SIDRAM versus THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR.

[2022] 8 S.C.R. 403

SIDRAM

THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIA INSURANCECO. LTD. AND ANR.

(Civil Appeal No. 8510 of 2022)

NOVEMBER 16, 2022

[SURYA KANT AND J. B. PARDIWALA, JJ.]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: Compensation – Enhancement of– Motor Accidents Claim – Claimant, aged 19 years sufferedgrievous injuries in road accident – Claimant suffered fromparaplegia due to the accident which caused permanent disabilityto the extent of 45% – Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs.6,13,000/- along with interest at the rate of 6% p.a. from the date offiling of the petition till the date of realisation of payment – However,the High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 9,26,800/- – Onappeal, held: Courts should be mindful that serious injury notonly permanently imposes physical limitations and disabilities butoften inflicts deep mental and emotional scars upon the victim – Onfacts,oral evidence of the doctor that the claimant sufferedpermanent disability to the tune of 45% – Evidence on recordindicate that the claimant suffered paraplegia due to the accident,which is form of paralysis of lower body and it restricts everydayroutine more particularly the physical activity – Paraplegia impairsphysical, mental and psychological health and had devastatingimpact on the social and financial well being of the victim – It leadsto 100% loss of earning – Claimant’s business could be said tohave been gravely impacted – In view thereof, the compensationenhanced from Rs. 9,26,800/- to Rs 21,78,600/-.

Compensation: Just Compensation – Explanation of – Held:‘Just compensation’ should include all elements that would go toplace the victim in as near position as she or he was in, before theoccurrence of the accident – No amount of money or other materialcompensation can erase the trauma, pain and suffering that victimundergoes after serious accident – Monetary compensation is themanner known to law, whereby society assures some measure ofrestitution to those who survive and the victims who have to facetheir lives.

DEF

AAllowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 The process of determining the compensationby the court is essentially very difficult task and can never bean exact science. Perfect compensation is hardly possible, moreso in claims of injury and disability. The principle consistentlyBfollowed by this Court in assessing motor vehicle compensationclaims, is to place the victim in as near position as she or hewas in before the accident, with other compensatory directionsfor loss of amenities and other payments. [Para 29, 30][420-H;421-A-C]

C1.2 It is now well settled position of law that even in casesof permanent disablement incurred as result of motor-accident,the claimant can seek, apart from compensation for future loss ofincome, amounts for future prospects as well. There are manyorders of different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by differentHigh Courts, taking the view that the claimant is not entitled toDcompensation for future prospects in accident cases involvingserious injuries resulting in permanent disablement. That is nota correct position of law. There is no justification to exclude thepossibility of compensation for future prospects in accident casesinvolving serious injuries resulting in permanent disablement.ESuch narrow reading is illogical because it denies altogetherthe possibility of the living victim progressing further in life inaccident cases - and admits such possibility of future prospects,in case of the victim’s death. [Para 31][421-C-E]1.3 ‘‘Just compensation” should include all elements thatFwould go to place the victim in as near position as she or he wasin, before the occurrence of the accident. Whilst no amount ofmoney or other material compensation can erase the trauma, painand suffering that victim undergoes after serious accident,(or replace the loss of loved one), monetary compensation isthe manner known to law, whereby society assures some measureGof restitution to those who survive, and the victims who have toface their lives. Making monetary assessment of the injurysuffered is the only process devised to compensate the victim.The process of making such an assessment, whether in case ofdeath or injury, is provided in Section 168 of the Motor VehiclesH

Act which requires that the tribunals constituted under the Actdetermine compensation, which appears to be ‘just’. Thus, theAct vests wide discretion upon the tribunals. [Para 32, 38][421-F-G; 430-A-B]

1.4 Courts should be mindful that serious injury not onlypermanently imposes physical limitations and disabilities but toooften inflicts deep mental and emotional scars upon the victim.The attendant trauma of the victim’s having to live in worldentirely different from the one she or he is born into, as an invalid,and with degrees of dependence on others, robbed of completepersonal choice or autonomy, should forever be in the judge’smind, whenever tasked to adjudge compensation claims. Severelimitations inflicted due to such injuries undermine the dignity(which is now recognized as an intrinsic component of the rightto life under Article 21) of the individual, thus depriving the personof the essence of the right to wholesome life which she or hehad lived, hitherto. From the world of the able bodied, the victimis thrust into the world of the disabled, itself most discomfitingand unsettling. If courts nit-pick and award niggardly amountsoblivious of these circumstances, there is resultant affront to theinjured victim. [Para 113][473-E-G]

2.1 The courts must apply the multiplier method, whileascertaining the compensation to be awarded to the victim. [Para53][453-G]

2.2 The evidence on record indicates that the appellantsuffered paraplegia due to the accident. Paraplegia is form ofparalysis of lower body. It restricts everyday routine moreparticularly the physical activity and leads to (i) deprivation ofsimple pleasures and amenities of life, (ii) 100% loss of earningcapacity, (iii) long term secondary complications requiringcontinuous care, medical treatment and hospitalization, (iv) feelingof helplessness, depression, anger, stress, anxiety, etc. In short,paraplegia impairs physical, mental and psychological health andhas devastating impact on the social and financial well being ofthe victim. In the case on hand, the appellant was in the businessof selling utensils and used to travel to various villages to sellthe same. With this disability in the form of paraplegia being

Asuffered by the appellant, it is not possible for him now to walk along distance or stand for long period. His business could besaid to have been gravely impacted. Further, the appellant at thetime of accident was just 19 years old. The High Court enhancedhis notional income from Rs. 5,000/- to Rs. 7,000/- per month.The appellant claimed that his notional income be determined atBRs. 9,000/-.Thus, more particularly keeping in mind the dictumof this Court in the case of Kirti’s case that it is not necessary toadduce any documentary evidence to prove the notional incomeof the victim and the Court can award the same even in theabsence of any documentary evidence. The Court should ensureCwhile choosing the method and fixing the notional income thatthe same is just in the facts and circumstances of the particularcase, neither assessing the compensation too conservatively, nortoo liberally. Thus, the notional income of the appellant isdetermined at Rs. 8,000/- per month. The same would result inthe compensation being enhanced as under: 8000 x 12 x 18 xD45% = INR 7,77,600/- [Para 56, 57, 59, 60][455-C-E; 456-A-C]2.3 Compensation under the head loss of earning for 6months was awarded by the tribunal and the High Court. Thetribunal awarded only Rs. 40,000/- under this head. The HighCourt enhanced it to Rs. 42,000/-. The payment towards loss ofEearning for six months as awarded by the High Court is upheldand applying the revised income, enhance the same as under:8000 x 6 = INR 48,000/- [Para 61, 62][456-D-E]

2.4 The appellant claims Rs. 2,00,000/- towards medicalexpenses. In this regard, the appellant adduced documentaryFevidence in the form of medical bills/receipts to the tune ofRs.1,54,931/-, as stated in the order of the tribunal. Thecompensation of Rs. 1,55,000/- is granted towards medicalexpenses. [Para 63, 66][456-F; 457-B]

2.5 The “Future Medical Expenses” and “AttendantGCharges” would fall within the ambit of Pecuniary Expenses. Thetribunal observed that the doctor has deposed that the appellantis likely to incur expenses of Rs. 2,50,000/- towards future medicalexpenses. However, according to the Tribunal, there was no

sufficient and cogent evidence in that regard under this head.Accordingly, the tribunal awarded Rs. 25,000/-. The High Courtthought fit not to award any amount for future medical expensesas there was no evidence adduced by the appellant in regard tofuture treatment that may be required. The High Court however,thought fit to clarify that in the event if the appellant incurs anyexpenses towards any surgery or treatment in future on accountof the injury suffered and if he proves the same, then the insurershall indemnify the same. PW-2-doctor deposed categorically thatthe appellant would require future medical expenses to the tuneof Rs. 2,50,000/-. Having regard to the evidence on record thatthe appellant would be incurring costs towards medical expensesin future along with physiotherapy and nursing and consideringthat the appellant at the time of accident was 19 years old, todayhis age would be around 29 years, even if bare minimum ofRs. 1000/- is spent per month, then it comes to:1000 x 12 x 18 =Rs. 2,16,000/- . Rs. 2,16,000/- is awarded towards future medicalexpenses. [Para 67-69, 72][457-C; 457-F-H; 458-A-B; 459-C]

2.6 Under the head attendant charges, neither the tribunalnor the High Court thought fit to award anything. The evidenceon record indicates that the appellant is unable to stand, walk, sitor bend his body or lift anything heavy. It is not in dispute thatthe appellant will not be able to work in the same manner as heused to prior to the accident. Indisputably, the appellant hassuffered from paraplegia on account of the accident and requiresan attendant throughout the day. According to the claimant, thecost of keeping the attendant would be Rs. 4,500/- per month. Itis fixed at Rs. 2,000/- per month. An amount of Rs. 4,32,000/- isawarded towards the attendant charges. [Para 73, 76][459-D-E;462-H]2.7 The accident took place on 18.07.2012. The appellantis pursuing this litigation for the past almost 10 years. The SLPbefore this Court was filed in 2018. It has been four years sincethen. An amount of Rs. 50,000/- is awarded towards litigationexpenses. [Para 78, 82][463-B; 465-D]

2.8 For loss of conveyance and special diet, the appellantis granted up to Rs 50,000/- considering that after the accident at

AKulgod-Gokak Road, the appellant was shifted to LakeviewHospital Belgaum wherein he was admitted as an indoor patientfrom 18.7.2012 to 6.8.2012 for 19 days, and took treatment forthe injuries suffered by him, and continued to take the treatmentafter getting discharged from the hospital as well. Thus,Rs. 50,000/- is awarded towards loss of conveyance and specialBdiet. [Para 89, 90][467-C-E]

2.9 Pain and suffering would be categorized as non-pecuniary loss as it is incapable of being arithmetically calculated.Therefore, when compensation is to be awarded for pain andsuffering, special circumstances of the claimant have to be takenCinto account including the victim’s age, the unusual deprivationthe victim has suffered, the effect thereof on his or her futurelife. Considering that the appellant was only 19 years at the timeof the accident and suffered permanent disability of 45%, heought to be awarded compensation under this head. An amountDof Rs. 1,00,000/- is awarded towards pain and suffering. [Para 93,96, 98][468-D; 469-F; 469-H]

2.10 sum of Rs. 3,00,000/- is awarded towards loss ofmarriage prospects. [Para 103][470-G]

2.11 An amount of Rs. 50,000/- is awarded for the loss ofEamenities taking into consideration the fact that the appellantwas 19 years old at the time of the accident, and also consideringthe nature of injuries suffered by him and the extent of hisdisability. [Para 111][472-H; 473-A]

2.12 The total compensation awarded under different heads-Floss of earning due to disability, loss of earning for 6 months,medical expenses, future medical expenses, attendant Charges,litigation charges, loss of conveyance, pain and suffering, marriageprospects and loss of amenities is 21,78,600/- [Para 112][473-B-D]

2.13 The respondent No. 1-insurance company is directedto pay the appellant-claimant the difference in the compensationawarded as against the amount of Rs. 9,26,800/- as awarded bythe High Court. The amount awarded by this Court would bedeposited by the respondent No. 1-insurance company within the

stipulated period after adjusting the amount already deposited.The rate of interest at the enhanced amount is to be the samei.e., 6% per annum. [Para 114][473-H; 474-A-B]

Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Company Limited(2011) 10 SCC 683; Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumarand Others AIR 2020 SCC 4424 : [2020] SCR 968;Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others v. Delhi TransportCorporation and Another (2009) 6 SCC 121 : [2009] 5SCR 1098; Kirti and Another v. Oriental InsuranceCompany Limited (2021) 2 SCC 166 – relied on.

Master Ayush v. Branch Manager, Reliance GeneralInsurance Company Limited and Another (2022) 7 SCC738; R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) Pvt. Ltd.and Others (1995) 1 SCC 551 : [1995] 1 SCR 75; RajKumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another (2011) 1 SCC 343 :[2010] 13 SCR 179; Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh andOthers (2003) 2 SCC 274 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 499;Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limitedand Others (2012) 6 SCC 421 : [2012] 3 SCR 1178;Jagdish v. Mohan and Others (2018) 4 SCC 571 :[2018] 3 SCR 20; Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others(2020) 4 SCC 413 : [2020] 3 SCR 622; DivisionalController, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty and Another(2003) 7 SCC 197 : [2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 14; Anthonyalias Anthony Swamy v. Managing Director, KarnatakaState Road Transport Corporation (2020) 7 SCC 161 :[2020] 5 SCR 860; Syed Sadiq and Others v. DivisionalManager, United India Insurance Company Limited(2014) 2 SCC 735; New India Assurance Company Ltd.v. Amit Kumar Yadav and Another F.A.O. Nos. 1285 &1489 of 2008 decided on March 23, 2022; SanjayKumar v. Ashok Kumar and Another (2014) 5 SCC 330;Ramesh v. Karan Singh & Anr. Civil Appeal No. 6365of 2022 dated September 16, 2022; Arvind KumarMishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited andAnother (2010) 10 SCC 254 : [2010] 11 SCR 857;National Insurance Company Limited v. Pranay Sethi

Aand Others (2017) 16 SCC 680 : [2017] 13 SCR 100;Helen C. Rebello (Mrs.) and Others v. MaharashtraState Road Transport Corporation and Another (1999)1 SCC 90 : [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 684; Laxman aliasLaxman Mourya v. Divisional Manager, OrientalInsurance Company Limited and Another (2011) 10BSCC 756; Anant son of Sidheshwar Dukre v. Pratapson of Zhamnnappa Lamzane and Another Civil AppealNo. 8420 of 2018 dated August 21, 2022; ParminderSingh v. New India Assurance Company Limited andOthers (2019) 7 SCC 217 : [2019] 8 SCR 986;CNeerupam Mohan Mathur v. New India AssuranceCompany (2013) 14 SCC 15 : [2013] 8 SCR 15;Nagarajappa v. Divisional Manager, Oriental InsuranceCompany Limited (2011) 13 SCC 323 : [2011] 6 SCR70; Mohan Soni v. Ram Avtar Tomar and Others (2012)2 SCC 267 : [2012] 2 SCR 921; Sandeep Khanuja v.DAtul Dande and Another (2017) 3 SCC 351; KeralaSRTC v. Susamma Thomas (1994) 2 SCC 176;Abhimanyu Partap Singh v. Namita Sekhon and Another(2022) 8 SCC 489; Sanjay Verma v. Haryana Roadways(2014) 3 SCC 210 : [2014] 1 SCR 924; New IndiaEAssurance Company Limited v. Gopali and Others(2012) 12 SCC 198 : [2012] 6 SCR 834; Nizam’sInstitute of Medical Sciences v. Prasanth S. Dhanankaand Others (2009) 6 SCC 1 : [2009] 9 SCR 313;Vijaykumar Babulal Modi v. State of Gujarat (Deleted)& Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation 2011 SCCFOnLine Guj 7349; Virendra Kumar v. Vijay Kumar andOthers (2021) ILR 3 All 272; Ibrahim v. Raju andOthers (2011) 10 SCC 634 – referred to.

H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard 1958-65 ACJ 504 (HL,England) – referred to.

Case Law Reference

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR.

(2011) 10 SCC 683[2010] 11 SCR 857[2010] 13 SCR 179[2017] 13 SCR 100[1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 684[2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 499(2011) 10 SCC 756[2012] 3 SCR 1178[2018] 3 SCR 20[2019] 8 SCR 986[2020] 3 SCR 622[2013] 8 SCR 15[2003] 2 Suppl. SCR 14[2020] 5 SCR 860[2011] 6 SCR 70(2014) 2 SCC 735[2012] 2 SCR 921(2017) 3 SCC 351[2009] 5 SCR 1098(1994) 2 SCC 176(2021) 2 SCC 166(2022) 8 SCC 489[2014] 1 SCR 924[2012] 6 SCR 834[2009] 9 SCR 313(2011) 10 SCC 634[2020] SCR 968

ACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 8510of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 25.04.2018 of the High Courtof Karnataka at Dharwad Bench in MFA No.100867/2014 (MV).

Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, Dharm Singh for M/s Nuli & Nuli, Advs.Bfor the Appellant.

Maibam Nabaghanashyam Singh, Shakti K. Pattanaik, SanjeevVerma, Advs. for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

CJ. B. PARDIWALA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been filed against the impugned final judgmentand order dated 25[th] of April, 2018 passed by the High Court of Karnataka(Dharwad Bench) in “Shri Sidram S/o Raju Bhosale v. Shri SidduDMahadev Bhosale & Anr.” urging various legal grounds and contentionsfor further enhancement of compensation in the case of motor accidentinvolving the appellant-claimant herein whereby the High Court enhancedthe compensation awarded by the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal,Belgaum (for short, ‘Tribunal’) by Rs. 3,13,800/- to total of Rs. 9,26,800/E-. The Tribunal had awarded compensation of Rs. 6,13,000/- under thevarious heads along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from thedate of filing of the petition till the date of realisation of payment.

3. The briefs facts of the case are given hereinunder. The appellant-claimant suffered grievous injuries in road accident that occurred onF18.07.2012, while he was walking on the left side of the Kulgod-Gokakroad. While the claimant was near the Laxmeshwar crossing, goodsvehicle bearing registration No. KA-23/9426, being driven in rash andnegligent manner banged into the appellant- claimant. The appellant-claimant was shifted to hospital and was treated as an indoor patientfrom 18.07.2012 till 06.08.2012. On account of the accident, the appellant-Gclaimant suffered permanent disability to the extent of 45%. Theappellant-claimant suffered from paraplegia due to the accident. Theappellant- claimant was in the business of selling utensils in differentvillages of the district.

4. The appellant-claimant filed claim petition before the FirstHAdditional Senior Civil Division Judge & MACT, Belgaum at Belgaum

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

which was registered as the M.V.C. No. 1786 of 2012. Before theTribunal, the appellant- claimant examined himself (PW-1) and alsoexamined Dr. Anil B. Patil as PW2 in respect of his claim and variousother documents were taken on record as evidence.

5. The Tribunal held that the accident took place due to the rashand negligent driving of the offending vehicle as result of which, theappellant sustained injuries and was awarded pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary damages. The Tribunal held that the appellant was entitled tothe compensation as under:

6. Aggrieved by the order of the Tribunal, the appellant filed anappeal in the High Court praying for enhancement of the compensationon the ground that the Tribunal ought to have awarded enhancedcompensation on the basis of the evidence adduced. The contentions ofthe appellant will be taken up in detail at later stage.

7. The High Court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 9,26,800/-.The High Court in its impugned order held:

“9. The Tribunal has taken the income of the claimant atRs. 5,000/- which is on the lower sipe. The accident is of theyear 2012 and the notional income of the claimant could betaken at Rs.7,000/- per month considering the nature ofbusiness carried on by him.

10. Thus, the claimant would be entitled to compensation underthe head of loss of future earning as follows: Rs.7,000/- x 12x 18 x 40% = Rs.6,04,800/.

A11. The compensation awarded under the head of pain andsuffering, medical expenses, conveyance, special diet, etc.,loss of amenities in life and marriage prospects is just andproper and same is not disturbed. The claimant who sufferedgrievous injury would have suffered loss of earning duringthe laid up. The compensation awarded under the head ofBpain and suffering, medical expenses, conveyance, specialdiet, etc., loss of amenities in life and marriage prospects isjust and proper and same is not disturbed. The claimant whosuffered grievous injury would have suffered loss of earningduring the laid up period for minimum period of six months.CTherefore, he is entitled for sum of Rs.42,000/- (Rs. 7,000 x6). The claimant would be further entitled to litigationexpenses of Rs.20,000/-.

12. With regard to future medical expenses, the claimant hasnot stated as to the nature of future treatment required. Hence,Dhe would not be entitled for any compensation on the head offuture medical expenses. However, it is made clear that if atall the claimant incurs any expenses towards any surgery ortreatment on account of the injury suffering in the presentmotor accident and if he proves the same before the insurer,the insurer shall indemnify the same.

13. Accordingly, the claimant is entitled for totalcompensation of Rs.9,26,800/- as against Rs.6,13,000/-awarded by the Tribunal.

14. Thus, the claimant shall be entitled to total compensationFunder the following heads:

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

7.Marriage prospectsRs. 20,000/-8.Litigation expensesRs. 20,000/- TotalRs. 9,26,800/-

Accordingly, there would be an enhanced compensationof Rs. 3,13,800/-, which shall carry interest at the rate of 6%per annum from the date of petition till date of realization.”

8. Not satisfied with the compensation awarded by the High Court,the appellant has appealed to this Court urging various contentions insupport of further enhancement of the compensation.

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT

9. Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, the learned counsel appearing forthe appellant, filed his submissions in writing. The submissions are asunder:

10. The accident had occurred on 18.07.2012 when the appellant-claimant was walking on the left side of the Kulgod-Gokak Road,Karnataka when goods vehicle bearing No. KA-23/9426 dashed againstthe appellant-claimant, whilst being driven in rash and negligent manner.In lieu of the same, the appellant-claimant sustained grievous injuries.The appellant-claimant was admitted to Lake View Hospital from18.07.2012 to 06.08.2012 and was an indoor patient for 19 days. Anamount of Rs.2,00,000/- had been spent towards his medical expenses.It was observed that there was permanent physical disability of 45%of the whole body as certified by the doctor and further was functionaldisability of 100% as the appellant-claimant is unable to continue withhis vocation and unable to find any work in lieu of the accident.11. It is submitted that the appellant-claimant was hale, healthyand aged only 19 years at the time of the accident. The appellant-claimantbeing aggrieved, had sought compensation to the tune ofRs. 25,00,000/- by filing MYC No.1786/20 12 before the Tribunal. TheTribunal had awarded meagre sum of Rs.6,13,000/- along with interestat 6%. Being aggrieved, the appellant-claimant had proceeded to fileM.F.A. No.100867/2014 (MV) before the High Court of Karnataka(Dharwad Bench). The High Court vide its impugned order has onlymarginally increased the compensation payable to the appellant-claimantfrom Rs.6,13,000/- to Rs.9,26,800/-. The High Court had considered theincome of the appellant-claimant to be only Rs. 7,000/- as against Rs.

A9,000/- which the appellant-claimant was earning through his utensilbusiness. The physical disability had only been taken as 40% as against45% as opined by the Doctor. The table showing the heads awarded ascompensation by the High Court and the Tribunal to the appellant-claimantis as follows:

12. It is submitted that both the Tribunal as well as the High Courthave failed to correctly provide/grant compensation under the head “futureprospects” as mandated by this Court by only taking the salary of theFappellant-claimant to be Rs. 7,000/- and not Rs. 9,000/-. It is submittedthat it had been specifically stated by Dr. Anil B. Patil (PW-2) that theappellant would require future medical expenses to the tune of Rs.2,50,000/-. However, the Tribunal awarded only sum of Rs. 25,000/-towards future medical expenses as against Rs. 2,50,000/- as stated byPW-2. The High Court has not considered the same at all.G

13. It is submitted that with regard to conveyance, it ought to beappreciated that the accident occurred on the Kulgod-Gokak Highwayand the appellant was subsequently transferred to Belgaum for treatment.Therefore, compensation under the head of conveyance ought to begranted on the higher side as the appellant was completely disabled andH

must have received help from family members or friends to get admittedat the hospital and back and forth which has also been observed inMaster Ayush v. Branch Manager, Reliance General InsuranceCompany Limited and Another, (2022) 7 SCC 738. Therefore, it wouldbe reasonable to award conveyance charges of Rs.50,000/-.

14. It is submitted that this Court in Sanjay Kumar v. AshokKumar and Another, (2014) 5 SCC 330, was pleased to awardcompensation to the tune of Rs.75,000/- for loss of marriage prospectswherein the claimant was earning only sum of Rs.3,500/- per month.Therefore, it would be reasonable to award compensation to the tune ofRs. 1,00,000/- for loss of marriage prospects to the appellant-claimant inthe present matter.

15. The appellant suffers from paraplegia because of the accidentand requires an attendant throughout the day and hence, Attendantcharges of Rs.4,500/- per month ought to be awarded to the appellant,which has not been considered by the Tribunal as well as the High Court.The appellant is unable to stand, walk or sit and is unable to bend hisbody or lift any weights. It is pertinent to point out herein that the appellantas consequence of his grievous injuries will not be able to work in thesame manner as he used to prior to the accident and therefore, functionaldisability of the appellant ought to be considered as 100%.16. It is further submitted that the appellant had been operatedupon twice and has undergone great deal of pain and suffering in lieuof the accident and has had to give up his vocation as consequence ofthe grievous nature of the injuries sustained. This Court in Ramesh v.Karan Singh & Anr. in Civil Appeal No. 6365 of 2022 dated September16, 2022 was pleased to grant compensation to the tune of Rs. 4,00,000/- after taking notice of the grievous nature of the injuries sustained bythe Claimant in the said matter and taking into consideration that he hadbeen operated upon 5 times. In light of the same, it would be reasonableto award compensation of Rs. 1,00,000/- to the appellant under the headof pain and suffering.

17. It is submitted that this Court in R.D. Hattangadi v. PestControl (India) Pvt. Ltd. and Others, (1995) 1 SCC 551, (Para-9) hadcategorically stated that in injury cases, compensation ought to beassessed as Pecuniary Damages i.e the costs incurred by the claimantfor the injury and Special Damages which includes damages for mental

Aand physical shock, loss of amenities, loss of expectation of life andinconvenience. It may be observed that cumulatively, only meagresum of Rs. 90,000/- has been awarded to the appellant for the same. Itought to be appreciated that the appellant would not be able to marry asa consequence of the accident and is forced to live with the pain andsuffering throughout his life as he would require an attendant to care forBhim as well. It may be observed that it has been specifically stated thatthe appellant is unable to squat or sit cross legged and unable to standand walk as well as per the disability certificate. Keeping in mind thesame, it would be reasonable to award compensation of Rs.50,000/-each to the appellant-claimant under the non-pecuniary heads of loss ofCamenities. It is submitted that with regards to litigation expenses, theappellant has contested the matter right from the point of the Tribunalupto this Court, in light of the same, it would be reasonable to awardlitigation expenses of Rs.50,000/- to the appellant.

18. It is submitted that this Court in Govind Yadav v. New IndiaDInsurance Company Limited, (2011) 10 SCC 683, Arvind KumarMishra v. New India Assurance Company Limited and Another,(2010) 10 SCC 254, and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar and Another,(2011) 1 SCC 343, has categorically held that adequate compensationought to be awarded not only for the physical injury and treatment, butalso for the loss of earning and his inability to lead normal life andEenjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyed but for the disability causeddue to the accident.

19. It is pertinent to point out herein that the appellant would beentitled to fair and just compensation in order to place the appellant insuch position as close to how the appellant was living prior to theFaccident as held by this Court in National Insurance Company Limitedv. Pranay Sethi and Others, (2017) 16 SCC 680, (Para-55) and in RajKumar v. Ajay Kumar (supra)(Para-5). This Court has also held inHelen C. Rebello (Mrs.) and Others v. Maharashtra State RoadTransport Corporation and Another, (1999) 1 SCC 90 (Para-36), thatGthe Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short, ‘the Act’) is beneficial pieceof legislation and hence the object of the Courts ought to be to assist theinjured/deceased person.

20. It is pertinent to point out herein that the claim of the appellant-claimant before the Tribunal was only Rs. 25,00,000/-. However, it isHsubmitted that this Court in Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh and Others,

(2003) 2 SCC 274, and in Laxman alias Laxman Mourya v. DivisionalManager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Another, (2011)10 SCC 756, had categorically stated that there is no restriction that theTribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimamount.

21. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the learned counsel prayedthat there being merit in his appeal, the same may be allowed and theamount of compensation may be enhanced accordingly.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTNO. 1-INSURANCE COMPANY

22. Mr. Maibam Nabaghanashyam Singh, the learned counselappearing for the insurance company has also submitted his submissionsin writing. The same are as under:

23. It is submitted that the present petition is filed by the petitionerchallenging the impugned order whereby the High Court had allowedthe appeal filed by the petitioner and enhanced the compensation fromRs. 6,13,000/- to Rs. 9,26,800/-. The petitioner by filing the present petitionis seeking further enhancement of the award. It is submitted that theHigh Court after considering the evidence on record and also afterconsidering the MACT award had rightly enhanced the award as claimedby the petitioner as such there is no scope for any further enhancementof the amount in the present petition.

24. It is submitted that the High Court has rightly appreciated theevidence and has taken 40% disability for whole body after consideringthe nature of injury suffered and the evidence of treating doctor, whichis 10% more than what has been considered by the Tribunal. The HighCourt has rightly assessed the future earning as per the law laid downby this Court in Anant son of Sidheshwar Dukre v. Pratap son ofZhamnnappa Lamzane and Another in Civil Appeal No. 8420 of 2018dated August 21, 2022. The calculation of loss of future earning wherethe claimant suffers permanent disability as result of injuries has beendealt in the aforementioned judgment in para no. 7.2. Therefore, underthis head there is no scope of enhancement as claimed in the presentpetition.

25. It is submitted that the appellant has wrongly claimedenhancement of the compensation towards the loss of future earningsduring the laid-up period. In fact, the High Court has awarded for loss of

Aearning during the laid-up period for six months. Whereas as per the lawlaid down by this Court in Anant v. Pratap (supra), this Court has heldthat the claimant cannot succeed in the claim of actual loss of income. Itwas observed by this Court in para No. 7.3 that “The grant of loss offuture income compensates for any further period of time whereincome was lost. Actual loss of income can be awarded for the monthBin which accident took place.” In fact, the High Court had ratherawarded on the higher side under this head i.e. for actual loss income,which ought to be have been awarded only for the month in whichaccident took place.

26. It is submitted that the appellant therein without any evidenceCon record is allegedly claiming that the claimant had 100% disability. It ispertinent to submit here that the appellant had miserably failed to produceany document before the Tribunal, the High Court or even in this Courtto show that the claimant had 100% disability. The only document reliedupon by appellant as regards to the disability of the claimant is the disabilityDcertificate which shows that total permanent physical disability of 45%to whole body. No document filed by the appellant is showing that theclaimant has 100% disability. Therefore, the contention made by theappellant for enhancement of the compensation on the ground of disabilityof 100% is nothing but desire of the claimant to gain sympathy of thisCourt to grant further amount as enhancement of the award. TheEapproach of the appellant is unhealthy and will set bad precedent ifsuch pleas are accepted by this Court. In view of the same the presentappeal is liable to be dismissed being devoid of merits.27. Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the learned counsel appearingfor the insurance company prays that there being no merit in the appealFfiled by the original claimant, the same may be dismissed.

ANALYSIS

28. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the partiesand having gone through the materials on record, the only question thatGfalls for our consideration is whether the appellant-claimant has madeout any case for further enhancement of the amount of compensation.

POSITION OF LAW

29. The process of determining the compensation by the court isessentially very difficult task and can never be an exact science. PerfectH

compensation is hardly possible, more so in claims of injury and disability.As rightly pointed out in H. West & Son Ltd. v. Shephard, 1958-65ACJ 504 (HL, England):

“…money cannot renew physical frame that has beenbattered.”

30. The principle consistently followed by this court in assessingmotor vehicle compensation claims, is to place the victim in as near aposition as she or he was in before the accident, with other compensatorydirections for loss of amenities and other payments. These generalprinciples have been stated and reiterated in several decisions.[Govind Yadav v. New India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683.]

31. It is now well settled position of law that even in cases ofpermanent disablement incurred as result of motor-accident, theclaimant can seek, apart from compensation for future loss of income,amounts for future prospects as well. We have come across many ordersof different tribunals and unfortunately affirmed by different High Courts,taking the view that the claimant is not entitled to compensation forfuture prospects in accident cases involving serious injuries resulting inpermanent disablement. That is not correct position of law. There is nojustification to exclude the possibility of compensation for future prospectsin accident cases involving serious injuries resulting in permanentdisablement. Such narrow reading is illogical because it deniesaltogether the possibility of the living victim progressing further in life inaccident cases – and admits such possibility of future prospects, in caseof the victim’s death.

32. This Court has emphasised time and again that “justcompensation” should include all elements that would go to place thevictim in as near position as she or he was in, before the occurrence ofthe accident. Whilst no amount of money or other material compensationcan erase the trauma, pain and suffering that victim undergoes after aserious accident, (or replace the loss of loved one), monetarycompensation is the manner known to law, whereby society assuressome measure of restitution to those who survive, and the victims whohave to face their lives.

33. In Santosh Devi v. National Insurance Company Limitedand Others, (2012) 6 SCC 421, this Court held that:

“14. We find it extremely difficult to fathom any rationale forthe observation made in paragraph 24 of the judgment in SarlaVerma case [Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] thatwhere the deceased was self-employed or was on fixed salarywithout provision for annual increment, etc., the Courts willusually take only the actual income at the time of death and adeparture from this rule should be made only in rare andexceptional cases involving special circumstances. In ourview, it will be nave to say that the wages or total emoluments/income of person who is self-employed or who is employedon fixed salary without provision for annual increment, etc.,would remain the same throughout his life.

15. The rise in the cost of living affects everyone across theboard. It does not make any distinction between rich and poor.As matter of fact, the effect of rise in prices which directlyimpacts the cost of living is minimal on the rich and maximumon those who are self-employed or who get fixed income/emoluments. They are the worst affected people. Therefore,they put in extra efforts to generate additional incomenecessary for sustaining their families.

16. The salaries of those employed under the Central andEState Governments and their agencies/instrumentalities havebeen revised from time to time to provide cushion againstthe rising prices and provisions have been made for providingsecurity to the families of the deceased employees. The salariesof those employed in private sectors have also increasedmanifold. Till about two decades ago, nobody could haveFimagined that salary of Class IV employee of the Governmentwould be in five figures and total emoluments of those in higherechelons of service will cross the figure of rupees one lakh.

17. Although the wages/income of those employed inunorganised sectors has not registered correspondingincrease and has not kept pace with the increase in the salariesof the government employees and those employed in privatesectors, but it cannot be denied that there has beenincremental enhancement in the income of those who are self-employed and even those engaged on daily basis, monthlybasis or even seasonal basis. We can take judicial notice of

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

the fact that with view to meet the challenges posed by highcost of living, the persons falling in the latter categoryperiodically increase the cost of their labour. In this context,it may be useful to give an example of tailor who earns hislivelihood by stitching cloths. If the cost of living increasesand the prices of essentials go up, it is but natural for him toincrease the cost of his labour. So will be the cases of ordinaryskilled and unskilled labour, like, barber, blacksmith, cobbler,mason etc.

18. Therefore, we do not think that while making theobservations in the last three lines of para 24 of Sarla Verma[Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121] judgment, the Courthad intended to lay down an absolute rule that there will beno addition in the income of person who is self-employedor who is paid fixed wages. Rather, it would be reasonable tosay that person who is self-employed or is engaged on fixedwages will also get 30% increase in his total income over aperiod of time and if he/she becomes the victim of an accidentthen the same formula deserves to be applied for calculatingthe amount of compensation.”

34. In Jagdish v. Mohan and Others, (2018) 4 SCC 571, thevictim, carpenter, suffered permanent disablement, and his claim forcompensation including for loss of future prospects was considered by athree-Judge Bench which included, incidentally, the judges who haddecided National Insurance Company (supra). This Court held that:

“13. In the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Pranay Sethi[National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC680], this Court has held that the benefit of future prospectsshould not be confined only to those who have permanentjob and would extend to self-employed individuals. In thecase of self-employed person, an addition of 40% of theestablished income should be made where the age of the victimat the time of the accident was below 40 years. Hence, in thepresent case, the appellant would be entitled to anenhancement of Rs. 2400 towards loss of future prospects.

14. In making the computation in the present case, the courtmust be mindful of the fact that the appellant has suffered

serious disability in which he has suffered loss of the use ofboth his hands. For person engaged in manual activities, itrequires no stretch of imagination to understand that lossof hands is complete deprivation of the ability to earn.Nothing—at least in the facts of this case—can restore losthands. But the measure of compensation must reflect genuineattempt of the law to restore the dignity of the being. Ouryardsticks of compensation should not be so abysmal as tolead one to question whether our law values human life. If itdoes, as it must, it must provide realistic recompense for thepain of loss and the trauma of suffering. Awards ofcompensation are not law’s doles. In discourse of rights,they constitute entitlements under law. Our conversationsabout law must shift from paternalistic subordination of theindividual to an assertion of enforceable rights as intrinsicto human dignity.

15. The Tribunal has noted that the appellant is unable toeven eat or to attend to visit to the toilet without the assistanceof an attendant. In this background, it would be denial ofjustice to compute the disability at 90%. The disability isindeed total. Having regard to the age of the appellant, theTribunal applied multiplier of 18. In the circumstances, thecompensation payable to the appellant on account of the lossof income, including future prospects, would be Rs 18,14,400.In addition to this amount, the appellant should be grantedan amount of Rs 2 lakhs on account of pain, suffering andloss of amenities. The amount awarded by the Tribunal towardsmedical expenses (Rs 98,908); for extra nourishment (Rs25,000) and for attendant’s expenses (Rs 1 lakh) ismaintained. The Tribunal has declined to award any amounttowards future treatment. The appellant should be allowedan amount of Rs 3 lakhs towards future medical expenses.The appellant is thus awarded total sum of Rs 25,38,308 byway of compensation. The appellant would be entitled tointerest at the rate of 9% p.a. on the compensation from thedate of the filing of the claim petition. The liability to paycompensation has been fastened by the Tribunal and by theHigh Court on the insurer, owner and driver jointly andseverally which is affirmed. The amount shall be deposited

before the Tribunal within period of 6 weeks from todayand shall be paid over to the appellant upon properidentification.”

35. The case of Parminder Singh v. New India AssuranceCompany Limited and Others, (2019) 7 SCC 217, involved an accidentvictim, who underwent surgery for hemiplegia (weakness of one half ofthe body on the left side; in this case, caused by an accident). Accordingto the treating medic, the victim could not work as labourer or performany agricultural work, or work as driver (as he was wont to); theassessment of his disability was at 75%, and of permanent nature. TheCourt held that:

“5.1. The appellant has however, produced an affidavit byhis employer in this Court. As per the said affidavit, theappellant was earning Rs 10,000 p.m. at the time of theaccident.

5.2. On the basis of the affidavit filed by the employer of theappellant, we accept that the income of the appellant was Rs10,000 p.m. at the time of the accident, for the purpose ofcomputing the compensation payable to him.

5.3. Taking the income of the appellant as Rs 10,000 p.m.,with future prospects @ 50% as awarded by the High Court,the total income of the appellant would come to Rs 15,000p.m.

5.4. The appellant was 23 years old at the time when theaccident occurred. Applying the multiplier of 18, the loss offuture earnings suffered by the appellant would work out toRs 15,000 × 12 × 18 = Rs 32,40,000.

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5.7. In K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2012) 12SCC 274, this Court held that: (SCC p. 279, para 10)

“10. It is noteworthy to state that an adjudicatingauthority, while determining the quantum of compensation,has to keep in view the sufferings of the injured personwhich would include his inability to lead full life, hisincapacity to enjoy the normal amenities which he wouldhave enjoyed but for the injuries and his ability to earn as

much as he used to earn or could have earned. Hence,while computing compensation the approach of theTribunal or court has to be broad-based. Needless tosay, it would involve some guesswork as there cannot beany mathematical exactitude or precise formula todetermine the quantum of compensation. In determinationof compensation the fundamental criterion of “justcompensation” should be inhered.”

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5.9. In the present case, it is an admitted position that it is notCpossible for the appellant to get employed as driver, or doany kind of manual labour, or engage in any agriculturaloperations whatsoever, for his sustenance. In suchcircumstances, the High Court has rightly assessed theappellant’s functional disability at 100% insofar as his lossof earning capacity is concerned. The appellant is, therefore,Dawarded Rs 32,40,000 towards loss of earning capacity.”

36. Yet later and in near past, in an accident case, which tragicallyleft in its wake young girl in life-long state of paraplegia, this Court,in Kajal v. Jagdish Chand and Others, (2020) 4 SCC 413, reiteratedthat in addition to loss of earnings, compensation for future prospectsEtoo could be factored in, and observed that:

“14. In Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi[ (1979) 4 SCC 365 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 996 : 1980 ACJ 55],this Court held : (SCC p. 366, para 2)

“2. … the determination of the quantum must be liberal,not niggardly since the law values life and limb in freecountry in generous scales.”

15. In R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control (India) (P) Ltd. [(1995)1 SCC 551 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 250], dealing with the differentheads of compensation in injury cases this Court held thus:(SCC p. 556, para 9)

“9. Broadly speaking while fixing the amount ofcompensation payable to victim of an accident, thedamages have to be assessed separately as pecuniarydamages and special damages. Pecuniary damages are

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

those which the victim has actually incurred and whichare capable of being calculated in terms of money; whereasnon-pecuniary damages are those which are incapable ofbeing assessed by arithmetical calculations. In order toappreciate two concepts pecuniary damages may includeexpenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medical attendance;(ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date of trial; (iii)other material loss. So far as non-pecuniary damages areconcerned, they may include: (i) damages for mental andphysical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered orlikely to be suffered in the future; (ii) damages tocompensate for the loss of amenities of life which mayinclude variety of matters i.e. on account of injury theclaimant may not be able to walk, run or sit; (iii) damagesfor loss of expectation of life i.e. on account of injury thenormal longevity of the person concerned is shortened;(iv) inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment,frustration and mental stress in life.”

16. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 1 SCC 343 : (2011)1 SCC (Civ) 164 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1161], this Court laiddown the heads under which compensation is to be awardedfor personal injuries: (SCC p. 348, para 6)

“6. The heads under which compensation is awarded inpersonal injury cases are the following:

Pecuniary damages (Special damages)

(i)Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines,transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneousexpenditure.

(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injuredwould have made had he not been injured, comprising:

(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;

(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanentdisability.

(iii) Future medical expenses.

Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)

(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as aconsequence of the injuries.

(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).

(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normallongevity).

In routine personal injury cases, compensation will beawarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only inserious cases of injury, where there is specific medicalevidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, thatcompensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b),(iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on accountof permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss ofamenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss ofexpectation of life.”

17. In K. Suresh v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2012) 12SCC 274 : (2013) 2 SCC (Civ) 279 : (2013) 4 SCC (Cri) 638,this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 276, para 2)

“2. … There cannot be actual compensation for anguishof the heart or for mental tribulations. The quintessentialitylies in the pragmatic computation of the loss sustainedwhich has to be in the realm of realistic approximation.Therefore, Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988(for brevity “the Act”) stipulates that there should be grantof “just compensation”. Thus, it becomes challenge fora court of law to determine “just compensation” which isneither bonanza nor windfall, and simultaneously,should not be pittance.

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Loss of earnings

20. Both the courts below have held that since the girl was ayoung child of 12 years only notional income of Rs 15,000p.a. can be taken into consideration. We do not think this is aproper way of assessing the future loss of income. This younggirl after studying could have worked and would have earnedmuch more than Rs 15,000 p.a. Each case has to be decided

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

on its own evidence but taking notional income to be Rs15,000 p.a. is not at all justified. The appellant has placedbefore us material to show that the minimum wages payableto skilled workman is Rs 4846 per month. In our opinion,this would be the minimum amount which she would haveearned on becoming major. Adding 40% for the futureprospects, it works to be Rs 6784.40 per month i.e. 81,412.80p.a. Applying the multiplier of 18, it works out toRs 14,65,430.40, which is rounded off to Rs 14,66,000.”

37. In Neerupam Mohan Mathur v. New India AssuranceCompany, (2013) 14 SCC 15, this Court considered the case of victim,whose injury was assessed to 70% as loss of earning capacity foramputation of the arm; he was postgraduate diploma holder inmechanical engineering, 32 years of age and earning about Rs. 3000/-per month. This Court held, approving the High Court’s order (whichhad adopted the formula from the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923to determine 70% for the purpose of deciding loss of earning capacity)as follows:“12. In the present case, the percentage of permanentdisability has not been expressed by the doctors with referenceto the full body or with reference to particular limb. However,it is not in dispute that the claimant suffered such permanentdisability as result of injuries that he is not in position ofdoing the specialised job of designing, refrigeration and airconditioning. For the said reason, the claimant’s services wereterminated by his employer but that does not mean that theclaimant is not capable to do any other job including thedesk job. Having qualification of BSc degree andpostgraduate diploma in Mechanical Engineering, he canperform any job where application of mind is required thanany physical work.

13. In view of the forgoing discussion we find no groundsmade out to interfere with the finding of the High Court whichdetermined the percentage of loss of earning capacity to 70%adopting the percentage of loss of earning capacity as perthe Workmen’s Compensation Act. The total loss of incomewas thus rightly calculated by the High Court at Rs 6,04,800.”

A38. However, making monetary assessment of the injury sufferedis the only process devised to compensate the victim. The process ofmaking such an assessment, whether in case of death or injury, is providedin Section 168 of the Act which requires that the tribunals constitutedunder the Act determine compensation, which appears to be ‘just’. Thus,the Act vests wide discretion upon the tribunals. The decision of thisBCourt in Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty andAnother, (2003) 7 SCC 197, needs mention here (para 15):

“15. ……It has to be borne in mind that compensation forloss of limbs or life can hardly be weighed in golden scales.Bodily injury is nothing but deprivation which entitles theclaimant to damages. The quantum of damages fixed shouldbe in accordance with the injury. An injury may bring aboutmany consequences like loss of earning capacity, loss ofmental pleasure and many such consequential losses. personbecomes entitled to damages for mental and physical loss,his or her life may have been shortened or that he or shecannot enjoy life, which has been curtailed because of physicalhandicap. The normal expectation of life is impaired. But atthe same time it has to be borne in mind that the compensationis not expected to be windfall for the victim. Statutoryprovisions clearly indicate that the compensation must be

“just” and it cannot be bonanza; not source of profit butthe same should not be pittance. The courts and tribunalshave duty to weigh the various factors and quantify theamount of compensation, which should be just. What wouldbe “just” compensation is vexed question. There can be nogolden rule applicable to all cases for measuring the valueof human life or limb. Measure of damages cannot be arrivedat by precise mathematical calculations. It would depend uponthe particular facts and circumstances, and attending peculiaror special features, if any. Every method or mode adoptedfor assessing compensation has to be considered in thebackground of “just” compensation which is the pivotalconsideration. Though by use of the expression “whichappears to it to be just”, wide discretion is vested in theTribunal, the determination has to be rational, to be done bya judicious approach and not the outcome of whims, wildguesses and arbitrariness.. …”

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

39. This Court in R.D. Hattangadi (supra), posited certainprinciples to be followed:

“9.……while fixing an amount of compensation payable to avictim of an accident, the damages have to be assessedseparately as pecuniary damages and special damages.Pecuniary damages are those which the victim has actuallyincurred and which are capable of being calculated in termsof money; whereas non-pecuniary damages are those whichare incapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations.In order to appreciate two concepts pecuniary damages mayinclude expenses incurred by the claimant: (i) medicalattendance; (ii) loss of earning of profit up to the date oftrial; (iii) other material loss. So far non-pecuniary damagesare concerned, they may include (i) damages for mental andphysical shock, pain and suffering, already suffered or likelyto be suffered in future; (ii) damages to compensate for theloss of amenities of life which may include variety of matters,

i.e., on account of injury the claimant may not be able towalk, run or sit; (iii) damages for the loss of expectation oflife, i.e., on account of injury the normal longevity of theperson concerned is shortened; (iv) inconvenience, hardship,discomfort, disappointment, frustration and mental stress inlife.”

40. In the case of Raj Kumar (supra) this Court has explained inthe following terms the general principles relating to compensation ininjury cases and assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanentdisability:

“General principles relating to compensation in injury cases

5. The provision of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (“the Act”,for short) makes it clear that the award must be just, whichmeans that compensation should, to the extent possible, fullyand adequately restore the claimant to the position prior tothe accident. The object of awarding damages is to make goodthe loss suffered as result of wrong done as far as moneycan do so, in fair, reasonable and equitable manner. Thecourt or the Tribunal shall have to assess the damagesobjectively and exclude from consideration any speculation

Aor fancy, though some conjecture with reference to the natureof disability and its consequences, is inevitable. person isnot only to be compensated for the physical injury, but alsofor the loss which he suffered as result of such injury. Thismeans that he is to be compensated for his inability to lead afull life, his inability to enjoy those normal amenities whichBhe would have enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inabilityto earn as much as he used to earn or could have earned.[See C.K. Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair [(1969) 3SCC 64 : AIR 1970 SC 376] , R.D. Hattangadi v. Pest Control(India) (P) Ltd. [(1995) 1 SCC 551 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 250]Cand Baker v. Willoughby [1970 AC 467 : (1970) 2 WLR 50 :(1969) 3 All ER 1528 (HL)].]

6. The heads under which compensation is awarded inpersonal injury cases are the following:

Pecuniary damages (Special damages)D(i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalisation, medicines,transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneousexpenditure.

(ii) Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured wouldEhave made had he not been injured, comprising:

(a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment;(b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanentdisability.

(iii) Future medical expenses.F

Non-pecuniary damages (General damages)

(iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as consequenceof the injuries.

(v) Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage).G(vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normallongevity).

In routine personal injury cases, compensation will beawarded only under heads (i), (ii)(a) and (iv). It is only inserious cases of injury, where there is specific medicalH

evidence corroborating the evidence of the claimant, thatcompensation will be granted under any of the heads (ii)(b),(iii), (v) and (vi) relating to loss of future earnings on accountof permanent disability, future medical expenses, loss ofamenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage) and loss ofexpectation of life.

7. Assessment of pecuniary damages under Item (i) and underItem (ii)(a) do not pose much difficulty as they involvereimbursement of actuals and are easily ascertainable fromthe evidence. Award under the head of future medicalexpenses—Item (iii)—depends upon specific medical evidenceregarding need for further treatment and cost thereof.Assessment of non-pecuniary damages—Items (iv), (v) and(vi)—involves determination of lump sum amounts withreference to circumstances such as age, nature of injury/deprivation/disability suffered by the claimant and the effectthereof on the future life of the claimant. Decisions of thisCourt and the High Courts contain necessary guidelines foraward under these heads, if necessary. What usually posessome difficulty is the assessment of the loss of future earningson account of permanent disability—Item (ii)(a). We areconcerned with that assessment in this case.

Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanentdisability

8. Disability refers to any restriction or lack of ability toperform an activity in the manner considered normal for ahuman being. Permanent disability refers to the residuaryincapacity or loss of use of some part of the body, foundexisting at the end of the period of treatment and recuperation,after achieving the maximum bodily improvement or recoverywhich is likely to remain for the remainder life of the injured.Temporary disability refers to the incapacity or loss of use ofsome part of the body on account of the injury, which willcease to exist at the end of the period of treatment andrecuperation. Permanent disability can be either partial ortotal. Partial permanent disability refers to person’s inabilityto perform all the duties and bodily functions that he couldperform before the accident, though he is able to perform

some of them and is still able to engage in some gainful activity.Total permanent disability refers to person’s inability toperform any avocation or employment related activities as aresult of the accident. The permanent disabilities that mayarise from motor accident injuries, are of much wider rangewhen compared to the physical disabilities which areenumerated in the Persons with Disabilities (EqualOpportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation)Act, 1995 (“the Disabilities Act”, for short). But if any of thedisabilities enumerated in Section 2(i) of the Disabilities Actare the result of injuries sustained in motor accident, theycan be permanent disabilities for the purpose of claimingcompensation.9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressed by thedoctors with reference to the whole body, or more often thannot, with reference to particular limb. When disabilitycertificate states that the injured has suffered permanentdisability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is notthe same as 45% permanent disability with reference to thewhole body. The extent of disability of limb (or part of thebody) expressed in terms of percentage of the total functionsof that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent ofdisability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanentdisability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability ofleft leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disabilitywith reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus60%). If different parts of the body have suffered differentpercentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed interms of the permanent disability with reference to the wholebody cannot obviously exceed 100%.

10. Where the claimant suffers permanent disability as aresult of injuries, the assessment of compensation under thehead of loss of future earnings would depend upon the effectand impact of such permanent disability on his earningcapacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply thepercentage of permanent disability as the percentage ofeconomic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases,the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage of

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

loss of earning capacity, arising from permanent disabilitywill be different from the percentage of permanent disability.Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, particularextent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in acorresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, ifthe evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability,will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. Inmost of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss ofearning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanentdisability will result in award of either too low or too high acompensation.

11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is the effectof the permanent disability on the earning capacity of theinjured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacity interms of percentage of the income, it has to be quantified interms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (byapplying the standard multiplier method used to determineloss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases,on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal mayfind that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as resultof the permanent disability, is approximately the same as thepercentage of permanent disability in which case, of course,the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determinationof compensation. (See for example, the decisions of this Courtin Arvind Kumar Mishra v. New India Assurance Co.Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 254 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1258 : (2010)10 Scale 298] and Yadava Kumar v. National Insurance Co.Ltd. [(2010) 10 SCC 341 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1285 : (2010)8 Scale 567])

12. Therefore, the Tribunal has to first decide whether thereis any permanent disability and, if so, the extent of suchpermanent disability. This means that the Tribunal shouldconsider and decide with reference to the evidence:

(i) whether the disablement is permanent or temporary;

(ii) if the disablement is permanent, whether it ispermanent total disablement or permanent partialdisablement;

(iii) if the disablement percentage is expressed withreference to any specific limb, then the effect of suchdisablement of the limb on the functioning of the entire body,that is, the permanent disability suffered by the person.

If the Tribunal concludes that there is no permanent disabilitythen there is no question of proceeding further anddetermining the loss of future earning capacity. But if theTribunal concludes that there is permanent disability then itwill proceed to ascertain its extent. After the Tribunalascertains the actual extent of permanent disability of theclaimant based on the medical evidence, it has to determinewhether such permanent disability has affected or will affecthis earning capacity.

13. Ascertainment of the effect of the permanent disability onthe actual earning capacity involves three steps. The Tribunalhas to first ascertain what activities the claimant could carryDon in spite of the permanent disability and what he could notdo as result of the permanent disability (this is also relevantfor awarding compensation under the head of loss of amenitiesof life). The second step is to ascertain his avocation,profession and nature of work before the accident, as alsoEhis age. The third step is to find out whether (i) the claimant istotally disabled from earning any kind of livelihood, or (ii)whether in spite of the permanent disability, the claimant couldstill effectively carry on the activities and functions, whichhe was earlier carrying on, or (iii) whether he was preventedor restricted from discharging his previous activities andFfunctions, but could carry on some other or lesser scale ofactivities and functions so that he continues to earn or cancontinue to earn his livelihood.

14. For example, if the left hand of claimant is amputated,the permanent physical or functional disablement may beassessed around 60%. If the claimant was driver or acarpenter, the actual loss of earning capacity may virtuallybe hundred per cent, if he is neither able to drive or docarpentry. On the other hand, if the claimant was clerk ingovernment service, the loss of his left hand may not result inloss of employment and he may still be continued as clerk

as he could perform his clerical functions; and in that eventthe loss of earning capacity will not be 100% as in the caseof driver or carpenter, nor 60% which is the actual physicaldisability, but far less. In fact, there may not be any need toaward any compensation under the head of “loss of futureearnings”, if the claimant continues in government service,though he may be awarded compensation under the head ofloss of amenities as consequence of losing his hand.Sometimes the injured claimant may be continued in service,but may not be found suitable for discharging the dutiesattached to the post or job which he was earlier holding, onaccount of his disability, and may therefore be shifted to someother suitable but lesser post with lesser emoluments, in whichcase there should be limited award under the head of lossof future earning capacity, taking note of the reduced earningcapacity.

15. It may be noted that when compensation is awarded bytreating the loss of future earning capacity as 100% (or evenanything more than 50%), the need to award compensationseparately under the head of loss of amenities or loss ofexpectation of life may disappear and as result, only tokenor nominal amount may have to be awarded under the headof loss of amenities or loss of expectation of life, as otherwisethere may be duplication in the award of compensation. Bethat as it may.

16. The Tribunal should not be silent spectator when medicalevidence is tendered in regard to the injuries and their effect,in particular, the extent of permanent disability. Sections 168and 169 of the Act make it evident that the Tribunal does notfunction as neutral umpire as in civil suit, but as an activeexplorer and seeker of truth who is required to “hold anenquiry into the claim” for determining the “justcompensation”. The Tribunal should therefore take an activerole to ascertain the true and correct position so that it canassess the “just compensation”. While dealing with personalinjury cases, the Tribunal should preferably equip itself witha medical dictionary and handbook for evaluation ofpermanent physical impairment (for example, Manual for

Evaluation of Permanent Physical Impairment for OrthopaedicSurgeons, prepared by American Academy of OrthopaedicSurgeons or its Indian equivalent or other authorised texts)for understanding the medical evidence and assessing thephysical and functional disability. The Tribunal may also keepin view the First Schedule to the Workmen’s CompensationAct, 1923 which gives some indication about the extent ofpermanent disability in different types of injuries, in the caseof workmen.

17. If doctor giving evidence uses technical medical terms,the Tribunal should instruct him to state in addition, in simplenon-medical terms, the nature and the effect of the injury. Ifa doctor gives evidence about the percentage of permanentdisability, the Tribunal has to seek clarification as to whethersuch percentage of disability is the functional disability withreference to the whole body or whether it is only with referenceto limb. If the percentage of permanent disability is statedwith reference to limb, the Tribunal will have to seek thedoctor’s opinion as to whether it is possible to deduce thecorresponding functional permanent disability with referenceto the whole body and, if so, the percentage.

E18. The Tribunal should also act with caution, if it proposedto accept the expert evidence of doctors who did not treat theinjured but who give “ready to use” disability certificates,without proper medical assessment. There are severalinstances of unscrupulous doctors who without treating theinjured, readily give liberal disability certificates to help theFclaimants. But where the disability certificates are given byduly constituted Medical Boards, they may be accepted subjectto evidence regarding the genuineness of such certificates.The Tribunal may invariably make it point to require theevidence of the doctor who treated the injured or who assessedGthe permanent disability. Mere production of disabilitycertificate or discharge certificate will not be proof of theextent of disability stated therein unless the doctor who treatedthe claimant or who medically examined and assessed theextent of disability of the claimant, is tendered for cross-examination with reference to the certificate. If the Tribunal

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

is not satisfied with the medical evidence produced by theclaimant, it can constitute Medical Board (from panelmaintained by it in consultation with reputed local hospitals/medical colleges) and refer the claimant to such MedicalBoard for assessment of the disability.

19. We may now summarise the principles discussed above:

(i) All injuries (or permanent disabilities arising frominjuries), do not result in loss of earning capacity.

(ii) The percentage of permanent disability withreference to the whole body of person, cannot be assumedto be the percentage of loss of earning capacity. To put itdifferently, the percentage of loss of earning capacity is notthe same as the percentage of permanent disability (except ina few cases, where the Tribunal on the basis of evidence,concludes that the percentage of loss of earning capacity isthe same as the percentage of permanent disability).

(iii) The doctor who treated an injured claimant or whoexamined him subsequently to assess the extent of hispermanent disability can give evidence only in regard to theextent of permanent disability. The loss of earning capacityis something that will have to be assessed by the Tribunalwith reference to the evidence in entirety.

(iv) The same permanent disability may result in differentpercentages of loss of earning capacity in different persons,depending upon the nature of profession, occupation or job,age, education and other factors.”

41. Later, in another judgment, i.e., Jakir Hussein v. Sabir andOthers, (2015) 7 SCC 252, this Court had to consider the correctness ofa compensation assessment based on the High Court’s analysis of theinjury to the victim (a driver who suffered permanent injury to his arm,impairing movement as well as the wrist, which rendered him incapableof driving any vehicle). The High Court had assessed permanentdisablement at 30%, even though the doctor had certified it to be 55%.This Court, reversing the High Court order, observed inter alia that:

“15. …..Due to this injury, the doctor has stated that theappellant had great difficulty to move his shoulder, wrist and

elbow and pus was coming out of the injury even two yearsafter the accident and the treatment was taken by him. Thedoctor further stated in his evidence that the appellant gotdelayed joined fracture in the humerus bone of his right handwith wiring and nailing and that he had suffered 55%disability and cannot drive any motor vehicle in future due tothe same. He was once again operated upon during thependency of the appeal before the High Court and he washospitalised for 10 days. The appellant was present in personin the High Court and it was observed and noticed by theHigh Court that the right hand of the appellant was completelycrushed and deformed. In view of the doctor’s evidence inthis case, the Tribunal and the High Court have erroneouslytaken the extent of permanent disability at 30% and 55%,respectively for the calculation of amount towards the loss offuture earning capacity. No doubt, the doctor has assessedthe permanent disability of the appellant at 55%. However, itis important to consider the relevant fact, namely, that theappellant is driver and driving the motor vehicle is the onlymeans of livelihood for himself as well as the members of hisfamily. Further, it is very crucial to note that the High Courthas clearly observed that his right hand was completelycrushed and deformed.16. In Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 1 SCC 343], thisCourt specifically gave the illustration of driver who haspermanent disablement of hand and stated that the loss offuture earnings capacity would be virtually 100%. Therefore,clearly when it comes to loss of earning due to permanentdisability, the same may be treated as 100% loss caused tothe appellant since he will never be able to work as driveragain. The contention of the respondent Insurance Companythat the appellant could take up any other alternativeemployment is no justification to avoid their vicarious liability.Hence, the loss of earning is determined by us at Rs 54,000per annum. Thus, by applying the appropriate multiplier asper the principles laid down by this Court in SarlaVerma v. DTC [(2009) 6 SCC 121 : (2009) 2 SCC (Civ)770 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 1002], the total loss of future

earnings of the appellant will be at Rs 54,000 × 16 = Rs8,64,000.”

42. In Anthony alias Anthony Swamy v. Managing Director,Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation, (2020) 7 SCC161, where the victim was painter by profession, three-Judge Benchhad followed Raj Kumar (supra) and Nagarajappa v. DivisionalManager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited, (2011) 13 SCC 323.The High Court had assessed the injury to be 25% permanent disability,although the treating doctor had said that the injury incurred by the buspassenger (who was earning Rs. 9000/- per month) was 75% of the leftleg and 37.5% for the whole body. In Raj Kumar (supra), the physicaldisability of the upper limb was determined as 68% in proportion to 22-23% of the whole-body. The High Court had assessed the injury as 25%and granted compensation. However, this Court assessed the injury onthe basis that the disability was 75%, stating as follows:

“8. PW 3 had assessed the physical functional disability ofthe left leg of the appellant at 75% and total body disabilityat 37.5%. The High Court has considered it proper to assessthe physical disability at 25% of the whole body only. Thereis no discussion for this reduction in percentage, much lessany consideration of the nature of permanent functionaldisability suffered by the appellant. The extent of physicalfunctional disability, in the facts of the case has to beconsidered in manner so as to grant just and propercompensation to the appellant towards loss of future earning.The earning capacity of the appellant as on the date of theaccident stands completely negated and not reduced. He hasbeen rendered permanently incapable of working as painteror do any manual work. Compensation for loss of futureearning, therefore has to be proper and just to enable him tolive life of dignity and not compensation which is elusive. Ifthe 75% physical disability has rendered the appellantpermanently disabled from pursuing his normal vocation orany similar work, it is difficult to comprehend the grant ofcompensation to him in ratio to the disability to the wholebody. The appellant is therefore held entitled to compensationfor loss of future earning based on his 75% permanent physicalfunctional disability recalculated with the salary of Rs 5,500with multiplier of 14 at Rs 6,93,000.”

A43. The question of amount of compensation payable to onesuffering injury as result of motor vehicle accident was consideredin Syed Sadiq and Others v. Divisional Manager, United IndiaInsurance Company Limited, (2014) 2 SCC 735, when this Court hadto apply the correct standard for awarding compensation for loss offuture prospects for vegetable vendor, whose right leg had to beBamputated, as result of motor accident. The High Court had consideredthe disability to be 65%. This Court held as follows:

“7. Further, the appellant claims that he was working as avegetable vendor. It is true that vegetable vendor might notrequire mobility to the extent that he sells vegetables at oneCplace. However, the occupation of vegetable vending is notconfined to selling vegetables from particular location. Itrather involves procuring vegetables from the wholesalemarket or the farmers and then selling it off in the retail market.This often involves selling vegetables in the cart which requiresD100% mobility. But even by conservative approach, if wepresume that the vegetable vending by the appellant claimantinvolved selling vegetables from one place, the claimant wouldrequire assistance with his mobility in bringing vegetables tothe market place which otherwise would be extremely difficultfor him with an amputated leg. We are required to be sensitiveEwhile dealing with manual labour cases where loss of limb isoften equivalent to loss of livelihood. Yet, considering thatthe appellant claimant is still capable to fend for his livelihoodonce he is brought in the market place, we determine thedisability at 85% to determine the loss of income.

8. The appellant claimant in his appeal further claimed thathe had been earning Rs 10,000 p.m. by doing vegetablevending work. The High Court however, considered the lossof income at Rs 3500 p.m. considering that the claimant didnot produce any document to establish his loss of income. ItGis difficult for us to convince ourselves as to how labourinvolved in an unorganised sector doing his own business isexpected to produce documents to prove his monthlyincome…..”

44. In Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra), the appellant at the timeHof accident was final year engineering (Mechanical) degree student in

reputed college. He was brilliant student and had passed all hissemester examinations with distinction. He suffered grievous injuriesand remained in coma for about two months; his studies were disruptedas he was moved to different hospitals for surgeries. For many months,his condition remained serious; his right hand was amputated and visionseriously affected. This Court accepted his claim and held that he waspermanently disabled to the extent of 70%. In Mohan Soni v. Ram AvtarTomar and Others, (2012) 2 SCC 267 (page 272), in case of injuryentailing loss of leg, this Court held that medical evidence of the extentof disability should not be mechanically scaled down:

“8. On hearing the counsel for the parties and on goingthrough the materials on record, we are of the view that boththe Tribunal and the High Court were in error in peggingdown the disability of the appellant to 50% with reference toSchedule I of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, 1923. In thecontext of loss of future earning, any physical disabilityresulting from an accident has to be judged with reference tothe nature of work being performed by the person sufferingthe disability. This is the basic premise and once that is grasped,it clearly follows that the same injury or loss may affect twodifferent persons in different ways. Take the case of marginalfarmer who does his cultivation work himself and ploughshis land with his own two hands; or the puller of cycle-rickshaw, one of the main means of transport in hundreds ofsmall towns all over the country. The loss of one of the legseither to the marginal farmer or the cycle-rickshaw-pullerwould be the end of the road insofar as their earning capacity

is concerned. But in case of person engaged in some kindof desk work in an office, the loss of leg may not have thesame effect. The loss of leg (or for that matter the loss ofany limb) to anyone is bound to have very traumatic effectson one’s personal, family or social life but the loss of one ofthe legs to person working in the office would not interferewith his work/earning capacity in the same degree as in thecase of marginal farmer or cycle-rickshaw-puller.

***************************

10. This Court in K. Janardhan case [(2008) 8 SCC518 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 733], set aside the High Court

judgment and held that the tanker driver had suffered 100%disability and incapacity in earning his keep as tanker driveras his right leg was amputated from the knee and, accordingly,restored the order passed by the Commissioner of Workmen’sCompensation. In K. Janardhan [(2008) 8 SCC 518 : (2008)2 SCC (L&S) 733] this Court also referred to and relied uponan earlier decision of the Court in Pratap NarainSingh Deo v. Srinivas Sabata [(1976) 1 SCC 289 : 1976 SCC(L&S) 52] in which carpenter who suffered an amputationof his left arm from the elbow was held to have sufferedcomplete loss of his earning capacity.

*******************

13. Any scaling down of the compensation should requiresomething more tangible than hypothetical conjecture thatnotwithstanding the disability, the victim could make up forthe loss of income by changing his vocation or by adoptinganother means of livelihood. The party advocating for loweramount of compensation for that reason must plead and showbefore the Tribunal that the victim enjoyed some legalprotection (as in the case of persons covered by the Personswith Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rightsand Full Participation) Act, 1995) or in case of the vastmultitude who earn their livelihood in the unorganised sectorby leading cogent evidence that the victim had in fact changedhis vocation or the means of his livelihood and by virtue ofsuch change he was deriving certain income.

14. The loss of earning capacity of the appellant, accordingto us, may be as high as 100% but in no case it would be lessthan 90%. We, accordingly, find and hold that thecompensation for the loss of the appellant’s future earningsmust be computed on that basis. On calculation on that basis,the amount of compensation would come to Rs 3,56,400 andafter addition of sum of Rs 30,000 and Rs 15,000 the totalamount would be Rs 4,01,400. The additional compensationamount would carry interest at the rate of 9% per annumfrom the date of filing of the claim petition till the date ofpayment. The additional amount of compensation along with

interest should be paid to the appellant without delay and notlater than three months from today.”

45. One more decision, Sandeep Khanuja v. Atul Dande andAnother, (2017) 3 SCC 351, too had dealt with the precise aspect ofassessing the quantum of permanent disablement. The victim was agedabout 30 years, working as chartered accountant for various institutionsfor which he was paid professional fees. The injuries suffered by himresulted in severe impairment of movement; as he had problems inclimbing stairs, back trouble while sleeping, etc. rod was implanted inhis leg. He suffered 70% permanent disability, and mental and physicalagony. This Court enhanced the compensation, observing the propermanner to calculate the extent of disability. This Court held as under:

“13. In the last few years, law in this aspect has beenstraightened by this Court by removing certain cobwebs thathad been created because of some divergent views on certainaspects. It is not even necessary to refer to all these cases. Wefind that the principle of determination of compensation inthe case of permanent/partial disablement has beenexhaustively dealt with after referring to the relevant caselaw on the subject in Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar [(2011) 1 SCC343 : (2011) 1 SCC (Civ) 164 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 1161] inthe following words: (SCC pp. 348-50, paras 8-11)

“Assessment of future loss of earnings due to permanentdisability

8. xxxxxx

9. The percentage of permanent disability is expressedby the doctors with reference to the whole body, or more oftenthan not, with reference to particular limb. When disabilitycertificate states that the injured has suffered permanentdisability to an extent of 45% of the left lower limb, it is notthe same as 45% permanent disability with reference to thewhole body. The extent of disability of limb (or part of thebody) expressed in terms of percentage of the total functionsof that limb, obviously cannot be assumed to be the extent ofdisability of the whole body. If there is 60% permanentdisability of the right hand and 80% permanent disability ofleft leg, it does not mean that the extent of permanent disability

with reference to the whole body is 140% (that is 80% plus60%). If different parts of the body have suffered differentpercentages of disabilities, the sum total thereof expressed interms of the permanent disability with reference to the wholebody cannot obviously exceed 100%.

10. Where the claimant suffers permanent disabilityas result of injuries, the assessment of compensation underthe head of loss of future earnings would depend upon theeffect and impact of such permanent disability on his earningcapacity. The Tribunal should not mechanically apply thepercentage of permanent disability as the percentage ofeconomic loss or loss of earning capacity. In most of the cases,the percentage of economic loss, that is, the percentage ofloss of earning capacity, arising from permanent disabilitywill be different from the percentage of permanent disability.Some Tribunals wrongly assume that in all cases, particularextent (percentage) of permanent disability would result in

corresponding loss of earning capacity, and consequently, ifthe evidence produced show 45% as the permanent disability,will hold that there is 45% loss of future earning capacity. Inmost of the cases, equating the extent (percentage) of loss ofearning capacity to the extent (percentage) of permanentdisability will result in award of either too low or too high acompensation.

11. What requires to be assessed by the Tribunal is theeffect of the permanent disability on the earning capacity ofthe injured; and after assessing the loss of earning capacityin terms of percentage of the income, it has to be quantifiedin terms of money, to arrive at the future loss of earnings (byapplying the standard multiplier method used to determineloss of dependency). We may however note that in some cases,on appreciation of evidence and assessment, the Tribunal mayfind that the percentage of loss of earning capacity as resultof the permanent disability, is approximately the same as thepercentage of permanent disability in which case, of course,the Tribunal will adopt the said percentage for determinationof compensation.”

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

14. The crucial factor which has to be taken intoconsideration, thus, is to assess as to whether the permanentdisability has any adverse effect on the earning capacity ofthe injured. In this sense, MACT approached the issue in theright direction by taking into consideration the aforesaid test.However, we feel that the conclusion of MACT, on theapplication of the aforesaid test, is erroneous. very myopicview is taken by MACT in taking the view that 70% permanentdisability suffered by the appellant would not impact theearning capacity of the appellant. MACT thought that sincethe appellant is Chartered Accountant, he is supposed todo sitting work and, therefore, his working capacity is notimpaired. Such conclusion was justified if the appellantwas in the employment where job requirement could be to dositting/table work and receive monthly salary for the said work.An important feature and aspect which is ignored by MACTis that the appellant is professional Chartered Accountant.To do this work efficiently and in order to augment his income,a Chartered Accountant is supposed to move around as well.If Chartered Accountant is doing taxation work, he has toappear before the assessing authorities and appellateauthorities under the Income Tax Act, as CharteredAccountant is allowed to practice up to Income Tax AppellateTribunal. Many times Chartered Accountants are supposedto visit their clients as well. In case Chartered Accountantis primarily doing audit work, he is not only required to visithis clients but various authorities as well. There are manystatutory functions under various statutes which the CharteredAccountants perform. Free movement is involved forperformance of such functions. person who is engaged andcannot freely move to attend to his duties may not be able tomatch the earning in comparison with the one who is healthyand bodily abled. Movements of the appellant have beenrestricted to large extent and that too at young age. Thoughthe High Court recognised this, it did not go forward to applythe principle of multiplier. We are of the opinion that in acase like this and having regard to the injuries suffered bythe appellant, there is definite loss of earning capacity andit calls for grant of compensation with the adoption ofmultiplier method…….

15. In Arvind Kumar Mishra case [Arvind Kumar Mishra v.New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2010) 10 SCC 254 : (2010) 4SCC (Civ) 153 : (2010) 3 SCC (Cri) 1258], after followingthe judgment in Kerala SRTC v. Susamma Thomas [(1994) 2SCC 176 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 335], the Court chose to applymultiplier of 18 keeping in view the age of the victim, whowas 25 years at the time of the accident.

16. In the instant case, MACT had quantified the income ofthe appellant at Rs 10,000 i.e. Rs 1,20,000 per annum. Goingby the age of the appellant at the time of the accident,multiplier of 17 would be admissible. Keeping in view thatCthe permanent disability is 70%, the compensation under thishead would be worked out at Rs 14,28,000. MACT hadawarded compensation of Rs 70,000 for permanent disability,which stands enhanced to Rs 14,28,000. For mental andphysical agony and frustration and disappointment towardsDlife, MACT has awarded sum of Rs 30,000, which weenhance to Rs 1,30,000……..”

46. In the case of Arvind Kumar Mishra (supra), this Courtobserved as under:

“9. We do not intend to review in detail state of authorities inrelation to assessment of all damages for personal injury.Suffice it to say that the basis of assessment of all damagesfor personal injury is compensation. The whole idea is to putthe claimant in the same position as he was insofar as moneycan. Perfect compensation is hardly possible but one has tokeep in mind that the victim has done no wrong; he hassuffered at the hands of the wrongdoer and the court musttake care to give him full and fair compensation for that hehad suffered.

10. In some cases for personal injury, the claim could be inrespect of lifetime’s earnings lost because, though he will live,he cannot earn his living. In others, the claim may be madefor partial loss of earnings. Each case has to be consideredin the light of its own facts and at the end, one must askwhether the sum awarded is fair and reasonable sum. Theconventional basis of assessing compensation in personal

injury cases—and that is now recognised mode as to theproper measure of compensation—is taking an appropriatemultiplier of an appropriate multiplicand.”

47. In Pappu Deo Yadav v. Naresh Kumar and Others, AIR2020 SCC 4424, it was held that courts should not adopt stereotypicalor myopic approach, but instead, view the matter taking into account therealities of life, both in the assessment of the extent of disabilities, andcompensation under various heads. In this case, the loss of an arm, inthe opinion of the court, resulted in severe income earning impairmentupon the appellant. As typist/data entry operator, full functioning of hishands was essential to his livelihood. The extent of his permanentdisablement was assessed at 89%; however, the High Court halved it to45% on an entirely wrong application of some ‘proportionate’ principle,which was illogical and is unsupportable in law. What is to be seen, asemphasized by decision after decision, is the impact of the injury uponthe income generating capacity of the victim. The loss of limb (a leg orarm) and its severity on that account is to be judged in relation to theprofession, vocation or business of the victim; there cannot be blindarithmetic formula for ready application.

48. With the aforesaid broad principles in mind, we proceed toexamine the appellant’s claim for enhancement of the compensationawarded to him by the High Court.

MEDICAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD

49. Dr. Anil B. Patil (PW-2) who treated the appellant has issueda Disability Certificate (Ex. P-8) wherein the following has been stated:

“This to certify that I have examined, Shri Sidram Raju Bhosle.Age-19 yrs/M of Kulgod. OPD No-19441 Dated-18/07/2012at Lakeview Hospital. He has come to me for assessment ofpermanent physical disability certificate as per the recordshown by the patient, the injuries were noted. The patienthad met with road Traffic accident on 18/7/2012 time around1:30 pm at near Laxmeshwar cross Gokak Dist-Belgaum. Hewas admitted in my Lakeview Hospital, Belgaum, for thetreatment on 4/5/09

MLC NO - outward no-BHSLVH/MRD MLC

No. 229 Dated 18/07/12

Date of admission -18/7/2012

Date of discharged - 6/8/2012

Diagnosis

Burst Fracture 12 vertebra with paraplegia.

Fracture 1 to 6 Ribs with Hydropneumothorax, surgicalemphysema.

X-Ray Report:

-Burst fracture 12 vertebra. X-ray no.-9832 Dated on 23/07 /2012

-Fracture 1 to 6 ribs with Hydropneumothorax, surgicalemphysema. X-ray no.- 753 dated 18/07/2012.

CT CHEST(PLAIN): on 18/07/2012

-Fracture of right 1st to 6th ribs along posterior/lateral aspect.

-Gross hydropneumothorax/hemothorax on the right side withpneumomediastinum causing gross shift of mediastinumtowards left side and partial collapse of right lung.

-Cystic lesions(two) in right upper lobe? post traumatic withfluid levels A/W patchy opacities in right lung S/o contusions.

-burst anterior wedge compression fracture of D12 vertebralbody involving both pedicles with retropulsion.

Case Examination

1.History

2-On Clinical Examination

1-History At Present Patient Con1plaints

-Pain and weakness in both legs and back.

-lnability in squatting & sitting crossed leg.

-Inability to stand and \Valle

2-On. Clinical Examination . .

Inspection:-Linear Scar extending fron1 DS to L5 present overspine.

-scar over anterior lateral aspect of right side of chest

-Unable to squat and sit cross leg.

-Movements of Left kneeRight knee grade 3-4

Flexion grade 2

Extension grade 3

Muscle wasting

Calf and thigh muscles ++

X-ray Shows- x-ray no. 2852 dated 29.07.2013

Old fracture D12 with implants in situ.

Observed function disability

-Pain in the left knee & left leg and weakness in both the legsand inability to stand and walk.

-Unable to squat and sit cross leg.

Conclusion

I am of the opinion that considering the clinical signs &radiological findings the patient has got the total permanentphysical disability of 45% to whole body in respect to D12fracture and neurological weakness with inability to stand,sit & walk.

Place-Belgaum”

50. Dr. Patil (PW-2) in his oral evidence has deposed as under:-

“I state that at present petitioner complains of pain andweakness in both legs and back. Inability in squatting andsitting cross leg. Inability to stand and walk. And on clinicalexamination of the petitioner it reveals that inspection linearscar extending from D5 to L5 present over spine, there isscar over anterior lateral aspect of right side of chest,unable to squat and sit cross leg.

I state that movements of left knee flexion grade-2,extension grade-3, right knee grade 3-4 and movementsof left foot, plantar-grade -1 dorsiflexion-grade-3 and leftfoot grade 3-4 and muscle wasting calf and thigh muscle++

Further I state that X-ray taken on 29-07-2013reveals old fracture D12 with implants in situ, functionaldisability observed to the petitioner are:- pain in the leftknee and left leg and weakness in both legs and inabilityto stand and walk, unable to squat and sit cross leg.

Further I state that petitioner needs future medicalexpenses would be Rs. 2,50,000/-.

After considering the clinical signs and radiologicalfinding, the petitioner has got the total permanent physicaldisability of 45% to whole body in respect of D-12 fractureand neurological weakness with inability to stand, sit andwalk.

I have issued the disability certificate to the petitioner andit bears my signature and said disability certificate isalready marked as Ex.P-8 and now my signature is markedas EX.P-8 (a), (b), (c) respectively.”

51. In his cross-examination at the instance of the owner of thevehicle, he has deposed: -

“It is true that the age of the petitioner is 19 years at the timeof assessment. It is not true to suggest that heel process of theinjuries is better than old age person. It is not true to suggestFthat rib fractures 1 to 6 are not simple in nature. It is false tosay that the petitioner is of young age and the heeling processis better improvement. It is false to say that disability given byme is on the higher side. It is false to say that after removingimplant the petitioner will be able to walk and stand properly.It is false to say that future medical treatment expenses willGRs. 2,50,000/-. It is false to say that the petitioner is able towalk, stand as earlier. It is false to say that to help thepetitioner I am deposing falsely.”

52. In the cross-examination at the instance of the insurancecompany, he has deposed:

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

“It is true that I am orthopedic surgeon and I am not neurosurgeon. It is false to suggest that I am authorized to givedisability certificate of paraplegia. It is true that I have notreceived any court summons for this case. I don’t know theavocation of the petitioner. It is true that the petitioner hadmet with road traffic accident. It is false that by birth thispetitioner is having this type of injury. It is true that thepetitioner has taken proper treatment from our hospital. It istrue that after well cured he was discharged from our hospital.It is true that I have advised him to take follow-up treatment.It is true that the petitioner has taken follow-up treatment. Itis false to say that for not taking follow-up treatment by thepetitioner this injury has worsened. It is false to say that fromfalling from the tree this type of injury may happen. It is falsethat due to rib fracture paraplegia cannot be caused. Burstfracture D-12 vertebra has caused paraplegia. It is false tosay that this injury is not accidental injury. It is not true thatto help the petitioner to get the compensation, I am deposingfalsely. It is false that I have seen X-ray before discharge andafter discharge. It is true that after seeing discharge X-raythere was improvement of the petitioner. It is false to say thatthe petitioner has acted as stated in your chief examination.It is true that basis of assessment I have referred ALIMCO.

It is false to say that petitioner is unable to walk, standproperly. It is false to say that I have given higher side medicalbills to help the petitioner. It is false that injuries are simple innature. It is true that I have given disability to the whole bodyand this is higher side. It is false that whole body disabilitycomes between 10% to 15% to help the petitioner. I amdeposing false to get the compensation.”

THE PECUNIARY EXPENSES

(1) Loss of earning due to disability

53. The courts must apply the multiplier method, while ascertainingthe compensation to be awarded to the victim. This was so held by thisCourt in Sarla Verma (Smt) and Others v. Delhi TransportCorporation and Another, (2009) 6 SCC 121. In Sarla Verma (supra),this Court quoted the following observations from Kerala SRTC v.Susamma Thomas, (1994) 2 SCC 176:

ABC

A“The multiplier method involves the ascertainment of the lossof dependency or the multiplicand having regard to thecircumstances of the case and capitalising the multiplicandby an appropriate multiplier. The choice of the multiplier isdetermined by the age of the deceased (or that of the claimantswhichever is higher) and by the calculation as to what capitalBsum, if invested at rate of interest appropriate to stableeconomy, would yield the multiplicand by way of annualinterest. In ascertaining this, regard should also be had tothe fact that ultimately the capital sum should also beconsumed-up over the period for which the dependency isCexpected to last.

It is necessary to reiterate that the multiplier method is logicallysound and legally well established. There are some caseswhich have proceeded to determine the compensation on thebasis of aggregating the entire future earnings for over theDperiod the life expectancy was lost, deducted percentagetherefrom towards uncertainties of future life and award theresulting sum as compensation. This is clearly unscientific.For instance, if the deceased was, say 25 years of age at thetime of death and the life expectancy is 70 years, this methodwould multiply the loss of dependency for 45 years%virtually

Eadopting multiplier of 45%and even if one-third or one-fourth is deducted therefrom towards the uncertainties of futurelife and for immediate lump sum payment, the effectivemultiplier would be between 30 and 34. This is whollyimpermissible.”F

54. The Tribunal held that although the appellant herein had claimedthat he was earning Rs. 9,000/- per month from his business of selling ofutensils, yet the appellant was not in position to adduce any documentaryevidence in that regard. Although Dr. Anil B. Patil (PW-2) in his oralevidence has deposed that the appellant suffered permanent disabilityGto the tune of 45%, yet the Tribunal held that the appellant had suffereda permanent disability of only 30%. The Tribunal applied the multiplieras explained in the case of Sarla Verma (supra). Accordingly, thecompensation awarded for the loss of earning capacity was determinedas follows:

5000 x 12 x 18 x 30% = INR 3,24,000/-

55. The High Court enhanced the income to Rs. 7,000/- statingthat the same was determined by the Tribunal on lower side. Further,the High Court held that having regard to the evidence of the treatingdoctor, the permanent disability of the appellant should be determined at40%. In such circumstances, the High Court while applying the multiplier,enhanced the compensation to be awarded under the head of loss ofearning capacity to Rs. 7,000/-, as under:

7,000 x 12 x 18 x 40% = INR 6,04,800/-

56. The evidence on record indicates that the appellant sufferedparaplegia due to the accident. Paraplegia is form of paralysis of lowerbody. It restricts everyday routine more particularly the physical activityand leads to (i) deprivation of simple pleasures and amenities of life, (ii)100% loss of earning capacity, (iii) long term secondary complicationsrequiring continuous care, medical treatment and hospitalization, (iv)feeling of helplessness, depression, anger, stress, anxiety, etc. In short,paraplegia impairs physical, mental and psychological health and hasdevastating impact on the social and financial well being of the victim.

57. In the case on hand, the appellant was in the business ofselling utensils and used to travel to various villages to sell the same.With this disability in the form of paraplegia being suffered by theappellant, it is not possible for him now to walk long distance or standfor long period. His business could be said to have been gravelyimpacted. Further, the appellant at the time of accident was just 19 yearsold. The High Court enhanced his notional income from Rs. 5,000/- toRs. 7,000/- per month. The appellant claimed that his notional income bedetermined at Rs. 9,000/-.

58. This Court in the case of Kirti and Another v. OrientalInsurance Company Limited, (2021) 2 SCC 166, while discussing theissue of proving the income of the victim, held as under:

“39. Taking the above rationale into account, the situation isquite clear with respect to notional income determined by acourt in the first category of cases outlined earlier, those wherethe victim is proved to be employed but claimants are unableto prove the income before the court. Once the victim hasbeen proved to be employed at some venture, the necessarycorollary is that they would be earning an income……”

A59. Thus, we are of the view, more particularly keeping in mindthe dictum of this Court in the case of Kirti (supra) that it is not necessaryto adduce any documentary evidence to prove the notional income ofthe victim and the Court can award the same even in the absence of anydocumentary evidence. In the case of Kirti (supra) it was stated thatthe Court should ensure while choosing the method and fixing the notionalBincome that the same is just in the facts and circumstances of the particularcase, neither assessing the compensation too conservatively, nor tooliberally.

60. In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that weshould determine the notional income of the appellant herein atCRs. 8,000/- per month. The same would result in the compensation beingenhanced as under:

8000 × 12 × 18 × 45% = INR 7,77,600/-

(2) Loss of earning for 6 months

61. Compensation under the aforesaid head was awarded by theTribunal and the High Court. The Tribunal awarded only Rs. 40,000/-under this head. The High Court enhanced it to Rs. 42,000/-.

62. We uphold the payment towards loss of earning for six monthsas awarded by the High Court and applying the revised income, enhanceEthe same as under:

8000 × 6 = INR 48,000/-

(3) Medical Expenses

63. The appellant claims Rs. 2,00,000/- towards medical expenses.FIn this regard, the appellant adduced documentary evidence in the formof medical bills/receipts to the tune of Rs.1,54,931/-, as stated in theorder of the Tribunal.

64. The Tribunal in its order dated 21.01.2014 held:

“Medical Expenses: The claimant submitted that he has takenGtreatment Lake view hospital, Belgaum and was indoorpatient. He has produced the hospital bill and medical billsto1 the tune of Rs.1,54,931/-. The same has been rounded to--Rs.1,50,000/ and the petitioner is entitled to Rs.1,50,000/under this head.” [Emphasis supplied]

65. The High Court in Para 11 of its impugned judgment, held:

“The compensation awarded under the head of pain andsuffering, medical expenses, conveyance, special diet, etc.,loss of amenities in life and marriage prospects is just andproper and same is not disturbed.”

66. In view of the aforesaid, we grant compensation ofRs. 1,55,000/- towards medical expenses.

(4) Future Medical Expenses

67. At the outset, we may state that the “Future Medical Expenses”and “Attendant Charges” would fall within the ambit of PecuniaryExpenses. In Abhimanyu Partap Singh v. Namita Sekhon andAnother, (2022) 8 SCC 489, this Court held:

“19. In view of the said legal position, the compensation canbe assessed in pecuniary heads i.e. the loss of future earning,medical expenses including future medical expenses, attendantcharges and also in the head of transportation including futuretransportation. In the non-pecuniary heads, the compensationcan be computed for the mental and physical pain andsufferings in the present and in future, loss of amenities oflife including loss of marital bliss, loss of expectancy in life,inconvenience, hardship, discomfort, disappointment,frustration, mental agony in life, etc.”

68. The Tribunal has observed that the doctor has deposed thatthe appellant is likely to incur expenses of Rs. 2,50,000/- towards futuremedical expenses. However, according to the Tribunal, there was nosufficient and cogent evidence in that regard under this head. Accordingly,the Tribunal awarded Rs. 25,000/-. The High Court thought fit not toaward any amount for future medical expenses as there was no evidenceadduced by the appellant in regard to future treatment that may berequired. The High Court however, thought fit to clarify that in the eventif the appellant incurs any expenses towards any surgery or treatment infuture on account of the injury suffered and if he proves the same, thenthe insurer shall indemnify the same.

69. Dr. Anil B. Patil (PW-2) has deposed categorically that theappellant would require future medical expenses to the tune ofRs. 2,50,000/-. We are of the view that having regard to the evidence on

Arecord that the appellant would be incurring costs towards medicalexpenses in future along with physiotherapy and nursing and consideringthat the appellant at the time of accident was 19 years old, today his agewould be around 29 years, even if bare minimum of Rs. 1000/- is spentper month, then it comes to:

1000 × 12 × 18 = Rs. 2,16,000/-

70. In Vijaykumar Babulal Modi v. State of Gujarat (Deleted)& Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation, 2011 SCC OnLine Guj7349, the High Court of Gujarat had the occasion to consider this aspect.The High Court held:

C“So far as future medical expenses are concerned, the amountclaimed in the petition was to the tune of Rs. 2 lac, whereasthe Tribunal has thought fit to award Rs. 25,000=00.

We have noticed that the injured as on today is 100% disableddue to paraplegia. He has no control over his bowels orDbladder. In such type of cases, treatment like physiotherapy,etc. needs to be given for very very long period of time. Theimportance of physiotherapy for persons injured in roadaccidents has been elaborately stressed upon by the SupremeCourt in the case of R.D. Hattangadi (supra). It is henceimportant to account for all expenses incurred and likely toEbe incurred and award reasonable sum for each head. It isalso important to remember the decreasing money value. Thelife expectancy of the injured is also to be kept in mind. Wefeel that life expectancy of the victim in such case canreasonably be assumed to be atleast 55 years, given theFadvancement in medical science, etc. The claimant’s age onthe date of the accident was 17 years, which means that theremaining period of life expectancy from that date of accidentwould be 38 years i.e. 1991 to 2029. We, therefore, proposeto assess future medical expenses at about Rs. 1,000=00 permonth. In that case, the adequate amount which can beGawarded for future medical expenses would be Rs. 1 lac. We,therefore, enhance the amount of Rs. 25,000=00 awardedtowards future medical expenses to Rs. 1 lac.”

71. In Sanjay Verma v. Haryana Roadways, (2014) 3 SCC 210,the claimant was 25-years-old and suffered from total disability. ThisHCourt accordingly held:

“20. Insofar as “future treatment” is concerned we have nodoubt that the claimant will be required to take treatment fromtime to time even to maintain the present condition of hishealth. In fact, the claimant in his deposition has stated thathe is undergoing treatment at Apollo Hospital at Delhi. Thoughit is not beyond our powers to award compensation beyondwhat has been claimed (Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh [(2003)2 SCC 274 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 523]), in the facts of the presentcase we are of the view that the grant of full compensation,as claimed in the claim petition i.e. Rs 3,00,000 under thehead “future treatment”, would meet the ends of justice. We,therefore, order accordingly.”

72. In view of the aforesaid, we award Rs. 2,16,000/- towardsfuture medical expenses.

(5) Attendant Charges

73. So far as this head is concerned, neither the Tribunal nor theHigh Court thought fit to award anything. The evidence on recordindicates that the appellant is unable to stand, walk, sit or bend his bodyor lift anything heavy. It is not in dispute that the appellant will not beable to work in the same manner as he used to prior to the accident.Indisputably, the appellant has suffered from paraplegia on account ofthe accident and requires an attendant throughout the day. According tothe claimant, the cost of keeping the attendant would be Rs. 4,500/- permonth. We fix it at Rs. 2,000/- per month. As result, we award theattendant charges as under:

2,000 × 12 × 18 = Rs. 4,32,000/-

74. In Abhimanyu Partap Singh (supra), the Claimant wassuffering from 100% disability and this Court held:

“16. The High Court in the impugned order [AbhimanyuPartap Singh v. Namita Sekhon, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H6271] observed that the claimant has now started practice asan advocate, therefore, future loss of earning has beencalculated only for 10 years, applying the multiplier of 16,without looking to the facts that the claimant cannot performthe work of advocacy similar to the other advocates byattending the cases in different courts. The attendant chargeshave been allowed only for 20 years with one attendant. In

fact, not only for determination of future loss of earning butfor attendant charges also the multiplier method should befollowed.

17. The multiplier method has been recognised as mostrealistic and reasonable because it has been decided lookingto the age, inflation rate, uncertainty of life and other realisticneeds. Thus, for determination of just compensation to ensurejustice with the family of the deceased or the injured as thecase may be the compensation can be determined applyingthe said method. Therefore, in our view the Tribunal whilegranting the compensation of future loss as well as earningonly for 10 years and attendant charges only for 20 yearswas not justified. In fact, the said amount should be determinedapplying the multiplier method.

******************

23. In the head of medical expenses, the MACT or the HighCourt has not awarded any compensation presumably becausethe mother of the claimant, who was minor at the time ofaccident, may have claimed the amount of medical expensesbeing an IAS officer. But now the claimant has become major,and looking to the nature of injuries, future medical expensesthat includes the attendant charges, use of diapers due toloss of urination senses is required to be calculated includingfuture medical expenses. The Tribunal awarded Rs 1,92,000in the head of attendant charges @ Rs 1000 p.m. While theHigh Court proceeded on the premises that the rate of theattendant charges is variable after every five years, however,the Court calculated the amount @ Rs 2000 thereafter @ Rs4000 p.m. for period of 20 years and accordingly determinedRs 9,00,000 making enhancement of Rs 7,08,000 in the saidhead. As discussed, if we apply the multiplier method and inview of the judgment of Kajal [Kajal v. Jagdish Chand,(2020) 4 SCC 413 : (2020) 3 SCC (Civ) 27 : (2020) 2 SCC(Cri) 577], we accept the rate of attendant charges at Rs 5000p.m. for 12 hours, looking to the nature of injuries anddisability the claimant is required two attendants at least within24 hours then the expenses in the head of attendant charges

comes to Rs 10,000 p.m. If we apply the multiplier of 18, theamount comes to Rs 21,60,000.”

75. In Vijaykumar Babulal Modi (supra), the Gujarat High Courthad held:

“It is clear that the appellant will require an attendant to assisthim in his daily activities. However, we cannot accept thesubmission of the learned counsel for the appellant who statedthat this will require an expenditure of Rs. 3,000=00 permonth. The Tribunal has awarded sum of Rs. 15,000=00,whereas the claim of the claimant is Rs. 4 lac.

As held in the case of R.D. Hattangadi (supra), the Court neednot be mathematical in calculating expenses on home attendantbut ought to look upon the circumstances prevailing in thesociety to decide the amount. The Supreme Court in R.D.Hattangadi’s case (supra) held as under:-

“9. xxxxxx10. xxxxxx

11. In the case Ward v. James, 1965 (1) All ER 563, it wassaid:

“Although you cannot give man so gravely injured muchfor his “lost years”, you can, however, compensate him forhis loss during his shortened span, that is, during his expected“years of survival”. You can compensate him for his loss ofearnings during that time, and for the cost of treatment, nursingand attendance. But how can you compensate him for beingrendered helpless invalid? He may, owing to brain injury,be rendered unconscious for the rest of his days, or, owing toback injury, be unable to rise from his bed. He has losteverything that makes life worthwhile. Money is no good forhim. Yet Judges and Juries have to do the best they can andgive him what they think is fair. No wonder they find it wellnigh insoluble. They are being asked to calculate theincalculable. The figure is bound to be for the most part aconventional sum. The Judges have worked out pattern,and they keep it in line with the changes in the value of money.”

In its very nature whenever Tribunal or Court is requiredto fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, itinvolves some guess work, some hypothetical consideration,some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of thedisability caused. But all the aforesaid elements have to beviewed with objective standards.”

12. The Supreme Court in the case of C.K. SubramoniaIyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair, AIR 1970 SC 376, in connectionwith the Fatal Accidents Act has observed:

“In assessing damages, the Court must exclude allconsiderations of matter which rest in speculation or fancythough conjecture to some extent is inevitable.”

13. In Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4[th] Edition, Vol. 12regarding non-pecuniary loss at page 446 it has been said:-

“Non-pecuniary loss: the pattern: Damages awarded for painDand suffering and loss of amenity constitute conventionalsum which is taken to be the sum which society deems fair,fairness being interpreted by the courts in the light of previousdecisions. Thus there has been evolved set of conventionalprinciples providing provisional guide to the comparativeEseverity of different injuries, and indicating bracket ofdamages into which particular injury will currently fall.The particular circumstances of the plaintiff, including hisage and any unusual deprivation he may suffer, is reflectedin the actual amount of the award.

The fall in the value of money leads to continuingreassessment of these awards and to periodic reassessmentsof damages at certain key points in the pattern where thedisability is readily identifiable and not subject to largevariations in individual cases.”

We feel that the average cost of keeping home attendantwould be around Rs. 1,000=00 per month for the period oflife expectancy. Accordingly, the annual expenses on anattendant works out to Rs. 12,000=00. We, therefore, proposeto enhance the sum awarded for attendant to Rs. 1 lac.”

76. Thus, we award an amount of Rs. 4,32,000/- towards theHattendant charges.

(6) Litigation Expenses

77. The Tribunal thought fit not to award anything towards thelitigation expenses. The High Court took the view that the appellant isentitled to the amount of Rs. 20,000/- towards the litigation expenses.The appellant claims Rs. 50,000/- towards the litigation expenses.

78. We take notice of the fact that the accident took place on18.07.2012. The appellant is pursuing this litigation for the past almost10 years. The SLP before this Court was filed in 2018. It has been fouryears since then.

79. In Govind Yadav (supra), this Court held:

“12. ……Sometimes the delay and litigation expenses makethe award passed by the Tribunal and even by the High Court(in appeal) meaningless…..”

80. In New India Assurance Company Limited v. Gopali andOthers, (2012) 12 SCC 198, this Court held:

“1. …India is acclaimed for achieving flourishingconstitutional order, an inventive and activist judiciary, aidedby proficient Bar and supported by the State. However, thecourts and tribunals, which the citizens are expected toapproach for redressal of their grievance and protection oftheir fundamental, constitutional and legal rights, are besetwith the problems of delays and costs. In country where36% of the population lives below the poverty line, thesedeficiencies in the justice-delivery system prevent largesegment of the population from availing legal remedies. Thedisadvantaged and the poor are deprived of access to justicebecause of the costs of litigation, both in terms of actualexpenses and lost opportunities, and the laudable goal ofsecuring justice—social, economic and political enshrinedin the Preamble to the Constitution of India remains an illusionfor them.

2. The infrastructure of courts and the processes which governthem are simply inaccessible to the poor. The State, which hasbeen mandated by Article 39-A of the Constitution to ensurethat the operation of the legal system promotes justice byproviding free legal aid and that opportunities for securing

justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic orother disabilities, has not been able to create an effectivemechanism for making justice accessible to the poor,downtrodden and disadvantaged. In the last two-and-a-halfdecades the institution of the Legal Services Authorities hasrendered yeoman’s service in the field of providing legal aidto the poor but lot is required to be done for ensuring justiceto economically deprived section of the society and those whosuffer from other disabilities like illiteracy and ignorance.

3. We have prefaced the disposal of this petition, filed againstthe order dated 22-3-2007 [New India Assurance Co.Ltd. v. Sheo Chand, Special Appeal Civil (SAC) No. 49 of2005, dated 22-3-2007 (Raj)] passed by the Division Benchof the Rajasthan High Court whereby the special appeal filedby the appellant against the judgment of the learned SingleJudge was dismissed as not maintainable, by making theaforementioned observations because in last almost 20 years

the claimants—the aged parents, wife and five children ofNanag Ram, who became victim of road accident in 1992,must have exhausted all their resources in prosecuting andcontesting the litigation till the stage of the High Court andthey must not have been left with money sufficient for engagingan advocate in this Court and also because in last almost fiveyears, during which the special leave petition remainedpending in this Court, they must have lost all hopes to getjustice.

4. The learned Single Judge of the High Court had allowedthe appeal filed by the dependants of Nanag Ram underSection 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short “theAct”) and enhanced the compensation awarded by the MotorAccidents Claims Tribunal, Jaipur (for short “the Tribunal”)by an amount of Rs 4,85,000 and directed the appellant topay the enhanced compensation with interest at the rate of12% per annum from the date of filing the claim petition till31-12-2000 and at the rate of 9% from 1-1-2001 till thepayment thereof, but on account of ex parte interim orderpassed by this Court on 23-7-2007 [New India AssuranceCo. Ltd. v. Sheo Chand, SLP (C) No. 11345 of 2007, order

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

dated 23-7-2007 (SC)], the claimants could get only paltrysum of Rs 2 lakhs and they perhaps thought that it will not beworthwhile to spend money for contesting the special leavepetition filed by the appellant. This is perhaps the thinking ofmany thousands of poor litigants, who succeed in the courtsbelow and the High Courts, but cannot afford the cost andexpenses of contesting litigation in the highest court of thecountry and suffer silently in the name of the Almighty Godby treating it as their destiny.”

81. In Syed Sadiq v. Divisional Manager, United IndiaInsurance Company Limited, (2014) 2 SCC 735, this Court held:

“14. Further, along with compensation under conventionalheads, the appellant claimant is also entitled to the cost oflitigation as per the legal principle laid down by this Courtin Balram Prasad v. Kunal Saha [(2014) 1 SCC 384 : (2014)1 SCC (Civ) 327]. Therefore, under this head, we find it justand proper to allow Rs 25,000.”

82. In view of the aforesaid, we award an amount of Rs. 50,000/- towards litigation expenses.

(7) Loss of Conveyance

83. Under this head, the Tribunal vide order dated 21.01.2014,

held:

“15. Conveyance, special diet etc: The claimant was admittedto the hospital and thereafter attended the hospital for furthertreatment. The claimant is also entitled for special diet andnutrition. Therefore, I award an amount of Rs.20,000/- underthis head.”

84. The Tribunal awarded Rs. 20,000/- under this head. The HighCourt in Para 11 of its impugned judgment dated 25.04.2018, held:

“The compensation awarded under the head of pain andsuffering, medical expenses, conveyance, special diet, etc.,loss of amenities in life and marriage prospects is just andproper and same is not disturbed”

85. The High Court thought fit to confirm Rs. 20,000/- as awardedby the Tribunal.

A86. However, the appellant has claimed Rs. 50,000/- towardsloss of conveyance.

87. This Court in Master Ayush (supra) held:

“14. The determination of damages in personal injury casesis not easy. The mental and physical loss cannot be computedBin terms of money but there is no other way to compensate thevictim except by payment of just compensation. Therefore, wefind that in view of the physical condition, the appellant isentitled to one attendant for the rest of his life though he maybe able to walk with the help of assistant device. The deviceCalso requires to be replaced every 5 years. Therefore, it isreasonable to award cost of 2 devices i.e. Rs 10 lakhs. Theappellant has not only lost his childhood but also adult life.Therefore, loss of marriage prospects would also be requiredto be awarded. The learned Tribunal has rejected the claimof taxi expenses for the reason that the taxi driver has notDbeen produced. It is impossible to produce the numerous taxidrivers. Still further, the Tribunal should have realised thecondition of the child who had complete sensory loss in thelegs. Therefore, if the parents of the child have taken him ina taxi, probably that was the only option available to them.EAccordingly, we award sum of Rs 2 lakhs as conveyance”charges.

88. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the New IndiaAssurance Company Ltd. v. Amit Kumar Yadav and Another, F.A.O.Nos. 1285 & 1489 of 2008 decided on March 23, 2022, held as under:

“22. The question of determination of compensation directlycame up before Supreme Court in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumarand another, 2011 (1) SCC 343. Therein, claimant sustainedfracture of both bone of left leg and fracture of left radius ina motor accident on 01.10.1991. Tribunal awardedcompensation under the heads of loss of future earning, painand sufferings, loss of earning during period of treatment,medical expenses, conveyance and special diet. He wasawarded total compensation of Rs. 94,700/- and 9% interest.His appeal for enhancement was rejected by Tribunal andultimately went in appeal to Supreme Court. It observed that

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

scheme of Act, 1988 shows that award must be “just”, whichmeans that compensation should, to the extent possible, fullyand adequately restore claimant to the position prior to theaccident. The object of awarding damages is to make goodthe loss suffered as result of wrong done as far as moneycan do so, in fair, reasonable and equitable manner. personis not only to be compensated for physical injury, but also forthe loss which he suffered as result of such injury. It meansthat he is to be compensated for his inability to lead full life,his inability to enjoy those normal amenities which he wouldhave enjoyed but for the injuries, and his inability to earn asmuch as he used to earn or could have earned……”

89. Hence, we may grant the appellant loss of conveyance andspecial diet up to Rs 50,000/- considering that after the accident atKulgod-Gokak Road, the appellant was shifted to Lakeview HospitalBelgaum wherein he was admitted as an indoor patient from 18.7.2012to 6.8.2012 for 19 days, and took treatment for the injuries suffered byhim, and continued to take the treatment after getting discharged fromthe hospital as well.

90. In view of the aforesaid, we may award Rs. 50,000/- towardsloss of conveyance and special diet.

NON-PECUNIARY EXPENSES

(8) Pain and Suffering

91. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the case ofVirendra Kumar v. Vijay Kumar and Others, (2021) ILR 3 All 272,while discussing the distinction between pecuniary and non-pecuniarydamages held as under:

“9. The law with respect to the grant of compensation in injurycases is well-settled. The injured is entitled to pecuniary aswell as non-pecuniary damages. Pecuniary damages alsoknown as special damages are generally designed to makegood the pecuniary loss which is capable of being calculatedin terms of money whereas non-pecuniary damages areincapable of being assessed by arithmetical calculations. Thepecuniary or special damages, generally include the expensesincurred by the claimants on his treatment, special diet,

468SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Aconveyance, cost of nursing/attending, loss of income, lossof earning capacity and other material loss, which may requireany special treatment or aid to the insured for the rest of hislife. The general damages or the non-pecuniary loss includethe compensation for mental or physical shock, pain,suffering, loss of amenities of life, disfiguration, loss ofBmarriage prospects, loss of expected or earning of life,inconvenience, hardship, disappointment, frustration, mentalstress, dejectment and unhappiness in future life, etc.”

92. The Tribunal awarded sum of Rs. 40,000/- for the pain andsuffering. The High Court affirmed the amount of Rs. 40,000/-. However,Cthe appellant is seeking enhancement of Rs. 40,000/- to make itRs. 1,00,000/- towards compensation for the pain and sufferings.

93. Pain and suffering would be categorized as non-pecuniaryloss as it is incapable of being arithmetically calculated. Therefore, whencompensation is to be awarded for pain and suffering, specialDcircumstances of the claimant have to be taken into account includingthe victim’s age, the unusual deprivation the victim has suffered, theeffect thereof on his or her future life. This Court in the case of R.D.Hattangadi (supra), while discussing this aspect held that:

“10. It cannot be disputed that because of the accident theEappellant who was an active practising lawyer has becomeparaplegic on account of the injuries sustained by him. It isreally difficult in this background to assess the exact amountof compensation for the pain and agony suffered by theappellant and for having become lifelong handicapped.FNo amount of compensation can restore the physical frameof the appellant. That is why it has been said by courts thatwhenever any amount is determined as the compensationpayable for any injury suffered during an accident, the objectis to compensate such injury “so far as money cancompensate” because it is impossible to equate the moneyGwith the human sufferings or personal deprivations. Moneycannot renew broken and shattered physical frame.

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17. …..When compensation is to be awarded for pain andsuffering and loss of amenity of life, the special circumstancesH

of the claimant have to be taken into account including hisage, the unusual deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereofon his future life. The amount of compensation for non-pecuniary loss is not easy to determine but the award mustreflect that different circumstances have been taken intoconsideration…….”

94. This Court in the case of Mahadeva Shetty (supra), whilediscussing the factors to be taken into consideration while awardingcompensation for pain and suffering held that:

“18. person not only suffers injuries on account of accidentbut also suffers in mind and body on account of the accidentthroughout his life and feeling is developed that he is nomore normal man and cannot enjoy the amenities of life asanother normal person can. While fixing compensation forpain and suffering as also for loss of amenities of life, featureslike his age, marital status and unusual deprivation he hasundertaken in his life have to be reckoned.”

95. In another case of this Court in Nizam’s Institute of MedicalSciences v. Prasanth S. Dhananka and Others, (2009) 6 SCC 1, thisCourt granted very high amount of Rs. 10,00,000/- on account of thepain and suffering of the victim. That was case of engineering studentaged 20 years, who was victim of medical negligence. The case beforethis Court was of young student who being the victim of paraplegiawas confined to wheelchair, and who pursued career in education andultimately got employed as I.T. engineer at handsome salary.

96. This Court has awarded compensation for pain and sufferingby looking into the circumstances of the case. Therefore, consideringthat the appellant was only 19 years at the time of the accident andsuffered permanent disability of 45%, he ought to be awardedcompensation under this head.

97. Furthermore, the decision of this Court in Nagappa (supra),holds that there is no embargo in awarding compensation more than thatclaimed by the Claimant.

98. In view of the aforesaid, we award an amount ofRs. 1,00,000/- towards pain and suffering.

A(9) Marriage Prospects

99. The Tribunal held that the appellant was young, and due to thephysical disability, his marriage prospects are now almost nil. The Tribunalawarded to Rs. 20,000/- under this head. The High Court upheld theamount of Rs. 20,000/-.

100. In Sanjay Kumar (supra), this Court observed as under:

“14… On the point of loss of marriage prospects, we feel thatit is major loss, keeping in mind the young age of theappellant and the High Court has gravely erred in notawarding adequate compensation separately under this headCand instead clubbed it under “loss of future enjoyment oflife” and “pain and suffering”. We thereby award Rs 75,000towards loss of marriage prospects…”

101. In Ibrahim v. Raju and Others, (2011) 10 SCC 634, thisCourt held:D

“19. On account of the injuries suffered by him, the prospectsof the appellant’s marriage have considerably reduced.Rather, they are extremely bleak. In any case, on account ofthe fracture of pelvis, he will not be able to enjoy thematrimonial life. Therefore, the award of Rs 50,000 underEthis head must be treated as wholly inadequate. In the factsand circumstances of the case, we feel that sum of Rs 2lakhs should be awarded to the appellant for loss of marriageprospects and enjoyment of life.”

102. In Master Ayush (supra), this Court observed that the victimF(5-year-old, paraplegic) was entitled to Rs.3,00,000/-.

“14.… The appellant has not only lost his childhood but alsoadult life. Therefore, loss of marriage prospects would alsobe required to be awarded…”

103. In view of the aforesaid, we award sum of Rs. 3,00,000/-Gtowards loss of marriage prospects.

(10) Loss of Amenities

104. The Tribunal held that an amount of Rs. 30,000/- should beawarded towards loss of amenities. The High Court upheld the amount

SIDRAM v. THE DIVISIONAL MANAGER, UNITED INDIAINSURANCE CO. LTD. AND ANR. [J. B. PARDIWALA, J.]

of Rs. 30,000/- as awarded by the Tribunal. The claim of the appellanttowards loss of amenities is Rs. 50,000/-.

105. This Court in the case of Pappu Deo Yadav (supra),observed:

“6. The principle consistently followed by this court inassessing motor vehicle compensation claims, is to place thevictim in as near position as she or he was in before theaccident, with other compensatory directions for loss ofamenities and other payments. These general principles havebeen stated and reiterated in several decisions. [Govind Yadavv. New India Insurance Co. Ltd. [Govind Yadav v. New IndiaInsurance Co. Ltd., (2011) 10 SCC 683 .….]”

106. In R.D. Hattangadi (supra) it has been held:

“12. In its very nature whenever tribunal or court isrequired to fix the amount of compensation in cases ofaccident, it involves some guesswork, some hypotheticalconsideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the natureof the disability caused. But all the aforesaid elements haveto be viewed with objective standards.

17. ……When compensation is to be awarded for pain andsuffering and loss of amenity of life, the special circumstancesof the claimant have to be taken into account including hisage, the unusual deprivation he has suffered, the effect thereofon his future life…..”

107. This Court in the case of Raj Kumar (supra) held:

“5. ….A person is not only to be compensated for the physicalinjury, but also for the loss which he suffered as result ofsuch injury. This means that he is to be compensated for hisinability to lead full life, his inability to enjoy those normalamenities which he would have enjoyed but for the injuries,and his inability to earn as much as he used to earn or couldhave earned…..”

108. In the case of Sri Laxman alias Laxman Mourya (supra),this Court observed:

“15. The ratio of the abovenoted judgments is that if the victimof an accident suffers permanent or temporary disability, thenefforts should always be made to award adequatecompensation not only for the physical injury and treatment,but also for the pain, suffering and trauma caused due to theaccident, loss of earning and the victim’s inability to lead anormal life and enjoy amenities, which he would have enjoyedbut for the disability caused due to the accident.”

109. This Court in Govind Yadav (supra) held:

“18. In our view, the principles laid down in Arvind KumarMishra v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 254and Raj Kumar v. Ajay Kumar (2011) 1 SCC 343 must befollowed by all the Tribunals and the High Courts indetermining the quantum of compensation payable to thevictims of accident, who are disabled either permanently ortemporarily. If the victim of the accident suffers permanentdisability, then efforts should always be made to awardadequate compensation not only for the physical injury andtreatment, but also for the loss of earning and his inability tolead normal life and enjoy amenities, which he would haveenjoyed but for the disability caused due to the accident.”

110. Vijaykumar Babulal Modi (supra), the High Court of Gujaratobserved as under:

“It appears that the claim under this head is to the tune ofRs.3 lac. However, the Tribunal has not awarded any sumunder the head ‘loss of amenities’. We are of the opinion thatFthis head must take into account all aspects of normal lifethat have been lost due to the injury caused. As per R.D.Hattangadi’s case (supra), this includes variety of matterssuch as the inability to walk, run or sit, etc. We include heretoo the loss of childhood pleasure such as the ability to freelyGplay, dance, run, etc., the loss of ability to freely move ortravel without assistance. Then, there is the virtual impossibilityof marriage as well as complete loss of the ability to havesex and to have and nurture children.”

111. In view of the aforesaid, we award an amount ofRs. 50,000/- for the loss of amenities taking into consideration the fact

that the appellant was 19 years old at the time of the accident, and alsoconsidering the nature of injuries suffered by him and the extent of hisdisability.

112. The total compensation awarded by us under different headsis as under:

113. Before we close this matter, it needs to be underlined, asobserved in Pappu Deo Yadav (supra) that Courts should be mindfulthat serious injury not only permanently imposes physical limitationsand disabilities but too often inflicts deep mental and emotional scarsupon the victim. The attendant trauma of the victim’s having to live in aworld entirely different from the one she or he is born into, as an invalid,and with degrees of dependence on others, robbed of complete personalchoice or autonomy, should forever be in the judge’s mind, whenevertasked to adjudge compensation claims. Severe limitations inflicted dueto such injuries undermine the dignity (which is now recognized as anintrinsic component of the right to life under Article 21) of the individual,thus depriving the person of the essence of the right to wholesome lifewhich she or he had lived, hitherto. From the world of the able bodied,the victim is thrust into the world of the disabled, itself most discomfitingand unsettling. If courts nit-pick and award niggardly amounts obliviousof these circumstances, there is resultant affront to the injured victim.[See: Pappu Deo Yadav (supra)]114. We, therefore, direct the respondent No. 1 herein – insurancecompany to pay the appellant-claimant the difference in the compensation

Aawarded herein as against the amount of Rs. 9,26,800/- as awarded bythe High Court. The amount awarded by this Court shall be deposited bythe respondent No. 1 – insurance company within period of eight weeksfrom today after adjusting the amount already deposited. The rate ofinterest at the enhanced amount is to be the same i.e., 6% per annum.

B115. In the result, the appeal is allowed to the aforesaid extent.There shall be no order as to costs.

116. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of accordingly.

Nidhi Jain

C(Assisted by : Neha Sharma, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.