BANKA SNEHA SHEELA versus THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS.

[2021] 8 S.C.R. 978

[2021] 8 S.C.R.

ABANKA SNEHA SHEELA

THE STATE OF TELANGANA & ORS.

(Criminal Appeal No. 733 of 2021)

BAUGUST 02, 2021

[R. F. NARIMAN AND HRISHIKESH ROY, JJ.]

Preventive detention: Telangana Prevention of DangerousActivities of Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas,Immoral Traffic Offenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious SeedCOffenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, FoodAdulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, ScheduledCommodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders,Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, Arms Offenders,Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or Financial OffendersDAct, 1986 – s. 3(2) – Preventive detention under – On facts, detenuaccused of cheating many people to the tune of more than Rs. 50.00lakhs in the guise of providing good profit through investment inshare market – Five FIRs filed against detenu, being u/s. 420, 406and 506 IPC – Detention order passed nine months after the filingof the last FIR – Writ petition challenging order of preventiveEdetention – Dismissed by the High Court – On appeal, held: Merecontravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminal breachof trust certainly affects ‘law and order’ but to affect ‘public order’,it must affect the community or the public at large – Allegation inthe FIRs pertain to the realm of ‘law and order’ wherein variousFacts of cheating are ascribed to the detenu punishable under IPC –Possible apprehension of breach of law and order can be said tobe made out – This may be ground to appeal against the bailorders granted and/or to cancel bail but not for recourse topreventive detention statute – Thus, the detention order is quashedand the impugned judgment is set aside.G

s. 2(a) explanation – Public order – Explained.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 On the facts of the instant case, it is clear thatat the highest, possible apprehension of breach of law and orderH

can be said to be made out if it is apprehended that the Detenu, ifset free, will continue to cheat gullible persons. This may be agood ground to appeal against the bail orders granted and/or tocancel bail but certainly cannot provide the springboard to moveunder preventive detention statute. Therefore, the detentionorder is quashed on this ground. The impugned judgment is setaside and the Detenu is ordered to be freed forthwith. [Para24][1005-D-F]

1.2 While it cannot seriously be disputed that the Detenumay be “white collar offender” as defined under Section 2(x) ofthe Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act, yet aPreventive Detention Order can only be passed if his activitiesadversely affect or are likely to adversely affect the maintenanceof public order. Public order is defined in the Explanation toSection 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous ActivitiesAct to be harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity amongthe general public or any section thereof or grave widespreaddanger to life or public health. As is well-known, the expressions‘law and order’, ‘public order’, and ‘security of state’ are differentfrom one another. [Para 11, 12][988-G-H; 989-A-B]1.3 There can be no doubt that for ‘public order’ to bedisturbed, there must in turn be public disorder. Merecontravention of law such as indulging in cheating or criminalbreach of trust certainly affects ‘law and order’ but before it canbe said to affect ‘public order’, it must affect the community orthe public at large. There can be no doubt that what is alleged inthe five FIRs pertain to the realm of ‘law and order’ in that variousacts of cheating are ascribed to the Detenu which are punishableunder the three sections of the Indian Penal Code set out in thefive FIRs. close reading of the Detention Order would make itclear that the reason for the said Order is not any apprehensionof widespread public harm, danger or alarm but is only becausethe Detenu was successful in obtaining anticipatory bail/bail fromthe Courts in each of the five FIRs. If person is grantedanticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies inthe ordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can alwaysappeal against the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellationof bail. The mere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail

Aorders being the real ground for detaining the Detenu, there canbe no doubt that the harm, danger or alarm or feeling of securityamong the general public spoken of in Section 2(a) of theTelangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act is make believeand totally absent in the facts of the instant case. [Para 13, 14][991-

G-H; 992-A-C]B

1.4 When person is preventively detained, it is Article 21and 22 that are attracted and not Article 19. Further, preventivedetention must fall within the four corners of Article 21 read withArticle 22 and the statute in question. To therefore argue that aliberal meaning must be given to the expression ‘public order’ inCthe context of preventive detention statute is wholly inappositeand incorrect. On the contrary, considering that preventivedetention is necessary evil only to prevent public disorder, theCourt must ensure that the facts brought before it directly andinevitably lead to harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurityDamong the general public or any section thereof at large. [Para17][994-C-E]

Madhu Limaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate (1970) 3SCC 746 – held inapplicable.

Subramanian v. State of Tamil Nadu (2012) 4 SCC 699E: [2012] 1 SCR 985 – distinguished.

Commissioner of Police v. C. Sunita (2004) 7 SCC 467: [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 701 ; R. Kalavathi v. State ofTamil Nadu (2006) 6 SCC 14 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR74; Ram Manohar Lohia v. State of Bihar [1966] 1 SCRF709; Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra [1980]2 SCR 1095; Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar(1984) 3 SCC 14 : [1984] 3 SCR 435; Union of Indiav. Yumnam Anand (2007) 10 SCC 190 : [2007] 5 SCR60; Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244 :G[2011] 4 SCR 740; Haradhan Saha v. The State of WestBengal (1975) 3 SCC 198 : [1975] 1 SCR 778; YummanOngbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur (2012) 2 SCC176 : [2012] 1 SCR 1; Mungala Yadamma v. State ofA.P. (2012) 2 SCC 386 : [2012] 1 SCR 26 – referredto.

BANKA SNEHA SHEELA v. THE STATE OF TELANGANA &ORS.

Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana (2018) 12 SCC 150: [2017] 4 SCR 52; Collector & District Magistrate v.Sangala Kondamma (2005) 3 SCC 666 – cited.

Case Law Reference

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.733 of 2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 31.03.2021 of the High Courtof Telangana at Hyderbad in Writ Petition No. 20146 of 2020.

Gaurav Agrawal, Venkateshwar Rao Anumolu, Shashwat Goel,Vijay Babu, Advs. for the Appellant.

Ranjit Kumar, Sr. Adv., S. Udaya Kumar Sagar, Ms. Sweena Nair,Advs. for the Respondents.

[2021] 8 S.C.R.

AThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

R. F. NARIMAN, J

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeal arises out of judgment dated 31.03.2021,Bpassed by the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, bywhich Writ Petition filed by the Petitioner challenging PreventiveDetention Order [hereinafter referred to as “Detention Order”] passedagainst the Petitioner’s husband [hereinafter referred to as “the Detenu”]under Section 3(2) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activitiesof Boot-leggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas, Immoral TrafficCOffenders Land-Grabbers, Spurious Seed Offenders, InsecticideOffenders, Fertiliser Offenders, Food Adulteration Offenders, FakeDocument Offenders, Scheduled Commodities Offenders, ForestOffenders, Gaming Offenders, Sexual Offenders, Explosive SubstancesOffenders, Arms Offenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White CollarDor Financial Offenders Act, 1986 [hereinafter referred to as “TelanganaPrevention of Dangerous Activities Act”], was dismissed.

3. The Detention Order under the provisions of the TelanganaPrevention of Dangerous Activities Act is dated 28.09.2020. It refers tofive FIRs that have been filed against the Detenu, all the said FIRs beingEunder Sections 420, 406 and 506 of the IPC. The facts contained in theFIRs range from October, 2017 to December, 2019 and are similar. Wemay set out the facts contained in FIR No.705 of 2019 as sample ofsimilar FIRs filed against the Detenu as follows [This narration of theFIR is to be found in the Detention Order itself]:

F“On 12.12.2019 at 1200 hours complaint was received from SriKommu Naveen Kumar S/o Veeraswamy, aged about 24 years,Occ: Car Mechanic, R/o H.No. 2-32, Yadaran Village, ShamirpetMandal stating that he has been running Garage near main roadat Muraharipally village for the past one year. One BankaRavikanth, aged about 35 years used to come to his garage forGtwo to three times in month for his car servicing. In the monthof March, 2019 the said Ravikanth introduced himself as HighCourt advocate and he would invest money in newly upcomingcompanies and insisted the complainant to invest money for 100%return. He also informed that they are three advocates, of themone is CA (Chartered Accountant) and another is CS (CompanyH

Secretary) by name Chandramouli, aged about 65 years. Onbelieving his words, he transferred Rs.50,000/- through Phone-pay to his Indian Bank, Shamirpet branch vide A/c No. [REDACTED].Again on 28.05.2019 he transferred Rs. 1,00,000/- through Phone-pay as second investment and on 20.06.2019 he deposited Rs.1,00,000/- from his Indian Bank, Gachibowli Branch account tohis account besides giving net cash of Rs. 2,00,000/- by hand.While sending Rs. 1 lakh through phone pay in presence of onePrasad, Banka Ravikanth assured the complainant that in the 2[nd]investment he would give him Rs. 41,000/- per month throughoutthe year and he will take Rs. 3,000/- towards his commission. On12.12.2019 when the complainant asked him to return his money,he threatened with dire consequences. The complainant statedthat the said Ravikanth has cheated him by saying that he wouldget more return. On the strength of the complainant, policeregistered case and investigation into.”

Following upon the narration of the 5 FIRs comes this importantparagraph:

“Due to above incidents, the complainants, victims and other youngaspirants, who want to invest money in stock/share market andderive benefits became scared and feeling insecure. Theseincidents have also caused loss of faith and trust among investorsin stock trading fearing similar cheating towards them by the peoplelike you. They are hesitated to consult any consultancies or personsfearing similar cheating by the unknown persons in the guise ofproviding good profits. These prejudicial activities have also causeddisturbance in the public.”

4. The Detention Order then refers to the ‘Modus Operandi’ ofthe Detenu as follows:

“You are native of Karimnagar district. You completed graduation(B.Com) in 2011 and LLB in 2019 and have been doing trading instock market. You have introduced yourselves to the victims as aHigh Court Advocate and you have team consisting of one CA(Chartered Accountant) and CS (Company Secretary) and threeadvocates. Your CS has an expertise and links in Central andState governments. You have knowledgeable persons in sharemarketing and used to invest money in upcoming companies which

Aensure return of 100%. You would lure the innocent public in theguise of providing good profit by investing their money in sharemarketing. You used to contact your known persons and lure themto invest their money in share market to get good profits assuringthe profit 100% within short period. Further you used to giveblank cheques and ask commission from the victims to gain theirBconfidence. As per plan, you collected amount from the victimsthrough Phone-pe which is linked to your bank account and net-banking and in-person. When you received money to your bankaccount, immediately you had transfer the received amount toyour wife’s bank account. When the victims contact you overCphone, you first start avoiding them and then diverting their callsand finally cheating them. Later, you changed your residentialaddress in order to conceal your where-abouts from the victims.You have cheated so many people to the tune of more than Rs.50.00 lakhs in the guise of providing good profit through investmentin share market.DYou are involved in Cr.No.34/2020 u/s 406, 420 IPC of MalkajgiriPolice Station in the limits of Rachakonda Police Commissioneratewhich referred by way of your antecedent criminal backgroundthe same is not relied upon for your detention.”

5. Thereafter, the Detention Order narrates that anticipatory bail/Ebail has been granted to the Detenu in all the aforesaid FIRs, the lastsuch relief granted being on 10.08.2020. The Detention Order thennarrates:

“Having regard to your involvement in series of criminal activitiessuch as cheating in the guise of providing good profit by investingFtheir money in stock market and collected huge amounts to thetune of more than Rs. 50 lakhs from them in an organized wayand in view of the bail petitions moved by you and granted in theaforesaid cases and later releasing on conditional bail, I am satisfiedthat free movement of such an offender like you is not safe in theinterest of the society as there is an imminent possibility of youGindulging in similar prejudicial activities with another set of innocentyouth and cheat them on the pretext of providing good profit byinvesting their money in stock market, which are detrimental topublic order, unless you were prevented from doing so by anappropriate order of detention.Hxxx xxx xxx

Thus you have indulged in the acts of White Collar offences bycommitting offences such as cheating so many people by collectingmore than Rs. 50 lakhs from them through Phone Pay and onlinebanking and sometimes in person in the guise of providing moreprofit in the limits of Cyberabad Police Commissionerate. Furtheryour acts have been adversely affecting the maintenance of publicorder and creating feeling of insecurity among young people, thusdisturbing peace and tranquillity in the area.

It is imperative to prevent you from acting in any manner prejudicialto the maintenance of public order. I feel that recourse to normallaw may not be effective deterrent-in preventing you fromindulging in such further activities prejudicial to the maintenanceof public order in the area, unless you were detained by invokingthe provisions under the “Telangana Prevention of DangerousActivities of Bootleggers, Dacoits, Drug-Offenders, Goondas,Immoral Traffic Offenders, Land-Grabbers, Spurious SeedOffenders, Insecticide Offenders, Fertiliser Offenders, FoodAdulteration Offenders, Fake Document Offenders, ScheduledCommodities Offenders, Forest Offenders, Gaming Offenders,Sexual Offenders, Explosive Substances Offenders, ArmsOffenders, Cyber Crime Offenders and White Collar or FinancialOffenders Act, 1986, (Act No. 01 of 1986)”.”

6. As result thereof, the Detenu was preventively detained fromthe date of the Detention Order itself. representation dated 31.10.2020was made by the Petitioner herein to the Commissioner of Police,Cyberabad Commissionerate [Respondent No. 2] which was consideredby the Advisory Board, who by its Order 11.11.2020 found that therewas sufficient cause to continue the Detention Order. Vide the Order ofthe State of Telangana dated 17.12.2020, the Detention Order wasconfirmed and the period of detention was directed to be for period ofone year from 05.10.2020.

7. The impugned judgment, after narrating the facts and thearguments made by counsel on behalf of the Petitioner as well as counselon behalf of the State, then held:

“9. In the instant case, perusal of the material placed on recordreveals that the detenu was granted bail by the Courts concernedin all the five cases relied upon by the detaining authority for

Apreventively detaining him. Under these circumstances, thecontention of the respondents that the illegal activities of the detenuwould disturb the even tempo of life of the community whichmakes it prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order andthere is imminent possibility of the detenu again indulging in similarprejudicial activities, cannot be brushed aside.”BThe judgment then referred to the decisions of this Court in MadhuLimaye v. Sub-Divisional Magistrate (1970) 3 SCC 746,Commissioner of Police v. C. Sunita (2004) 7 SCC 467 and R.Kalavathi v. State of Tamil Nadu (2006) 6 SCC 14, and then concluded:C“The modus operandi of the detenu in the alleged offences whichwere committed in quick succession would certainly disturb thepublic peace and tranquillity. So it is imperative upon the officersconcerned to pass the order of detention, since the acts of thedetenu are prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. Theillegal activities of the detenu were of such reach and extent,Dthat they would certainly affect the even tempo of life and wereprejudicial to the public order. The detaining authority had sufficientmaterial to record subjective satisfaction that the detention of thedetenu was necessary to maintain public order and even tempo oflife of the community. The order of detention does not suffer fromEany illegality. The grounds of detention, as indicated in the impugnedorder, are found to be relevant and in tune with the provisions ofthe P.D.Act. Since the detenu got bail in all the five cases reliedupon by the detaining authority, there is nothing wrong on the partof the detaining authority in raising an apprehension that there isevery possibility of the detenu committing similar offences, whichFwould again certainly affect the public order. The quick successionof commission of alleged offences by the detenu makes it amplyclear that there is every possibility of detenu committing similaroffences in future, which are prejudicial to the maintenance ofpublic order.”

G8. Shri Gaurav Agarwal, learned counsel appearing on behalf ofthe Petitioner has raised three points before us. First and foremost, hesaid there is no proximate or live connection between the acts complainedof and the date of the Detention Order, as the last act that was complainedof, which is discernible from the first 3 FIRs [FIRs dated 12.12.2019,H12.12.2019 and 14.12.2019], was in December 2019 whereas the

Detention Order was passed 9 months later on 28.09.2020. He thenargued, without conceding, that at best only ‘law and order’ problem ifat all would arise on the facts of these cases and not ‘public order’problem, and referred to certain judgments of this court to buttress thesame. He also argued that the Detention Order was totally perverse inthat it was passed only because anticipatory bail/bail applications weregranted. The correct course of action would have been for the State tomove to cancel the bail that has been granted if any further untowardincident were to take place.

9. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalfof the State of Telangana, reiterated the grounds contained in theDetention Order and argued that the Detenu was habitual fraudsterwho had therefore created fear amongst the gullible public, and since hewas likely to commit similar offences in future, it was important topreventively detain him, as the ordinary law had no deterrent effect onhim. Further, there is no doubt that he had infringed ‘public order’ asdefined by the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous Activities Act andhad disturbed the even tempo of life of persons who were cheated byhim and were likely to be cheated by him.

10. Having heard learned counsel for both parties, it is firstimportant to set out the important provisions of the Act as follows:

“2. Definitions

In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires,

(a) “acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of publicorder” means when bootlegger, dacoit, drug-offender, agoonda, an immoral traffic offender, Land-Grabber, SpuriousSeed Offender, an Insecticide Offender, Fertiliser Offender, aFood Adulteration Offender, Fake Document Offender, aScheduled Commodities Offender, Forest Offender, GamingOffender, Sexual Offender, an Explosive Substances Offender,an Arms Offender, Cyber Crime Offender and White Collaror Financial Offender is engaged or is making preparations forengaging, in any of his activities as such, which affect adversely,or are likely to affect adversely, the maintenance of public order:

Explanation:- For the purpose of this clause public order shall bedeemed to have been affected adversely or shall be deemed likely

to be affected adversely inter alia, if any of the activities of any ofthe persons referred to in this clause directly, or indirectly, is causingor calculated to cause any harm, danger or alarm or feeling ofinsecurity among the general public or any section thereof or agrave wide-spread danger to life or public health;

Bxxx xxx xxxx

(x) “White collar offender” or “Financial Offender” means aperson who commits or abets the commission of offencespunishable under the Telangana Protection of Depositors ofFinancial Establishment Act, 1999 (Act 17 of 1999) or under sectionsC406 to 409 or 417 to 420 or under Chapter XVIII of the IndianPenal Code, 1860.”

“Section 3. Power to make orders detaining certain persons

(1) The Government may, if satisfied with respect to any bootlegger,dacoit, drug-offender, goonda, immoral traffic offender, Land-DGrabber, Spurious Seed Offender, Insecticide Offender, FertilizerOffender, Food Adulteration Offender, Fake Document Offender,Scheduled Commodities Offender, Forest Offender, GamingOffender, Sexual Offender, Explosive Substances Offender, ArmsOffender, Cyber Crime Offender and White Collar or FinancialEOffender that with view to preventing him from acting in anymanner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, it isnecessary so to do, make an order directing that such person bedetained.”

“Section 13. Maximum period of detention

The maximum period for which any person may be detained, inpursuance of any detention order made under this Act which hasbeen confirmed under section 12, shall be twelve months fromthe date of detention.”

11. While it cannot seriously be disputed that the Detenu may beGa “white collar offender” as defined under Section 2(x) of the TelanganaPrevention of Dangerous Activities Act, yet Preventive Detention Ordercan only be passed if his activities adversely affect or are likely toadversely affect the maintenance of public order. Public order is definedin the Explanation to Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention ofDangerous Activities Act to be harm, danger or alarm or feeling ofH

insecurity among the general public or any section thereof or gravewidespread danger to life or public health.

12. As is well-known, the expressions ‘law and order’, ‘publicorder’, and ‘security of state’ are different from one another. In RamManohar Lohia v. State of Bihar (1966) 1 SCR 709 the question beforethis Court arose under Preventive Detention Order made under Rule30 of the Defence of India Rules, which permits apprehension anddetention of person likely to act in manner prejudicial to themaintenance of public order. This Court set out the distinction betweena mere law and order disturbance and public order disturbance asfollows:“The Defence of India Act and the Rules speak of the conditionsunder which preventive detention under the Act can be ordered.In its long title and the preamble the Defence of India Act speaksof the necessity to provide for special measures to ensure publicsafety and interest, the defence of India and civil defence. Theexpression public safety and interest between them indicate therange of action for maintaining security peace and tranquillity ofIndia whereas the expressions defence of India and civil defenceconnote defence of India and its people against aggression fromoutside and action of persons within the country. These genericterms were used because the Act seeks to provide for congeriesof action of which preventive detention is just small part. Inconferring power to make rules, Section 3 of the Defence of IndiaAct enlarges upon the terms of the preamble by specification ofdetails. It speaks of defence of India and civil defence and publicsafety without change but it expands the idea of public interestinto maintenance of public order, the efficient conduct of militaryoperations and maintaining of supplies and services essential tothe life of the community. Then it mentions by way of illustrationin clause (15) of the same section the power of apprehension anddetention in custody of any person whom the authority empoweredby the rules to apprehend or detain (the authority empowered todetain not being lower in rank than that of District Magistrate),suspects, on grounds appearing to that authority to be reasonable—

(a) of being of hostile origin; or

(b) of having acted, acting or being about to act or being likely toact in manner prejudicial to—

[2021] 8 S.C.R.

(i) the defence of India and civil defence;(ii) the security of the State;(iii) the public safety or interest:(iv) the maintenance of public order;(v) India’s relations with foreign states:

(vi) the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part or area ofIndia: or

(vii) the efficient conduct of military operations.

It will thus appear that security of the state, public safety or interest,maintenance of public order and the maintenance of peacefulconditions in any part or area of India may be viewed separatelyeven though strictly one clause may have an effect or bearing onanother. Then follows Rule 30, which repeats the above conditionsand permits detention of any person with view to preventinghim from acting in any of the above ways. The argument of DrLohia that the conditions are to be cumulatively applied is clearlyuntenable. It is not necessary to analyse Rule 30 which we quotedearlier and which follows the scheme of Section 3(15). Thequestion is whether by taking power to prevent Dr Lohia fromacting to the prejudice of “law and order” as against “public order”the District Magistrate went outside his powers.

[page 738-739]

xxx xxx xxx

We have here case of detention under Rule 30 of the Defenceof India Rules which permits apprehension and detention of aperson likely to act in manner prejudicial to the maintenance ofpublic order. It follows that if such person is not detained publicdisorder is the apprehended result. Disorder is no doubt preventedby the maintenance of law and order also but disorder is broadspectrum which includes at one end small disturbances and at theother the most serious and cataclysmic happenings. Does theexpression “public order” take in every kind of disorders or onlysome of them? The answer to this serves to distinguish “publicorder” from “law and order” because the latter undoubtedly takesin all of them. Public order if disturbed, must lead to public disorder.Every breach of the peace does not lead to public disorder. Whentwo drunkards quarrel and fight there is disorder but not publicdisorder. They can be dealt with under the powers to maintainlaw and order but cannot be detained on the ground that theywere disturbing public order. Suppose that the two fighters wereof rival communities and one of them tried to raise communalpassions. The problem is still one of law and order but it raises theapprehension of public disorder. Other examples can be imagined.The contravention of law always affects order but before if canbe said to affect public order, it must affect the community or thepublic at large. mere disturbance of law and order leading todisorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under theDefence of India Act but disturbances which subvert the publicorder are. District Magistrate is entitled to take action underRule 30(1)(b) to prevent subversion of public order but not in aidof maintenance of law and order under ordinary circumstances.

It will thus appear that just as “public order” in the rulings of thisCourt (earlier cited) was said to comprehend disorders of lessgravity than those affecting “security of State”, “law and order”also comprehends disorders of less gravity than those affecting“public order”. One has to imagine three concentric circles. Lawand order represents the largest circle within which is the nextcircle representing public order and the smallest circle representssecurity of State. It is then easy to see that an act may affect lawand order but not public order just as an act may affect publicorder but not security of the State. By using the expression“maintenance of law and order” the District Magistrate waswidening his own field of action and was adding clause to theDefence of India Rules.”

[page 745-746]

13. There can be no doubt that for ‘public order’ to be disturbed,there must in turn be public disorder. Mere contravention of law such asindulging in cheating or criminal breach of trust certainly affects ‘lawand order’ but before it can be said to affect ‘public order’, it mustaffect the community or the public at large.

14. There can be no doubt that what is alleged in the five FIRspertain to the realm of ‘law and order’ in that various acts of cheating

Aare ascribed to the Detenu which are punishable under the three sectionsof the Indian Penal Code set out in the five FIRs. close reading of theDetention Order would make it clear that the reason for the said Orderis not any apprehension of widespread public harm, danger or alarm butis only because the Detenu was successful in obtaining anticipatory bail/bail from the Courts in each of the five FIRs. If person is grantedBanticipatory bail/bail wrongly, there are well-known remedies in theordinary law to take care of the situation. The State can always appealagainst the bail order granted and/or apply for cancellation of bail. Themere successful obtaining of anticipatory bail/bail orders being the realground for detaining the Detenu, there can be no doubt that the harm,Cdanger or alarm or feeling of security among the general public spokenof in Section 2(a) of the Telangana Prevention of Dangerous ActivitiesAct is make believe and totally absent in the facts of the present case.

15. At this stage, it is important to advert to the counter affidavitdated 17.07.2021 filed by the State of Telangana. Paragraph 18 of theDcounter affidavit refers to the granting of bail by Courts in all the fiveFIRs, which is the real reason for the passing of the Detention Order, asfollows:

“18. It is submitted that in the instant case, the decision to detainthe detenu herein is based on the perusal of the material on recordsEwhich revealed that the detenu was granted bail by the Courtsconcerned in all the five cases relied upon by the detaining authorityfor preventively detaining him. The Respondent No. 2 hereinrecorded his satisfaction that the activities of the detenu areprejudicial to the maintenance of public order, and that ordinarylaw may not be an effective deterrent to prevent the detenu fromFindulging in further prejudicial activities. Furthermore, the materialsrelied upon and circumstances show that subjective satisfactionof the detaining authority is not tainted or illegal on any account.Therefore the passing of the detention order is justified consideringthat the illegal activities of the detenu would disturb the even tempoGof life of the community, which makes it prejudicial to themaintenance of the public order and there is imminent possibilityof the detenu again indulging in similar prejudicial activities.”

Paragraph 21 of the counter affidavit then states as follows:

“21. It is submitted that in the acts which disturb public tranquillityHor are breaches of the peace should not be given narrow meaning,

but should be given liberal interpretation and the expression ‘inthe interest of public order’ is very wide amplitude as held by thisHon’ble Court in Madhu Limaye Versus Sub DivisionMagistrate reported in AIR 1971 SC 2486. Therefore theRespondent No. 2, before passing the said detention orderconsidered the crucial issues as to whether the activities of thedetenu were prejudicial to public and as to whether public ordercould be affected by only such contravention which affects thecommunity or the public at large.”

16. The reference to Madhu Limaye v. Sub-DivisionalMagistrate (supra) is wholly inapposite. This judgment dealt with thescope of the expression “in the interests of public order” which occursin Article 19(2) to 19(4) of the Constitution of India. The observationsmade by this judgment were in the context of challenge to Section 144of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Importantly, this Court referred tothe judgment in Ram Manohar Lohia (supra) and then opined:

“19. Adopting this test we may say that the State is at the centreand society surrounds it. Disturbances of society go in broadspectrum from more disturbance of the serenity of life to jeopardyof the State. The acts become graver as we journey from theperiphery of the largest circle towards the centre. In this journeywe travel first though public tranquillity, then through public orderand lastly to the security of the State.

20. In dealing with the phrase “maintenance of public order” inthe context of preventive detention, we confined the expressionin the relevant Act to what was included in the second circle andleft out that which was in the largest circle. But that considerationneed not always apply because small local disturbances of theeven tempo of life, may in sense be said to effect “public order”in different sense, namely, in the sense of state of lawabidingness vis-a-vis the safety of others. In our judgment theexpression “in the interest of public order” in the Constitution iscapable of taking within itself not only those acts which disturbthe security of the State or act within ordre publique as describedbut also certain acts which disturb public tranquillity or are breachesof the peace. It is not necessary to give the expression narrowmeaning because, as has been observed, the expression “in theinterest of public order” is very wide. Whatever may be said of

A“maintenance of public order” in the context of special lawsentailing detention of persons without trial on the pure subjectivedetermination of the Executive cannot be said in othercircumstances. In the former case this Court confined the meaningto graver episodes not involving cases of law and order which arenot disturbances of public tranquillity but of ordre publique.”B

17. To tear these observations out of context would be fraughtwith great danger when it comes to the liberty of citizen under Article21 of the Constitution of India. The reason for not adopting narrowmeaning of ‘public order’ in that case was because of the expression “inthe interests of” which occurs to Article 19(2) to 19(4) and which isCpressed into service only when law is challenged as beingunconstitutional for being violative of Article 19 of the Constitution. Whena person is preventively detained, it is Article 21 and 22 that are attractedand not Article 19. Further, preventive detention must fall within the fourcorners of Article 21 read with Article 22 and the statute in question. ToDtherefore argue that liberal meaning must be given to the expression‘public order’ in the context of preventive detention statute is whollyinapposite and incorrect. On the contrary, considering that preventivedetention is necessary evil only to prevent public disorder, the Courtmust ensure that the facts brought before it directly and inevitably leadto harm, danger or alarm or feeling of insecurity among the generalEpublic or any section thereof at large.

18. Several judgments of this Court have reminded us about therole of the High Courts and this Court in cases of preventive detention.Thus, in Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra (1980) 2 SCR1095, Division Bench of this Court held:F

“We have no doubt in our minds about the role of the court incases of preventive detention: it has to be one of eternal vigilance.No freedom is higher than personal freedom and no duty higherthan to maintain it unimpaired. The Court’s writ is the ultimateinsurance against illegal detention. The Constitution enjoinsGconformance with the provisions of Article 22 and the Court exactscompliance. Article 22(5) vests in the detenu the right to be providedwith an opportunity to make representation. Here the LawReports tell story and teach lesson. It is that the principalenemy of the detenu and his right to make representation isneither high-handedness nor mean-mindedness but the casual

indifference, the mindless insensibility, the routine and the red tapeof the bureaucratic machine.”

Likewise, in Vijay Narain Singh v. State of Bihar (1984) 3 SCC14, 3-Judge Bench of this Court (in which A.P. Sen,J. dissented),Venkataramiah, J., speaking for the majority, reminds us:

“32. …It is well settled that the law of preventive detention is ahard law and therefore it should be strictly construed. Care shouldbe taken that the liberty of person is not jeopardised unless hiscase falls squarely within the four corners of the relevant law.The law of preventive detention should not be used merely to clipthe wings of an accused who is involved in criminal prosecution.It is not intended for the purpose of keeping man under detentionwhen under ordinary criminal law it may not be possible to resistthe issue of orders of bail, unless the material available is such aswould satisfy the requirements of the legal provisions authorisingsuch detention. When person is enlarged on bail by competentcriminal court, great caution should be exercised in scrutinisingthe validity of an order of preventive detention which is based onthe very same charge which is to be tried by the criminal court.”

[emphasis supplied]

O. Chinappa Reddy, J., in short concurring judgment also setsout the constitutional fundamentals qua preventive detention as follows:

“I entirely agree with my brother Venkataramiah, J. both on thequestion of interpretation of the provisions of the Bihar Control ofCrimes Act, 1981 and on the question of the effect of the order ofgrant of bail in the criminal proceeding arising out of the incidentconstituting one of the grounds of detention. It is really unnecessaryfor me to add anything to what has been said by Venkataramiah,J., .but my brother Sen, J. has taken different view and out ofrespect to him, I propose to add few lines. I am unable to agreewith my brother Sen, J. on several of the views expressed by himin his dissent. In particular, I do not agree with the view that “thosewho are responsible for the national security or for the maintenanceof public order must be the sole judges of what the national securityor public order requires” It is too perilous proposition. OurConstitution does not give carte blanche to any organ of theState to be the sole arbiter in such matters. Preventive detention

Ais considered so treacherous and such an anathema to civilisedthought and democratic polity that safeguards against undueexercise of the power to detain without trial, have been built intothe Constitution itself and incorporated as Fundamental Rights.There are two sentinels, one at either end. The Legislature isrequired to make the law circumscribing the limits within whichBpersons may be preventively detained and providing for thesafeguards prescribed by the Constitution and the courts arerequired to examine, when demanded, whether there has beenany excessive detention, that is whether the limits set by theConstitution and the Legislature have been transgressed.CPreventive detention is not beyond judicial scrutiny. While adequacyor sufficiency may not be ground of challenge, relevancy andproximity are certainly grounds of challenge. Nor is it for the courtto put itself in the position of the detaining authority and to satisfyitself that the untested facts reveal path of crime. I agree withmy brother Sen,, J. when he says, “It has always been the view ofDthis Court that the detention of individuals without trials for anylength of time, however short, is wholly inconsistent with the basicideas of our Government and the gravity of the evil to thecommunity resulting from anti-social activities can never furnishan adequate reason for invading the personal liberty of the citizenEexcept in accordance with the procedure established by law.”

19. In Union of India v. Yumnam Anand (2007) 10 SCC 190,this Court reiterated some of these principles as follows:

“8. In case of preventive detention no offence is proved, nor anycharge is formulated and the justification of such detention isFsuspicion or reasonability and there is no criminal conviction whichcan only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive justice requiresan action to be taken to prevent apprehended objectionableactivities. (See R. v. Halliday [1917 AC 260 : (1916-17) All ERRep Ext 1284 : 86 LJ KB 116 : 116 LT 417 (HL)] and KubicGDarusz v. Union of India [(1990) 1 SCC 568 : 1990 SCC (Cri)227 : AIR 1990 SC 605] .) But at the same time, person’s greatestof human freedoms i.e. personal liberty is deprived, and, therefore,the laws of preventive detention are strictly construed, and ameticulous compliance with the procedural safeguard, howevertechnical, is mandatory. The compulsions of the primordial need

to maintain order in society, without which enjoyment of all rights,including the right of personal liberty would lose all their meanings,are the true justifications for the laws of preventive detention.This jurisdiction has been described as “jurisdiction of suspicion”,and the compulsions to preserve the values of freedom of ademocratic society and social order sometimes merit thecurtailment of the individual liberty. (See Ayya v. State ofU.P. [(1989) 1 SCC 374 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 153 : AIR 1989 SC364] ) To lose our country by scrupulous adherence to the writtenlaw, said Thomas Jefferson, would be to lose the law, absurdlysacrificing the end to the means. No law is an end itself and thecurtailment of liberty for reasons of State’s security and nationaleconomic discipline as necessary evil has to be administeredunder strict constitutional restrictions. No carte blanche is givento any organ of the State to be the sole arbiter in such matters.”

20. In Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu, (2011) 5 SCC 244,a 3-Judge Bench of this Court spoke of the interplay between Articles21 and 22 as follows:

“13. In our opinion, Article 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of Indiawhich permits preventive detention is only an exception to Article21 of the Constitution. An exception is an exception, and cannotordinarily nullify the full force of the main rule, which is the rightto liberty in Article 21 of the Constitution. Fundamental rights aremeant for protecting the civil liberties of the people, and not to putthem in jail for long period without recourse to lawyer andwithout trial. As observed in R. v. Secy. of State for the HomeDeptt., ex p Stafford [(1998) 1 WLR 503 (CA)] : (WLR p. 518F-G)

“ … The imposition of what is in effect substantial term ofimprisonment by the exercise of executive discretion, withouttrial, lies uneasily with ordinary concepts of the rule of law.”

Article 22, hence, cannot be read in isolation but must be read asan exception to Article 21. An exception can apply only in rareand exceptional cases, and it cannot override the main rule.

14. Article 21 is the most important of the fundamental rightsguaranteed by the Constitution of India. Liberty of citizen is amost important right won by our forefathers after long, historical

and arduous struggles. Our Founding Fathers realised its valuebecause they had seen during the freedom struggle civil libertiesof our countrymen being trampled upon by foreigners, and that iswhy they were determined that the right to individual liberty wouldbe placed on the highest pedestal along with the right to life as thebasic right of the people of India.

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17. Article 22(1) of the Constitution makes it fundamental rightof person detained to consult and be defended by lawyer ofhis choice. But Article 22(3) specifically excludes the applicabilityCof clause (1) of Article 22 to cases of preventive detention.Therefore, we must confine the power of preventive detention tovery narrow limits, otherwise the great right to liberty won by ourFounding Fathers, who were also freedom fighters, after long,arduous and historical struggles, will become nugatory.”

DThis Court went on to discuss, in some detail, the conceptual natureof preventive detention law as follows:

“29. Preventive detention is, by nature, repugnant to democraticideas and an anathema to the rule of law. No such law exists inthe USA and in England (except during war time). Since, however,EArticle 22(3)(b) of the Constitution of India permits preventivedetention, we cannot hold it illegal but we must confine the powerof preventive detention within very narrow limits, otherwise wewill be taking away the great right to liberty guaranteed by Article21 of the Constitution of India which was won after long, arduousand historic struggles. It follows, therefore, that if the ordinaryFlaw of the land (the Penal Code and other penal statutes) candeal with situation, recourse to preventive detention law willbe illegal.

30.Whenever an order under preventive detention law ischallenged one of the questions the court must ask in deciding itsGlegality is: was the ordinary law of the land sufficient to deal withthe situation? If the answer is in the affirmative, the detentionorder will be illegal. In the present case, the charge against thedetenu was of selling expired drugs after changing their labels.Surely the relevant provisions in the Penal Code and the Drugsand Cosmetics Act were sufficient to deal with this situation.

Hence, in our opinion, for this reason also the detention order in”question was illegal. [emphasis supplied]

[emphasis supplied]

In an important passage, this Court then dealt with certain generalobservations made by the Constitution Bench in Haradhan Saha v. TheState of West Bengal (1975) 3 SCC 198 as follows:

“33. No doubt it has been held in the Constitution Bench decisionin Haradhan Saha case [(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri)816] that even if person is liable to be tried in criminal courtfor commission of criminal offence, or is actually being so tried,that does not debar the authorities from passing detention orderunder preventive detention law. This observation, to be understoodcorrectly, must, however, be construed in the background of theconstitutional scheme in Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution(which we have already explained). Article 22(3)(b) is only anexception to Article 21 and it is not itself fundamental right.It is Article 21 which is central to the whole chapter on fundamentalrights in our Constitution. The right to liberty means that beforesending person to prison trial must ordinarily be held givinghim an opportunity of placing his defence through his lawyer. Itfollows that if person is liable to be tried, or is actually beingtried, for criminal offence, but the ordinary criminal law (thePenal Code or other penal statutes) will not be able to deal withthe situation, then, and only then, can the preventive detention lawbe taken recourse to.

34. Hence, the observation in SCC para 34 in Haradhan Sahacase [(1975) 3 SCC 198 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 816] cannot be regardedas an unqualified statement that in every case where person isliable to be tried, or is actually being tried, for crime in criminalcourt detention order can also be passed under preventivedetention law.

35. It must be remembered that in cases of preventive detentionno offence is proved and the justification of such detention issuspicion or reasonable probability, and there is no conviction whichcan only be warranted by legal evidence. Preventive detention isoften described as “jurisdiction of suspicion” (vide State ofMaharashtra v. Bhaurao Punjabrao Gawande [(2008) 3 SCC613 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 128], SCC para 63). The detaining

authority passes the order of detention on subjective satisfaction.Since clause (3) of Article 22 specifically excludes the applicabilityof clauses (1) and (2), the detenu is not entitled to lawyer or theright to be produced before Magistrate within 24 hours of arrest.To prevent misuse of this potentially dangerous power the law ofpreventive detention has to be strictly construed and meticulouscompliance with the procedural safeguards, however technical,is, in our opinion, mandatory and vital.

36. It has been held that the history of liberty is the history ofprocedural safeguards. (See Kamleshkumar IshwardasPatel v. Union of India [(1995) 4 SCC 51 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 643]vide para 49.) These procedural safeguards are required to bezealously watched and enforced by the court and their rigourcannot be allowed to be diluted on the basis of the nature of thealleged activities of the detenu. As observed in RattanSingh v. State of Punjab [(1981) 4 SCC 481 : 1981 SCC (Cri)853] : (SCC p. 483, para 4)

“4. … May be that the detenu is smuggler whose tribe(and how their numbers increase!) deserves no sympathy sinceits activities have paralysed the Indian economy. But the laws ofpreventive detention afford only modicum of safeguards topersons detained under them, and if freedom and liberty are tohave any meaning in our democratic set up, it is essential that atleast those safeguards are not denied to the detenus.”

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39. Personal liberty protected under Article 21 is so sacrosanctand so high in the scale of constitutional values that it is theobligation of the detaining authority to show that the impugneddetention meticulously accords with the procedure established bylaw. The stringency and concern of judicial vigilance that is neededwas aptly described in the following words in Thomas PelhamDale case [(1881) 6 QBD 376 (CA)] : (QBD p. 461)

“Then comes the question upon the habeas corpus. It is generalrule, which has always been acted upon by the courts of England,that if any person procures the imprisonment of another he musttake care to do so by steps, all of which are entirely regular, and

that if he fails to follow every step in the process with extremeregularity the court will not allow the imprisonment to continue.””

[emphasis supplied]

21. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing on behalfof the State of Telangana relied strongly upon Subramanian v. State ofTamil Nadu (2012) 4 SCC 699, and in particular upon paragraphs 14and 15 which read as follows:

“14. It is well settled that the court does not interfere with thesubjective satisfaction reached by the detaining authority exceptin exceptional and extremely limited grounds. The court cannotsubstitute its own opinion for that of the detaining authority whenthe grounds of detention are precise, pertinent, proximate andrelevant, that sufficiency of grounds is not for the court but forthe detaining authority for the formation of subjective satisfactionthat the detention of person with view to preventing him fromacting in any manner prejudicial to public order is required andthat such satisfaction is subjective and not objective. The objectof the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventiveand further that the action of the executive in detaining personbeing only precautionary, normally, the matter has necessarily tobe left to the discretion of the executive authority. It is notpracticable to lay down objective rules of conduct in an exhaustivemanner. The satisfaction of the detaining authority, therefore, isconsidered to be of primary importance with certain latitude inthe exercise of its discretion.

15. The next contention on behalf of the detenu, assailing thedetention order on the plea that there is difference between“law and order” and “public order” cannot also be sustained sincethis Court in series of decisions recognised that public order isthe even tempo of life of the community taking the country as awhole or even specified locality. [Vide Pushpadevi M.Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan [(1987) 3 SCC 367 : 1987 SCC (Cri)526], SCC paras 11 & 14; Ram Manohar Lohia v. State ofBihar [AIR 1966 SC 740 : 1966 Cri LJ 608 : (1966) 1 SCR 709]; Union of India v. Arvind Shergill [(2000) 7 SCC 601 : 2000SCC (Cri) 1422], SCC paras 4 & 6; Sunil FulchandShah v. Union of India [(2000) 3 SCC 409 : 2000 SCC (Cri)

A659] , SCC para 28 (Constitution Bench); Commr. of Police v. C.Anita [(2004) 7 SCC 467 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 1944] , SCC paras 5,7 & 13.]”

The statement made by this Court in paragraphs 14 and 15 wereon facts which were completely different from the facts of the presentBcase as reflected in paragraphs 16 and 17 thereof which read as follows:

“16. We have already extracted the discussion, analysis and theultimate decision of the detaining authority with reference to theground case dated 18-7-2011. It is clear that the detenu, armedwith “aruval”, along with his associates, armed with “katta” cameCto the place of the complainant. The detenu abused the complainantin filthy language and threatened to murder him. His associatesalso threatened him. The detenu not only threatened thecomplainant with weapon like “aruval” but also damaged theproperties available in the shop. When the complainant questionedthe detenu and his associates, the detenu slapped him on his face.DWhen the complainant raised an alarm for rescue, on the arrivalof general public in and around, they were also threatened by thedetenu and his associates that they will kill them.

17. It is also seen from the grounds of detention that because ofthe threat by the detenu and his associates by showing weapons,Ethe nearby shopkeepers closed their shops out of fear and autodrivers took their autos from their stand and left the place.According to the detaining authority, the above scene created apanic among the public. In such circumstances, the scene createdby the detenu and his associates cannot be termed as only lawFand order problem but it is public order as assessed by the detainingauthority who is supposed to safeguard and protect the interest ofpublic. Accordingly, we reject the contention raised by the learnedSenior Counsel for the appellant.”

This was obviously case in which ‘public order’ was directlyaffected and not case in which ‘law and order’ alone was affectedGand is thus distinguishable, on facts, from the present case.

22. In Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State of Manipur (2012)2 SCC 176, this Court specifically adverted to when preventive detentionorder would be bad, as recourse to the ordinary law would be sufficient

in the facts of given case, with particular regard being had to bailhaving been granted. This Court held:

“23. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalfof the respective parties, we are inclined to hold that the(sic exercise of) extraordinary powers of detaining an individualin contravention of the provisions of Article 22(2) of the Constitutionwas not warranted in the instant case, where the grounds ofdetention do not disclose any material which was before thedetaining authority, other than the fact that there was everylikelihood of Yumman Somendro being released on bail inconnection with the cases in respect of which he had been arrested,to support the order of detention.

24. Article 21 of the Constitution enjoins that:

“21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—No personshall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according toprocedure established by law.”

In the instant case, although the power is vested with the authoritiesconcerned, unless the same are invoked and implemented in ajustifiable manner, such action of the detaining authority cannotbe sustained, inasmuch as, such detention order is an exceptionto the provisions of Articles 21 and 22(2) of the Constitution.

25. When the courts thought it fit to release the appellant’s husbandon bail in connection with the cases in respect of which he hadbeen arrested, the mere apprehension that he was likely to bereleased on bail as ground of his detention, is not justified.

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27. As has been observed in various cases of similar nature bythis Court, the personal liberty of an individual is the most preciousand prized right guaranteed under the Constitution in Part IIIthereof. The State has been granted the power to curb such rightsunder criminal laws as also under the laws of preventive detention,which, therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution aswell as upon proper appreciation of the facts as to whethersuch acts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the securityof the State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law andorder, warranting the issuance of such an order. An individual

incident of an offence under the Penal Code, however heinous, isinsufficient to make out case for issuance of an order ofpreventive detention.”

This judgment was followed in Mungala Yadamma v. State ofA.P. (2012) 2 SCC 386, as follows:

“7. Having considered the submissions made on behalf of therespective parties, we are unable to accept the submissions madeon behalf of the State in view of the fact that the decision in Rekhacase [(2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] , in our view,clearly covers the facts of this case as well. The offencescomplained of against the appellant are of nature which can bedealt with under the ordinary law of the land. Taking recourse tothe provisions of preventive detention is contrary to theconstitutional guarantees enshrined in Articles 19 and 21 of theConstitution and sufficient grounds have to be made out by thedetaining authorities to invoke such provisions.

8. In fact, recently, in Yumman Ongbi Lembi Leima v. State ofManipur [(2012) 2 SCC 176] we had occasion to consider thesame issue and the three-Judge Bench had held that the personalliberty of an individual is the most precious and prized rightguaranteed under the Constitution in Part III thereof. The Statehas been granted the power to curb such rights under criminallaws, as also under the laws of preventive detention, which,therefore, are required to be exercised with due caution as wellas upon proper appreciation of the facts as to whether suchacts are in any way prejudicial to the interest and the security ofthe State and its citizens, or seek to disturb public law and order,warranting the issuance of such an order.

9. No doubt, the offences alleged to have been committed by theappellant are such as to attract punishment under the AndhraPradesh Prohibition Act, but that in our view has to be done underthe said laws and taking recourse to preventive detention lawswould not be warranted. Preventive detention involves detainingof person without trial in order to prevent him/her from committingcertain types of offences. But such detention cannot be made asubstitute for the ordinary law and absolve the investigatingauthorities of their normal functions of investigating crimes which

the detenu may have committed. After all, preventive detention inmost cases is for year only and cannot be used as an instrumentto keep person in perpetual custody without trial. Accordingly,while following the three-Judge Bench decision in Rekhacase [(2011) 5 SCC 244 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 596] we allow theappeal and set aside the order passed by the High Court dated20-7-2011 [ The High Court dismissed the same vide MunagalaYadamma v. State of A.P., WP (Cri) No. 13313 of 2011, orderdated 20-7-2011 (AP)] and also quash the detention order dated15-2-2011, issued by the Collector and District Magistrate, RangaReddy District, Andhra Pradesh.”23. Shri Gaurav Agrawal and Shri Ranjit Kumar also cited thejudgments of this Court in Sama Aruna v. State of Telangana (2018)12 SCC 150 and Collector & District Magistrate v. SangalaKondamma (2005) 3 SCC 666 respectively. Since we are not goinginto other grounds raised by the Petitioner, it is unnecessary to discussthe law laid down in these judgments.

24. On the facts of this case, as has been pointed out by us, it isclear that at the highest, possible apprehension of breach of law andorder can be said to be made out if it is apprehended that the Detenu, ifset free, will continue to cheat gullible persons. This may be goodground to appeal against the bail orders granted and/or to cancel bail butcertainly cannot provide the springboard to move under preventivedetention statute. We, therefore, quash the detention order on this ground.Consequently, it is unnecessary to go into any of the other grounds arguedby the learned counsel on behalf of the Petitioner. The impugned judgmentis set aside and the Detenu is ordered to be freed forthwith. Accordingly,the appeal is allowed.

Nidhi Jain

Appeal allowed.