BHIMA RAZU PRASAD versus STATE, REP. BY DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE, CBI/SPE/ACU-II

[2021] 2 S.C.R.

BHIMA RAZU PRASAD

STATE, REP. BY DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT OF POLICE,

CBI/SPE/ACU-II

(Criminal Appeal No. 305 of 2021)

MARCH 12, 2021

[MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR ANDVINEET SARAN, JJ.]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.195(1)(b) – PenalCCode, 1860 – ss.420, 467, 468 and 471 – Prevention of CorruptionAct, 1988 – s.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(d) – case was registered againstthe appellant/accused no.1 u/ss.420, 467, 468 and 471 of IPC ands.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(d) of the PC Act – Thereafter, the respondent-investigative agency conducted search at the appellant’s residenceDand found an amount of Rs.79,65,900/-, in addition to jewelleryand property papers – Assets were found disproportionate to theappellant’s known sources of income – Another separate case wasregistered u/s. 13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(d) of the PC Act – During the courseof investigation, accused no. 2 claimed that he had entered into anagreement to sale to purchase properties from accused no.3 andEsince he (accused no.2) was not available on the date of executionof the agreement, he had entrusted the amount of Rs. 80 lakhs tothe accused no.1 – Since, the accused no.1 house was raided, themoney was not paid and agreement to sale was not executed – Hence,accused no. 2 and 3 sought recovery of money – However, theFrespondent-investigation agency revealed that the market value fixedby the State Government of the said properties was much belowRs.80 lakhs – The license of the stamp vendor/accused no.4, throughwhom the stamp papers of sale deed were issued, was cancelled inthe year 1992 and sale deed were issued in the year 2001 – So, therespondent-investigative agency alleged that the accused no.1Gconspired with accused no.2-4 to fabricate false deed of agreementto sale for the purpose of being shielded from legal action in thedisproportionate assets case – The charges were framed – Theaccused contended that complaint u/s.195(1)(b), Cr.P.C. wasnecessary for prosecuting the case u/s.193, IPC – The contentionHwas rejected by the trial Court – The trial Court convicted the

appellant/accused no.1 u/s.13(2) r/w. s.13(1)(e) of the PC Act aswell as ss.120B and 193 of the IPC and accused no.2 and 3 wereconvicted u/s.120B and s.193 of the IPC – Before the High Court,the accused no. 2 and 3 reiterated that the requirements ofs.195(1)(b)(i) and s.340, Cr.P.C. were not complied with prior toframing of charge u/s. 193 of IPC – The said contention was againrejected by the High Court – The High Court confirmed the trialCourt’s finding that the accused had conspired to fabricate falseevidence for shielding appellant/accused no.1 from prosecution inthe disproportionate assets case – Whether s.195(1)(b)(i),Cr.P.C.bars lodging of case by the investigating agency u/s. 193, IPC, inrespect of offence of giving false evidence which is committed atthe stage of investigation, prior to production of such evidencebefore the Trial Court – Held: S. 195(1)(b)(i), Cr.P.C. will not barprosecution by the investigating agency for offence punishable u/s.193, IPC, which is committed during the stage of investigation –This is provided that the investigating agency has lodged complaintor registered the case u/s. 193, IPC prior to commencement ofproceedings and production of such evidence before the trial Court– In such circumstance, the same would not be considered an offencecommitted in, or in relation to, any proceeding in any Court for thepurpose of s.195(1)(b)(i), Cr.P.C. – Thus, appellants directed tosurrender for serving out the rest of their sentence, if they are notalready in custody.Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.195(1)(b)(i) – Whetheran offence u/s.193, IPC committed at the stage of investigation,prior to production of the false evidence before the trial Court by aperson who is not yet party to proceedings before the Trial Court, isan offence “in relation to” proceeding in any court u/s.195(1)(b)(i), Cr.P.C. – Held: The words “in relation to” u/s.195(1)(b(i) appear to encompass situations wherein false evidencehas been fabricated prior to being produced before Court of law,for the purpose of being used in proceedings before the Court –The Construction of the words “in relation to” must be controlledby the overarching principle as stated in Patel Laljibhai Somabhaiand Sachida Nanda Singh, which was affirmed by the ConstitutionBench in Iqbal Singh Marwah – That is, even if the offence iscommitted prior to giving of the fabricated evidence in the Court, itmust have direct or reasonably close nexus with the courtproceedings.

ABC

1022SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ACode of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.195(1)(b)(i) – PenalCode, 1860 – s.193 – Whether the words “stage of judicialproceeding” under Explanation 2 to s.193, IPC can be equatedwith “proceeding in any court” u/s.195(1)(b)(i), Cr.P.C. – Held:The purpose of s.195(1)(b)(i), Cr.P.C., there must be an intentionon part of the alleged offender to directly mislead the Court intoBforming certain opinion by commission of offence u/s.193, IPC –Though criminal investigation is certainly stage of judicialproceeding insofar as it may culminate in issue of process and trialagainst the accused, it would not be proceeding in relation to acertain Court u/s.195(1)(b)(i), Cr.P.C. before the Court has evenCtaken judicial notice of such investigation – The difference betweena “stage” of judicial proceeding and the judicial proceeding itselfmust be emphasized in this regard.

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.195(1)(b)(i) ands.195(1)(b)(ii) – Difference between – Held: There is pertinentDdifference in the wording of s.195(1)(b)(i) and s.195(1)(b)(ii)inasmuch as s.195(1)(b)(ii) is restricted to offences which arecommitted in respect of document which is “produced or given inevidence in proceeding in any court” – Whereas s.195(1)(b)(i)applies to offences against public justice which are committed notonly in any proceeding in any court, but also “in relation to” suchEproceeding.

Dismissing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. General overview of the law on Section 195(1)(b)(ii), Cr.P.C.

F1.1 The issue of whether Section 195(1)(b) (ii), CrPC isapplicable to documents which are forged prior to their productionin Court is no longer res integra. This Court in Sachida NandSingh has held that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) read with Section 340(1),CrPC will only apply in respect of offences which are committedduring the time when the document concerned was custodia legisGor in the custody of the Court. [Para 7][1037-F-G]

1.2 The observations of the Supreme Court in Patel LaljibhaiSomabhai, as cited in Sachida Nand Singh, make the import andpurpose of Section 195(1)(b), CrPC clear. The provision is

intended to bar the right to initiate prosecution only where theoffence committed has reasonably close nexus with the courtproceedings, such that the Court can independently determinethe need for an inquiry into the offence with reference to its ownrecords. Therefore, the offence must be such that directly impactsadministration of justice by the Court. This would certainly bethe case if the document was in the custody of the Court at thetime of commission of offence. However, the bar under Section195(1)(b)(ii) cannot be read as operating even in cases wherethe offence against administration of justice was committed inrespect of document : 1) outside of the Court, 2) by personwho was not yet party to the Court proceedings, and, 3) at timelong before the production of the document before the Court.The same would not have “reasonably close nexus” with thecourt proceedings. Though these observations in Sachida NandSingh were made in the context of Section 195(1)(b)(ii), this Courtfinds that they have useful application in interpreting Section195(1)(b)(i) as well. The prohibition contained in Section195(1)(b)(i) should not be extended to provide protection to aperson who has been accused of tendering false evidence duringthe investigative stage prior to becoming party to the courtproceedings and producing such evidence before the Court. Theview taken in Sachida Nand Singh was subsequently affirmed bythe Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah. [Paras 7 and8][1040-B-H]

1.3 Similar to Sachida Nand Singh, the Constitution Benchalso referred to the observations made by the three-Judge Benchin Patel Laljibhai Somabhai on Sections 192(b) and 192(c) of theCode of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (“1898 Code”) whichcorresponded to Section 192(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the present CrPCrespectively. This Court in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai had notedthat even under Section 192(b) of the 1898 Code (correspondingto Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC), the offence committed is one witha “close nexus” to the court proceedings. [Para 8][1045-A-C]

2. Import of the Words “in relation to” in Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC.

2.1 The phrase “in relation to any proceeding in any Court”,which appears in Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC but is absent in

ASection 195(1)(b)(ii). It may be argued that this phrase makesthe scope of Section 195(1)(b)(i) wider than Section 195(1)(b)(ii).The words “in relation to” under Section 195(1)(b(i) appear toencompass situations wherein false evidence has been fabricatedprior to being produced before Court of law, for the purpose ofbeing used in proceedings before the Court. Therefore, it mayBnot be possible to apply the ratio of Iqbal Singh Marwah byway of analogy to Section 195(1)(b)(i) in every case. [Para 9][1045-C-E]

2.2 The construction of the words “in relation to” must becontrolled by the overarching principle applicable to SectionC195(1)(b), CrPC as stated in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai and SachidaNand Singh, which was affirmed by the Constitution Bench inIqbal Singh Marwah. That is, even if the offence is committedprior to giving of the fabricated evidence in court, it must have adirect or reasonably close nexus with the court proceedings.D[Para 14][1049-B-C]

2.3 Looking to the decision in Bandekar Brothers, is trueto say that Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC may be attracted to theoffence of fabricating false evidence prior to its production beforethe Court, provided that such evidence is led by person who isEparty to the court proceedings, for the purpose of leading theCourt to form certain opinion based on such evidence. The baragainst taking of cognizance under Section 195(1)(b)(i) may alsoapply where person who is initially not party to the courtproceedings fabricates certain evidence, and 1) subsequentlybecomes party and produces it before the Court; or; 2) falselyFdeposes as witness before the Court on the strength of suchevidence, for the purpose of causing the Court to form anerroneous opinion on point material to the result of theproceedings. [Para 15][1049-C-E]

2.4 However, where person fabricates false evidence forGthe purpose of misleading the investigating officer, this may nothave any direct nexus with the subsequent court proceedings.There is an indirect nexus inasmuch as if the investigating agencydoes not suspect any wrongdoing, and the Court commits thecase for trial, the evidence will be produced for the Court’s perusalH

and impact the judicial decision-making process. However, it maybe equally possible that even if the fabricated evidence appearssufficiently convincing, the investigating agency may dropproceedings against the accused and divert its time and resourceselsewhere. Therefore, the offence may never reach the stage ofcourt proceedings. Further, if it subsequently comes to light thatthe evidence was falsely adduced, it will be the investigatingagency which will suffer loss of face and be forced to conduct afresh investigation. Hence, though the offence is one which affectsthe administration of justice, it is the investigating agency, andnot the Court, which is the aggrieved party in such circumstance.It is possible that Courts may be more pro-active in makingcomplaints under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC upon applicationmade by the concerned investigative agencies, than in thosepreferred by private parties. The former being public authoritieswould enjoy more credence in seeking inquiry into their claims.Therefore, the reasons assigned by the Constitution Bench inIqbal Singh Marwah for adopting narrow construction of Section195(1)(b)(ii), CrPC may not be strictly applicable in the presentcase. [Paras 16 and 17][1049-F-H; 1050-A; 1051-F-G]

2.5 Just like private party who has been victim of forgerycommitted outside the precincts of the Court, the investigativeagency should not be left remediless against persons who haveproducing false evidence for the purpose of interfering with theinvestigation process. [Para 17.1][1052-A-B]

2.6 It would not be possible for the Court to independentlyascertain the need for lodging complaint under Section195(1)(b)(i) read with Section 340, CrPC when the evidencealleged to have been falsified is not even present on its records.Rather, it is the investigating agency which is best placed to verifyand prove whether such falsification has taken place, throughwhat means and for what purpose. [Para 17.2][1052-D-E]

2.7 The investigation agency cannot be compelled to takea chance and wait for the trial court to form its opinion in eachand every case. This may give the offender under Section 193,IPC sufficient time to fabricate more falsehoods to hide the

Aoriginal crime. Further, irrespective of the potential impact thatsuch false evidence may have on the opinion formed by the trialcourt, the investigating agency has separate right to proceedagainst the accused for attempting to obstruct fair and transparentprobe into criminal offence. Thus, this Court is of the view thatit would be impracticable to insist upon lodging of writtenBcomplaint by the Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC in sucha situation. [Para 17.3][1052-G-H; 1053-A]

3. Whether “stage of judicial proceeding” underExplanation 2 to Section 193, IPC is synonymous with“proceeding in any court” under Section195(1)(b)(i),CrPC?C

3.1 The purpose of Explanation 2 to Section 193, IPC isevidently to ensure that person who fabricates false evidencebefore an investigating or inquiring authority prior to the trial ofthe case does not escape penalty. This encompasses all nature ofproceedings, whether civil or criminal. However, whether theDcommission of such offence would require the complaint of Courtunder Section 195(1)(b)(i) would depend upon the authority beforewhom such false evidence is given. For example, if person givesfalse evidence in an inquiry before the Magistrate under Section200, CrPC, that would undoubtedly be an offence committedEbefore Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC. However, thiswould not be the case where false evidence is led before aninvestigating officer prior to the Court having taken cognizanceof the offence or the case being committed for trial.[Para 20.1][1054-F-H]

F3.2 The object and purpose of Section 195(1)(b), CrPC mustbe borne in mind whilst determining whether the fabrication offalse evidence during stage of judicial proceeding amounts tohaving made such fabrication in relation to proceeding beforethe Court. At the cost of repetition, it must be emphasized thatSection 195(1)(b) is meant to restrict the right to make complaintGin respect of certain offences to public servants, or to the relevantCourt, as they are considered to be the only party who is directlyaggrieved or impacted by those offences. Furthermore, for thepurpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC, there must be an intentionon part of the alleged offender to directly mislead the Court intoHforming certain opinion by commission of offence under Section

193, IPC. Though criminal investigation is certainly stage of ajudicial proceeding insofar as it may culminate in issue of processand trial against the accused, it would not be proceeding inrelation to certain Court under Section 195(1)(b) (i), CrPC beforethe Court has even taken judicial notice of such investigation.The difference between “stage” of judicial proceeding andthe judicial proceeding itself must be emphasized in this regard.[Para 20.2][1055-A-D]

3.3 In the present case, it is not the Trial Court but theRespondent authority/agency which has been directly impacteddue to fabrication of evidence by the Appellants/accused. TheAppellants’ intention was not to mislead the Trial Court, at leastnot at the first instance. Rather, their goal was to ensure that theAppellant/Accused No. 1 was cleared of wrongdoing at the stageof investigation itself. It was after being charged under Section193, IPC, that the Appellants/accused reiterated the fictitiousescrow arrangement story before the Trial Court so as to provetheir innocence. Hence it cannot be said that the offence underSections 120B read with 193, IPC was committed by the Appellants“in relation to” proceeding in court under Section 195(1)(b)(i),CrPC. [Para 22.1][1057-G-H; 1058-A]3.4 Had this been case wherein the Respondent had notdeveloped any suspicion against Accused Nos. 2 and 3, and theTrial Court had subsequently discovered the subterfuge causedby them, we may have taken different view. As this Court hasnoted, where the fabrication of evidence has escaped the scrutinyof the investigating agency, and the case is subsequently broughtto trial, such evidence would have direct bearing on the trialcourt’s opinion and hence the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i),CrPC may be applicable. However, in the present case, theinvestigating agency has been sagacious enough to detect thecommission of offence under Section 193, IPC at the preliminarystage. Therefore, as stated earlier, it would be unjust andimpracticable to insist upon the requirement of an independentinquiry and written complaint by the Trial Court in such scenario.[Para 22.3][1058-D-F]

ABC

A3.5 Thus, the questions of law stated stand answered againstthe Appellants/accused. Even on merits, there is no valid reasonto interfere with the concurrent findings of the Trial Court andthe High Court. The High Court has rightly observed that theAppellant/Accused No. 1 had not raised the defence of holdingthe money in escrow for Accused Nos. 2 and 3 at the time ofBsearch conducted at his house on 24.01.2001. The supposedagreement of sale was also not produced. This defence was raisedby Accused Nos. 2 and 3 at highly belated stage on 4.02.2002,almost year after the recovery of the seized currency, thoughthe Appellant had corresponded with Accused No. 2 in May-June,C2001. It is improbable in the ordinary course of conduct that aperson would wait so long to claim an amount of approximatelyRs. 80 lakhs which was required for completion of sale transaction.The stamp paper on which the sale deed was made was also provedto be illegal. Hence it is apparent that the Appellants/accusedentered into an elaborate conspiracy and attempted to create aDfalse circumstance of escrow transaction for the purpose ofshielding Appellant/Accused No. 1 from prosecution. In fact, theHigh Court has shown great lenity by reducing the sentencesawarded to the Appellants/accused in view of their advanced ageand delay in completion of the trial. In view of the gravity of theEoffence, no further benefit can be granted to them in this regard.[Para 23][1058-F-H; 1059-A-C]

Iqbal Singh Marwah and Another v. Meenakshi Marwahand Another, (2005) 4 SCC 370 : [2005] 2 SCR 708 –followed.

FSachida Nand Singh and Another v. State of Bihar andAnother, (1998) 2 SCC 493 : [1998] 1 SCR 492; PatelLaljibhai Somabhai AIR 1971 SC 1935 – relied on.

Arvindervir Singh v. State of Punjab and Another,(1998) 6 SCC 352 : [1998] 3 SCR 1004; Lalji HaridasGv. State of Maharashtra, (1964) 6 SCR 700; Babita Lilaand Another v. Union of India, (2016) 9 SCC 647 :[2016] 7 SCR 604; Chandrapal Singh and Others v.Maharaj Singh and Another, (1982) 1 SCC 466 –distinguished.

Bandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. PrasadVassudev Keni and Others, AIR 2020 SC 4247; Stateof Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (2020) 12 SCC 96 : 2020(2) JT 469; Surjit Singh and Others v. Balbir Singh,(1996) 3 SCC 533 : [1996] 3 SCR 70; Kailash Mangalv. Ramesh Chand (Dead) Through Legal Representative,(2015) 15 SCC 729 : [2015] 2 SCALE 615; NarendraKumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar and Others, (2019)3 SCC 318 : [2019] 2 SCR 643; Punjab and HaryanaHigh Court Bar Association, Chandigarh Through itsSecretary v. State of Punjab and Others, (1994) 1 SCC616 : [1993] 3 Suppl. SCR 915; Punjab & HaryanaHigh Court Bar Association v. State of Punjab andOthers, (1996) 4 SCC 742 : [1996] 2 Suppl. SCR 787– referred to.

CRIMINAL APPEAL JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No.G305 of 2021

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.01.2020 of the High Courtof Judicature at Madras in CRL.A.No. 1089 of 2007.

AWith

Criminal Appeal No. 306 and 307 of 2021

Basva Prabhu Patil, Sr. Adv., Amit Anand Tiwari, Ms. ShakunSharma, Kushagr Pandey, Ms. Devyani Gupta, B. Karunakaran, AnoopPrakash Awasthi, S. Gowthaman, Advs. for the Appellant.BMs. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG., Arvind Kumar Sharma, Advs. forthe Respondent.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.C

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise out of judgment dated 6.01.2020 in Crl. A.Nos. 1089, 1090 and 1091 of 2007 passed by the High Court of Judicatureat Madras (“High Court”). Since they involve common facts and questionof law, appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5102 of 2020 shall beDtaken as the leading case.

3. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as follows:

3.1 The Appellant/Accused No. 1 was working as RegionalManager (South) at Chennai with the Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. OnE4.01.2001 case was registered against the Appellant under Section 120Bread with Sections 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860(“IPC”); and Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of the Preventionof Corruption Act, 1988 (“PC Act”). Subsequently, the officers of theRespondent investigative agency conducted search at the Appellant’sresidence on 24.01.2001 on the basis of search warrant issued by theFSpecial Judge, Tis Hazari Court, New Delhi. During the course of thissearch, an amount of Rs. 79,65,900/- (“seized currency”), in addition tojewellery and property papers, was seized from the Appellant’s residence.Since these assets were found to be disproportionate to the Appellant’sknown sources of income, on 9.03.2001 separate disproportionate assetsGcase was registered against him under Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e)of the PC Act. It is this case that forms the factual crux of the presentappeal.

3.2 During the course of investigation, Accused No. 2 V.S.Krishnan (Appellant in the connected appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.)HNo. 6720 of 2020) and Accused No. 3 Murugesan (Appellant in the

connected appeal arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6327 of 2020) wroteletter dated 4.02.2002 to the Superintendent of Police, CBI/ACU-IIclaiming that the seized currency did not belong to the Appellant/AccusedNo. 1. They contended that Accused No. 2 had entered into agreementof sale dated 24.01.2001 to purchase properties from Accused No. 3,for which sum of Rs 80 lakhs was to be paid in advance. Since AccusedNo. 2 was not available on that date for execution of the writtenagreement, he had entrusted the seized currency, along with duplicatecopy of the agreement signed by him, to the Appellant. The agreementwas to be executed by Accused No. 3 in the presence of Appellant.However, since the Appellant’s house was raided on that date, the moneycould not be paid and the agreement of sale could not be executed.Hence Accused Nos. 2 and 3 sought recovery of the seized currency.

Accused No. 2 produced the purported sale deed dated 24.01.2001(in duplicate) typed out on stamp paper before the Investigating Officerin support of their claim. He also produced certain books of accounts toshow that he had financial capacity to purchase the properties fromAccused No. 3, in which entry was made on 20.01.2001 pertaining topayment of advance price of Rs 80 lakhs to Accused No. 3. However,pertinently, the Appellant had not taken any such defence at the time ofsearch conducted in his house on 24.01.2001, nor had he produced theduplicate sale deed before the officers of the Respondent agency at thattime.3.3 Investigation conducted by the Respondent revealed that themarket value fixed by the State Government in respect of the twoproperties described in sale deed dated 24.01.2001, was much below Rs80 lakhs. Further, that the first property was equitably mortgaged withthe Tamil Nadu Mercantile Bank Ltd. since 4.9.1998; whereas portionof the second property had already been sold to other persons. That thelicense of Accused No. 4 stamp vendor S. Mohankumar, through whomthe stamp papers of the sale deed were issued on 11.01.2001, wascancelled on 7.10.1992. No stamp paper of any denomination had beenissued to him during the period of 1998 to 2001. Therefore, theRespondent’s claim is that the Appellant conspired with Accused Nos.2-4 to fabricate false deed of agreement for sale for the purpose ofbeing shielded from legal action in the disproportionate assets case.Accordingly, the Learned Additional Special Judge for CBI Cases,Chennai (“Trial Court”) framed charges against the Appellant andAccused Nos. 2-4 under Section 120B read with Section 193 of the

AIPC, in addition to charges under the PC Act already framed against theAppellant. Accused No. 4 died during the pendency of trial.

No objection was raised by the accused at the stage of taking ofcognizance. However, during the course of trial, the Accused arguedthat complaint under Section 195(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,B1973 (“CrPC”) was necessary for prosecuting the case under Section193, IPC. The Trial Court rejected this argument by referring to theopinion of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah and Anotherv. Meenakshi Marwah and Another, (2005) 4 SCC 370. Furthermore,based on the evidence on the record, the Trial Court found that it wasnot proved that Accused No. 2 had entrusted the seized currency to theCAppellant for holding in escrow till completion of sale transaction byAccused No. 3. Hence, the Trial Court convicted the Appellant underSection 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the PC Act; as well as Sections120B and 193 of the IPC, and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonmentfor two years and payment of fine of Rs 1.5 lakhs. Accused Nos. 2 andD3 were convicted under Sections 120B and 193 of IPC and sentenced torigorous imprisonment for one year and payment of fine of Rs 1 lakheach.

3.4 In appeal before the High Court, Accused Nos. 2 and 3reiterated that the requirements of Sections 195(1)(b)(i) and 340 of theECrPC were not complied with prior to framing of charge under Section193, IPC. Therefore, framing of charge without conduct of inquiry andmaking of written complaint by the Trial Court was illegal and withoutjurisdiction. The High Court rejected this contention and held that theprocedure under Section 195(1)(b)(i) is only mandatory in offences whichdirectly affect administration of justice, i.e. pertaining to documents whichFare custodia legis. Thus, the offence must be committed after adocument is produced in evidence before the Court. Therefore Sections195(1)(b)(i) and 340, CrPC will not be applicable in the present casewhere documents were fabricated during the investigative phase priorto their production during before the Trial Court.G

The High Court relied upon the decision of three-Judge Benchof this Court in Sachida Nand Singh and Another v. State of Biharand Another, (1998) 2 SCC 493, and the later Constitution Bench decisionin Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) which affirmed the view taken inSachida Nand Singh, while laying down its opinion. Though theseHdecisions were rendered in the context of interpreting Section 195(1)(b)(ii)

of the CrPC, the High Court held that Section 195(1)(b)(i) is analogousto the former provision. Hence the observations made in theaforementioned decisions are equally applicable to the present case. Onmerits, the High Court confirmed the Trial Court’s finding that theAccused had conspired to fabricate false evidence for shielding Appellant/Accused No. 1 from prosecution in the disproportionate assets case.However, taking into consideration the advanced age of the Accusedand the long passage of time since taking of cognizance of the case, thesentences awarded to the Accused were reduced. Nevertheless, theAccused have come before us in the present appeals challenging theimpugned judgment of the High Court.

4. Learned senior counsel Mr. Basava Prabhu Patil, and learnedcounsel Mr. Amit Anand Tiwari and Mr. B. Karunakaran appearing forthe Appellants/Accused, have forcefully argued that Section 195(1)(b)(i),CrPC cannot be construed as analogous to Section 195(1)(b)(ii).Therefore, the holding of the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah(supra) will not be applicable to the present case. They have relied uponBandekar Brothers Pvt. Ltd. and Another v. Prasad Vassudev Keniand Others, AIR 2020 SC 4247 in support of their contentions. Thus,they have stressed that there is an absolute bar against taking ofcognizance for the offences specified under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPCby any means except upon written complaint by the concerned Court.This is even if the offence of giving false evidence under Section 193,IPC was allegedly committed prior to proceedings before Court oflaw. Therefore, the prosecution lodged by the Respondent agency againstthe Accused under Section 193, IPC is unsustainable.

4.1 Per contra, learned Additional Solicitor General appearing forthe Respondent, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, has contended that the holding inIqbal Singh Marwah is applicable in respect of Section 195(1)(b)(i) ofthe CrPC as well. She has also sought to distinguish Bandekar Brothers(supra) and other decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for theAppellants/Accused on the ground that these were rendered in theparticular facts of those cases, and will not apply to the present case.

5. Before we proceed further, we must first consider the relevantprovisions of Sections 195 and 340, CrPC.

“195. Prosecution for contempt of lawful authority of publicservants, for offences against public justice and for offencesrelating to documents given in evidence.

(1) No Court shall take cognizance—

(b)(i) of any offence punishable under any of the following sectionsof the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860), namely, sections 193 to196 (both inclusive), 199, 200, 205 to 211 (both inclusive) and 228,when such offence is alleged to have been committed in, or inBrelation to, any proceeding in any Court,

(ii) of any offence described in section 463, or punishable undersection 471, section 475 or section 476, of the said Code, whensuch offence is alleged to have been committed in respect of aCdocument produced or given in evidence in proceeding in anyCourt,

(iii) of any criminal conspiracy to commit, or attempt to commit,or the abetment of, any offence specified in sub-clause (i) orsub-clause (ii), except on the complaint in writing of that Court orby such officer of the Court as that Court may authorise in writingin this behalf, or of some other Court to which that Court issubordinate.

xxxE

(3) In clause (b) of Sub-Section (1), the term “Court” means aCivil, Revenue or Criminal Court, and includes tribunal constitutedby or under Central, provincial or State Act if declared by thatAct to be Court for the purposes of this section.”

(emphasis supplied)

It is well settled that Section 195(1)(b) creates bar against takingcognizance of offences against the administration of justice for thepurpose of guarding against baseless or vindictive prosecutions by privateparties. The provisions of this Section imply that the Court is the onlyGappropriate authority which is entitled to raise grievance in relation toperjury, forgery of documents produced before the Court, and otheroffences which interfere with the effective dispensation of justice bythe Court. Hence, it for the Court to exercise its discretion and considerthe suitability of making complaint for such offences. However, thereis pertinent difference in the wording of Section 195(1)(b)(i) and SectionH195(1)(b)(ii) inasmuch as Section 195(1)(b)(ii) is restricted to offences

which are committed in respect of document which is “produced orgiven in evidence in proceeding in any court”. Whereas Section195(1)(b)(i) applies to offences against public justice which are committednot only in any proceeding in any court, but also “in relation to” suchproceeding. Whether such semantical difference bars the analogousapplication of precedents relating to Section 195(1)(b)(ii) for interpretingSection 195(1)(b)(i) will be discussed by us later.

5.1 Section 340, CrPC prescribes the procedure to be followedfor recording complaint under Section 195(1)(b):

“340. Procedure in cases mentioned in section 195.—(1)When upon an application made to it in this behalf or otherwiseany Court is of opinion that it is expedient in the interest of justicethat an inquiry should be made into any offence referred to inclause (b) of Sub-Section (1) of section 195, which appears tohave been committed in or in relation to proceeding in that Courtor, as the case may be, in respect of document produced orgiven in evidence in proceeding in that Court, such Court may,after such preliminary inquiry, if any, as it thinks necessary;

(a) record finding to that effect;

(b) make complaint thereof in writing;

(c) send it to Magistrate of the first class having jurisdiction;

(d) take sufficient security for the appearance for the accusedbefore such Magistrate, or if the alleged offence is non-bailableand the Court thinks it necessary so to do send the accused incustody to such Magistrate; and

(e) bind over any person to appear and give evidence before suchMagistrate.

xxx

(4) In this section, “Court” has the same meaning as in section195.”

At this juncture, it is relevant to note that Bench of this Court(consisting of one of us) in State of Punjab v. Jasbir Singh, (2020) 12SCC 96, has referred the question of whether it is mandatory for theCourt to conduct preliminary inquiry and provide opportunity of hearingto the would-be-accused under Section 340, CrPC prior to making

Acomplaint under Section 195, for consideration of larger Bench.Therefore, we shall be limiting our findings to the issue of whether writtencomplaint by the Trial Court was required under Section 195(1)(b)(i),CrPC in the present case, without delving extensively into the aspect ofwhether preliminary inquiry was required to be conducted prior to suchcomplaint.B

5.2 We also find it necessary to consider Sections 192 and 193 ofthe IPC for the purpose of deciding this matter. Both fall under ChapterXI, under the heading “Of False Evidence and Offences Against PublicJustice”, of the IPC.C“192. Fabricating false evidence. Whoever causes anycircumstance to exist or makes any false entry in any book orrecord, or electronic record or makes any document or electronicrecord containing false statement, intending that suchcircumstance, false entry or false statement may appear in evidencein judicial proceeding, or in proceeding taken by law before aDpublic servant as such, or before an arbitrator, and that suchcircumstance, false entry or false statement, so appearing inevidence, may cause any person who in such proceeding is toform an opinion upon the evidence, to entertain an erroneousopinion touching any point material to the result of such proceeding,Eis said “to fabricate false evidence”.

xxx

193. Punishment for false evidence. Whoever intentionallygives false evidence in any stage of judicial proceeding, orfabricates false evidence for the purpose of being used in anyFstage of judicial proceeding, shall be punished with imprisonmentof either description for term which may extend to seven years,and shall also be liable to fine…

Explanation 2: An investigation directed by law preliminary to aproceeding before Court of Justice, is stage of judicialGproceeding, though that investigation may not take place before aCourt of Justice.”

In the present case, the allegation against Accused Nos. 2 and 3is that they colluded with Appellant/Accused No. 1 to create false saledeed, and gave false explanation of escrow arrangement amongst theHthree parties, to justify how the seized currency came to be in the

Appellant’s possession. This was done to exonerate the Appellant/Accused No. 1 and recover the seized currency at the stage ofinvestigation itself, which is deemed to be “a stage of judicialproceeding” under Explanation 2 of Section 193. Had the genuinenessof the sale deed been accepted, the Respondent may have erroneouslyopined that the seized currency belonged to Accused No. 2, andconsequently abandoned proceedings under Section 13(1)(e), PC Actagainst the Appellant. Therefore Section 193, IPC is squarely applicableto the allegations at hand.

6. Hence, the primary question of law that arises for ourconsideration in these appeals is whether Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPCbars lodging of case by the investigating agency under Section 193, IPC,in respect of offence of giving false evidence which is committed at thestage of investigation, prior to production of such evidence before theTrial Court? This in turn, requires us to resolve the following sub-questions:

6.1 Whether an offence under Section 193, IPC committed at thestage of investigation, prior to production of the false evidence beforethe Trial Court by person who is not yet party to proceedings beforethe Trial Court, is an offence “in relation to” proceeding in any courtunder Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC?

6.2 Whether the words “stage of judicial proceeding” underExplanation 2 to Section 193, IPC can be equated with “proceeding inany court” under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC?

I. General overview of the law on Section 195(1)(b)(ii)

7. Before answering the questions stated in paragraph 6 (supra),it may be useful to refer to the landmark precedents of this Court whichhave considered similar issues arising under Section 195(1)(b)(ii), CrPC.The issue of whether Section 195(1)(b) (ii), CrPC is applicable todocuments which are forged prior to their production in Court is no longerres integra. This Court in Sachida Nand Singh (supra) has held thatSection 195(1)(b)(ii) read with Section 340(1), CrPC will only apply inrespect of offences which are committed during the time when thedocument concerned was custodia legis or in the custody of the Court.The reasoning given by the Court was as follows:

“5. The contention of the appellants is that if the offence allegedis with respect to document which reached the Court then theaforesaid bar operates, no matter whether the offence was

committed before or after its production in court. In other words,according to the appellants, the decisive event for attracting thebar is the production of the document in the Court.

xxx

7. Even if the clause is capable of two interpretations we areinclined to choose the narrower interpretation for obvious reasons.Section 190 of the Code empowers “any magistrate of the firstclass” to take cognizance of “any offence” upon receiving acomplaint, or police report or information or upon his ownknowledge. Section 195 restricts such general powers of themagistrate, and the general right of person to move the courtwith complaint is to that extent curtailed. It is well-recognisedcanon of interpretation that provision curbing the general jurisdictionof the court must normally receive strict interpretation unless thestatute or the context requires otherwise(Abdul Waheed Khan v.Bhawani [AIR 1966 SC 1718: (1966) 3 SCR 617]).

8. That apart it is difficult to interpret Section 195(1) (b)(ii) ascontaining bar against initiation of prosecution proceedings merelybecause the document concerned was produced in court albeitthe act of forgery was perpetrated prior to its production in theCourt. Any such construction is likely to ensue unsavouryconsequences. For instance, if rank forgery of valuable documentis detected and the forgerer is sure that he would imminently beembroiled in prosecution proceedings he can simply get thatdocument produced in any long-drawn litigation which was eitherinstituted by himself or somebody else who can be influenced byhim and thereby pre-empt the prosecution for the entire long periodof pendency of that litigation. It is settled proposition that if thelanguage of legislation is capable of more than one interpretation,the one which is capable of causing mischievous consequencesshould be averted…

xxx

10…It has to be noted that Section 340 falls within Chapter XXVIof the Code which contains fasciculus of “Provisions as tooffences affecting the administration of justice” as the title of thechapter appellates. So the offences envisaged in Section 195(1)(b)of the Code must involve acts which wouldhave affected theadministration of justice.

11. The scope of the preliminary enquiry envisaged in Section340(1) of the Code is to ascertain whether any offence affectingadministration of justice has been committed in respect of adocument produced in court or given in evidence in proceedingin that Court. In other words, the offence should have beencommitted during the time when the document was in custodialegis.

12. It would be strained thinking that any offence involving forgeryof document if committed far outside the precincts of the Courtand long before its production in the Court, could also be treatedas one affecting administration of justice merely because thatdocument later reached the court records.

13. The three-Judge Bench of this Court in Patel LaljibhaiSomabhai case [(1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548 : AIR1971 SC 1935] has interpreted the corresponding section in theold Code, [Section 195(1)(c)] in almost the same manner asindicated above…

…The issue involved in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai case [(1971)2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548 : AIR 1971 SC 1935] related tothe applicability of that sub- section to case where forgeddocument was produced in suit by party thereto, andsubsequently prosecution was launched against him for offencesunder Sections 467 and 471 of IPC through private complaint.The ratio of the decision therein is the following: (SCC Headnote)

“The offences about which the court alone is clothed with theright to complain may, therefore, be appropriately considered tobe only those offences committed by party to proceeding inthat court, the commission of which has reasonably close nexuswith the proceedings in that court so that it can without embarkingupon completely independent and fresh inquiry, satisfactorilyconsider by reference principally to its records the expediency ofprosecuting the delinquent party. It, therefore, appears to be moreappropriate to adopt the strict construction of confirming theprohibition contained in Section 195(1)(c) only to those cases inwhich the offences specified therein were committed by partyto the proceeding in the character as such party.”

14. After stating so their Lordships proceeded to observe that thelegislature could not have intended to extend the prohibition in the

1040SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Asub-section to offences committed by party to the proceedingsprior to his becoming such party. According to their Lordships,any construction to the contrary would unreasonably restrict theright of person which was recognized in Section 190 of theCode.” (emphasis supplied)

BAforementioned observations of this Court in Patel LaljibhaiSomabhai (supra), as cited in Sachida Nand Singh (supra), make theimport and purpose of Section 195(1)(b), CrPC clear. The provision isintended to bar the right to initiate prosecution only where the offencecommitted has reasonably close nexus with the court proceedings,such that the Court can independently determine the need for an inquiryCinto the offence with reference to its own records. Therefore, the offencemust be such that directly impacts administration of justice by the Court.This would certainly be the case if the document was in the custody ofthe Court at the time of commission of offence. However, the bar underSection 195(1)(b)(ii) cannot be read as operating even in cases whereDthe offence against administration of justice was committed in respectof document

1) outside of the Court,

2) by person who was not yet party to the Court proceedings,

and,E

3) at time long before the production of the document beforethe Court.

The same would not have “reasonably close nexus” with thecourt proceedings.Fwere made

Though these observations in Sachida Nand Singh were madein the context of Section 195(1)(b)(ii), we find that they have usefulapplication in interpreting Section 195(1)(b)(i) as well. The prohibitioncontained in Section 195(1)(b)(i) should not be extended to provideprotection to person who has been accused of tendering false evidenceGduring the investigative stage prior to becoming party to the courtproceedings and producing such evidence before the Court.

8. The view taken in Sachida Nand Singh was subsequentlyaffirmed by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra). Inthat case, it was alleged that the appellants had created fictitious willHto divest the respondents out of their share in the disputed property.

Since the respondents’ application under Section 340, CrPC was notdisposed of, they filed criminal complaint for prosecuting the appellantsunder Sections 192 and 193, as well as Sections 463 and 471, IPC. TheMetropolitan Magistrate in that case held that both Sections 195(1)(b)(i)and (ii), CrPC operated as bar against taking cognizance of theseoffences. The Sessions Judge and the High Court, relying on SachidaNand Singh, held that the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would notapply where forgery of document was committed before producingthe said document in court. However, it was noticed that Sachida NandSingh appeared to conflict with an earlier three-Judge Bench decisionin Surjit Singh and Others v. Balbir Singh, (1996) 3 SCC 533. SurjitSingh had held that the bar against taking cognizance under Section195(1)(b)(ii) would apply even if the offences stipulated therein werecommitted prior to production of the document before the Court, if suchdocument was subsequently produced before the Court. The ConstitutionBench clarified the position of law as follows:

“10…This being the scheme of two provisions or clauses of Section195 viz. that the offence should be such which has direct bearingor affects the functioning or discharge of lawful duties of publicservant or has direct correlation with the proceedings in courtof justice, the expression “when such offence is alleged to havebeen committed in respect of document produced or given inevidence in proceeding in any court” occurring in clause (b)(ii)should normally mean commission of such an offence after thedocument has actually been produced or given in evidence in thecourt. Thesituation or contingency where an offence asenumerated in this clause has already been committed earlier andlater on the document is produced or is given in evidence in court,does not appear to be in tune with clauses (a)(i) and (b)(i) andconsequently with the scheme of Section 195 CrPC. This indicatesthat clause (b)(ii) contemplates situation where the offencesenumerated therein are committed with respect to documentsubsequent to its production or giving in evidence in proceedingin any court.

11…The fact that the procedure for filing complaint by courthas been provided in Chapter XXVI dealing with offences affectingadministration of justice, is clear pointer to the legislative intentthat the offence committed should be of such type which directly

affects the administration of justice viz. which is committed afterthe document is produced or given in evidence in court. Anyoffence committed with respect to document at time prior toits production or giving in evidence in court cannot, strictly speaking,be said to be an offence affecting the administration of justice.

12. It will be useful to refer to some earlier decisions touching thecontroversy in dispute which were rendered on Section 195 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short “the old Code”)…

14. Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. KushalPal Singh [AIR 1931 All 443 : 32 Cri LJ 1105 (SB)] consideredCthe scope of the aforesaid provision and held, that clause (c) ofSection 195(1) applies only to cases where an offence iscommitted by party, as such, to proceeding to any court inrespect of document which has been produced or given inevidence in such proceeding. It was held that an offence whichhas already been committed by person who does not become aDparty till, say, 30 years after the commission of the offence, cannotbe said to have been committed by party within the meaning ofclause (c). three-Judge Bench of this Court in Patel LaljibhaiSomabhai v. State of Gujarat after examination of thecontroversy in considerable detail observed that as general ruleEthe courts consider it expedient in the interest of justice to startprosecutions as contemplated by Section 476 (of the old Codewhich now corresponds to Section 340 CrPC) only if there is areasonable foundation for the charge and there is reasonablelikelihood of conviction. The requirement of finding as to theexpediency is understandable in case of an offence alleged toFhave been committed either in or in relation to proceeding inthat court in case of offences specified in clause (b) [of the oldCode corresponding to clause (b)(i) CrPC] because of theclosenexus between the offence and the proceeding. In case of offencesspecified in clause (c), they are required to be committed by aGparty to proceeding in that court with respect to documentproduced or given in evidence in that court. The court approvedthe view taken by the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. KushalPal Singh and held as under in para 7 of the Report: (PatelLaljibhai Somabhai case [(1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri)548] , SCC pp.376-77)

“(i) The underlying purpose of enacting Sections 195(1)(b) and(c) and Section 476 seems to be to control the temptation on thepart of the private parties to start criminal prosecution on frivolousvexations or insufficient grounds inspired by revengeful desireto harass or spite their opponents. These offences have beenselected for the court’s control because of their direct impact onthe judicial process. It is the judicial process or the administrationof public justice which is the direct and immediate object or thevictim of these offences. As the purity of the proceedings of thecourt is directly sullied by the crime, the court is considered to bethe only party entitled to consider the desirability of complainingagainst the guilty party. The private party who might ultimatelysuffer can persuade the civil court to file complaint…18. The other case which is the sheet anchor of the argument oflearned counsel for the appellants is Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh.The facts as stated in paras 1 and 11 of the Report show that acriminal complaint was filed by the respondent under Sections420, 467, 468, 471 read with 120-B IPC alleging that the appellantshad conspired and fabricated an agreement dated 26-7-1978 andhad forged the signature of Smt Dalip Kaur and on the basisthereof, they had made claim to remain in possession of house.The Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 27-9-1983.The appellants thereafter filed civil suit on 9-2-1984 whereinthey produced the agreement. It may be noticed that the cognizanceby the criminal court had been taken much before filing of thecivil suit wherein the agreement had been filed. During the courseof discussion, the Court not only noticed Gopalakrishna Menon[(1983) 4 SCC 240: 1983 SCC (Cri) 822] but also quotedextensively from Patel Laljibhai. Reference was then made toSanmukhsingh v. R. [AIR 1950 PC 31: 51 Cri LJ 651] and SushilKumar v. State of Haryana [1987 Supp SCC 654: 1988 SCC(Cri) 136 : AIR 1988 SC 419] wherein it has been held that thebar of Section 195 would not apply if the original document hadnot been produced or given in evidence in court. Then comes thepassage in the judgment (para 10 of the Report) which we havereproduced in the earlier part of our judgment. The observationstherein should not be understood as laying down anything contraryto what has been held in Patel Laljibhai but was made in thecontext that bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would not be

Aattracted unless the original document was filed. It is for this reasonthat in the very next paragraph, after observing that the cognizancehad been taken prior to filing of the civil suit and the originalagreement in court, the view taken by the High Court that theMagistrate could proceed with the trial of the criminal case wasupheld and the appeal was dismissed.B

20. Since the object of deletion of the words “by party to anyproceeding in any court” occurring in Section 195(1)(c) of the oldCode is to afford protection to witnesses also, the interpretationplaced on the said provision in the earlier decisions would still holdgood.

33. In view of the discussion made above, we are of the opinionthat Sachida Nand Singh has been correctly decided and theview taken therein is the correct view. Section 195(1)(b)(ii) CrPCwould be attracted only when the offences enumerated in thesaid provision have been committed with respect to documentDafter it has been produced or given in evidence in proceeding inany court i.e. during the time when the document was in custodialegis.” (emphasis supplied)

Curiously, though the facts of Iqbal Singh Marwah also requireda determination as to the applicability of Section 195(1)(b)(i), theEConstitution Bench did not express any specific finding on this point.This was perhaps because the limited point for consideration before theBench was the apparent conflict between Sachida Nand Singh andSurjit Singh (supra). However, it can nevertheless be seen that theConstitution Bench did not interpret Section 195(1)(b)(ii) in isolation, butFlinked its construction with the overall scheme under Sections 195(1)(b)and 340, CrPC. The Court reiterated the test laid down in SachidaNand Singh, i.e., that the offence in respect of which only the Courtcan make complaint must be one which has direct correlation to, ora direct impact on, proceedings before court of justice. It is for thisreason that only the relevant Court is vested with the right to considerGthe desirability of complaining against the guilty party.

The Court further noted that the situation wherein the offence asenumerated under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) has been committed earlier, butthe document is produced later in court is not in consonance with theobject of Sections 195(1)(b)(i) either. Even in Surjit Singh, this CourtHhad held on the facts of that case, that since the criminal Court had

taken cognizance of the offence long before filing of the original documentbefore the civil Court, the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(ii) would not apply.

Similar to Sachida Nand Singh, the Constitution Bench alsoreferred to the observations made by the three-Judge Bench in PatelLaljibhai Somabhai (supra) on Sections 192(b) and 192(c) of the Codeof Criminal Procedure, 1898 (“1898 Code”) which corresponded toSection 192(1)(b)(i) and (ii) of the present CrPC respectively. This Courtin Patel Laljibhai Somabhai had noted that even under Section 192(b)of the 1898 Code (corresponding to Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC), theoffence committed is one with “close nexus” to the court proceedings.

II. Import of the Words “in relation to” in Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC.

9. This brings us to the phrase “in relation to any proceeding inany Court”, which appears in Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC but is absentin Section 195(1)(b)(ii). It may be argued that this phrase makes thescope of Section 195(1)(b)(i) wider than Section 195(1) (b)(ii). The words“in relation to” under Section 195(1)(b)(i) appear to encompass situationswherein false evidence has been fabricated prior to being producedbefore Court of law, for the purpose of being used in proceedingsbefore the Court. Therefore, it may not be possible to apply the ratio ofIqbal Singh Marwah by way of analogy to Section 195(1)(b)(i) in everycase.

10. For further elucidation on this point, we may turn to the recentdecision of this Court in Bandekar Brothers (supra). The appellants inthat case claimed that the respondents/accused had given false evidenceand forged debit notes and books of accounts in civil court proceedingsbetween the parties. They had initially filed application under Section340, CrPC before the relevant Judicial Magistrate. However, they latersought to convert this into private complaints, in reliance upon IqbalSingh Marwah (supra). The respondents objected on the ground thatthe bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) could not be circumvented.Subsequently, the appellants took the plea that offences under Section195(1)(b)(ii) were also made out:

“13. The point forcefully argued by the learned Counsel on behalfof the Appellants is that his clients, being victims of forgery, oughtnot to be rendered remediless in respect of the acts of forgerywhich are committed before they are used as evidence in court

Aproceeding, and that therefore, private complaint would bemaintainable in the fact circumstance mentioned in the two criminalcomplaints referred to hereinabove. The Court has thus to steerbetween two opposite poles of spectrum the “yin” being theprotection of person from frivolous criminal complaints, and the“yang” being the right of victim to ventilate his grievance andBhave the Court try the offence of forgery by means of privatecomplaint. In order to appreciate whether this case falls withinthe category of avoiding frivolous litigation, or whether it fallswithin the individual’s right to pursue private complaint, we mustneeds refer to several decisions of this Court.”C10.1 This Court thereafter proceeded to distinguish between theoffence of fabricating false evidence under Sections 192 and 193, IPCand the offence of forgery. It noted that the averments made by theappellants in their complaints pertained exclusively to giving of falseevidence and did not disclose the ingredients of forgery as defined underDthe IPC. Hence, this Court in Bandekar Brothers upheld the respondents’contentions, and opined that Iqbal Singh Marwah would not benefitthe appellants in that case. Even though the false evidence was createdoutside of the Court, it was by the appellants’ own admission, created“in relation to” proceedings before the Court. Thus, this Court heldthat:E

“19. At this stage, it is important to understand the differencebetween the offences mentioned in Section 195(1)(b)(i) and Section195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Where the factsmentioned in complaint attracts the provisions of Section 191 to193 of the Indian Penal Code, Section 195(1)(b)(i) of the Code ofFCriminal Procedure applies. What is important is that once theseSections of the Indian Penal Code are attracted, the offence shouldbe alleged to have been committed in, or in relation to, anyproceeding in any Court. Thus, what is clear is that the offencepunishable under these Sections does not have to be committedGonly in any proceeding in any Court but can also be an offencealleged to have been committed in relation toany proceeding inany Court.

22. Contrasted with Section 195(1)(b)(i), Section 195(1)(b)(ii) ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure speaks of offences described inHSection 463, and punishable under Sections 471, 475 or 476 of the

Indian Penal Code, when such offences are alleged to have beencommitted in respect of document produced or given in evidencein proceeding in any Court. What is conspicuous by its absencein Section 195(1)(b)(ii) are the words “or in relation to”, making itclear that if the provisions of Section 195(1)(b)(ii) are attracted,then the offence alleged to have been committed must becommitted in respect of document that is custodia legis, andnot an offence that may have occurred prior to the documentbeing introduced in court proceedings. Indeed, it is this distinctionthat is vital in understanding the sheet anchor of the Appellant’scase namely, this Court’s judgment in Iqbal Singh Marwah(supra).” (emphasis supplied)

10.2 We fully agree with the aforementioned reasoning. Thepresence of “in relation to” under Section 195(1)(b)(i) means that IqbalSingh Marwah would not have blanket application to every case wherea complaint is lodged in respect of an offence specified under that Section.However, on the facts of Bandekar Brothers, this was not situationin which the offence complained of did not have “reasonably closenexus” with the court proceedings. The offence of giving false evidencewas committed by the respondents, who were party to the courtproceedings, for the purpose of leading the Court to form an erroneousopinion on point material to the result of the proceedings. Hence itcould be said that though the offence was not committed during thecourse of the court proceedings, it was certainly committed “in relationto” such proceedings.

11. Similar circumstances were present in Kailash Mangal v.Ramesh Chand (Dead) Through Legal Representative, (2015) 15SCC 729 and Narendra Kumar Srivastava v. State of Bihar andOthers, (2019) 3 SCC 318, which were the decisions relied upon by thisCourt in Bandekar Brothers (supra). In Kailash Mangal, it was allegedthat the appellant in that case had filed false affidavit before the civilcourt for getting civil suit decreed in his favour. The respondent filed aprivate complaint under Section 340, CrPC alleging offence punishableunder Sections 193 and 419, IPC. The Division Bench observed that:“10. In the instant case, the false affidavit alleged to have beenfiled by the appellant was in proceeding pending before the civilcourt and the offence falls under Section 193 IPC and theproceeding ought to have been initiated on the complaint in writing

Aby that court under Section 195(1)(b)(i) IPC. Since the offence issaid to have been committed in relation to or in proceeding in acivil court, the case of Iqbal Singh Marwah is not applicable tothe instant case.”

(emphasis supplied)

BTherefore, this Court expressly observed in Kailash Mangal thatsince the document was filed during the course of proceeding whichwas already pending before the court, the offence could be said to havebeen committed “in relation to” such proceeding for the purpose ofSection 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC. The requirement of reasonable nexusbetween the offence and the proceeding before the Court was clearlyCsatisfied in that case.

11.1 In Narendra Kumar Srivastava (supra), the appellant hadfiled private complaint contending that the respondent officials hadproduced false show-cause affidavit in the contempt petition filed bythe appellant. Resultantly, the High Court dropped the contempt case.DThe Division Bench held that Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC covers differentcategory of offence and is therefore distinct from Section 195(1)(b)(ii).Hence Sachida Nand Singh (supra) would not be applicable, andcognizance could not have been taken on the basis of private complaint.However, on the facts of that case, this was again situation wherein atEthe first instance, the Court was allegedly persuaded to form an opinionbased on certain false evidence which was produced by persons whowere already party to the proceedings. This is completely differentfactual matrix from the present case.

12. Indeed, at this juncture it must be noted that even SachidaFNand Singh (supra) and Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra) were renderedin the context of balancing the right of private parties to initiate complaintsin respect of forged documents, with protecting parties to civil suits fromfrivolous or vexatious prosecutions. In neither of the abovementioneddecisions has this Court authoritatively considered the specific issue ofpreserving the right of an investigative agency, such as the RespondentGin the present case, to initiate complaints against persons who havefabricated false evidence during the course of criminal proceedings.

13. The moot point therefore, as mentioned in Para Nos. 6 & 6.1,is whether offence committed under Section 193, IPC during the stageof investigation, prior to commencement of proceedings before the TrialHCourt, by person who is not yet party to proceedings before the Trial

Court, is an offence committed “in relation to” such proceedings forthe purpose of the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC?

14. The construction of the words “in relation to” must becontrolled by the overarching principle applicable to Section 195(1)(b),CrPC as stated in Patel Laljibhai Somabhai (supra) and Sachida NandSingh (supra), which was affirmed by the Constitution Bench in IqbalSingh Marwah (supra). That is, even if the offence is committed priorto giving of the fabricated evidence in court, it must have direct orreasonably close nexus with the court proceedings.

15. Looking to the decision in Bandekar Brothers (supra), istrue to say that Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC may be attracted to the offenceof fabricating false evidence prior to its production before the Court,provided that such evidence is led by person who is party to the courtproceedings, for the purpose of leading the Court to form certain opinionbased on such evidence. The bar against taking of cognizance underSection 195(1)(b)(i) may also apply where person who is initially not aparty to the court proceedings fabricates certain evidence, and

1) subsequently becomes party and produces it before the Court;or;

2) falsely deposes as witness before the Court on the strengthof such evidence,

for the purpose of causing the Court to form an erroneous opinionon point material to the result of the proceedings.

16. However, where person fabricates false evidence for thepurpose of misleading the investigating officer, this may not have anydirect nexus with the subsequent court proceedings. There is an indirectnexus inasmuch as if the investigating agency does not suspect anywrongdoing, and the Court commits the case for trial, the evidence willbe produced for the Court’s perusal and impact the judicialdecision-making process. However, it may be equally possible that evenif the fabricated evidence appears sufficiently convincing, theinvestigating agency may drop proceedings against the accused and divertits time and resources elsewhere. Therefore, the offence may neverreach the stage of court proceedings. Further, if it subsequently comesto light that the evidence was falsely adduced, it will be the investigatingagency which will suffer loss of face and be forced to conduct freshinvestigation. Hence, though the offence is one which affects the

Aadministration of justice, it is the investigating agency, and not the Court,which is the aggrieved party in such circumstance.

17. In this regard, we consider it beneficial to refer to the portionof the opinion expressed by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal SinghMarwah (supra) as to why narrow interpretation of SectionB195(1)(b)(ii), CrPC was necessary to avoid impracticality or injustice inits implementation:

“23…Before filing of the complaint, the court may hold apreliminary enquiry and record finding to the effect that it isexpedient in the interests of justice that enquiry should be madeCinto any of the offences referred to in Section 195(1)(b). Thisexpediency will normally be judged by the court by weighing notthe magnitude of injury suffered by the person affected by suchforgery or forged document, but having regard to the effect orimpact, such commission of offence has upon administration ofjustice. It is possible that such forged document or forgery mayDcause very serious or substantial injury to person in the sensethat it may deprive him of very valuable property or status orthe like, but such document may be just piece of evidenceproduced or given in evidence in court, where voluminous evidencemay have been adduced and the effect of such piece of evidenceEon the broad concept of administration of justice may be minimal.In such circumstances, the court may not consider it expedient inthe interest of justice to make complaint. The broad view ofclause (b)(ii), as canvassed by learned counsel for the appellants,would render the victim of such forgery or forged documentremediless. Any interpretation which leads to situation where aFvictim of crime is rendered remediless, has to be discarded.

24. There is another consideration which has to be kept in mind.Sub-section (1) of Section 340 CrPC contemplates holding of apreliminary enquiry. Normally, direction for filing of complaintis not made during the pendency of the proceeding before thecourt and this is done at the stage when the proceeding is concludedand the final judgment is rendered. Section 341 provides for anappeal against an order directing filing of the complaint. The hearingand ultimate decision of the appeal is bound to take time. Section343(2) confers discretion upon court trying the complaint toadjourn the hearing of the case if it is brought to its notice that an

appeal is pending against the decision arrived at in the judicialproceeding out of which the matter has arisen. In view of theseprovisions, the complaint case may not proceed at all for decadesspecially in matters arising out of civil suits where decisions arechallenged in successive appellate fora which are time-consuming.It is also to be noticed that there is no provision of appeal againstan order passed under Section 343(2), whereby hearing of thecase is adjourned until the decision of the appeal. These provisionsshow that, in reality, the procedure prescribed for filing complaintby the court is such that it may not fructify in the actual trial of theoffender for an unusually long period. Delay in prosecution of aguilty person comes to his advantage as witnesses becomereluctant to give evidence and the evidence gets lost. This importantconsideration dissuades us from acceptingthe broad interpretationsought to be placed upon clause (b)(ii).

xxx

26. Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that the courts arenormally reluctant to direct filing of criminal complaint and sucha course is rarely adopted. It will not be fair and proper to give aninterpretation which leads to situation where person alleged tohave committed an offence of the type enumerated in clause (b)(ii)is either not placed for trial on account of non-filing of complaintor if complaint is filed, the same does not come to its logical end.Judging from such an angle will be in consonance with the principlethat an unworkable orimpracticable result should be avoided…”

(emphasis supplied)

It is possible that Courts may be more pro-active in makingcomplaints under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC upon application made bythe concerned investigative agencies, than in those preferred by privateparties. The former being public authorities would enjoy more credencein seeking inquiry into their claims. Therefore, the aforementioned reasonsassigned by the Constitution Bench in Iqbal Singh Marwah for adoptinga narrow construction of Section 195(1)(b)(ii), CrPC may not be strictlyapplicable in the present case. However, the general principles of statutoryinterpretation laid down by the Constitution Bench should not bedisregarded. This is especially given that the Court did not considerSection 195(1)(b)(ii) separately but provided holistic view of the schemeunder Section 195(1)(b).

A17.1 Just like private party who has been victim of forgerycommitted outside the precincts of the Court, the investigative agencyshould not be left remediless against persons who have producing falseevidence for the purpose of interfering with the investigation process.Moreover, the present case concerns offences alleged to have beencommitted under the PC Act. Public interest and the reputation of theBState will suffer significant harm if corrupt public servants are facilitatedby third parties in hiding their assets from scrutiny. Hence anyinterpretation which negates against the speedy and effective trial ofsuch persons must be avoided.

17.2 The application of the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPCCto situations such as the present case can lead to two scenarios. Thefirst is one in which the investigative agency, on the basis of false/fabricated material drops the case. Subsequently, it is brought to theirnotice that the evidence was falsified. Second, the investigative agencyat that very stage suspects that the material produced before them is

Dbogus or forged in nature. In both scenarios, the Court has not had anopportunity to consider the allegedly fabricated evidence, as trial has notyet commenced in respect of the offence. Hence it would not be possiblefor the Court to independently ascertain the need for lodging complaintunder Section 195(1)(b)(i) read with Section 340, CrPC when the evidencealleged to have been falsified is not even present on its records. Rather,Eit is the investigating agency which is best placed to verify and provewhether such falsification has taken place, through what means and forwhat purpose.

17.3 In case the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i) is applied tooffences committed during the course of investigation, the Court mayFthink it fit to wait till the completion of trial to evaluate whether complaintshould be made or not. Subsequently, the Court may be of the opinionthat in the larger scheme of things the alleged fabrication of evidenceduring investigation has not had any material impact on the trial, anddecline to initiate prosecution for the same. The investigation agencycannot be compelled to take chance and wait for the trial court to formGits opinion in each and every case. This may give the offender underSection 193, IPC sufficient time to fabricate more falsehoods to hide theoriginal crime. Further, irrespective of the potential impact that suchfalse evidence may have on the opinion formed by the trial court, theinvestigating agency has separate right to proceed against the accusedHfor attempting to obstruct fair and transparent probe into criminal

offence. Thus, we are of the view that it would be impracticable to insistupon lodging of written complaint by the Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i),CrPC in such situation.

18. It must be clarified that the aforementioned opinion expressedby us is limited to factual situations such as the present case wherein thefabricated evidence has been detected prior to commencement of thetrial, or without such trial having been initiated in the first place. Thesame may not apply for example, where the investigation agency on thebasis of false evidence given by third party happens to wrongfullyimplicate person, other than the real perpetrator, for particular offence.Subsequently, the Court during the course of trial proceedings may takejudicial notice of such defect in the investigation process and make acomplaint under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC. Since by this stage, theevidence has been produced before the Court, and contains potential fordirectly impacting the formation of the Court’s opinion on the innocenceor guilt of the accused person, invoking the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i)may not give rise to much difficulty. However, at this juncture, we declineto make any conclusive finding on this aspect, as the facts of the presentappeal do not require us to consider the same. It is left open to futureBenches of this Court to settle this issue if it so arises before them.19. In this regard, we also find it necessary to distinguish thethree-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Arvindervir Singh v. Stateof Punjab and Another, (1998) 6 SCC 352 from the present case. Inthat case it was alleged that the investigating officers themselves(including the appellant therein) had abducted and murdered an advocateand his family, and falsely implicated another person for this offence.The case involving the falsely accused person had already been committedfor trial when this Court, in writ proceedings initiated by the Punjab andHaryana Bar Association, directed the CBI to conduct an independentinvestigation [Punjab and Haryana High Court Bar Association,Chandigarh Through its Secretary v. State of Punjab and Others,(1994) 1 SCC 616]. Subsequently, after the CBI submitted its report, itwas directed to file the necessary challan before the trial court [Punjab& Haryana High Court Bar Association v. State of Punjab andOthers, (1996) 4 SCC 742)]. The CBI then filed chargesheet beforethe designated trial court in that case under Sections 193 and 211, IPC.

This Court in Arvindervir Singh clarified that challan was to be

Afiled directly by the CBI only in respect of the offence of abduction andmurder alleged to have been committed by the appellant-accused. Sofar as the offence punishable under Sections 193 and 211, IPC wasconcerned it was for the designated trial court to make written complaintto Magistrate having jurisdiction. However, the three-Judge Bench didnot discuss the scope and ambit of “in relation to” under SectionB195(1)(b)(i), CrPC. Moreover, since this decision was rendered prior tothe Constitution Bench decision in Iqbal Singh Marwah (supra), thethree-Judge Bench did not have the benefit of referring to theobservations made in that case. Hence the decision in Arvindervir Singhwill not have any application to the case at hand as it involved completelyCdifferent set of factual and legal issues.III. Whether “stage of judicial proceeding” underExplanation 2 to Section 193, IPC is synonymous with“proceedingin any court” under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC?

20. The last point that remains to be considered is the effect ofDExplanation 2 to Section 193, IPC which deems an investigationpreliminary to proceeding before Court of Justice to be “stage ofa judicial proceeding” for the purposes of the Section. Such deemingprovision applies even though that investigation may not take place beforea Court of Justice. This gives rise to the question of whether an offenceEcommitted during the investigation, which is “stage of judicialproceeding” under Explanation 2, Section 193, IPC, would be an offencecommitted “in relation to any proceeding in any Court” under Section195(1)(b)(i), CrPC.

20.1 The purpose of Explanation 2 to Section 193, IPC is evidentlyFto ensure that person who fabricates false evidence before aninvestigating or inquiring authority prior to the trial of the case does notescape penalty. This encompasses all nature of proceedings, whethercivil or criminal. However, whether the commission of such offencewould require the complaint of Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i) woulddepend upon the authority before whom such false evidence is given.GFor example, if person gives false evidence in an inquiry before theMagistrate under Section 200, CrPC, that would undoubtedly be anoffence committed before Court under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC.However, this would not be the case where false evidence is led beforean investigating officer prior to the Court having taken cognizance of theHoffence or the case being committed for trial.20.2 The object and purpose of Section 195(1)(b), CrPC must beborne in mind whilst determining whether the fabrication of false evidenceduring stage of judicial proceeding amounts to having made suchfabrication in relation to proceeding before the Court. At the cost ofrepetition, it must be emphasized that Section 195(1)(b) is meant to restrictthe right to make complaint in respect of certain offences to publicservants, or to the relevant Court, as they are considered to be the onlyparty who is directly aggrieved or impacted by those offences.Furthermore, for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC, there mustbe an intention on part of the alleged offender to directly mislead theCourt into forming certain opinion by commission of offence underSection 193, IPC. Though criminal investigation is certainly stage ofa judicial proceeding insofar as it may culminate in issue of process andtrial against the accused, it would not be proceeding in relation to acertain Court under Section 195(1)(b) (i), CrPC before the Court haseven taken judicial notice of such investigation. The difference betweena “stage” of judicial proceeding and the judicial proceeding itself mustbe emphasized in this regard.

21. We find it necessary to distinguish certain decisions of thisCourt which have adjudicated upon the correlation between the words“judicial proceeding” and “proceeding in any court” for further clarifyingour position on this point. In Lalji Haridas v. State of Maharashtra,(1964) 6 SCR 700, Constitution Bench of this Court considered whetherproceedings before an Income Tax Officer under the Indian IncomeTax Act, 1922 would be proceedings in any court under Section 195(1)(b)of the 1898 Code, which was the corresponding section in that Code toSection 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC. Section 37(4) of the 1922 Act provided thatproceedings before the Income Tax authority shall be deemed to be“judicial proceedings” (and not merely stage of such proceedings)under Section 193, IPC. It was in this context that the majority of theConstitution Bench (K.C. Dasgupta J., dissenting) held that theexpressions “judicial proceeding” under the 1922 Act and “proceedingin any court” under Section 195(1) (b), 1898 Code are synonymous.Therefore, private complaint would not be maintainable in respect of afalse statement given on oath before the Income Tax Officer.

21.1 In Babita Lila and Another v. Union of India, (2016) 9SCC 647, Division Bench of this Court similarly considered thejurisdiction of the Deputy Director of Income Tax to make complaintunder Section 195(1)(b), CrPC in respect of false statements given on

Aoath during search operation conducted under the Income Tax Act,1961. The discussion in this case was primarily concerned with whetherthe Deputy Director would be the competent appellate authority authorizedto make complaint under Section 195(4), CrPC. However, the DivisionBench, referring to Lalji Haridas, made an ancillary observation thatsuch search operation is deemed to be “judicial proceeding” underBSection 193, CrPC, and that the relevant Income Tax authority would bedeemed to be civil court for the purpose of Section 195, CrPC. This isas per the express provision made to the effect under Section 196 of the1961 Act.

21.2 In Chandrapal Singh and Others v. Maharaj Singh andCAnother, (1982) 1 SCC 466, three-Judge Bench of this Court wasfaced with the issue of whether 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC would bar complaintunder Sections 193, 199 and 201 of the IPC alleging making of falsestatements in affidavit before the Rent Control Officer under the U.P,Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.Similar to the aforementioned income tax statutes, Section 34(2) of theD1972 Act provided that the District Magistrate or the prescribed authorityholding an inquiry under the Act shall be deemed to be Civil Courtwithin the meaning of Sections 480 and 482 of the 1898 Code. Moreover,that proceedings before such authority shall be judicial proceedings underSection 193, IPC.EThe three-Judge Bench noted that under the 1972 Act, the RentControl Officer was authorized to exercise the powers and functions ofthe District Magistrate. Hence, in view of the specific provision madeunder Section 34(2) of the 1972 Act, the Rent Control Officer wouldalso be deemed to be civil court and the proceedings before him wouldFbe judicial proceedings. Therefore, if any false evidence was given duringthe course of such proceedings, only the Rent Control Officer wasauthorized to make complaint of the same under Section 195(1)(b)(i),CrPC. Even otherwise, on the facts of the case, the three-Judge Benchfound that abuse of criminal process had taken place and observed that“chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to giveGvent to their frustration by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of thecriminal court” (Chandrapal Singh, (supra), paragraph 14).

21.3 It can be seen from the above discussion that this Court has,in some instances, opined that where the law deems proceedings beforea certain authority to be “judicial proceedings”, the same would beHconsidered as “proceedings in any court” under Section 195(1)(b)(i),

CrPC. Therefore, if the offence under Section 193, IPC is committedbefore such an authority, the written complaint of that authority ismandatorily required for trial of the offence. However, the facts of thedecisions in Lalji Haridas (supra), Babita Lila (supra) and ChandrapalSingh (supra), are clearly distinguishable from the present appeal asthey all involve 1) False statements made on oath or in affidavits, 2) in ajudicial proceeding and 3) before an authority which is expressly deemedunder law to be “court”. None of the aforequoted cases were concernedwith fabrication of evidence before an investigating authority under apenal statute.

22. In the present case, pursuant to recovering the seized currencyfrom the Appellant’s house on 24.01.2001, the Respondent initiatedinvestigation under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e), PC Actagainst him. Accused Nos. 2 and 3, at the behest of the Appellant, wroteletter dated 4.02.2002 to the Superintendent of Police, CBI stating thatthe seized currency was held by the Appellant as part of an escrowarrangement amongst the parties. Hence, they sought that the moneyshould be paid back to Accused No. 2. They additionally produced afalse sale deed dated 24.01.2001 and certain books of account in supportof their claim. There was no involvement of the Trial Court at this stagein as much as the letter dated 4.02.2002 and the sale deed were obviouslyintended to convince the investigation agency that the Appellant had notaccumulated disproportionate financial assets. Had the Respondentaccepted the veracity of the contents of this letter, they would not onlyhave dropped the investigation against Appellant/Accused No. 1 but alsowrongfully returned the seized currency under the mistaken impressionthat it was the property of Accused No. 2. The Accused No. 2 wouldhave then facilitated the return of the Appellant’s ill-gotten gains back tohis custody. The authorities would be none the wiser and the loss of Rs.80 lakhs from the exchequer would have flown under the radar.

22.1 Therefore in the present case, it is not the Trial Court but theRespondent authority/agency which has been directly impacted due tofabrication of evidence by the Appellants/accused. The Appellants’intention was not to mislead the Trial Court, at least not at the first instance.Rather, their goal was to ensure that the Appellant/Accused No. 1 wascleared of wrongdoing at the stage of investigation itself. It was afterbeing charged under Section 193, IPC, that the Appellants/accusedreiterated the fictitious escrow arrangement story before the Trial Courtso as to prove their innocence. Hence it cannot be said that the offence

Aunder Sections 120B read with 193, IPC was committed by the Appellants“in relation to” proceeding in court under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC.22.2 Section 2(i), CrPC defines “judicial proceeding” as includingany proceeding in the course of which evidence is or may be legallytaken by oath. The investigation under the PC Act was admittedly aBstage of judicial proceeding by virtue of Explanation 2 to Section 193,IPC. However, neither was the fabricated evidence in the present casegiven on oath before the investigating officer, nor is the investigatingauthority under the PC Act deemed to be “court” for the purpose ofSection 195(1)(b), CrPC. Hence, the decisions in Lalji Haridas (supra)and Chandrapal Singh (supra) will have no applicability to the presentCcase. Thus, it can be concluded that the investigation conducted by theRespondent under the PC Act cannot be equated with proceeding in acourt of law under Section 195(1) (b)(i), CrPC, though it is deemed to bea stage of judicial proceeding under Section 193, IPC.

22.3 Had this been case wherein the Respondent had notDdeveloped any suspicion against Accused Nos. 2 and 3, and the TrialCourt had subsequently discovered the subterfuge caused by them, wemay have taken different view. As we have noted in paragraph 18(supra), where the fabrication of evidence has escaped the scrutiny ofthe investigating agency, and the case is subsequently brought to trial,such evidence would have direct bearing on the trial court’s opinion andEhence the bar under Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC may be applicable.However, in the present case, the investigating agency has been sagaciousenough to detect the commission of offence under Section 193, IPC atthe preliminary stage. Therefore, as stated by us in paragraph 17.3(supra), it would be unjust and impracticable to insist upon the requirement

Fof an independent inquiry and written complaint by the Trial Court insuch scenario.

23. Thus, the questions of law stated in paragraph 6 (supra) standanswered against the Appellants/accused. Even on merits, we do notfind any valid reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of theTrial Court and the High Court. The High Court has rightly observedGthat the Appellant/Accused No. 1 had not raised the defence of holdingthe money in escrow for Accused Nos. 2 and 3 at the time of searchconducted at his house on 24.01.2001. The supposed agreement of salewas also not produced. This defence was raised by Accused Nos. 2 and3 at highly belated stage on 4.02.2002, almost year after the recoveryHof the seized currency, though the Appellant had corresponded with

Accused No. 2 in May-June, 2001. It is improbable in the ordinary courseof conduct that person would wait so long to claim an amount ofapproximately Rs. 80 lakhs which was required for completion of saletransaction. The stamp paper on which the sale deed was made wasalso proved to be illegal. Hence it is apparent that the Appellants/accusedentered into an elaborate conspiracy and attempted to create falsecircumstance of escrow transaction for the purpose of shielding Appellant/Accused No. 1 from prosecution. In fact, the High Court has showngreat lenity by reducing the sentences awarded to the Appellants/accusedin view of their advanced age and delay in completion of the trial. Inview of the gravity of the offence, no further benefit can be granted tothem in this regard.

Conclusions

24. The questions of law formulated in paragraph 6 (supra) areanswered as follows:

Section 195(1)(b)(i), CrPC will not bar prosecution by theinvestigating agency for offence punishable under Section 193, IPC,which is committed during the stage of investigation. This is providedthat the investigating agency has lodged complaint or registered the caseunder Section 193, IPC prior to commencement of proceedings andproduction of such evidence before the trial court. In such circumstance,the same would not be considered an offence committed in, or in relationto, any proceeding in any Court for the purpose of Section 195(1)(b)(i),CrPC.

24.1 The appeals are accordingly dismissed both on law and onmerits. The sentence awarded by the High Court shall be set- off againstthe period of imprisonment, if any, already undergone by the Appellants.The Appellants are directed to surrender within two weeks for servingout the rest of their sentence, if they are not already in custody. TheRegistry is further directed to expeditiously release the amount of fine, ifany, deposited before this Court. If any arrears of fine are remaining,the Appellants shall pay the same within period of not more than fourweeks from the date of this order.