eden of concepts but rather an everyday life ofneeds, interests and the values that given society seeks to realiseBin given time. The law is tool which is intended to providesolutions for the problems of human being in society.

92. ………………………………Law is not static, it has tochange with changing times and changing social/societalconditions.”

45. Much emphasis has been given by the learned counsel for theappellant on the fact that various tenants are tenants of small shopswhich are their source of livelihood when application under 14(1)(e)filed by the landlord on bona fide need, they are not even entitled tocontest the application by filing written statement. They are obliged toDobtain leave to defend as per Section 25B which leave to defend isrejected in most of the cases which causes great hardship on the tenants.It is submitted that in so far as applicability of the procedure under Section25B is concerned, the issue needs to be revisited to save the tenantsfrom hardship. In our view this cannot be ground for referring thejudgment of Satyawati Sharma to larger Bench for reconsideration ofEjudgment of Satyawati Sharma. Satyawati Sharma having not saidabout the procedure, there is nothing in the judgment which needs to berevisited on the above aspect. It is for the Legislature to take stock ofsituation and if it so decides it can make necessary changes in theprocedure for considering the application under Section 14(1)(e) withFregard to eviction of commercial tenants on the ground of bona fideneed of the land lord. We need to add nothing more on the subject. Insofaras submission of the learned counsel for the appellant is that underSection 14(1)(e) in respect of commercial tenancy leave to defend isgenerally rejected, it is suffice to say that rejection of leave for particularcase is matter to be examined in each case and no general observationGcan be made in this regard.

46. There is one more aspect of the matter which needs to benoted. We have already extracted observation of Constitution Benchjudgment in Gian Devi Anand in paragraph 39 where the ConstitutionBench observed that bona fide need of the landlord stands very much onH

the same footing in regard to either class of premises, residential orcommercial. We, therefore, suggest that Legislature may consider theadvisability of making the bona fide requirement of the landlord groundof eviction in respect of commercial premises as well. After more thana decade of the above observation, comprehensive Legislation, namely,Delhi Rent Act, 1995 has been enacted to provide for the regulation ofrents, repairs and maintenance and evictions relating to premises and ofrates of hotels and lodging houses in the National Capital Territory ofDelhi. In Act, 1995 the definition of premises as was contained in Act,1958 remained same. With regard to protection of tenant against evictiona new Section 22(r) which provides as follows:

“Section 22(r) that the premises let for residential or non-residential purposes are required, whether in the same form orafter re-construction or re-building, by the landlord for occupationfor residential or non-residential purpose for himself or for anymember of his family if he is the owner thereof, or for any personfor whose benefit the premises are held and that the landlord orsuch person has no other reasonably suitable accommodation:

Provided that where the landlord has acquired the premisesby transfer, no application for the recovery of possession of suchpremises shall lie under this clause unless period of three yearshas elapsed from the date of the acquisition:

Provided further that where an order for the recovery ofpossession of any premises is made on the ground specified inthis clause, the landlord shall be entitled to obtain possession thereofon the expiration of period of six months in the case of residentialpremises and one year in the case of non-residential premisesfrom the date of passing of eviction order.”

47. We may notice another three-Judge Bench judgment of thisCourt, i.e., Subramanian Swamy and others vs. Raju throughMember, Juvenile Justice Board and another, (2014) 8 SCC 390.This Court in the above judgment laid down that reading down theprovisions of statute cannot be resorted to when the meaning thereofis plain and unambiguous and the legislative intent is clear. We need tonotice the issues raised in the above case and the ratio of the judgment.Above was case where lady of 23 years in age in moving bus wasbrutally assaulted sexually and physically. The lady succumbed to her

Ainjuries. Five persons were apprehended in connection with the crime.The respondent, Raju was below 18 years of age on the date ofcommission of the crime. His case was referred for inquiry to the JuvenileJustice Board. The other accused were tried in regular Sessions Courtand have been found guilty of the offences under Section 376(2)(g) andSection 302 of the Penal Code. Other accused were sentenced to death,Bappeal against which was dismissed by the High court. The petitionershad filed applications for impleadment before the Juvenile Justice Board.The case of the petitioners was that on proper interpretation of the Act(Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000), theJuvenile(respondent) was not entitled to the benefits under the Act butCwas liable to be tried under the penal law of the land in regular criminalcourt along with the other accused.48. writ petition was also filed in the High Court praying for anauthoritative interpretation of Sections 2(l) and 2(k) of the Act that thecriterion of 18 years set out therein does not comprehend cases of graveDoffences in general and of heinous crimes against women in particularthat shakes the root of humanity in general. The writ petition wasdismissed by the High Court holding that against the order of the JuvenileJustice Board the alternative remedies were available under the Actwhich should be first exhausted. The prayer for impleadment of thepetitioners was also rejected.E

49. Special Leave Petition against the above judgment of theHigh Court as well as writ petition was filed in this Court. The submissionsof petitioners were noted by this Court. In paragraphs 59 and 60 thisCourt noticed the submissions made on behalf of the petitioner as below:

F“59. Dr. Swamy at the outset has urged that there is no attempton his part to challenge the constitutional validity of the Act,particularly, the provisions contained in Sections 2(k) and 2(l) ofthe Act and what he seeks is mere reading down of the Act……

60. Dr. Swamy would urge that the relevant provisions of the ActGi.e. Sections 1(4), 2(k), 2(l) and 7 must be read to mean thatjuveniles (children below the age of 18) who are intellectually,emotionally and mentally mature enough to understand theimplications of their acts and who have committed serious crimesdo not come under the purview of the Act. Such juveniles areliable to be dealt with under the penal law of the country and by

the regular hierarchy of courts under the criminal justice systemadministered in India……”

50. This Court in the background of the above submissions laiddown following in paragraph 61:

“61. Reading down the provisions of statute cannot be resortedto when the meaning thereof is plain and unambiguous and thelegislative intent is clear. The fundamental principle of the “readingdown” doctrine can be summarized as follows. Courts must readthe legislation literally in the first instance. If on such reading andunderstanding the vice of unconstitutionality is attracted, the courtsmust explore whether there has been an unintended legislativeomission. If such an intendment can be reasonably implied withoutundertaking what, unmistakably, would be legislative exercise,the Act may be read down to save it from unconstitutionality. Theabove is fairly well established and well accepted principle ofinterpretation which having been reiterated by this Court time andagain would obviate the necessity of any recall of the huge numberof precedents available except, perhaps, the view of Sawant, J.(majority view) in Delhi Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. MazdoorCongress and Ors. 1991 Supp. (1) SCC 600 which succinctlysums up the position is, therefore, extracted below: (SCC pp.728-29, para 255)

“255. It is thus clear that the doctrine of reading down or ofrecasting the statute can be applied in limited situations. It isessentially used, firstly, for saving statute from being struckdown on account of its unconstitutionality. It is an extension ofthe principle that when two interpretations are possible—onerendering it constitutional and the other making itunconstitutional, the former should be preferred. Theunconstitutionality may spring from either the incompetenceof the legislature to enact the statute or from its violation ofany of the provisions of the Constitution. The second situationwhich summons its aid is where the provisions of the statuteare vague and ambiguous and it is possible to gather theintentions of the legislature from the object of the statute, thecontext in which the provision occurs and the purpose for whichit is made. However, when the provision is cast in definiteand unambiguous language and its intention is clear, it is not

Apermissible either to mend or bend it even if such recasting isin accord with good reason and conscience. In suchcircumstances, it is not possible for the court to remake thestatute. Its only duty is to strike it down and leave it to thelegislature if it so desires, to amend it. What is further, if theremaking of the statute by the courts is to lead to its distortionBthat course is to be scrupulously avoided. One of the situationsfurther where the doctrine can never be called into play iswhere the statute requires extensive additions and deletions.Not only it is no part of the court’s duty to undertake suchexercise, but it is beyond its jurisdiction to do so.””

51. Rejecting the submission of the petitioner to read down thestatute following was held in paragraph 64:

“64.If the provisions of the Act clearly indicate the legislative intentin the light of the country’s international commitments and thesame is in conformity with the constitutional requirements, it isDnot necessary for the Court to understand the legislation in anyother manner. In fact, if the Act is plainly read and understood,which we must do, the resultant effect thereof is wholly consistentwith Article 14. The Act, therefore, need not be read down, assuggested, to save it from the vice of unconstitutionality for suchEunconstitutionality does not exist.”

52. Now reverting to the judgment of this Court in SatyawatiSharma (supra), in the said judgment this Court did not read down theprovision of Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act. This Courtheld that Section 14(1)(e) is not intra vires the doctrine of equalityFenshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution. In paragraph 31 followingwas laid down:

“31………In our considered view, the discrimination which waslatent in Section 14(1)(e) at the time of enactment of the 1958Act has, with the passage of time (almost 50 years), become soGpronounced that the impugned provision cannot be treated intravires Article 14 of the Constitution by applying any rational criteria.”

53. After considering all aspects of the matter, this Court inSatyawati Sharma (AIR 2008 SC 3148) held that Section 14(1)(e) isviolative of the doctrine of equality embodied in Article 14 of the

Constitution. This Court, thus, struck down the discriminatory portion ofSection 14(1)(e). In paragraphs 38 and 39 following was laid down:

“38. In view of the above discussion, we hold that Section 14(1)(e)of the 1958 Act is violative of the doctrine of equality embodied inArticle 14 of the Constitution of India insofar as it discriminatesbetween the premises let for residential and non-residentialpurposes when the same are required bona fide by the landlordfor occupation for himself or for any member of his familydependent on him and restricts the latter’s right to seek evictionof the tenant from the premises let for residential purposes only.”

39. However, the aforesaid declaration should not bemisunderstood as total striking down of Section 14(1)(e) of the1958 Act because it is neither the pleaded case of the parties northe learned Counsel argued that Section 14(1)(e) is unconstitutionalin its entirety and we feel that ends of justice will be met by strikingdown the discriminatory portion of Section 14(1)(e)…”

54. The judgment of Satyawati Sharma was, thus, not case ofreading down of Section 14(1)(e) rather it was case where portion ofSection 14(1)(e) was struck down as discriminatory and violative ofArticle 14 of the Constitution. Thus, three-Judge Bench judgment inSubramanian Swamy and others (supra) is clearly distinguishable anddoes not affect the ratio laid down by two-Judge Bench judgment inSatyawati Sharma case.

55. The Legislature itself notices the need for providing groundfor eviction to landlord on bona fide need with regard to residential aswell as non-residential premises. Thus, what was said in Gian Devi Anandin paragraph 39 was duly accepted by Legislature. It is another matterthat Delhi Rent Act, 1995 even though it received assent of the Presidentcould not be enforced. Section 1(3) provided that it shall come into forceon such date as the Central Government may, by notification in theOfficial Gazette, appoint. Central Government did not issue any notificationin the Official Gazette for enforcement of the Act. Writ Petition wasfiled in Delhi High Court for issuance of mandamus to Central Governmentto enforce Act, 1995 which was dismissed. From the above, it is clearthat what was observed by Gian Devi Anand was also accepted by theLegislature in providing for eviction from both the residential and non-

Aresidential premises on the ground of bona fide need in Act, 1995.Although, said Act could not be enforced, the Legislation is completewhen the Act is passed by the Legislature and receives the assent of thePresident.

56. Constitution Bench in State of Kerala and others vs.BMar Appraem Kuri Company Limited and another, (2012) 7 SCC106, laid down following in paragraphs 50 and 51:

“50. Broadly speaking, law-making is exclusively the functionof the legislatures (see Articles 79 and 168). The President andthe Governor are part of the Union or the legislatures of theStates. As far as Parliament is concerned, the legislative processis complete as soon as the procedure prescribed by Article 107 ofthe Constitution and connected provisions are followed and theBill passed by both the Houses of Parliament has received theassent of the President under Article 111. Similarly, Statelegislation becomes an Act as soon as Bill has been passed bythe State Legislature and it has received the assent of the Governorin accordance with Article 200. It is only in the situationcontemplated by Article 254(2) that State legislation is requiredto be reserved for consideration and assent by the President. Thus,irrespective of the date of enforcement of parliamentary or Stateenactment, Bill becomes an Act and comes on the statute bookimmediately on receiving the assent of the President or theGovernor, as the case may be, which assent has got to be publishedin the Official Gazette.

51. The legislature, in exercise of its legislative power, may eitherenforce an Act, which has been passed and which has receivedthe assent of the President or the Governor, as the case may be,from specified date or leave it to some designated authority tofix date for its enforcement. Such legislations are conditionallegislations as in such cases no part of the legislative function isleft unexercised. In such legislations, merely because the legislaturehas postponed the enforcement of the Act, it does not mean thatthe law has not been made.”

57. The above authority duly supports our view that law has beenmade by the Parliament in enacting Act, 1995 which accepts thesuggestion of Constitution Bench in Gian Devi Anand and hence whathas been held by Satyawati Sharma was felt both by this Court andLegislature. We, thus, do not find any good ground to refer the judgmentof this Court in Satyawati Sharma for reconsideration by larger Bench.We, thus, reject the submission of the learned counsel for the appellantthat Satyawati Sharma needs to be referred to larger Bench forreconsideration.

58. We having decided the above issue let the appeals be nowlisted for consideration on merits.