ABID-UL-ISLAM versus INDER SAIN DUA

[2022] 2 S.C.R. 1016

[2022] 2 S.C.R.

ABID-UL-ISLAM

INDER SAIN DUA

(Civil Appeal No. 9444 of 2016)

APRIL 07, 2022

[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M. M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.25B(8), proviso – RevisionalPower of the High Court of Delhi – Scope and ambit of – In theinstant case, appellant (landlord) filed eviction petition u/s.14(1)(e)Cr/w s.25B of the Act – Respondent (tenant) unsuccessfully filed anapplication before Rent Controller for leave to defend u/s.25B(5)of the Act – Respondent approached High Court by invoking therevisional power provided under proviso to s.25B(8), which wasallowed on the premise that there are triable issues – On appeal,held: Proviso to s.25B(8) creates an embargo by not providing anDappeal against the order passed by the Rent Controller over anapplication filed u/s.25B(5) – The intent of the legislature is to removethe appellate remedy and thereafter second appeal – It gives theHigh Court exclusive power of revision against an order of RentController in the nature of superintendence over an inferior courtEon the decision making process – Thus, High Court is not expectedto substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Court – Itsrole is to just satisfy itself on the process adopted – The scope ofinterference by the High Court is very restrictive except in caseswhere there is an error apparent on the face of the record – In theinstant case, High Court proceeded to allow the revision by treatingFit like an appeal – Approach of High Court not sustainable in theeye of law.

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.14(1)(e) – Bona fiderequirement by landlord – U/s.14(1)(e) landlord makes an applicationseeking possession of the tenanted premise for his bona fideGrequirement when there is no other reasonably suitableaccommodation – There has to be satisfaction on two grounds,namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availability of reasonably suitable residential accommodation –Such reasonableness along with suitability is to be seen from theHperspective of the landlord and not the tenant.

Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958: s.14(1)(e) vis-a-vis s.25B(5) –Scope of – For availing leave to defend u/s.25B(5), mere assertionper se would not suffice as s.14(1)(e) creates presumption subjectto the satisfaction of the Rent Controller qua bona fide need infavour of the landlord – Before presumption is drawn, landlord isduty bound to place prima facie material supported by the adequateaverments – It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attracted andthe onus shifts on the tenant – Further, s.19 of the Act gives rightto the dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction – Sucha right is available only to tenant who stood dispossessed on theapplication filed by the landlord invoking s.14(1)(e) being allowed.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to theregular mode of eviction. Thus, in case where landlord makesan application seeking possession of the tenanted premises forhis bona fide requirement, the Rent Controller may dispense withthe protection prescribed under the Act and then grant an orderof eviction. Requirement is the existence of bona fide need, whenthere is no other “reasonably suitable accommodation”. Whenthe Rent Controller comes to the conclusion that there exists abona fide need coupled with the satisfaction that there is noreasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twinconditions mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied. [Para12][1025-D-F]2. For availing the leave to defend as envisaged underSection 25B(5), mere assertion per se would not suffice asSection 14(1)(e) creates presumption subject to the satisfactionof the Rent Controller qua bona fide need in favour of the landlordwhich is obviously rebuttable with some material of substance tothe extent of raising triable issue. The satisfaction of the RentController in deciding on an application seeking leave to defendis obviously subjective. The degree of probability is one ofpreponderance forming the subjective satisfaction of the RentController. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between meremoonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for therejection of normal application for eviction. [Para 15][1029-A-C]

A3. Before presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty boundto place prima facie material supported by the adequateaverments. It is only thereafter, the presumption gets attractedand the onus shifts on the tenant. The object ofSection 14(1)(e)vis vis Section 25B has to be seen in the light of yet anotherprovision contained under Section 19. Section 19 gives right toBthe dispossessed tenant for repossession if there is non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction, to putthe premises to use for the intendedpurpose. Such right isavailable only to tenant who stood dispossessed on the applicationfiled by the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed.CThus, Section 19 inter alia throws more light on the legislativeobjective facilitating speedy possession. The object is alsoreflected in the proviso to Section 25B(8), denying right ofappeal. [Para 16][1029-C-E]

4. The proviso to Section 25B(8) creates distinct andDunequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the orderpassed by the Rent Controller over an application filed undersub-section (5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear,which is to remove the appellate remedy and thereafter, furthersecond appeal. It is clear omission that is done by the legislatureconsciously through covenant removing the right of two stagesEof appeals. Proviso to Section 25B(8) gives the High Courtexclusive power of revision against an order of the RentController, being in the nature of superintendence over an inferiorcourt on the decision making process, inclusive of proceduralcompliance. Thus, the High Court is not expected to substituteFand supplant its views with that of the trial Court by exercisingthe appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on the processadopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is veryrestrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparenton the face of the record, which would only mean that in the

absence of any adjudication per se, the High Court should notGventure to disturb such decision. There is no need for holdinga roving inquiry in such matters which would otherwise amountto converting the power of superintendence into that of regularfirst appeal, an act, totally forbidden by the legislature. [Paras 19,20][1032-D-H]H

5. The High Court proceeded to allow the revision bytreating it like an appeal. It did not even reverse the findings ofthe learned Rent Controller, but proceeded to hold that the denialsof the appellant in his reply to the application seeking leave todefend are vague, qua the plea of alternative accommodation,notwithstanding the rejection of the contention of the respondentthat he cannot question the title. [Para 24][1038-H; 1039-A-B]

Anil Bajaj and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610;Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC778 : [2005] 4 Suppl. SCR 26; Ram Krishan Grover v.Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC 506; Inderjeet Kaur v.Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706 : [2000] 5 Suppl.SCR 707; Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co.Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119 : [1998] 2 Suppl. SCR 390;Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay Kumar Singhal, (2020) 7 SCC327 – relied on.

Balwant Singh alias Bant Singh and Anr. v. SudarshanKumar and Anr. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 114 10; M.M.Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. (1981) 3 SCC36 : [1981] 3 SCR 367; P.V. Papanna and Ors. v. K.Padmanabhaiah (1994) 2 SCC 316 : [1994] 1 SCR642; Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain (1986) 4SCC 736 : [1987] 1 SCR 275; D. Satyanarayana v. P.Jagadish (1987) 4 SCC424 : [1988] 1 SCR 145;Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva(1982) 3 SCC 270 : [1983] 1 SCR 498; Liaq Ahmedand Ors. v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman (2000) 5 SCC 708 :[2000] 3 SCR 800; India Umbrella Manufacturing Co.and Ors. v. Bhagabandei Agarwalla (Dead) by LRs andOrs. (2004) 3 SCC 178 : [2004] 1 SCR 10; GramPanchayat v. Ujagar Singh and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC 543: [2000] 3 Suppl. SCR 457 – referred to.

Case Law Reference

(2014) 15 SCC 610[1981] 3 SCR 367

relied onreferred to

Para 10Para 11

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.04.2016 of the High Courtof Delhi at New Delhi in RC. REV. No. 395/2015.

EAmit Andlay, P. S. Sudheer, Rishi Maheshwari, Ms. Anne Mathew,Bharat Sood, Ms. Shruti Jose, Advs. for the Appellant.

Respondent-in-person

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

FM. M. SUNDRESH, J.

1. Focus in this appeal is on the exercise of the revisional powerby the High Court of Delhi in its invocation of proviso to Section 25B(8)of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (for short “the Act”).

2. Heard Mr. Amit Andley, learned counsel for the appellant andGthe respondent, party-in-person. We have perused all the documentsfiled along with written arguments.

BRIEF FACTS:

3. Shri Haji Badrul Islam (since deceased) was the original ownerof the two shops leased out to the respondent orally way back in theH

year 1970. The lease continued for decades. After the demise of theoriginal landlord, his son Shri Sajid-Ul-Islam became the owner both byinheritance and by virtue of an award dated 11.03.1980. He too expiredon 21.11.1986 and the appellant, who claims through the award andinheritance by operation of law, filed the eviction petition under Section14(1)(e) read with Section 25B of the Act in the year 2014.

4. The respondent filed an application seeking leave to defend,inter alia, raising three primary contentions, namely, (i) the appellant isnot having title over the property; (ii) the property actually belongs to theGovernment of India under the Enemy Property Act, 1968 (hereinafterreferred to as “Enemy Property Act”) and (iii) there are alternativeaccommodations by way of other properties available for carrying outthe business of the appellant as such the need of the appellant is notbona fide.

5. The learned Rent Controller dismissed the application holdingthat the title of the appellant cannot be questioned by the respondent, theaverments regarding the suitability of alternative accommodation arevague and the embargo under the Enemy Property Act would not bemade applicable to the properties in question. Incidentally, the bona fideneed of the appellant has also been discussed by the learned RentController.

6. The respondent, being dissatisfied with the said decision of thelearned Rent Controller, approached the High Court of Delhi invokingthe proviso to Section 25B(8) of the Act. Despite holding that therespondent cannot question the title of the appellant, having filed suitacknowledging the said factum, the revision was allowed on the premisethat there are triable issues as the denial of the appellant on the defenceof the appellant qua the issue of alternative accommodation is vague.

7. Assailing the aforesaid decision rendered by the High Court,the present appeal is before us.

SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPELLANT:

8. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the jurisdictionavailable to the High Court being limited and restrictive, the decisionmade without specific finding on the reasoning of the learned RentController would amount to exercising jurisdiction not vested. Therespondent has not made out case even on facts. It is not for the

Arespondent being tenant to insist upon particular property, especiallywhen clear statement has been made on possession. The appellanthas specifically denied ownership of any alternate properties mentionedby the respondent in his application seeking leave to defend.

9. On the additional documents filed by the respondent, it isBsubmitted that the subsequent proceeding initiated under the EnemyProperty (Amendment and Validation) Act, 2017 (hereinafter referredto as the “Amended Act”) was one without jurisdiction, especially whenthe earlier one was closed after conducting preliminary inquiry. Tosubstantiate the same, reliance is made on the report dated 04.11.2015.The learned counsel has also stated that the proceedings challenging theCsubsequent notices are pending before the High Court of Delhi whereinan order of “no coercive steps should be taken” has been passed. In theaforesaid proceedings the application filed by the respondent to impleadhimself was rejected for want of bona fides, which stood confirmed bythis Court.D10. To buttress the submissions, learned counsel has relied on thefollowing judgments rendered by this Court:

•Anil Bajaj and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja (2014) 15 SCC 610

•Balwant Singh alias Bant Singh and Anr. v. SudarshanKumar and Anr. 2021 SCC OnLine SC 114E

SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT:

11. The respondent, who appears as party-in-person, submittedthat there are triable issues involved and, therefore, the High Court wasright in allowing the revision. There is serious cloud over the title of theFappellant as some of the owners of the properties are living in theneighbouring country of Pakistan. The award obtained on 11.03.1980 isunder cloudand thus liable to be ignored. The authority constituted underthe Amended Act has recognized the status of the respondent as itstenant. It was further submitted that the appellant is in possession ofalternative accommodations available for running the business. Thus,Gwhile confirming the order of the High Court, the subsequent eventshaving taken place as evidenced by the documents filed, will have to betaken note of. The respondent sought the dismissal of the present appeal.Seeking to strengthen his case further, the respondent took us throughthe following judgments of this Court:

•M.M. Quasim v. Manohar Lal Sharma and Ors. (1981) 3ASCC 36

•P.V. Papanna and Ors. v. K. Padmanabhaiah (1994) 2 SCC316

•Amarjit Singh v. Khatoon Quamarain (1986) 4 SCC 736

•D. Satyanarayana v. P. Jagadish (1987) 4 SCC424

•Precision Steel and Engineering Works v. Prem Deva (1982)3 SCC 270

•Liaq Ahmed and Ors. v. Habeeb-Ur-Rehman (2000) 5 SCC708

•India Umbrella Manufacturing Co. and Ors. v. BhagabandeiAgarwalla (Dead) by LRs and Ors. (2004) 3 SCC 178

•Gram Panchayat v. Ujagar Singh and Ors. (2000) 7 SCC543

DISCUSSION

Relevant Provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958:

Section 14(1)(e):

“14. Protection of tenant against eviction:(1)Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in anyother law or contract, no order or decree for the recovery ofpossession of any premises shall be made by any court orController in favour of the landlord against tenant:

Provided that the Controller may, on an application madeto him in the prescribed manner, make an order for the recoveryof possession of the premises on one or more of the followinggrounds only, namely:-

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(e) that the premises let for residential purposes are requiredbona fide by the landlord for occupation as residence forhimself or for any member of his family dependent on him, ifhe is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefitthe premises are held and that the landlord or such person hasno other reasonably suitable residential accommodation.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this clause, “premises letfor residential purposes” include any premises which havingbeen let for use as residence are, without the consent of thelandlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;”

SECTION 19:

“19. Recovery of possession for occupation and re-entry:(1) Where landlord recovers possession of any premises fromthe tenant in pursuance of an order made under clause (c) ofthe proviso to sub-section (1) of section 14, Ins. By Act 57 of1988, sec. 10 (w.e.f.1-12-1988) [or under sections 14A, 14B,14C, 14D and 21], the landlord shall not, except with thepermission of the Controller obtained in the prescribed manner,re-let the whole or any part of the premises within three yearsfrom the date of obtaining such possession, and in grantingsuch permission the Controller may direct the landlord to putsuch evicted tenant in possession of the premises.

(2) Where landlord recovers possession of any premises asaforesaid and the premises are not occupied by the landlord orby the person for whose benefit the premises are held, withintwo months of obtaining such possession, or the premises havingbeen so occupied are, at any time within three years from thedate of obtaining possession, re-let to any person other thanthe evicted tenant without obtaining the permission of theController under sub-section (1) or the possession of suchpremises is transferred to another person for reasons whichdo not appear to the! Controller to be bona fide, the Controllermay, on an application made to him in this behalf by suchevicted tenant within such time as may be prescribed, directthe landlord to put the tenant in possession of the premises orto pay him such compensation as the Controller thinks fit.”

Section 25B

“25B. Special procedure for the disposal of applicationsfor eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement:

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(5) The Controller shall give to the tenant leave to contest theapplication if the affidavit filed by the tenant discloses such

facts as would disentitle the landlord from obtaining an orderfor the recovery of possession of the premises on the groundspecified in clause (c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section14, or under section 14A.

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(8) No appeal or second appeal shall lie against an order forthe recovery of possession of any premises made by theController in accordance with the procedure specified in thissection:

Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfyingitself that an order made by the Controller under this section isaccording to law, call for the records of the case and passsuch order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.”

Requirement Under Section 14(1)(e):

12. Section 14(1)(e) carves out an exception to the regular modeof eviction. Thus, in case where landlord makes an application seekingpossession of the tenanted premises for his bona fide requirement, thelearned Rent Controller may dispense with the protection prescribedunder the Act and then grant an order of eviction. Requirement is theexistence of bona fide need, when there is no other “reasonably suitableaccommodation”. Therefore, there has to be satisfaction on two grounds,namely, (i) the requirement being bona fide and (ii) the non-availabilityof reasonably suitable residential accommodation. Such reasonablenessalong with suitability is to be seen from the perspective of the landlordand not the tenant. When the learned Rent Controller comes to theconclusion that there exists bona fide need coupled with the satisfactionthat there is no reasonably suitable residential accommodation, the twinconditions mandated under Section 14(1)(e) stand satisfied.

13. We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in InderjeetKaur v. Nirpal Singh, (2001) 1 SCC 706:

“9. Chapter III-A deals with summary trial of certain applicationsexpressly stating that every application by landlord for recoveryof possession on the ground specified in clause (e) of the provisoto sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, or under Section 14-Aor 14-B or 14-C or 14-D shall be dealt with in accordance withthe special provisions prescribed in Section 25-B of the Act. As

per the broad scheme of this Chapter tenant is precluded fromcontesting an application filed for eviction on the grounds mentionedin the aforementioned provisions unless he obtains leave from theController to contest the eviction petition. In default of obtainingleave to defend or leave is refused to him an order of evictionfollows. It appears recourse to summary trial is adopted havingdue regard to nature of the grounds on which the eviction is soughtwith view to avoid delay so that the landlord should not bedeprived or denied of his right to immediate possession of premisesfor his bona fide use.

10. At the same time, it is well settled and accepted position inlaw that no one shall be subjected to suffer civil consequencelike eviction from premises resulting in hardship to him withoutproviding adequate and effective opportunity to disprove the caseagainst him and establish his case as pleaded.

11. As is evident from Sections 25-B(4) and (5) of the Act, burdenplaced on tenant is light and limited in that if the affidavit filed byhim discloses such facts as would disentitle the landlord fromobtaining an order for the recovery of the possession of thepremises on the ground specified in clause (e) of the proviso toSection 14(1) of the Act, with which we are concerned in thiscase, are good enough to grant leave to defend.

12. landlord, who bonafidely requires premises for his residenceand occupation should not suffer for long, waiting for eviction of atenant. At the same time tenant cannot be thrown out from apremises summarily, even though prima facie he is able to saythat the claim of the landlord is not bona fide or untenable and assuch not entitled to obtain an order of eviction. Hence the approachhas to be cautious and judicious in granting or refusing leave todefend to tenant to contest an eviction petition within the broadscheme of Chapter III-A and in particular having regard to theclear terms and language of Section 25-B(5).13. We are of the considered view that at stage when the tenantseeks leave to defend, it is enough if he prima facie makes out acase by disclosing such facts as would disentitle the landlord fromobtaining an order of eviction. It would not be right approach tosay that unless the tenant at that stage itself establishes strongcase as would non-suit the landlord, leave to defend should not be

granted when it is not the requirement of Section 25-B(5). leaveto defend sought for cannot also be granted for mere asking or ina routine manner which will defeat the very object of the specialprovisions contained in Chapter III-A of the Act. Leave to defendcannot be refused where an eviction petition is filed on meredesign or desire of landlord to recover possession of the premisesfrom tenant under clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) ofSection 14, when as matter of fact the requirement may not bebona fide. Refusing to grant leave in such case leads to evictionof tenant summarily resulting in great hardship to him and hisfamily members, if any, although he could establish if only leave isgranted that landlord would be disentitled for an order of eviction.At the stage of granting leave to defend, parties rely on affidavitsin support of the rival contentions. Assertions and counter-assertions made in affidavits may not afford safe and acceptableevidence so as to arrive at an affirmative conclusion one way orthe other unless there is strong and acceptable evidence availableto show that the facts disclosed in the application filed by thetenant seeking leave to defend were either frivolous, untenable ormost unreasonable. Take case when possession is sought onthe ground of personal requirement, landlord has to establish hisneed and not his mere desire. The ground under clause (e) of theproviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 enables landlord torecover possession of the tenanted premises on the ground of hisbona fide requirement. This being an enabling provision, essentiallythe burden is on the landlord to establish his case affirmatively. Inshort and substance, wholly frivolous and totally untenabledefence may not entitle tenant to leave to defend, but when atriable issue is raised duty is placed on the Rent Controller bythe statute itself to grant leave. At the stage of granting leave thereal test should be whether facts disclosed in the affidavit filedseeking leave to defend prima facie show that the landlord wouldbe disentitled from obtaining an order of eviction and not whetherat the end defence may fail. It is well to remember that whenleave to defend is refused, serious consequences of eviction shallfollow and the party seeking leave is denied an opportunity to testthe truth of the averments made in the eviction petition by cross-examination. It may also be noticed that even in cases whereleave is granted provisions are made in this very Chapter forexpeditious disposal of eviction petitions. Section 25-B(6) states

that where leave is granted to tenant to contest the evictionapplication, the Controller shall commence the hearing of theapplication as early as practicable. Section 25-B(7) speaks of theprocedure to be followed in such cases. Section 25-B(8) bars theappeals against an order of recovery of possession except aprovision of revision to the High Court. Thus combined effectof Sections 25-B(6), (7) and (8) would lead to expeditious disposalof eviction petitions so that landlord need not wait and suffer fora long time. On the other hand, when tenant is denied leave todefend although he had fair chance to prove his defence, willsuffer great hardship. In this view balanced view is to be takenhaving regard to competing claims.”

14. We further wish to place reliance on the judgment of thisCourt in Anil Bajaj and Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja, (2014) 15 SCC 610:

“6. In the present case it is clear that while the landlord (Appellant1) is carrying on his business from shop premise located in anarrow lane, the tenant is in occupation of the premises locatedon the main road which the landlord considers to be more suitablefor his own business. The materials on record, in fact, disclosethat the landlord had offered to the tenant the premises located inthe narrow lane in exchange for the tenanted premises whichoffer was declined by the tenant. It is not the tenant’s case thatthe landlord, Appellant 1, does not propose to utilise the tenantedpremises from which eviction is sought for the purposes of hisbusiness. It is also not the tenant’s case that the landlord proposesto rent out/keep vacant the tenanted premises after obtainingpossession thereof or to use the same is any way inconsistentwith the need of the landlord. What the tenant contends is that thelandlord has several other shop houses from which he is carryingon different businesses and further that the landlord has otherpremises from where the business proposed from the tenantedpremises can be effectively carried out. It would hardly requireany reiteration of the settled principle of law that it is not for thetenant to dictate to the landlord as to how the property belongingto the landlord should be utilised by him for the purpose of hisbusiness. Also, the fact that the landlord is doing business fromvarious other premises cannot foreclose his right to seek evictionfrom the tenanted premises so long as he intends to use the saidtenanted premises for his own business.”

15. For availing the leave to defend as envisaged under Section25B(5), mere assertion per se would not suffice as Section 14(1)(e)creates presumption subject to the satisfaction of the learned RentController qua bona fide needin favour of the landlord which is obviouslyrebuttable with some material of substance to the extent of raising atriable issue. The satisfaction of the Rent Controller in deciding on anapplication seeking leave to defend is obviously subjective. The degreeof probability is one of preponderance forming the subjective satisfactionof the Rent Controller. Thus, the quality of adjudication is between amere moonshine and adequate material and evidence meant for therejection of normal application for eviction.

16. Before presumption is drawn, the landlord is duty bound toplace prima facie material supported by the adequate averments. It isonly thereafter, the presumption gets attracted and the onus shifts on thetenant. The object of Section 14(1)(e) vis vis Section 25B has to beseen in the light of yet another provision contained under Section 19.Section 19 gives right to the dispossessed tenant for repossession ifthere is non-compliance on the part of the landlord albeit after eviction,to put the premises to use for the intended purpose. Such right isavailable only to tenant who stood dispossessed on the application filedby the landlord invoking Section 14(1)(e) being allowed. Thus, Section19 inter alia throws more light on the legislative objective facilitating aspeedy possession. The object is also reflected in the proviso to Section25B(8), denying right of appeal.

17. Dealing with pari materia provision, this Court in BaldevSingh Bajwa v. Monish Saini, (2005) 12 SCC 778, was pleased toclarify the aforesaid position holding the procedure as summary. In sucha case, the tenant is expected to put in adequate and reasonable materialsin support of the facts pleaded in the form of declaration sufficient toraise triable issue. One cannot lose sight of the object behind Section25B in facilitating not only the expeditious but effective remedy for aclass of landlords, sans the normal procedural route. In this regard, wewish to quote the decision of this court in Baldev Singh (supra):“14. The phrase “bona fide requirement” or “bona fide need” or“required reasonably in good faith” or “required”, occurs in almostall Rent Control Acts with the underlying legislative intent whichhas been considered and demonstrated innumerable times byvarious High Courts as also by this Court, some of which we

would like to refer to. In Ram Dass v. Ishwar Chander [(1988) 3SCC 131] it is said that the bona fide need should be genuine andhonest, conceived in good faith. It was also indicated that thelandlord’s desire for possession, however honest it might otherwisebe, has inevitably subjective element in it, and that desire, tobecome “requirement” in law must have the objective elementof “need”, which can be decided only by taking all the relevantcircumstances into consideration so that the protection affordedto tenant is not rendered illusory or whittled down.

15. In Bega Begum v. Abdul Ahad Khan [(1979) 1 SCC 273] itwas held by this Court that the words “reasonable requirement”undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need asopposed to mere desire or wish. The distinction between desireand need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so as to makeeven the genuine need as nothing but desire.

16. In Surjit Singh Kalra v. Union of India [(1991) 2 SCC 87] athree-Judge Bench of this Court has held as under: (SCC p. 99,para 20)

“20. The tenant of course is entitled to raise all relevantcontentions as against the claim of the classified landlords.The fact that there is no reference to the words bona fiderequirement in Sections 14-B to 14-D does not absolve thelandlord from proving that his requirement is bona fide or thetenant from showing that it is not bona fide. In fact every claimfor eviction against tenant must be bona fide one. There isalso enough indication in support of this construction from thetitle of Section 25-B which states ‘special procedure for thedisposal of applications for eviction on the ground of bona fiderequirement’.”

17. In Shiv Sarup Gupta v. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta [(1999) 6SCC 222] this Court while dealing with the aspect of bona fiderequirement has said that the sense of felt need which is an outcomeof sincere, honest desire, in contradistinction with mere pretenceor pretext to evict tenant, refers to state of mind prevailingwith the landlord. The only way of peeping into the mind of thelandlord is an exercise undertaken by the judge of facts by placinghimself in the armchair of the landlord and then posing questionto himself — whether in the given facts, substantiated by the

landlord, the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural,real, sincere and honest.

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19. … In our view there are inbuilt protections in the relevantprovisions for the tenants that whenever the landlord wouldapproach the court he would approach when his need is genuineand bona fide. It is, of course, subject to the tenant’s right to rebutit but with strong and cogent evidence. In our view, in theproceeding taken up under Section 13-B by the NRI landlords forthe ejectment of the tenant, the court shall presume that thelandlord’s need pleaded in the petition is genuine and bona fide.But this would not disentitle the tenant from proving that in factand in law the requirement of the landlord is not genuine. heavyburden would lie on the tenant to prove that the requirement ofthe landlord is not genuine. To prove this fact the tenant will becalled upon to give all the necessary facts and particulars supportedby documentary evidence, if available, to support his plea in theaffidavit itself so that the Controller will be in position to adjudicateand decide the question of genuine or bona fide requirement ofthe landlord. mere assertion on the part of the tenant would notbe sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in the landlord’s favourthat his requirement of occupation of the premises is real andgenuine.”18. We further wish to place reliance upon recent decision ofthis Court in Ram Krishan Grover v. Union of India, (2020) 12 SCC506, wherein this Court considered the aforesaid decisions in InderjeetKaur (supra) and Baldev Singh (supra)andinterpreted the burden onthe tenant to be rebutted at the stage of leave to defend and observed:

“39. The requirement of “strong case” for obtaining leave todefend means good case that brings to fore reasonable andwell-grounded basis on which the tenant seeks leave to contestthe eviction proceedings. It does not mean setting up andestablishing at that stage case beyond any scintilla of doubt anddebate. The grounds and pleas raised should reflect clear andstrong defence and relate to the grounds mentioned in para 25in Baldev Singh Bajwa [Baldev Singh Bajwa v. Monish Saini,(2005) 12 SCC 778] . The standard applied is similar to parameters

Aelucidated in Inderjeet Kaur v. Nirpal Singh [(2001) 1 SCC 706],in which this Court had held that the leave to defend should not begranted on mere asking but when the pleas and contentions raisetriable issues and the dispute on facts demands that the matter beproperly adjudicated after ascertaining the truth of affidavits filedby the witnesses in their cross-examination. Each case has to beBdecided on its merits and not on the basis of any preconceivedsuppositions and presumptions. By providing for simplifiedprocedure of eviction by the Non-Resident Indians, Section 13-Bdoes not dilute the rights of tenants. It gives chance to the tenantson merits to establish their case and when justified and necessaryCto take the matter to trial. By no means, therefore, Section 13-Bcan be held to be arbitrary and unreasonable.”

SCOPE OF REVISION

19. We are, in fact, more concerned with the scope and ambit ofthe proviso to Section 25B(8). The proviso creates distinct andDunequivocal embargo by not providing an appeal against the order passedby the learned Rent Controller over an application filed under sub-section(5). The intendment of the legislature is very clear, which is to removethe appellate remedy and thereafter, further second appeal. It is aclear omission that is done by the legislature consciously through aEcovenant removing the right of two stages of appeals.

20. Proviso to Section 25B(8) gives the High Court exclusive powerof revision against an order of the learned Rent Controller, being in thenature of superintendence over an inferior court on the decision makingprocess, inclusive of procedural compliance. Thus, the High Court is notFexpected to substitute and supplant its views with that of the trial Courtby exercising the appellate jurisdiction. Its role is to satisfy itself on theprocess adopted. The scope of interference by the High Court is veryrestrictive and except in cases where there is an error apparent on theface of the record, which would only mean that in the absence of anyadjudication per se, the High Court should not venture to disturb such aGdecision. There is no need for holding roving inquiry in such matterswhich would otherwise amount to converting the power ofsuperintendence into that of regular first appeal, an act, totally forbiddenby the legislature. We do not wish to go further on this settled propositionof law, except by quoting the decision of this Court in Sarla Ahuja v.HUnited India Insurance Co. Ltd., (1998) 8 SCC 119:

“5. Section 25-B of the Act lays down “special procedure for thedisposal of application for eviction on the ground of bona fiderequirement”. Sub-section (1) says that every application forrecovery of possession on the ground specified in Section 14(1)(e)of the Act shall be dealt with in accordance with the procedurespecified in Section 25-B. Sub-section (8) says that no appeal orsecond appeal shall lie against an order for the recovery ofpossession of any premises made by the Rent Controller inaccordance with the procedure specified in this section. Theproviso to that sub-section reads thus:

“Provided that the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfyingitself that an order made by the Controller under this section isaccording to law, call for the records of the case and passsuch order in respect thereto as it thinks fit.”

6. The above proviso indicates that power of the High Court issupervisory in nature and it is intended to ensure that the RentController conforms to law when he passes the order. Thesatisfaction of the High Court when perusing the records of thecase must be confined to the limited sphere that the order of theRent Controller is “according to the law”. In other words, theHigh Court shall scrutinize the records to ascertain whether anyillegality has been committed by the Rent Controller in passingthe order under Section 25-B. It is not permissible for the HighCourt in that exercise to come to different fact finding unlessthe finding arrived at by the Rent Controller on the facts is sounreasonable that no Rent Controller should have reached such afinding on the materials available.

7. Although, the word “revision” is not employed in the proviso toSection 25-B(8) of the Act, it is evident from the language usedtherein that the power conferred is revisional power. In legalparlance, distinction between appellate and revisional jurisdictionis well understood. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction is wide enoughto afford rehearing of the whole case for enabling the appellateforum to arrive at fresh conclusions untrammelled by theconclusions reached in the order challenged before it. Of course,the statute which provides appeal provision can circumscribe orlimit the width of such appellate powers. Revisional power, on thecontrary, is ordinarily power of supervision keeping subordinate

tribunals within the bounds of law. Expansion or constriction ofsuch revisional power would depend upon how the statute hascouched such power therein. In some legislations, revisionaljurisdiction is meant for satisfying itself as to the regularity, legalityor propriety of proceedings or decisions of the subordinate court.In Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar[(1980) 4 SCC 259] this Court considered the scope of the words(“the High Court may call for and examine the records … tosatisfy itself as to the regularity of such proceedings or thecorrectness, legality or propriety of any decision or order …”) bywhich power of revision has been conferred by particular statute.Dealing with the contention that the above words indicatedconferment of very wide power on the revisional authority, thisCourt has observed thus in the said decision: (SCC p. 262, para 3)

“The dominant idea conveyed by the incorporation of the words‘to satisfy itself’ under Section 25 appears to be that the powerconferred on the High Court under Section 25 is essentially apower of superintendence. Therefore, despite the wide languageemployed in Section 25 the High Court quite obviously shouldnot interfere with findings of fact merely because it does notagree with the finding of the subordinate authority.”

8. Dealing with Section 32, the Delhi and Ajmer Rent (Control)Act, 1952, which is almost identically worded as in the proviso toSection 25-B(8) of the Act, three-Judge Bench of this Courthas stated thus in Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury[AIR 1963 SC 698 : 1962 Supp (1) SCR 933] :

“The section is thus framed to confer larger powers than thepower to correct error of jurisdiction to which Section 115 islimited. But it must not be overlooked that the section — inspite of its apparent width of language where it confers poweron the High Court to pass such order as the High Court mightthink fit, — is controlled by the opening words, where it saysthat the High Court may send for the record of the case tosatisfy itself that the decision is ‘according to law’. It stands toreason that if it was considered necessary that there should bea rehearing, right of appeal would be more appropriateremedy, but the Act says that there is to be no further appeal.”

9. In Malini Ayyappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavadas[(1969) 1 SCC 688] another three-Judge Bench of this Court wasconsidering similarly worded proviso in Section 75(1) of theProvincial Insolvency Act, 1920. Though, learned Judges did notgive an exhaustive definition of the expression “according to law”,a catalogue of instance in which the High Court may interfereunder the said proviso was given in the decision as the following[Ed.: The passage quoted is an extract from Beaumont, C.J.’sjudgment in Bell & Co. Ltd. v. Wamen Hemrai, (1938) 40 BomLR 125 which was approved by the Supreme Court in the casecited.]: (SCC p. 691, para 7)

“They are cases in which the Court which made the order hadno jurisdiction or in which the Court has based its decision onevidence which should not have been admitted, or cases wherethe unsuccessful party has not been given proper opportunityof being heard, or the burden of proof has been placed on thewrong shoulders. Wherever the Court comes to the conclusionthat the unsuccessful party has not had proper trial accordingto law, then the Court can interfere.”

10. The Bench has, however, cautioned that the High Court shouldnot interfere merely because it considered that “possibly the Judgewho heard the case may have arrived at conclusion which theHigh Court would not have arrived at”.

11. Learned Single Judge of the High Court in the present casehas reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh to reach adifferent finding as though it was exercising appellate jurisdiction.No doubt even while exercising revisional jurisdiction, reappraisalof evidence can be made, but that should be for the limited purposeto ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-findingcourt is wholly unreasonable. reading of the impugned ordershows that the High Court has overstepped the limit of its poweras revisional court. The order impugned on that score is hencevitiated by jurisdictional deficiency.

12. Clause (e) of the proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act affordsone of the grounds to the landlord to seek recovery of possessionof the building leased. The said clause reads thus:

“14. (1)(e) that the premises let for residential purposes arerequired bona fide by the landlord for occupation as residencefor himself or for any member of his family dependent on him,if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefitthe premises are held and that the landlord or such person hasno other reasonably suitable residential accommodation;

Explanation.—For the purposes of this clause, ‘premises letfor residential purposes’ include any premises which havingbeen let for use as residence are, without the consent of thelandlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes;”

13. If the landlord has another residential accommodation whichis reasonably suitable, he is not permitted to avail himself of thebenefit afforded in the ground set out in the clause. Learned SingleJudge of the High Court has noted that the landlord in this casehas “admitted in her deposition that the house in Calcutta was a3-bedroom house with drawing/dining room and one of thebedrooms was used by her, another by her son with his wife andanother bedroom was kept for her daughter who used to comeand stay”. This was one of the reasons which persuaded the learnedSingle Judge to interfere with the order of eviction. To deprive alandlord of the benefit of the ground mentioned in Section 14(1)(e)on account of availability of alternative residential accommodation,it is not enough that such alternative accommodation is in fardifferent State. Such accommodation must be available in the samecity or town, or at least within reasonable proximity thereof if it isoutside the limits of the city. The said limb of clause (e) cannot beinterpreted as to mean that if the landlord has another houseanywhere in the world, he cannot seek recovery of possession ofhis building under clause (e). The High Court therefore went wrongin observing that since the landlord has possession of another flatat Calcutta she is disentitled to seek recovery of possession of thetenanted premises situated at Delhi.

14. The crux of the ground envisaged in clause (e) of Section14(1) of the Act is that the requirement of the landlord foroccupation of the tenanted premises must be bona fide. When alandlord asserts that he requires his building for his own occupation,the Rent Controller shall not proceed on the presumption that therequirement is not bona fide. When other conditions of the clause

are satisfied and when the landlord shows prima facie case, it isopen to the Rent Controller to draw presumption that therequirement of the landlord is bona fide. It is often said by courtsthat it is not for the tenant to dictate terms to the landlord as tohow else he can adjust himself without getting possession of thetenanted premises. While deciding the question of bona fides ofthe requirement of the landlord, it is quite unnecessary to make anendeavour as to how else the landlord could have adjusted himself.”

21. The aforesaid decision has been recently considered andapproved by this Court in the case of Mohd. Inam v. Sanjay KumarSinghal, (2020) 7 SCC 327:

“22. This Court in Sarla Ahuja v. United India Insurance Co.Ltd. [(1998) 8 SCC 119] had an occasion to consider the scope ofproviso to Section 25-B(8) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958.This Court found, that though the word “revision” was notemployed in the said proviso, from the language used therein, thelegislative intent was clear that the power conferred was revisionalpower. This Court observed thus: (SCC p. 124, para 11)

“11. The learned Single Judge of the High Court in the presentcase has reassessed and reappraised the evidence afresh toreach different finding as though it was exercising appellatejurisdiction. No doubt even while exercising revisionaljurisdiction, reappraisal of evidence can be made, but thatshould be for the limited purpose to ascertain whether theconclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is whollyunreasonable.”

It could thus be seen, that this Court has held, that the High Courtwhile exercising the revisional powers under the Delhi Rent ControlAct, 1958 though could not reassess and reappraise the evidence,as if it was exercising appellate jurisdiction, however, it wasempowered to reappraise the evidence for the limited purpose soas to ascertain whether the conclusion arrived at by the fact-finding court is wholly unreasonable.

23. Again in Ram Narain Arora v. Asha Rani [(1999) 1 SCC 141],this Court had an occasion to consider the aforesaid powers underthe Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958. This Court observed thus: (SCCp. 148, para 12)

“12. It is no doubt true that the scope of revision petitionunder Section 25-B(8) proviso of the Delhi Rent Control Act isa very limited one, but even so in examining the legality orpropriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller, theHigh Court could examine the facts available in order to findout whether he had correctly or on firm legal basis approachedthe matters on record to decide the case. Pure findings of factmay not be open to be interfered with, but (sic if) in givencase, the finding of fact is given on wrong premise of law,certainly it would be open to the Revisional Court to interferewith such matter.”

It was thus held, that though the scope of revisional powers of theHigh Court was very limited one, but even so in examining thelegality or propriety of the proceedings before the Rent Controller,the High Court could examine the facts available in order, to findout whether he had correctly or on firm legal basis approachedthe matters on record to decide the case. It has also been held,that pure findings of fact may not be open to be interfered with,but in given case, if the finding of fact is given on wrongpremise of law, it would be open to the Revisional Court to interferewith the same.”

EON MERITS:

22. Learned Rent Controller passed detailed speaking order.On undertaking such an exercise, he found that the bona fide need issatisfied; the averments of the respondent regarding alternativeaccommodation are vague; the title of the appellant cannot be questioned;Fand the embargo under the Enemy Property Act does not get attracted.Thus, having found that the defense set up by the respondent is only amoonshine, the application filed seeking leave to defend was accordinglyrejected.

23. After completing the aforesaid process, the Court made certainGobservations in addition to the order on merits, giving its indictment onthe conduct of the respondent, who dropped the names of not only aDistrict Judge but also High Court Judge, certainly not germane to thecase.

24. The High Court, while ignoring the aforesaid conduct of therespondent, as noted by the learned Rent Controller, proceeded to allowH

the revision by treating it like an appeal. It did not even reverse thefindings of the learned Rent Controller, but proceeded to hold that thedenials of the appellant in his reply to the application seeking leave todefend are vague, qua the plea of alternative accommodation,notwithstanding the rejection of the contention of the respondent that hecannot question the title. This approach, in our considered view, cannotbe sustained in the eye of law.

25. Section 14(1)(e) deals with only the requirement of bonafide purpose. The contention regarding alternative accommodation canat best be only an incidental one. Such requirement has not been foundto be incorrect by the High Court, though it is not even open to it to do so,in view of the limited jurisdiction which it was supposed to exercise.Therefore, the very basis upon which the revision was allowed is obviouslywrong being contrary to the very provision contained in Section 14(1)(e)and Section 25B(8).26. We have already discussed the scope of Section 14(1)(e) visa vis Section 25B(8) of the Act. Therefore, the mere existence of theother properties which are, in fact, denied by the appellant would notenure to the benefit of the respondent in the absence of any pleadingsand supporting material before the learned Rent Controller to the effectthat they are reasonably suitable for accommodation.

27. The respondent made substantial claims on the judgment ofthis Court in Precision Steel (supra). We do not find the said decisionhelping the case of the respondent, in the light of the discussion made onthe scope of the relevant provisions, as leave to defend cannot be grantedon mere asking. We can only reiterate that we do not find any perversityin the decision rendered by the learned Rent Controller and the HighCourt has not only certainly abdicated its jurisdiction, but also exceededin way.

28. We are constrained to note that the respondent continued todrop the names of persons holding high offices even before us. He proudlyproclaimed during his argument that the proceedings under the EnemyProperty Act, as amended, were initiated only at his instance on hispersonally meeting with an Hon’ble Union Minister. We can only adoptthe process undertaken by the learned Rent Controller by not letting thesaid statement come in the way of deciding the matter on merits, despiteit being unconscionable and shockingly brazen.

A29. Much reliance has been made on the documents indicatingthe re-creation of tenancy right in favour of the respondent by the authorityconstituted under the Amended Act. We do not wish to state anything onthat, nor the said communication would have an impact on our order.Neither the said Authority is before us, nor its existence or viability canbe gone into in these proceedings. The scope of the Enemy PropertyBAct, as amended, vis vis the proceedings for eviction was alreadydealt with by the learned Rent Controller, though not touched upon bythe High Court. Further, the attempt of the respondent to implead himselfin pending case before the High Court of Delhi on challenge made tothe notices passed under the Amended Act got miserably failed with anCobservation by the High Court that it smacked of mala fides. We mayfurther note, notwithstanding the earlier conclusion by way of reportdated 04.11.2015 wherein the Assistant Custodian of Enemy Propertyunder the Enemy Property Act has observed that the predecessors ofthe appellant are non-evacuees and that the properties owned by themby no stretch of imagination can be termed as enemy property, there isDanother action initiated on which we don’t wish to express any view.The decision of the High Court rejecting the respondent’s impleadmentwas not only confirmed by the dismissal of the intra-court appeal, butalso that of the rejection of the special leave petition by this Court. Onfact, the proceedings initiated under the Enemy Property Act, as amended,

Eare also stayed by the High Court having considered the report dated04.11.2015, by reasoned order.

30. On the aforesaid analysis, we have no hesitation in settingaside the order of the High Court by restoring the order passed by thelearned Rent Controller. The appeal stands allowed. No costs.

Devika Gujral

Appeal allowed.