UNIVERSITY OF DELHI versus UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

[2019] 16 S.C.R. 1259

UNIVERSITY OF DELHI

UNION OF INDIA & ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 9488-9489 of 2019)

DECEMBER 17, 2019

[R. BANUMATHI, A. S. BOPANNA ANDHRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]

Delay/Laches:

Writ petition – By Delhi University – Challenging change inuse of the land acquired for Delhi Metro Rail project – Petitiondismissed on the ground of delay and laches – Letters Patentappeal filed after delay of 916 days – Division Bench dismissedthe appeal, on the ground of delay refusing to condone the delay– Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: In the facts of the case, theexplanation for the inordinate delay is not convincing as the sameis not reasonable – Considering the accrued right of the oppositeparty, condonation of such delay would be contrary to publicinterest – Therefore, writ petition as well as LPA were rightlydismissed on the ground of delay.

Condonation of delay – Criteria for – Held: By and large aliberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation ofdelay – Consideration for condonation of delay would not dependon the status of the party such as Government or the public body– Condonaton of long delay should not be automatic – Whileconsidering condonation of delay, routine explanation is notenough, but it should be in the nature of indicating ‘sufficientcause’ to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop ofeach case.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. By and large, liberal approach is to be takenin the matter of condonation of delay. The consideration forcondonation of delay would not depend on the status of the partynamely the Government or the public bodies so as to apply adifferent yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be torender even-handed justice to the parties. Even in such casethe condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the

Aaccrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite partyis also to be kept in perspective. In that background whileconsidering condonation of delay, the routine explanation wouldnot be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating“sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on thebackdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully byBthe Courts based on the fact situation.[Para 20] [1274-H; 1275-A-C]

2. The delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916days and as such the consideration to condone can be made onlyif there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannotCbe merely because the appellant is public body. The entireexplanation, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law oflimitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apartwhen there is such long delay and there is no properexplanation, laches would also come into play while noticing asto the manner in which party has proceeded before filing anDappeal. In addition, there was delay and laches in filing the writpetition itself at the first instance from which the present appealhad arisen. [Para 21] [1275-E-F]3. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916days is twofold, i.e. the non-availability of the Vice- ChancellorEdue to retirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice-Chancellor, also that the matter was placed before the ExecutiveCouncil and decision was taken to file the appeal and the saidprocess had caused the delay. The reasons, as stated, do notappear very convincing since the situation was of availing theappellate remedy and not the original proceedings requiring suchFdeliberation when it was mere continuation of the proceedingswhich had already been filed on behalf of the appellant, after duedeliberation. Significantly, the Vice-Chancellor who was at thehelm of affairs when the writ petition was filed, prosecuted anddisposed of on 27.04.2015 was available in the same office tillG28.10.2015, for about six months which was long enough periodas compared to 30 days limitation period for filing appeal. In thatcircumstance when the said Vice-Chancellor who had prosecutedthe writ petition was available, the submission of the appellantthat unseen hands are likely to have prevented the filing of theappeal also cannot be accepted. Secondly, the reason sought toHbe put forth about the decision required to be taken by the

Executive Council is also not acceptable when it was just thematter of filing the appeal. In fact, in the writ petition an affidavitwas filed referring to Resolution No.56 and 173 of AcademicCouncil and Executive Council authorising for filing writpetition. When the writ petition was filed based on suchauthorisation and the stand of the appellant, as the writ petitionerwas put forth and had failed in the writ petition, it cannot beaccepted that the appellant with all the wherewithal was unableto file the appeal, that too when the same Vice-Chancellor wasavailable for six months after dismissal of the writ petition.Hence the reasons put forth cannot constitute sufficient cause.[Para 22] [1275-H; 1276-A-E]

4. That apart, the approval from the Executive Council wasobtained on 28.02.2017 / 07.03.2017, the appeal was ultimatelyfiled on 01.03.2018 after an year from the said date which onlyindicates the casual approach which is now sought to beovercome with the plea of public interest despite there beingno explanation for the delay at every stage. It is true that everyday’s delay need not be explained with such precision but thefact remains that reasonable and acceptable explanation is verymuch necessary. [Para 23] [1276-F-G]

5. In the present matter, the land was converted toresidential use in 2005 and Respondent No.11 – DMRC hadinvited bids and public auction was conducted on 28.07.2008which ought to have awakened the appellant for the first timesince the fact of conversion of the land into residentialdevelopment was in public domain even if is assumed that theearlier process of approval etc. by the DDA on the approvalrequest of DMRC are internal process and not be known to theappellant. [Para 26] [1277-E]

6. Despite the writ petition having been filed belatedly inrespect of certain actions which had commenced in the year 2005and even though the writ petition was filed after obtainingapproval of the Executive Council, no steps were taken to filethe writ appeal for 916 days after disposal of the writ petition.In such circumstance, the cumulative effect of the delay andlaches cannot be ignored. [Para 27] [1277-G-H; 1278-A]

7. Though contention is put forth that the delay is requiredto be condoned since public interest is involved, the nature of

Athe proceedings that have taken place thus far would indicatethat the matter has been examined at different stages in theearlier litigations and if the grounds on which the appellant wasassailing the action of the respondents were to be examined onmerits, they ought to have been more diligent in prosecutingthe matter before the Court. [Para 27] [1278-B-C]

8. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, thewell accepted position is also that the accrued right of theopposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. In that regard, ratherthan taking note of the hardship that would be caused torespondent No.13, what is necessary to be taken note is theCmanner in which respondent No.11 – DMRC has proceeded inthe matter. The respondent No.11-DMRC is engaged inproviding the public transport and for the said purpose theGovernment through policy decision has granted approval togenerate resources through property development and in thatDregard the development is taken up. Pursuant thereto therespondent No.11 has received sum of Rs.218.20 crores fromrespondent No.13 as far back as in the year 2008. The saidamount as indicated is used for its projects providing metro railservice to the commuting public. In such circumstance, if at thisstage the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of theElackadaisical manner in which the appellant has proceeded in thematter, it would also be contrary to public interest. [Para 28][1278-D-F]

9. Therefore, not only the Single Judge was justified inholding that the writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and lachesFbut the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPAon the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and theorders do not call for interference. [Para 29] [1278-F-G]

Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Katiji& Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107 : [1987] 2 SCR 387 ; M/sGDehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. DistrictBoard, Bhojpur & Ors. (1992) 2 SCC 598 : [1992] 2SCR 155 – distinguished.

Postmaster General & Ors. v. Living Media IndiaLimited & Anr. (1992) 3 SCC 563 ; Adil Singh v. UnionHof India (2010) 171 DLT 748 – referred to.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 9488-9489 of 2019.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.10.2018 of the HighCourt of Delhi at New Delhi in C.M. No. 8654 of 2018 in L.P.A. No.89 of 2018.

Tushar Mehta, SG, A.N.S. Nadkarni, ASG, Mohan Parasaran,Ramji Srinivasan, Aman Sinha, Shyam Divan, Gurukrishna Kumar,R. Venkataramani, Ms. Meenakshi Arora, Sr. Advs., Mohinder Rupal,Prasanna S., Anurag Ojha, Vishnu Kumar, Shantanu Singh, PraveshThakur, Ms. Nupoor Sinha, Goutham Shivshankar Tarun Johri, S.S.Rebella, Ms. Aakanksha Kaul, D.L. Chidananda, Prabudh Singh, ArvindKumar Sharma, Raj Bahadur, Mahesh Agarwal, Abhinav Agrawal,Anirudh Bhatia, Rohan Talwar, E. C. Agrawala, Ms. Binu Tamta,Praveen Swarup, Smarhar Singh, Ashutosh Thakur, Advs. for theappearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

A. S. BOPANNA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals have been preferred by the appellant-Universityof Delhi through its Registrar to challenge the common judgment andorder dated 29.10.2018 whereby, the High Court of Delhi declined tocondone the delay of 916 days in filing the appeal to challenge thejudgment dated 27.04.2015 whereunder, the learned Single Judge haddismissed the W.P (C) No.2743/2012 filed by the University of Delhi.

3. The challenge in the writ petition was, inter alia, to thedecision dated 12.5.2011 of the Delhi Development Authority(hereinafter referred to as the, “DDA” for short) who had allowedrespondent no.13-M/s Young Builders (P) Ltd. to construct high-risemultistory group housing society in the control zone of Zone-C in theUniversity campus, without any height restriction. The construction

Apermission was allowed on the plot leased out to the Delhi Metro RailCorporation (hereinafter referred to as the, “DMRC” for short) bypermitting segregation of 2 hectares as separate entity from the total3 hectares of land, acquired for the metro station.

4. The principal contentions of the appellant-University on theBmerits of the challenge were as follows:

a) the permission sought by Respondent No. 13 (namely,M/s Young Builders Private Limited) for the proposedconstruction of group housing society on the landoriginally owned by the Ministry of Defence in theUniversity enclave is violative of the MPD-2021 and isagainst the larger public interest, given the fact that theproject site in question and its vicinity are within theNorth Campus of the University and that it containsvarious historical and archaeological buildings, apartfrom it being the centre of higher education andadvanced learning; and

b) the change in the character of the subject land isimpermissible in law, since the land having been acquiredfor public purpose for construction of the metro railproject, has suddenly been diverted to privatecommercial use and auctioned to private builder forEbuilding group housing society in manner contraryto the purpose and charter of incorporation of the DelhiMetro Rail Corporation (DMRC)

c) The restriction on certain developments for Metro Stationprescribed under Master Plan of Delhi – 2021 (‘MPD’for short) was also contention raised by the writpetitioner which imposed ban on construction of high-rise buildings in the control zone of the Delhi University.The location of various ladies’ hostels of the Universityin close vicinity of the proposed construction site washighlighted as an important privacy concern. Theimpediment to access of thousands of students, teachersat the entrance of the University was the other maincontention raised in the writ petition.

5. On the other hand, the DMRC had projected that afterconstruction of the University Metro Station, 2 hectares of landHremained surplus and the housing project was intended to generate

revenue for the DMRC as per the policy of the Government. The formalapplication made to the authorities for change of land use and approvalsecured for conversion of the land for residential use, was alsohighlighted by the DMRC.

6. The learned Single Judge having noticed the entire sequencerefused to entertain the writ petition of the University including on theground of delay and laches. In the judgment dated 27.04.2015 the Courthowever observed that DDA is the master of the formulation andimplementation of the Master Plan and, necessary approvals have beentaken from various statutory authorities for the housing project. It wasalso observed that the change in the land use from “public” to“residential” is permissible by adverting to the Delhi High Court’sDivision Bench Judgment in Adil Singh vs. Union of India (2010) 171DLT 748. According to the Writ court, since it was policy decisiontaken by the Government body and since the appellant-University hasfailed to demonstrate any illegality, impropriety, mala fide in the decisionmaking by the authority, interference of the Court with the policydecision, would not be justified.7. It is the case of the appellant that following the dismissal ofthe writ petition and being concerned about the future use of the subjectland, the University Authorities constituted Committee to recommendthe appropriate course of action to be taken by the University. TheCommittee’s report furnished on 11.11.2016 is stated to have been laidbefore the Executive Council of the University and after dueconsideration of the report and the judgment of the learned Single Judge,the Executive Council of the University through their resolution dated28.02.2017/07.03.2017 decided to prefer an intra-Court Appeal in theHigh Court.

8. While the above deliberations were on, accessibility concernto the University’s Metro Station area was raised under the Rights ofPersons with Disabilities Act, 2016 by persons with disabilities. TheUniversity also received report on preventive measures to be takenin the accident-prone area of the Metro Station. With these and otherprojection, the appeal in LPA No.89/2018 came to be filed on 01.03.2018after delay of 916 days, together with the C.M.No.8654/2018 forcondonation of delay in filing the appeal.

9. The delay of 916 days caused in preferring the Appeal wasexplained in the application seeking delay condonation and the rejoinderto the reply to said application to the following effect;

(i) Non-convening of Executive Council and delayoccasioned due to non-availability of Vice-Chancellor.The case in the present LPA is different from otherroutine litigation preferred or contested by the appellant.It is the only case where, the approval from theExecutive Council of the University of Delhi wasrequired to be taken and before such approval, variousdeliberations preceded so as to appraise the ExecutiveCouncil of the different shades of the subject matter.Being statutory body, an adherence to the just methodof decision making requires consultations with affecteddepartments of the University itself and therefore, thefinal say in the matter rests with the Executive Councilwhich is constituted under Section 21 of the DelhiUniversity Act, 1922. The Council includes the seniormost Deans, democratically elected representatives ofteachers, the Visitor’s nominee, the Registrar, and theVice-Chancellor.

(ii) The judgment of learned Single Judge was sent by theCounsel representing the University quite late and it was,then, place before the Legal Cell of the University forexamining the matter. After going through thevoluminous paper book, it was opined that the matterbe referred to the Vice-Chancellor for consideration andpursuant thereto, meeting was held, wherein it wasdecided that the matter needs to be dealt withholistically, having regard to all the issues decided andconnotations thereof. The issue could not be taken upfor consideration as the post of Vice- Chancellor hadfallen vacant w.e.f. 28.10.2015 and could be consideredonly after the new Vice-Chancellor had assumed officeand taken stock of things. On 10.03.2016, the newVice-Chancellor joined the office and in order to ensuredemocratic functioning of the University, he decided toconstitute Committee comprising of senior facultypersons representing different sections of the University.The terms of reference of the Five-member Committeewere, to recommend the course of action to theUniversity in the light of the dismissal of the Writ Petitionfiled by the University in the DMRC matter.(iii) On 11.11.2016, the above constituted Committee gaveits Report.Based on the Report of the five-memberCommittee, it was decided by the Competent Authoritythat the subject matter of the present case be referredto the Executive Council of the University for its finaldecision. In the Executive Council meeting held on28.02.2017, the matter was discussed. The item wasagain discussed in the Executive Council meeting heldon 7.3.2017 (continued meeting), where the membersof the Council referred to the earlier discussions anddecisions of both the Academic Council and theExecutive Council with respect to the same matter andit was decided unanimously to prefer an Appeal againstthe Order of the learned Single Judge dated 27.04.2015after adequate preparation.

(iv) In the meanwhile, reservation was strongly put forth bythe disabled students and faculty in the light of theproposed project by the private builder at the very mainentrance of the University of Delhi. Suchrepresentations were received from individuals as wellas groups which the University had to consider andwere therefore forwarded to the Equal Opportunity Cellfor consideration. The Equal Opportunity Cell, Universityof Delhi, which looks after the welfare of disabledstudents and others, in the light of the new enactmenton the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016,analyzed the probable outcome. After detaileddeliberations, the Equal Opportunity Cell submitted itsReport on 28.04.2017 which was brought to the noticeof Competent Authorities for their consideration. TheReport was considered at various levels of theUniversity including the Office of the Dean, StudentWelfare, the Department of legal affairs, the Office ofthe Proctor, the Engineering Department, and theDepartment of Environmental Studies. Holdingdiscussions and deliberations among these bodies andconsidering their inputs involved further time and itinvolved co-ordination and interaction with variousauthorities and stake holders. All this exercise involveda further period of five to six months before

DEFGH

considered opinion could be generated by the Universityof Delhi. Hence the representations and the Report ofthe Equal Opportunity Cell could be finally consideredby the University of Delhi around the end of year 2017.

(v) In the interregnum, the accidents occurred at ChhatraBMarg in December 2017 led to the need for thepreparation of Report by the Office of the Proctor ofthe University dated 05.02.2018 wherein the Proctorrecommended the area to be declared as accident prone.Both the Reports - one by the Equal Opportunity Celland the other by the Office of Proctor — were sent toCthe Counsel concerned who was holding the brief forthe preparation of the Appeal memorandum.Subsequently legal opinion was sought and the draftappeal and petition was prepared which was thereaftergot vetted and settled by the Senior Counsel. Thefinalized Appeal was thereafter again considered at theDhighest level at the University to take the final decision,which entailed some time. On 01.03.2018, the LPA wasfiled before the Delhi High Court.

10. The above explanation for the delayed filing was howevernot accepted and the Division Bench of the High Court on 29.10.2018Edismissed the LPA on the ground of delay without considering the meritsof the appeal. Thus, aggrieved the appellant-University has filed thisappeal.

11. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel for theappellant submits that the implication of the rejection of the writ petitionFand the LPA without considering the substantial contention raised bythe University on merits would cause grave injury to the publicinstitution. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the UniversityAuthorities have been pursuing the issue with due diligence but decisionhad to be taken after consultation with all the stakeholders and therefore,the delay in preferring the LPA should not be attributed to any inaction,Gmuch less deliberate inaction. The endeavor of the Courts accordingto Shri Parasaran should be to do substantial justice to the parties bydeciding the matters on merits but in the present case, neither thelearned Single Judge nor the Division Bench of the High Court hadconsidered the merit of the contention raised by the appellant-University.Shri Parasaran argues that the expression “sufficient cause” is elasticHenough to enable the courts to apply the law of limitation in meaningful

manner. He also projects that since the builders are yet to start theirconstruction, the delayed filing of the LPA should not have resulted innon-consideration of the contention on merits, as major public interestissues have been raised in the present matter. The learned SeniorCounsel argues that important questions effecting public interest cannotbe defeated on technical objection, inasmuch as the proposed site forconstruction was originally owned by the Defence Ministry and the landwas acquired for public purpose at public expense but is now soughtto be given over to private builder, for profit oriented motive. Thesaid contentions are also supplemented by Shri R. Venkataramani andShri Ramji Srinivasan, learned Senior Advocates.

12. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel representingthe applicants/intervenors submits that six girl hostels are located nearto the project site and if high rise apartments are allowed to beconstructed, the privacy of the hostel residents would be compromised.Ms. Arora also refers to the letter dated 25.10.1943 of the JointSecretary, Government of India, Department of Education addressedto the Chief Commissioner of Delhi conveying the decision of theGovernment of India to ensure that no tall buildings are erected insidethe Delhi University Campus and also the necessity of protectingUniversity area, as an enclave. The Senior Counsel then refers to theZonal Development Plan for Zone-”C” (Civil Lines Zone) of the DDAas approved by the Ministry of Urban Development to point out thatthe authorities have recognized the existence of number of old historicalbuildings of the colonial period within the Delhi University Campus andeffort should be made to convert the Delhi University into an integratedCampus with restriction on tall buildings.

13. Shri Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel for respondentNo.13- M/s Young Builders would at the outset contend that thoughthe learned Senior Counsel for the appellant has referred to the meritsof the case, keeping in view the position that the Division Bench of theHigh Court has dismissed the LPA on the ground of delay and laches,that aspect of the matter would require consideration at the threshold.He would assert that the delay of 916 days is an inordinate delay ofmore than two and half years and in such event the principle ofapplying the usual test for “sufficient cause” would not arise as it isnot merely the number of days requiring condonation but also amountsto laches in filing the writ petition, as well as the LPA. Mere contentionthat the proceedings initiated by the appellant is in public interest wouldnot advance the case inasmuch as the learned Single Judge having

Aadverted to all these aspects has arrived at the conclusion that the petitionsuffers from laches in addition to there being no merit and in suchcircumstance when the LPA was once again delayed by 916 days theDivision Bench was justified in its conclusion. It is pointed out that thesaid delay of 916 days is as against the period of 30 days which isallowed in law for filing the LPA. It is contended that the cause ofBaction if any should be construed on 23.09.2005 when the area wasconverted into residential, but the writ petition was filed only on07.05.2012 and despite the writ petition having been disposed of on27.04.2015 the LPA was filed only on 01.03.2018 after delay of 916days. The reason assigned that decision to file the LPA could not betaken as the office of Vice-Chancellor had fallen vacant also cannotCbe accepted since such vacancy arose only on 28.10.2015 while thewrit petition had already been disposed of on 27.04.2015 and therewas sufficient time to file the LPA if they had the intention to do so.The learned Senior Counsel further refers to the large number of casesthat was filed on behalf of the University during the said period. It isDcontended that while considering condonation of delay the prejudice thatwould be caused to the opposite side is also one of the aspects to beconsidered. If that situation is kept in view, in the instant case therequest for proposal in favour of the respondent No.13 was notified on23.06.2008 and the Letter of Acceptance was issued on 13.08.2008and the lease being for 90 years, already 11 years have passed and byEsuch belated proceedings the project is prejudicially hampered. Therespondent No.13 has already spent Rs.233 crores being the leaseamount paid to the DMRC and also for securing appropriate approvals.It is contended that the respondent No.13 had to face earlier litigationas well which has been taken note by the learned Single Judge and theFrespondent cannot be exposed to such repeated litigations.

14. Shri Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General appearingon behalf of respondent No.11-DMRC, has contended that the Ministryof Urban Development as matter of Policy of the Government ofIndia had permitted the DMRC to generate its own resources throughGproperty development and has accordingly permitted to carry outproperty development on the land transferred to it by the Government.In such event when the DMRC has taken such steps not only in theinstant case but also in several other projects, any interference at thisstage more particularly when there is belated challenge of the presentnature, it would have serious impact on the projects undertaken. ItHwas submitted that due to certain changes affected in the manner in

which the Metro Rail Project was to be implemented there was someexcess land which has been put to use to generate resources for theproject and in that regard when there is contractual relationship withrespondent No.13 if the much belated petition is entertained at this stage,there would be great financial impact which is also loss to the publicexchequer and in such event the public interest would be better servedby not condoning the delay in such matters. Moreover, it is not caseof mere delay in filing the LPA but is serious case of laches. It isalso noticed by the learned Single Judge that the writ petition itself wasfiled after 7-8 years and in such event if the discretionary orders passedin the writ jurisdiction is interfered in the limited jurisdiction of this Court,it would set bad precedent.

15. Shri A.N.S. Nandkarni, learned Additional Solicitor Generalwould also refer to the aspect of delay and laches and supplement thearguments advanced by the learned Solicitor General. He would furthercontend that the Union of India being the owner of the land which wasacquired does not have objection for the project and in such eventinterference at the instance of the appellant herein would not be justified.Ms. Binu Tamta, learned Counsel submitted in support of the contentionsraised by the respondents.

16. Shri Mohan Parasaran, learned Senior Counsel in reply tothe said contention would reiterate the contentions put forth relating tothe explanation of delay and would contend that the conclusion of thelearned Single Judge that the writ petition was hit by laches is fallaciousinasmuch as the respondent No.13 themselves had filed writ petitionraising certain disputes with regard to the limit of FAR through theNotification dated 20.01.2005 and such challenge by the respondentNo.13 had come to an end on 18.05.2011 and the NOC etc. wereobtained subsequently, after which the writ petition was filed by theappellant herein in the year 2012. Hence the delay and laches has beenexplained and it is not case of negligence. It is contended that thestand of the DMRC that it would be put to financial loss cannot beaccepted at this point since the question as to whether they would beliable to pay interest or not are matters which would have to beconsidered in appropriate proceedings. Hence, he contends that theHigh Court ought to have condoned the delay and the matter shouldhave been considered on its merits.

17. Though we have exhaustively referred to the pleadings andthe contentions of the parties, including contentions put forth on merits,the same is only for completeness and to put the matter in perspective

Abefore considering the issue relating to delay and laches. In the instantcase, considering that the Division Bench of the High Court hasdismissed the LPA on the ground of delay of 916 days, that aspect ofthe matter would require consideration at the outset and the facts onmerits is noted to the limited extent to find out whether in thatbackground the public interest would suffer. The learned SeniorBCounsel for the appellant in order to impress upon this Court theprinciple relating to consideration of “sufficient cause” for condonationof delay and the factors that are required to be kept in view, has reliedon the decision in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag& Anr.vs. Katiji & Ors., 1987(2) SCC 107 wherein it is held ashereunder:C

“3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delayby enacting Section 5 [ Any appeal or any application, other thanan application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of theCode of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after theprescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies theDcourt that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appealor making the application within such period.] of the IndianLimitation Act of 1963 in order to enable the courts to dosubstantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”.The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature isadequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in aEmeaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice — thatbeing the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts.It is common knowledge that this Court has been making ajustifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. Butthe message does not appear to have percolated down to all theother courts in the hierarchy. And such liberal approach isFadopted on principle as it is realized that:

“1. Ordinarily litigant does not stand to benefit by lodgingan appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in meritoriousmatter being thrown out at the very threshold and causeof justice being defeated. As against this when delay iscondoned the highest that can happen is that causewould be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not meanthat pedantic approach should be made. Why not everyhour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must

[A. S. BOPANNA, J.]

be applied in rational common-sense pragmaticmanner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations arepitted against each other, cause of substantial justicedeserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claimto have vested right in injustice being done because ofa non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioneddeliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or onaccount of mala fides. litigant does not stand to benefitby resorting to delay. In fact he runs serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not onaccount of its power to legalize injustice on technicalgrounds but because it is capable of removing injusticeand is expected to do so.

Making justice-oriented approach from this perspective, therewas sufficient cause for condoning the delay in the institution ofthe appeal. The fact that it was the “State” which was seekingcondonation and not private party was altogether irrelevant.The doctrine of equality before law demands that all litigants,including the State as litigant, are accorded the same treatmentand the law is administered in an even-handed manner. There isno warrant for according step-motherly treatment when the“State” is the applicant praying for condonation of delay. In factexperience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery(no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by thejudgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inheritedbureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is lessdifficult to understand though more difficult to approve. In anyevent, the State which represents the collective cause of thecommunity, does not deserve litigant-non-grata status. Thecourts therefore have to be informed with the spirit andphilosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation ofthe expression “sufficient cause”. So also the same approach hasto be evidenced in its application to matters at hand with the endin view to do even-handed justice on merits in preference to theapproach which scuttles decision on merits. Turning to the factsof the matter giving rise to the present appeal, we are satisfiedthat sufficient cause exists for the delay. The order of the High

1274SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ACourt dismissing the appeal before it as time-barred, is therefore,set aside. Delay is condoned. And the matter is remitted to theHigh Court. The High Court will now dispose of the appeal onmerits after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to boththe sides.”

B18. Further the decision in the case of M/s Dehri Rohtas LightRailway Company Ltd. Vs. District Board, Bhojpur & Ors. (1992)2 SCC 598 is relied upon, wherein this Court has indicated the real testto determine the delay is that the petitioner should come to Court beforea parallel right is created and that the lapse of time is not attributableto any laches or negligence.

19. The learned Senior Counsel for respondent No.13, on theother hand, has relied upon the decision in the case of PostmasterGeneral & Ors. vs. Living Media India Limited & Anr. 1992 (3)SCC 563 wherein it is held as hereunder:

“28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in matter ofDcondonation of delay when there was no gross negligence ordeliberate inaction or lack of bona fides, liberal concession hasto be adopted to advance substantial justice, we are of the viewthat in the facts and circumstances, the Department cannot takeadvantage of various earlier decisions. The claim on account ofimpersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic methodology ofEmaking several notes cannot be accepted in view of the moderntechnologies being used and available. The law of limitationundoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government.

29. In our view, it is the right time to inform all the governmentbodies, their agencies and instrumentalities that unless they haveFreasonable and acceptable explanation for the delay and therewas bona fide effort, there is no need to accept the usualexplanation that the file was kept pending for several months/years due to considerable degree of procedural red tape in theprocess. The government departments are under specialobligation to ensure that they perform their duties with diligenceGand commitment. Condonation of delay is an exception andshould not be used as an anticipated benefit for the governmentdepartments. The law shelters everyone under the same light andshould not be swirled for the benefit of few.”

20. From consideration of the view taken by this Court throughHthe decisions cited supra the position is clear that, by and large, liberal

approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay. Theconsideration for condonation of delay would not depend on the statusof the party namely the Government or the public bodies so as to applya different yardstick but the ultimate consideration should be to rendereven- handed justice to the parties. Even in such case the condonationof long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or theadverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept inperspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay,the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the natureof indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will dependon the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefullyby the Courts based on the fact situation. In the case of Katiji (Supra)the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept infocus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the considerationtherein was in the background of dismissal of the application seekingcondonation of delay in case where there was delay of four dayspitted against the consideration that was required to be made on meritsregarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 percent.21. As against the same, the delay in the instant facts in filingthe LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can bemade only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannotbe merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanationnoticed above, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law oflimitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart whenthere is such long delay and there is no proper explanation, lacheswould also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which aparty has proceeded before filing an appeal. In addition in the instantfacts not only the delay and laches in filing the appeal is contended onbehalf of the respondents seeking dismissal of the instant appeal but itis also contended that there was delay and laches in filing the writpetition itself at the first instance from which the present appeal hadarisen. In that view, it would be necessary for us to advert to thoseaspects of the matter and notice the nature of consideration made inthe writ petition as well as the LPA to arrive at conclusion as towhether the High Court was justified.

22. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916 daysis twofold, i.e. the non-availability of the Vice- Chancellor due toretirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice-Chancellor, alsothat the matter was placed before the Executive Council and decision

Awas taken to file the appeal and the said process had caused the delay.The reasons as stated do not appear very convincing since the situationwas of availing the appellate remedy and not the original proceedingsrequiring such deliberation when it was mere continuation of theproceedings which had already been filed on behalf of the appellantherein, after due deliberation. Significantly, the Vice-Chancellor whoBwas at the helm of affairs when the writ petition was filed, prosecutedand disposed of on 27.04.2015 was available in the same office till28.10.2015, for about six months which was long enough period ascompared to 30 days limitation period for filing appeal. In thatcircumstance when the said Vice-Chancellor who had prosecuted thewrit petition was available, the submission of the learned Senior CounselCfor the appellant that unseen hands are likely to have prevented thefiling of the appeal also cannot be accepted. Secondly, the reasonsought to be put forth about the decision required to be taken by theExecutive Council is also not acceptable when it was just the matterof filing the appeal. In fact, in the writ petition an affidavit was filedDreferring to Resolution No.56 and 173 of Academic Council andExecutive Council authorising for filing writ petition. When the writpetition was filed based on such authorisation and the stand of theappellant, as the writ petitioner was put forth and had failed in the writpetition, it cannot be accepted that the appellant with all the wherewithalwas unable to file the appeal, that too when the same Vice-ChancellorEwas available for six months after dismissal of the writ petition. Hencethe reasons put forth cannot in our opinion constitute sufficient cause.

23. That apart, as rightly noticed by the Division Bench in theLPA, the approval from the Executive Council was obtained on28.02.2017 / 07.03.2017, the appeal was ultimately filed on 01.03.2018Fafter an year from the said date which only indicates the casual approachwhich is now sought to be overcome with the plea of public interestdespite there being no explanation for the delay at every stage. It istrue that as held in the case of Mst. Katiji (supra) that every day’sdelay need not be explained with such precision but the fact remainsthat reasonable and acceptable explanation is very much necessary.GThe Division Bench apart from noticing these aspects had also notedthat the learned Single Judge too found the writ petition to be hit bydelay and laches.24. In that backdrop, perusal of the order dated 27.04.2015passed by the learned Single Judge would indicate that the learned SingleHJudge in para – 65 of the order with reference to his earlier observation

has arrived at the categorical conclusion that the petition suffers fromlaches and has been filed with delay of 7-8 years. The learned SeniorCounsel for the appellant while seeking to dispel such conclusion bythe learned Single Judge contended that the respondent No. 13themselves had filed writ petition being aggrieved by the restrictedFAR and the said writ petition was disposed only on 18.05.2011 andthe need for the appellant herein to file the writ petition arose onlythereafter. The said contention is also not acceptable if the entiresequence is noticed.

25. In that regard there can be no dispute to the fact that theRespondent No. 13 being aggrieved by the decision of DDA had fileda petition bearing W.P. No.3135/2010 assailing the letter dated19.08.2009 and the same was disposed of only on 18.05.2011 but theappellant cannot take shelter under the same to explain the laches. Thisis because much water had flown under the bridge before the saiddevelopment and those events ought to have triggered action from theappellant in challenging, more so when there were other litigationsrelating to the same subject, as noticed in the order of the learned SingleJudge.

26. In the present matter, the land was converted to residentialuse in 2005 and Respondent No.11 – DMRC had invited bids and publicauction was conducted on 28.07.2008 which ought to have awakenedthe appellant herein for the first time since the fact of conversion ofthe land into residential development was in public domain even if isassumed that the earlier process of approval etc. by the DDA on theapproval request of DMRC are internal process and not be known tothe appellant. In fact, the learned Single Judge while taking note ofthe challenge raised by the appellant herein has also taken note of anearlier petition bearing W.P (C) No.8675/2011 filed by the Associationof Metro Commuters wherein also the residential development was anissue, which came to be dismissed by order dated 14.02.2011. Similarly,another petition in W.P(C) No.6624-6625/2012, though challenging theacquisition was filed, the same was also dismissed. Thereafter the writpetition of the appellant filed in the year 2012 was pending till it wasdisposed on 27.04.2015.

27. Despite the writ petition having been filed belatedly in respectof certain actions which had commenced in the year 2005 and eventhough the writ petition was filed after obtaining approval of theExecutive Council, no steps were taken to file the writ appeal for 916days after disposal of the writ petition. In such circumstance, the

Acumulative effect of the delay and laches cannot be ignored. Thedecisions referred by the learned Senior Counsel for the appellant notedSupra cannot, therefore, be applied in the present facts and circumstanceinasmuch as the consideration hereunder was not merely the explanationfor the delay of few days in filing the appeal. Though contention isput forth that the delay is required to be condoned since public interestBis involved, the nature of the proceedings that have taken place thusfar would indicate that the matter has been examined at different stagesin the earlier litigations and if the grounds on which the appellant wasassailing the action of the respondents were to be examined on merits,they ought to have been more diligent in prosecuting the matter beforethe Court.C28. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the wellaccepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite partycannot be lightly dealt with. In that regard, rather than taking note ofthe hardship that would be caused to the respondent No.13 as contendedby the learned Senior Counsel, what is necessary to be taken note isDthe manner in which the respondent No.11 – DMRC has proceeded inthe matter. The respondent No.11- DMRC is engaged in providing thepublic transport and for the said purpose the Government through policydecision has granted approval to generate resources through propertydevelopment and in that regard the development as earlier indicated, istaken up. Pursuant thereto the respondent No.11 has received sumEof Rs.218.20 crores from respondent No.13 as far back as in the year2008. The said amount as indicated is used for its projects providingmetro rail service to the commuting public. In such circumstance, if atthis stage the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the lackadaisicalmanner in which the appellant has proceeded in the matter, it wouldalso be contrary to public interest.F

29. Therefore, taking into consideration all these aspects of thematter, we are of the opinion that not only the learned Single Judgewas justified in holding that the writ petition inter alia is hit by delayand laches but the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPAon the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the orders doGnot call for interference.

30. Accordingly, the appeals being devoid of merits standdismissed with no order as to costs. All pending applications shall standdisposed of.

HKalpana K. Tripathy