DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY versus GODFREY PHILLIPS (I) LTD AND ORS.

[2022] 19 S.C.R. 1193

DELHI DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

GODFREY PHILLIPS (I) LTD AND ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 3073 of 2022)

MAY 06, 2022

[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 - s. 6, s.4, 5 - Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitationand Resettlement Act, 2013 – s. 24(2) –Original land owners enteredinto agreement to sell with the Respondent No. 1 on 25.9.1990 forthe land measuring 28 Bigha 08 Biswa – The said land was in theprocess of acquisition which was started in 1980 vide notificationu/s. 6 and s. 4 of the 1894 Act – The agreement to sell recited that;‘acquisition process was challenged before the High Court, whereinthe entire land was released from the acquisition and the DelhiAdministration has not filed appeal and at present the above landsare free from acquisition’ – Land Acquisition Collector had takenpossession and paid compensation to the owners, then thecompensation has been paid back - The respondent No.1 purchasedthe land vide sale deed dated 30.8.1991 and 27.2.1991 – RespondentNo. 1 filed Writ Petition for declaration that the lands purchasedby them are free from and outside the scope of acquisitionproceedings, which was dismissed – Special Leave Petition was filedagainst the order, which was also dismissed – Respondent no.1 filedanother Writ Petition after the commencement of the 2013 Act forquashing of the notification u/s 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act, and claimedthe Mandamus to handover the peaceful possession of land – Inabsence of any proof of encashment of cheque (the paid backamount of compensation), the High Court directed the purchaser topay the amount of Rs. 16,61,774/- and such amount stands paidand held that proceedings stand lapsed in terms of Section 24(2) of2013 Act – The Appellant challenged the said order before SupremeCourt – Held: The purchaser has no right to claim lapsing ofacquisition proceedings – Original land owner filed Writ Petitionchallenging the notification u/s. 6 of 1894 Act, which was dismissed– Special Leave Petition was filed challenging the order, which was

DEF

Awithdrawn – It was the conscious decision of land owner not tocontinue with SLP – All the objections which were available to theoriginal land owner including the purchaser up to that stage cannotbe permitted to be raised again – No right confer on the other landowners who have not disputed the acquisition proceedings on theground of lack of effective hearing of objections under Section 5-BA of the Act – Original land owner never filed any objections underSection 5-A of the Act, the purchaser cannot seek the relief whichwas not available even to the original land owner – The purchaserhad in fact filed Writ of Mandamus for delivering the possessionof the entire acquired land – Such claim of Mandamus shows thatCthe purchaser is out of possession –Therefore, the condition in IndoreDevelopment Authority for lapsing of the acquisition is not satisfied– Appellant directed to refund the amount of Rs.16,61,774/- to thepurchaser, without any interest as such deposit was voluntary offerto deposit.

DAllowing the appeal, the CourtHELD:

1.1 The purchaser has purchased the property knowing fullywell that the vendor has not disputed the acquisition proceedings.But on the basis of an order passed in Balbir Singh, it was conveyedEand accepted by the purchaser, that the acquisition stands quashedand original land owner was in possession of the land. Since SudanSingh, affirming the order in Balbir Singh has not been approvedby this Court in the three judgments referred hereinabove (AbheyRam, Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II), no rightFwould accrue to the original land owner or the purchaser. TheHigh Court in the impugned order has not noticed any of thethree judgments of this Court in Abhey Ram, Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II nullifying the effect of Balbir Singhand instead ordered the purchaser to deposit twice of the amountpaid to the original land owner. The condition of payment ofGcompensation in Balbir Singh by the land owners does not survivein view of the fact that such judgment has not been approved bythis Court. [Para 38][1220-G-H; 1221-A-B]

1.2 In the present case, as per the purchaser itself, thepossession of Part land comprising in Khasra No. 384 (4-6),H

385 (4-6) and 390 (4-6) total measuring 12 Bigha and 18 Biswawas taken by the Appellant and the compensation was paid. Theargument is that in terms of the impugned orders of the HighCourt, the purchaser had deposited Rs.16,61,774/-, therefore,the acquisition stand lapsed. Such deposit is in turn based on theorder of the High Court in Balbir Singh. The deposit by thepurchaser, either in terms of the impugned order or the orderpassed in Balbir Singh, is wholly inconsequential. The amount ofcompensation was paid on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, thecompensation of the acquired land paid by the appellant cannotlead to lapsing of the acquisition in terms of Indore DevelopmentAuthority. The purchaser in its written submissions had made noreference to the later judgments of this Court referred to above.The deposit in terms of the order of the High Court will not leadto lapsing of the acquisition proceedings, such orders beingabsolutely being illegal. Thus, in respect of Part land, thepurchaser cannot take shelter of the order, which had no legalvalue and stands nullified. Even otherwise, there could not beany direction to deposit the amount now after more than 25 years.The right which has been lost due to passage of time cannot berevived by virtue of deposit of the amount subsequent to ordersof the High Court. [Para 39][1221-C-F]

1.3 The purchaser had in fact filed Writ of Mandamus fordelivering the possession of the entire acquired land. Such claimof Mandamus shows that the purchaser is out of possession.Therefore, the condition in Indore Development Authority forlapsing of the acquisition is not satisfied. Therefore, as per thepurchaser, the possession has been taken of the part of the landand compensation has been deposited in respect of the remainingland. Thus, the twin conditions as laid down by this Court are notsatisfied. [Para 41][1222-D-E]

1.4 Even otherwise, the stand of the appellant is that thepossession of the entire land was taken on 14.7.1987 whereaspossession of land measuring 12 Bigha 18 Biswa was handedover to it, whereas the possession of the remaining landmeasuring 15 Bigha 10 Biswa is with the Government of Delhi.

ABC

ATherefore, the purchaser is not entitled to any declaration oflapsing of acquisition proceedings inter alia on the ground that ithas purchased the land after vesting of the land with the Stateand the possession has been taken of the land measuring 28 Bigha8 Biswa and the compensation has also been deposited in respectof entire land, though the compensation in respect of landBadmeasuring 12 Bigha 18 Biswa was disbursed. The remainingamount of compensation was with the Land Acquisition Collector.[Para 42][1222-F-H]1.5 The order passed by the High Court is set aside.However, the appellant shall refund the amount of Rs.16,61,774/C- to the purchaser, without any interest as such deposit was avoluntary offer to deposit, in accordance with law. [Para44][1225-A]

Ishwar Chand Gupta v. Union of India Writ PetitionNo. 2736 of 1985 (Delhi HC); Munni Lal v. Lt. GovernorDof Delhi 1983 SCC OnLine Del 321; Balak Ram Guptav. Union of India AIR 1987 Del 239; Shri B.R. Guptav. Union of India & Ors. 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367;Balbir Singh v. Union of India & Ors. 1989 SCCOnLine Del 211; Delhi Development Authority v. SudanESingh (1997) 5 SCC 430; Abhey Ram & Ors. v. Unionof India &Ors. (1997) 5 SCC 421 : [1997] 3 SCR 931;Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors.(1999) 7 SCC 44; Delhi Administration v. Gurdip SinghUban & Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 296 : [2000] 2 Suppl. SCR496; Godfrey Phillips v. Union of India 2005 (125)FDelhi Law Times 207; Om Parkash vs. Union of India(2010) 4 SCC 17 : [2010] 2 SCR 447; Meera Sahni v.Lt. Governor of Delhi (2008) 9 SCC 177 : [2008] 10SCR 1012; M. Venkatesh v. Bangalore DevelopmentAuthority (2015) 17 SCC 1 : [2015] 11 SCR 454;GGovernment (NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust &Anr (2017) 6 SCC 751 : [2017] 4 SCR 232 – referredto.

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal & Ors. 7(2020) 8 SCC 129 : [2020] 3 SCR 1; Shyam Nandan

Prasad & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (1993) 4 SCC255 : [1993] 1 Suppl. SCR 533; Chairman andManaging Director, Tamil Nadu Housing Board & Anr.v. S. Saraswathy & Ors (2015) 8 SCC 723 : [2015] 6SCR 331; State of Haryana & Anr. v. Devander Sagar& Ors. (2016) 14 SCC 746 : [2015] 13 SCR 1057;Shiv Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors (2019) 10SCC 229 – relied on.

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 3073of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 09.12.2016 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in W.P. (C) No. 6507 of 2014.

Sanjay Poddar, Sr. Adv., Vishnu B. Saharya, Viresh B. Saharya,Vivek B. Saharya, Gobind Kumar for M/s Saharya & Co., Advs. for theAppellant.

Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASG, Kapil Sibal, Debal Bannerjee, Sr. Advs.,Merusagar Samantaray, Ms. Ruchi Kohli, Durga Dutt, AniruddhaPurushotham, Manvendra Singh, Ms. BLN Shivani, Aman Sharma, Ms.Shreya Jain, Ms. S. Mehta, Amrish K. Sharma, Nizam Pasha, KrishanKumar, Pankaj Vivek, Nitin Pal, Ms. Sujeeta Srivastava, Advs. for theRespondents.

AThe Judgment of the Court was delivered by

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

1. The challenge in the present appeal is to an order dated 9.12.2016passed by the High Court of Delhi whereby the writ petition filed byrespondent No. 1[1] was allowed and the proceedings initiated under theBLand Acquisition Act, 1894[2] were declared to have lapsed in terms ofSection 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency inLand Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013[3].

2. The process of acquisition of land admeasuring 50,000 Bighassituated in 12 villages for the planned development of Delhi started wayCback in 1980. The intention to acquire the land was published videnotification dated 5.11.1980 in respect of land situated in villages ofTughlakabad, Tigri, Deoli, Khanpur, Said-ul-Ajaib, Neb Sarai, Hauz Khasand Khirki, and vide notification dated 25.11.1980 in respect of the landsituated in villages Chattarpur, Satbari Maidangarhi, Sayoorpur and RajpurDKhurd. The declarations under Section 6 of the Act were published on27.5.1985, 6.6.1985, 7.6.1985 and 26.2.1986 and the award wereannounced on 20.5.1987 or thereafter.3. M/s. Satluj Bhatta Co. through its partners[4] (1) Shri IshwarChander Gupta; (2) Shri Hari Chand; and (3) Shri Jai Chand were ownersEof land admeasuring 58 Bigha 14 Biswa. An agreement to sell wasexecuted by them on 25.9.1990 for the land measuring 28 Bigha 08Biswa with the purchaser. Thereafter, the purchaser is said to havepurchased the land in question vide sale deeds dated 30.8.1991 and27.2.1991.F4. The purchaser for the first time in written synopsis, filed afterthe conclusion of the arguments, asserted that the original land ownersin respect of land measuring 58 Bigha 14 Biswa situated in revenueestate of Village Sayoorpur, had filed Writ Petition No. 2736 of 1985titled as Ishwar Chand Gupta v. Union of India before the High Court.We requisitioned the records of the said writ petition from the HighGCourt. It transpires that the writ petition was filed on or about 30.10.1985on the ground that the notification dated 20.5.1985 under Section 6 of

1 For short, the ‘purchaser’

2 For short, the ‘Act’

3 For short, the ‘2013 Act’

H4 Hereinafter referred to as “Original land owners”

the Act had been published after period of more than three years ofthe notification under Section 4 of the Act on 25.11.1980. There is noassertion that the original land owners had filed any objections underSection 5A of the Act. The said writ petition was dismissed on 2.12.1985when the following order was passed:

“For the reasons recorded in Civil Writ No. 426 of 1981 titledMuni Lal & Others Vs. Lt. Governor of Delhi and others decidedon 15[th] November, 1983 and Civil Writ 2850 of 1985 titled HemantSharma and Others Vs. Union of India and others decided on 25[th]November, 1985, the petition is without merit. Dismissed.”

5. The Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 4169 of 1986 filed againstthe said order was withdrawn on 12.9.1989 with two other petitions.The order passed by this Court reads as thus:

“These three special leave petitions along with several other caseswere heard together. They are directed against the judgment ofthe Delhi High Court rejecting the writ petitions of the presentpetitioners challenging notification issued under Section 4 of theLand Acquisition Act. It is stated by Mr. Chitale, the learnedcounsel for the petitioners in the Special Leave Petition No. 1224of 1986 that on subsequent writ petition filed by another interestedparty, the High Court has struck down the subsequent notificationissued under Section 6 of the Act and in the circumstances thepresent special leave petitions have become infructuous and willnot be pressed. The learned counsel on behalf of the respondentshas refuted the proposition. He says that the subsequent judgmentof the Delhi High Court may be impugned in this Court and if thechallenge is successful, the petitioners who are not parties to thatcase will not be in position to take any advantage out of theafore-said judgment of the High Court. Alternatively, the learnedcounsel for the respondents has contended that even if the saidnotification issued under Section 6 finally stands quashed, theauthorities will be entitled to issue fresh notification under Section6 on the basis of the Section 4 notification which has beenunsuccessfully challenged by the petitioners in the present case.We do not consider it necessary to decide the question as towhether the special leave petitions have become infructuous ornot and whether on their withdrawal by the petitioners they aregoing to suffer in the long run as the learned counsel for the

FGH

1200SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Apetitioners, even after we made this position clear to them, statedthat the S.L.Ps. would not be pressed. Since the petitioners arewithdrawing the S.L.Ps. at their own risk, the same are dismissedas withdrawn. There will be no order as to costs.”

6. The process of acquisition was challenged in number of otherBwrit petitions before the High Court and stay of dispossession was grantedtherein even before the notification under Section 6 of the Act waspublished. One of such writ petitions was Munni Lal v. Lt. Governorof Delhi[5]. The validity of the declarations under Section 6 of the Actwas challenged inter-alia on the ground that the acquisition proceedingsstood lapsed in view of the Central Act No. 68 of 1984 fixing time limitCfor publication of notification under Section 6 of the Act. Such questionwas examined by the Full Bench of the High Court in judgment dated27.5.1987 reported as Balak Ram Gupta v. Union of India[6]. The FullBench held that the period during which the acquisition proceedings werestayed should be excluded while determining the validity of the declarationDunder Section 6 of the Act. Therefore, it was found that the notificationunder Section 6 of the Act was within the time fixed by the statute. Thematter was remitted to the Division Bench as the Full Bench was of theview that it would not be convenient or possible for the Full Bench toconsider and pronounce the numerous contentions which may be raisedin each one of the 73 petitions.E7. The Division Bench decided all the writ petitions in the judgmentreported as Shri B.R. Gupta v. Union of India & Ors.[7] when thefollowing operative order was passed on 14.10.1988:

“The orders of Land Acquisition Collectors under Section 5A andFthe notifications issued by the Lt. Governor under Section 6 of theLand Acquisition Act together with further land acquisitionproceedings in all the above writ petition are quashed and setaside with cost. There shall be two set of counsel’s fees at Rs.1,500/- each as the group of petitions were heard mainly in thetwo writ petitions. The respondents have also not filed the counterGaffidavits in all the petitions as it was agreed to complete two setsof petitions with counter affidavits. The rule is made absolute.‘Reasons to follow’’.

5 1983 SCC OnLine Del 3216 For short, the ‘Balak Ram-I’, 1987 SCC OnLine Del 227 : AIR 1987 Del 239H7 For short, the ‘Balak Ram-II’, 1988 SCC OnLine Del 367 : (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)

8. The High Court upon recording the reasons on 18.11.1988 setaside the notification issued under Section 6 of the Act as the writ petitionerwas neither given an opportunity of personal hearing, nor was he actuallyheard in the objections filed by the landowners under Section 5A of theAct and since there was no record maintained for consideration of largenumber of objections filed by the writ petitioners/landowners. It washeld that the writ petitioner whose land is being taken by the Governmentwithout his consent has right to know the reasons as to why his claimfor exemption was being declined. It was held as under:

“16. We may note that there are number of other contentionsraised by the petitioner in the writ petition apart from the onesthat are mentioned and considered above. We need not go into allof them and given any finding, since we have already come to theconclusion that reports under Section 5A and orders under Section6 cannot be sustained in law on the basis of the contentions alreadynoted by us.”

9. Many landowners filed writ petitions before the High Courtchallenging the action of the Delhi Administration to take possessionfrom them even though the declaration under Section 6 of the Act stoodquashed in its entirety in Balak Ram-II. The High Courtin judgmentreported as Balbir Singh v. Union of India & Ors.[8] held on 15.5.1989that the action of the respondents to take the possession from thelandowners was not sustainable. Thus, the benefit of the judgment wasextended to all the landowners as the entire notification under Section 6of the Act was found to be quashed. The Court passed the followingorder:

“This order will dispose of CW 1373-75/89.............illegible.Proceedings u/s 5A of the Land Acquisition Act right upto thestage of Award relating to villages, namely, Khan Pur Deoli @Devli, Tughlakabad, Khirkee, Neb Sarai, Said-ul-Ajaib, Tigri,Shayoor Pur, Satbari, Chattar Pur, Raj Pur Khurd, Maidan Ghari,have been quashed by Division Bench of this Court in BalakRam Gupta vs. U.O.I. C.W.P. 1639/85 decided on 14th October,1988/18th November, 1988. The prayer of the petitioners is thatin spite of that Judgment, the respondents are trying to takepossession of the land.

8 1989 SCC OnLine Del 211 : (1989) 39 DLT 233 (DB)

A2. The Delhi Administration as also the Delhi DevelopmentAuthority have taken up very fair stand before us. Theircontention is that certain land owners have received compensationand as such they should not be allowed to deal with the land tillthe compensation is paid back to the Delhi Administration withinterest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date they receivedBthe payment till the date they have refunded the amount. Thecontention raised is quite fair and is accepted. It is further statedby learned counsel for the respondents that no effort would bemade to take possession of any land from anybody and thepossession already taken of these lands will be restored back toCthe land owners on receipt of the refund of compensation, if madewith interest. It is further con-tended that in certain cases, theland owners have been allotted alternate plots in leiu of their landhaving been acquired and in those cases the alternate plots mustbe surrendered before the land owners can take advantage of theDquashing of the notifications. The counsel for the petitioner acceptsthis suggestion of the respondents. Consequently, we direct thatthe possession of the petitioners will not be disturbed except incases where the compensation has been received by the landowners or alternate plots have been allotted until the compensationamount and the alternate plot is surrendered. Counsel for theEpetitioners agree that the land owners who have receivedcompensation or have been allotted alternate plots would surrenderthe same as indicated above within two months from today. Allother land owners who have neither received compensation norany alternate plot are free to deal with their lands the way theyFlike and their possession will not be disturbed by the respondents.Delhi Administration will see to it that the Revenue records areamended accordingly. The proper authority i.e. the LandAcquisition Collector will receive the refund of compensation with12 per cent interest per annum as well as the surrender of thealternate plots when and if offered. The writ petitions are disposedGof in these terms.”

10. The Union of India sought review of the order passed (RANo. 2766 of 1989) in the all the matters. The review was dismissed on6.7.1990 on the ground that since the entire notification stands quashed,therefore, Union cannot keep the possession.H

11. The said judgment and order of the Division Bench in BalbirSingh came up for consideration before this Court in judgment reportedas Delhi Development Authority v. Sudan Singh in Civil Appeal No.3847 of 1991 and Civil Appeal Nos. 3801-3847/1991[9]. This Courtdismissed the appeals filed by the Union of India or by the DelhiDevelopment Authority on 20.9.1991 except to the extent that the landof Village Saidul Azab was not part of the writ petitions which weredecided in Balak Ram-II.

12. The order of the High Court in C.W.P. No. 2657/85 AbheyRam vs. Union of India dated 2.9.1987 was passed in the writ petitionfiled by the land owners of Village Khirkee on the ground that thenotification dated 7.6.1985 under Section 6 of the Act has been issuedafter three years of the publication of the notification under Section 4 ofthe Act on 5.11.1980. In the said case also, the land owners had not filedany objections under Section 5A of the Act. The writ petition wasdismissed. The order of the High Court reads thus:-

“It transpires that this petition challenges the Notification underSection 6 of the Land Acquisition Act dated 7th June, 1985. Thevalidity of this Notification has already been upheld by Full Benchof this Court in the case of Balak Ram Gupta Vs. Union of India,CWP No. 1639/85 decided on 27th May, 1987. No other point ispressed. The writ petition is consequently dismissed”.

13. The said order was the subject matter of appeal before thisCourtin judgment reported as Abhey Ram & Ors. v. Union of India& Ors.[10]. three judge Bench in the said judgment inter-alia examinedan argument raised that the benefit of quashing of the declaration underSection 6 of the Act by the High Court in Balak Ram-II should beextended to the appellants, though the notification had been quashed quathe writ petitioners before the High Court. This Court examined thequestion as to whether declaration under Section 6 of the Act in itsentirety stands quashed even when the Court had quashed the declarationin the case of the land owners who had filed writ petitions after theirobjections were not considered under Section 5-A of the Act. This Courtnoticed that unfortunately, the operative part of the judgment (asreproduced in para 7 of this judgment) in Balak Ram-II had not been

9 (1997) 5 SCC 430

10 (1997) 5 SCC 421

Abrought to the notice of this Court in Sudan Singh. It was held that suchjudgment of the High Court has no application to the facts of the case asunless the declaration under Section 6 is quashed in its entirety specifically,it does not mean that the entire declaration has been quashed. It wasnoticed that the appellants had not filed any objections to the noticeissued under Section 5-A. This Court held as under:B

“9. Therefore, the reasons given in B.R. Gupta v. UOI and others,37(1989) Delhi Law Times 150are obvious with reference tothe quashing of the publication of the, declaration under Section 6vis-a-vis the writ petitioners therein....

C10. The question then arises is: whether the quashing of thedeclaration by the Division Bench in respect of the other matterswould enure the benefit to the appellants also ? Though, primafacie, the argument of the learned counsel is attractive, on deeperconsideration, it is difficult to give acceptance to the contention ofMr. Sachhar. When the Division Bench expressly limited theDcontroversy to the quashing of the declaration qua the writpetitioners before the Bench, necessary consequences would bethat the declaration published under Section 6should stand upheld.11. It is seen that before the Division Bench judgment was rendered,the petition of the appellants stood dismissed and the appellantsEhad filed the special leave petition in this Court. If it were caseentirely relating to Section 6 declaration as has been quashed bythe High Court, necessarily that would enure the benefit to othersalso, though they did not file any petition, except to those whoselands were taken possession of and were vested in the State underFSections 16 and 17(2) of the Act free from all encumbrances. Butit is seen that the Division Bench confined the controversy to thequashing of the declaration under Section 6 in respect of the personsqua the writ petitioners before the Division Bench. Therefore, thebenefit of the quashing of the declaration under Section 6 by theDivision Bench does not enure to the appellants.

12. It is true that Bench of this Court has considered the effectof such quashing in Delhi Development Authority v. SudanSingh [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : (1991) 45 DLT 602] . But, unfortunately,in that case the operative part of the judgment referred to earlierhas not been brought to the notice of this Court. Therefore, the

ratio therein has no application to the facts in this case. It is alsotrue that in Yusufbhai Noormohmed Nendoliya case [(1991) 4SCC 531] this Court had also observed that it would enure thebenefit to those petitioners. In view of the fact that the notificationunder Section 4(1) is composite one and equally the declarationunder Section 6 is also composite one, unless the declarationunder Section 6 is quashed in toto, it does not operate as if theentire declaration requires to be quashed. It is seen that theappellants had not filed any objections to the notice issued underSection 5-A.”

14. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors.[11],this Court held that the three-Judge Bench judgment in Abhey Ram isbinding in preference to the judgment of the two Judges in Sudan Singh.This Court held as under:

“7. We may state that it is true that in Sudan Singh case [(1997)5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] two-Judge Bench of this Courtconfirmed another judgment of the Delhi High Court wherein theHigh Court had allowed the writ petition on the basis that thejudgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988 had quashedthe Section 6 declaration wholly. It is also true that in Sudan Singhcase [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] too no objectionswere filed by the owners under Section 5-A. But, we are governedby the judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ramcase [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] where the saidBench not only referred to the effect of the Division Benchjudgment of the High Court dated 18-11-1988 but also referred tothe judgment of the two-Judge Bench of this Court in Sudan Singhcase [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] . The three-JudgeBench in Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] isbinding on us in preference to the judgment of the two Judgesin Sudan Singh [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602].

8. In connection with owners or persons interested who have notfiled objections under Section 5-A, in principle, it must be acceptedthat they had no objection to the Section 4 notification operating inrespect of their property. On the other hand, in respect of thosewho filed objections, they might have locus standi to contend that

DEFG

11 For short, the ‘Gurdip Singh Uban-I’ (1999) 7 SCC 44

the Section 5-A enquiry was not conducted properly. We, therefore,agree in principle with the view of the three-Judge Bench in AbheyRam case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] that thosewho have not filed objections under Section 5-A, could not beallowed to contend that the Section 5-A enquiry was bad and thatconsequently the Section 6 declaration must be struck down andthat then the Section 4 notification would lapse. If, therefore, noobjections were filed by the respondents, logically the Section 6declaration must be deemed to be in force so far as they areconcerned.

9. But learned Senior Counsel for the respondents contends thatthe judgment of the Division Bench dated 18-11-1988 in B.R. Guptacase [(1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)] had quashed the entire Section5-A proceedings and that even in case the respondents had filedobjections, the position would not have been different. We cannotaccept this contention. We are of the view that in respect of thosewho did not object to the Section 4(1) notification by filing objectionsunder Section 5-A, the said notification must be treated as beingin force. The writ petitioners cannot be permitted to contend thatin some other cases, the notification was quashed and that suchquashing would also enure to their benefit.

E10. Then coming to the effect of the judgment of the DivisionBench dated 18-11-1988 of the High Court, we are of the viewthat the three-Judge Bench judgment in Abhey Ram case [(1997)5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] has interpreted or declared theeffect of the said High Court judgment dated 18-11-1988. Thatjudgment is binding on us. We cannot go by the two-Judge BenchFjudgment in Sudan Singh case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991)DLT 602] because we are bound by the judgment of the three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997)5 SC 354] . Further, the judgment in Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] takes notice of Sudan SinghGcase [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602] and it cannot becontended that they have not looked fully into the judgmentin Sudan Singh case [(1997) 5 SCC 430 : 45 (1991) DLT 602]or fully into the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Courtdated 18-11-1988 in B.R. Gupta case [(1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)].Nor is the dismissal of the special leave petition in B.L. Sharma

case precedent which can outweigh Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC421 : JT (1997) 5 SC 354] . The opinion of the legal department ofthe Government or the Delhi Development Authority which isrelied upon — apart from not having binding force, cannotoverride Abhey Ram case [(1997) 5 SCC 421 : JT (1997) 5 SC354].”

15. In another judgment reported as Delhi Administration v.Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors.[12], this Court considered the InterlocutoryApplications filed by the landowners in Gurdip Singh Uban-I after thedismissal of review petition on 24-11-1999. This Court, while decidingsuch applications noticed that the brief operative order in Balak Ram-II in each of the 73 writ petitions was not noticed in Sudan Singh. Itwas held as under:

“42. On fresh consideration of the matter, we are of the opinionthat Abhey Ram [(1997) 5 SCC 421] was decided correctly — ifwe may say so with great respect — and that the latter order ofthe Division Bench in the writ petitions in the batch in Balak RamGupta [B.R. Gupta v. Union of India, (1989) 37 DLT 150 (DB)(order dated 14-10-1988)] must be confined to the writ absoluteorders dated 14-10-1988 in each of those 73 writ petitions and tothe land covered thereby, because the objections filed were personalto each case and there was no argument before the Division Benchor even before us that there was no public purpose or that therewas colourable exercise of power. We are of the view that theDivision Bench of the High Court in its latter order dated 18-11-1988 containing reasons could not in law have quashed the Section5-A inquiry and Section 6 declaration covering all other cases notbefore the Division Bench when no question going to the root andcovering all cases arose, and contrary to the writ absolute issuedin each case. The order dated 14-10-1988, in our view, wouldcontrol the order dated 18-11-1988 and would restrict the same.”

16. With this background, the facts of the present case need to beexamined. The original land owners entered into agreement to sell on25.9.1990 for the land measuring 28 Bigha 08 Biswa comprising in KhasraNo. 376 (4-6), 377 (4-16),381 (1-2), 383 (4-16), 384 (4-6), 385 (4-6),386/1 (1-18), 386/2 (2-18), 389 (4-16), 390 (4-6), 391 (4-6), 392/1 (1-0),

12 For short, the ‘Gurdip Singh Uban-II’, (2000) 7 SCC 296

A392/2 (3-16), 394 (4-16), 395/1 (0-04), 395/2 (3-0), 396 (4-6) with thepurchaser. The agreement to sell inter-alia recites as under:

“AND WHEREAS some of the owners of the land of the abovevillage challenged the acquisition proceedings in the High Courtof Delhi. The Hon’ble Court was pleased to release the entireBabove lands from acquisition, the main judgment being passed inCivil Writ 1639/85 decided on 14-10/18-11-1988 titled “Balak RamGupta Vs. UOI”, Delhi Administration has not filed any appealand at present the above lands are free from acquisition.”

17. The agreement further states that the Land AcquisitionCCollector had taken possession and paid compensation to the owners ofKhasra No. 384 (4-6), 385 (4-6) and 390 (4-6) and in terms of the orderpassed (though not mentioned specifically but the reference is to theorder passed in Balbir Singh), the compensation has been paid backand, thus, Khasra Numbers stand released from acquisition.

D18. Thereafter, the purchaser is said to have purchased the landin question vide sale deeds dated 30.8.1991 and 27.2.1991. Though, it isargued by the appellant that the sale deed was not registered, but Mr.Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the respondent-purchaser statedthat the sale deeds were registered. However, that is not relevantconsideration at this stage for the issues arising in the present appeal asEwe proceed on the basis that land was purchased by the purchaser.

19. The purchaser filed writ petition before the High Courtreported as Godfrey Phillips v. Union of India[13]. The said writ petitionalong with the other two writ petitions were dismissed by the DivisionBench of the Delhi High Court on 18.11.2005. The High Court recordedFa finding that the vendors of the writ petitioners including the purchasershave not filed any writ petition and have thus accepted the acquisitionproceedings. The High Court held as under:

“13. …The only inference that can be drawn from these facts isthat the predecessors in interest of the petitioners.h1d acquiescedGto the proceedings and the petitioners had remained content withtheir acquiescing only right to claim compensation for the landpurchased by them as they could not acquire by reason of thesaid purchase the locus to challenge the proceedings. Even if the

petitioners could legally maintain petitions to assail the validity ofthe proceedings, they did nothing from 1991 till 2005 to agitate thematter in any forum or Court to have the proceedings quashed.

24. That apart, the right to challenge the notifications available tothe original land owners having been lost by the original ownersby their acquiescence and silence till the year 1991 when the landwas transferred to the petitioner, there was no question of anysuch right being exercised bythe transferees 15 years thereafter.The inaction and acquiescence of the owners before the sale ofthe land in favour of the petitioners would by itself conclude thecontroversy. But even if one were to look at the delay from thepoint of the petitioners also, there is no explanation whatsoeverfor their silence from 1991 when they purchased the land till 2005when they actually filed the petitions.”

20. The Special Leave Petition (c) No. 4642 of 2006 filed againstthe said judgment was dismissed on 8.2.2010 along with other CivilAppeals reported as Om Parkash Vs. Union of India[14].

21. It was thereafter that the purchaser filed another writ petitionafter the commencement of the 2013 Act for declaring that the acquisitionproceedings stand lapsed under Section 24. The purchaser asserted thatthe possession of Khasra Nos. 376 (4-6), 377 (4-16), 381 Min (1-2), 383(4-16), 386/1 Min (0-4) and 386/2 Min (0-6) were never taken by therevenue authorities, meaning thereby that the physical possession hasalways been retained by the owners of the said land. The prayer in thewrit petition filed was for quashing of the notification under Sections 4and 6 of the Act, and the award in respect of land measuring 28 Bigha 8Biswa, forming part of revenue estate of Village Sahoorpur falling inTehsil Saket, Delhi. The purchaser also claimed Mandamus to handovervacant and peaceful possession of the land measuring 28 Bigha 8 Biswa.The prayer reads thus:

“(ii) MANDAMUS directing, commanding and requiring’ theRespondents to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of theagricultural land Khasra Nos. 376 (4·6), 377 (4·16), ,381 Min (1·2), 383 (4·16), 384 (4·6), 385 (4·6), 386/1 Min (0·4), 386/2 Min

1210SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A(O·G) and 390 (4·6) admeasuring 28 Bighas and 8 Biswa formingpart of the revenue estate of Village Sahoorpur falling in TehsilSaket, New Delhi since the acquisition proceedings in respectthereof have lapsed in terms of Section 24 (2) of the Right to FairCompensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act.”B

22. The stand of the appellant in the counter affidavit before theHigh Court was that since the acquisition proceedings have attainedfinality, there cannot be any lapsing of something which has alreadyachieved finality under the Act. The appellant stated as under:

C“(i) I say that the present writ petition is liable to be dismissedsince there is no question of the acquisition proceedings havingbeen lapsed. It is submitted that the challenge to the acquisitionproceedings of Award no. 10/87-88 has already attained finalityand there can be no Indirect challenge to the acquisition of theland, which has already assumed finality under the provisions ofDthe Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

It would not be out of place to mention here that with the landowners having failed in their challenge to the acquisition underthe provisions of ‘The Land Acquisition Act, 1894’, the petitionercannot now turn around and say that the acquisition proceedingsEwas pending and has lapsed.

xxxx

l) I say that the physical possession of the acquired land falling inkhasra no. 384(4-16), 385(4-06) &390(4-06) in village ShayoorpurFhas been handed over to the respondent no. 2-Delhi DevelopmentAuthority on 14.07.87 by the LAC/Land & Building Department,Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi however physicalpossession of khasra no 386/1 Min. (0-04), 386/2 Min(0-06), 376(4-16), 377 (4-16), 381 Min (1-02), 383(4-16) has not been handedover to the respondent no. 2-Delhi Development Authority by theGLAC/Land & Building Department, Govt. of National CapitalTerritory of Delhi.”

23. The High Court vide the order impugned found that an amountof Rs.3,87,360/- was refunded by way of Cheque No. 361656 by theoriginal landowner on 11.7.1989 but since the encashment of chequeHwas not confirmed, the purchaser offered to deposit the said amount

twice over along with interest, which as on 30.11.2016, comes toRs.16,61,774/-. The High Court accepted the offer made by the purchaserand held that proceedings stand lapsed.

24. The purchaser filed additional documents before this Court byway of I.A. No. 50154 of 2022. It has been asserted as under:

“(i) Lands of which possession was taken over by way ofPossession proceedings (Kabza Karyawahi) on 14.7.1987 by LACand compensation was paid are bearing Kh. No. 384(4-16), 385(4-6) & 390(4-6) total measuring 12 Bighas and 18 Biswas of VillageSayoorpur, Delhi.

(ii) Lands of which possession has not been taken but allegedlycompensation amount was placed in RD with LAC, bear Kh. No.376(4-6), 377(4-16), 381 min. (1-2), 383 (4-16), 386/1 min. (0-4),386/2 min. (0-6) total measuring 15 Bighas and 10 Biswas ofVillage Sayoorpur, Delhi.”

25. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the purchaserhas no right to claim lapse of acquisition proceedings in view of judgmentof this Court reported as Meera Sahni v. Lt. Governor of Delhi[15]andthree Judge Bench Judgment in M. Venkatesh v. BangaloreDevelopment Authority[16].

26. It was further contended that the judgment in Balbir Singhdirecting the land owners to deposit the amount of compensation alongwith interest ceases to be binding precedent in view of the judgment ofthis Court in Abhey Ram when the judgment in Sudan Singh was notfound to be the correct law. Such proposition that Sudan Singh was notthe correct proposition of law was reiterated in Gurdip Singh Uban-I.Once the subsequent judgments in Abhey Ram and Gurdip Singh Uban-I have held that Sudan Singh was not correctly decided, it wouldnecessarily mean that the judgment in Balbir Singh ceases to be of anyrelevance or binding precedent.

27. On the other hand, Mr. Kapil Sibal argued that the writ petitionwas disposed of on the short ground of lapsing of the acquisition in viewof Section 24 of the 2013 Act but in other similar matters, this Court hasremanded back the matters to the High Court for fresh decision after

15 (2008) 9 SCC 17716 (2015) 17 SCC 1

Athe decision of this Court in Indore Development Authority v.Manoharlal & Ors.[17]. It was also contended that the subsequentpurchaser has right to claim lapsing of the acquisition proceedings inview of the judgment of this Court in Government (NCT of Delhi) v.Manav Dharam Trust & Anr.[18]

B28. In the written submissions filed, the purchaser made referenceto the land comprising in 384(4-16), 385(4-6) & 390(4-6) 12 Bigha 18Biswa land as Part A; whereas the land comprising in Khasra Nos.376(4-6), 377(4-16), 381 min. (1-2), 383 (4-16), 386/1 min. (0-4), 386/2min. (0-6) total measuring 15 Bigha and 10 Biswa was referred to asPart land. In respect of Part land, the argument was thatCcompensation was paid but in view of the order of the High Court inBalbir Singh, the original land owner had paid back the amount ofcompensation by cheque. It was further submitted, that in the absenceof any proof of encashment of cheque, the High Court in the impugnedorder, directed the purchaser to pay the amount of Rs. 16,61,774/- andDsuch amount stands paid. Therefore, in respect of such land, thecompensation had not been paid in law. In respect of Part land, theargument was that the amount of compensation had not been paid norhas the possession been taken.

29. We do not find any merit in the arguments raised by the learnedEcounsel for the purchaser. The writ petition was filed after thecommencement of the 2013 Act on short question that the acquisitionproceedings stand lapsed. This Court in Indore Development Authorityhas held that twin conditions have to be satisfied before proceedings canbe said to be lapsed i.e., possession not taken and/or compensation notpaid. This Court examining the question of payment or deposit in theFlight of the Standing Order No. 28 issued in 1909 by the State of Punjaband as applicable to Delhi also, provided five modes of payment in Paras74 and 75. It has been held as under:

“226.Thus, in our opinion, the word “paid” as used in Section 24(2)does not include within its meaning the word “deposited”, whichGhas been used in the proviso to Section 24(2). Section 31 of the1894 Act, deals with the deposit as envisaged in Section 31(2) onbeing “prevented” from making the payment even if the amount

17 (2020) 8 SCC 129H18 (2017) 6 SCC 751

has been deposited in the treasury under the Rules framed underSection 55 or under the Standing Orders, that would carry theinterest as envisaged under Section 34, but acquisition would notlapse on such deposit being made in the treasury. In case amounthas been tendered and the landowner has refused to receive it, itcannot be said that the liability arising from non-payment of theamount is that of lapse of acquisition. Interest would follow insuch case also due to non-deposit of the amount. Equally, whenthe landowner does not accept the amount, but seeks referencefor higher compensation, there can be no question of such individualstating that he was not paid the amount (he was determined to beentitled to by the Collector). In such case, the landowner wouldbe entitled to the compensation determined by the ReferenceCourt.244. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, intends thatthe Collector would have sufficient funds to deposit it with respectto the majority of landholdings. In case compensation has not beenpaid or deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, all thebeneficiaries are entitled for higher compensation. In case moneyhas not been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or inthe treasury or in court with respect to majority of landholdings,the consequence has to follow of higher compensation as per theproviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. Even otherwise, if depositin treasury is irregular, then the interest would follow as envisagedunder Section 34 of the 1894 Act. Section 24(2) is attracted ifacquisition proceeding is not completed within 5 years after thepronouncement of award…………………….. The 2013 Actapplies only to the pending proceedings in which possession hasnot been taken or compensation has not paid and not to casewhere proceedings have been concluded long back, Section 24(2)is not tool to revive those proceedings and to question the validityof taking acquisition proceedings due to which possession in 1960s,1970s, 1980s were taken, or to question the manner of deposit ofamount in the treasury. The 2013 Act never intended revival ofsuch claims. In case such landowners were interested inquestioning the proceedings of taking possession or mode of depositwith the treasury, such challenge was permissible within the

time available with them to do so. They cannot wake from deepslumber and raise such claims in order to defeat the acquisitionvalidly made. In our opinion, the law never contemplates—norpermits—misuse much less gross abuse of its provisions to reopenall the acquisitions made after 1984, and it is the duty of the courtto examine the details of such claims. There are several litigationsbefore us where landowners, having lost the challenge to the validityof acquisition proceedings and after having sought enhancementof the amount in the reference succeeding in it nevertheless areseeking relief arguing about lapse of acquisition after severalrounds of litigation.

xxxx

247. The question which arises whether there is any differencebetween taking possession under the 1894 Act and the expression“physical possession” used in Section 24(2). As matter of fact,what was contemplated under the 1894 Act, by taking theDpossession meant only physical possession of the land. Takingover the possession under the 2013 Act always amounted to takingover physical possession of the land. When the State Governmentacquires land and draws up memorandum of taking possession,that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On theElarge chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, theGovernment is not supposed to put some other person or the policeforce in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land isused by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. TheGovernment is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupyit once possession has been taken by drawing the inquestFproceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if anyfurther retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land orsomeone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing inthe outhouse, etc. is deemed to be the trespasser on land which isin possession of the State. The possession of trespasser alwaysGinures for the benefit of the real owner that is the State Governmentin the case.”

30. It was held that under Section 16 of the Act, vesting of title inthe Government is complete immediately upon taking of possession, andthe acquired land becomes the property of the State under Sections 16Hand 17 of the Act without any condition or limitation either as to title or

possession. It was held that if once panchnama had been drawn oftaking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possession is thatof the trespasser. This Court held as under:

“249. The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises theright to possess and to exclude others, essential is animuspossidendi. Possession depends upon the character of the thingwhich is possessed. If the land is not capable of any use, merenon-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is notin possession. The established principle is that the possessionfollows title. Possession comprises of the control over the property.The element of possession is the physical control or the powerover the object and intention or will to exercise the power. Corpusand animus are both necessary and have to co-exist. Possessionof the acquired land is taken under the 1894 Act under Section 16or 17, as the case may be. The Government has right to acquirethe property for public purpose. The stage under Section 16 comesfor taking possession after issuance of notification under Section4(1) and stage of Section 9(1). Under Section 16, vesting is afterpassing of the award on taking possession and under Section 17before passing of the award.

345. Section 24(2) is sought to be used as an umbrella so as toquestion the concluded proceedings in which possession has beentaken, development has been made, and compensation has beendeposited, but may be due to refusal, it has not been collected.The challenge to the acquisition proceedings cannot be made withinthe parameters of Section 24(2) once panchnama had been drawnof taking possession, thereafter re-entry or retaining the possessionis that of the trespasser. The legality of the proceedings cannot bechallenged belatedly, and the right to challenge cannot be revivedby virtue of the provisions of Section 24(2). Section 24(2) onlycontemplates lethargy/inaction of the authorities to act for fiveyears or more. It is very easy to lay claim that physical possessionwas not taken, with respect to open land. Yet, once vesting takesplace, possession is presumed to be that of the owner i.e. theState Government and land has been transferred to thebeneficiaries, corporations, authorities, etc. for developmentalpurposes and third-party interests have intervened. Such challenges

cannot be entertained at all under the purview of Section 24(2) asit is not what is remotely contemplated in Section 24(2) of the2013 Act.”

31. This Court concluded as under:

“366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possessionand compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemedlapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for fiveyears or more prior to commencement of the said Act, thepossession of land has not been taken nor compensation has beenpaid. In other words, in case possession has been taken,compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly,if compensation has been paid, possession has not been takenthen there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) ofDthe 2013 Act does not include deposit of compensation in court.The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso toSection 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect tomajority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as onthe date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with theEprovisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interestunder Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit ofcompensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of landacquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect toFthe majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation underthe 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date ofnotification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act.

366.5. In case person has been tendered the compensation asprovided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to himto claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due tonon-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. Theobligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensationor who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claimthat the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2)of the 2013 Act.

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and ascontemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possessionunder Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there isno divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, asonce possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section24(2).

366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to newcause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedingsof land acquisition. Section 24 applies to proceeding pending onthe date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e. 1-1-2014. It does notrevive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concludedproceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of modeof taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit ofcompensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidateacquisition.”

32. Further, this Court in judgment reported as Shyam NandanPrasad & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.[19] held that the notificationunder Section 6 of the Act could not have been set aside and shouldhave individualized justice vis-à-vis each writ petitioner. It was held asunder:

“22. Having thus clarified the law governing the field, we wouldopen doors for streams of equities and discretions to enter in theexercise of power by the High Court under Article 226 of theConstitution. As observed earlier, we are of the view that theHigh Court should not have upset the notification under Section 6of the Act as whole and should have individualised justice vis-a-vis each writ petitioner before it, having regard to the equitiesinterplaying in each case and to the regulation of its discretionkeeping in view host of other factors which weigh with the HighCourt to deny, grant or mould relief even when illegalities inprocedure keep staring. Thus for the view afore-expressed, weallow these appeals, set aside the impugned orders of the HighCourt and remit all these matters back to it with the request thatthough it may take them up as batch, it may give individualattention to each case, view the illegalities pointed out by the writ

Apetitioner in their right perspective having regard to the time factorand confine the relief, if due, to him separately. We shall not betaken to have controlled the discretion of the High Court inadministering individualised justice and amongst others it may, withthe cooperation of the Society and of the State Government, asalso the writ petitioners examine the possibility of an equitableBsolution so that the fist of law and the discretion of the court donot hurt unbearably. We thus remit the matters to the High Courtwithout any order as to costs.”

33. In Chairman and Managing Director, Tamil NaduHousing Board & Anr. v. S. Saraswathy & Ors.[20], this Court held thatCSection 6 declaration cannot be treated to be quashed in entirety unlessit is quashed in toto or in its wholeness by the Court specifically. It washeld as under:

“11. We are respectfully in accord with the observations ofCoordinate Benches that unless the declaration under Section 6Dor the notification under Section 4 of the Act is not explicitlyquashed in toto or in its wholeness by the Court, the benefits ofrelief granted by the Court would be effective only qua the partiesbefore it. As already adumbrated above, at the time the appeal ofA.S. Naidu came to be decided, the three year limitation period toEpublish declaration under Section 6 of the Act had alreadyexpired, making it impossible for the Government to complete afresh process culminating in another declaration; and it was forthis reason that the acquisition was quashed by the Court.

12. It has been repeatedly reiterated by this Court that those whoFhave missed the boat in challenging the acquisition proceedings,who sat idle and have let the grass grow under their feet cannot,thereafter, be permitted to jump on the bandwagon of others whoentered the portals of the Court at the appropriate time andthereafter obtained favourable orders. Significantly, inChandrasekaran [(2010) 2 SCC 786 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ) 553]Gthe Court was alive to the reality of utilisation of large chunks ofland by the State for housing scheme; and in this scenario, it wasobviously and rightly reluctant and facially hesitant to quash theacquisition proceedings in toto, knowing that that would result in

grave consequences to society. In this analysis, the respondentsincluding their vendor, P. Velu, cannot be permitted to take anyadvantage of the orders passed by this Court in A.S. Naidu [A.S.Naidu v. State of T.N., (2010) 2 SCC 801 : (2010) 1 SCC (Civ)568] .”

34. In another judgment reported as State of Haryana & Anr. v.Devander Sagar & Ors.[21], this Court has held that the acquisitionproceedings cannot be quashed of one or two land owners. It is the dutyof the land owners to challenge the acquisition proceedings at leasebefore award is pronounced and possession is taken. It was held asunder:

“11. It would be pertinent to clarify that the quashing of the entireacquisition proceeding has to be explicitly expressed. This Courthas in Shyam Nandan Prasad v. State of Bihar [Shyam NandanPrasad v. State of Bihar, (1993) 4 SCC 255] , DelhiAdmn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban [Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip SinghUban, (1999) 7 SCC 44] , Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip SinghUban [Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban, (2000) 7 SCC 296]and T.N. Housing Board v. S. Saraswathy [T.N. HousingBoard v. S. Saraswathy, (2015) 8 SCC 723 : (2015) 4 SCC (Civ)443] reiterated and restated the established and consistent viewthat quashing of acquisition proceedings at the instance of one ortwo landowners does not have the effect of nullifying the entireacquisition. In A.P. Industrial Infrastructure Corpn. Ltd. v.Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao [A.P. Industrial InfrastructureCorpn. Ltd. v. Chinthamaneni Narasimha Rao, (2012) 12 SCC797 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 731] this Court has reiterated theestablished proposition that landowners who are aggrieved by theacquisition proceedings would have to lay challenge to them atleast before an award is pronounced and possession of the land istaken over by the Government. Numerous decisions of this Courthave been discussed obviating the need to analyse all of themonce again. However, generally speaking, the courts come to thesuccour of those who approach it. In some instances, equities areequalised by allowing subsequent slothful petitioners, belatedly andconveniently jumping on the bandwagons, to receive, at the highest,compensation granted to others sans interest.”

DEF

A35. The original land owner had filed writ petition before theDelhi High Court but such writ petition was dismissed on 02.12.1985.The Special Leave Petition was withdrawn on 12.09.1989 even thoughthe reservation was conveyed by the learned counsel appearing forthe appellant. Such withdrawal was after the judgment of the HighCourt in Balbir Singh case. The original land owners have made aBconscious decision not to continue with the Special Leave Petitions.Thus, all the objections which were available to the original land ownerincluding the purchaser up to that stage cannot be permitted to beraised again.

36. In Balak Ram-II, the acquisition proceedings wereCquashedsince the objections filed by the land owners were not heard ordecided in accordance with law. Thus, Balak Ram-II is judgment inpersonam and not in rem, as the grievance of the writ petitioners wasspecific to them. The judgment of the High Court in Balbir Singh isbased upon the fact that in Balak Ram-II, the entire notification underDSection 6 of the Act stands quashed. Such aspect has not found favor inAbhey Ram and Gurdip Singh Uban-I and II. Otherwise also, non-hearing of objections filed would be limited to those land owners whohave filed objections. The predecessor-in-interest of the purchaser hasnot filed any objections under Section 5A of the Act, therefore, the judgmentin Balak Ram-II cannot come to the aid of land owners who haveEnever preferred any objections.

37. Therefore, the judgment in Balbir Singh does not confer anyright on the other land owners who have not disputed the acquisitionproceedings on the ground of lack of effective hearing of objectionsFunder Section 5-A of the Act. Since the original land owner never filedany objections under Section 5-A of the Act, the purchaser cannot seekthe relief which was not available even to the original land owner.

38. The purchaser has purchased the property knowing fullywell that the vendor has not disputed the acquisition proceedings. ButGon the basis of an order passed in Balbir Singh, it was conveyed andaccepted by the purchaser, that the acquisition stands quashed andoriginal land owner was in possession of the land. Since Sudan Singh,affirming the order in Balbir Singh has not been approved by thisCourt in the three judgments referred hereinabove (Abhey Ram,Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II), no right wouldH

accrue to the original land owner or the purchaser. The High Court inthe impugned order has not noticed any of the three judgments of thisCourt in Abhey Ram, Gurdip Singh Uban-I and Gurdip Singh Uban-II nullifying the effect of Balbir Singh and instead ordered thepurchaser to deposit twice of the amount paid to the original land owner.The condition of payment of compensation in Balbir Singh by theland owners does not survive in view of the fact that such judgmenthas not been approved by this Court.

39. In the present case, as per the purchaser itself, the possessionof Part land comprising in Khasra No. 384 (4-6), 385 (4-6) and 390(4-6) total measuring 12 Bigha and 18 Biswa was taken by the Appellantand the compensation was paid. The argument is that in terms of theimpugned orders of the High Court, the purchaser had depositedRs.16,61,774/-, therefore, the acquisition stand lapsed. Such deposit isin turn based on the order of the High Court in Balbir Singh. Thedeposit by the purchaser, either in terms of the impugned order or theorder passed in Balbir Singh, is wholly inconsequential. The amountof compensation was paid on behalf of the appellant. Therefore, thecompensation of the acquired land paid by the appellant cannot lead tolapsing of the acquisition in terms of Indore Development Authority.The purchaser in its written submissions had made no reference to thelater judgments of this Court referred to above. The deposit in termsof the order of the High Court will not lead to lapsing of the acquisitionproceedings, such orders being absolutely being illegal. Thus, in respectof Part land, the purchaser cannot take shelter of the order, whichhad no legal value and stands nullified. Even otherwise, there couldnot be any direction to deposit the amount now after more than 25years. The right which has been lost due to passage of time cannot berevived by virtue of deposit of the amount subsequent to orders of theHigh Court.

40. In respect of Part land, comprising of Khasra Nos. 376 (4-6), 377 (4-16), 381 Min (1-2), 383 (4-16), 386/1 Min (0-4) and 386/2 Min(0-6)total 15 Bigha 10 Biswa, the stand of the appellant in the counteraffidavit filed before the High Court was that the physical possession ofthe acquired land falling in khasra no. 384(4-16), 385(4-06) &390(4-06)in village Shayoorpur had been handed over to the respondent no. 2-Delhi Development Authority on 14.07.87 by the LAC/Land & BuildingDepartment, Govt. of National Capital Territory of Delhi, however

Aphysical possession of khasra no 386/1 Min. (0-04), 386/2 Min(0-06),376(4-16), 377 (4-16), 381 Min (1-02), 383(4-16) has not been handedover to the respondent no. 2-Delhi Development Authority by the LAC/Land & Building Department, Govt. of National Capital Territory ofDelhi. Still further, the purchaser in its IA had asserted that the lands ofBwhich possession has not been taken but compensation amount wasplaced in RD with LAC, bear Kh. No. 376(4-6), 377(4-16), 381 min. (1-2), 383 (4-16), 386/1 min. (0-4), 386/2 min. (0-6) total measuring 15Bigha and 10 Biswa of Village Sayoorpur, Delhi. Thus, we find thatpossession was in fact taken of the entire acquired land and compensationwas deposited. If the appellant had not been able to utilize the land onCaccount an order of stay of dispossession in various writ petitions filed,that would not be material fact to return finding that the purchasercontinues to be in possession. As reiterated above, after the panchnamahad been prepared, the possession of the land owners would be that of atrespasser.D41. The purchaser had in fact filed Writ of Mandamus fordelivering the possession of the entire acquired land. Such claim ofMandamus shows that the purchaser is out of possession. Therefore,the condition in Indore Development Authority for lapsing of theacquisition is not satisfied. Therefore, as per the purchaser, the possessionEhas been taken of the part of the land and compensation has beendeposited in respect of the remaining land. Thus, the twin conditions aslaid down by this Courtare not satisfied.

42. Even otherwise, the stand of the appellant is that the possessionof the entire land was taken on 14.7.1987 whereas possession of landFmeasuring 12 Bigha 18 Biswa was handed over to it, whereas thepossession of the remaining land measuring 15 Bigha 10 Biswa is withthe Government of Delhi. Therefore, the purchaser is not entitled to anydeclaration of lapsing of acquisition proceedings inter alia on the groundthat it has purchased the land after vesting of the land with the State andGthe possession has been taken of the land measuring 28 Bigha 8 Biswaand the compensation has also been deposited in respect of entire land,though the compensation in respect of land admeasuring 12 Bigha 18Biswa was disbursed. The remaining amount of compensation was withthe Land Acquisition Collector.H

43. Still further, the purchaser had purchased the property aftervesting of the land with the State. In fact, in Manav Dharam Trust,earlier three Judge Bench judgment in M. Venkatesh was not evenreferred to. The purchaser has no right to claim lapsing of acquisitionproceedings in view of the recent larger Bench judgment of this Courtreported as Shiv Kumar & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.[22] whereinthe judgment rendered by two-Judge Bench in Manav Dharam Trustwas not found to be good law. Hence, the purchaser has no right toclaim declaration sought for. It was held as under:“26. In Manav Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. ManavDharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] ,even the provisions of the Act of 2013 have not been taken intoconsideration, which prohibits such transactions in particularprovisions of Section 11, including the proviso to Section 24(2).Apart from that, it was not legally permissible to Division Benchto ignore the decisions of the larger Bench comprising of threeJudges and of coordinate Bench. They were not per incuriamand were relevant for deciding the issue of taking possessionunder the 1894 Act, at the instance of purchaser. In case itwanted to depart from the view taken earlier, it ought to havereferred the matter to larger Bench. It has been ignored thatwhen purchase is void, then no declaration can be sought onthe ground that the land acquisition under the 2013 Act has lapseddue to illegality/irregularity of proceedings of taking possessionunder the 1894 Act. No declaration can be sought by purchaserunder Section 24 that acquisition has lapsed, effect of whichwould be to get back the land. They cannot seek declarationthat acquisition made under the 1894 Act has lapsed by thechallenge to the proceedings of taking possession under the 1894Act. Such right was not available after the purchase in 2000 andno such right has been provided to the purchasers under the2013 Act also. Granting right to question acquisition would beagainst the public policy and the law which prohibits suchtransactions; it cannot be given effect to under the guise ofsubsequent legislation containing similar provisions. Subsequentlegislation does not confer any new right to person based on

CDEFG

such void transaction; instead, it includes provision prohibitingsuch transactions without permission of the Collector as providedin Section 11(4).

27. Thus, we have to follow the decisions including that of largerBench mentioned above, laying down the law on the subject, whichstill holds the field and were wrongly distinguished. The bindingvalue of the decisions of larger and coordinate Benches have beenignored while deciding Manav Dharam Trust case [State (NCTof Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3SCC (Civ) 611] , it was not open to it to take different view. Thedecision in Manav Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. ManavDharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] is perincuriam in light of this decision of this Court in MamleshwarPrasad v. Kanhaiya Lal [Mamleshwar Prasad v. Kanhaiya Lal,(1975) 2 SCC 232] , A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak [A.R.Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri) 372], State of U.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. [State ofU.P. v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd., (1991) 4 SCC 139] , B.Shama Rao v. State (UT of Pondicherry) [B. Shama Rao v. State(UT of Pondicherry), AIR 1967 SC 1480] , MCD v. GurnamKaur [MCD v. Gurnam Kaur, (1989) 1 SCC 101] , State ofM.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan [State of M.P. v. NarmadaBachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC 639 : (2011) 3 SCC (Civ) 875 :AIR 2011 SC 1989] , Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State ofOrissa [Hyder Consulting (UK) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (2015) 2SCC 189 : (2015) 2 SCC (Civ) 38] and Sant Lal Gupta v. ModernCoop. Group Housing Society Ltd. [Sant Lal Gupta v. ModernCoop. Group Housing Society Ltd., (2010) 13 SCC 336 : (2010)4 SCC (Civ) 904]

28. We hold that Division Bench in Manav Dharam Trust [State(NCT of Delhi) v. Manav Dharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 :(2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] does not lay down the law correctly.Given the several binding precedents which are available and theprovisions of the 2013 Act, we cannot follow the decisionin Manav Dharam Trust [State (NCT of Delhi) v. ManavDharam Trust, (2017) 6 SCC 751 : (2017) 3 SCC (Civ) 611] andoverrule it. “

44. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed. The orderpassed by the High Court is set aside. However, the appellant shallrefund the amount of Rs.16,61,774/- to the purchaser, without anyinterest as such deposit was voluntary offer to deposit, in accordancewith law.

Ankit Gyan and Anurag Bhaskar(Assisted by : Bodhi Ramteke, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.