RUPALI DEVI versus STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

[2019] 6 S.C.R. 577

RUPALI DEVI

STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.

(Criminal Appeal No. 71 of 2012) APRIL 09, 2019

[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI, L. NAGESWARA RAO AND SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: s.498A – Jurisdiction – Whether in casewhere cruelty had been committed in matrimonial home by thehusband or the relatives of the husband and the wife leaves thematrimonial home and takes shelter in the parental home located ata different place, the courts situated at the place of the parentalhome of the wife have jurisdiction to entertain the complaint unders.498A – Held: In the normal course, it is the court within whoselocal jurisdiction the offence is committed that would have the powerand authority to take cognizance of the offence in question – Unders.179, Cr.P.C., if by reason of the consequences emanating from acriminal act, an offence is occasioned in another jurisdiction, thecourt in that jurisdiction would also be competent to take cognizance

– What is to be really determined is whether the exception carvedout by s.179 Cr.P.C. would have any application to conferjurisdiction in the courts situated in the local area where the parentalhouse of the wife is located – The provisions contained in s.498Aundoubtedly, encompasses both mental as well as the physical well-being of the wife – Even the silence of the wife may have anunderlying element of an emotional distress and mental agony –Her sufferings at the parental home though may be directlyattributable to commission of acts of cruelty by the husband at thematrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be the consequences of theacts committed at the matrimonial home – Such consequences, byitself, would amount to distinct offences committed at the parentalhome where she has taken shelter – The adverse effects on the mentalhealth in the parental home though on account of the acts committedin the matrimonial home would amount to commission of crueltywithin the meaning of s.498A at the parental home – Theconsequences of the cruelty committed at the matrimonial home

Aresults in repeated offences being committed at the parental home –This is the kind of offences contemplated under s.179 Cr.P.C –Therefore, the courts at the place where the wife takes shelter afterleaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account ofacts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would,dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to entertainBa complaint alleging commission of offences under s.498A – Codeof Criminal Procedure, 1973 – ss.177, 178, 179 – Crime againstwomen – Evidence Act, 1972 – s.113A.

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 –Object behind its enactment – discussed.C

Words and phrases: Cruelty – Meaning of – Discussed.

Disposing of the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Section 177 of the Code of Criminal Procedurecontemplates that “every offence shall ordinarily be inquired intoDand tried by Court within whose local jurisdiction it wascommitted”. Therefore, in the normal course, it is the court withinwhose local jurisdiction the offence is committed that would havethe power and authority to take cognizance of the offence inquestion. [Para 6][584-D]E1.2 Section 178 creates an exception to the “ordinary rule”engrafted in Section 177 by permitting the courts in another localarea where the offence is partly committed to take cognizance.Also if the offence committed in one local area continues inanother local area, the courts in the latter place would becompetent to take cognizance of the matter. Under Section 179,Fif by reason of the consequences emanating from criminal actan offence is occasioned in another jurisdiction, the court in thatjurisdiction would also be competent to take cognizance. Thus,if an offence is committed partly in one place and partly in another;or if the offence is continuing offence or where the consequencesGof criminal act result in an offence being committed at anotherplace, the exception to the “ordinary rule” would be attractedand the courts within whose jurisdiction the criminal act iscommitted will cease to have exclusive jurisdiction to try theoffence. [Para 8][585-A-D]

State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi (1972) 2 SCC 890 :[1973] 3 SCR 1004 – relied on.

2. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was introducedby the Criminal Law (second amendment) Act, 1983. In additionto the said amendment in the IPC, the provisions of Sections 174and 176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating toinquiries by police in case of death by suicides and inquiries bymagistrates into cause of such deaths were also amended.Further by an amendment in the first schedule to the Cr.P.C. theoffence under Section 498A was made cognizable and non-bailable.Of considerable significance is the introduction of Section 113Ain the Indian Evidence Act by the Criminal Law (secondamendment) Act, 1983 providing for presumption as to abetmentof suicide by married woman to be drawn if such suicide hadbeen committed within period of seven years from the date ofmarriage of the married woman and she had been subjected tocruelty. The object behind these amendments, undoubtedly, wasto combat the increasing cases of cruelty by the husband and therelatives of the husband on the wife which leads to commissionof suicides or grave injury to the wife besides seeking to dealwith harassment of the wife so as to coerce her or any personrelated to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property, etc.[Paras 12, 13][586-F-H; 587-A; D-E]

3. Cruelty can be both physical or mental cruelty. Theimpact on the mental health of the wife by overt acts on the partof the husband or his relatives; the mental stress and trauma ofbeing driven away from the matrimonial home and herhelplessness to go back to the same home for fear of being illtreated are aspects that cannot be ignored while understandingthe meaning of the expression “cruelty” appearing in Section498A IPC. The emotional distress or psychological effect on thewife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue to traumatizethe wife even after she leaves the matrimonial home and takesshelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of physical crueltycommitted in the matrimonial house may have ceased and suchacts do not occur at the parental home, there can be no doubtthat the mental trauma and the psychological distress cause bythe acts of the husband including verbal exchanges, if any, that

BCDE

Ahad compelled the wife to leave the matrimonial home and takeshelter with her parents would continue to persist at the parentalhome. Mental cruelty borne out of physical cruelty or abusiveand humiliating verbal exchanges would continue in the parentalhome even though there may not be any overt act of physicalcruelty at such place. [Para 14][587-G-H; 588-A-C]

4. The object behind the enactment of the Protection ofWomen from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 is to provide civilremedy to victims of domestic violence as against the remedy incriminal law which is what is provided under Section 498A IPC.The definition of the Domestic Violence in the Act of 2005Ccontemplates harm or injuries that endanger the health, safety,life, limb or well-being, whether mental or physical, as well asemotional abuse. The said definition would certainly have closeconnection with Explanation & to Section 498A, IPC whichdefines cruelty. The provisions contained in Section 498A IPC,Dundoubtedly, encompasses both mental as well as the physicalwell-being of the wife. Her sufferings at the parental home thoughmay be directly attributable to commission of acts of cruelty bythe husband at the matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be theconsequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home.Such consequences, by itself, would amount to distinct offencesEcommitted at the parental home where she has taken shelter.The adverse effects on the mental health in the parental homethough on account of the acts committed in the matrimonial homewould amount to commission of cruelty within the meaning ofSection 498A at the parental home. The consequences of the

Fcruelty committed at the matrimonial home results in repeatedoffences being committed at the parental home. This is the kindof offences contemplated under Section 179 Cr.P.C which wouldsquarely be applicable to the instant case as an answer to thequestion raised. [Para 15][589-D-H; 590-A]

G5. The courts at the place where the wife takes shelter afterleaving or driven away from the matrimonial home on account ofacts of cruelty committed by the husband or his relatives, would,dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction toentertain complaint alleging commission of offences underSection 498A IPC. [Para 16][589-B]H

Y. Abraham Ajith and Others v. Inspector of Police,Chennai and Another (2004) 8 SCC 100 : [2004] 3Suppl. SCR 604 ; Ramesh and Others v. State of TamilNadu (2005) 3 SCC 507 : [2005] 2 SCR 493 ; ManishRatan and Others v. State of Madhya Parade andAnother (2007) 1 SCC 262 : [2006] 8 Suppl. SCR226 ; Amarendu Jyoti and Others v. State of Chhattisgarhand Others (2014) 12 SCC 362 ; Sujata Mukherjee v.Prashant Kumar Mukherjee (1997) 5 SCC 30 :[1997] 3 SCR 1127 ; Sunita Kumari Kashyap v. Stateof Bihar and Another (2011) 11 SCC301 : [2011] 6SCR 83 ; State of M.P. v. Suresh Kaushal & Anr.(2003) 11 SCC 126 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal AppealNo. 71 of 2012

With

Criminal Appeal Nos.619, 620, 621, 622 and 623 of 2012.

From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2011 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Criminal Misc. Writ Petition No. 16456 of2007.

Pramod Swaroop, Sr. Adv., Ajay Kumar Srivastava, Vikrant SinghBais, Ashutosh Dubey, Sandeep Chaudhary, K. Uma Shankar, Ms. ShubhiBhardwaj, Raj Kishor Choudhary, Shakeel Ahmed, Anupam Bhati, AshokKumar Shrivastava, Raj Sharma, Ms. Nidhi Singh Dubey, Ms. Sundri,

AMs. Shalu Sharma, Subhro Sanyal, Mrs. Revathy Raghavan, S. MuthuKrishnan, Mrs. K. Sarada Devi, Amarjeet Singh Dheman, Ms. NidhiDwivedi, Ms. Alka Sinha, Ms. Malvika Trivedi, Anuvrat Sharma, PraveenChaturvedi, Ms. Jyoti Chaturvedi, Ms. Addya. Mishra, Abhinav Mukerji,Ms. Purnima Krishna, Mr. Sunil Kumar Verma, Saju Jakob, Ms. LilyThomas, Abhishek Jaiswal, Gopal Jha, Shreyash Bhardwaj, G. R. Pandey,BShyamal Kumar, Rajesh Kumar Chaurasia, Sunil Kr., Ms. Abha R.Sharma, D. S. Parmar, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Mahendra Singh,Parmanand Gaur, Ekansh Bansal, Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi,B. N. Dubey, Mukesh Kumar, Jatinder Kumar Bhatia, Ashutosh KumarSharma, Ugra Shankar Prasad, Advs. for the appearing parties.

CThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

RANJAN GOGOI, CJI.

1. “Whether woman forced to leave her matrimonial home onaccount of acts and conduct that constitute cruelty can initiate and accessDthe legal process within the jurisdiction of the courts where she is forcedto take shelter with the parents or other family members”. This is theprecise question that arises for determination in this group of appeals.

2. The opinions of this Court on the aforesaid question being sharplydivided, the present reference to larger Bench has been made forEconsideration of the question indicated hereinabove.

(i) Y. Abraham Ajith and Others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and Another (2004) 8 SCC 100.

(ii) Ramesh and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu (2005) 3F SCC 507.

(iii) Manish Ratan and Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh and Another (2007) 1 SCC 262.

(iv) Amarendu Jyoti and Others v. State of ChhattisgarhG and Others (2014) 12 SCC 362.

view has been taken that if on account of cruelty committed toa wife in matrimonial home she takes shelter in the parental home andif no specific act of commission of cruelty in the parental home can beattributed to the husband or his relatives, the initiation of proceedings

under Section 498A in the courts having jurisdiction in the area wherethe parental home is situated will not be permissible. The core fact thatwould be required to be noted in the above cases is that there were noallegations made on behalf of the aggrieved wife that any overt act ofcruelty or harassment had been caused to her at the parental home aftershe had left the matrimonial home. It is in these circumstances that theview had been expressed in the above cases that the offence of crueltyhaving been committed in the matrimonial home the same does not amountto continuing offence committed in the parental home to which placethe aggrieved wife may have later shifted.4. In Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Mukherjee(1997) 5 SCC 30; Sunita Kumari Kashyap v. State of Bihar andAnother (2011) 11 SCC 301 and State of M.P. v. Suresh Kaushal& Anr. (2003) 11 SCC 126 seemingly different view has been taken.However, the said view may appear to be based in the particular factsof each of the cases in question. For instance, in Sujata Mukherjee(Supra) there was specific allegation that the husband, after committingacts of cruelty in the matrimonial home, had also gone to the parentalhouse of the wife where she had taken shelter and had assaulted herthere. On the said facts this court in Sujata Mukherjee (Supra) heldthat the offence is continuing offence under Section 178 (c) of theCr.P.C. In Sunita Kumari Kashyap (Supra), there was an allegation thatthe wife was illtreated by her husband who left her at her parental homeand further that the husband had not made any enquiries about herthereafter. There was further allegation that even when the wife hadtried to contact the husband, he had not responded. In the said facts,this court took the view that the consequences of the offence underSection 498A have occurred at the parental home and, therefore, thecourt at that place would have jurisdiction to take cognizance of theoffence alleged in view of Section 179 of the Cr.P.C. Similarly in Stateof M.P. vs. Suresh Kaushal (Supra) as the miscarriage was causedto the wife at Jabalpur, her parental home, on account of cruelty metedout to her in the matrimonial home, it was held that the court at the placeof the parental home of the wife would have jurisdiction to entertain thecomplaint under Section 179 Cr.P.C.

5. The above two views which the learned referring bench hadconsidered while making the present reference, as already noticed, werefounded on the peculiar facts of the two sets of cases before the Court.

AIt may be possible to sustain both the views in the light of the facts of thecases in which such view was rendered by this court. What confrontsthe court in the present case is however different. Whether in casewhere cruelty had been committed in matrimonial home by the husbandor the relatives of the husband and the wife leaves the matrimonial homeand takes shelter in the parental home located at different place, wouldBthe courts situated at the place of the parental home of the wife havejurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 498A. This is in asituation where no overt act of cruelty or harassment is alleged to havebeen committed by the husband at the parental home where the wifehad taken shelter.

6. look at the provisions of Chapter XIII of the Code of CriminalProcedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C) dealing with the jurisdiction of the CriminalCourt in inquires and trials will now be required. Section 177 of theCode of Criminal Procedure contemplates that “every offence shallordinarily be inquired into and tried by Court within whose localDjurisdiction it was committed”. It is, therefore, clear that in the normalcourse, it is the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence iscommitted that would have the power and authority to take cognizanceof the offence in question.

7. Sections 178 and 179 are exceptions to the above rule and mayEbe set out hereinunder:

“178.Place of inquiry or trial.-

(a) When it is uncertain in which of several local areas an offencewas committed, or

(b) where an offence is committed partly in one local area andFpartly in another, or

(c) where an offence is continuing one, and continues to becommitted in more local areas than one, or

(d) where it consists of several acts done in different local areas,Git may be inquired into or tried by Court having jurisdiction overany of such local areas.”

“179. Offence triable where act is done or consequenceensues.- When an act is an offence by reason of anything whichhas been done and of consequence which has ensued, the offence

may be inquired into or tried by Court within whose localjurisdiction such thing has been done or such consequence hasensued.”

8. Section 178 creates an exception to the “ordinary rule”engrafted in Section 177 by permitting the courts in another local areawhere the offence is partly committed to take cognizance. Also if theoffence committed in one local area continues in another local area, thecourts in the latter place would be competent to take cognizance of thematter. Under Section 179, if by reason of the consequences emanatingfrom criminal act an offence is occasioned in another jurisdiction, thecourt in that jurisdiction would also be competent to take cognizance.Thus, if an offence is committed partly in one place and partly in another;or if the offence is continuing offence or where the consequences of acriminal act result in an offence being committed at another place, theexception to the “ordinary rule” would be attracted and the courts withinwhose jurisdiction the criminal act is committed will cease to haveexclusive jurisdiction to try the offence.

9. At this stage it may also be useful to take note of what can beunderstood to continuing offence. The issue is no longer res integrahaving been answered by this court in State of Bihar v. DeokaranNenshi (1972) 2 SCC 890. Para 5 may be usefully noticed in thisregard.

“5. continuing offence is one which is susceptible of continuanceand is distinguishable from the one which is committed once andfor all. It is one of those offences which arises out of failure toobey or comply with rule or its requirement and which involvesa penalty, the liability for which continues until the rule or itsrequirement is obeyed or complied with. On every occasion thatsuch disobedience or non-compliance occurs and reoccurs, thereis the offence committed. The distinction between the two kindsof offences is between an act or omission which constitutes anoffence once and for all and an act or omission which continues,and therefore, constitutes fresh offence every time or occasionon which it continues. In the case of acontinuing offence,there is thus the ingredient of continuance of the offence which isabsent in the case of an offence which takes place when an actor omission is committed once and for all.”

A10. The question that has posed for an answer has nothing to dowith the provisions of Section 178 (b) or (c). What has to be reallydetermined is whether the exception carved out by Section 179 wouldhave any application to confer jurisdiction in the courts situated in thelocal area where the parental house of the wife is located.

B11. To answer the above question, one will have to look into theStatement of Objects and Reasons of the Criminal Law [2[nd] AmendmentAct, 1983 (Act 46 of 1983)] by which Section 498A was inserted in theIndian Penal Code. The section itself may be noticed in the first instance:

“498A.Husband or relative of husband of womanCsubjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or therelative of the husband of woman, subjects such woman to crueltyshall be pun-ished with imprisonment for term which may extendto three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—D(a)any wilful conduct which is of such nature as is likely todrive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury ordanger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of thewoman; or

(b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with aEview to coercing her or any person related to her to meet anyunlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is onaccount of failure by her or any person related to her to meetsuch demand.”

12. Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code was introduced by theFCriminal Law (second amendment) Act, 1983. In addition to the aforesaidamendment in the Indian Penal Code, the provisions of Sections 174 and176 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 relating to inquiries bypolice in case of death by suicides and inquiries by magistrates into causeof such deaths were also amended. Section 198A was also inserted inthe Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to prosecution of offencesGunder Section 498A. Further by an amendment in the first schedule tothe Cr.PC the offence under Section 498A was made cognizable andnon-bailable. Of considerable significance is the introduction of Section113A in the Indian Evidence Act by the Criminal Law (secondamendment) Act, 1983 providing for presumption as to abetment ofH

suicide by married woman to be drawn if such suicide had beencommitted within period of seven years from the date of marriage ofthe married woman and she had been subjected to cruelty. Section113A is in the following term:

“113-A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by marriedwoman.– When the question is whether the commission of suicideby woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative ofher husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide withina period of seven years from the date of her marriage and thather husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her tocruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the othercircumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted byher husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation.– For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shallhave the same meaning as in section 498-A of the Indian PenalCode (45 of 1860).”

13. The object behind the aforesaid amendment, undoubtedly, wasto combat the increasing cases of cruelty by the husband and the relativesof the husband on the wife which leads to commission of suicides orgrave injury to the wife besides seeking to deal with harassment of thewife so as to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawfuldemand for any property, etc. The above stated object of the amendmentcannot be overlooked while answering the question arising in the presentcase. The judicial endeavour must, therefore, always be to make theprovision of the laws introduced and inserted by the Criminal Laws(second amendment) Act, 1983 more efficacious and effective in viewof the clear purpose behind the introduction of the provisions in question,as already noticed.

14. “Cruelty” which is the crux of the offence under Section 498AIPC is defined in Black’s Law Dictionary to mean “The intentional andmalicious infliction of mental or physical suffering on living creature,esp. human; abusive treatment; outrage (Abuse, inhuman treatment,indignity)”. Cruelty can be both physical or mental cruelty. The impacton the mental health of the wife by overt acts on the part of the husbandor his relatives; the mental stress and trauma of being driven away fromthe matrimonial home and her helplessness to go back to the same homefor fear of being illtreated are aspects that cannot be ignored while

Aunderstanding the meaning of the expression “cruelty” appearing in Section498A of the Indian Penal Code. The emotional distress or psychologicaleffect on the wife, if not the physical injury, is bound to continue totraumatize the wife even after she leaves the matrimonial home andtakes shelter at the parental home. Even if the acts of physicalcrueltycommitted in the matrimonial house may have ceased and such actsdoBnot occur at the parental home, there can be no doubt that the mentaltrauma and the psychological distress cause by the acts of the husbandincluding verbal exchanges, if any, that had compelled the wife to leavethe matrimonial home and take shelter with her parents would continueto persist at the parental home. Mental cruelty borne out of physicalCcruelty or abusive and humiliating verbal exchanges would continue inthe parental home even though there may not be any overt act of physicalcruelty at such place.

15. The Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, asthe object behind its enactment would indicate, is to provide civil remedyDto victims of domestic violence as against the remedy in criminal lawwhich is what is provided under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code.The definition of the Domestic Violence in the Protection of Womenfrom Domestic Violence Act, 2005 contemplates harm or injuries thatendanger the health, safety, life, limb or well-being, whether mental orphysical, as well as emotional abuse. The said definition would certainly,Efor reasons stated above, have close connection with Explanation &B to Section 498A, Indian Penal Code which defines cruelty. Theprovisions contained in Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code,undoubtedly, encompasses both mental as well as the physical well-beingof the wife. Even the silence of the wife may have an underlying elementFof an emotional distress and mental agony. Her sufferings at the parentalhome though may be directly attributable to commission of acts of crueltyby the husband at the matrimonial home would, undoubtedly, be theconsequences of the acts committed at the matrimonial home. Suchconsequences, by itself, would amount to distinctoffences committed at

the parental home where she has taken shelter. The adverse effects onGthe mental health in the parental home though on account of the actscommitted in the matrimonial home would, in our considered view, amountto commission of cruelty within the meaning of Section 498A at theparental home. The consequences of the cruelty committed at thematrimonial home results in repeated offences being committed at theH

RUPALI DEVI v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & ORS.[RANJAN GOGOI, CJI]

parental home. This is the kind of offences contemplated under Section179 Cr.P.C which would squarely be applicable to the present case asan answer to the question raised.

16. We, therefore, hold that the courts at the place where thewife takes shelter after leaving or driven away from the matrimonialhome on account of acts of cruelty committed by the husband or hisrelatives, would, dependent on the factual situation, also have jurisdiction

to entertain complaint alleging commission of offences under Section498A of the Indian Penal Code.

17. All the appeals are disposed of in terms of the above.

Devika Gujral

Appeals disposed of.