STATE OF UTTARAKHAND versus SUDHIR BUDAKOTI

[2022] 16 S.C.R. 913

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

SUDHIR BUDAKOTI

(Civil Appeal Nos. 2661 of 2015)

APRIL 07, 2022

[SANJAY KISHAN KAUL AND M.M. SUNDRESH, JJ.]

Constitution of India: Art.14: Classification test – TheGovernment of India, Ministry of Human Resource Developmentpublished communications on revision of pay scale of the Lecturerson one side and the Administrative Staff starting from the Registraron the other – The State of Uttarakhand applied the directions issuedby the Central Government on revised salary to its teaching facultyalone, and not to the registrar – Allegation of discrimination – HighCourt held that the pay scale was meant to be applied to registrarand the faculty both – On appeal, held: Appellant is not bound byany direction issued by the Central Government which would atworst be mandatory to the Central Universities and the CentralGovernment Colleges receiving funds – Thus, any such decisionwould obviously be directory to State Government Colleges andUniversities, being in the nature of mere recommendation – HighCourt misconstrued the facts – Appellant nowhere made decisionto accept and adopt the circular of the Central Governmentpertaining to the Registrars working in the Universities coming underits purview – In absence of any legal right with the correspondingduty, such relief can never be asked for, particularly when thereare clear and specific rules provided for the pay scale of Registrarsby the appellant – When the classification is distinct and clear havingadequate rationale with due relation to the objective, there is noreason to hold otherwise by treating Registrar at par with theLecturers – One is meant for administration and the other teaching– Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973 – Universities.

Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973: s.17(1) –Appointment – Whether State Universities bound by directions issuedby Central Government – Held: Appellant not bound by any directionissued by the Central Government which would at worst bemandatory to the Central Universities, and Colleges receiving funds

DEF

Aby the Central Government. Such directions would be directory toState Government Colleges and Universities, being in the nature ofa mere recommendation.

Allowing the appeal, the Court

HELD: 1.1 mere differential treatment on its own cannotBbe termed as an “anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution”.When there is reasonable basis for classification adopted bytaking note of the exigencies and diverse situations, the Court isnot expected to insist on absolute equality by taking rigid andpedantic view as against pragmatic one. [Para 14][920-A-B]

1.2 When the differentiation is clearly distinguishable withadequate demarcation duly identified, the object of Article 14 getssatisfied. Social, revenue and economic considerations arecertainly permissible parameters in classifying particular group.Thus, valid classification is nothing but valid discrimination.DThat being the position, there can never be an injury to the conceptof equality enshrined under the Constitution, not being aninflexible doctrine. [Para 15][920-B-D]

1.3 The question as to whether classification is reasonableor not is to be answered on the touchstone of reasonable,Ecommon man’s approach, keeping in mind the avowed objectbehind it. If the right to equality is to be termed as genus, aright to non-discrimination becomes specie. When two identifiedgroups are not equal, certainly they cannot be treated as ahomogeneous group. reasonable classification thus certainlywould not injure the equality enshrined under Article 14 whenFthere exists an intelligible differentia between two groups havinga rational relation to the object. Therefore, an interference wouldonly be called for on the court being convinced that theclassification causes inequality among similarly placed persons.The role of the court being restrictive, generally, the task is bestleft to the concerned authorities. When classification is madeGon the recommendation made by body of experts constitutedfor the purpose, courts will have to be more wary of entering intothe said arena as its interference would amount to substitutingits views, process which is best avoided. [Para 17][920-E-H;921-A]H

1.4 As long as the classification does not smack of inherentarbitrariness and conforms to justice and fair play, there may notbe any reason to interfere with it. It is the wisdom of the otherwings which is required to be respected except when aclassification is bordering on arbitrariness, artificial differenceand itself being discriminatory. decision made sans the aforesaidsituation cannot be tested with either suspicious or microscopiceye. Good-faith and intention are to be presumed unless thecontrary exists. [Para 18][921-A-C]

2.1 The appellant is not bound by any direction issued bythe Central Government which would at worst be mandatory tothe Central Universities and the Central Government Collegesreceiving funds. Thus, any such decision would obviously bedirectory to State Government Colleges and Universities, beingin the nature of mere recommendation. [Para 20][930-D-E]

2.2 The High Court of Uttarakhand has misconstrued thefacts. The Appellant nowhere has made decision to accept andadopt the circular of the Central Government pertaining to theRegistrars working in the Universities coming under its purview.In the absence of any legal right with the corresponding duty,such relief can never be asked for, particularly when there areclear and specific rules provided for the pay scale of Registrarsby the Appellant. When the classification is distinct and clearhaving adequate rationale with due relation to the objective, thereis no reason to hold otherwise by treating Registrar at par withthe Lecturers. One is meant for administration and the otherteaching. [Para 21][930-H; 931-A-D]

Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust(2011) 2 SCC 575: [2010] 14 SCR 873; Shamasundarv. University of Mysore 1996 SCC OnLine Kar 430;Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India (1994) 2 SCC521: [1994] 1 SCR 700; Union of India v. InternationalTrading Co. (2003) 5 SCC 437; Hotel & Bar (FL.3)Association of Tamil Nadu (HOBAT) v. The Secretary toGovernment, Commercial Taxes Department 2015 SCCOnLine Mad 7092; Narmada Bachao Andolan v.

AUnion of India (2000) 10 SCC 664: [2000] 4 Suppl.SCR 94; State of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan,(2011) 7 SCC 639: [2011] 6 SCR 443; Indian Drugs& Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen, (2007) 1 SCC 408:[2006] 9 Suppl. SCR 73; Union of India v. InternationalTrading Co., (2003) 5 SCC 437: [2003] 1 Suppl. SCRB55; Kalyani Mathivanan v. K.V. Jeyaraj, (2015) 6 SCC363: [2015] 3 SCR 467 – relied on.

Case Law Reference

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2661Eof 2015.

From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2012 of the High Courtof Uttarakhand at Nainital in Writ Petition (S/B) No.51 of 2011.

Jatinder Kumar Sethi, Dy. AG, Ashutosh Kumar Sharma, SunnyFSachin Rawat, Sudarshan Singh Rawat, Ayush Negi, Ms. VishakhaUpadhyaya, Ms. Himanshi Tyagi, Aakarshan Aditya, Advs. for theappearing parties.

Respondent-in-person

The Judgment of the Court was delivered byG

M. M. SUNDRESH, J.

1. Aggrieved over the judgment rendered by the High Court ofUttarakhand in allowing the Writ Petition (S/B) No.51/2011 filed by theRespondents before us, the present appeal by special leave has beenfiled.H

NECESSARY FACTS

2. The statute by the name, “State Universities Act, 1973” enactedby the State of Uttar Pradesh was adopted by the State of Uttarakhandthrough modification order of the year 2001.

3. Section 16 of the Uttar Pradesh State Universities Act, 1973(hereinafter referred to as the “Act”) deals with the post of Registrar,who shall be whole-time officer of the University. He shall not beoffered nor be entitled to accept any remuneration for any other work inthe University, save as provided under the governing rules. Hisappointment has to be in terms of Section 17 of the Act and the rulemaking power provided thereunder.

4. In exercise of the powers conferred under Section 17(1) of theAct, the State of Uttarakhand brought into the statute book, “TheUttarakhand State University (Centralized Services) Rules, 2006”(hereinafter referred to as, “2006 Rules”), prescribing essentialqualifications, procedure for recruitment and pay scale etc. for the postof Registrars in the State Universities. The 2006 Rules also provide thequalification for Lecturer, which is obviously different to that of aRegistrar. To be noted, the pay scale at the relevant point of time was3200-100-3500-125-4875, with effect from 01.01.1986.

5. The State of Uttarakhand, on 16.06.2008, sent requisition tothe State Public Service Commission for the appointment of Registrarsin the State Universities, clearly indicating the essential qualificationsalong with the pay scale, as aforesaid. On 31.12.2008, the Governmentof India, Ministry of Human Resource Development, Department ofHigher Education, New Delhi published two separate communicationsaddressed to the Secretary, University Grant Commission (hereinafterreferred to as “the UGC”) on the revision of the pay scale of the Lecturerson one side and the Administrative Staff starting from the Registrar onthe other. Both these circulars issued separately were obviously meantto be implemented by the Central Government Universities and theCentral Government Colleges duly funded by it. In other words, theybecame mere recommendations qua the State Government Universities.We may hasten to add the qualification prescribed for the post of Registrarby the UGC being higher, stands different to that of the UttarakhandState Universities as mandated under the 2006 Rules.

A6. The State of Uttarakhand thought it fit to accept therecommended revised pay scale of the Government of India dated31.12.2008, meant to be applied for the Central Universities and CentralGovernment Colleges, to its teaching faculties alone, except sub-clause(f) in clause 8, which speaks of age of superannuation, an issue withwhich we are not concerned in the present lis.B

7. Respondent No. 1 was selected and given the appointment tothe post of Registrar on 23.11.2009 with the appropriate pay scale interms of the 2006 Rules, which was also notified in the advertisementitself.

C8. After taking charge as an Assistant Registrar in KumaonUniversity, Respondent No. 1 filed Writ Petition (S/B) No.51/2011 beforethe High Court of Uttarakhand seeking the pay scale meant to be appliedfor his counterparts in the Central Universities. While entertaining thewrit petition, the High Court in and by its order dated 11.03.2011 directedthe Principal Secretary, Higher Education of the State of Uttarakhand toDtake call on the letter dated 01.01.2010 sent by the Kumaon University,which order is appositely placed hereunder:

“ ............. List after service is affected. It appears thatKumaon University has written letter dated 08.01.2010to the Principal Secretary, Higher EducationDepartment seeking fixation of the pay scale of thepetitioner. We are requesting the Principal Secretary,Higher Education Department to take decision thereonand informed us in regard to that decision.

Chief justice, Sudhanshu Dhulia, J.11.03.2011"

9. The pay scale of Respondent No. 1 was also revised by theState of Uttarakhand on the recommendation of the Sixth PayGCommission through Government Order in G.O. No. 124/XXVIV(6)/2011 dated 05.04.2011. On receipt of the Government Order, RespondentNo. 1 got his prayer duly amended seeking to question it as unconstitutional.

10. By the order dated 27.02.2012, the High Court of Uttarakhandissued direction to the Pay Anomaly Committee to look into the matter

afresh, which was accordingly complied with, by not accepting the caseof Respondent No. 1, finding no justification particularly when there is adistinct difference in the qualification as prescribed by the UGC and theState Government for the aforesaid post. supplementary counter-affidavit was also filed bringing this to the notice of the Court.

11. The High Court allowed the writ petition on factual error bymisconstruing the decision made in favour of the teaching faculty to thatof the Registrar and other administrative staff. The Appellant seeks toset aside the said decision before us.

RESPECTIVE SUBMISSIONS:

Submissions of the Appellant:

12. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the HighCourt has completely misunderstood the admitted facts. There are twocirculars dealing with the Lecturers and the Registrars. decision wasmade to revise the pay scales of the UGC for the Lecturers and not forthe Registrars. One has to see the economic implication. RespondentNo. 1 has got neither any accrued nor vested right to seek pay parity.Such parity cannot be sought by comparing the Lecturers and theother Registrars working in the Central Universities. There is nomandatory compliance of the Central Government’s revised pay scaleimplementation for the State Universities. The matter involved partakesthe character of policy decision made upon considering the availablematerial, including the economic fallout and therefore, no judicial reviewis available. Mainly because Respondent No. 1 was made to undertakethe work assigned to Lecturer and vice versa, the aforesaid arrangementbeing temporary will not create right. The classification being just andfair and Respondent No. 1 being aware of the pay scale fixed in tunewith the rules governing, the order passed by the High Court havinghuge financial ramifications, has to be set aside.

Submissions of the respondents:

13. Respondent No. 1, who appears as party-in-person, made aprimary contention before us that he did function as Lecturer albeit fora limited period, the pay scale fixed was very low. Having revised thepay scale for the Lecturers, nothing prevented the Appellant fromundertaking the said exercise for the Registrars as well. Thus, the benefitconferred need not be disturbed.

AClassification Test & Policy Decisions of the State:

14. mere differential treatment on its own cannot be termed asan “anathema to Article 14 of the Constitution”. When there is areasonable basis for classification adopted by taking note of theexigencies and diverse situations, the Court is not expected to insist onBabsolute equality by taking rigid and pedantic view as against pragmaticone.

15. Such discrimination would not be termed as arbitrary as theobject of the classification itself is meant for providing benefits to anidentified group of persons who form class of their own. When theCdifferentiation is clearly distinguishable with adequate demarcation dulyidentified, the object of Article 14 gets satisfied. Social, revenue andeconomic considerations are certainly permissible parameters inclassifying particular group. Thus, valid classification is nothing but avalid discrimination. That being the position, there can never be an injuryto the concept of equality enshrined under the Constitution, not being anDinflexible doctrine.

16. larger latitude in dealing with challenge to the classificationis mandated on the part of the Court when introduced either by theLegislature or the Executive as the case may be. There is no way, courtscould act like appellate authorities especially when classification isEintroduced by way of policy decision clearly identifying the group ofbeneficiaries by analysing the relevant materials.

17. The question as to whether classification is reasonable ornot is to be answered on the touchstone of reasonable, common man’sapproach, keeping in mind the avowed object behind it. If the right toFequality is to be termed as genus, right to non-discrimination becomesa specie. When two identified groups are not equal, certainly they cannotbe treated as homogeneous group. reasonable classification thuscertainly would not injure the equality enshrined under Article 14 whenthere exists an intelligible differentia between two groups having rationalGrelation to the object. Therefore, an interference would only be calledfor on the court being convinced that the classification causes inequalityamong similarly placed persons. The role of the court being restrictive,generally, the task is best left to the concerned authorities. When aclassification is made on the recommendation made by body of expertsconstituted for the purpose, courts will have to be more wary of entering

into the said arena as its interference would amount to substituting itsviews, process which is best avoided.

18. As long as the classification does not smack of inherentarbitrariness and conforms to justice and fair play, there may not be anyreason to interfere with it. It is the wisdom of the other wings which isrequired to be respected except when classification is bordering onarbitrariness, artificial difference and itself being discriminatory. decisionmade sans the aforesaid situation cannot be tested with either suspiciousor microscopic eye. Good-faith and intention are to be presumed unlessthe contrary exists. One has to keep in mind that the role of the court ison the illegality involved as against the governance.

19. For the aforesaid principle of law, we would like to quote theelucidations of this Court in the following judgments:

Transport & Dock Workers Union v. Mumbai Port Trust,(2011) 2 SCC 575:

“36. Differential treatment in our opinion does not per se amountto violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. It violates Article 14only when there is no conceivable reasonable basis for thedifferentiation. In the present case, as pointed out above, there isa reasonable basis and hence in our opinion there is no violation ofArticle 14 of the Constitution.

37. In our opinion it is not prudent or pragmatic for the Court toinsist on absolute equality when there are diverse situations andcontingencies, as in the present case. In view of the inherentcomplexities involved in modern society, some free play must begiven to the executive authorities in this connection.

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39. In our opinion, there is often misunderstanding about Article14 of the Constitution, and often lawyers and Judges tend toconstrue it in doctrinaire and absolute sense, which may betotally impractical and make the working of the executiveauthorities extremely difficult if not impossible.

40. As Lord Denning observed:

“This power to overturn executive decision must be exercisedvery carefully, because you have got to remember that the

executive and the local authorities have their very ownresponsibilities and they have the right to make decisions. Thecourts should be very wary about interfering and only interferein extreme cases, that is, cases where the court is sure theyhave gone wrong in law or they have been utterly unreasonable.Otherwise you would get conflict between the courts andthe Government and the authorities, which would be mostundesirable. The courts must act very warily in this matter.”(See Judging the World by Garry Sturgess Philip Chubb.)”

41. In our opinion Judges must maintain judicial self-restraint whileexercising the powers of judicial review of administrative orlegislative decisions. “In view of the complexities of modernsociety”, wrote Justice Frankfurter, while Professor of Law atHarvard University, “and the restricted scope of any man’sexperience, tolerance and humility in passing judgment on theworth of the experience and beliefs of others become crucialfaculties in the disposition of cases. The successful exercise ofsuch judicial power calls for rare intellectual disinterestedness andpenetration, lest limitation in personal experience and imaginationoperate as limitations of the Constitution. These insights Mr JusticeHolmes applied in hundreds of cases and expressed in memorablelanguage: It is misfortune if Judge reads his conscious orunconscious sympathy with one side or the other prematurely intothe law, and forgets that what seem to him to be first principlesare believed by half his fellow men to be wrong.

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43. In our opinion adjudication must be done within the system ofhistorically validated restraints and conscious minimisation of theJudges’ preferences. The Court must not embarrass theadministrative authorities and must realise that administrativeauthorities have expertise in the field of administration while theCourt does not. In the words of Chief Justice Neely, former ChiefJustice of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals:

“I have very few illusions about my own limitations as Judge.I am not an accountant, electrical engineer, financer, banker,stockbroker or system management analyst. It is the height offolly to expect Judges intelligently to review 5000 page record

addressing the intricacies of public utility operation. It is notthe function of Judge to act as super board, or with the zealof pedantic school master substituting its judgment for thatof the administrator.”

44. In administrative matters the Court should, therefore, ordinarilydefer to the judgment of the administrators unless the decision isclearly violative of some statute or is shockingly arbitrary. In thisconnection, Justice Frankfurter while Professor of Law at HarvardUniversity wrote in The Public and its Government:

“With the great men of the Supreme Court constitutionaladjudication has always been statecraft. As mere Judge,Marshall had his superiors among his colleagues. Hissupremacy lay in his recognition of the practical needs ofthe Government. The great Judges are those to whom theConstitution is not primarily text for interpretation but themeans of ordering the life of progressive people.”

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48. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC225 : AIR 1973 SC 1461 (vide AIR para 1547) Khanna, J.observed: (SCC p. 821, para 1535)

“1535. In exercising the power of judicial review, the courtscannot be oblivious of the practical needs of the Government.The door has to be left open for trial and error.”

B. Shamasundar v. University of Mysore, 1996 SCC OnLineKar 430:

“6. Equality before law and equal protection of laws is the heartand soul of the Constitutional system adopted by this country. Theright to equality and equal protection of laws under Article 14 aregenus and the right to non-discrimination are the species. Equalityas contemplated under the Constitutional scheme means equalityamong equals. The doctrine of equality is considered to be acorollary to the concept of Rule of Law which postulates thatevery executive action, if it is to operate to the prejudice of anyperson must be fair and referable to legal authority. What Article14 prohibits is the class legislation and not reasonable classification.If classification is based upon reasonable criteria and the persons

belonging to well-defined class are treated equally, the vice ofdiscrimination would not be attracted. In order to pass the test ofreasonable classification the impugned Statute, order or notificationis required to pass the twin tests of permissible classification viz.,

(i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligibledifferentia which distinguishes persons or things that aregrouped together from others left out of the group and;

(ii) that, that differentia must have rational relation to theobject sought to be achieved by the impugned statute or order.

7. It is not conceived that the classification should be scientificallyperfect or logically complete. The Court would not interfere unlessit is shown that the classification resulted in inequality amongstthe persons similarly situated. The reasonable classificationexpected to stand the test of the Constitutional guarantees requiresthat such classification was real and substantial which contemplatedsome just reasonable relation to the job of the legislation. TheCourts have not to determine as to whether the impugned actionhas resulted in inequality but have to decide whether there wassome differentia which had an object to be achieved by theimpugned action. Mere differentiation per se does not amount todiscrimination attracting the operation of the guarantee of equality.The purpose and object of the impugned action has to beascertained from the attending circumstances in each case.

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11. Applying the tests noted herein above it is apparent that theappellants did not discharge the initial onus of proof of prima faciesatisfying the Court that the impugned statute was violative ofArticle 14 & 16 of the Constitution of India. The mere fact thatthe statute provided different age of retirement for the teachersof the University was by itself not sufficient to conclude that thesame was discriminatory or that the classification contemplatedwas not reasonable. It has been conceded before us thatclassification was made in favour of specified class i.e., theteachers as defined under Section 2(7) and 2(8) of the KarnatakaState Universities Act 1976 (hereinafter called the ‘Act’). Theclassification thus made in favour of teachers cannot be held to

be discriminatory. Such classification was held permissible in Stateof Madhya Pradesh v. Hari Datt Sharma [AIR 1993 SC 1312]. InLife Insurance Corporation of India etc. v. S. Srivastava [AIR1987 SC 1527.], it was held that while determining the questionregarding the fixation of age for retirement the Court can takejudicial notice of different age of retirement prevailing in severalservices in the Country. The discrimination as regards the age ofretirement between Employees belonging to different classesthough in the same service could not be termed to be discriminatory.The teachers within the meaning of the Act include Professors,Readers, Lecturers and other persons imparting instructions inany affiliated college. Even though the definition is inclusive, yet itis only for the University to consider and decide as to who werethe persons appointed for the purpose of imparting instructions inthe University or in the colleges maintained by the University.This Court cannot embark upon the task of deciding as to whowas teacher within the meaning of the Act. The Division Benchof this Court in University of Mysore v. Maribasavaradya’s case,[ILR 1990 Kar 3671.] supra considered this aspect of the matteras well and rightly came to the conclusion that the appellantstherein who were the Research Assistants could not be held to beteachers on the basis of the performance of their duties. Clause(d) of statute 2 of the impugned statutes defined the teacher ofthe University to mean such persons who were appointed for thepurposes of imparting instructions in University or in any collegemaintained by the Universities. It is admitted that none of theappellants before us was appointed as teacher of the Universityfor being entitled to the benefit of the Statute 3 which is impugnedbefore us. Whether all the appellants or any one of them wasimparting instructions is question which can properly beappreciated and adjudicated by the University, the employer ofthe appellants. This Court cannot embark upon deciding theacademic question on the basis of assumptions and presumptions.The appellants have not been in position to persuade us to disagreewith the earlier judgment of this Court in the University of Mysorev. P. Maribasavaradya’s case [ILR 1990 Kar 3671]. We are alsoof the opinion that the classification contemplated by the impugnedstatute is neither unreasonable nor without any basis.”

ABC

Shyam Babu Verma v. Union of India, (1994) 2 SCC 521:

“9. It was then urged on behalf of the petitioners that on principleof ‘equal pay for equal work’ they were entitled to pay scale ofRs 330-560. It was pointed out that they have been performingthe same nature of work, which was being performed by otherPharmacists Grade-B who have been given the scale of Rs 330-560. The nature of work may be more or less the same but scaleof pay may vary based on academic qualification or experiencewhich justifies classification. The principle of ‘equal pay for equalwork’ should not be applied in mechanical or casual manner.Classification made by body of experts after full study andanalysis of the work should not be disturbed except for strongreasons which indicate the classification made to be unreasonable.Inequality of the men in different groups excludes applicability ofthe principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ to them. The principleof ‘equal pay for equal work’ has been examined in State of M.P.v. Pramod Bhartiya, (1993) 1 SCC 539 : 1993 SCC (L&S) 221 :(1993) 23 ATC 657 by this Court. Before any direction is issuedby the Court, the claimants have to establish that there was noreasonable basis to treat them separately in matters of paymentof wages or salary. Then only it can be held that there has been adiscrimination, within the meaning of Article 14 of the Constitution.”

Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC

“15. While the discretion to change the policy in exercise of theexecutive power, when not trammelled by any statute or rule iswide enough, what is imperative and implicit in terms of Article14 is that change in policy must be made fairly and should notgive the impression that it was so done arbitrarily or by any ulteriorcriteria. The wide sweep of Article 14 and the requirement ofevery State action qualifying for its validity on this touchstoneirrespective of the field of activity of the State is an acceptedtenet. The basic requirement of Article 14 is fairness in action bythe State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance is theheartbeat of fair play. Actions are amenable, in the panorama ofjudicial review only to the extent that the State must act validlyfor discernible reason, not whimsically for any ulterior purpose.

The meaning and true import and concept of arbitrariness is moreeasily visualized than precisely defined. question whether theimpugned action is arbitrary or not is to be ultimately answered onthe facts and circumstances of given case. basic and obvioustest to apply in such cases is to see whether there is any discernibleprinciple emerging from the impugned action and if so, does itreally satisfy the test of reasonableness.

16. Where particular mode is prescribed for doing an act andthere is no impediment in adopting the procedure, the deviation toact in different manner which does not disclose any discernibleprinciple which is reasonable itself shall be labelled as arbitrary.Every State action must be informed by reason and it follows thatan act uninformed by reason is per se arbitrary.”

Hotel & Bar (FL.3) Association of Tamil Nadu (HOBAT) vThe Secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes Department2015 SCC OnLine Mad 7092:

“17. The power of judicial review over policy decision in thefield of revenue is quite settled. Such decision is not required tobe tested by Court of law with suspicious and microscopic eye.The parameters for decision are good faith and intention. AConstitutional Court will have to look at the decision made by theExecutive or Legislature by taking practical view and it shouldrather avoid an absolute and inflexible concept. An interpretation,which serves the legislative object and intent leading to purposiveconstruction, is required to be made by the Court…”

Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India, (2000) 10 SCC

“229. It is now well-settled that the courts, in the exercise of theirjurisdiction, will not transgress into the field of policy decision.Whether to have an infrastructural project or not and what is thetype of project to be undertaken and how it has to be executed,are part of policy-making process and the Courts are ill-equippedto adjudicate on policy decision so undertaken. The Court, nodoubt, has duty to see that in the undertaking of decision, nolaw is violated and people’s fundamental rights are not transgressedupon except to the extent permissible under the Constitution….”

AState of M.P. v. Narmada Bachao Andolan, (2011) 7 SCC639:

“36. The Court cannot strike down policy decision taken by theGovernment merely because it feels that another decision wouldhave been fairer or more scientific or logical or wiser. The wisdomand advisability of the policies are ordinarily not amenable to judicialreview unless the policies are contrary to statutory or constitutionalprovision or arbitrary or irrational or an abuse of power….”

Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workmen, (2007)1 SCC 408:

“29. In para 19 of the aforesaid judgment of the Constitution Bench,an important observation has been made about whether the courtcan impose financial burden on the State in this manner. Para 19states as under: (Umadevi (3) case, Secy., State of Karnataka(3), (2006) 4 SCC 1: 2006 SCC (L& S) 753, SCC pp.25-26)

“19. One aspect arises. Obviously, the State is also controlledby economic considerations and financial implications of anypublic employment. The viability of the department or theinstrumentality of the project is also of equal concern for theState. The State works out the scheme taking into considerationthe financial implications and economic aspects. Can the courtimpose on the State financial burden of this nature by insistingon regularisation or permanence in employment, when thoseemployed temporarily are not needed permanently or regularly?As an example, we can envisage direction to give permanentemployment to all those who are being temporarily or casuallyemployed in public sector undertaking. The burden maybecome so heavy by such direction that the undertaking itselfmay collapse under its own weight. It is not as if this had nothappened. So, the court ought not to impose financial burdenon the State by such directions, as such directions may turncounterproductive.”

Union of India v. International Trading Co., (2003) 5 SCC437:

“17. The courts as observed in G.B. Mahajan v. JalgaonMunicipal Council, (1991) 3 SCC 91:AIR 1991 SC 1153 arekept out of the lush field of administrative policy except where

policy is inconsistent with the express or implied provision of astatute which creates the power to which the policy relates orwhere decision made in purported exercise of power is suchthat repository of the power acting reasonably and in good faithcould not have made it. But there has to be word of caution.Something overwhelming must appear before the court willintervene. That is and ought to be difficult onus for an applicantto discharge. The courts are not very good at formulating orevaluating policy. Sometimes when the courts have intervened onpolicy grounds the courts’ view of the range of policies open underthe statute or of what is unreasonable policy has not got publicacceptance. On the contrary, curial views of policy have beensubjected to stringent criticism.18. As Professor Wade points out (in Administrative Law byH.W.R. Wade, 6th Edn.), there is ample room within the legalboundaries for radical differences of opinion in which neither sideis unreasonable. The reasonableness in administrative law must,therefore, distinguish between proper course and improper abuseof power. Nor is the test court’s own standard of reasonablenessas it might conceive it in given situation. The point to note is thatthe thing is not unreasonable in the legal sense merely becausethe court thinks it to be unwise.

19. In Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn., (1993)3 SCC 499 : AIR 1994 SC 988 it was observed that decisiontaken by the authority must be found to be arbitrary, unreasonableand not taken in public interest where the doctrine of legitimateexpectation can be applied. If it is question of policy, even byways of change of old policy, the courts cannot intervene with thedecision. In given case whether there are such facts andcircumstances giving rise to legitimate expectation, would primarilybe question of fact.

20. As was observed in Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Unionof India, (1999) 4 SCC 727 : AIR 1999 SC 1801 the change inpolicy can defeat substantive legitimate expectation if it can bejustified on “Wednesbury reasonableness”. The decision-makerhas the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant tothe change in policy. It is, therefore, clear that the choice of policyis for the decision-maker and not the court. The legitimate

Asubstantive expectation merely permits the court to find out if thechange of policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimateexpectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonableperson could have made. claim based on merely legitimateexpectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give right.Its uniqueness lies in the fact that it covers the entire span of time:Bpresent, past and future. How significant is the statement thattoday is tomorrow’s yesterday. The present is as we experienceit, the past is present memory and future is present expectation.For legal purposes, expectation is not same anticipation. Legitimacyof an expectation can be inferred only if it is founded on theCsanction of law.”

ON FACTS

20. We have recorded the facts in the preceding paragraphs. Lawhas become quite settled that the Appellant is not bound by any directionissued by the Central Government which would at worst be mandatoryDto the Central Universities and the Central Government Colleges receivingfunds. Thus, any such decision would obviously be directory to StateGovernment Colleges and Universities, being in the nature of mererecommendation. The aforesaid position has been clarified by the decisionof this Court in Kalyani Mathivanan v. K.V. Jeyaraj, (2015) 6 SCCE363:

“62.2. The UGC Regulations being passed by both the Houses ofParliament, though subordinate legislation has binding effect onthe universities to which it applies.

62.3. The UGC Regulations, 2010 are mandatory to teachers andFother academic staff in all the Central universities and collegesthereunder and the institutions deemed to be universities whosemaintenance expenditure is met by UGC.

62.4. The UGC Regulations, 2010 are directory for the universities,colleges and other higher educational institutions under the purviewGof the State legislation as the matter has been left to the StateGovernment to adopt and implement the Scheme. Thus, the UGCRegulations, 2010 are partly mandatory and is partly directory.”

21. The High Court of Uttarakhand in our opinion has completelymisconstrued the facts. The Appellant nowhere has made decision toH

accept and adopt the circular of the Central Government pertaining tothe Registrars working in the Universities coming under its purview. Inthe absence of any legal right with the corresponding duty, such reliefcan never be asked for, particularly when there are clear and specificrules provided for the pay scale of Registrars by the Appellant itself.The decision of the Appellant qua the Lecturers who form distinctgroup as against the Respondent No. 1 who holds higher position in theadministration has been lost sight of. Merely because Respondent No. 1was made to fill the gap by temporarily taking up the job of Lecturer,he would never become one and so also Lecturer, who might undertakethe job of Registrar. This is nothing but an administrative convenienceborne out of contingency. When the classification is distinct and clearhaving adequate rationale with due relation to the objective, there is noreason to hold otherwise by treating Registrar at par with the Lecturers.One is meant for administration and the other teaching. The High Courthas also not considered the financial implications as any decision wouldnot rest with Respondent No. 1 alone, but the entirety of the administrativestaff.

22. Having pointed out the aforesaid wrong understanding of factsculminating in the decision impugned before us, we accordingly set asidethe same by allowing the Civil Appeal No.2661 of 2015 and, as aconsequence, the writ petition filed, stands dismissed. No costs.

Devika Gujral and Amarendra Kumar(Assisted by : Vrinda Singh, LCRA)

Appeal allowed.