SAREGAMA INDIA LIMITED versus NEXT RADIO LIMITED & ORS.

[2021] 9 S.C.R. 137

SAREGAMA INDIA LIMITED

NEXT RADIO LIMITED & ORS.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 5985-5987 of 2021)

SEPTEMBER 27, 2021

[DR DHANANJAYA Y CHANDRACHUD ANDB. V. NAGARATHNA, JJ.]

Constitution of India: Art. 226 – Writ jurisdiction, scope of –Judicial rewriting, permissibility – Held: Writ court is entrusted bythe Constitution of the power of judicial review – In the dischargeof its mandate, the court may evaluate the validity of legislationor rules made under it – However, the court in exercise of judicialreview cannot supplant the terms of the provision through judicialinterpretation by re-writing statutory language – In the instant case,High Court by interim order modified the operation of Rule 29 ofthe Copyright Rules by stipulating that the particulars which are tobe furnished in the notice may be furnished within period of fifteendays after the broadcast – According to Rule 29, the broadcastingorganisation shall give notice of fifteen days before broadcasting,exception provides that in unforeseen circumstances, notice shallbe given twenty four hours after the broadcasting – The interimorder converted the second proviso into “routine procedure”instead of an exception (as the High Court has described itsdirection) that notice shall be given fifteen days after the broadcast– This exercise by the High Court amounts to re-writing – Such anexercise of judicial redrafting of legislation or delegated legislationcannot be carried out – An exercise of judicial rewriting of astatutory rule by High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Art.226particularly in interlocutory proceedings is not warranted –Copyright Rules, 2013 – r.29 (4) – Interlocutory order.

Judicial review: Scope of – Held: Court in exercise of judicialreview cannot supplant the terms of the provision through judicialinterpretation by re-writing statutory language – Draftsmanship isa function entrusted to the legislature – Craftsmanship on the judicialside cannot transgress into the legislative domain by re-writing thewords of statute – For then, the judicial craft enters the forbiddendomain of legislative draft.

CDEF

138SUPREME COURT REPORTS

AInterpretation of statutes: It is settled principle of law thatwhen the words of statute are clear and unambiguous, it is notpermissible for the court to read words into the statute.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1.1 It is settled principle of law that when theBwords of statute are clear and unambiguous, it is not permissiblefor the court to read words into the statute. The court is entrustedby the Constitution of the power of judicial review. In thedischarge of its mandate, the court may evaluate the validity of alegislation or rules made under it. statute may be invalidated ifis ultra vires constitutional guarantees or transgresses theClegislative domain entrusted to the enacting legislature.Delegated legislation can, if it results in constitutional infractionor is contrary to the ambit of the enacting statute be invalidated.However, the court in the exercise of judicial review cannotsupplant the terms of the provision through judicial interpretationDby re-writing statutory language. Draftsmanship is functionentrusted to the legislature. Craftsmanship on the judicial sidecannot transgress into the legislative domain by re-writing thewords of statute. For then, the judicial craft enters the forbiddendomain of legislative draft. That precisely is what the DivisionBench of the High Court has done by its interim order. SectionE31D(2) speaks of the necessity of giving prior notice, in themanner as may be prescribed, of the intention to broadcast thework stating the duration and the territorial coverage of thebroadcast, together with the payment of royalties in the mannerand at the rates fixed by the Appellate Board. While the HighFCourt held the broadcasters down to the requirement of priornotice, it modified the operation of Rule 29 by stipulating thatthe particulars which are to be furnished in the notice may befurnished within period of fifteen days after the broadcast. TheHigh Court was also of the view that the second proviso may beresorted to as matter of routine, instead of as an exception andGthat the ex post facto reporting should be enlarged to period offifteen days (instead of period of twenty four hours). Such anexercise was impermissible since it would substitute statutoryrule made in exercise of the power of delegated legislation with anew regime and provision which the High Court considers moreHpracticable. The interim order of the High Court is set aside.

This is, however, subject to the clarification that this Court hasnot expressed any opinion on the merits of the rival submissionswhich would fall for determination in the exercise of the writjurisdiction of the High Court in the pending proceedings. [Paras20-23][149-G; 150-D-H; 151-D-F]

Padma Sundara Rao v. State of Tamil Nadu (2002) 3SCC 533 - followed.

In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section 138 ofNI Act 1881 Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 2 of

2020, 16 April 2021 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

[2002] 2 SCR 383followedPara 20

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos.5985-5987 of 2021.

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.08.2021 of the High Courtof Judicature at Madras in W.P. No.15860 of 2021 and W.M.P. Nos.16749and 16752 of 2021.

With

Civil Appeal Nos.5988 and 5990 of 2021

Mukul Rohatgi, Akhil Sibal, Sr. Advs., Ankur Sangal, Ms. SuchetaRoy, Ms. Imon Roy, M/s Khaitan & Co., Advs. for the Appellant.

Navroz Seervai, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Advs., AbhishekMalhotra, Ms. Liz Mathew, Ms. Sapna Chaurasia, Ms. Naomi Chandra,Ms. Shilpa Gamnani, Ms. Atmaja Tripathy, Kaizad Irani, Ms. NamishaChadha, Navneet R., Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals arise from an interim order dated 2 August 2021of Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Madras in abatch of petitions. The writ petitions have been instituted before theHigh Court under Article 226 of the Constitution to challenge the validityof Rule 29(4) of the Copyright Rules 2013[1]. The High Court has, by itsinterim order, directed that:

1 “Rules”

A(i)No copyrighted work may be broadcast in terms of Rule 29without issuing prior notice;

(ii) Details pertaining to the broadcast, particularly the duration,time slots and the like, including the quantum of royalty payablemay be furnished within fifteen days of the broadcast orBperformance;

(iii) Compliance be effected with modified regime of post facto,as opposed to prior compliance mandated by Rule 29(4) andthe statutory mandate of twenty four hour prior notice shallbe substituted by provision for compliance within fifteenCdays after the broadcast; and

(iii) The interim order will be confined to the petitioners beforethe High Court and the copyrighted works of the second andthird respondents which are sought to be exploited.

3. The primary submission which has been urged on behalf of theDappellants is that the interim order of the High Court has the effect ofre-writing Rule 29(4) of the Rules framed in pursuance of the provisionsof Section 31D and Section 78(2)(cD) of the Copyright Act 1957[2].

4. Mr Mukul Rohatgi and Mr Akhil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel,have appeared on behalf of the appellants. Mr Navroz Seervai and MrENeeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior Counsel, have appeared on behalfof the contesting respondents, who are the original petitioners before theHigh Court.

5. Since the interim direction has been issued in the writ petitionsmoved before the High Court and the petitioners before the High CourtFare represented in these proceedings through counsel, on caveat, weare disposing of the appeals at this stage.

6. The batch of writ petitions before the High Court is listed forfinal disposal on 4 October 2021. grievance has been made on behalfof the contesting respondents that the appellants have not filed counterGaffidavits in response to the petitions. The learned counsel appearing onbehalf of the appellants assured the Court that they would do soexpeditiously, well before the next date of listing so as to facilitate thefinal disposal of the writ petitions.

7. The facts, insofar as they are necessary for the disposal of thepresent appeals, which arise from the interim order of the High Court,can be briefly visited.

8. By the Copyright Amendment Act 2012, Parliament incorporatedthe provisions of Section 31D which were brought into force on 21 June2012. Section 31D is in the following terms:

“31D. Statutory licence for broadcasting of literary and musicalworks and sound recording.—(1) Any broadcastingorganisation desirous of communicating to the public byway of broadcast or by way of performance of literaryor musical work and sound recording which has alreadybeen published may do so subject to the provisions of thissection.

(2)The broadcasting organisation shall give prior notice, insuch manner as may be prescribed, of its intention tobroadcast the work stating the duration and territorialcoverage of the broadcast, and shall pay to the owner ofrights in each work royalties in the manner and at the ratefixed by the Commercial Court.

(3)The rates of royalties for radio broadcasting shall bedifferent from television broadcasting and the CommercialCourt shall fix separate rates for radio broadcasting andtelevision broadcasting.

(4)In fixing the manner and the rate of royalty under sub-section (2), the Commercial Court may require thebroadcasting organisation to pay an advance to the ownersof rights.

(5)The names of the authors of the principal performers ofthe work shall, except in case of the broadcastingorganisation communicating such work by way ofperformance, be announced with the broadcast.

(6)No fresh alteration to any literary or musical work, whichis not technically necessary for the purpose ofbroadcasting, other than shortening the work forconvenience of broadcast, shall be made without theconsent of the owners of rights.

A(7)The broadcasting organisation shall—

(a)maintain such records and books of account, and renderto the owners of rights such reports and accounts; and

(b)allow the owner of rights or his duly authorised agent orrepresentative to inspect all records and books of accountBrelating to such broadcast, in such manner as may beprescribed.

(8)Nothing in this section shall affect the operation of anylicence issued or any agreement entered into before thecommencement of the Copyright (Amendment) Act,C2012.”

9. Under sub-section (1) of Section 31D, broadcastingorganization which is desirous of communicating to the public by way ofa broadcast or performance of literary or musical work and soundrecording which has already been published, may do so subject toDcompliance with the provisions of the Section Sub-Section (2) incorporatesfive requirements, namely: (i) prior notice; (ii) in the manner prescribed;(iii) of the intention to broadcast the work; (iv) stating the duration andterritorial coverage of the broadcast; and (v) payment to the owner ofrights in each work royalties in the manner and at the rate fixed by theEAppellate Board.

10. Applications were filed by several broadcasters before theIntellectual Property Appellate Board[3] seeking the determination of therates for the purpose of statutory license under Section 31D (togetherwith the provisions of Rules 29 to 31 of the Rules), for the communicationFof sound recordings to the public by way of broadcast through FM radio.For several years, the Copyright Board was not duly constituted. In2017, the Copyright Board merged with the IPAB as result of statutoryamendment. By an order dated 31 December 2020, the IPAB determinedthe rates of royalty and payment mechanism for the communication ofsound recordings by way of FM radio broadcasts, under Section 31D.GThe order of the Copyright Board, insofar as it is material, contains thefollowing directions:

“215.We hereby direct that the above mentioned royalty ratesset out in para 149 for broadcasting sound recordings

H3 “IPAB”

payable respectively for the sound recording and for theunderlying literary and musical works as envisaged underSection 31D with effect from 1[st] October 2020 to 30thSeptember 2021. We further direct that:

a.The above royalty rates shall be published in the IPABWebsite and Copyright Office website.

b.The new royalty rates comes into effect from 01.10.2020.

c.The radio broadcasters have to pay the arrears of royaltyto the music companies on or before 10.02.2021 for theperiod of 01.10.2020 to 31.01.2021. As far as royalty fixedby us for underlying works of sound recording is concerned,the same shall be distributed as per the amended provisionof proviso 3 & 4 of Section 18 and 19 of the Act. Withregard to receipt of royalty from the broadcasterspertaining to sound recording which has been fixed by us,the broadcasters shall pay the same to PPL on behalf oftheir members, rest of the same shall be paid directly tothe respective parties. Similarly, the share of author andcomposer fixed by us for underlying works shall be fixedby IPRS on behalf of the authors and composers beingmembers to be paid. The non-members of the IPRS shallbe entitled to receive the royalty directly from thebroadcasters.

d.The radio broadcasters have to comply with Rule29 of the Copyright Rules, 2013 to obtain statutorylicense from the music companies, by giving advancenotice to the owner of the copyright along with anadvance payment as per the above royalty calculationwith effect from 01.02.2021. The same notice copyhas to be sent to the Registrar of Copyrights forrecords.

e.In case, the respondents would insist for advancepayments as mentioned in the Rules, we are of the viewthat since COVID 19 pandemic is an unusual thing tohappen in the year 2020. The lockdown to tackle the Covidcrisis had not only affected the radio industry, but everyother industry in the country. Considering the peculiar

circumstances till 30.09.2021, we direct all the broadcastersto deposit 25% (twenty five percent) as advance amountunder the compliance of Rule 29, subject to adjustment ofamount every calendar month.

f.As far as regional songs and small broadcasters havingBone or two radio stations having total gross income of lessthan 10 crores, they are free to negotiate with the musiccompanies under Section-30 of the Act as per earlierpractise either to play in lumpsum or as per terms andconditions decided by them.

Cg.The royalty rates shall be reviewed by the Board as perRule 31(9) at the end of the said period either suo mottoor on the application by any interested person.

h.The rate determined under these proceedings will act asa base for future revision/change in the rates, where thisentire process need not be replicated, except taking intoconsiderations, change in the financial details, payingcapacity of the Radio Broadcasters, the effect of pandemicand all other relevant factors etc. which have been givendue consideration.

Ei.All the Petitions are allowed in terms of the royaltydetermined hereinabove.

j.Indian Performing Rights Society/Authors (lyricists &music composers) are also entitled to claim their share ofroyalty from the assignee.

Fk.No costs.”

(emphasis supplied)

11. The order of the IPAB is stated to have been challenged bythe copyright owners, on the one hand. On the other hand, suits arepending before the High Court of Delhi and the High Court of JudicatureGat Bombay. This is not the bone of contention in the present case.

12. Rule 29 of the Rules, insofar as it is material, contains thefollowing requirements:

“29. Notice to owner for communication to the public of literaryand musical works and sound recordings.—(1) Any broadcasting

organisation desirous of communicating to the public by way ofbroadcast or by way of performance of published literary ormusical work and sound recording under sub-section (1) of Section31-D shall give notice of its intention to the owner of the copyrightand to the Registrar of Copyrights before period of five days inadvance of such communication to the public and shall pay to theowner of the copyright, in the literary or musical work or soundrecording or any combination thereof, the amount of royalties dueat the rate fixed by the Board in this regard:

Provided that in case of communication to the public by way ofbroadcast or by way of performance of newly published literaryor musical work or sound recording or any combination thereof,which has been published within the said period of five days ofsuch communication and which do not form part of the scheduledprogrammes, the notice shall, be given before such communicationto the public:

Provided further that in case of communication to the public byway of broadcast or by way of performance of any publishedliterary or musical work and sound recording or any combinationthereof, in unforeseen circumstances, the notice shall, be givenwithin twenty-four hours of such communication to the public:

Provided also that any broadcasting organisation shall give noticeunder this chapter only after the royalty to be paid is determinedby the Board under Rule 31 and published in the journal and in thewebsite of the Copyright Office and the Board.

(2) Every such notice shall be in respect of works belonging toone owner only.

(3) Separate notices shall be given for communication to publicby way of radio broadcast or television broadcast or by way ofperformance of literary or musical work and sound recordingwhich has already been published.

(4) The notice under sub-rule (1) shall contain the followingparticulars, namely—

(a) Name of the channel;

A(b) Territorial coverage where communication to public by wayof radio broadcast, television broadcast or performance under sub-rule (3) is to be made;

(c) Details necessary to identify the work which is proposed to becommunicated to the public by way of radio broadcast, televisionBbroadcast or performance under sub-rule (3);

(d) Year of publication of such work, if any;

(e) Name, address and nationality of the owner of the copyrightin such works;

C(f) Names of authors and principal performers of such works;

(g) Alterations, if any, which are proposed to be made for thecommunication to the public by way of radio broadcast, televisionbroadcast or performance of the works, reasons thereof, and theevidence of consent of the owners of rights, if required, for makingsuch alteration;D(h) Mode of the proposed communication to public, i.e. radio,television or performance;

(i) Name, if any, of the programme in which the works are to beincluded;

E(j) Details of time slots, duration and period of the programme inwhich the works are to be included;

(k) Details of the payment of royalties at the rates fixed by theBoard; and

F(l) Address of the place where the records and books of accountsare to be maintained for inspection by the owner of rights.”

13. Rule 29(4) has been challenged before the High Court on theground that it (i) violates Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution; and (ii) isultra vires Section 31D of the Act.

G14. The High Court, in the course of its interim order, observed:

“3.Prima facie, there appears to be an element ofunworkability about the Rule in that it may be seen to bealmost claustrophobic in its operation and leaving very littleroom for flexibility. Indeed, the very concept of speaking

or performing ad lib, which is the essence of spontaneityin any live speech or live performance, would be lost ifpre-planned details, down to the every second of theprogramme must be disclosed as the impugned Rule maybe read to imply.”

The High Court was of the view that the duty which is cast onbroadcasters in the notice to broadcast under Rule 29(1) is “apparentlyonerous”. Consequently, it directed that the petitioners before it may bepermitted to resort to the second proviso to Rule 29(4) as “routineprocedure”, instead of an exception, subject to the duration of the expost facto reporting being enlarged to fifteen days. In other words, theHigh Court, while maintaining the requirement of prior notice underSection 31 D, has re-fashioned the rule by stipulating that details pertainingto the broadcasts, particularly the duration, time slots and the like, includingthe quantum of royalty may be furnished within fifteen days of thebroadcast or performance.

15. Mr Mukul Rohatgi and Mr Akhil Sibal, learned Senior Counselappearing on behalf of the appellants, submitted that:

(i)The interim order of the High Court re-writes Rule 29(4),which is impermissible, in any event at the interim stage;

(ii)The validity of Rule 29(4) is yet to be adjudicated uponand presumption would attach to the constitutionality ofboth- the Rules and the Statute;

(iii)There is no challenge to the validity of Section 31D interms of which Rule 29 has been framed;

(iv)The order of the IPAB dated 31 December 2020specifically requires compliance with the provisions ofRule 29 while fixing the rates of royalty; and

(v)The High Court has, in the course of its interim order,extended it only to the petitioners before it and to thebroadcasters who have been impleaded as parties, as aresult of which the pan-India operation of the Rule is leftin the realm ofuncertainty.

16. These submissions have been contested on behalf of thebroadcasters by Mr Navroz Seervai and Mr Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learnedSenior Counsel.

148SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2021] 9 S.C.R.

A17. Mr Navroz Seervai urged that:

(i)Section 31D(2) stipulates that the broadcastingorganization shall give prior notice, in such manner as maybe prescribed, of its intention to broadcast the work, statingthe duration and territorial coverage of the broadcast,Btogether with the payment of royalty;

(ii)Section 31 D, in referring to notice in the manner asmay be prescribed, does not envisage that conditionsincorporating minute details should be provided in the priornotice; and

(iii)The rule making power in Section 78 makes distinctionbetween ‘form’, ‘manner’ and ‘conditions’. Since Section31D refers to the manner in which the notice may be issued,the ‘manner’ cannot extend to stipulating ‘conditions’.

18. Mr Neeraj Kishan Kaul has submitted that:D

(i)Section 31D was introduced by Parliament by anamendment of 2012 to obviate the exercise of monopolisticrights wielded by copyright owners to the detriment of thepublic at large;

(ii)Section 31D creates statutory right in favour ofEbroadcasters to obtain licenses as result of which theearlier regime of voluntary licensing has been replaced bythe regime of statutory licenses envisaged in Section 31D;

(iii)Until December 2020, in the absence of duly constitutedIPAB, broadcasters were functioning under the ambit ofFvoluntary licensing agreements;

(iv)Rule 29(4) defeats the object of Section 31D insofar as itincorporates minute details in the prior notice which hasbeen prescribed;

G(v)Many broadcasters operate in the context of interactivedynamic sites as result of which the requirements whichhave been prescribed in Rule 29(4) are onerous andimpossible to fulfill;

(vi)The broadcasters are ready and willing to pay royaltiesHwhich are prescribed by the IPAB according to the statute

at the end of every month and even inspection of recordsis furnished to copyright owners; and

(vii)Whereas Section 31D provides for only the duration andterritorial coverage of the intended broadcast, the noticewhich has been prescribed by Rule 29(4) has gone farbeyond the statutory ambit of Section 31D and is ultraBvires for that reason.

19. While counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting partieshave addressed submissions on merits, we would desist from expressingany opinion on the constitutional challenge which is pending considerationbefore the High Court of Judicature at Madras where, as noted earlier,the writ petitions are slated for final disposal on 4 October 2021.

20. At this stage, the issue is whether the interim order of theHigh Court can be sustained. Essentially, as the narration in the earlierpart of this judgment would indicate, the High Court has substituted theprovisions of Rule 29(4) with regime of its own, which is made applicableto the broadcasters and the petitioners before it. Constitution Benchof this Court in In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section138 of NI Act 1881[4 ]has emphasized that the judiciary cannot transgressinto the domain of policy making by re-writing statute, however strongthe temptations maybe. This Court observed:

“20.Conferring power on the court by reading certain wordsinto provisions is impermissible. judge must not rewritea statute, neither to enlarge nor to contract it. Whatevertemptations the statesmanship of policy-making mightwisely suggest, construction must eschew interpolation andevisceration. He must not read in by way of creation. TheJudge’s duty is to interpret and apply the law, not to changeit to meet the Judge’s idea of what justice requires. Thecourt cannot add words to statute or read words into itwhich are not there.”

It is settled principle of law that when the words of statute areclear and unambiguous, it is not permissible for the court to read words

4 Suo Motu Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 2 of 2020, 16 April 2021, available at https://-main.sci.gov.in/supremecourt/2020/9631/9631_2020_31_501_27616_Judgement_16-Apr2021.pdf

Ainto the statute. Constitution Bench of this Court in Padma SundaraRao v State of Tamil Nadu[5]has observed:

“12.…The court cannot read anything into statutory provisionwhich is plain and unambiguous. statute is an edict ofthe legislature. The language employed in the statute isBdeterminative factor of legislative intent. The first andprimary rule of construction is that the intention of thelegislation must be found in the words used by thelegislature itself. The question is not what may be supposedand has been intended but what has been said.

14.While interpreting provision the court only interprets thelaw and cannot legislate it. If provision of law is misusedand subjected to the abuse of process of law, it is for thelegislature to amend, modify or repeal it, if deemednecessary.”

21. The court is entrusted by the Constitution of the power ofjudicial review. In the discharge of its mandate, the court may evaluatethe validity of legislation or rules made under it. statute may beinvalidated if is ultra vires constitutional guarantees or transgresses theElegislative domain entrusted to the enacting legislature. Delegatedlegislation can, if it results in constitutional infraction or is contrary tothe ambit of the enacting statute be invalidated. However, the court inthe exercise of judicial review cannot supplant the terms of the provisionthrough judicial interpretation by re-writing statutory language.Draftsmanship is function entrusted to the legislature. CraftsmanshipFon the judicial side cannot transgress into the legislative domain by re-writing the words of statute. For then, the judicial craft enters theforbidden domain of legislative draft. That precisely is what the DivisionBench of the High Court has done by its interim order. Section 31D(2)speaks of the necessity of giving prior notice, in the manner as may beGprescribed, of the intention to broadcast the work stating the durationand the territorial coverage of the broadcast, together with the paymentof royalties in the manner and at the rates fixed by the Appellate Board.While the High Court has held the broadcasters down to the requirementof prior notice, it has modified the operation of Rule 29 by stipulating that

H5(2002) 3 SCC 533

the particulars which are to be furnished in the notice may be furnishedwithin period of fifteen days after the broadcast. The interim orderconverts the second proviso into “routine procedure” instead of anexception (as the High Court has described its direction). This exerciseby the High Court amounts to re-writing. Such an exercise of judicialredrafting of legislation or delegated legislation cannot be carried out.The High Court has done so at the interlocutory stage.

22. We are, therefore, clearly of the view that an exercise ofjudicial re-drafting of Rule 29(4) was unwarranted, particularly at theinterlocutory stage. The difficulties which have been expressed beforethe High Court by the broadcasters have warranted an early listing ofthe matter and this Court has been assured by the copyright owners thatthey would file their counter affidavits immediately so as to facilitate theexpeditious disposal of the proceedings. That having been assured, weare of the view that an exercise of judicial re-writing of statutory ruleis unwarranted in the exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 226 of theConstitution, particularly in interlocutory proceedings. The High Courtwas also of the view that the second proviso may be resorted to as amatter of routine, instead of as an exception and that the ex post factoreporting should be enlarged to period of fifteen days (instead of aperiod of twenty four hours). Such an exercise was impermissible sinceit would substitute statutory rule made in exercise of the power ofdelegated legislation with new regime and provision which the HighCourt considers more practicable.

23. We accordingly allow the appeals by setting aside the interimorder of the High Court dated 2 August 2021.This is, however, subject tothe clarification that this Court has not expressed any opinion on themerits of the rival submissions which would fall for determination in theexercise of the writ jurisdiction of the High Court in the pendingproceedings.

24. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

Devika Gujral

Appeals allowed.