SHANKARLAL NADANI versus SOHANLAL JAIN

[2022] 13 S.C.R. 841

SHANKARLAL NADANI

SOHANLAL JAIN

(Civil Appeal No. 2816 of 2022)

APRIL 12, 2022

[HEMANT GUPTA AND V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN, JJ.]

Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 – Suit for Possession –Rent Tribunal’s Jurisdiction after the applicability of Act – Validityof decree passed by the Civil Court – The appellant’s father was thetenant of the shop since 1982, whose owner was the father of therespondent – After the death of the appellant’s father, the shop wascontinuing for monthly tenancy of the appellant – The premises inquestion was not in the urban area when the suit for possessionwas filed on 18.04.2013 – During the pendency of the suit, theState Government issued notification extending the provisions ofthe Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 w.e.f. 11.5.2015 – The CivilCourt passed the decree for possession on 28.05.2015 against theappellants even though the Act became applicable to the area inquestion w.e.f. 11.5.2015 – The High Court on appeal being filed,held that the decree in civil suit could be passed after the applicabilityof the Act to the area in question and dismissed the appeal – Onappeal, held: The Act has come into force in respect of the premisesin question on 11.5.2015 i.e., after the civil suit was filed, therefore,the decree could validly be passed and executed – After theapplicability of the Act to the area in question, the landlord andtenant dispute can be raised only before the Rent Tribunal but notbefore the civil court – However, suit filed before the civil courtprior to the applicability of the Act has to be decided by the civilcourt – decree passed by the civil court is valid and executablewhich is not interdicted by the applicability of the Act to the area inquestion – The Act is applicable to the area in question from thedate the notification came into force and it does not bar the decreeof the civil court or the pendency of such civil suit – One of theprinciples is that the rights of the parties have to be determined onthe date when lis commences i.e., on the date of filing of the suit –The plaintiff is entitled to decree on that day when he initiated theproceedings, therefore, rights of the parties have to be examined as

DEF

Aon the said day – No error in the order passed by the High Court –Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – Sec. 106.

Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge & Ors.(1992) 1 SCC 751 : [1992] 1 SCR 349; Shri Kishan& Ors. v. Manoj Kumar & Ors. (1998) 2 SCC 710 :[1998] 1 SCR 830 ; Mansoor Khan v. MotiramHarebhan Kharat & Anr. (2002) 5 SCC 462 : [2002] 2SCR 594 - relied on.

K. Ramnarayan Khandelwal v. Shri Pukhraj Banthiya2017 SCC OnLine Raj 4178; Om Prakash Gupta v.DIG Vijendrapal Gupta (1982) 2 SCC 61 : [1982] 3SCR 491; Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera(1984) 3 SCC 352:[1984] 2 SCR 333; Nand KishoreMarwah & Ors. v. Samundri Devi (1987) 4 SCC 382 :[1988] 1 SCR 158; Mani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra(1980) 1 SCC 1 : [1980] 2 SCR 141; Atma Ram Mittalv. Ishwar Singh Punia (1988) 4 SCC 284 : [1988] 2Suppl. SCR 528; Rajender Bansal & Ors. v. Bhuru(Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors. (2017) 4SCC 202 : [2016] 9 SCR 800; Shree Chamundi MopedsLtd. v. Church of South India Trust Association CSICinod Secretariat, Madras (1992) 3 SCC 1 : [1992]2 SCR 999 ; Pandurang Ramchandra Mandlik & Anr.v. Shantibai Ramchandra Ghatge & Ors. 1989 Supp(2) SCC 627: [1989] 2 Suppl. SCR 1 ; Dilip v. Mohd.Azizul Haq & Anr. (2000) 3 SCC 607 : [2000] 2 SCR 280; Subhash Chander & Ors. v. Bharat PetroleumCorporation Ltd. (BPCL) & Anr. 2022 SCC OnLineSC 98; ECGC Limited v. Mokul Shriram EPC JV21 2022SCC OnLine SC 184; Garikapati Veeraya v. N. SubbiahChoudhry & Ors. AIR 1957 SC 540 : [1957] 0 SCR 488; Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner ofSales Tax, M.P., Nagpur AIR 967 SC 344; HardeodasJagannath v. The State of Assam AIR 1970 SC 724 :[1969] 2 SCR 261 - referred to.

Case Law Reference

[1982] 3 SCR 491

referred to

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.2816of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.12.2021 of the High Courtof Judicature for Rajasthan, Jodhpur in S.B. Civil Second Appeal No.119of 2021.

With

Civil Appeal No.2817 of 2022

Gopal Shankarnarayan, Sr. Adv., Deepak Prakash, Ms. DivyangnaMalik, Vishal Somany, Ms. Vishnu Priya, Subhash Choudhary, Ms. TanyaSrivastava, Nachiketa Vajpayee, Advs. for the Appellant.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

HEMANT GUPTA, J.

1. This judgment shall dispose of two appeals arising out ofjudgment dated 16.12.2021 passed by the High Court of Judicature ofRajasthan, Jodhpur whereby the tenant’s revision petition against thedecree for possession was dismissed.

A2. For the sake of convenience, the facts in Civil Appeal No. 2816of 2022 (Shankarlal Nadani v. Sohanlal Jain) are mentionedhereinafter.

3. The appellant’s father was the tenant of Shop No. 4 situated atJain Katla, Bikaner Road, Suratgarh since 1982, whose owner was theBfather of the respondent herein at that time. The premises were let outon lease for monthly rent of Rs.583.33. After the death of the appellant’sfather, the shop was continuing for monthly tenancy of the appellant.The premises in question was not in the urban area when the suit forpossession was filed on 18.4.2013 after serving notice of terminationof tenancy under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882[1].CDuring the pendency of the suit, the State Government issued anotification on 11.7.2014 extending the provisions of the Rajasthan RentControl Act, 2001[2] w.e.f. 11.5.2015.

4. The Civil Court passed the decree for possession against theappellants on 28.5.2015 even though the Act became applicable to theDarea in question w.e.f. 11.5.2015. Aggrieved against the said judgmentand decree, the appellants filed first appeal before the Additional DistrictJudge, Suratgarh which was dismissed on 5.10.2021. In the second appealbefore the High Court, the appellants relied on the Division Benchjudgment of the Rajasthan High Court reported as K. RamnarayanEKhandelwal v. ShriPukhraj Banthiya[3]wherein it has been held thatthe decree in civil suit could not be passed after the applicability of theAct to the area in question. The High Court in the impugned judgmentfound that such judgment has been stayed by this Court in Special LeavePetition, therefore, the judgment is not binding. In view of the said fact,the High Court held that the decree in civil suit could be passed as theFsame view was adopted by another co-ordinate Bench of the High Courtin another case[4] and consequently, dismissed the appeals filed by theappellants.

5. Learned counsel for the appellants argued that the Special LeavePetition arising out of the Division Bench judgment of the RajasthanGHigh Court in K. Ramnarayan Khandelwal and other similar casesare pending final disposal before this Court and that, therefore, the present

1 For short, the ‘TP Act’2 For short, the ‘Act’3 2017 SCC OnLine Raj 4178H4 Mohd. Rafiq v. Hanuman Sahai & Ors. (SBCWP No. 16681 of 2019)

appeals should also be heard along with the said matters. But we do notthink so. Though, ideally all cases in which the same or similar questionsare pending, are taken up together, but there is no bar for us to deal withthe matters that come up before us. Once the question of law is answeredin one matter, all other matters, pending at various stages, will followsuit. In any case, we find that the interest of the appellants is materiallydifferent from the interest of the petitioners in the Special LeavePetition(s) which are pending. In the present case, the appellants aretenants whose interest is in continuing to be in possession whereas thepetition(s) pending before this Court are preferred on behalf of thelandlord. We have heard Mr. Gopal Sankaranarayanan, learned seniorcounsel appearing for the appellants assisted by Mr. Deepak Prakash,learned Advocate on Record on the legal question as to whether thedecree passed by the civil court after the Act is made applicable to thearea in question can be executed.

6. The Act was applicable in the first instance to such of themunicipal areas which were comprising of the District Headquarters inthe State and later on to such of the other municipal areas having apopulation exceeding fifty thousand as per 1991 census as the StateGovernment may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify fromtime to time as per Section 1(2) of the Act. Section 18 of the Act dealswith jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal whereas Section 32 repeals theRajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950. Therelevant provisions from the Act read thus:

“1. Short title, extent and commencement.—(1) This Actmay be called the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001.

(2) It shall extend in first instance to such of the municipal areaswhich are comprising the District Headquarters in the State andlater on to such of the other municipal areas having populationexceeding fifty thousand as per 1991 Census as the StateGovernment may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specifyfrom time to time.

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18. Jurisdiction of Rent Tribunal.—(1) Notwithstandinganything contained in any other law for the time being in force, inthe areas to which this Act extends, only the Rent Tribunal and nocivil court shall have jurisdiction to hear and decide the petitions

Arelating to disputes between landlord and tenant and mattersconnected therewith and ancillary thereto, filed under the provisionsof this Act:

Provided that Rent Tribunal shall, in deciding suchpetitions to which provisions contained in Chapters II and III ofBthis Act do not apply, have due regard to the provisions of Transferof Properties Act, 1882 (Act 4 of 1882), the Contract Act, 1872(Act 9 of 1872), or any other substantive law applicable to suchmatter in the same manner in which such law would have beenapplied had the dispute been brought before civil court by wayof suit…

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32. Repeal and Savings.—The Rajasthan Premises (Control ofRent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (Act, 1950 (Act 17 of 1950) shallstand repealed with effect from the date notified under sub-section(3) of Section 11 of this Act.

D(2) The repeal under sub-section (1) shall not affect—(a) anything duly done or suffered under the enactment sorepealed; or(b) any right, title, privilege, obligation or liability acquired orEincurred under the enactment so repealed; or

(c) any fine, penalty or punishment incurred or suffered uder theprovision of the enactment so repealed.

G7. The argument of learned counsel for the appellants is that afterthe notification of the State Government issued on 11.7.2014, becameoperative from 11.5.2015, it was the Rent Tribunal alone which wouldhave jurisdiction to hear and decide the petitions related to disputesbetween landlord and tenant and not the civil courts. Therefore, thedecree of possession could not be passed by the civil court as it can beH

passed only by the Rent Tribunal. Reliance was placed upon non-obstanteclause with which sub-section (1) of Section 18 of the Act starts so as togive overriding effect to the Act in question.

8. The civil court ceases to have jurisdiction to hear and decidethe petitions as only the Rent Tribunal would have jurisdiction to decidesuch dispute but it does not deal with the suits and proceedings initiatedand pending on the date of applicability of the Act to the municipal area.There is no express or implied provision in the Act in respect of thedecrees passed prior to the applicability of the Act to the area in question.The notification issued cannot have any retrospective application or theAct contemplates the applicability of the Act with retrospective effect.

9. We are of the opinion that whether or not the decree of evictioncan be passed after the Act became applicable would depend upon thelanguage of the statute.

10. short resume of the various judgments of this Court on themaintainability of decree by the civil court may be noticed. Under theUttar Pradesh Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction)Act, 1972[5], the Act is not applicable for period of ten years from thedate of construction of the building. Section 20 of the U.P. Rent Actrestricts the right of landlord to evict tenant which reads thus:

“2. Exemptions from operation of Act.—(1) Nothing in this Actshall apply to [the following, namely]:—

(1)xxxxxx

(2) [Except as provided in sub-section (5) of Section 12, sub-section (1-A) of Section 21, sub-section (2) of Section 24, Sections24-A, 24-B, 24-C or sub-section (3) of Section 29, nothing in thisAct shall apply to building during period of ten years from thedate on which its construction is completed]:

20. Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except on specifiedgrounds. —(1) Save as provided in sub-section (2), no suit shallbe instituted for the eviction of tenant from building,notwithstanding the determination of his tenancy by efflux of timeor on the expiration of notice to quit or in any other manner:

Provided that nothing in this sub-section shall bar suitfor the eviction of tenant on the determination of his tenancy by

5 For short, the “U.P. Rent Act”

848SUPREME COURT REPORTS

[2022] 13 S.C.R.

Aefflux of time where the tenancy for fixed term was enteredinto by or in pursuance of compromise or adjustment arrived atwith reference to suit, appeal, revision or execution proceeding,which is either recorded in court or otherwise reduced to writingand signed by the tenant.”

B11. In Om Prakash Gupta v. DIG Vijendrapal Gupta[6], questionarose whether the Rent Act would be applicable to building which wasconstructed prior to the applicability of the Rent Act and whether theexemption granted to newly constructed buildings would be available tosuch building. It was held that the Rent Act is not applicable to buildingwhich does not have standing for ten years, even if the building wasCconstructed prior to the applicability of the State Urban Rent Act to thearea in question. However, in later judgment reported as Vineet Kumarv. Mangal Sain Wadhera[7], it was held that under the U.P. Rent Act,even if the suit was filed within the exemption period and if the decree isnot passed, the decree would be not executable after the Rent Act willbecame applicable. This Court held as under:D

“17. The appellant in the present case only seeks the protectionof the new Rent Act which became applicable to the premises inquestion during the pendency of the litigation. We see no reasonwhy the benefit of the new Rent Act be not given to the appellant.Section 20 of the new Rent Act provides bar to suit for evictionEof tenant except on the specified grounds as provided in thesection. Sub-section (4) of Section 20 stipulates that in any suitfor eviction on the grounds mentioned in clause (a) to sub-section(2) viz. the arrears of rent, if at the first hearing of the suit thetenant in default pays all arrears of rent to the landlord or depositsin court the entire amount of rent and damages for use andFoccupation of the building due from him, such damages for useand occupation being calculated at the same rate as rent togetherwith interest thereon at the rate of nine per cent per annum andthe landlord’s cost of the suit in respect thereof after deductingtherefrom any amount already deposited by the tenant under sub-Gsection (1) of Section 30, the court may, in lieu of passing decreefor eviction on that ground, pass an order relieving the tenantagainst his liability for eviction on that ground. Sections 39 and 40of the new Rent Act also indicate that the benefit of the new Act

6 (1982) 2 SCC 617 (1984) 3 SCC 352H

will be given to the tenant if the conditions contemplated in thosesections are satisfied. Section 39 also indicates that the partiesare entitled to make necessary amendment in their pleadings andto adduce additional evidence where necessary.”

12. However, the said judgment was explained in later judgmentreported as Nand Kishore Marwah & Ors. v. Samundri Devi[8] whereinit was held as under:

“14. …. This is put in Chapter IV with the heading “Regulationand Eviction” and the section starts with title which is printed inbold “Bar of suit for eviction of tenant except, on specified grounds”and again in the wording of the section itself it provides: “No suitshall be instituted for eviction”. This clearly indicates that therestriction put under Section 20 is to the institution of the suit itselfand therefore it is clear that if the provisions of this Act appliesthen no suit for eviction can be instituted except on the groundsspecified in the sub-sections of this section. Keeping in view thelanguage of this section if we examine the provisions contained insub-section (2) of Section 2 it will be clear that for newlyconstructed building the provisions of this Act will not apply for 10years and therefore so far as the restriction under Section 20 isconcerned they will not apply and therefore it is clear that within10 years as provided for in sub-section (2) of Section 2 restrictionon the institution of suit as provided for in Section 20 sub-section(1) quoted above will not be applicable and it is thus clear thatduring the pendency of the litigation even if 10 years expired therestriction will not be attracted as the suit has been instituted within10 years and therefore restriction as provided for in Section 20cannot be attracted.”

13. Later in Ramesh Chandra v. III Additional District Judge& Ors.[9], three-Judge Bench of this Court held as under:

“12. Yet another contention urged by the learned counsel for thetenant on the strength of Vineet Kumar v. Mangal SainWadhera [(1984) 3 SCC 352] is that inasmuch as the statutoryperiod of ten years expired during the pendency of the suit, theAct became applicable and the suit must be disposed of only inaccordance with the provisions of the Act and in particular sub-section (2) of Section 20. This decision has, however, been8 (1987) 4 SCC 3829 (1992) 1 SCC 751

Aexplained in subsequent decision in Nand KishoreMarwah v. Samundri Devi [(1987) 4 SCC 382] wherein it hasbeen held that the law applicable on the date of the institution ofthe suit alone governs the suit and the mere fact that the statutoryperiod of 10 years expires during the pendency of the suit/appeal/revision, the Act does not become applicable. It was held that theBsuit has to be tried and decided without reference to the Act. Weare in respectful agreement with the view expressed in NandKishore Marwah [(1987) 4 SCC 382].”

14. In Mani Subrat Jain v. Raja Ram Vohra[10], the provisions ofEast Punjab Rent Restriction Act, 1949[11] were being examined. It wasCa case where consent decree was passed by the civil court but beforethe decree could be executed, the Punjab Rent Act was extended to theurban area of Chandigarh. Section 13 of the said Act is to the effect thata tenant in possession of building or rented land shall not be evictedtherefrom in execution of decree passed before or after thecommencement of the Act or otherwise, before or after the terminationDof the tenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this section.Considering the said provision, this Court held that person who hassuffered decree of the civil court continues to be tenant and since hewas in possession on the date when the Punjab Rent Act was extendedto Chandigarh, therefore, the tenant is not liable to be evicted after theEcommencement of the Punjab Rent Act. Such judgment was in view ofSection 13 of the Punjab Rent Act which bars the execution of decreepassed before or after the commencement of the Punjab Rent Act whichreads thus:“13. Eviction of tenants. - (1) tenant in possession of buildingor rented land shall not be evicted therefrom in execution of aFdecree passed before or after the commencement of this Act orotherwise and whether before or after the termination of thetenancy, except in accordance with the provisions of this Section,[or in pursuance of an order made under Section 13 of the PunjabUrban Rent Restriction Act, 1947, as subsequently amended].”

G15. The Haryana Urban (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1973[12]provides that tenant in possession of building or rented land shallnot be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisions ofthis section. The relevant provisions of the said Act read thus:10 (1980) 1 SCC 111 For short, the “Punjab Rent Act”H12 For short, the “Haryana Rent Act”

xxxx

(3) Nothing in this Act shall apply to any building the constructionof which is completed on or after the commencement of this Actfor period of ten years from the date of its completion.

xx xx xx

13 (1) tenant in possession of building or rented land shallnot be evicted therefrom except in accordance with the provisionsof this section.”

16. perusal of the said provisions goes to show that the tenantcannot be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the saidAct. Considering the said provisions, this Court in judgment reportedas Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia[13] held that if the suit hasbeen filed within the exemption period of ten years, the decree could beexecuted. This Court held as under:

“8. It is well-settled that no man should suffer because of thefault of the court or delay in the procedure. Broom has stated themaxim “actus curiae neminem gravabit” — an act of court shallprejudice no man. Therefore, having regard to the time normallyconsumed for adjudication, the ten years’ exemption or holidayfrom the application of the Rent Act would become illusory, if thesuit has to be filed within that time and be disposed of finally. It iscommon knowledge that unless suit is instituted soon after thedate of letting it would never be disposed of within ten years andeven then within that time it may not be disposed of. That willmake the ten years holiday from the Rent Act illusory and provideno incentive to the landlords to build new houses to solve problemof shortages of houses. The purpose of legislation would thus bedefeated. Purposive interpretation in social ameliorationlegislation is an imperative irrespective of anything else.

9. xxxxxx If the immunity from the operationof the Rent Act is made and depended upon that ultimate disposalof the case within the period of exemption of ten years which is inreality an impossibility, then there would be empty reasons. In ouropinion, bearing in mind the well-settled principle that the rights ofthe parties crystallise to (sic on) the date of the institution of thesuit as enunciated by this Court in Om PrakashGupta v. Digvijendrapal Gupta [(1982) 2 SCC 61 : (1982) 3

ASCR 491] , the meaningful construction must be that the exemptionwould apply for period of ten years and will continue to beavailable until suit is disposed of or adjudicated. Such suit orproceeding must be instituted within the stipulated period of tenyears. Once rights crystallise the adjudication must be inaccordance with law.”B17. In three-judge Bench judgment reported as Shri Kishan &Ors. v. Manoj Kumar & Ors.[14], the judgment of this Court in VineetKumar was specifically overruled. This Court held as under:“20. Thus it is seen that this Court has been consistently takingthe view that suit instituted during the period of exemption couldCbe continued and decree passed therein could be executed eventhough the period of exemption came to an end during the pendencyof the suit. The only discordant note was struck in VineetKumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera [(1984) 3 SCC 352] . We havenoticed that several decisions subsequent thereto have heldthat Vineet Kumar [(1984) 3 SCC 352] is not good law. We haveDalready construed the relevant provisions of the Act and pointedout that there is nothing in the Act which prevents the civil courtfrom continuing the suit and passing decree which could beexecuted.”

18. Thus, under the Punjab Rent Act, the provision is explicit thatEno decree for eviction passed before or after the commencement of theAct can be executed whereas under the Haryana Rent Act, tenantcannot be evicted except in accordance with the provisions of the HaryanaRent Act. It has also been held in the judgments referred to above that ina suit filed within the exemption period, the decree could be passed bythe civil court even if the premises are located within the urban area toFwhich the Act is applicable. The consistent view of this Court is that thedecree can be validly executed if the suit was filed within the exemptionperiod, except Vineet Kumar, which was specifically held to be notlaying good law.

19. It would be relevant to refer to one judgment of this CourtGreported as Mansoor Khan v. Motiram Harebhan Kharat & Anr.[15]which dealt with an identical question wherein after filing of the suit, byvirtue of notification, municipality was established. The landlord fileda suit for possession on 2.5.1985 whereas Risod, District Yavatmal wasnotified to be municipality on 9.10.1989. This Court held as under:

14 (1998) 2 SCC 710H15 (2002) 5 SCC 462

“5. So long as the provisions of the Order are not applicable toany premises, the rights and obligations of landlord and tenant aregoverned by the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Oncethe Order becomes applicable, landlord cannot give notice to atenant determining the lease nor can initiate proceedings forrecovery of possession from the tenant except with the previouswritten permission of the Controller in accordance with clause 13of the Order. What is prohibited by the Order is initiation of theproceedings by the landlord. In the present case, the proceedingswere initiated by filing suit before civil court, much before theprovisions of the Order became applicable to the suit premises.There is nothing in the Order which makes it applicable to thepending suit for eviction of the tenant.

6. The learned counsel for the appellant tenant has placed relianceon decision of this Court in Nandlal v. Moti Lal [(1977) 3 SCC500 : AIR 1977 SC 2143] . The said decision is an authority forthe proposition that the Order becomes applicable to any areawhich is notified to be municipality from the date of suchnotification because the Order was already applicable in theProvince of C.P. and Berar. However, this Court has veryspecifically held that the provisions of the Order would becomeapplicable from that date i.e. the date on which particular areawithin which the suit premises are situated, is notified to be amunicipality. The Order is not retrospective in operation. It doesnot affect the validity of the proceedings initiated before the dateon which the Order became applicable. Clause 13 of the Orderdoes not restrain the court from exercising its power to pass adecree of eviction. All that clause 13 provides is to impose arestriction on the right of the landlord to initiate the proceedingsfor eviction. Inasmuch as the proceedings for eviction were alreadyinitiated and the Order is not retrospective in operation, it does notaffect the validity of the previously instituted proceedings nor doesit take away the power of the court to pass decree of eviction inthe pending suit.”20. Out of the various judgments referred to by the learned counselfor the appellants, the judgment relied upon in Rajender Bansal & Ors.v. Bhuru (Dead) through Legal Representatives & Ors.[16] was dealingwith Haryana Rent Act. The landlords were the appellants who had

Afiled suit for eviction of the respondents, their tenants. The suit was filedin the civil court. The premises in question were outside the ambit ofrent legislation on the day the suit was filed. However, during thependency of the suit and before it could be finally decided, the area inquestion was brought within the sweep of rent legislations by requisitenotifications. This Court concluded the issue against the tenants whereinBit was held as under:

“18. From the aforesaid discussion in Atma Ram Mittal [AtmaRam Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4 SCC 284] , VineetKumar [Vineet Kumar v. Mangal Sain Wadhera, (1984) 3 SCC352] , Ram Saroop Rai [Ram Saroop Rai v. Lilavati, (1980) 3SCC 452] , Ramesh Chandra [Ramesh Chandra v. III Addl.District Judge, (1992) 1 SCC 751] and Shri Kishan [ShriKishan v. Manoj Kumar, (1998) 2 SCC 710] cases, the apparentprinciples which can be culled out, forming the ratio decidendi ofthose cases, are as under:

18.1. Rights of the parties stand crystallised on the date of theinstitution of the suit and, therefore, the law applicable on the dateof filing of the suit will continue to apply until the suit is disposedof or adjudicated.

18.2. If during the pendency of the suit, the Rent Act becomesapplicable to the premises in question, that would be of noEconsequence and it would not take away the jurisdiction of thecivil court to dispose of suit validly instituted.

18.3. In order to oust the jurisdiction of the civil court, there mustbe specific provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction ofthe civil court in respect of those cases also which were validlyFinstituted before the date when protection of the Rent Act becameavailable in respect of the said area/premises/tenancy.

18.4. In case the aforesaid position is not accepted and theprotection of the Rent Act is extended even in respect of suitvalidly instituted prior in point of time when there was no suchprotection under the Act, it will have the consequence of makingGthe decree, that is obtained prior to the Rent Act becomingapplicable to the said area/premises, unexecutable after theapplication of these Rent Acts in respect of such premises. Thiswould not be in consonance with the legislative intent.

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23. When we apply the principles laid down above to the instantcase, we find that this case would fall in the category of AtmaRam Mittal [Atma Ram Mittal v. Ishwar Singh Punia, (1988) 4SCC 284] and Mansoor Khan [Mansoor Khan v. MotiramHarebhan Kharat, (2002) 5 SCC 462] , etc. as under the schemeof the Rent Act, no protection to the ex-tenants is provided and noprovision is made excluding the jurisdiction of the civil courts inrespect of pending cases, expressly or impliedly. On the otherhand, in the facts of the present case, it needs to be highlightedagain that the respondents had not only sublet the premises buthad not paid rent for period of 14 years. His defence was struckoff by the civil court and ultimately the suit was even decreed. Itis only during the pendency of the appeal that the notification wasissued covering the area where the suit premises are situate underthe Rent Act. It will be travesty of justice if the appellant landlordsare deprived of the fruits of the said decree.24. We are, thus, unable to accept the view taken by the HighCourt. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the judgment of thefirst appellate court as well as the High Court is set aside. As theonly contention which was taken by the respondents before thefirst appellate court, challenging the decree of the trial court, wasthat the civil court ceased to have jurisdiction, the said first appealpreferred by the respondents stands dismissed thereby restoringthe decree passed by the trial court. There shall, however, be noorder as to costs.”

21. In the aforesaid case, the Haryana Rent Act provided that nodecree could be executed after the commencement of the Haryana RentAct whereas, the Act herein has no such or similar provision. Therefore,this Court in the said judgment held that decree for eviction can beexecuted if suit has been filed when the Act was not applicable to thepremises in question. We have our reservations in respect of such findingin the context of Haryana Rent Act but such question may be examinedin an appropriate case. The Haryana Rent Act was enacted after repealof Punjab Rent Act, which provides that tenant in possession of abuilding shall not be evicted except in accordance with the provisions ofSection 13 of the said Act.

22. Mr. Sankaranarayanan has referred to Shree ChamundiMopeds Ltd. v. Church of South India Trust Association CSI Cinod

ASecretariat, Madras[17] to contend that the stay granted by this Courtwould not wipe off the order passed by the Division Bench of the HighCourt holding that the decree could not be passed by the civil court. Thesaid question need not be answered in the present case as the fact remainsthat the High Court has taken view that the decree of the civil courtcould be validly passed to which we agree.B

23. Another judgment referred to is Pandurang RamchandraMandlik & Anr. v. Shantibai Ramchandra Ghatge & Ors.[18 ]whereinthe issue was maintainability of the suit filed by the appellants under theBombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948. The finding returnedwas that the said Act is not applicable to the land in question as onlyCnatural grass grew thereon. The issue was whether the civil court hasthe jurisdiction to entertain the suit or the competent authority under theBombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1948 would have thejurisdiction to decide the suit. The question was regarding the jurisdictionof the civil court and the revenue court not that whether the decreepassed by the civil court could be executed.D24. Reference has been made to Dilip v. Mohd. Azizul Haq &Anr.[19] wherein Section 13-A of the C.P. and Berar Letting of Housesand Rent Control Order, 1949 as amended on 26.10.1989 barred thepassing of decree of eviction in suit for proceedings filed and pending.The relevant clause reads as under:

“13-A- no decree for eviction shall be passed in suit or proceedingEfiled and pending against the tenant in any court or before anyauthority unless the landlord produces written permission of theController as required by sub-clause (1) of clause 13”

25. The dispute in the said case was in respect of an open plot. Asper the landlord, the tenancy was deemed to have expired on 10.4.1986Fin view of Section 106 of the TP Act before Section 13-A of the C.P.and Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 came intoforce. The High Court held that no appeal was pending against the tenantwhen Section 13-A was introduced. This Court remanded the matterback to the High Court as the High Court has not examined the questionas to whether the amendment was retrospective or prospective. ThisGCourt held as under:

“8. The High Court further concluded that the amendments haveno retrospective effect. The provision came into force when the

17 (1992) 3 SCC 118 1989 Supp (2) SCC 627H19 (2000) 3 SCC 607

appeal was pending. Therefore, though the provision is prospectivein force, has “retroactive effect”. This provision merely providesfor limitation to be imposed for the future which in no wayaffects anything done by party in the past and statutes providingfor new remedies for enforcement of an existing right will applyto future as well as past causes of action. The reason being thatthe said statutes do not affect existing rights and in the presentcase, the insistence is upon obtaining of permission of the Controllerto enforce decree for eviction and it is, therefore, notretrospective in effect at all, since it has only retroactive force.

xx xx xx

10. The High Court further took the view that the expression“premises” in the Act (sic Order) does not state as to when theamendment was to be effective as it does not state whether theamendment was retrospective or prospective. The same is on thestatute-book on the date on which the suit or proceeding is pendingfor purpose of eviction and cannot ignore the provision on thestatute-book. Therefore, the view of the High Court on this aspectof the matter also, is incorrect. The arguments advanced on behalfof the respondents that these amendments are retrospective incharacter and could not have been made in the absence of anauthority under the main enactment by virtue of which such orderis made are untenable.”

26. The facts of the said case do not go to the extent to say thatthe decree of the civil court cannot be executed if the Act has beenextended to an urban area.

27. Mr. Sankaranarayanan has also referred to the judgment ofthis Court reported as Subhash Chander & Ors. v. Bharat PetroleumCorporation Ltd. (BPCL) & Anr.[20] wherein the landlord had filed acivil suit for possession though the premises was situated in the urbanarea governed by the Haryana Rent Act. It has been held that such civilsuit is not maintainable as the remedy lies under the Haryana Rent Act.This Court held as under:

“25. In the given circumstances, we are of the considered viewthat no error was committed by the High Court in arriving to aconclusion that even after the expiry of the lease term of thelease deed, the respondents became statutory tenant andjurisdiction of the Civil Court is impliedly barred and could beevicted only under the provisions of the Act 1973.”

A28. Under the Act in question, Section 18 does not talk about thevalidity of any decree of the civil court but only restricts the jurisdictionof the civil court from the date the Act became applicable. The Act hascome into force in respect of the premises in question on 11.5.2015 i.e.,after the civil suit was filed, therefore, the decree could validly be passedand executed. After the applicability of the Act to the area in question,Bthe landlord and tenant dispute can be raised only before the Rent Tribunalbut not before the civil court. However, suit filed before the civil courtprior to the applicability of the Act has to be decided by the civil court. Adecree passed by the civil court is valid and executable which is notinterdicted by the applicability of the Act to the area in question. The Actis applicable to the area in question from the date the notification cameCinto force and it does not bar the decree of the civil court or the pendencyof such civil suit.

29. Still further, one of the principles is that the rights of the partieshave to be determined on the date when lis commences i.e., on the dateof filing of the suit. The plaintiff is entitled to decree on that day when heDinitiated the proceedings, therefore, rights of the parties have to beexamined as on the said day. Recently, this Bench in judgment reportedas ECGC Limited v. Mokul Shriram EPC JV[21] was examining thequestion as to whether the condition of deposit while filing appeal underthe Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would be applicable or the provisionsas it existed under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 when the complaintEwas filed would be applicable. This Bench considering the ConstitutionBench judgments in Garikapati Veeraya v. N. Subbiah Choudhry &Ors.[22], Vitthalbhai Naranbhai Patel v. Commissioner of Sales Tax,M.P., Nagpur[23]and Hardeodas Jagannath v. The State of Assam[24]held that the provisions of the Consumer Protection Act, 2019 would notbe applicable to the complaints filed prior to the commencement of theF2019 Act. Therefore, the Judgement and Decree passed in the suit forpossession does not suffer from any illegality.

30. In view of the above, we do not find any error in the orderpassed by the High Court. Consequently, the appeals are dismissed.

GAnkit Gyan(Assisted by : Rahul Rathi, LCRA)

Appeals dismissed.

21 2022 SCC OnLine SC 18422 AIR 1957 SC 54023 AIR 1967 SC 344H24 AIR 1970 SC 724