ARUN SINGH & OTHERS versus STATE OF U.P. THROUGH ITS SECRETARY & ANOTHER

[2020] 3 S.C.R. 707

ARUN SINGH & OTHERS

STATE OF U.P. THROUGH ITS SECRETARY & ANOTHER

(Criminal Appeal No. 250 of 2020)

FEBRUARY 10, 2020

[NAVIN SINHA AND KRISHNA MURARI, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973– s.482 – Non-compoundable offences – Power of High Court to quashproceedings – Respondent no.2 alleged that after the marriageproposal of his daughter was finalised with appellant no.1, he startedvisiting their house frequently and misleading his daughter that nowsince the marriage is finalised and only ceremony of ‘feras’ remainsto be performed, took her for outings on various occasions – Oneday he induced her to his room and established physical relationshipwith her – Subsequently, the appellant started making demand ofdowry of Rs. 5 Lakh – Complaint made before Mahila Thana – Noaction taken – On coming to know that appellant no.1’s marriagewas settled with some other girl, FIR was lodged u/ss. 493, IPC r/wss. 3/4, 1961 Act – Appellants challenged the chargesheet u/s. 482,CrPC and alleged that demand of Rs.10 Lakhs was made fromthem with threat to implicate in false case if the demand was notmet – Appellant made application u/s.156(3), CrPC againstrespondent no.2 and his family members – Meanwhile, respondentno.2 made complaint in Mahila Thana which was latercompromised, in view of which the appellants did not press theapplication u/s. 156(3), CrPC – Petition u/s. 482, CrPC dismissedby High Court – Held: Though the offences in question are non-compoundable but the power of High Court u/s. 482, CrPC to quashthe proceedings in such offences is well recognised – Offences forwhich the appellants are charged are infact offences against societyand not private in nature – In such cases, settlement even if arrivedat between the complainant and the accused, the same cannotconstitute valid ground to quash FIR or charge sheet – High Courtnot unjustified in refusing to quash charge sheet on ground ofcompromise – Further, the allegations made in FIR, only againstone of the appellant, cannot be said to constitute any offence

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Au/s. 493, IPC as they do not cull out any inducement of belief in thevictim that she is lawfully married to appellant no.1 and on accountof this deceitful misstatement, she co-habited with him – Also, thereare no allegations in this regard in respect of other five accused-appellants – However, allegations in FIR clearly show that demandof Rs. 5 Lakhs as dowry was made by appellants from respondentBno.2 thus, it can not be said that no offence under the 1961 Act ismade out – Charge sheet insofar as s. 493, IPC is concerned standsquashed – However, in respect of charge sheet u/s.3 r/w s.4, 1961Act, the appeal is dismissed – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss. 3,4& 8(2) – Penal Code, 1860 – s.493.

CPenal Code, 1860 – s. 493 – Essence of offence under –Discussed.

Words & Expressions – “deceit” – Meaning of – Held: Deceitcan be said to be false statement of fact made by person knowinglyand recklessly with the intent that it shall be acted upon by anotherDwho on believing the same after having acted thereupon suffers aninjury – It is an attempt to deceive and includes such declarationand statement that misleads others or causes him to believe whichotherwise is false and incorrect – Penal Code, 1860 – s.493.

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss. 3 and 4 – EssentialEingredients of offence under – Discussed.

Disposing of the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 Offences for which the appellants have beencharged are infact offences against society and not private inFnature. Such offences have serious impact upon society andcontinuance of trial of such cases is founded on the overriddingeffect of public interests in punishing persons for such seriousoffences. It is neither an offence arising out of commercial,financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions orhas any element of civil dispute thus it stands on distinct footing.GIn such cases, settlement even if arrived at between thecomplainant and the accused, the same cannot constitute validground to quash the F.I.R. or the charge sheet. Thus the HighCourt cannot be said to be unjustified in refusing to quash thecharge sheet on the ground of compromise between the parties.[Paras 15, 16][716 F-H; 717 A-B]H

1.2 plain reading of the Section 493, IPC goes to showthat in order to constitute an offence under this Section, it has tobe demonstrated that man has deceitfully caused any woman,who is not lawfully married to him, to believe that she is lawfullymarried wife and thereby co-habit with him. In other words, theaccused must induce woman, not lawfully married to him, tobelieve that she is married to him and as result of suchmis-representation, woman should believe that she was lawfullymarried to the man and thus there should be co-habitation orsexual intercourse. The essence of an offence under Section 493IPC is, therefore, practice of deception by man on woman asa consequence of which the woman is led to believe that she islawfully married to him although she is not and then make hercohabit with him. Deceit can be said to be false statement offact made by person knowingly and recklessly with the intentthat it shall be acted upon by another who on believing the sameafter having acted thereupon suffers an injury. It is an attempt todeceive and includes such declaration and statement thatmisleads others or causes him to believe which otherwise is falseand incorrect. [Paras 18, 20 and 21][717 D-F; 718-G, H; 719-A]

1.3 From perusal of the F.I.R., it is not found that allegationsmade therein can be said to constitute any offence under Section493 IPC. The allegations do not even prima-facie, cull out anyinducement of belief in the victim that she is lawfully married tothe appellant no. 1 and on account of this deceitful misstatement,the victim co-habited with the accused. Also whatever theallegations, in this regard, have been made only against theaccused-appellant no. 1 which also do not constitute an offenceand there are no allegations in this regard in respect of other fiveaccused-appellants. [Paras 23-25][719 B-H]

1.4 reading of Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act showsthat essential ingredients of the offence thereunder are that thepersons accused should have made demand directly or indirectlyfrom the parents or other relatives or guardians of bride or abridegroom as the case may be any dowry and/or abets the givingand taking of dowry. The allegations of the F.I.R. clearly go to

Ashow that demand of dowry of Rs. 5 Lakhs was made by theappellants from the complainants and thus it can not be said thatno offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act are made out againstthe appellants. The charge sheet insofar as Section 493 I.P.C isconcerned stands quashed. However, in respect of charge sheetunder Section 3 read with Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, theBAppeal stands dismissed. [Paras 29, 31][721 C-E; 722-B]

Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303 :[2012] 8 SCR 753; Parbatbhai Aahir & Others v. Stateof Gujarat & Others (2017) 9 SCC 641 : [2017] 10SCR 12; Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6CSCC 466 : [2014] 4 SCR 1012; Ram Chandra Bhagatv. State of Jharkhand (2013) 1 SCC 562 : [2012] 10SCR 1050 – relied on.

Amrawati & another v. State of U.P. (2004) 57 ALR290; Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P. 2009D(3) ADJ 322 (SC) – referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.F250 of 2020.

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.11.2016 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Application U/S 482 No. 20591 of 2015.

Sunil Kumar Singh, Amit Kumar Srivastava, Amit Wadhwa, HariomGSharan Singh, Dr. Vinod Kumar Tewari, Advs. for the Appellants.

Sanjay Kumar Tyagi, Yogesh P., D. Rai, Ajay Kumar Pandey,Krishna Kant Dubey, Rakesh Kumar Tewari, Ms. Suchi Singh, SatyendraKumar Shrivastava, Sanjay Kumar Dubey, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

KRISHNA MURARI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and orderdated 24.11.2016 passed by the High Court[1] dismissing the petitionfiled by the appellants under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code(in short ‘the CrPC) challenging the charge sheet filed against them.The High Court while rejecting Section 482 CrPC petition directed theaccused appellants to surrender before the Court concerned within 30days from the date of order and in case they do so within the stipulatedperiod and apply for bail the same was liable to be considered and decidedin view of law laid down by full bench of High Court in case of Amrawati& another versus State of U.P.[2 ]affirmed by this court in Lal KamlendraPratap Singh versus State of U.P.[3]

3. Shorn of unnecessary details the brief facts which led to thefilling of this appeal can be summarised as under:-

Respondent No. 2 lodged First Information Report with PoliceStation Izzat Nagar, District Bareilly under Section 493 I.P.C. read withSection 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellants hereinwhich was registered as case crime No. 431 of 2014. The allegationsmade in the F.I.R. were that Respondent No.-2 approached Appellantswith the proposal of marriage of his daughter Jyoti with AppellantNo.-1. On 30[th] June, 2013 the appellants visited the house of RespondentNo.-2 and after meeting his daughter the proposal was finalised. On21.07.2013, ring ceremony was performed and date of marriage wasscheduled for 19.11.2013. Thereafter, Appellant No.-2 started visitingthe house of complainant/respondent no.-2. frequently and misleadinghis daughter Jyoti that now since the marriage is finalised and onlyceremony of ‘feras’ remains to be performed took her for outings onvarious occasions. On 16.08.2013 appellant No.-2 induced Jyoti to hisroom and established physical relationship with her. However,subsequently thereto the appellant started making demand of dowry ofRs. 5 Lakh. complaint in this regard was made before Mahila Thanabut no action was taken. On coming to know that marriage of Appellant

1 High Court of Judicature at Allahabad

2 2004 (57) ALR 290

3 2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC)

ANo.-2 was settled with some other girl for handsome amount of dowry,the First Information Report was being lodged.

4. The matter was investigated by the concerned Police Stationand charge sheet was filed against the appellants, which was challengedbefore the High Court by way of petition under Section 482 CrPC.

5. The case set up by the appellants before the High Court wasthat behaviour of the complainant and his family members changed afterthe date of marriage was fixed and they refused to share the expensesof marriage, which was settled between the parties to be shared equally.Further, demand of Rs. 10 Lakhs was made from the appellants withCa threat to implicate them in false case in case the demand was notfulfilled. It was further pleaded that Appellant No.-2 made an applicationunder Section 156(3) CrPC before the ACJM against the complainantand his other family members. During the pendency of proceedings underSection 156(3) CrPC complaint was made by Respondent No.-2 in theMahila Thana. The inspector incharge of Mahila Thana summoned bothDthe parties where the dispute between them was compromised. In viewof the compromise arrived, the appellants did not press the applicationunder Section 156 (3) CrPC. However, the Complainant-RespondentNo.-2 filed the First Information Report after about 10 months of thecompromise.

6. The High Court finding that there was no justification forquashing the charge sheet dismissed the petition.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended thatthe High Court has failed to appreciate and consider that the fresh criminalaction can not be launched on the basis of the same cause of action,Fwhich was already settled 10 months back by way of compromise whichwas acted upon by both the parties.

8. Learned counsel further submits that the High Court has failedto consider and appreciate that the allegations as contained in the FirstInformation Report even if taken on the face value and assumed to beGcorrect in entirety, do not prima-facie disclose commission of any offence,much less cognizable offence. It is also submitted on behalf of theappellants that the High Court did not appreciate and consider the factat all that the allegations in the F.I.R., prima-facie, do not constitutecommission of any offence and dismissed the 482 petition withoutadverting itself to this aspect of the matter.H

9. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the argumentsadvanced on behalf of appellants submitted that the First InformationReport was filed under Section 493 of the Indian Penal Code (in shortthe “I.P.C.”) read with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act andboth the aforesaid offences are non-compoundable in nature and thuscould not have been compromised. The allegations made in the FirstInformation Report were found to be substantiated on investigation andthus charge sheet filed by the Police and the High Court rightly dismissedthe petition for quashing of the same.

10. We have considered the rival submissions and perused thefacts on record.

11. The offence under Section 493 is non-compoundable. Similarly,the offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is also non-compoundable, in view of Section 8(2) of the said Act, which providesthat every offence under this Act, shall be non-bailable and non-compoundable.

12. Though the offence in question are non-compoundable butthe power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC of the Court toquash the proceedings in such offences is well recognised by variousdecision of this court and the issue is no longer res integra. Referencemay be made to the observations of Three Judge Bench of this Court inGian Singh versus State of Punjab.[4]

“Quashing of offences or criminal proceedings on the ground ofsettlement between an offender and victim is not the same thingas compounding of the offence. They are different and notinterchangeable. Strictly speaking the power of compounding ofoffence given to Court under Section 320 is materially differentfrom the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court inexercise of the inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offence,power of criminal court is circumscribed by the provisionscontained in Section 320 and the Court is guided solely and squarelythereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by theHigh Court for quashing criminal offence or criminal proceedingsor criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as towhether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of poweralthough the ultimately consequence may be acquittal or dismissalof indictment.

4 (2012) 10 SCC 303

AB.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji to illustratethe principle that High Court may quash the criminal proceedingsor F.I.R. or complaint in exercise of its inherent power underSection 482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or effectthe powers of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be saidthat by quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi, NikhilBMerchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji this Court has compoundedthe non-compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so.There does exists the distinction between compounding of anoffence under Section 320 and quashing of criminal caseby aHigh Court in exercise of inherent power under Section 482. TheCtwo powers are distinct and different although the ultimateconsequence may be the same viz. acquittal of the accused ordismissal of the indictment.

13. Another Three Judge Bench of this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir& Others versus State of Gujarat & Others.[5 ]After analysing theDprecedents on, the above issue has summarised the broad principles inparagraph 15 of the reports as under:-

15. “The broad principles which emerge from the precedentson the subject, may be summarised in the followingpropositions:-

E(i)Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the HighCourt to prevent an abuse of the process of any courtor to secure the ends of justice. The provision does notconfer new powers. It only recognises and preservespowers which inhere in the High Court;

F(ii)The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High court toquash First Information Report or criminalproceeding on the ground that settlement has beenarrived at between the offender and the victim is notthe same as the invocation of jurisdiction for theGpurpose of compounding an offence. Whilecompounding an offence, the power of the court isgoverned by the provisions of Section 320 of the Codeof Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Power to quashUnder Section 482 is attracted even if the offence isnon-compoundable.H5 (2017) 9 SCC 641

(iii)In forming an opinion whether criminal proceedingor complaint should be quashed in exercise of itsjurisdiction Under Section 482, the High Court mustevaluate whether the ends of justice would justify theexercise of the inherent power;

(iv)While the inherent power of the High Court has wideambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i) to securethe ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an abuse of theprocess of any court;

(v)The decision as to whether complaint or FirstInformation Report should be quashed on the groundCthat the offender and victim have settled the dispute,revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances ofeach case and no exhaustive elaboration of principlescan be formulated;

(vi)In the exercise of the power Under Section 482 andDwhile dealing with plea that the dispute has beensettled, the High Court must have due regard to thenature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and seriousoffences involving mental depravity or offences suchas murder, rape and dacoity cannot appropriately bequashed though the victim or the family of the victimEhave settled the dispute. Such offences are, trulyspeaking, not private in nature but have seriousimpact upon society. The decision to continue with thetrial in such cases is founded on the overriding elementof public interest in punishing persons for seriousFoffences;

(vii)As distinguished from serious offences, there may becriminal cases which have an overwhelming orpredominant element of civil dispute. They stand on adistinct footing in so far as the exercise of the inherentpower to quash is concerned;

(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise fromcommercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or similartransactions with an essentially civil flavour may inappropriate situations fall for quashing where partieshave settled the dispute;

A(ix)In such case, the High Court may quash the criminalproceeding if in view of the compromise between thedisputants, the possibility of conviction is remote andthe continuation of criminal proceeding would causeoppression and prejudice; and

B(x)There is yet an exception to the principle set out inpropositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic offencesinvolving the financial and economic well being of thestate have implications which lie beyond the domain ofa mere dispute between private disputants. The HighCourt would be justified in declining to quash whereCthe offender is involved in an activity akin to financial

or economic fraud misdemeanour. The consequencesof the act complained of upon the financial or economicsystem will weigh in the balance.”

14. In another decision in the case of Narinder Singh Vs. StateDof Punjab[6 ]it has been observed that in respect of offence against thesociety it is the duty to punish the offender. Hence, even where there isa settlement between the offender and victim the same shall not prevailsince it is in interests of the society that offender should be punishedwhich acts as deterrent for others from committing similar crime. OnEthe other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where thecorrectional objective of criminal law would have to be given moreweightage than the theory of deterrent punishment. In such cases, thecourt may be of the opinion that settlement between the parties wouldlead to better relations between them and would resolve festeringprivate dispute and thus may exercise power under Section 482 CrPCFfor quashing the proceedings or the complaint or the FIR as the casemay be.

15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laiddown, we are of the view that offences for which the appellantshave been charged are infact offences against society and not private inGnature. Such offences have serious impact upon society and continuanceof trial of such cases is founded on the overridding effect of publicinterests in punishing persons for such serious offences. It is neither anoffence arising out of commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership orsuch similar transactions or has any element of civil dispute thus it standsH6 (2014) 6 SCC 466

on distinct footing. In such cases, settlement even if arrived at betweenthe complainant and the accused, the same cannot constitute validground to quash the F.I.R. or the charge sheet.

16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in refusingto quash the charge sheet on the ground of compromise between theparties.

17. The next issue which arises for consideration is whether theallegations made in the F.I.R constitute commission of an offence. Asalready stated hereinabove, the appellants have been charged withSection 493 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 3 read with Section 4of the Dowry Prohibition Act.

Section 493 reads as under:-

“Cohabitation caused by man deceitfully inducing beliefof lawful marriage. - Every man who by deceit causes anywoman who is not lawfully married to him to believe that sheis lawfully married to him and to cohabit or have sexualintercourse with him in that belief, shall be punished withimprisonment of either description for term which mayextend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”

18. plain reading of the Section goes to show that in order toconstitute an offence under this Section, it has to be demonstrated that aman has deceitfully caused any woman, who is not lawfully married tohim, to believe that she is lawfully married wife and thereby co-habitwith him. In other words, the accused must induce woman, not lawfullymarried to him, to believe that she is married to him and as result ofsuch mis-representation, woman should believe that she was lawfullymarried to the man and thus there should be co-habitation or sexualintercourse.

19. three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Ram ChandraBhagat Vs. State of Jharkhand[7 ]after analysing the provisions of Section493 of I.P.C, has observed as under:-

“Upon perusal of Section 493 IPC, to establish that personhas committed an offence under the said section, it must beestablished that person had deceitfully induced belief toa woman, who is not lawfully married to him, that she is

7 (2013) 1 SCC 562

Alawfully married wife of that person and thereupon she shouldcohabit or should have had sexual intercourse with thatperson. Looking at the aforestated section, it is clear that theaccused must induce woman, who is not lawfully married tohim, to believe that he is married to her and as result of theaforestated representation, the woman should believe that sheBwas lawfully married to him and there should be cohabitationor sexual intercourse as result of the deception.”

“If woman is induced to change her status from that of anunmarried to that of married woman with all the duties andobligations pertaining to the changed relationship and thatCresult is accomplished by deceit, such woman within the lawcan be said to have been deceived and the offence underSection 493 IPC is brought home. Inducement by persondeceitfully to woman to change her status from unmarriedwoman to lawfully married woman and on that inducementDmaking her cohabit with him in the belief that she is lawfullymarried to him is what constitutes an offence under Section493. The victim woman has been induced to do that which,but for the false practice, she would not have done and hasbeen led to change her social and domestic status. Theingredients of Section 493 can be said to be fully satisfiedEwhen it is proved – (a) deceit causing false belief of existenceof lawful marriage, and (b) cohabitation or sexualintercourse with the person causing such belief. It is notnecessary to establish the factum of marriage according topersonal law but the proof of inducement by man deceitfully

Fto woman to change her status from that of an unmarried tothat of lawfully married woman and then make that womancohabit with him establishes an offence under Section 493IPC.”

20. The essence of an offence under Section 493 IPC is, therefore,Gpractice of deception by man on woman as consequence of whichthe woman is led to believe that she is lawfully married to him althoughshe is not and then make her cohabit with him.

21. Deceit can be said to be false statement of fact made by aperson knowingly and recklessly with the intent that it shall be actedHupon by another who on believing the same after having acted thereupon

suffers an injury. It is an attempt to deceive and includes such declarationand statement that misleads others or causes him to believe whichotherwise is false and incorrect.

22. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 493I.P.C., the allegations in the FIR must demonstrate that appellant hadpracticed deception on the daughter of the complainant causing falsebelief of existence of lawful marriage and which led her to cohabit withhim.

23. From perusal of the F.I.R., we do not find that allegationsmade therein can be said to constitute any offence under Section 493IPC. There are no allegation of any inducement or any deceit to makethe victim believe that she was lawfully married to the appellant, whichmislead her to have sexual intercourse with the accused appellant no.1.Only allegations in the First Information Report in this regard are that“after the marriage was settled, the appellant no.1 started visiting thehouse of the complainant frequently and would mislead and instigate hisdaughter that relation is final and only ‘Feras’ remains to be performed.On the fateful day, i.e., 16.08.2013, the appellant no.1 took leave andenticed and instigated his daughter took her to his room and promisingthat she is being his wife established physical relations.”

24. perusal of the averments would go to show that ingredientsto constitute an offence under Section 493 I.P.C. are missing from theaverments. The allegations do not even prima-facie, cull out anyinducement of belief in the victim that she is lawfully married to theappellant no.1 and on account of this deceitful misstatement, the victimco-habited with the accused. Since the essential ingredients to constitutean offence under Section 493 I.P.C. are missing from the allegationsmade in the F.I.R., offence under the said Section can not be said to bemade out against the appellants.

25. It is also to be taken note that whatever the allegations, in thisregard, have been made only against the accused-appellant no. 1 whichalso do not constitute an offence and there are no allegations in thisregard in respect of other five accused-appellants.

26. The High Court having failed to advert itself to the aforesaidaspects discussed hereinabove and to that extent, the judgment is notliable to be sustained.

A27. The other charge against the appellants are under Section 3/4of the Dowry Prohibition Act. The said sections read as under:-

“Section 3 -Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— [1] If anyperson, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes orabets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable[with imprisonment for term which shall not be less than[five years], and with fine which shall not be less than fifteenthousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry,whichever is more:

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasonsCto be recorded in the judgment, impose sentence ofimprisonment for term of less than [five years].

[(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relationto,—

(a) presents which are given at the time of marriage to thebride (without any demand having been made in that behalf):Provided that such presents are entered in list maintainedin accordance with the rules made under this Act;

(b) presents which are given at the time of marriage to thebridegroom (without any demand having been made in thatEbehalf):

Provided that such presents are entered in list maintainedin accordance with the rules made under this Act:

Provided further that where such presents are made by or onbehalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, suchFpresents are of customary nature and the value thereof isnot excessive having regard to the financial status of theperson by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.]

Section 4- Penalty for demanding dowry—If any persondemands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or otherrelatives or guardian of bride or bridegroom, as the casemay be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonmentfor term which shall not be less than six months, but whichmay extend to two years and with fine which may extend toten thousand rupees:

Provided that the court may, for adequate and special reasonsto be mentioned in the judgment, impose sentence ofimprisonment for term of less than six months.”

28. The allegations in the First Information Report in respect ofSection 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are very specific. The relevantallegations are being reproduced hereunder :-

“Not only this applicant also finalised Barat Ghar OM Lawn formarriage party and made advance payment of Rs. 20,000/- butArun along with his parents and all the opposite parties stick totheir demand of Rs. 5 Lakhs cash. Applicant is poor employee.He showed his inability to pay such huge amount. But despite avery humble request and praying opposite parties could not bepersuaded and they made demand for Rs. 5 Lakh in fullPanchayat....”

29. reading of the above provisions shows that essentialingredients of the offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry ProhibitionAct are that the persons accused should have made demand directly orindirectly from the parents or other relatives or guardians of bride or abridegroom as the case may be any dowry and/or abets the giving andtaking of dowry. The allegations of the F.I.R. quoted hereinabove clearlygo to show that demand of dowry of Rs. 5 Lakhs was made by theappellants from the complainants and thus it can not be said that nooffence under the Dowry Prohibition Act are made out against theappellants. There being direct allegations of demand of Dowry in theFirst Information Report, the allegations prima-facie constitute acommission of an offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act and thus thecharges leveled against the appellants under Section 3/4 of the said Act,are not liable to be quashed.

30. In view of the above facts and discussions, we are of theconsidered view that insofar as offence under Section 493 I.P.C. isconcerned, since F.I.R. does not disclose the commission of any offenceunder the said Section and thus continuance of the criminal prosecutionunder said section would amount to abuse of process of the Court andthe order of the High Court to that extent is liable to be set aside.However, insofar as offence against the appellants under Section 3/4 ofthe Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, since the allegations disclosethe commission of cognizable offence in the F.I.R., it is not fit case to

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722SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aexercise power under Section 482 Cr.PC and to quash criminalproceedings against the appellants for the said offence.

31. As result of our aforesaid discussion, the charge sheet insofaras Section 493 I.P.C is concerned stands quashed. However, in respectof charge sheet under Section 3 read with Section 4 of Dowry ProhibitionBAct, the Appeal stands dismissed.

Divya Pandey

Appeal disposed of.