BALWAN SINGH versus THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ANR.

[2019] 11 S.C.R. 1

BALWAN SINGH

THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH AND ANR.

(Criminal Appeal No. 727 of 2015)

AUGUST 06, 2019

[N. V. RAMANA, MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR ANDAJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: s.120-B and ss.148, 302/149– Case of theprosecution that on account of previous enmity with the victim-deceased, the appellant was talking with the other accused regardingpreparation to kill him – Their conversation was heard by PW-11and PW-12 – PW-9 and PW-16, who were near the scene of theoccurrence, rushed to the spot after hearing the cries of the victim,and saw all the accused assaulting him with lathis and tabbal– Accusedconvicted u/ss.148, 302/149 –Charges were framed u/s.120-B alsobut, the accused were acquitted in respect of the said offence – Onappeal, held: Statements of the alleged eye witnesses, PW-9 andPW-16 were recorded after eight days of the incident – Prosecutiontried to explain the delay in recording their statement – In normalcourse, the Court would have accepted the explanation offered,but the facts in this case are different – PW-2 admitted that he hadseen PW-9 at the place of the incident when the police had come tothe village after the registration of the FIR – Thus, the IO knew verywell, on the first day itself, that PW-9 was an eye witness – Therewas no reason as to why he did not record the statement of the so-called eye witness at the earliest point of time – Whole story of theprosecution about the presence of PW-9 and PW-16 at the time ofincident appears to be concocted – Prosecution also relied uponthe recovery of bloodstained sticks and tabbal – In the absence ofpositive material indicating that the stained blood was of humanorigin (even though the blood group was not proved because ofdisintegration of blood) and of the same blood group as that of theaccused, it would be difficult to rely upon the aspect of recovery ofthe weapons– Further, all the accused were acquitted for the offenceof conspiracy, which means that there are concurrent findings ofthe courts below that the prosecution failed to prove the aspect ofconspiracy of the accused to commit the murder of the deceased –

AIn view of the material on record which is shaky, suspicion arises inthe mind of the Court about the genesis of the case of the prosecution– Impugned judgments of the Trial Court and the High Court setaside – Appellants to be released forthwith, if not required in anyother case.BCriminal Trial – Delay in recording of the statement of eyewitnesses – When does not raise suspicion – Discussed.

Evidence– Recovery of bloodstained weapon– Burden to bedischarged by the prosecution – Discussed.

Allowing the appeals, the CourtC

HELD: 1.1 Though the incident took place on 22[nd] January,2007, the statements of the alleged eye witnesses, namely, PW-9and PW-16, were recorded after eight days of the incident. Theprosecution tried to explain the delay in recording the statementof the eye witnesses by contending that they were scared of theDaccused, particularly the appellant who was the village Sarpanch(Panchayat Chairman); the appellant was stated to be powerfuland influential; only after some of the accused were arrested,these witnesses came to the village and gave their statements tothe police during the course of investigation. Mere delay inErecording of the statement of the eye witness by the investigatingofficer cannot ipso facto raise suspicion in the mind of the Courtabout the veracity of the prosecution case, more particularly, aboutthe veracity of the eye witnesses. In the normal course, this Courtwould have accepted the explanation offered by the witnesses orthe prosecution for not recording the statements at an earlierFpoint in time, but the facts in this case are different inasmuch asit is admitted by the prosecution witnesses, more particularly bythe investigating officer, that PW-9 was very much present in thevillage. PW-2 had admitted in the cross-examination that he hadseen PW-9 at the place of the incident when the police had comeGto the village after the registration of the First InformationReport. PW-2 is none else but the younger brother of PW-9, andthey were residing separately in one house. Thus, the evidenceof PW-2 cannot be disbelieved insofar as it relates to the presenceof PW-9 in the village, and on the spot when the police had startedHinvestigation. PW-9, being the Patel of the village, could not have

kept the fact about the incident or about the complicity of theaccused from the investigating officer at the first instance, hadhe really been an eye witness to the incident. There was no reasonas to why the investigating officer did not record the statementof the so-called eye witness at the earliest point of time, moreparticularly when, at that point in time, the investigating officerdid not have any clue about the murderers. The story, as putforth by the prosecution, that PW-9 did not tell the investigatingofficer about the presence of PW-16, is not believable. Accordingto PW-16, he came to the village Semaria after eight days, i.e.after the arrest of few accused, and gave the statement to thepolice. [Para 6] [7-D-H; 8-A-E; 9-A-B]1.2 Evidence relating to recovery of bloodstained sticksand tabbal may not be helpful to the prosecution in this caseinasmuch as there is no evidence to show that these articles werestained with human blood, and more particularly with blood ofthe same blood group as that of the deceased. As per the ForensicScience Laboratory Report, the blood stains were disintegrated,and their origin could not be determined. At times, it may bevery difficult for the serologist to detect the origin of the blooddue to the disintegration of the serum, or insufficiency of blood-stains, or haematological changes etc. In such situations, theCourt, using its judicious mind, may deny the benefit of doubt tothe accused, depending on the facts and circumstances of eachcase, if other evidence of the prosecution is credible and ifreasonable doubt does not arise in the mind of the Court aboutthe investigation. It may not always be possible to inextricablylink the bloodstains on the items seized in recovery to the bloodof the deceased, due to the possibility of disintegration ofbloodstains on account of the time-lapse in carrying out therecovery. If the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyondreasonable doubt by the prosecution, and if the investigation wasnot found to be tainted, then it may be sufficient if the prosecutionshows that the blood found on the articles is of human originthough, even though the blood group is not proved because ofdisintegration of blood. The Court will have to come to theconclusion based on the facts and circumstances of each case,and there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to

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Aprove, or need not prove, that the blood groups match. In theinstant case, some reliance could have been placed on therecovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood wasof human origin. The prosecution has tried to concoct the casefrom stage to stage. Hence, in the absence of positive materialBindicating that the stained blood was of human origin and of thesame blood group as that of the accused, it would be difficult forthe Court to rely upon the aspect of recovery of the weapons andtabbal, and such recovery does not help the case of theprosecution. All the accused were acquitted for the offence ofconspiracy, which means that there are concurrent findings ofCboth the courts below that the prosecution has failed to provethe aspect of conspiracy of the accused to commit the murder ofthe deceased. Once the conspiracy to commit the murder of thedeceased is absent, there is no material on record to show as towhy the accused had gathered in the house of the appellant. [ParasD8,9, 12-15] [9-E; 10-E; 12-C-D, F-H; 13-A-C]

1.3 In view of the material which is shaky, suspicion arisesin the mind of the Court about the genesis of the case of theprosecution. The impugned judgments of the Trial Court and theHigh Court are set aside. The appellants are directed to beEreleased forthwith, if not required in any other case. [Para 16][13-D-E]

1.4 The appellants in these appeals are Accused 1, Accused2 and Accused 7. Other accused in S.T. No. 57 of 2010 have notpreferred an appeal. Since in respect of the appellants herein itis found that the prosecution has not proved the charges beyondFreasonable doubt, the benefit of this judgment should also enureto the other accused who were convicted in S.T. No. 57 of 2010.Accordingly, the other accused in S.T. No. 57 of 2010, who havenot preferred appeals before Supreme Court, shall also bereleased forthwith, if not required in any other case. [Para 16]G[13-F-G]

Raghav Prapanna Tripathi & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR1963 SC 74 : [1963] SCR 239 – followed.

Sattatiya v. State of Maharashtra (2008) 3 SCC 210;Shantabai and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 16HSCC 354 : [2008] 3 SCR 713 – relied on.

BALWAN SINGH v. THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH

R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCC 266 : [2013]3 SCR 1172 ; Gura Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001)2 SCC 205 : [2000] 5 Suppl. SCR 408 ; JagroopSingh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11 SCC 768 : [2012]7 SCR 91 ; State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and Others(1999) 3 SCC 507 : [1999] 2 SCR 29 ; John Pandianv. State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu,(2010) 14 SCC 129 ; Prabhu Dayal v. State ofRajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal AppealNo. 727 of 2015.

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.02.2015 of the High Courtof Chhattisgarh, at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 178 of 2011.

With

Criminal Appeal No. 1197 of 2016.

Sanjay Hegde, Sr. Adv., Sarvam Ritam Khare, Ms.ShwetaChaurasia, Pranjal Kishore, Rahul Tomar, Rajeev Kumar Bansal,M. P. Singh, Akshay K.Ghai, Advs. for the Appellant.

Pranav Sachdeva, Ms. Neha Rathi, Jatin Bhardwaj, AbhinavGShrivastava, Rupesh Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.

1. These appeals arise out of the judgment dated 10.02.2015 ofthe High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 178H

Aof 2011 and Criminal Appeal No. 179 of 2011 confirming the judgmentand order of conviction dated 20.01.2011 passed by the AdditionalSessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Pendra Road, District Bilaspur inS.T. No. 57 of 2010 convicting the appellants and other accused foroffences punishable under Sections 148 and 302/149 of the Indian PenalCode (for short, ‘IPC’) and sentencing them accordingly.B

2. The case of the prosecution is that on account of previousenmity with Pitambar Singh (since deceased), the Accused No. 1 –Balwan Singh (appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 727 of 2015), on 22[nd]January, 2007, at evening time, was talking with the other accusedregarding preparation to kill Pitambar Singh. Their conversation wasCheard by Sunderlal Rathore @ Sunder Singh Rathore (PW-11) andShatrughan Singh (PW-12), who were passing through the same place.Further, it was the case of the prosecution that all the accused, armedwith deadly weapons, went towards the field of one Bhagwat Seth andcommitted the murder of Pitambar Singh. PW-9 and PW-16, who wereDnear the scene of the occurrence, rushed to the spot after hearing thecries of the injured, and saw all the accused assaulting the deceasedwith lathis and tabbal (an agriculture implement made up of iron). It isstated by PW-9 and PW-16 that the tabbal was held by the AccusedNo. 4, namely, Ashok Singh. The injured died instantaneously and theaccused fled away.E

The dead body was seen by one Drupad Singh (PW-1) at 7 o’clockthe next morning, who in turn informed Nar Singh Rajput (PW-17), theinformant. Thereafter, Drupad Singh and Nar Singh Rajput together wentto the place where the dead body was lying, and saw that PitambarSingh was murdered. The deceased was the uncle of the informant.F

3. The Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court, believingthe testimonies of PW-9 and PW-16 who were the eye witnesses of theincident, and the testimonies of PW-11 and PW-12 who deposed aboutthe conspiracy to commit the murder of the deceased, convicted theaccused for the offences punishable under Sections 148 and 302/149GIPC. It is pertinent to state that although charge was also framed underSection 120-B IPC, the accused were acquitted in respect of the saidoffence.

4. Shri Sanjay Hegde, learned senior counsel appearing for theappellant Balwan Singh, and Shri Rajeev Kumar Bansal, learned counselHappearing for appellants Latel Ram and Santu @ Santram, drew the

attention of the Court to the relevant portions of the depositions of theimportant witnesses, and submitted that the prosecution had planted theeye witnesses, namely, PW-9 and PW-16 for the purpose of prosecutingthe accused, though these witnesses were not present near the scene ofoccurrence. They contended that the statements of these alleged eyewitnesses were recorded about eight days after the incident in question,though they were very much present in the village or though the policeknew that these witnesses were the alleged eye witnesses of the incident.According to the learned counsel for the appellants, the evidence ofPW-11 and PW-12 is also vague, cryptic, and unreliable inasmuch as thecourts below have acquitted the accused for the offence under Section120-B IPC.

5. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the State arguedin support of the judgments of the courts below.

6. We find from the records that though the incident took place on22[nd] January, 2007, the statements of the alleged eye witnesses, namely,PW-9 and PW-16, were recorded after eight days of the incident. Theprosecution has tried to explain the delay in recording the statement ofthe eye witnesses by contending that they were scared of the accused,particularly Balwan Singh who was the village Sarpanch (PanchayatChairman); the accused Balwan Singh was stated to be powerful andinfluential; only after some of the accused were arrested, these witnessescame to the village and gave their statements to the police during thecourse of investigation; till such time, the eye witnesses PW-9 and PW-16 did not come to the village at all and were staying in different villagesin their relatives’ houses.

We are conscious of the fact that mere delay in recording of thestatement of the eye witness by the investigating officer cannot ipsofacto raise suspicion in the mind of the Court about the veracity of theprosecution case, more particularly, about the veracity of the eyewitnesses. In the normal course, this Court would have accepted theexplanation offered by the witnesses or the prosecution for not recordingthe statements at an earlier point in time, but the facts in this case aredifferent inasmuch as it is admitted by the prosecution witnesses, moreparticularly by the investigating officer, that PW-9 was very much presentin the village. PW-2 and the investigating officer, during the course ofthe investigation, had seen PW-9, being the Patel (Patwari) of the village.PW-2 had admitted in the cross-examination that he had seen PW-9 at

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Athe place of the incident when the police had come to the village afterthe registration of the First Information Report. PW-2 is none else butthe younger brother of PW-9, and they were residing separately in onehouse. Thus, the evidence of PW-2 cannot be disbelieved insofar as itrelates to the presence of PW-9 in the village, and on the spot when thepolice had started investigation. Furthermore, the investigating officerBalso testified that immediately after reaching the village Semaria, wherethe incident took place, he had called the Patel (PW-9). He categoricallyadmitted that he called PW-9 to the place of the occurrence and that he(PW-9) was present during the course of the investigation. PW-9, beingthe Patel of the village, could not have kept the fact about the incident orCabout the complicity of the accused from the investigating officer at thefirst instance, had he really been an eye witness to the incident. Theinvestigating officer had proceeded to depose that, on his own, he hadrecorded the statement of PW-9 on 30.01.2007, which means that PW-9 had not informed the investigating officer that he was an eye witnessto the incident. The investigating officer, on his own accord, had recordedDthe statement of PW-9. It is thus clear that the investigating officerknew very well, on the first day itself, that PW-9 was an eye witness.There was no reason as to why the investigating officer did not recordthe statement of the so-called eye witness at the earliest point of time,more particularly when, at that point in time, the investigating officer didEnot have any clue about the murderers.

PW-9 and PW-16 are close friends, and on the date of the incident,had gone together to see Panthi dance in the village during night, and atthat point in time, both of them heard the cries of the deceased andrushed to the spot and saw the accused committing the murder of theFdeceased. It is also the evidence of PW-9 and PW-16 that the accusedsaw these witnesses at the time of the occurrence of the murder inasmuchas these witnesses told all the accused not to beat/assault the deceased.On hearing such utterance of these witnesses, the accused allegedlytried to chase them, but they fled away from the scene. If this weretrue, then PW-9, who was present at the spot during the course of theGinvestigation on the first day itself, would not have left the policeuninformed about the presence of PW-16 also. It is also relevant to notethat PW-16 is from different village, namely, Kusumkonda, which isstated to be 75 K.M. away from the place of incident, and on the date ofthe incident he had come to the village Semaria where the incident hadHtaken place. The place of work of PW-16 is Takatpur, which is stated to

be 70 K.M. away from Semaria village. It is curious to note that PW-9and PW-16 met on the date of incident after gap of about 15 years,and thereafter went to watch the dance performance. In our consideredopinion, the story, as put forth by the prosecution, that PW-9 did not tellthe investigating officer about the presence of PW-16, is not believable.According to PW-16, he came to the village Semaria after eight days,i.e. after the arrest of few accused, and gave the statement to thepolice.

7. As per the case of the prosecution, Balwan Singh is powerfuland influential person and the eye witnesses were scared of him. It isrelevant to note that even at the time of the recording of the statementsof PW-9 and PW-16 after eight days of the incident, Balwan Singh wasnot arrested. He was arrested after about two months from the recordingof the statements of these witnesses. It is relevant to note that thesewitnesses were not scared of other accused who were arrested. Bethat as it may, we find that the whole story of the prosecution about thepresence of PW-9 and PW-16 on the spot at the time of incident appearsto be artificial and concocted.8. The prosecution also relies upon the evidence relating to recoveryof sticks and tabbal which were bloodstained. Such evidence may notbe helpful to the prosecution in this case inasmuch as there is no evidenceto show that these articles were stained with human blood, and moreparticularly with blood of the same blood group as that of the deceased.As per the Forensic Science Laboratory Report, the blood stains weredisintegrated, and their origin could not be determined.

In Sattatiya v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 3 SCC 210, oneof the crucial factors that had led this Court to reverse the convictionwas that the bloodstains on the items seized in the recovery could not belinked with the blood of the deceased. This factor was treated as aserious lacuna in the case of the prosecution.

Similarly, in Shantabai and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008)16 SCC 354, the bloodstains on some of the clothes seized from theaccused in recovery belonged to different blood group from that of theblood group of bloodstains found on the clothes of the deceased and onthe sample of soil, axe, stones etc. which were taken from the spot bythe investigating officer. As result of this mismatch, it was held thatthis circumstance was not proved against the accused.

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AIt is also important to note the following observations made by aConstitution Bench of this Court in Raghav Prapanna Tripathi & Ors.v. State of U.P., AIR (1963) SC 74:

“21. In this connection, reference may also be made tocircumstances 9 and 10, relating to the recovery of the bloodstainedBearth from the house. The bloodstained earth has not been provedto be stained with human blood. Again, we are of opinion that itwould be far-fetched to conclude from the mere presence ofbloodstained earth that earth was stained with human blood andthat the human blood was of Kamla and Madhusudhan. TheseCcircumstances have, therefore, no evidentiary value.”

(Emphasis supplied)

Therefore, the five-judge bench had ruled that in that case theprosecution needed to prove that the bloodstains found on the earth orthe weapons were of human origin and were of the same blood groupDas that of the deceased.

9. We are also conscious of the fact that, at times, it may be verydifficult for the serologist to detect the origin of the blood due to thedisintegration of the serum, or insufficiency of blood-stains, orhaematological changes etc. In such situations, the Court, using itsEjudicious mind, may deny the benefit of doubt to the accused, dependingon the facts and circumstances of each case, if other evidence of theprosecution is credible and if reasonable doubt does not arise in the mindof the Court about the investigation.

Thus, in the case of R. Shaji v. State of Kerala, (2013) 14 SCCF266, this Court had observed:

“31. failure by the serologist to detect the origin of the blooddue to disintegration of the serum does not mean that the bloodstuck on the axe could not have been human blood at all.Sometimes it is possible, either because the stain is insufficient inGitself, or due to haematological changes and plasmatic coagulation,that serologist may fail to detect the origin of the blood in question.However, in such case, unless the doubt is of reasonabledimension which judicially conscientious mind may entertain withsome objectivity, no benefit can be claimed by the accused in thisHregard. Once the recovery is made in pursuance of disclosure

statement made by the accused, the matching or non-matching ofblood group(s) loses significance.”

Similar observations were made by this Court in the case of GuraSingh v. State of Rajasthan, (2001) 2 SCC 205, wherein it wasobserved that it was not possible to accept the submission made onbehalf of the accused that in the absence of the report regarding theorigin of the blood, the accused could not have been convicted, inasmuchas it was only because of the lapse of time that blood could not beclassified successfully.

In the case of Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 11SCC 768, this Court had ruled that as the recovery was made pursuantto disclosure statement made by the accused, and the serological reporthad found that the blood was of human origin, the non-determination ofthe blood group had lost its significance.

In the case of State of Rajasthan v. Teja Ram and Others,(1999) 3 SCC 507, the Court had observed that the failure of theserologist to detect the origin of the blood, due to disintegration of theserum, did not mean that the blood stuck on the weapon could not havebeen human blood at all. In this context, it was noted that it could not besaid that in all cases where there was failure in detecting the origin ofblood, the circumstance arising from recovery of the weapon wouldstand relegated to disutility. It was thus observed that unless the doubtwas of reasonable dimension which judicially conscientious mindentertained with some objectivity, no benefit could be claimed by theaccused.

10. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that the accusedwould be in disadvantageous position in case if the aforementioneddictum laid down by this Court in the cases of R. Shaji (supra), GuraSingh (supra), Jagroop Singh (supra) and Teja Ram (supra) relatingto the blood-stains is applied in each and every case. Non-confirmationof blood-group or origin of the blood may assume importance in caseswhere the accused pleads defence or alleges mala fides on the part ofthe prosecution, or accuses the prosecution of fabricating the evidenceto wrongly implicate him in the commission of the crime.

11. In the case of John Pandian v. State Represented byInspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, (2010) 14 SCC 129, this Court, on

Afacts, observed that the evidence of recovery of weapons was credible.The Forensic Science Report (FSL) report had disclosed that the bloodwas of human origin. The Court proceeded to conclude that since theevidence of recovery of weapon was proved to the satisfaction of theCourt, it was sufficient that the prosecution had proved that the bloodstainswere of human origin, even though the blood group could not beBascertained.

12. The cases discussed above highlight the burden that theprosecution would ordinarily have to discharge, depending on the otherfacts and circumstances of the case, for the evidence relating to recoveryto be considered against the accused. At the same time, as mentionedCabove, we are conscious of the fact that it may not always be possible toinextricably link the bloodstains on the items seized in recovery to theblood of the deceased, due to the possibility of disintegration of bloodstainson account of the time-lapse in carrying out the recovery. For this reason,in Prabhu Dayal v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 8 SCC 127, whereDone of us (Mohan M. Shantanagoudar J.) had the occasion to author thejudgment, this Court, relying on Teja Ram (supra), had held that thefailure to determine the blood group of the bloodstains collected fromthe scene of offence would not prove fatal to the case of the prosecution.In Prabhu Dayal case (supra), although the FSL report could notdetermine the blood group of the bloodstains on account of disintegration,Ethe report clearly disclosed that the bloodstains were of human origin,and the chain of circumstantial evidence was completed by the testimoniesof the other witnesses as well as the reports submitted by the BallisticExpert and the Forensic Science Laboratory regarding the weapon usedto commit murder.F13. From the aforementioned discussion, we can summarise thatif the recovery of bloodstained articles is proved beyond reasonable doubtby the prosecution, and if the investigation was not found to be tainted,then it may be sufficient if the prosecution shows that the blood found onthe articles is of human origin though, even though the blood group is notGproved because of disintegration of blood. The Court will have to cometo the conclusion based on the facts and circumstances of each case,and there cannot be any fixed formula that the prosecution has to prove,or need not prove, that the blood groups match.

14. In the instant case, then, we could have placed some relianceHon the recovery, had the prosecution at least proved that the blood was

of human origin. As observed supra, while discussing the evidence ofPWs 9 and 16, the prosecution has tried to concoct the case from stageto stage. Hence, in the absence of positive material indicating that thestained blood was of human origin and of the same blood group as thatof the accused, it would be difficult for the Court to rely upon the aspectof recovery of the weapons and tabbal, and such recovery does nothelp the case of the prosecution.

15. What remains is the evidence of PW-11 and PW-12, whohave deposed about the preparation of conspiracy of the accused tocommit the murder of the deceased. As mentioned earlier, all the accusedwere acquitted for the offence of conspiracy, which means that thereare concurrent findings of both the courts below that the prosecutionhas failed to prove the aspect of conspiracy of the accused to committhe murder of the deceased. Once the conspiracy to commit the murderof the deceased is absent, there is no material on record to show as towhy the accused had gathered in the house of Balwan Singh.

16. In view of the above material which is shaky, suspicion arisesin the mind of the Court about the genesis of the case of the prosecution.In our considered opinion, the Trial Court and the High Court were notjustified in relying upon the evidence of the eye witnesses as well as ofPW-11 and PW-12. Similarly, their reliance on the aspect of recoverywas also not justified, for the reasons mentioned earlier.

Accordingly, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgmentsof the Trial Court and the High Court are set aside. The appellants aredirected to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

We find that the appellants in these appeals are Accused 1,Accused 2 and Accused 7. Other accused in S.T. No. 57 of 2010 havenot preferred an appeal. Since in respect of the appellants herein wefind that the prosecution has not proved the charges beyond reasonabledoubt, the benefit of this judgment should also enure to the other accusedwho were convicted in S.T. No. 57 of 2010. Accordingly, the other accusedin S.T. No. 57 of 2010, who have not preferred appeals before thisCourt, shall also be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.

Divya Pandey

Appeals allowed.