SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

[2021] 2 S.C.R. 617

SHIVAJI CHINTAPPA PATIL

STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

(Criminal Appeal No. 1348 of 2013)

MARCH 02, 2021

[R. F. NARIMAN AND B. R. GAVAI, JJ.]

Penal Code, 1860: s.302 – Conviction based on circumstantialevidence – Prosecution case was that the appellant was addicted toliquor and used to abuse and beat his wife forcing her to get moneyfrom her mother – On the fateful night, the appellant and his wifewent to sleep in their house – Next day morning, when the brotherof the appellant went to call the appellant for going to field forharvesting crop, appellant informed him that his wife committedsuicide by hanging – Trial court convicted appellant under s.302and sentenced him to imprisonment for life – High Court upheld thesaid order – On appeal, held: The medical expert who conductedthe autopsy admitted that the rope, which was found on the spot,could have been used for suicidal hanging of the deceased – Hefurther stated that in case of homicidal strangulation, the bodilyresistance would be reflected – Admittedly, there were no marks onthe body to suggest violence or struggle – In any case, the medicalexpert himself did not rule out the possibility of suicidal death – Inthe light of this evidence, trial court as well as High Court erred inholding that the prosecution proved that the death of the deceasedwas homicidal – The motive relied on by prosecution was ill-treatmentby the appellant meted out to the deceased for not arranging moneyfrom her mother – PW-3, mother of the deceased stated that appellantand deceased had been to her house and stayed for four days fewdays prior to the incident – This showed that the relations betweenthe deceased and appellant were cordial – Thus, it was not safe torely on the uncorroborated evidence of such witness – Also,prosecution sought to rely on the evidence of PW-1 – However, hisevidence was full of improvements and omissions – Even trial courtand High Court disbelieved his evidence – Thus, prosecution utterlyfailed to prove motive beyond doubt – As such, an important link tocomplete the chain of circumstances was totally absent – Prosecutionfailed to prove single incriminating circumstance beyond

Areasonable doubt – Conviction and sentence passed by trial courtas affirmed by High Court is set aside and appellant is acquitted ofall the charges.

Evidence Act, 1872: s.106 – Burden to prove – s.106 doesnot directly operate against either husband or wife staying underBthe same roof and being the last person seen with the deceased –s.106 does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primaryburden of proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt –It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, if believed,will sustain conviction, or which makes out prima facie case,that the question arises of considering facts of which the burden ofCproof would lie upon the accused – In the instant case, theprosecution has even failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt thatthe death was homicidal.

Criminal law: Motive – Though in case of direct evidence,motive would not be relevant, in case of circumstantial evidence,Dmotive plays an important link to complete the chain ofcircumstances.

Criminal law: False explanation or non-explanation can onlybe used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution hasproved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusionEthan the guilt of the accused – However, it cannot be used as linkto complete the chain.

Criminal law: Two views – If two views are possible, the benefitshall always go to the accused.

FAllowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. In the instant case, PW-6 examined as medicalexpert, conducted the autopsy along with his senior medicalofficer. In the advance death certificate issued on 24[th] March 2003,under his signature, the probable cause of death was ‘asphyxiadue to strangulation’. However, in the Post-Mortem Report whichGwas signed by PW-6 as well as his Senior Medical Officer on 19[th]June 2003, the cause of death was ‘cardio respiratory arrest dueto asphyxia due to hanging’. PW-6 admitted, that in both the casesof suicidal or homicidal hanging, the ligature marks around theneck shall go upwards ears. He further admitted that afterH

consulting his senior medical officer and going through the books,he concluded that it was case of hanging. He further admitted,that rope, which was found on the spot, can be used for suicidalhanging. He further admitted, that in case of homicidalstrangulation, the bodily resistance would be reflected.Admittedly, there are no marks on the body which would suggestviolence or struggle. In any case, the medical expert himself hasnot ruled out the possibility of suicidal death. On the contrary,the Post-Mortem Report shows, that the cause of death was‘asphyxia due to hanging’. In the light of this evidence, the trialcourt as well as the High Court erred in holding, that theprosecution proved that the death of the deceased was homicidal.[Paras 13, 15, 17, 18][625-A-C, E-F; 626-C-D]

Eswarappa alias Doopada Eswarappa v. State ofKarnataka (2019) 16 SCC 269 – relied on.

Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology 23[rd]Edn. p.572 – referred to.

2. It is well-settled that Section 106 of the Evidence Actdoes not directly operate against either husband or wife stayingunder the same roof and being the last person seen with thedeceased. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve theprosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving theprosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. In the present case,the prosecution has even failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt,that the death was homicidal. [Paras 22, 23][628-A-C, C-D]

Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another (2009)14 SCC 415 : [2009] 9 SCR 725; Gargi v. State ofHaryana (2019) 9 SCC 738; Trimukh Maroti Kirkan v.State of Maharashtra (2006) 10 SCC 681 : [2006] 7Suppl. SCR 156; Ponnusamy v. State of Tamil Nadu(2008) 5 SCC 587; [2008] 6 SCR 303 – relied on

3. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecutionwas, that the appellant failed to give any explanation in hisstatement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. By now it is well-settledprinciple of law, that false explanation or non-explanation can onlybe used as an additional circumstance, when the prosecution has

Aproved the chain of circumstances leading to no other conclusionthan the guilt of the accused. However, it cannot be used as alink to complete the chain. [Para 24][628-D-E]

4. Though in case of direct evidence, motive would notbe relevant, in case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays anBimportant link to complete the chain of circumstances. The motiverelied on by the prosecution is the ill-treatment by the appellantmeted out to the deceased for not arranging the money from hermother. PW-3, mother of the deceased has stated, that the accusedand deceased had been to her house and stayed for four days fewdays prior to the incident. This would show, that the relationsCbetween the deceased and accused were cordial. The prosecutionhas utterly failed to prove motive beyond doubt. As such, animportant link to complete the chain of circumstances is totallyabsent in the present case. [Paras 26, 27, 30][628-H; 629-A-C;630-F]DAnwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh(2020) 10 SCC 166 – relied on.

State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC254:[2006] 8 Suppl. SCR 501 – held inapplicable.

E5. It is more than settled principle of law that if two viewsare possible, the benefit shall always go to the accused. In thepresent case, let alone establishing chain of events which are sointerwoven to each other leading to no other conclusion than theguilt of the accused, the prosecution has failed even to prove asingle incriminating circumstance beyond reasonable doubt. TheFconviction and sentence passed by the trial court as affirmed bythe High Court is set aside. The appellant is acquitted of all thecharges. [Paras 32, 34][631-A, G-H; 632-A]

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra(1984) 4 SCC 116 : [1985] 1 SCR 88; Devi Lal v. StateGof Rajasthan (2019) 19 SCC 447 – relied on.

G. Parshwanath v. State of Karnataka (2010) 8 SCC593: [2010] 10 SCR 377; Babu v. State of Kerala (2010)9 SCC 189:[ 2010] 9 SCR 1039 – referred to.

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.1348 of 2013

From the Judgment and Order dated 01.10.2008 of the High Courtof Judicature at Bombay in Criminal Appeal No. 46 of 2005

S. Mahendran, Sachin Patil, Rahul Chitnis, Aaditya A. Pande, GeoJoseph, Advs. for the appearing parties.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

B. R. GAVAI, J.

1. This appeal assails the judgment and order delivered by theDivision Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in CriminalAppeal No. 46 of 2005, thereby dismissing the appeal of the appellantand maintaining the conviction and sentence of the appellant as passedby the Additional Sessions Judge, Islampur in Sessions Case No. 39 of2003 for offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code(For short ‘IPC’).

2. The prosecution case in brief as could be gathered from thematerial placed on record is as under:-

Deceased Jayashree was married to the accused prior to about 8or 9 years from the date of the incident. They were blessed with twoissues. PW-3-Anandibai is the mother of deceased. PW-5-RamchandraChintappa is the brother of the appellant, who was residing separately in

Adifferent part of the same house. It is the case of the prosecution, thatthe appellant was addicted to liquor and used to abuse and beat thedeceased forcing her to get money from her mother. On the fateful nightof 23[rd] March 2003, the accused and deceased went to sleep in theirhouse. At the dawn of 24[th] March 2003, PW-5 gave call to the appellant,so that they could go to their field for harvesting jawar crop. The accusedBopened the door and expressed his inability to accompany him to thefield stating, that Jayashree had committed suicide by hanging. PW-4-Ramchandra Shankar resides near the house of the appellant as well asPW-5. PW-5 informed PW-4 about the incident. PW-5 went to the villagePanumbre to inform the mother of deceased and other relatives aboutCthe incident. PW-5 went to Kokrud Police Station and gave informationabout death of the deceased. On the basis of information received fromPW-5, initially Ad No.13/2003 came to be registered. Subsequently, crimecame to be registered for the offence punishable under Section 302IPC. As per the advance death certificate, the probable cause of deathwas asphyxia due to strangulation. The charge-sheet came to be filedDbefore the jurisdictional Magistrate, First Class.

3. The case was committed to the learned Sessions Judge. Chargewas framed for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC. Theappellant pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. At the conclusion ofthe trial, the learned trial judge convicted the accused for the offenceEpunishable under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to imprisonmentfor life. Being aggrieved thereby, the appellant preferred an appeal beforethe High Court, which came to be dismissed. Hence, the present appeal.

4. We have heard Shri S. Mahendaran, learned amicus curiaeappearing on behalf of the appellant and Shri Sachin Patil, learned counselFappearing on behalf of the State.

5. Shri Mahendaran, learned counsel for the appellant submitted,that the case rests entirely on the circumstantial evidence. He submitted,that unless and until the prosecution proves its case beyond all reasonabledoubt, conviction in case of circumstantial evidence would not beGwarranted. The learned counsel submitted, that merely on the basis ofsuspicion, conviction would not be sustainable. He relies in this respecton the judgment of this Court in the case of G. Parshwanath v. State ofKarnataka[1].

H1 (2010) 8 SCC 593

6. The learned counsel submitted, that in the present case, theprosecution has not been in position to establish, that the death of thedeceased was homicidal. He submitted, that if the evidence of PW-6-Dr. Kishor Patki is considered, it would reveal, that the evidence isinconsistent with the theory of homicidal death. In this respect, the learnedcounsel relies on the judgment of this Court in the case of Eswarappaalias Doopada Eswarappa v. State of Karnataka[2].

7. Insofar as the finding of the learned trial court and the HighCourt with regard to the burden of the accused in view of Section 106 ofthe Evidence Act is concerned, the learned counsel submitted, that unlessthe initial burden is discharged by the prosecution, the burden would notshift on the appellant. Reliance in this respect is placed on the judgmentsof this Court in Subramaniam v. State of Tamil Nadu and Another[3]and Gargi v. State of Haryana[4].

8. The learned counsel submitted, that in the case of circumstantialevidence, motive plays an important role and the prosecution has utterlyfailed to prove the case as to motive. Reliance in this respect is placedon the judgment of this Court in the case of Babu v. State of Kerala[5].

9. Lastly, the learned counsel submitted, that when two views arepossible, one leaning towards acquittal and another towards conviction,the benefit should be given to accused. Reliance in this respect placedon the judgment of this Court in the case of Devi Lal v. State ofRajasthan[6].

10. Shri Sachin Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of theState submitted, that no interference is warranted in the concurrentfindings of the trial court and the High Court. He submitted, that the trialcourt as well as the High Court have rightly relied on the judgment ofthis Court in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Kashi Ram[7]for convictingthe accused.

11. The law with regard to conviction on the basis of circumstantialevidence has been very well crystalised in the judgment of this Court inthe case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra[8]:-

2 (2019) 16 SCC 269

3 (2009) 14 SCC 415

4 (2019) 9 SCC 738

5 (2010) 9 SCC 189

6 (2019) 19 SCC 447

7 (2006) 12 SCC 2548 (1984) 4 SCC 116

“153. close analysis of this decision would show that thefollowing conditions must be fulfilled before case againstan accused can be said to be fully established:

(1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt isto be drawn should be fully established.

It may be noted here that this Court indicated that thecircumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be”established. There is not only grammatical but legaldistinction between “may be proved” and “must be or shouldbe proved” as was held by this Court in Shivaji SahabraoCBobade v. State of Maharashtra (1973) 2 SCC 793 where theobservations were made : [SCC para 19, p. 807 : SCC (Cri)p. 1047]

“19. …..Certainly, it is primary principle that theaccused must be and not merely may be guilty before aDcourt can convict and the mental distance between ‘maybe’ and ‘must be’ is long and divides vague conjecturesfrom sure conclusions.”

(2) the facts so established should be consistent only withthe hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say,they should not be explainable on any other hypothesisEexcept that the accused is guilty,

(3) the circumstances should be of conclusive nature andtendency,

(4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis exceptFthe one to be proved, and

(5) there must be chain of evidence so complete as not toleave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistentwith the innocence of the accused and must show that inall human probability the act must have been done by theaccused.G

154. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitutethe panchsheel of the proof of case based on circumstantialevidence.”

12. In the light of these guiding principles, let us examine the factsHin the present case.

13. In the present case, PW-6-Dr. Kishor Patki has been examinedas medical expert. He has conducted the autopsy along with his seniormedical officer Dr. Tamboli. In the advance death certificate (Exh.-15),issued on 24[th] March 2003, under the signature of PW-6, the probablecause of death was ‘asphyxia due to strangulation’. However, in thePost-Mortem Report (Exh.-16) which is signed by Dr. Kishor Patki aswell as Dr. Tamboli on 19[th] June 2003, the cause of death was ‘cardiorespiratory arrest due to asphyxia due to hanging’. The only explanationfor inordinate delay of almost 3 months in signing the Post-Mortem Reportas given in his evidence by PW-6 is, that he was busy in some otherwork.

14. It will be relevant to refer to cross-examination of PW-6:-

“It is correct that in both cases of suicidal or homicidalhanging the ligature mark around the neck shall go upwardsears. It is correct that while issuing advance death certificateit did not consult senior medical officer and after consultingof senior medical officer and going through the books Iconcluded that it was case of hanging. Article No. 1 can beused for suicidal hanging and in case of homicidal hangingor homidic strangulation the bodily resistance would havereflected other recorded in my presence wise.”

15. It is thus clear, that the medical expert has admitted, that inboth the cases of suicidal or homicidal hanging, the ligature marks aroundthe neck shall go upwards ears. He has further admitted, that afterconsulting his senior medical officer and going through the books, heconcluded that it was case of hanging. He has further admitted, thatArticle No. 1 which is rope, which is found on the spot, can be used forsuicidal hanging. He has further admitted, that in case of homicidalstrangulation, the bodily resistance would have been reflected.

16. It will be apposite to refer to the judgment of this Court in thecase of Eswarappa alias Doopada Eswarappa (supra), wherein thisCourt relied on Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology andobserved thus:-

“7. In Modi’s Medical Jurisprudence and Toxicology, 23rdEdn., p. 572 it is observed as follows:

“Homicidal hanging, though rare, has been recorded.Usually, more than one person is involved in the act, unless

the victim is child or very weak and feeble, or is renderedunconscious by some intoxicating or narcotic drug. In acase, where resistance has been offered, marks of violenceon the body and marks of struggle or footprints of severalpersons at or near the place of the occurrence are likelyto be found.”

None of the well-known signs referred to by the learnedauthor are present in this case.”

17. In the present case also, admittedly, there are no marks on thebody which would suggest violence or struggle. In any case, the medicalCexpert himself has not ruled out the possibility of suicidal death. On thecontrary, the Post-Mortem Report shows, that the cause of death was‘asphyxia due to hanging’.

18. In the light of this evidence, we find, that the trial court as wellas the High Court have erred in holding, that the prosecution has provedDthat the death of the deceased was homicidal.

19. That leads us to the reliance placed by the High Court as wellas the trial court on the provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act. Inthe case of Subramaniam (supra), this Court had occasion to considerthe similar case of the husband and wife remaining within the four wallsEof house and death taking place. It will be relevant to refer to thefollowing observations of this Court:-

“23. So far as the circumstance that they had been livingtogether is concerned, indisputably, the entirety of thesituation should be taken into consideration. Ordinarily whenFthe husband and wife remained within the four walls of ahouse and death by homicide takes place it will be for thehusband to explain the circumstances in which she might havedied. However, we cannot lose sight of the fact that althoughthe same may be considered to be strong circumstance butGthat by alone in the absence of any evidence of violence onthe deceased cannot be held to be conclusive. It may bedifficult to arrive at conclusion that the husband and thehusband alone was responsible therefor.”

20. In the case of Subramaniam (supra), reliance was placedHon behalf of the State on the judgments of this Court in Trimukh Maroti

Kirkan v. State of Maharashtra[9]and Ponnusamy v. State of TamilNadu[10]. This Court observed thus:-

“26. In both the aforementioned cases, the death occurreddue to violence. In this case, there was no mark of violence.The appellant has been found to be wholly innocent. So faras the charges under Section 498-A or Section 4 of the DowryProhibition Act is concerned, the evidence of the parents ofthe deceased being PW 1 and PW 2 as also the mediators,PWs 4 and 5 have been disbelieved by both the courts below.That part of the prosecution story suggesting strong motiveon the part of the appellant to commit the murder, thus, hasbeen ruled out……”

21. It will also be relevant to refer to the following observations ofthis Court in the case of Gargi (supra):-

“33.1. Insofar as the “last seen theory” is concerned, thereis no doubt that the appellant being none other than the wifeof the deceased and staying under the same roof, was the lastperson the deceased was seen with. However, suchcompanionship of the deceased and the appellant, by itself,does not mean that presumption of guilt of the appellant isto be drawn. The trial court and the High Court haveproceeded on the assumption that Section 106 of the EvidenceAct directly operates against the appellant. In our view, suchan approach has also not been free from error where it wasomitted to be considered that Section 106 of the Evidence Actdoes not absolve the prosecution of its primary burden. ThisCourt has explained the principle in Sawal Das v. State ofBihar, (1974) 4 SCC 193 in the following: (SCC p. 197, para10)

“10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 ofthe Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecutionfrom the duty of discharging its general or primary burdenof proving the prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt.It is only when the prosecution has led evidence which, ifbelieved, will sustain conviction, or which makes out aprima facie case, that the question arises of considering

9 (2006) 10 SCC 681

10 (2008) 5 SCC 587

Afacts of which the burden of proof may lie upon theaccused.””

22. It could thus be seen, that it is well-settled that Section 106 ofthe Evidence Act does not directly operate against either husband orwife staying under the same roof and being the last person seen with theBdeceased. Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve theprosecution of discharging its primary burden of proving the prosecutioncase beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the prosecution has ledevidence which, if believed, will sustain conviction, or which makesout prima facie case, that the question arises of considering facts ofwhich the burden of proof would lie upon the accused.C23. In the present case, as discussed hereinabove, the prosecutionhas even failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt, that the death washomicidal.

24. Another circumstance relied upon by the prosecution is, thatDthe appellant failed to give any explanation in his statement under Section313 Cr.P.C. By now it is well-settled principle of law, that false explanationor non-explanation can only be used as an additional circumstance, whenthe prosecution has proved the chain of circumstances leading to noother conclusion than the guilt of the accused. However, it cannot beused as link to complete the chain. Reference in this respect could beEmade to the judgment of this Court in Sharad Birdhichand Sarda(supra).

25. The High Court and the trial court have then relied on Section8 of the Evidence Act about the conduct of the accused. It will be relevantto note, that PW-5-Ramchandra Chintappa who was the first informant,Fhas stated in his evidence, that when he went to call the accused forgoing to the field for harvesting the crop of jawar, he informed him, thatthe deceased had committed suicide by hanging. Not only this, but onthe basis of the report of the said witness, initially Ad No.13 of 2003came to be registered. The evidence of this witness is also dulyGcorroborated by the evidence of PW-4-Ramchandra Shankar. Both thesewitnesses are prosecution witnesses. We find, that the High Court andthe trial court have failed to take into consideration the evidence of thesewitnesses.

26. Though in case of direct evidence, motive would not berelevant, in case of circumstantial evidence, motive plays an importantH

link to complete the chain of circumstances. The motive relied on by theprosecution is the ill-treatment by the appellant meted out to the deceasedfor not arranging the money from her mother. In this respect, theprosecution relies on the evidence of PW-3-Anandi, mother of thedeceased. It will be relevant to refer to the cross-examination of thesaid witness:-

“….The accused and deceased had been to my house andstayed for four days few days prior to the incident…..”

27. PW-3-Anandi, mother of the deceased has stated, that theaccused and deceased had been to her house and stayed for four daysfew days prior to the incident. It would thus show, that the relationsbetween the deceased and accused were cordial. It will not be safe torely on the uncorroborated evidence of such witness.

28. The prosecution has sought to rely on the evidence of PW-1-Nivrutti. However, his evidence is full of improvements and omissions.Even the trial court and the High Court have disbelieved his evidence.

29. It will be relevant to refer to recent judgment of this Court inthe case of Anwar Ali and Another v. State of Himachal Pradesh[11]:-

“24. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the accusedthat in the present case the prosecution has failed to establishand prove the motive and therefore the accused deservesacquittal is concerned, it is true that the absence of provingthe motive cannot be ground to reject the prosecution case.It is also true and as held by this Court in Suresh ChandraBahri v. State of Bihar 1995 Supp (1) SCC 80 that if motive isproved that would supply link in the chain of circumstantialevidence but the absence thereof cannot be ground to rejectthe prosecution case. However, at the same time, as observedby this Court in Babu [Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC189, absence of motive in case depending on circumstantialevidence is factor that weighs in favour of the accused. Inparas 25 and 26, it is observed and held as under:[Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189], SCC pp. 200-01)

“25. In State of U.P. v. Kishanpal, (2008) 16 SCC 73, thisCourt examined the importance of motive in cases of

circumstantial evidence and observed: (SCC pp. 87-88,paras 38-39)

‘38. … the motive is thing which is primarily known tothe accused themselves and it is not possible for theprosecution to explain what actually promoted or excitedthem to commit the particular crime.

39. The motive may be considered as circumstance whichis relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence isclear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove theguilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if themotive is not very strong one. It is also settled law thatthe motive loses all its importance in case where directevidence of eyewitnesses is available, because even if theremay be very strong motive for the accused persons tocommit particular crime, they cannot be convicted if theevidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing. In the sameway, even if there may not be an apparent motive but if theevidence of the eyewitnesses is clear and reliable, theabsence or inadequacy of motive cannot stand in the wayof conviction.’

26. This Court has also held that the absence of motive ina case depending on circumstantial evidence is factorthat weighs in favour of the accused. (Vide Pannayar v. Stateof T.N., (2009) 9 SCC 152.””

30. In the present case, we are of the considered view that theprosecution has utterly failed to prove motive beyond doubt. As such, anFimportant link to complete the chain of circumstances is totally absent inthe present case.

31. Insofar as the reliance placed by the learned counsel for theState on the judgment of Kashi Ram (supra) is concerned, it wouldreveal, that this Court had used the factor of non-explanation underGSection 313 Cr.P.C. only as an additional link to fortify the finding, thatthe prosecution had established chain of events unquestionably leadingto the guilt of the accused and not as link to complete the chain. Assuch, the said judgment would not be applicable to the facts of the presentcase.

32. It is more than settled principle of law that if two views arepossible, the benefit shall always go to the accused. It will be apposite torefer to the following observations of this Court in the case of SharadBirdhichand Sarda (supra):-

“163. We then pass on to another important point which seemsto have been completely missed by the High Court. It is wellsettled that where on the evidence two possibilities areavailable or open, one which goes in favour of the prosecutionand the other which benefits an accused, the accused isundoubtedly entitled to the benefit of doubt. In KaliRam v. State of Himachal Pradesh (1973) 2 SCC 808, thisCourt made the following observations : [SCC para 25, p.820 : SCC (Cri) p. 1060]

“Another golden thread which runs through the web ofthe administration of justice in criminal cases, is that iftwo views are possible on the evidence adduced in the case,one pointing to the guilt of the accused and the other tohis innocence, the view which is favourable to the accusedshould be adopted. This principle has special relevancein cases wherein the guilt of the accused is sought to beestablished by circumstantial evidence.””

33. This Court, recently, in the case of Devi Lal (supra) observedthus:-

“19. That apart, in the case of circumstantial evidence, twoviews are possible on the case of record, one pointing to theguilt of the accused and the other his innocence. The accusedis indeed entitled to have the benefit of one which is favourableto him. All the judicially laid parameters, defining the qualityand content of the circumstantial evidence, bring home theguilt of the accused on criminal charge, we find no difficultyto hold that the prosecution, in the case in hand, has failed tomeet the same.”

34. In the present case, we are of the considered view that letalone establishing chain of events which are so interwoven to each otherleading to no other conclusion than the guilt of the accused, the prosecutionhas failed even to prove single incriminating circumstance beyondreasonable doubt. As such, the appeal is allowed and the conviction and

Asentence passed by the trial court as affirmed by the High Court is setaside. The appellant is acquitted of all the charges and he is directed tobe released forthwith if not required in any other case.

Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.