S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA versus THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION & ORS

[2022] 12 S.C.R. 1

S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA

THE STATE ELECTION COMMISSION & ORS.

(Civil Appeal No. 6576 of 2022)

SEPTEMBER 14, 2022

[UDAY UMESH LALIT, CJI, INDIRA BANERJEE ANDAJAY RASTOGI, JJ.]

Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 – ss.27, 33-35, 39 – Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979– Representation of People Act, 1951 – s.123(2) – Conduct ofElections Rules, 1961 – Election Petition filed by respondent no.4was allowed, election of the appellant to the Mysore MunicipalCorporation as Councillor was set aside – On appeal, held: falsedeclaration w.r.t the assets of candidate, his/her spouse ordependents, constitutes corrupt practice irrespective of the impactof such false declaration on the election of the candidate – It isundisputed that the appellant suppressed information w.r.t the assetsof her husband – Corrupt Practices have been defined in s.39(2),KMC Act to include ‘undue influence’ as defined in s.123(2), 1951RP Act – s.123(2) of the 1951 RP Act came up for interpretation bythis Court in Lok Prahari case, wherein it was held that the non-disclosure would amount to ‘undue influence’ as defined under the1951 RP Act – Definition of ‘undue influence’ as used in s.123(2)of 1951 RP Act is also adopted by s.39(2) of the KMC Act –Therefore, the non-disclosure of assets in the municipal electionswould also amount to ‘undue influence’ and consequently to ‘corruptpractice’– Further, the notifications issued by the State ElectionCommission were not questioned by the appellant– Rather, sheaccepted them as binding on her, and accordingly filed an affidavit–Thus, the appellant is estopped from questioning the validity of thenotifications or the power of the State Election Commission to issuethe same – Also, there is no legal or normative impediment for theState Election Commission to issue directions requiring disclosureof assets of the candidate, his/her spouse and dependent associatesby way of affidavit – In issuing the notification, the ElectionCommission has not encroached into the legislative domain of theKarnataka State Legislature– No ground to interfere with the

CDEF

Ajudgment of the High Court affirming the order setting aside theelection of appellant.

Constitution of India – Article 243-ZA(1), 324(1) – Held: Thelanguage and tenor of Article 243-ZA(1) is in pari materia with Article324(1) – Interpretation of Article 324(1) to confer wide powers onBthe Election Commission to issue directions in respect of electionsto Parliament and State legislatures would apply to Article 243-ZA(1) which has to be construed to confer powers on the StateElection Commission to issue directions related to superintendence,direction and control of the preparation of electoral roles or forconduct of elections to municipalities – State Election CommissionChas the same powers u/Article 243-K and 243-ZA(1) as the ElectionCommission has u/Article 324(1).

Karnataka Municipal Corporations Act, 1976 – KarnatakaMunicipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 – Representation ofPeople Act, 1951 – Conduct of Elections Rules, 1961 – Held: ADhypertechnical view of the omission to incorporate any specificprovision in the KMC Election Rules, similar to the 1961 Rules,expressly requiring disclosure of assets, to condone dishonesty andcorrupt practice would be against the spirit of the Constitution andpublic interest.

Precedent – Held: judgment is precedent for the issue oflaw raised and decided – Judgment has to be construed in thebackdrop of the facts and circumstances in which it has beenrendered.

Dismissing the appeal, the CourtF

HELD: 1.1 The election of the Appellant is governed bythe Karnataka Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, and theKarnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979 framedthereunder. false declaration with regard to the assets of acandidate, his/her spouse or dependents, constitutes corruptGpractice irrespective of the impact of such false declaration onthe election of the candidate. It may be presumed that falsedeclaration impacts the election. [Para 16, 38][10-E-F; 17-A-B]

1.2 judgment is precedent for the issue of law that israised and decided. The judgment has to be construed in the

backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which the judgmenthas been rendered. Words, phrases and sentences in judgment,cannot be read out of context. Nor is judgment to be read andinterpreted in the manner of statute. It is only the law asinterpreted by Court in an earlier judgment, which constitutes abinding precedent, and not everything that the Judges say. [Para41][18-B-D]

State of M. P. v. Centre for Environment ProtectionResearch & Development (2020) 9 SCC 781 : 2020(8) JT 353 – distinguished.

1.3 Under Section 39 of the KMC Act, corrupt practicesinclude undue influence. The definition of undue influence inClause 2 of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act1951, (“the 1951 RP Act”) has been incorporated in Section 39(2)of the KMC Act. Under Section 27 of the KMC Act corruptpractices defined in Section 39(2) which includes “undueinfluence’ entails disqualification from being Councillor, for sixyears. [Para 45, 47][22-D-E; 23-D]

1.4 Corrupt Practices have been defined in Section 39(2)of the KMC Act to include ‘undue influence’ as defined in Section123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Actcame up for interpretation by this Court in Lok Prahari, wherethis Court held that the non-disclosure would amount to ‘undueinfluence’ as defined under the Representation of People Act.The definition of ‘undue influence’ as used in Section 123(2) of1951 RP Act is also adopted by Section 39(2) of the KMC Act.Therefore, the non- disclosure of assets in the municipal electionswould also amount to ‘undue influence’ and consequently to‘corrupt practice’. As argued, the notifications dated 14th July2003 and 19th June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission,have never been questioned by the Appellant. Rather, thePetitioner accepted the notifications as binding on her, andaccordingly filed an affidavit. The Appellant is, therefore, estoppedfrom questioning the validity of the notifications or the power ofthe State Election Commission to issue the same. That non-disclosure of assets would amount to ‘corrupt practices’, entailingdisqualification, is evident from Sections 35 and 39(ii) of the KMCAct, read with Section 123(2) of the Representation of People

AAct 1951, as interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari. It is not indispute that the Appellant had suppressed information with regardto the assets of her husband. Section 35(1)(b) of the KMC Actprovides that if the Court is of the opinion that party hascommitted ‘corrupt practice’, that would result in the electionbeing declared void. Section 35 of the KMC Act enumerates theBgrounds on which Courts could declare the election of thereturned candidate to be void. Section 35(1)(b) mentions corruptpractice by returned candidate or his election agent or by anyother person, either with the consent of returned candidate orhis election agent, as one of the grounds for declaring the electionCto be void. Section 39 of the KMC Act enumerates the acts/practices, which are to be deemed to be corrupt practices. Corruptpractices include ‘undue influence’. This is specified in Section39(2) of the KMC Act. The definition of undue influence in Section123(2) of the 1951 RP Act has expressly been incorporated inthe definition of undue influence in Section 39(2) of the KMCDAct. Further, having regard to the tenor of Section 39(3) of theKMC Act, any false statement relating to candidate would becorrupt practice. At the cost of repetition, it is emphasized thatKMC Act incorporates the definition of undue influence in Section123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. The judgments of this CourtEinterpreting ‘undue influence’ in Section 123(2) of the 1951, RPAct, would squarely apply to the interpretation of undue influenceunder Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Section 123(2) of theRepresentation of People Act, 1951 had been interpreted by thisCourt in Lok Prahari where this Court held that non-disclosurewould amount to ‘undue influence’ as defined in theFRepresentation of People Act, 1951. The non-disclosure of assetswould therefore, also amount to ‘undue influence’ andconsequently to ‘corrupt practices’ under the KMC Act. Mr. Patilargued that the Notifications dated 14th July 2003 and in particular19th June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission made itGmandatory for the candidates to file affidavits, disclosing the assetsof their spouses. [Paras 55-62][24-H; 25-A-B, C, F-H; 26-A-G]

Lok Prahari v. Union of India (2018) 4 SCC 699 : [2018]2 SCR 892 – relied on.

1.5 The question of whether the Election Commission hadpower to issue directions to the candidates to file affidavitsdisclosing the assets of their spouses, in the absence of anyspecific provision under the KMC Act or the Rules framedthereunder is no longer res integra. The question is squarelycovered by the law laid down by this Court in Union of India v.Association for Democratic Reforms and Ors., where this Courthad directed the Election Commission to secure to voters, interalia, information pertaining to assets not only of the candidatesbut also of their spouse and dependents. The Election Commissionhas to act within the four corners of law made by the Parliamentand/or the concerned State legislature, as the case may be. Thenotification dated 14th July 2003 was issued pursuant to thejudgment of this Court in Association for Democratic Reforms,where this Court held that “the Constitution has madecomprehensive provision under Article 324 to take care ofsurprise situations and it operates in areas left unoccupied bylegislation.” The interpretation given by this Court of Article 324of the Constitution of India is binding on all courts. [Paras 63-65][26-G-H; 27-A-C]

Union of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms(2002) 5 SCC 294 : [2002] 3 SCR 696 – relied on.

1.6 The language and tenor of Article 243-ZA(1) is in parimateria with Article 324(1) of the Constitution. The language andtenor of Section 243-ZA(1) is identical to that of Article 324(1).This Court has interpreted Article 324(1) to confer wide powerson the Election Commission relating to superintendence,direction and control of preparation of electoral roles and/or theconduct of elections to Parliament and to the legislature of everyState provided, of course, that the directions are not contrary tolaw. The interpretation of Article 324(1) to confer wide powerson the Election Commission to issue directions in respect ofelections to Parliament and State legislatures would apply toArticle 243-ZA(1). Article 243-ZA(1) has to be construed to conferpowers on the State Election Commission to issue directionsrelated to superintendence, direction and control of thepreparation of electoral roles or for conduct of elections tomunicipalities. The Election Commission has wide powers under

AArticle 324(1) of the Constitution of India to issue directionsnecessary for conducting free and fair elections, subject to thecontours of law. The power of the Election Commission includesthe power to issue directions where the law is silent. The StateElection Commission has the same powers under Article 243-Kand 243-ZA(1) as the Election Commission of India has underBArticle 324(1) of the Constitution of India. In Association forDemocratic Reforms and in Lok Prahari, this Court held that foreffective exercise of his fundamental right under Article 19(1)((a),the voter is entitled to have all relevant information aboutcandidates at an election which would include criminalCantecedents, if any, of the candidate, his/her assets and liabilities,educational qualifications, etc. It may be true that amendment ofthe 1951 RP Act is within the exclusive domain of the UnionParliament as observed in Lok Prahari and amendment of theKMC Act is exclusively within the domain of the Karnataka StateLegislature. However, in light of the law declared by this CourtDin Association for Democratic Reforms, there is no legal ornormative impediment for the State Election Commission to issuedirections requiring disclosure of assets of the candidate, his/her spouse and dependent associates by way of affidavit. In issuingthe notification dated 14th July 2003, the Election CommissionEhas not encroached into the legislative domain of the KarnatakaState Legislature. The direction, as contained in the notificationdated 14th July 2003 had been accepted by the Appellant. Havingaffirmed false affidavit, it does not lie in the mouth of theAppellant to contend that her election should not be set aside onthe ground of corrupt practice under Section 35(1) of the KMCFAct. [Paras 66-70][27-C-D, G-H; 28-A-G]

1.7 The Election Commission has issued the notificationdated 14th July 2003 within the contours of law. Purity of electionat all levels, be it election to the Union Parliament or StateLegislature or Municipal Corporation or Panchayat is matterGof national importance in which uniform policy is desirable inthe interest of all the States. hypertechnical view of the omissionto incorporate any specific provision in the KMC Election Rules,similar to the 1961 Rules, expressly requiring disclosure ofassets, to condone dishonesty and corrupt practice would be

S. RUKMINI MADEGOWDA v. THE STATE ELECTIONCOMMISSION & ORS.

against the spirit of the Constitution and public interest. Thereare no grounds to interfere with or set aside the impugnedjudgment and order of the High Court, affirming the judgmentand order of the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mysuru,allowing Election Petition and setting aside the election of theAppellant. [Paras 72, 74 and 75][29-C, F-G; 30-A-B]

Shrikant v. Vasantrao and Others (2006) 2 SCC 682 :[2006] 1 SCR 496; Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (1982) 1SCC 691 : [1982] 3 SCR 318 – distinguished.

Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar & Ors. (2015) 3 SCC467 : [2015] 4 SCR 987; State Bank of India v. SantoshGupta (2017) 2 SCC 538 : [2016] 9 SCR 985; State ofWest Bengal v. Union of India AIR 1963 SC 1963 –relied on.

Srikant v. Vasant Rao and Others; Shailesh ManubhaiParmar v. Election Commission of India (2018) 9 SCC100 : [2018] 10 SCR 76; Tolaram Relumal and Anotherv. State of Bombay [1955] 1 SCR 158; BipinchandraParshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat (2003) 4 SCC642: [2003] 3 SCR 533 – referred to.

From the Judgment and Orders dated 26.05.2021 of the HighCourt of Karnataka at Bengaluru in M.F.A. No.49 of 2021.

AShyam Diwan, Sr. Adv., Darpan KM., Hemanth Raj, RajitJonathan Shaw, Ms. Amrita Sharma, Ms. Rashi Bansal, Advs. for theAppellant.

Basava Prabhu S. Patil. Sr. Adv., Shailesh Madiyal, ManmohanP.N., Sudhanshu Prakash, Geet Ahuja, Ms. Rakhi M., Advs. for theBRespondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

INDIRA BANERJEE, J.

Leave granted.C

2. This Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitutionof India is against judgment and order dated 26[th] May 2021 passed bythe Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, upholding thejudgment and order dated 14[th] December 2020 of the Principal Districtand Sessions Judge, Mysuru, allowing Election Petition No.4 of 2018Dand setting aside the election of the Appellant to the Mysore MunicipalCorporation as Councillor from Ward No.36-Yeraganahalli, Karnataka.

3. Sometime in 2018, the Appellant filed her nomination for electionto the Mysore Municipal Corporation, as Councillor from Ward No.36-Yeraganahalli in Karnataka, which was reserved for Backward Class-B (Women), along with declaration by way of an affidavit, furnishingEdetails of the movable and immovable properties held by the Appellantas well as her spouse and dependents, which is hereinafter referred toas the “Affidavit of Assets”.

4. In August 2018, elections to the Mysore Municipal Corporationwere held. On 3[rd] September 2018, the results of said elections wereFdeclared. The Appellant was declared as successfully elected Councillorfrom the said Ward No.36, that is Yeraganahalli.

5. The Respondent No.4, an unsuccessful candidate, filed ElectionPetition No.4 of 2018 in the Court of Principal District and SessionsJudge, Mysuru under Sections 33 and 34 of the Karnataka MunicipalGCorporations Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the “KMC Act”.

6. In the said Election Petition, the Respondent No.4 alleged thatthe Appellant had, in her Affidavit of Assets, falsely declared that herhusband did not possess any immovable property, and that by givingsuch false declaration, the Appellant had indulged in corrupt practices toH

get the benefit of reservation under the Category of Backward Class-B(Women).

7. By judgment and order dated 16[th] April 2019, the PrincipalDistrict and Sessions Judge, Mysuru (Trial Court) rejected the saidElection Petition No.4 of 2018 filed by the Respondent No.4.

8. The Respondent No.4 filed an appeal being Miscellaneous FirstAppeal No.4023 of 2019 in the High Court of Karnataka, challengingthe said judgment and order dated 16[th] April 2019 passed by the TrialCourt.

9. By an order dated 28[th] April 2020, the High Court remandedElection Petition No.4 of 2018 back to the Trial Court, for reconsideration,in the light of the judgments of this Court in Union of India v. Associationfor Democratic Reforms[1] and in Lok Prahari v. Union of India[2]. TheHigh Court observed:

“…This Court is of the considered opinion that for completeadjudication of the lis the trial court should have consideredsuch question with reference to the relevant provisions of theKMC Act and the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court inUnion of India v. Association for Democratic Reforms People’sUnion for Civil Liberties (PUCL) and another vs Union ofIndia and in Lok Prahari Vs. Union of India and Others.”

10. Thereafter, by judgment and order dated 14[th] December2020, the Trial Court allowed the Election Petition No.4 of 2018 and setaside the election of the Appellant.

11. On or about 23[rd] December 2020, the Appellant filed an appealin the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, under Section 38 of theKMC Act, which was admitted and registered as MFA No.49 of 2021.The High Court has dismissed the Appeal, being MFA No.49 of 2021 bythe judgment and order dated 26[th] May 2021, impugned in this appeal.

12. Mr. Shyam Diwan, appearing on behalf of the Appellant,submitted that the Appellant was successful in the Municipal electionfor Ward No.36, Yeraganahalli in the Mysore City Corporation, and wasaccordingly chosen as the Mayor of the Mysore City Corporation andshe continues to be the sitting Mayor.

1 (2002) 5 SCC 294

2 (2018) 4 SCC 699

13. Mr. Diwan argued that while the Respondent No.4 secured2902 votes, the Appellant secured 3295 votes. Mr. Diwan emphasizedon the fact that the Election Petition had initially been dismissed, but theHigh Court had, by an order dated 28[th] April 2020 in appeal, remandedthe matter back for reconsideration of the learned Trial Court.

B14. Mr. Diwan submitted that the High Court had erred in law, inpassing the impugned order dated 26[th] May 2021, upholding the orderdated 14[th] December 2020 of the Trial Court in Election Petition No.4 of2018, setting aside the election of the Appellant as Councillor for WardNo.36-Yeraganahalli, Karnataka.C15. Mr. Diwan raised the following questions of law forconsideration of this Court:-

(i)Whether duly elected candidate, serving as the Mayor,Mysore City Corporation after election, could be unseated, inthe absence of any statutory provision requiring disclosure ofassets in the affidavit filed with the nomination form?D

(ii) Whether non-disclosure of assets would constitute corruptpractice, in the absence of any statutory provision requiringdisclosure of assets?

16. The election of the Appellant is governed by the KarnatakaEMunicipal Corporation Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the “KMCAct”, and the Karnataka Municipal Corporation (Election) Rules, 1979framed thereunder, which is hereinafter referred to as the “KMC ElectionRules”.

17. Mr. Diwan emphatically argued that there was no requirementFof any disclosure under the KMC Act or under the KMC Election Rules.Having recognized and proceeded on the basis that elections were beingheld in terms of the KMC Act read with the KMC Election Rules, theHigh Court should not have dismissed the Appeal of the Appellant.

18. Mr. Diwan submitted that the Election Law which governsGthe election, is self-contained statutory law which has to be strictlyadhered to. In the absence of any specific provision in the law, whichrequires candidate to disclose, by way of affidavit, the assets of his/her spouse, candidate intending to contest an election cannot becompelled to make such disclosure by adoption of policy decision orthrough action at common law.H

19. In support of his submission, Mr. Diwan cited Shrikant v.Vasantrao and Others[3], where this Court quoted with approval its earlierdecision in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal[4] and held:-

“…Outside of statute, there is no right to elect, no right to beelected and no right to dispute an election. Statutory creationsthey are, and therefore, subject to statutory limitation. Anelection petition is not an action at common law, nor in equity.It is statutory proceeding to which neither the common lawnor the principles of equity apply but only those rules whichthe statute makes and applies. It is special jurisdiction, anda special jurisdiction has always to be exercised in accordancewith the statute creating it. Concepts familiar to common lawand equity must remain strangers to election law unlessstatutorily embodied. court has no right to resort to themon considerations of alleged policy because policy in suchmatters as those, relating to the trial of election disputes, iswhat the statute lays down. In the trial of election disputes,court is put in straitjacket.”

20. In Srikant v. Vasant Rao & Others (supra) this Court held :-

“11. person cannot, therefore, be disqualified unless hesuffers disqualification laid down in Article 191of theConstitution or under Sections 8, 8-A,9,9-A,10 or 10-A ofthe Act. It is not possible to add to or subtract from thedisqualifications, either on the ground of convenience, or onthe grounds of equity or logic or perceived legislative intention.A combined reading of Article 191 of the Constitution of Indiaand Chapter III of the Representation of the People Act, 1951makes it clear that person can be held to be disqualifiedfor being chosen as, and for being, Member of theLegislative Assembly or Legislative Council of State onlyon the following, and no other, grounds :

Disqualifications under the Constitution of India :

...............

3 (2006) 2 SCC 682

4 (1982) 1 SCC 691

(viii) if he is person having subsisting contract with theState Government for the supply of goods to or for theexecution of any works undertaken by that Government, videsection 9-Aof the Act; …”

21. The judgment of this Court in Srikant v. Vasant Rao andBOthers, was rendered in the context of Chapter III of the Representationof the People Act 1951, in terms whereof person could be held to bedisqualified from being Member of the Legislative Assembly only onthe grounds stipulated, and no other, which included person having asubsisting contract with the State Government for supply of goods.

C22. This Court found on facts that the concerned candidate didnot have any subsisting contracts with the State Government, but withentities under the control of the State Government. This Court, thusobserved and held that the State Government was different from legalor other authorities under its control.

D23. The proposition of law noted by this Court in Jyoti Basu v.Debi Ghosal (supra) that except in accordance with Statute, there is noright to elect, be elected or to dispute an election, as approved andreiterated in Srikant v. Vasant Rao & Others (supra) is well settled. AnElection Petition is indisputably statutory proceeding governed by thestatute under which the Election Petition is filed, or the Statutory RulesEframed under that statute.

24. The observations of this Court in Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal(supra), referred to above have been made in the context of the issue ofwhether the appellant could be impleaded in an election petition and heldguilty of corrupt practice, when he was not candidate contesting theFelection, which had been challenged. The judgments in Srikant v. VasantRao & Others (supra) and Jyoti Basu v. Debi Ghosal (supra) aredistinguishable on facts.

25. In Shailesh Manubhai Parmar v. Election Commission ofIndia[5], also cited by Mr. Diwan, this Court held, in effect, that evenGthough Article 324 of the Constitution confers wide powers on the ElectionCommission to take action with view to ensure free and fair election,even by assuming the role of an adviser, the power to make law vests inthe Parliament under Article 327 of the Constitution. The Parliament is

H5 (2018) 9 SCC 100

supreme and, therefore, not bound by any advice of the ElectionCommission.

26. This Court held:-

“26. Interpreting the said Article, the Constitution Bench in KuldipNayar [Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India, (2006) 7 SCC 1] held: (SCC p. 139, para 427)

“427. In this context, we would say that where the law onthe subject is silent, Article 324 is reservoir of power forthe Election Commission to act for the avowed purpose ofpursuing the goal of free and fair election, and in thisview it also assumes the role of an adviser. But the powerto make law under Article 327 vests in Parliament, whichis supreme and so, not bound by such advice. We wouldreject the argument by referring to what this Court hasalready said in Mohinder Singh Gill [Mohinder SinghGill v. Chief Election Commr., (1978) 1 SCC 405] and whatbears reiteration here is that the limitations on the exerciseof “plenary character” of the Election Commission includeone to the effect that ‘when Parliament or any StateLegislature has made valid law relating to or in connectionwith elections, the Commission, shall act in conformity with,not in violation of, such provisions’ [SCC p. 452, para92(2)(b)].”

27. Relying on Shailesh Manubhai Parmar (supra), Mr. Diwanargued that the Election Commission has to act within the four cornersof law made by Parliament. That apart, if any direction is issued by thisCourt, interpreting provision for furtherance of purity of election, it willbe obligatory on the part of the Commission to act in accordance withthe same. The Commission cannot introduce concepts or ideas ordimensions which would not fit into the legal framework. There can beno dispute with the aforesaid proposition.

28. Mr. Diwan questioned the authority of the Election Commissionto issue the notification dated 14[th] July 2003 requiring candidatescontesting elections to disclose their assets and the assets of their spousesand dependents by filing an affidavit. He argued that there was no vacuumin the KMC Act, which was required to be filled up by issuance of anotification.

DEF

14SUPREME COURT REPORTS

A29. The notification dated 14[th] July 2003, was issued pursuant tothe judgment of this Court in Union of India v. Association forDemocratic Reforms (supra). The relevant part of the judgment isextracted hereinbelow:-

“48. The Election Commission is directed to call forinformation on affidavit by issuing necessary order in exerciseof its power under Article 324 of the Constitution of Indiafrom each candidate seeking election to Parliament or StateLegislature as necessary part of his nomination paper,furnishing therein, information on the following aspects inrelation to his/her candidature:

(1) Whether the candidate is convicted/acquitted/discharged of any criminal offence in the past — if any,whether he is punished with imprisonment or fine.

(2) Prior to six months of filing of nomination, whether thecandidate is accused in any pending case, of any offencepunishable with imprisonment for two years or more, andin which charge is framed or cognizance is taken by thecourt of law. If so, the details thereof.

(3) The assets (immovable, movable, bank balance, etc.)Eof candidate and of his/her spouse and that ofdependants.

(4) Liabilities, if any, particularly whether there are anyoverdues of any public financial institution or governmentdues.

F(5) The educational qualifications of the candidate.”

30. In Lok Prahari (supra), this Court held:-

“68. In the light of the law declared by this Court in ADRcase [Union of India v. Assn. for Democratic Reforms, (2002)5 SCC 294 : AIR 2002 SC 2112] and PUCL case [PUCL v.Union of India, (2003) 4 SCC 399 : AIR 2003 SC 2363], wedo not see any legal or normative impediment nor has anytenable legal objection been raised before us by any one ofthe respondents, for issuance of the direction relating to thechanges in Form 26 (declaration by the candidates). On theother hand, the 2nd respondent in his counter stated:

“7. It is submitted that so far as the first prayer in thecaptioned writ petition is concerned, the information aboutsource(s) of income of candidates, their spouses anddependants will be step in the direction of enhancingtransparency and should form part of the declaration inCol. (9) of Form 26. The Answering RespondentCommission vide its Letter No. 3/4/ECI/LET/FUNC/JUD/SDR/Vol.I/2016 dated 7-9-2016 has already requested theMinistry of Law and Justice to consider the proposedamendments made in Column (3) and Column (9) of Form26 and in total affirmation with the prayer made by thepetitioner.”

Therefore, we are of the opinion that Prayer 1(1) should begranted and is accordingly granted. We direct that Rule 4-Aof the Rules and Form 26 appended to the Rules shall besuitably amended, requiring candidates and their associatesto declare their sources of income.”

31. Mr. Diwan argued that in Lok Prahari (supra), this Courtdirected that Rule 4A and Form 26 appended to the Conduct of ElectionsRules, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the “1961 Rules” framed underthe Representation of People Act shall be suitably amended requiringcandidates and their associates to declare their sources of income. ThisCourt further observed:

“81. For the very same logic as adopted by this Courtin Krishnamoorthy [Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar, (2015) 3SCC 467 : (2015) 2 SCC (Cri) 359 : AIR 2015 SC 1921] , weare also of the opinion that the non-disclosure of assets andsources of income of the candidates and their associateswould constitute corrupt practice falling under heading“undue influence” as defined under Section 123(2) of the1951 RP Act. We, therefore, allow Prayer 2.”

32. Mr. Diwan argued that, in this case, the elections were beingheld under the KMC Act read with the KMC Rules. Neither the KMCAct, nor any Rules framed thereunder require disclosure of the assetsof candidate intending to contest elections or his/her spouse. The HighCourt has in its impugned order recorded that the statutory Form No. 2under the KMC Rules does not require candidate to file any affidavitof assets and liabilities of the candidate or the candidate’s spouse.

A33. Mr. Diwan emphasized on the difference between electionsconducted by the Election Commission of India and an election governedby the KMC Act and/or the KMC Rules. He argued that the electionsconducted by the Election Commission of India are governed by theRepresentation of People Act, 1951 and the 1961 Rules. Mr. Diwansubmitted that there is statutory form and express statutory requirementBin terms of Rule 4A of the 1961 Rules mandating disclosures. The formof affidavit which is required to be filed in respect of elections conductedby the Election Commission of India, must contain details of spouse’sincome, property etc. However, the requirement to make disclosurescannot be imported into the KMC Rules, without an appropriateCamendment of the said rules as also the statutory form thereunder.

34. Mr. Diwan submitted that the High Court erred in placingreliance on the order of the State Election Commission dated 14[th] July2003. Mr. Diwan argued that the absence of statutory requirement couldnot be overcome by an order of the State Commission. The operativeDorder of the Notification dated 14[th] July 2003 cannot amount to amendingprovisions of the KMC Act or any rules framed thereunder.

35. Mr. Diwan argued that it is the duty of the Election Commissionto conduct fair elections in accordance with the statutory provisions. Itis not for the Election Commission to legislate. Furthermore, if anEadministrative direction as the one issued by the State ElectionCommission by the Notification dated 14[th] July 2003 were adequate,there would be no need to amend the Central Rules for the conduct ofelections.

36. Mr. Diwan submitted that the High Court erred in arriving atFthe finding that the Appellant had indulged in corrupt practices. Theconsequences of such finding is that the Appellant stands disqualifiedfrom being Councillor for period of six years in terms of Section 27of the KMC Act. At the highest, the action impugned would amount toimproper acceptance of nomination under Section 35(1)(d)(i).

G37. Mr. Diwan submitted that the election could, at best, havebeen set aside under Section 35(1)(d)(i) and not on the ground of corruptpractices. The High Court has not arrived at any specific finding withregard to material impact of improper acceptance of the Appellant’snomination or election, to constitute corrupt practice.

38. In our considered view, false declaration with regard to theassets of candidate, his/her spouse or dependents, constitutes corruptpractice irrespective of the impact of such false declaration on theelection of the candidate. It may be presumed that false declarationimpacts the election.

39. Mr. Diwan finally argued that penal measures can only beimposed in accordance with statutory provisions and/or rules. In thecontext of his submission, Mr. Diwan cited State of M. P. v. Centre forEnvironment Protection Research & Development[6], authored by oneof us (Indira Banerjee, J.), where this Court held:-

“54. It is well settled that when statute or statutory rulesprescribed penalty for any act or omission, no other penaltynot contemplated in the statute or statutory rules can beimposed. It is well settled that when statute requires thing tobe done in particular manner, it is to be done only in thatmanner.

55. There can be no doubt that strong measures must be takento protect the environment and improve the air qualitywhenever there is contravention of statutory rules causingenvironmental pollution. Stringent action has to be taken, butin accordance with law.

56. Stoppage of supply of fuel to vehicles not complying withthe requirement to have and/or display valid PUC certificateis not contemplated either in the 1989 Rules or in the NGTAct. Motor vehicles not complying with the requirement ofpossessing and/or displaying valid PUC certificate cannotbe debarred from being supplied fuel.

58. This Court is, therefore, constrained to hold that thelearned Tribunal had no power and/or authority and/orjurisdiction to pass orders directing the appellant StateGovernment to issue orders, instructions or directions ondealers, outlets and petrol pumps not to supply fuel to vehicleswithout PUC certificate. The first two questions are answeredaccordingly.”

6 (2020) 9 SCC 781

A40. As submitted by Mr. Diwan candidly, the aforesaid order ofthis Court was passed in the context of an order of the National GreenTribunal, directing that supply of fuel to vehicles be stopped for non-compliance with the requirement to display valid PUC (Pollution UnderControl) Certificate, even though there were specific provisions in thestatute for dealing with the contravention. The observations of this CourtBextracted above were made in an altogether different context, wherepenalty not contemplated by statute had been imposed.

41. It is well settled that, judgment is precedent for the issueof law that is raised and decided. The judgment has to be construed inthe backdrop of the facts and circumstances in which the judgment hasCbeen rendered. Words, phrases and sentences in judgment, cannot beread out of context. Nor is judgment to be read and interpreted in themanner of statute. It is only the law as interpreted by Court in anearlier judgment, which constitutes binding precedent, and noteverything that the Judges say.

42. Emphasizing on the well settled principle of strict constructionof penal statutes, Mr. Diwan submitted that the impugned judgment andorder was incorrect. In the context of his submission, Mr. Diwan cited afive-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Tolaram Relumal andAnother v. State of Bombay[7], where this Court dealing with the penalEprovision in the Bombay Rent Restriction Act, 1947, held:-

“ … It may be here observed that the provisions of Section18(1) are penal in nature and it is well-settled rule ofconstruction of penal statutes that if two possible andreasonable constructions can be put upon penal provision,Fthe court must lean towards that construction which exemptsthe subject from penalty rather than the one which imposespenalty. It is not competent to the court to stretch the meaningof an expression used by the legislature in order to carry outthe intention of the legislature. As pointed out by LordMacmillan in London and North Eastern RailwayGCo. v. Berriman [1946 AC 278, 295] “where penalties forinfringement are imposed it is not legitimate to stretch thelanguage of rule, however, beneficent its intention, beyondthe fair and ordinary meaning of its language”.

43. In Bipinchandra Parshottamdas Patel v. State of Gujarat[8],cited by Mr. Diwan, this Court held:-

“31. It is trite that law leading to disqualification to holdan office should be clear and unambiguous like penal law.In the event statute is not clear, recourse to strictinterpretation must be made for construction thereof. In hisclassic work The Interpretation and Application ofStatutes Read Dickerson states:

“(1) The court will not extend the law beyond its meaning totake care of broader legislative purpose. Here ‘strict’ meansmerely that the court will refrain from exercising its creativefunction to apply the rule announced in the statute to situationsnot covered by it, even though such an extension would helpto advance the manifest ulterior purpose of the statute. Here,strictness relates not to the meaning of the statute but to usingthe statute as basis for judicial law-making by analogy withit.

(2) The court will resolve an evenly balanced uncertainty ofmeaning in favour of criminal defendant, the common law,the ‘common right’, taxpayer, or sovereignty.

(3) The court will so resolve significant uncertainty ofmeaning even against the weight of probability.

(4) The court will adhere closely to the literal meaning of thestatute and infer nothing that would extend its reach.

(5) Where the manifest purpose of the statute, as collaterallyrevealed, is narrower than its express meaning, the court willrestrict application of the statute to its narrower purpose. Thisdiffers from the Riggs situation in that the narrow purpose isrevealed by sources outside the statute and its proper context.”

44. The relevant provisions of the Karnataka MunicipalCorporations Act, 1976, governing the election of the Appellant are setout herein below for convenience.

“27. Corrupt practices entailing disqualification.—TheCorrupt practices specified in section 39 shall entail

disqualification for being councillor for period of sixyears counting from the date on which the finding of the courtas to such practice takes effect under this Act.

33. Election petition.—(1) No election of councillor shallbe called in question except by an election petition presentedfor adjudication to the District Court having jurisdiction,within thirty days from the date of the publication of the resultof election under section 32.

(2) An election petition may be presented on one or more ofthe grounds specified in Section 35,—

(a) by any candidate at such election; or

(b) by any voter of the ward concerned.

(3) petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition allthe candidates at the election………………

34. Relief that may be claimed by the petitioner.- petitionermay, in addition to claiming declaration that the election ofall or any of the 368 Municipal Corporations 1977: KAR.ACT 14] returned candidates is void, claim furtherdeclaration that he himself or any other candidate has beenduly elected.

35. Grounds for declaring elections to be void.—(1) Subjectto the provisions of sub-section (2), if the court is of opinion,—(a) that on the date of his election returned candidate wasnot qualified or was disqualified, to be chosen as councillorunder this Act, or

(b) that any corrupt practice has been committed by returnedcandidate or his election agent or by any other person withthe consent of returned candidate or his election agent, or

(c) that any nomination has been improperly rejected, or

(d) that the result of the election, in so far as it concerns areturned candidate, has been materially affected,—

(i) by the improper acceptance of any nomination; or

(ii) by any corrupt practice committed in the interests of thereturned candidate by an agent other than his election agent;or

(iii) by the improper reception, refusal or rejection of anyvote or the reception of any vote which is void; or

(iv) by any non-compliance with the provisions of this Act orof any rules or orders made thereunder, the court shall declarethe election of the returned candidate to be void.

(2) If in the opinion of the court, returned candidate hasbeen guilty, by person other than his election agent, of anycorrupt practice, but the court is satisfied,—

(a) that no such corrupt practice was committed at the electionby the candidate or his election agent and every such corruptpractice was committed contrary to the orders and withoutthe consent of the candidate or his election agent;

(b) that the candidate and his election agent took allreasonable means for preventing the commission of corruptpractices at the election; and

(c) that in all other respects the election was free from anycorrupt practice on the part of the candidate or any of hisagents, then the court may decide that the election of thereturned candidate is not void

37. Decision of the court.—(1) At the conclusion of the trialof an election petition, the court shall make an order,—

(a) dismissing the election petition; or

(b) declaring the election of all or any of the returnedcandidates to be void; or

(c) declaring the election of all or any of the returnedcandidates to be void and the petitioner or any other candidateto have been duly elected.

38. Appeal.—An appeal shall lie to the High Court from anorder of the District Court under section 37 within period

[2022] 12 S.C.R.

of thirty days from the date of the order of the court excludingthe time required for obtaining copy of the order:

Provided that the High Court may entertain an appeal afterthe expiry of the said period of thirty days if it is satisfied thatthe appellant had sufficient cause for not preferring the appealBwithin the said period.

39. Corrupt practices.—The following shall be deemed to becorrupt practices for the purposes of this Act, namely:—

(1) ‘bribery’ as defined in clause (1) of section 123 of theRepresentation of the People Act, 1951 (Central Act 43 ofC1951) for the time being in force;

(2) ‘undue influence’ as defined in clause (2) of the saidsection for the time being in force;

D45. Under Section 39 of the KMC Act, corrupt practices includeundue influence. The definition of undue influence in Clause 2 of Section123 of the Representation of the People Act 1951, (hereinafter referredto as “the 1951 RP Act”) has been incorporated in Section 39(2) of theKMC Act.

E46. Section 123 (2) of the 1951 RP Act provides :-

“123. Corrupt practices- The following shall be deemed tobe corrupt practices for the purposes of this Act:—

(1) ...

F(2) Undue influence, that is to say, any direct or indirectinterference or attempt to interfere on the part of the candidateor his agent, or of any other person with the consent of thecandidate or his election agent, with the free exercise of anyelectoral right:

Provided that—G

(a) without prejudice to the generality of the provisions ofthis clause any such person as is referred to therein who—

(i)threatens any candidate or any elector, or any person inwhom candidate or an elector is interested, with injury

of any kind including social ostracism andexcommunication or expulsion from any caste orcommunity; or

(ii) induces or attempts to induce candidate or an electorto believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested,will become or will be rendered an object of divinedispleasure or spiritual censure,

shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of theelectoral right of such candidate or elector within the meaningof this clause;

(b) declaration of public policy, or promise of public action,or the mere exercise of legal right without intent to interferewith an electoral right, shall not be deemed to be interferencewithin the meaning of this clause.”

47. Under Section 27 of the KMC Act corrupt practices definedin Section 39(2) which includes “undue influence’ entails disqualificationfrom being Councillor, for six years.

48. Mr. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearingon behalf of the Respondent No.4, submitted that the election in questionwas conducted within the legal framework of the KMC Act, theNotification dated 14[th] July 2003 issued by the Karnataka State ElectionCommission in exercise of its powers under Articles 243K & 243ZA ofthe Constitution of India, as also the addendum dated 19[th] June 2018 tothe Notification dated 14[th] July 2003, which required candidatesparticipating in elections to submit an affidavit disclosing assets ownedby the candidates, their spouses and dependents.

49. In compliance with the requirements of the said Notificationsdated 14[th] July 2003 and 19[th] June 2018, the Appellant filed an affidavit.It is admitted by the Appellant that she has made incorrect statements inthe said affidavit in that (i) she falsely stated that her husband’s namewas ‘Nanjegowda’ instead of stating his real name ‘Madegowda’, (ii)she has stated that her husband did not own any movable or immovableproperties although he owned large number of movable properties.

50. After the results of the election were declared on 3[rd] September2018 and thereafter the false statements made in her affidavit werediscovered, the Respondent No.4 filed the Election Petition No.4/2018.

A51. In the reply given by the Appellant to the Election Petition shestated:-

“4. Regarding the averments made in the Paragraph 4 of thepetition, the 4th respondent humbly submits that as matter offact, by oversight the name of the son (i.e. Nanje Gowda) ofBthe 4th respondent has been mentioned in that column insteadof the name of her husband (i.e., S. Made Gowda).In fact, atthe beginning of that affidavit, the name of the 4[th] respondent’shusband has been correctly mentioned.

5. Regarding the averments made in the paragraph 5 of theCpetition, the 4th respondent humbly submits that she had noknowledge about her husband having the propertiesmentioned in the said paragraph at the time of swearing tothat affidavit and hence she has not mentioned the same inher said affidavits. The non-mentioning of the said propertiesin the said affidavit is unintentional and for the said bonaDfide reason”.

52. Mr. Patil submitted that the Trial Court had initially erred indismissing the Election Petition notwithstanding the admission of theAppellant that she had not given the correct name of her husband andhad suppressed the fact that her husband had owned properties.

53. Mr. Patil submitted that on remand the Election Petition wasrightly allowed. The non-disclosure by the Appellant of her husband’sassets would amount to corrupt practices and is therefore, violative ofthe KMC Act as well as Section 123 of the 1951 RP Act. The TrialCourt therefore, set aside the election of the Appellant and declared theFRespondent No.4 as elected.

54. Mr. Patil argued that the High Court had rightly come to theconclusion that the election of the Appellant was vitiated by corruptpractice adopted by her in view of the fact that she had filed falseaffidavit filed and had not disclosed her husband’s assets. Mr. PatilGsubmitted that Section 35(1)(d) of the KMC Act provides that if theCourt is of the opinion that party has committed ‘corrupt practice’that would result in the election being declared void.

55. Corrupt Practices have been defined in Section 39(2) of theKMC Act to include ‘undue influence’ as defined in Section 123(2) of

the 1951 RP Act. Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act came up forinterpretation by this Court in Lok Prahari (supra), where this Courtheld that the non-disclosure would amount to ‘undue influence’ as definedunder the Representation of People Act. The definition of ‘undueinfluence’ as used in Section 123(2) of 1951 RP Act is also adopted bySection 39(2) of the KMC Act. Therefore, the non-disclosure of assetsin the municipal elections would also amount to ‘undue influence’ andconsequently to ‘corrupt practice’.

56. Rebutting the argument on behalf of the Appellant that theState Election Commission did not have the power to issue theNotifications dated 14[th] July 2003 and 19[th] June 2018, making it mandatoryfor candidates to file affidavits disclosing the assets of their spouses,since there was no such requirement in the KMC Act, Mr. Patil argued,and in our view, rightly, that the issue is squarely covered by the decisionof this Court in the Association for Democratic Reforms and Ors.(supra).

57. In Krishnamoorthy v. Sivakumar & Ors.[9], cited by Mr.Patil, this Court upheld notification of the Tamil Nadu State ElectionCommission requiring that every candidate contesting elections to localbody, should disclose whether there was any criminal case pending againsthim. In the aforesaid case, the election of the appellant as the Presidentof the Panchayat had been declared null and void for not disclosing theinformation required in terms of the notification issued by the Tamil NaduState Election Commission.

58. As argued by Mr. Patil, the notifications dated 14[th] July 2003and 19[th] June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission, have neverbeen questioned by the Appellant. Rather, the Petitioner accepted thenotifications as binding on her, and accordingly filed an affidavit. TheAppellant is, therefore, estopped from questioning the validity of thenotifications or the power of the State Election Commission to issue thesame. That non-disclosure of assets would amount to ‘corrupt practices’,entailing disqualification, is evident from Sections 35 and 39(ii) of theKMC Act, read with Section 123(2) of the Representation of PeopleAct 1951, as interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari (supra).

59. It is not in dispute that the Appellant had suppressed informationwith regard to the assets of her husband. Section 35(1)(b) of the KMC

AAct provides that if the Court is of the opinion that party has committeda ‘corrupt practice’, that would result in the election being declared void.

60. Section 35 of the KMC Act enumerates the grounds on whichCourts could declare the election of the returned candidate to be void.Section 35(1)(b) mentions corrupt practice by returned candidate orBhis election agent or by any other person, either with the consent of areturned candidate or his election agent, as one of the grounds for declaringthe election to be void. Section 39 of the KMC Act enumerates the acts/practices, which are to be deemed to be corrupt practices. Corruptpractices include ‘undue influence’. This is specified in Section 39(2) ofthe KMC Act.C

61. The definition of undue influence in Section 123(2) of the1951 RP Act has expressly been incorporated in the definition of undueinfluence in Section 39(2) of the KMC Act. Further, having regard to thetenor of Section 39(3) of the KMC Act, any false statement relating to acandidate would be corrupt practice. At the cost of repetition, it isDemphasized that KMC Act incorporates the definition of undue influencein Section 123(2) of the 1951 RP Act. The judgments of this Courtinterpreting ‘undue influence’ in Section 123(2) of the 1951, RP Act,would squarely apply to the interpretation of undue influence underSection 39(2) of the KMC Act.

62. Mr. Patil rightly argued that Section 123(2) of the Representationof People Act, 1951 had been interpreted by this Court in Lok Prahari(supra) where this Court held that non-disclosure would amount to ‘undueinfluence’ as defined in the Representation of People Act, 1951. Thenon-disclosure of assets would therefore, also amount to ‘undue influence’Fand consequently to ‘corrupt practices’ under the KMC Act. Mr. Patilargued that the Notifications dated 14[th] July 2003 and in particular 19[th]June 2018 issued by the State Election Commission made it mandatoryfor the candidates to file affidavits, disclosing the assets of their spouses.

63. The question of whether the Election Commission had powerGto issue directions to the candidates to file affidavits disclosing the assetsof their spouses, in the absence of any specific provision under the KMCAct or the Rules framed thereunder is no longer res integra. The questionis squarely covered by the law laid down by this Court in Union ofIndia v. Association for Democratic Reforms and Ors. (supra), wherethis Court had directed the Election Commission to secure to voters,H

inter alia, information pertaining to assets not only of the candidates butalso of their spouse and dependents.

64. The Election Commission has to act within the four corners oflaw made by the Parliament and/or the concerned State legislature, asthe case may be, as argued by Mr. Diwan.

65. The notification dated 14[th] July 2003 was issued pursuant tothe judgment of this Court in Association for Democratic Reforms(supra), where this Court held that “the Constitution has madecomprehensive provision under Article 324 to take care of surprisesituations and it operates in areas left unoccupied by legislation.”The interpretation given by this Court of Article 324 of the Constitutionof India is binding on all courts.

66. It would be pertinent to note that the language and tenor ofArticle 243-ZA(1) is in pari materia with Article 324(1) of theConstitution. The language and tenor of Section 243-ZA(1) is identicalto that of Article 324(1). Articles 243-ZA(1) and Article 324(1) are setout hereinbelow for convenience :-

“243-ZA. Elections to the Municipalities.—(1) Thesuperintendence, direction and control of the preparation ofelectoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to theMunicipalities shall be vested in the State Election Commissionreferred to in Article 243-K.

xxxxxxxxx

324. Superintendence, direction and control of elections to bevested in an Election Commission.—(1) The superintendence,direction and control of the preparation of the electoral rollsfor, and the conduct of, all elections to Parliament and to theLegislature of every State and of elections to the offices ofPresident and Vice-President held under this Constitution shallbe vested in Commission (referred to in this Constitution asthe Election Commission).”

67. This Court has interpreted Article 324(1) to confer wide powerson the Election Commission relating to superintendence, direction andcontrol of preparation of electoral roles and/or the conduct of electionsto Parliament and to the legislature of every State provided, of course,that the directions are not contrary to law. The interpretation of Article

A324(1) to confer wide powers on the Election Commission to issuedirections in respect of elections to Parliament and State legislatureswould apply to Article 243-ZA(1). Article 243-ZA(1) has to be construedto confer powers on the State Election Commission to issue directionsrelated to superintendence, direction and control of the preparation ofelectoral roles or for conduct of elections to municipalities.B

68. The Election Commission has wide powers under Article324(1) of the Constitution of India to issue directions necessary forconducting free and fair elections, subject to the contours of law. Thepower of the Election Commission includes the power to issue directionswhere the law is silent. The State Election Commission has the sameCpowers under Article 243-K and 243-ZA(1) as the Election Commissionof India has under Article 324(1) of the Constitution of India.

69. In Association for Democratic Reforms (supra) and in LokPrahari (supra), this Court held that for effective exercise of hisfundamental right under Article 19(1)((a), the voter is entitled to have allDrelevant information about candidates at an election which would includecriminal antecedents, if any, of the candidate, his/her assets and liabilities,educational qualifications, etc. It may be true that amendment of the1951 RP Act is within the exclusive domain of the Union Parliament asobserved in Lok Prahari (supra) and amendment of the KMC Act isEexclusively within the domain of the Karnataka State Legislature.

70. However, in light of the law declared by this Court inAssociation for Democratic Reforms (supra), we do not see any legalor normative impediment for the State Election Commission to issuedirections requiring disclosure of assets of the candidate, his/her spouseFand dependent associates by way of affidavit. In issuing the notificationdated 14[th] July 2003, the Election Commission has not encroached intothe legislative domain of the Karnataka State Legislature. The direction,as contained in the notification dated 14[th] July 2003 had been acceptedby the Appellant. Having affirmed false affidavit, it does not lie in themouth of the Appellant to contend that her election should not be setGaside on the ground of corrupt practice under Section 35(1) of the KMCAct.

71. India is quasi-federal State. Article 1 of the Constitutiondescribes India as “Union of States”. Every State is an integral andinseverable part of India. The Indian polity combines the features of aHfederal Government with certain features of unitary Constitution. While

the division of powers between the Union Government and the StateGovernments is an essential feature of federalism, in matters of nationalimportance, uniform policy is essential in the interest of all the states,without disturbing the clear division of powers, so that the Union and theStates legislate within their respective spheres. The Constitution is thesupreme law for the Union and for the States supported by an independentjudiciary which acts as the guardian of the Constitution.

72. There can be no doubt that the Parliament and the respectiveState legislatures are supreme and not bound by any advice of the ElectionCommission. It is equally true that the Election Commission has to actwithin the four corners of law made by the Parliament and/or theconcerned State Legislature, as the case may be. However, in ourconsidered opinion, the Election Commission has issued the notificationdated 14[th] July 2003 within the contours of law.

73. In State Bank of India v. Santosh Gupta[10], Rohinton FaliNariman, J. speaking for the Bench relied upon decision of this Court inState of West Bengal v. Union of India[11] and, inter-alia, reiteratedthe following characteristic of Indian Federalism –

(c) Distribution of powers between the Union and the regionalunits each in its sphere coordinate and independent of theother. The basis of such distribution of power is that in mattersof national importance in which uniform policy is desirablein the interest of the units, authority is entrusted to the Union,and matters of local concern remain with the State.

74. Purity of election at all levels, be it election to the UnionParliament or State Legislature or Municipal Corporation or aPanchayat is matter of national importance in which uniform policyis desirable in the interest of all the States. hypertechnical view of theomission to incorporate any specific provision in the KMC Election Rules,similar to the 1961 Rules, expressly requiring disclosure of assets, tocondone dishonesty and corrupt practice would be against the spirit ofthe Constitution and public interest.

10 (2017) 2 SCC 538 (para 10)

11 AIR 1963 SC 1963

A75. This Court is of the view that there are no grounds to interferewith or set aside the impugned judgment and order of the High Court,affirming the judgment and order of the Principal District and SessionsJudge, Mysuru, allowing Election Petition No. 4 of 2018 and setting asidethe election of the Appellant.

B76. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed. All pending applicationsare, accordingly, disposed of.

Divya Pandey

(Assisted by : Deepak Panwar, LCRA)

Appeal dismissed.