SMT. S. VANITHA versus THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU URBAN DISTRICT & ORS.

[2020] 12 S.C.R. 1057

SMT. S. VANITHA

THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU URBANDISTRICT & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 3822 of 2020)

DECEMBER 15, 2020

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD,INDU MALHOTRA AND INDIRA BANERJEE, JJ.]

Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act,2007:

2(b) and 3 – Petition under the Act – By respondent Nos. 2and 3 seeking eviction of their daughter-in-law (appellant) fromtheir house – Plea of appellant that she had been living in the houseas her matrimonial residence and that her husband (respondentNo. 4) had deserted her and their daughter – The authoritiesconcerned directed the appellant to vacate the house – Writ Petition– Single Judge of High Court held that the appellant had no causeof action against respondent Nos. 2 and 3 as they owned the houseand that her right to claim shelter lied only against her husband –Division Bench of High Court affirmed the judgment of Single Judge– Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: The premises in questionconstitute ‘shared household’ within meaning of s. 2(s) ofProtection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – Object of2005 Act is to recognize right of woman to reside in sharedhousehold – Both pieces of legislation are intended to deal withsalutary aspects of public welfare and interest – Both the Acts arespecial Acts – Both sets of legislations have to be harmoniouslyconstrued – The right of woman to secure residence order for ashared household under the 2005 Act cannot be defeated bysecuring an order of eviction under the 2007 Act. The over-ridingeffect for the remedies sought under 2007 Act cannot preclude allother competing remedies under 2005 Act – It would be appropriatefor Tribunal u/s. 2007 Act to grant such remedies of maintenanceas envisaged u/s 2(b) of 2007 Act that do not result in obviatingcompeting remedies under other statutes – The Tribunal under 2007Act should appropriately mould reliefs after noticing competing

Aclaims of the parties claiming under 2005 and 2007 Acts – Theaggrieved woman after obtaining relief for shared household fromthe Tribunal constituted under 2007 Act, is duty bound to informthe Magistrate under 2005 Act as per s.26(3) of 2005 Act – Thiscourse of action would ensure speedy relief to both the groups –Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 – ss. 2(s),B17, 26(3) and 36.

Interpretation of statutes:

Two special Acts – Prevailing effect – Held: Where both theActs contain non-obstante clauses, later Act will prevail – However,Cin the event of conflict between the Special Acts the dominantpurpose of both the statutes have to be analysed to ascertain whichone would prevail over the other – The primary effort of theinterpreter must be to harmonize, not excise.

Definition clause – Interpretation of – Held: Where theDdefinition of an expression adopts ‘means and includes’ stipulation,it is intended to be exhaustive.

Words and Phrases:

‘Shared household’ – Meaning of, in the context of Preventionof Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.E

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. On construing the provisions of sub-Section (2)of section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act 2007, it is evident that itapplies to situation where senior citizen has right to receivemaintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof isFtransferred. The situation in the present case is that the evictionwas sought of the daughter-in-law, i.e. the appellant. The land,where the house has been constructed, was originally purchasedby the son of the applicants who are seeking eviction of theirdaughter-in-law. The son had purchased the property few monthsGbefore his marriage to the appellant. He had subsequentlytransferred the property by registered sale deed to his fatherand the fact that it was for the same consideration after the lapseof several years is of significance. The father, in turn, executed agift deed in favor of his spouse. The appellant has asserted thatshe had been living in the house, as her matrimonial residence,H

until the application was filed. Her spouse has (according to her)deserted her and their minor daughter and left them in the lurch.The electricity to the premises was disconnected for non-paymentof dues. Their daughter has sought admission to an engineeringdegree course however her father- Fourth respondent has notprovided any financial support. The transfers which took placecannot be viewed in isolation from the context of the on-goingmatrimonial dispute which has taken place. [Paras 17 and23][1087-C-D; 1077-E-H; 1078-A]

2.1 The appellant has submitted that the premisesconstitute “shared household” within the meaning of Section2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act,2005 (PWDV Act). The definition of the expression “sharedhousehold” in Section 2(s) uses the familiar legislative formulaof “means and includes” definition. Where the definition of anexpression in an enactment adopts ‘means and includes’stipulation, it is intended to be exhaustive. The ‘means’ part ofthe definition indicates what would normally fall within the ambitof the expression, while the ‘includes’ element gives it anextended meaning. Together they indicate that the legislaturehas provided for an exhaustive enumeration of what falls withinthe ambit of the definition. The use of the expression ‘means’ isintended to make it exhaustive. On the other hand, the use ofthe expression ‘includes’ is intended to make it more extensive.The legislature by using an expression ‘includes’ evinces,notwithstanding the meaning of the phrase, an intention: “toenlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in thebody of the statute”. “Includes” is utilized so as to comprehend:“not only such things as they signify according to their natureand import but also those things which the interpretation clausedeclares that they shall include”. [Para 18][1078-C; 1079-B-C;D-F]

Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice PSingh, Lexis Nexis, 14[th] Ed. Page 197-199 – referredto.

2.2 However, when statutory definition incorporates the‘means and includes’ approach, the intent is to make the definitionexhaustive. The definition of ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s)

Aof the PWDV Act 2005 is exhaustive. The definition of theexpression ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) of the PWDV Actof 2005 is in two parts: in the means part of the definition theexpression ‘shared household’ means (i) household where theperson aggrieved lives in domestic relationship either singlyor along with the respondent or; (ii) At any stage has lived in aBdomestic relationship either singly or along with the respondent.This is followed by an inclusive element, so as to cover such ahousehold (i) whether owned or tenanted either jointly by theaggrieved person and the respondent or (ii) owned or tenantedby either of them in respect of which either the aggrieved personCor the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title orequity. This has also been given an inclusive or extendedmeaning, which extends to household which may belong to thejoint family of which respondent is member, irrespective ofwhether the respondent or the aggrieved person have any right,title or interest in the shared household. The last part of theDinclusive definition is intended to extend the meaning of sharedhousehold to situation where the household in fact belongs to ajoint family, of which the respondent is member. The legislaturehas made it clear that though neither the respondent, nor theaggrieved person in such case may have right, title or interestEin the shared household it would irrespective fall within the ambitof the definition. [Paras 18 and 19][1080-B-C, E-H; 1081-A-B]

Satish Chandra Ahuja v. Sneha Ahuja Civil Appeal No.2483 of 2020, decided on 15 October 2020 – reliedon.

F3.1 Section 36 of the PWDV Act 2005 stipulates that theprovisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogationof, the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.This is intended to ensure that the remedies provided under theenactment are in addition to other remedies and do not displaceGthem. The Maintenance and Welfare of Parents and SeniorCitizens Act 2007 is undoubtedly later Act and Section 3 thereofstipulates that its provisions will have effect, notwithstandinganything inconsistent contained in any other enactment. However,the provisions of Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 giving

it overriding force and effect, would not by themselves beconclusive of an intent to deprive woman who claims right ina shared household, as under the PWDV Act 2005. [Para 20][1082-G-H; 1083-A-C]

3.2 Principles of statutory interpretation dictate that in theevent of two special acts containing non obstante clauses, the laterlaw shall typically prevail. In the present case, the Senior Citizen’sAct 2007 contains non obstante clause. However, in the eventof conflict between special Acts, the dominant purpose of bothstatutes would have to be analyzed to ascertain which one shouldprevail over the other. The primary effort of the interpreter mustbe to harmonize, not excise. In the present case, Section 36 ofthe PWDV Act 2005, albeit not in the nature of non-obstanteclause, has to be construed harmoniously with the non obstanteclause in Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that operatesin separate field. [Para 20][1083-C-D; 1084-B-C]

Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial ServicesLtd., (2001) 3 SCC 71 : [2001] 1 SCR 932; Bank ofIndia v. Ketan Parekh (2008) 8 SCC 148 : [2008] 9SCR 346; Pioneer Urban Land and Infrastructure Ltd.v. Union of India (2019) 8 SCC 416 : [2019] 10 SCR381 – relied on.

3.3 Both pieces of legislation are intended to deal withsalutary aspects of public welfare and interest. The PWDV Act2005 was intended to deal with the problems of domestic violencewhich, as the Statements of Objects and Reasons sets out, “iswidely prevalent but has remained largely invisible in the publicdomain”. The Statements of Objects and Reasons indicates thatwhile Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code created penaloffence out of woman’s subjection to cruelty by her husband orrelative, the civil law did not address its phenomenon in itsentirety. Hence, consistent with the provisions of Articles 14, 15and 21 of the Constitution, Parliament enacted legislation whichwould “provide for remedy under the civil law which is intendedto protect the woman from being victims of domestic violenceand to prevent the occurrence of domestic violence in thesociety”. [Para 21][1084-C-E]

3.4 The object of the legislation of PWDV Act, 2005 is toprovide for and recognize the rights of women to secure housingand to recognize the right of woman to reside in matrimonialhome or shared household, whether or not she has any title orright in the shared household. [Para 21][1085-B-C]

B3.5 Allowing the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to have anoverriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective ofcompeting entitlements of woman to right in sharedhousehold within the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005, would defeatthe object and purpose which the Parliament sought to achievein enacting the latter legislation. The law protecting the interestCof senior citizens is intended to ensure that they are not leftdestitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives. Equally,the purpose of the PWDV Act 2005 cannot be ignored by sleightof statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations have to beharmoniously construed. Hence the right of woman to secure aDresidence order in respect of shared household cannot bedefeated by the simple expedient of securing an order of evictionby adopting the summary procedure under the Senior CitizensAct 2007. [Para 21][1085-G-H; 1086-A-B]

3.6 The Senior Citizens Act 2007 was promulgated with aEview to provide speedy and inexpensive remedy to seniorcitizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted under Section7. These Tribunals have the power to conduct summaryprocedures for inquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts, underSection 8. The jurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitlybarred under Section 27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007. However,Fthe over-riding effect for remedies sought by the applicants underthe Senior Citizens Act 2007 under Section 3, cannot beinterpreted to preclude all other competing remedies andprotections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDV Act2005. The PWDV Act 2005 is also in the nature of specialGlegislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting genderdiscrimination that pans out in the form of social and economicinequities in largely patriarchal society. [Para 22][1086-B-D]

3.7 In deference to the dominant purpose of both thelegislations, it would be appropriate for Tribunal under the

SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURUURBAN DISTRICT

Senior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance,as envisaged under S.2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that donot result in obviating competing remedies under other specialstatutes, such as the PWDV Act 2005. [Para 22][1086-E]

3.8 Section 26 of the PWDV Act empowers certain reliefs,including relief for residence order, to be obtained from anycivil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event thata composite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case wherethe suit premises are site of contestation between two groupsprotected by the law, it would be appropriate for the Tribunalconstituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to appropriatelymould reliefs, after noticing the competing claims of the partiesclaiming under the PWDV Act 2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007.Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007 cannot be deployed toover-ride and nullify other protections in law, particularly that ofa woman’s right to ‘shared household’ under Section 17 of thePWDV Act 2005. In the event that the “aggrieved woman”obtains relief from Tribunal constituted under the SeniorCitizens Act 2007, she shall be duty-bound to inform theMagistrate under the PWDV Act 2005, as per Sub-section (3) ofSection 26 of the PWDV Act 2005. This course of action wouldensure that the common intent of the Senior Citizens Act 2007and the PWDV Act 2005- of ensuring speedy relief to its protectedgroups who are both vulnerable members of the society, iseffectively realized. Rights in law can translate to rights in life,only if there is an equitable ease in obtaining their realization.[Para 22][1086-E-F; 1087-A-C]

3.9 The fact that specific proceedings under the PWDV Act2005 had not been instituted when the application under theSenior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed, should not lead to situationwhere the enforcement of an order of eviction deprives her frompursuing her claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of awoman to access judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies,be consequence of destitution, ignorance or lack of resources.Even otherwise, recourse to the summary procedurecontemplated by the Senior Citizen Act 2007 was not availablefor the purpose of facilitating strategies that are designed to defeat

Athe claim of the appellant in respect of shared household. Ashared household would have to be interpreted to include theresidence where the appellant had been jointly residing with herhusband. Merely because the ownership of the property has beensubsequently transferred to her in-laws (Second and ThirdRespondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth respondent)Bis now residing separately, is no ground to deprive the appellantof the protection that was envisaged under the PWDV Act 2005.[Para 23][1087-G-H; 1088-A-C]

3.10 Therefore, the claim of the appellant that the premisesCconstitute shared household within the meaning of the PWDVAct 2005 would have to be determined by the appropriate forum.The claim cannot simply be obviated by evicting the appellant inexercise of the summary powers entrusted by the Senior CitizensAct 2007. The Second and Third Respondents are at liberty tomake subsequent application under Section 10 of the SeniorDCitizens Act 2007 for alteration of the maintenance allowance,before the appropriate forum. [Para 24][1088-C-E]

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3822Fof 2020.

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.09.2019 of the High Courtof Karnataka at Bengaluru in Writ Appeal No. 2874 of 2019.

GYatish Mohan, E. C. Vidya Sagar, Subhash Chandra Sagar, RajeshMahale, Harisha S.R., Advs. for the appearing parties.

SMT. S. VANITHA v.THE DEPUTY COMMISSIONER, BENGALURU

URBAN DISTRICT

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD, J.

Index

ABackground

BSubmissions

CLegislative scheme: Senior Citizens Act 2007

DA woman’s right of residence: safeguard against domesticviolence

EHarmonising competing reliefs under the PWDV Act 2005Cand Senior Citizens Act 2007

FSummation

Background

1. The present dispute arises out of an application filed by theDSecond and Third respondents against the appellant, who is their daughter-in-law. The Second and Third respondents are the parents of the Fourthrespondent, who is the estranged spouse of the appellant. The Secondand Third respondents filed an application under the provisions of theMaintenance and Welfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act 2007[1],Eand inter alia, sought the appellant and her daughter’s eviction from aresidential house in North Bengaluru[2].2. The Assistant Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner inappeal, allowed the application under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 anddirected the appellant to vacate the suit premises. Aggrieved by thisorder, the appellant unsuccessfully pursued writ proceeding under ArticleF

2. The Assistant Commissioner, and the Deputy Commissioner inappeal, allowed the application under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 anddirected the appellant to vacate the suit premises. Aggrieved by thisorder, the appellant unsuccessfully pursued writ proceeding under Article226 of the Constitution before Single Judge, and in appeal before aDivision Bench of the High Court of Karnataka. The Division Bench byits judgment dated 17 September 2019 held that the suit premises belongedto the mother-in-law (the Second respondent) of the appellant and theremedy of the appellant for maintenance and shelter lies only againsther estranged husband (the Fourth respondent). The Division Benchupheld the Order of the Deputy Commissioner, and directed the appellantto vacate the suit premises before 31 December 2019. Challenging the

1 “Senior Citizens Act 2007”

2 “suit premises”

Ajurisdiction of the authorities[3] to decree her eviction under the SeniorCitizens Act 2007, the appellant has moved this Court under Article 136of the Constitution.

3. The appellant and the Fourth respondent were married on 30May 2002. Soon thereafter, matrimonial dispute arose between theBparties. The appellant alleges that she was harassed for dowry and evencompelled to institute suit for partition against her father in 2003[4] whichshe later withdrew, after her spouse allegedly deserted her to be in arelationship with another woman. The subject matter of the controversyis residential house situated at Gangondonahalli, Dasanapura, Hobli,Bengaluru North Taluk. The land was purchased by the Fourth respondentCon 2 May 2002, few months before the appellant married him. Theappellant alleges that her father had financed portion of this purchase.

4. On 5 October 2006, the Fourth respondent sold the land to hisfather - the Third respondent. The transaction of sale between the fatherand the son was for the same consideration of Rs.1.19 lacs, as was paidDby the Fourth respondent for the original purchase of the property in2002. By then, the appellant and the Fourth respondent had daughter.In 2009, the Fourth respondent instituted petition for divorce[5] underSection 13(1)(ia) and (ib) of Hindu Marriage Act 1955 before the SeniorCivil Judge and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Nelamangala[6]. The Thirdrespondent, following the purchase of the property and after constructingEa house, gifted it to his spouse - the Second respondent, on 19 July 2010.Soon thereafter, on 17 August 2010, the Second respondent instituted asuit against the appellant[7] before the JMFC, Nelamangala seeking apermanent injunction restraining the appellant from interfering with thepossession of the suit property. The suit is pending. On 5 DecemberF2013, the petition for divorce was allowed by the Trial Judge and themarriage between the appellant and the Fourth respondent was dissolved.On 19 March 2014, the appellant instituted proceeding[8] formaintenance. She also filed an appeal before the High Court ofKarnataka[9] against the dissolution of her marriage by the Trial Judge.The proceedings for divorce and maintenance are also pending.G3 The Assistant Commissioner, Bengaluru North Sub-Division at Bengaluru and theDeputy Commissioner, Bengaluru District

4 OS 211 of 2003

5 MC 22 of 2009

6 “Trial Judge”

7 OS 312 of 2010H8 Criminal Miscellaneous 114 of 2014 before the Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), JMFC Nelamangala9 MFA 3968 of 2014

5. In 2015, the Third and Fourth respondents invoked the provisionsof the Senior Citizens Act 2007 by instituting an application before theAssistant Commissioner, Bengaluru North Sub Division. Their son (theFourth respondent) and the appellant were impleaded as respondents tothe petition[10]. The reliefs sought were:

(i) Eviction of the appellant from the suit premises where shewas residing;

(ii) direction to the Fourth respondent to pay an amount ofRs.15,000 to the parents by way of monthly maintenance;and

(iii) direction to the appellant and fourth respondent to pay anamount quantified at Rs. 25,000 towards legal expenses.

The appellant filed an objection to the petition filed under the SeniorCitizens Act 2007, alleging it to be malicious proceeding that wasinstituted with the sole intent to evict her from the suit premises. Theappellant also claimed that the proceedings were collusive in nature andan attempt by the Second and Third respondents and her estranged spouse(the Fourth respondent) to evict her from her matrimonial home. Theappellant specifically raised an objection to the jurisdiction of theauthorities to entertain the proceedings seeking her eviction from thepremises. She submitted that while the Senior Citizens Act 2007 providesfor the maintenance of senior citizen or parent, there is no provisionenvisaging an order of eviction, and that the authorities had no jurisdictionto direct her removal from the premises.

6. The Assistant Commissioner by an Order dated 25 June 2015,held that the residential house was the self-acquired property of theThird respondent which he subsequently gifted to the Second Respondent.The appellant was residing in the property, but was held to have no rightor authority. The appellant’s plea for maintenance could (in the view ofthe Assistant Commissioner) only be raised against the Fourth respondent.Therefore, the Assistant Commissioner allowed the petition by directing(i) the Fourth respondent to pay monthly maintenance of Rs.10,000 tohis parents; and (ii) the appellant to vacate the premises.

7. The appeal filed by the appellant under Section 28 of the HinduMarriage Act 1955 against the decree for dissolution of marriage, was

10 Petition 31 of 2015

Aallowed by Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court on 14 January2016. The High Court set aside the order of the Trial Court and remandedthe proceedings to the jurisdictional Family Court, for passing fresh ordersafter hearing the parties. During the pendency of the appeal, the Fourthrespondent entered into marriage with another woman. On remand,the proceedings for divorce and the application for maintenance areBpending disposal.

8. On 29 February 2016, the Deputy Commissioner, acting as theappellate authority under the Senior Citizens Act 2007, dismissed theappeal filed by the appellant as well as companion appeal by the Fourthrespondent against the order of the Assistant Commissioner. The orderCrequiring the appellant to vacate the suit premises was thereby confirmed.The appellant challenged the order passed by the Deputy Commissionerin proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Single Judgeof the Karnataka High Court, by judgement dated 18 June 2019, heldthat the suit premises have been transferred by the Third respondent toDhis wife - the Second respondent - by registered gift deed dated 19July 2010. The Single Judge noted the contention of the Second andThird respondents that following matrimonial dispute, their son (theFourth respondent) had left the house after which the appellant hadousted them on 12 August 2010 and they are currently living in their“native place”. In light of the fact that the marriage between the appellantEand Fourth respondent had been dissolved by the Trial Judge, the SingleJudge held that the appellant had no right over the suit premises and herclaim for maintenance could only by asserted against the Fourthrespondent. Though, the appellant has specifically questioned thejurisdiction of the authorities under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to orderFher eviction, the Single Judge did not address the submission.

Aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge, the appellantchallenged the order in writ appeal. Once again, it was urged in thecourse of the hearing that the proceedings which were instituted underthe Senior Citizens Act 2007 were only device to oust the appellantGand that the authorities had no jurisdiction to direct her eviction. TheDivision Bench reiterated the views of the Single Judge, and held thatthe appellant had no cause of action against the Second and Thirdrespondents who owned the suit premises. It held that the appellant’sclaim for maintenance and shelter would lie only against the Fourthrespondent. In dealing with the preliminary objection as regards theH

jurisdiction of the Assistant Commissioner to direct eviction, the DivisionBench merely observed that it was not in agreement with the submissionthat “the Assistant Commissioner was powerless to pass an orderdirecting dispossession of the appellant”.

Submissions

9. The appellant, aggrieved by the judgement of the Division Benchof the High Court, has preferred the present special leave petition.Mr Yatish Mohan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellantsubmitted that:

(i)The appellant is residing in her matrimonial home as thelawfully wedded spouse of the Fourth respondent and shecannot be evicted from her shared household, in view ofthe protection offered by Section 17 of the Protection ofWomen from Domestic Violence Act 2005[11];

(ii)The proceeding under Sections 3 and 4 of the Senior CitizensAct 2007 was filed by her mother-in-law and father-in-lawDin connivance with her estranged spouse to deprive her ofher matrimonial home;

(iii)The finding of the Division Bench on the appellant’s currentresidential status was based on fraudulent set up. Thealleged postal cover was dispatched on 21 June 2018, duringthe pendency of the proceedings before the Single Judge,and merely indicated postal endorsement (“no suchperson”) as it arrived when nobody was present at home toreceive it;

(iv)The decree for the dissolution of marriage which was passedagainst the appellant by the Trial Judge on 5 December2013 has been set aside by the High Court on 14 January2016 and the proceedings have been remanded back to thejurisdictional Family Court for disposal afresh. Hence, asof date, the appellant continues to be in lawful relationshipof marriage with the Fourth respondent and she has no otherplace to live except the suit premises, with her minordaughter;

A(v)The provisions of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 have beenmanipulated to defeat the rights of the appellant. The mannerin which the premises were transferred by the spouse ofthe appellant to his father and the gift deed thereafter tomother-in-law of the appellant are indicative of an attemptto misuse the provisions of the Act, to defeat the claims ofBthe appellant; and

(vi)In asserting her right under Section 17 of the PWDV Act2005, the appellant relies on the decision of this Court inSatish Chander Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja[12].In sum andsubstance, it has been urged that the authorities constitutedCunder the Senior Citizens Act 2007 had no jurisdiction toorder the eviction of the appellant. Moreover, theproceedings have been utilised to secure the eviction of theappellant so as to deny her claim of right to reside in theshared household under the PWDV Act 2005.D10. On the other hand, while seeking to rebut the submissions ofthe appellant, Mr Rajesh Mahale, learned Counsel appearing on behalfof the Second and Third respondents submits that:

(i)Both the Second respondent (who is 72 years old) and theThird respondent (who is 82 years old) are senior citizens;

(ii)The suit premises was constructed by the Third respondent-the father-in-law of the appellant, on plot of landadmeasuring 1200 square feet situated in Gangondanahalli,Bengaluru North Taluk. This was subsequently gifted tothe Second respondent, the mother-in-law of the appellant;

(iii)The appellant has been concurrently found to have oustedthe Second and Third respondents from the propertybelonging to them and to have illegally entered intopossession; and

(iv)The Second and Third respondents filed an application underGthe Senior Citizens Act 2007 before the AssistantCommissioner for evicting the appellant and for therestoration of their possession, which has been allowed bythe authorities and the High Court concurrently.

H12 Civil Appeal No. 2483 of 2020, decided on 15 October 2020

11. Dealing with the issue of jurisdiction, Mr Mahale submittedthat

(i)The Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act 2007has the jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders for protectingthe life and property of parents and senior citizens, includingorders of eviction;B

(ii)The intent and object of the Act is to provide for aninexpensive and speedy relief to parents and senior citizens;

(iii)While Chapter II entitles parents and senior citizens to applyfor orders to provide monetary relief for sustenance andCmaintenance, Chapter V contains provisions for protectingthe life and property of parents and senior citizens;

(iv)The Tribunal constituted under the Act has been entrustedto issue orders after summary enquiry, for effectivemaintenance of parents and senior citizens including reliefagainst neglect, harassment and protection of the propertyDof senior citizens;

(v)Section 23 confers two separate and distinct rights:

(a)Section 23(1) empowers the Tribunal to declare atransfer of property by senior citizen void, whereEthe transfer was conditioned upon providing basicamenities and physical needs to senior citizen, wherethe transferee fails to provide them;

(b)Section 23(2) recognises pre-existing right of asenior citizen to receive maintenance out of an estateand secures the right of making it enforceable againsta transferee who had notice of the right;

(vi)The expression “maintenance” in Section 2(b) includesprovision for residence and right to reside can be enforcedby senior citizen, if the property is transferred withoutmaking suitable provision for maintenance; and

(vii)Though the Senior Citizens Act 2007 does not contain anexpress provision enabling the Tribunal to pass evictionorders, the power has to be read within its jurisdiction bynecessary implication. Such an interpretation, it has been

Aurged, would be purposive, in order to effectuate theprovisions of the Act. The contrary view would causehardship to senior citizens who would be powerless, despitebeing forcibly dispossessed of their means of sustenance.Parliament has empowered the State governments toauthorise local authorities to take remedial measures forBprotecting the life and property of senior citizens and it wouldbe incorrect to limit the relief that can be granted by aTribunal only to monetary relief. Relegating senior citizento civil court for the recovery of their property wouldresult in defeating the provisions of the Act. Hence, it hasCbeen urged that such an interpretation should not be adopted.

Legislative scheme: Senior Citizens Act 2007

12. The rival submissions will now be analysed.

13. Our analysis of the rival submissions must begin with explainingDand interpreting the salient feature of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 whichhave bearing on the present controversy. ‘Maintenance’ is defined inan inclusive manner to incorporate, among other things, provisions forfood, clothing, residence, medical assistance and treatment[13]. In definingthe expression ‘property’, the legislation uses broad terminologyencompassing “property of any kind” and to include “rights or interestsEin such property”[14]. Overriding effect is given to the provisions of theenactment by Section 3[15]. Besides the definitions which are comprisedin Chapter I, Chapter II is titled “Maintenance of Parents and SeniorCitizens” while Chapter V is titled “Protection of Life and Property ofSenior Citizen”. The Statement of Objects and Reasons indicates therationale for the enactment of the law:F“Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress onproviding care for the elderly. However, due to withering of thejoint family system, large number of elderly are not being lookedafter by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly

G13 2(b) “maintenance” includes provisions for food, clothing, residence and medicalattendance and treatment

14 2(f) “property” means property of any kind, whether movable or immovable, ancestralor self acquired, tangible or intangible and includes rights or interests in such property;15 3. Act to have overriding effect.—The provisions of this Act shall have effectnotwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any enactment otherthan this Act, or in any instrument having effect by virtue of any enactment other thanHthis Act.

widowed women are now forced to spend their twilight years allalone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physicaland financial support. This clearly reveals that ageing has becomea major social challenge and there is need to give more attentionto the care and protection for the older persons. Though the parentscan claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure,1973, the procedure is both time - consuming as well as expensive.Hence, there is need to have simple, inexpensive and speedyprovisions to claim maintenance for parents.”

Briefly reviewed, Section 4 recognises an entitlement ofmaintenance to inhere in parents and senior citizens. Section 5 lays downthe procedure by which an application for maintenance can be made.Section 6 elucidates provisions governing jurisdiction and procedure.Section 7 contains stipulations for the constitution of MaintenanceTribunal. Section 8 envisages summary procedure for making an inquiry.Section 11 provides for the enforcement of an order of maintenance.

14. senior citizen, including parent, who is unable to maintainthemselves from their own earning or out of property owned by them, isentitled to make an application under Section 4(i). parent or grand-parent may make an application against one or more of their children. Achildless senior citizen can make an application against relative specifiedin Section 2(g). Section 4 recognises corresponding obligation on thepart of the children or relative to maintain senior citizen, extending tosuch needs as would enable them to lead normal life. In the case of arelative, the obligation is if they are in possession of the property of thesenior citizen or would inherit property from them. Hence, in the case ofthe children of senior citizen, the obligation to maintain parent is notconditional on being in possession of property of the senior citizen orupon right of future inheritance[16].

16 4. Maintenance of parents and senior citizens.—(1) senior citizen including parentwho is unable to maintain himself from his own earning or out of the property ownedby him, shall be entitled to make an application under section 5 in case of—(i) parent or grand-parent, against one or more of his children not being minor;(ii) childless senior citizen, against such of his relative referred to in clause (g) ofsection 2.

(2) The obligation of the children or relative, as the case may be, to maintain seniorcitizen extends to the needs of such citizen so that senior citizen may lead normal life.(3) The obligation of the children to maintain his or her parent extends to the needs ofsuch parent either father or mother or both, as the case may be, so that such parent maylead normal life.

A15. The procedure to be followed by Maintenance Tribunal(constituted under Section 7) is of summary nature as provided inSection 8(1) and with all the powers of Civil Court, as provided inSection 8(2)[17]. Under Sub-section (1) of Section 9, where senior citizenis not able to maintain himself or herself and the children or relatives, asthe case may be, neglect or refuse to maintain them, the Tribunal isBempowered to order them to make monthly allowance at such monthlyrate for the maintenance of the senior citizen, as the Tribunal may deemfit[18]. The amount of the monthly allowance can be altered inter aliaupon change in circumstances, under Section 10[19]

16. Of particular relevance to the facts of the case at hand isCChapter V, which enacts provisions for protecting the life and propertyof senior citizen. Section 23 proceeds in the following terms:

(4) Any person being relative of senior citizen and having sufficient means shallmaintain such senior citizen provided he is in possession of the property of suchcitizen or he would inherit the property of such senior citizen:DProvided that where more than one relatives are entitled to inherit the property of asenior citizen, the maintenance shall be payable by such relative in the proportion inwhich they would inherit his property.17 8. Summary procedure in case of inquiry.—

(1)In holding any inquiry under section 5, the Tribunal may, subject to any rules thatmay be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf, follow such summaryEprocedure as it deems fit.(2) The Tribunal shall have all the powers of Civil Court for the purpose of takingevidence on oath and of enforcing the attendance of witnesses and of compelling thediscovery and production of documents and material objects and for such other purposesas may be prescribed; and the Tribunal shall be deemed to be Civil Court for all thepurposes of section 195 and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of 1974F18 9. Order for maintenance.—(1) If children or relatives, as the case may be, neglect or refuse to maintain seniorcitizen being unable to maintain himself, the Tribunal may, on being satisfied of suchneglect or refusal, order such children or relatives to make monthly allowance at suchmonthly rate for the maintenance of such senior citizen, as the Tribunal may deem fitand to pay the same to such senior citizen as the Tribunal may, from time to time,direct.G19 10. Alteration in allowance.—(1) On proof of misrepresentation or mistake of fact or change in the circumstances ofany person, receiving monthly allowance under section 9, for the maintenance orderedunder that section to pay monthly allowance for the maintenance, the Tribunal maymake such alteration, as it thinks fit, in the allowance for the maintenance. (2) Where itappears to the Tribunal that, in consequence of any decision of competent CivilCourt, any order made under section 9 should be cancelled or varied, it shall cancel theorder or, as the case may be, vary the same accordinglyH

“23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances.—(1) Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement ofthis Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property,subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basicamenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and suchtransferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physicalneeds, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have beenmade by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall atthe option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal.(2) Where any senior citizen has right to receive maintenanceout of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred, theright to receive maintenance may be enforced against thetransferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transferis gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration andwithout notice of right.

(3) If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights undersub-sections (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by anyof the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) ofsection 5.”

Sub-section (1) of Section 23 covers situation where propertyhas been transferred after the enactment of the legislation by seniorcitizen (by gift or otherwise) subject to the condition that the transfereemust provide the basic amenities and physical needs to the transferor. Inother words, Sub-section (1) deals with situation where the transfer ofthe property is accompanied by specific condition to provide for themaintenance and needs of senior citizen. In such an event, if thetransferee fails to provide the maintenance and physical needs, thetransfer of the property is deemed to have been vitiated by fraud, coercionor under undue influence. Sub-section 1, in other words, creates deemingfiction of the law where the transfer of the property is subject to acondition and the condition of providing for maintenance and the basicneeds of senior citizen is not fulfilled by the person upon whom theobligation is imposed. Then, at the option of the transferor, the transfercan be declared as void by the Tribunal. On the other hand, Sub-section(2) of Section 23 envisages situation where senior citizen has rightto receive maintenance out of an estate. Where such right exists, theright of maintenance can be enforced where the estate or portion of it,is transferred against transferor who has notice of the right; or if the

Atransfer is gratuitous. The right however cannot be enforced against atransferee for consideration and without notice of the right. Now, Sub-section (1) of Section 23 envisages situation where the transfer ofproperty is by the senior citizen. This is evident from the language ofsub-Section (1) namely “where any senior citizen who, after thecommencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise,Bhis property…”. On the other hand, sub-Section (2) of Section 23 doesnot confine itself to transfer by senior citizen, unlike sub-Section (1).Sub-Section (2) uses the expression “such estate or part thereof istransferred”. Where senior citizen has right to receive maintenanceout of the estate and any part of it is transferred, sub-section 2 permitsCthe enforcement of the right to receive maintenance out of the estateagainst transferee with notice or against gratuitous transferee. Sub-Section (2), in other words, may cover situation where the transfer ofthe estate (in which senior citizen has right to maintenance) is by athird party, in which event, the provision provides the right to enforce theclaim of maintenance against such transferee (other than those transfereesDfor consideration or without notice of the pre-existing right). Arguably,the language of sub-section (2) is broad enough to also cover situationwhere the transfer is by the senior citizen, in which event the transfereewith notice of the right; or gratuitous transferee, can be made subjectto the enforcement of the right against the transferred estate. AnotherEdistinction between sub-Section (1) and sub-Section (2) of Section 23must also be noticed. Under sub-Section (1), where transfer has beenmade by senior citizen subject to the condition that the transferee willprovided for basic amenities or physical needs of the transferor and ifthere is failure of the transferee to fulfil the condition, two consequencesfollow: (i) the transfer of property shall be deemed to have been madeFby fraud or coercion or under undue influence; and (ii) the transfer shall,at the option of the transferor, be declared to be void by the Tribunal.The deeming consequence which is provided for in sub-Section (1) isnot incorporated in sub-Section (2). Sub-Section (2), in contradistinction,stipulates that the right to receive maintenance can be enforced againstGa gratuitous transferee or transferee with notice of the pre-existingright of citizen to receive maintenance out of an estate notwithstandingwho is the transferee of the estate. In keeping with the salutary publicpurpose underlying the enactment of the legislation, the expression‘transfer’ would include not only the absolute transfer of property butalso transfer of right or interest in the property. This would also be inH

consonance with the provisions of Section 2(f) which defines theexpression property to include “rights or interests in such property”. Theexpression ‘transfer’ not having been defined specifically by thelegislation, it must receive an interpretation which would advance thebeneficent object and purpose of its provisions. Sub-section (2) of section23 speaks of the enforcement of the “right to receive maintenance”which is more comprehensive in its nature, than merely enforcing anorder for maintenance passed under Section 9 of the Act.17. The substance of sub-Section (2) of section 23, as submittedby the Second and Third respondents, is that the Tribunal had thejurisdiction to pass an order directing the eviction of the appellant who istheir daughter-in-law. According to the submission, the power to ordereviction is implicit in the provision guaranteeing ‘right to receivemaintenance out of an estate’ and the enforcement of that right. Insupporting the submission, they have referred to the view which hasbeen taken by several High Courts, indicating that the Tribunal mayorder the eviction of child or relative from the property of seniorcitizen, where there has been breach of the obligation to maintain thesenior citizen. The Tribunal under the Senior Citizens Act 2007 mayhave the authority to order an eviction, if it is necessary and expedient toensure the maintenance and protection of the senior citizen or parent.Eviction, in other words would be an incident of the enforcement of theright to maintenance and protection. However, this remedy can be grantedonly after adverting to the competing claims in the dispute. It is necessaryto recapitulate that the situation in the present case is that the evictionwas sought of the daughter-in-law, i.e. the appellant. The land, wherethe house has been constructed, was originally purchased by the son ofthe applicants who are seeking eviction of their daughter-in-law. Theson had purchased the property few months before his marriage to theappellant. He had subsequently transferred the property by registeredsale deed to his father and the fact that it was for the same considerationafter the lapse of several years is of significance. The father, in turn,executed gift deed in favor of his spouse. The appellant has assertedthat she had been living in the house, as her matrimonial residence, untilthe application was filed. Her spouse has (according to her) desertedher and their minor daughter and left them in the lurch. The electricityto the premises was disconnected for non-payment of dues. Theirdaughter has sought admission to an engineering degree course howeverher father- Fourth respondent has not provided any financial support.

AThe transfers which took place cannot be viewed in isolation from thecontext of the on-going matrimonial dispute which has taken place. Theissue is whether the appellant as the daughter-in-law and the minordaughter could have been ousted in the above manner.

woman’s right of residence: safeguard against domesticBviolence

18. In arriving at decision of this issue it becomes necessary toelucidate the right, which is asserted by the appellant. The appellant hassubmitted that the premises constitute “shared household” within themeaning of Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act 2005. Section 2(s) definesCthe expression “shared household” in the following terms:

“(s) “shared household “meansa household where the personaggrieved lives or at any stage has lived in domestic relationshipeither singly or along with the respondent and includessuch ahousehold whether owned or tenanted either jointly by theDaggrieved person and the respondent, or owned or tenanted byeither of them in respect of which either the aggrieved person orthe respondent or both jointly or singly have any right, title, interestor equity and includes such household which may belong to thejoint family of which the respondent is member, irrespective ofwhether the respondent or the aggrieved person has any right,Etitle or interest in the shared household;”

(emphasis supplied)

Section 19[20] contemplates the passing of residence order by theMagistrate on an application under sub-Section (1) of Section 12 of theF20 19. Residence orders-1) While disposing of an application under sub-section (1) of section 12, the Magistratemay, on being satisfied that domestic violence has taken place, pass residence order -(a) restraining the respondent from dispossessing or in any other manner disturbing thepossession of the aggrieved person from the shared household, whether or not therespondent has legal or equitable interest in the shared household; (b) directing therespondent to remove himself from the shared household; (c) restraining the respondentGor any of his relatives from entering any portion of the shared household in which theaggrieved person resides; (d) restraining the respondent from alienating or disposing offthe shared household or encumbering the same; (e) restraining the respondent fromrenouncing his rights in the shared household except with the leave of the Magistrate;or (f) directing the respondent to secure same level of alternate accommodation for theaggrieved person as enjoyed by her in the shared household or to pay rent for the same,if the circumstances so require: Provided that no order under clause (b) shall be passedHagainst any person who is woman.

PWDV Act 2005. The essence of the submission of the appellant is thatthe order of eviction which has been made in the exercise of the summarypowers entrusted by the Senior Citizens Act 2007 would completelydisplace the appellant from seeking recourse to her remedies underSection 12(1) read with Section 19 of the PWDV Act 2005 in respect ofthe premises, which she claims to be her shared household. The definitionof the expression “shared household” in Section 2(s) uses the familiarlegislative formula of “means and includes” definition. Where thedefinition of an expression in an enactment adopts ‘means and includes’stipulation, it is intended to be exhaustive. The ‘means’ part of thedefinition indicates what would normally fall within the ambit of theexpression, while the ‘includes’ element gives it an extended meaning.Together they indicate that the legislature has provided for an exhaustiveenumeration of what falls within the ambit of the definition. Justice PSingh in his seminal treatise on the Principles of Statutory Interpretation[21]observes:

“The Legislature has the power to define word even artificially.So the definition of word in the definitions section may either berestrictive of its ordinary meaning or it may be extensive of thesame. When word is defined to ‘mean’ such and such, thedefinition is prima facie restrictive and exhaustive.”

On the other hand, “includes” is titled so as to comprehend anextensive meaning:

“Whereas, where the word defined is declared to ‘include’ suchand such, the definition is prime facie extensive. When by anamending Act, the word ‘includes’ was substituted for the word‘means’ in definitions section, it was held that the intention wasto make it more extensive…..”

The use of the expression ‘means’ is intended to make it exhaustive.On the other hand, the use of the expression ‘includes’ is intended tomake it more extensive. The legislature by using an expression ‘includes’evinces, notwithstanding the meaning of the phrase, an intention:

“to enlarge the meaning of the words or phrases occurring in thebody of the statute”.

A“Includes” is utilized so as to comprehend:

“not only such things as they signify according to their nature andimport but also those things which the interpretation clause declaresthat they shall include”

However, when statutory definition incorporates the ‘meansBand includes’ approach, the intent is to make the definition exhaustive.

“Further, definition may be in the form of ‘means and includes’,where again the definition is exhaustive.”

[See in this context the decisions in Jagir Singh vs State of Bihar;CAIR 1976 SC 997, pp. 999, 1001 :1976 SCC (Tax) 204 : (1976) 2SCC 942; Kasilingam vs P.S.G. College of Technology, supra,Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. vs Coop. Bank EmployeesUnion, (2007) 4 SCC 685 (para 23) : (2007) 4 JT 573 : (2007) 2LLJ 825 : AIR 2007 SC 2320; Paul Enterprise vs Rajib Chatterjeeand Company, (2009) 3 SCC 709 para 28 : (2009) 1 JT 632]”D

19. The definition of ‘shared household’ in Section 2(s) of thePWDV Act 2005 is exhaustive. This has also recently been held to beso, by judgment of three judge bench of this Court, delivered byJustice Ashok Bhushan, in Satish Chandra Ahuja vs Sneha Ahuja[22][Satish Chandra].EThe definition of the expression ‘shared household’ in Section2(s) of the PWDV Act of 2005 is in two parts: in the means part of thedefinition the expression ‘shared household’ means

(i)A household where the person aggrieved lives in domesticrelationship either singly or along with the respondent or;F

(ii) At any stage has lived in domestic relationship either singlyor along with the respondent.

This is followed by an inclusive element, so as to cover such ahousehold (i) whether owned or tenanted either jointly by the aggrievedGperson and the respondent or (ii) owned or tenanted by either of them inrespect of which either the aggrieved person or the respondent or bothjointly or singly have any right, title or equity. This has also been given aninclusive or extended meaning, which extends to household which maybelong to the joint family of which respondent is member, irrespective

of whether the respondent or the aggrieved person have any right, titleor interest in the shared household. The last part of the inclusive definitionis intended to extend the meaning of shared household to situationwhere the household in fact belongs to joint family, of which therespondent is member. The legislature has made it clear that thoughneither the respondent, nor the aggrieved person in such case may havea right, title or interest in the shared household it would irrespective fallwithin the ambit of the definition.

The meaning which has been attributed above to the plain languageof the definition is in consonance with the judgment of the three judgeBench in Satish Chandra where it has been explained as follows:

“55…the definition can be divided in two parts, first, which followsthe word “means” and second which follows the word “includes”.The second part which follows “includes” can be further sub-divided in two parts. The first part reads “shared household meansa household where the person aggrieved has lived or at any stagehas lived in domestic relationship either singly or along with therespondent”. Thus, first condition to be fulfilled for sharedhousehold is that person aggrieved lives or at any stage has livedin domestic relationship. The second part subdivided in two partsis- (a) includes such household whether owned or tenanted eitherjointly by the aggrieved person and the respondent and owned ortenanted by either of them in respect of which either the aggrievedperson or the respondent or both jointly or singly have any right,title, interest or equity and (b)includes such household whichmay belong to the joint family of which the respondent is member,irrespective of whether the respondent or the aggrieved personhas any right, title or interest in the shared household. In the abovedefinition, two expressions, namely, “aggrieved person” and“respondent” have occurred. From the above definition, followingis clear:- (i) it is not requirement of law that aggrieved personmay either own the premises jointly or singly or by tenanting itjointly or singly; (ii) the household may belong to joint family ofwhich the respondent is member irrespective of whether therespondent or the aggrieved person has any right, title or interestin the shared household; and (iii) the shared household may eitherbe owned or tenanted by the respondent singly or jointly.”

AAfter noticing the ambit of the definition of ‘shared household’and the object and purpose of the PWDV Act of 2005, Justice AshokBhushan noted:

“Section 2(s) read with Sections 17 and 19 of Act, 2005 grants anentitlement in favour of the woman of the right of residence underBthe shared household irrespective of her having any legal interestin the same or not.”

The expression ‘respondent’ has been defined in section 2 (q) ofthe PWDV Act of 2005 in the following terms:

“(q) “respondent” means any adult male person who is, or hasCbeen, in domestic relationship with the aggrieved person andagainst whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief underthis Act:”

Noticing the above definition and the provisions of section 2(s),the Court in Satish Chandra held:D“64…The definition of shared household as noticed in Section

“64…The definition of shared household as noticed in Section2(s) does not indicate that shared household shall be one whichbelongs to or taken on rent by the husband. We have noticed thedefinition of “respondent” under the Act. The respondent in aproceeding under Domestic Violence Act can be any relative ofEthe husband. In [the] event, the shared household belongs to anyrelative of the husband with whom in domestic relationship thewoman has lived, the conditions mentioned in Section 2(s) aresatisfied and the said house will become shared household.”

The Bench concluded that:

F“84…The definition of shared household given in Section 2(s)cannot be read to mean that shared household can only be thathousehold which is household of the joint family of which husbandis member or in which husband of the aggrieved person has ashare.”

GEHarmonising competing reliefs under the PWDV Act2005 and Senior Citizens Act 2007

20. Section 36[23] of the PWDV Act 2005 stipulates that theprovisions of the Act shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the

23 36-Act not in derogation of any other law- The provisions of this Act shall be inHaddition to, and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law, for the time beingin force.

provisions of any other law for the time being in force. This is intendedto ensure that the remedies provided under the enactment are in additionto other remedies and do not displace them. The Maintenance andWelfare of Parents and Senior Citizens Act 2007 is undoubtedly laterAct and as we have noticed earlier, Section 3 stipulates that its provisionswill have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent contained in anyother enactment. However, the provisions of Section 3 of the SeniorCitizens Act 2007 giving it overriding force and effect, would not bythemselves be conclusive of an intent to deprive woman who claims aright in shared household, as under the PWDV Act 2005. Principles ofstatutory interpretation dictate that in the event of two special actscontaining non obstante clauses, the later law shall typically prevail.[24]In the present case, as we have seen, the Senior Citizen’s Act 2007contains non obstante clause. However, in the event of conflictbetween special acts, the dominant purpose of both statutes would haveto be analyzed to ascertain which one should prevail over the other. Theprimary effort of the interpreter must be to harmonize, not excise. Atwo-judge bench of this Court, in the case of Bank of India v. KetanParekh[25], in examining similar factual scenario, observed that:

“28. In the present case, both the two Acts i.e. the Act of 1992and the Act of 1993 start with the non obstante clause. Section 34of the Act of 1993 starts with non obstante clause, likewise Section9-A (sic 13) of the Act of 1992. But incidentally, in this case Section9-A came subsequently i.e. it came on 25-1-1994. Therefore, it isa subsequent legislation which will have the overriding effect overthe Act of 1993. But cases might arise where both the enactmentshave the non obstante clause then in that case, the properperspective would be that one has to see the subject and thedominant purpose for which the special enactment was made andin case the dominant purpose is covered by that contingencies,then notwithstanding that the Act might have come at later pointof time still the intention can be ascertained by looking to theobjects and reasons.However, so far as the present case isconcerned, it is more than clear that Section 9-A of the Act of1992 was amended on 25-1-1994 whereas the Act of 1993 camein 1993. Therefore, the Act of 1992 as amended to include Section

24 Solidaire India Ltd. v. Fairgrowth Financial Services Ltd, (2001) 3 SCC 71

25 (2008) 8 SCC 148

[2020] 12 S.C.R.

A9-A in 1994 being subsequent legislation will prevail and not theprovisions of the Act of 1993.”

(emphasis supplied)

This principle of statutory interpretation was also affirmed by athree-judge bench of this Court in Pioneer Urban Land andBInfrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India.[26] In the present case, Section36 of the PWDV Act 2005, albeit not in the nature of non-obstanteclause, has to be construed harmoniously with the non obstante clausein Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that operates in separatefield.

21. In this case, both pieces of legislation are intended to dealwith salutary aspects of public welfare and interest. The PWDV Act2005 was intended to deal with the problems of domestic violence which,as the Statements of Objects and Reasons sets out, “is widely prevalentbut has remained largely invisible in the public domain”. The StatementsDof Objects and Reasons indicates that while Section 498A of the IndianPenal Code created penal offence out of woman’s subjection tocruelty by her husband or relative, the civil law did not address itsphenomenon in its entirety. Hence, consistent with the provisions ofArticles 14, 15 and 21 of the Constitution, Parliament enacted legislationwhich would “provide for remedy under the civil law which is intendedEto protect the woman from being victims of domestic violence and toprevent the occurrence of domestic violence in the society”. The ambitof the Bill has been explained thus:

“4. The Bill, inter alia, seeks to provide for the following:-

F(i) It covers those women who are or have been in relationshipwith the abuser where both parties have lived together in sharedhousehold and are related by consanguinity, marriage or througha relationship in the nature of marriage or adoption. In addition,relationships with family members living together as joint familyare also included. Even those women who are sisters, widows,Gmothers, single women, or living with the abuser are entitled tolegal protection under the proposed legislation. However, whereasthe Bill enables the wife or the female living in relationship inthe nature of marriage to file complaint under the proposedenactment against any relative of the husband or the male partner,

H26 (2019) 8 SCC 416

it does not enable any female relative of the husband or the malepartner to file complaint against the wife or the female partner.

(ii) It defines the expression “domestic violence” to include actualabuse or threat or abuse that is physical, sexual, verbal, emotionalor economic. Harassment by way of unlawful dowry demands tothe woman or her relatives would also be covered under thisdefinition.

(iii) It provides for the rights of women to secure housing. It alsoprovides for the right of woman to reside in her matrimonialhome or shared household, whether or not she has any title orrights in such home or household. This right is secured by aresidence order, which is passed by the Magistrate.

(iv) It empowers the Magistrate to pass protection orders in favourof the aggrieved person to prevent the respondent from aiding orcommitting an act of domestic violence or any other specified act,entering workplace or any other place frequented by theaggrieved person, attempting to communicate with her, isolatingany assets used by both the parties and causing violence to theaggrieved person, her relatives or others who provide herassistance from the domestic violence.

(v) It provides for appointment of Protection Officers andregistration of non-governmental organisations as serviceproviders for providing assistance to the aggrieved person withrespect to her medical examination, obtaining legal aid, safe shelter,etc.”

The above extract indicates that significant object of thelegislation is to provide for and recognize the rights of women to securehousing and to recognize the right of woman to reside in matrimonialhome or shared household, whether or not she has any title or right inthe shared household. Allowing the Senior Citizens Act 2007 to have anoverriding force and effect in all situations, irrespective of competingentitlements of woman to right in shared household within themeaning of the PWDV Act 2005, would defeat the object and purposewhich the Parliament sought to achieve in enacting the latter legislation.The law protecting the interest of senior citizens is intended to ensurethat they are not left destitute, or at the mercy of their children or relatives.Equally, the purpose of the PWDV Act 2005 cannot be ignored by

Asleight of statutory interpretation. Both sets of legislations have to beharmoniously construed. Hence the right of woman to secure aresidence order in respect of shared household cannot be defeated bythe simple expedient of securing an order of eviction by adopting thesummary procedure under the Senior Citizens Act 2007.

B22. This Court is cognizant that the Senior Citizens Act 2007 waspromulgated with view to provide speedy and inexpensive remedy tosenior citizens. Accordingly, Tribunals were constituted under Section 7.These Tribunals have the power to conduct summary procedures forinquiry, with all powers of the Civil Courts, under Section 8. Thejurisdiction of the Civil Courts has been explicitly barred under SectionC27 of the Senior Citizens Act 2007. However, the over-riding effect forremedies sought by the applicants under the Senior Citizens Act 2007under Section 3, cannot be interpreted to preclude all other competingremedies and protections that are sought to be conferred by the PWDVAct 2005. The PWDV Act 2005 is also in the nature of specialDlegislation, that is enacted with the purpose of correcting genderdiscrimination that pans out in the form of social and economic inequitiesin largely patriarchal society. In deference to the dominant purpose ofboth the legislations, it would be appropriate for Tribunal under theSenior Citizens Act, 2007 to grant such remedies of maintenance, asenvisaged under S.2(b) of the Senior Citizens Act 2007 that do not resultEin obviating competing remedies under other special statutes, such asthe PWDV Act 2005. Section 26[27] of the PWDV Act empowers certainreliefs, including relief for residence order, to be obtained from anycivil court in any legal proceedings. Therefore, in the event that acomposite dispute is alleged, such as in the present case where the suitFpremises are site of contestation between two groups protected by thelaw, it would be appropriate for the Tribunal constituted under the SeniorCitizens Act 2007 to appropriately mould reliefs, after noticing the

27 26. Relief in other suits and legal proceedings.—(1) Any relief available under sections18, 19,20, 21 and 22 may also be sought in any legal proceeding, before civil court,family court or criminal court, affecting the aggrieved person and the respondentGwhether such proceeding was initiated before or after the commencement of this Act.(2) Any relief referred to in sub-section (1) may be sought for in addition to and alongwith any other relief that the aggrieved person may seek in such suit or legal proceedingbefore civil or criminal court.

(3) In case any relief has been obtained by the aggrieved person in any proceedingsother than proceeding under this Act, she shall be bound to inform the Magistrate ofHthe grant of such relief.

competing claims of the parties claiming under the PWDV Act 2005and Senior Citizens Act 2007. Section 3 of the Senior Citizens Act, 2007cannot be deployed to over-ride and nullify other protections in law,particularly that of woman’s right to ‘shared household’ under Section17 of the PWDV Act 2005. In the event that the “aggrieved woman”obtains relief from Tribunal constituted under the Senior Citizens Act2007, she shall duty-bound to inform the Magistrate under the PWDVAct 2005, as per Sub-section (3) of Section 26 of the PWDV Act 2005.This course of action would ensure that the common intent of the SeniorCitizens Act 2007 and the PWDV Act 2005- of ensuring speedy relief toits protected groups who are both vulnerable members of the society, iseffectively realized. Rights in law can translate to rights in life, only ifthere is an equitable ease in obtaining their realization.

23. Adverting to the factual situation at hand, on construing theprovisions of sub-Section (2) of section 23 of the Senior Citizen Act2007, it is evident that it applies to situation where senior citizen hasa right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or partthereof is transferred. On the other hand, the appellant’s simple plea isthat the suit premises constitute her ‘shared household’ within the meaningof Section 2(s) of the PWDV Act 2005. We have also seen the series oftransactions which took place in respect of the property: the spouse ofthe appellant purchased it in his own name few months before themarriage but subsequently sold it, after few years, under registeredsale deed at the same price to his father (the father-in-law of theappellant), who in turn gifted it to his spouse i.e. the mother-in-law of theappellant after divorce proceedings were instituted by the Fourthrespondent. Parallel to this, the appellant had instituted proceedings ofdowry harassment against her mother-in-law and her estranged spouse;and her spouse had instituted divorce proceedings. The appellant hadalso filed proceedings for maintenance against the Fourth respondentand the divorce proceedings are pending. It is subsequent to these events,that the Second and Third respondents instituted an application underthe Senior Citizens Act 2007. The fact that specific proceedings underthe PWDV Act 2005 had not been instituted when the application underthe Senior Citizens Act, 2007 was filed, should not lead to situationwhere the enforcement of an order of eviction deprives her from pursuingher claim of entitlement under the law. The inability of woman toaccess judicial remedies may, as this case exemplifies, be consequenceof destitution, ignorance or lack of resources. Even otherwise, we are

Aclearly of the view that recourse to the summary procedure contemplatedby the Senior Citizen Act 2007 was not available for the purpose offacilitating strategies that are designed to defeat the claim of the appellantin respect of shared household. shared household would have to beinterpreted to include the residence where the appellant had been jointlyresiding with her husband. Merely because the ownership of the propertyBhas been subsequently transferred to her in-laws (Second and ThirdRespondents) or that her estranged spouse (Fourth respondent) is nowresiding separately, is no ground to deprive the appellant of the protectionthat was envisaged under the PWDV Act 2005

SummationC

24. For the above reasons, we have come to the conclusion thatthe claim of the appellant that the premises constitute shared householdwithin the meaning of the PWDV Act 2005 would have to be determinedby the appropriate forum. The claim cannot simply be obviated by evictingthe appellant in exercise of the summary powers entrusted by the SeniorDCitizens Act 2007. The Second and Third Respondents are at liberty tomake subsequent application under Section 10 of the Senior CitizensAct 2007 for alteration of the maintenance allowance, before theappropriate forum. For the above reasons, while allowing the appeal, weissue the following directions:E

(i)The impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench ofthe High Court of Karnataka dated 17 September 2019affirming the order of eviction against the appellant shallstand set aside with the consequence that the order of theAssistant Commissioner ordering and directing the appellantto vacate the suit premises shall stand set aside;

(ii)We leave it open to the appellant to pursue her remediesunder the PWDV Act 2005. For that purpose, it would beopen to the appellant to seek the help of the District LegalServices Authorities and if the appellant does so, allGnecessary aid and assistance shall be furnished to her inpursuing her legal remedies and rights;

(iii)IA 111352/2020 for restoration of the electricity connectionis allowed by directing the Fourth respondent to take allnecessary steps for restoration of the electricity connectionto the premises within period of two weeks from theH

receipt of certified copy of this judgment. The FourthArespondent shall also continue to pay the electricity dues infuture; and

(iv)In order to enable the appellant to pursue her remedies underthe PWDV Act 2005, there shall be an order and directionrestraining the respondents from forcibly dispossessing theBappellant, disposing of the premises or from creating anyright, title and interest in favor of any third party in anymanner whatsoever for period of one year, to enable theappellant to pursue her remedies in accordance with law.The appellant is at liberty to move the Court to espouse herCremedies under the PWDV Act 2005 for appropriate orders,including interim protections.

The directions contained in (iii) and (iv) above emanate in exerciseof the powers of this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution.

25. The Appeal is allowed in the above terms. The appellant isentitled to costs quantified at Rs 25,000 from the private respondents.

26. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

Kalpana K. Tripathy

Appeal allowed.