S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY versus V. NARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS

[2022] 11 S.C.R. 42

[2022] 11 S.C.R.

S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY

V. NARAYANA REDDY AND OTHERS

(Civil Appeals No. 5503-04 of 2022)

BAUGUST 18, 2022

[N. V. RAMANA, CJI, KRISHNA MURARI ANDHIMA KOHLI, JJ.]

Civil procedure Code, 1908 – S.114 r/w Or XLVII – ReviewApplication – Maintainability of – Held: s.114 r/w Or XLVII makesCit clear that review application would be maintainable on (i)discovery of new and important matters or evidence which, afterexercise of due diligence, were not within the knowledge of theapplicant or could not be produced by him when the decree waspassed or the order made; (ii) on account of some mistake or errorDapparent on the face of the record; or (iii) for any other sufficientreason – The error must be apparent on the face of the record andnot one which has to be searched out – The power of review is notto be confused with the appellate power which enables the SuperiorCourt to correct errors committed by subordinate Court – Underthe review, the Court can correct mistake but not substitute theEview taken earlier merely because there is possibility of takingtwo views in matter – There is clear distinction between anerroneous decision as against an error apparent on the face of therecord – An erroneous decision can be corrected by the SuperiorCourt, however an error apparent on the face of the record canFonly be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction – In the presentcase, nothing have prevented the respondents from filing the certifiedcopies of the revenue records even earlier, but they elected to fileonly photocopies of the very same surrender proceedings – At nostage plea was taken by the respondents with regard to thediscovery of new documents which could have been produced byGthem after due diligence – Several opportunities were available tothe respondents to file authenticated copies of the revenue records,firstly, when respondents challenged ex-parte order of Appellateauthority , secondly, when Appellate authority reconsidered theappeals, thirdly, when respondent preferred second set of revisionHpetition, fourthly, when respondent filed two review petitions, and

lastly, when respondent preferred Special Leave Petition beforeSupreme Court – Moreover, no averments were made by therespondents in the second set of review to the effect that they couldnot trace the documents in question earlier – Therefore, non-production of the relevant documents on the part of the respondentsat the appropriate stage cannot be ground for seeking review ofthe judgment when five opportunities were available to them forproduction of the said documents – Even otherwise, recourse tosuccessive review petitions against the same order is impermissiblewhen the respondents have miserably failed to draw the attentionof the Court to any circumstances that would entitle them to invokereview jurisdiction – Thus, Second set of review petition ought tobe rejected by High Court.

Allowing the appeals, the Court

HELD: 1. It has been consistently held by this Court inseveral judicial pronouncements that the Court’s jurisdiction ofreview, is not the same as that of an appeal. judgment can beopen to review if there is mistake or an error apparent on theface of the record, but an error that has to be detected by aprocess of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparenton the face of the record for the Court to exercise its powers ofreview under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercisingpowers of review, the Court can correct mistake but notsubstitute the view taken earlier merely because there is apossibility of taking two views in matter. judgment may alsobe open to review when any new or important matter of evidencehas emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to thecondition that such evidence was not within the knowledge ofthe party seeking review or could not be produced by it when theorder was made despite undertaking an exercise of due diligence.There is clear distinction between an erroneous decision asagainst an error apparent on the face of the record. An erroneousdecision can be corrected by the Superior Court, however anerror apparent on the face of the record can only be corrected byexercising review jurisdiction. Yet another circumstance referredto in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing judgment has beendescribed as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phrasehas been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, atleast analogous to those specified in the rule” [Para 26][65-G-H;66-A-D]

ABC

DEF

A2. The Single Judge of the High Court has taken great painsto discuss the three circumstances available under Order XLVIICPC for maintaining review application and observed that inthe instant case, the respondents had stated before this Courtthat they had in their possession, genuine documents relating tosurrender of the protected tenancy rights in respect of the subjectBland and in view of the said submission, the petitions for SpecialLeave to Appeal were disposed of with an observation that if therespondents were able to obtain such documents, it would beopen to them to file review petition before the High Court.What is relevant is that this Court had even then declined toCinterfere with the findings on merits returned by the High Courtvide Judgment dated 09th July, 2013; nor was the review orderdated 20[th] February, 2014, interfered with. Under the garb of theliberty granted to them to approach the High Court again, all thatthe respondents have done is to obtain certified copies of therevenue records in respect of the subject land and enclosed themDwith the second set of review petitions. This is so whenphotocopies of the said documents had been filed by them earlier.[Para 27][66-E-H]

3. Nothing prevented the respondents from filing thecertified copies of the revenue records even earlier, but theyEelected to file only photocopies of the very same surrenderproceedings along with the revision petitions that were ultimatelydismissed by the High Court vide common judgment dated 9[th]July, 2013. The above chronology of events gains significance asit goes to amply demonstrate that several opportunities wereFavailable to the respondents if they really wished to fileauthenticated copies of the revenue records relating to thepurported surrender proceedings before the Tehsildar which theydid not avail of, for reasons best known to them. The firstopportunity arose when the respondents challenged the ex parteorder dated 2nd April, 2005 passed by the Appellate AuthorityGwhen they filed two Civil Revision Petitions which were allowedand the matter was remanded back to the Appellate Authority forfresh consideration; the second opportunity arose when theAppellate Authority re-considered the appeals remitted by theHigh Court and passed an order dated 23rd March, 2013, in favourHof the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant; the thirdopportunity arose when the respondents preferred second setof Civil Revision Petitions assailing the order dated 23rd March,2013 that culminated in the common judgment and order dated9th July, 2013 passed by the High Court; the fourth opportunityarose when the respondents filed two review applications forseeking review of the common judgment and order dated 9thJuly, 2013, that came to be dismissed vide order dated 20thFebruary, 2014; and the fifth opportunity arose when therespondents preferred petitions for special leave to appeal beforethis Court being aggrieved by the common judgment and ordersdated 9th July, 2013 and the review order dated 20th February,2014 passed by the High Court. [Paras 28 and 31][67-B; 69-F-H;70-A-B]

4. Nothing has been stated on affidavit to substantiate theplea taken by the respondents at such belated stage that thedocuments sought to be filed by them with the second set ofreview petitions had come to light after passing of the judgmentand order dated 9th July, 2013. Under the garb of the libertygranted to them, the respondents have tried to fill in the glaringloopholes and introduce evidence in the review proceedings thatwas all along in their power and possession and ought to haveseen the light of the day much earlier. In fact, it appears that theCivil Revision Petitions were originally argued to the hilt onseveral other grounds, not limited just to the revenue record,which were all considered and turned down as meritless.Therefore, we have no hesitation in holding that non-productionof the relevant documents on the part of the respondents at theappropriate stage cannot be ground for seeking review of thejudgment and order dated 9[th] July, 2013 particularly, when fiveopportunities enumerated in para 31 above, were available tothem for production of the said documents, which were all fritteredaway, one by one. [Para 34][71-E-G]

5. Even otherwise, recourse to successive review petitionsagainst the same order is impermissible more so, when therespondents have miserably failed to draw the attention of thisCourt to any circumstances that would entitle them to invokereview jurisdiction within the ambit of the Rules. Under the rules,the respondents were not required to produce “genuine”

ABCD

Adocuments but new documents/evidence that was not within theirknowledge and could not have been so even after exercise ofdue diligence, which could have turned the tables in their favour.Nor has any error apparent on the face of the record been broughtout by them. [Para 35][72-A-B]

BBabboo Alias Kalyandas and Others v. State of MadhyaPradesh (1979) 4 SCC 74; Sakuru v. Tanaji (1985) 3SCC 590 : [1985] 2 Suppl. SCR 109; Dharappa v.Bijapur Coop. Milk Products Societies Union Limited(2007) 9 SCC 109 : [2007] 5 SCR 729 – referred to.

CCol. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others(1980) Supp SCC 562; Parsion Devi and Others v.Sumitri Devi and Others (1997) 8 SCC 715 : [1997] 4Suppl. SCR 470; Lilly Thomas and Others v. Union ofIndia and Others (2000) 6 SCC 224 : [2000] 3 SCR1081; Kerala State Electricity Board v. HitechDElectrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others (2005)6 SCC 651 : [2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 517; Jain StudiosLtd. v. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.(2006) 5 SCC 501: [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 409; Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawatiand Others (2013) 8 SCC 320 : [2013] 11 SCR 25;EAribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma(1979) 4 SCC 389; State of West Bengal and Others v.Kamal Sengupta and Another (2008) 8 SCC 612 :[2008] 10 SCR 4; S. Nagaraj and Others v. State ofKarnataka and Another (1993) 4 Supp SCC 595 :[1993] 2 Suppl. SCR 1; Patel Narshi Thakershi andFOthers v. Shri Pradyuman Singhji Arjunsinghji (1971)3 SCC 844; Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Othersv. Vinod Kumar Rawat and Others (2020) SCC OnlineSC 896; Chajju Ram v. Neki Ram and Moran MarBasselios Catholicos and Anr. v. Most Rev. Mar PouloseGAthanasius and Others – relied on.

Case Law Reference

S. MADHUSUDHAN REDDY v. V. NARAYANA REDDY ANDOTHERS

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 5503-5504 of 2022.

From the Judgment and Order dated 29.04.2022 of the High Courtfor the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in IA No.2 of 2014 (Rev. CRMPNo.6377 of 2014) and CRP No. 2786 of 2013.

With

Civil Appeal No. 5505 of 2022.

Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, V. K. Shukla, Sr. Advs., Achut Reddy,Somanadri Goud Katam, Nidhi Ram Sharma, Ganesh Bhardwaj, SirajMalik, Advs. for the Appellant.

Mukul Rohatgi, Sr. Adv., Giridhar Rao, Sridhar Potaraju, ArjunSingh, Ms. Shiwani Tushir, Rajat Srivastav, Gaichangpou Gangmei, Advs.for the Respondents.

The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

HIMA KOHLI, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The present appeals are directed against common judgmentand order dated 29[th] April, 2022 passed by the learned Single Judge ofthe High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad, allowing thereview petitions filed by the respondent Nos. 1 to 6 herein (IA No.2 of2014 in Revision CRPMP No. 6377 of 2014 moved in and Civil RevisionPetition No.2786 of 2013 and IA No.1 of 2014 in Revision CRMP No.4997/2014 moved in and Civil Revision Petition No.2787 /2013). As resultof allowing the review petitions, the common judgment and order dated09[th] July, 2013 passed by the predecessor Bench upholding the commonorder dated 23[rd] March, 2013 in Cases No. F1/3/2005 and F1/4/2005passed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, has been set aside and as

Aa sequel thereto, the orders dated 31st March, 1967 passed by theTahsildar, Shadnagar, accepting the surrender of protected tenancy rightsby the ancestors of the appellant have been confirmed.

3. The appeals have chequered history that dates back to theyear 1967. The facts relevant for deciding the present appeals are asBfollows:-

3.1 Late Shri Chandra Reddy and late Shri Chenna Reddy, bothsons of Buchi Reddy, were protected tenants in respect of separateparcels of land situated in different survey numbers of KammadanamVillage, Shadnagar Mandal, Mahabubnagar District[1]. The recordedClandlord of the protected tenants was late Venkat Anantha Reddy, whowas the Karta of joint family comprising of himself and his brother,late Laxma Reddy. On the basis of an oral partition of the land that tookplace between the two brothers, the subject land fell to the share of lateL. Harshavardhan Reddy (respondent No.6), son of late Laxma Reddy.Pertinently, L. Harshavardhan Reddy expired during the pendency ofDthe review petitions and L. Sameera Reddy was brought on record ashis legal heir. As per the respondents, late Shri Chandra Reddy, whowas protected tenant in respect of the subject land measuring 57 acresand 16 guntas, had surrendered his protected tenancy rights on submittinga written application dated 6th August, 1966 to the Tehsildar. similarEapplication was submitted by the three legal heirs of Late Chenna Reddy(Ram Reddy, Chandra Reddy and Laxma Reddy) in respect of landmeasuring 98 acres 18 guntas. The respondents claim that on receivingthe said applications, the Tehsildar, Shadnagar, recorded the statementsof the applicants and after confirming the identity of the parties, issued apublic notice and thereafter, accepted the surrender on satisfying theFrequirements prescribed in the A.P. (Telangana Area) Tenancy andAgricultural Lands Act, 1950[2]. After accepting the surrender applications,the names of the protected tenants were struck off from the final recordsof tenancy, vide order dated 31[st] March, 1967.

3.2 It is also the version of the respondents that the protectedGtenants had surrendered their tenancy rights in favour of late VenkatAnantha Reddy pursuant to an understanding that the latter would notoppose the 38-B Certificate issued by the Tenancy Tribunal in favour ofChandra Reddy and the sons of late Chenna Reddy in respect of the

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘subject land’H2 For short ‘Act’

parcel of land measuring 85 acres 23 guntas situated in KammadanamVillage. In other words, there was reciprocity between the protectedtenants and the landlord based on which, the landlord relinquished hisrights in respect of land measuring 85 acrs 23 guntas in exchange of thesurrender of the subject land by Chandra Reddy and the legal heirs oflate Chenna Reddy.

3.3 On the other hand, the appellant, who is the legal heir of theoriginal tenants, claims that his ancestors were dispossessed from thesubject land in the year 1975 when they were trying to obtain 38-ECertificate from the authorities. Only in the year 2001 when the legalheirs of the protected tenants had applied for the final record of tenancy,did they discover that the names of the protected tenants had been struckoff on the basis of the purported surrender proceedings conducted bythe Tehsildar in the year 1967. Challenging the said surrender proceedings,the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant being the protected tenants,preferred appeals before the Joint Collector in February, 2002 alongwith an application seeking condonation of delay. The said appeals wereallowed by the Joint Collector, Mahabubnagar, being the AppellateAuthority, vide order dated 2nd April, 2005. Aggrieved by the said order,the respondents approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh[3] raisinga plea that it was an ex-parte order and filed two Civil Revision Petitions(CRP No. 4620/2005 and CRP No. 4988/2005), which were allowed,vide order dated 19[th] September, 2006 and the matters were remandedback for fresh disposal. On re-hearing, the Appellate Authority passedan order on 23[rd] March, 2013 whereby, the order dated 31[st] March, 1967passed by the Tehsildar, Shadnagar accepting the surrender of theprotected tenancy rights by the ancestors of the appellant, was set asideand the original entries in respect of the land in the final record of tenancyas existing prior to 1967, were restored.

3.4 Dissatisfied by the order dated 23[rd] March, 2013, therespondents once again approached the High Court by filing two CivilRevision Petitions (CRP No.2786/2013 and CRP No.2787/2013), whichcame to be dismissed by common judgment and order dated 09th July,2013. The review petitions subsequently filed by the respondents forseeking review of the aforesaid judgment (Rev. CRMP No.5443/2013in Civil Revision Petition No. 2786/2013 and Rev. CRMP No. 5432/2013 in Civil Revision Petition No. 2787/2013) were also dismissed, vide

3 For short ‘High Court’

Aorder dated 20th February, 2014. The common judgment and order dated9[th] July, 2013 and the order dated 20[th] February, 2014 were assailed bythe respondent Nos. 1 to 6 through Special Leave Petitions (C) CC No.8209- 8210/ 2014 that were disposed of with the following order passedon 4[th] July, 2014:B“Delay condoned.

The learned counsel for the petitioners submits that he would bein position to file genuine documents to show that there wassurrender of tenancy. If he will be able to obtain such documents,it is open to him to file review before the High Court. The specialCleave petitions are disposed of accordingly.”

3.5 Armed with the above order, the respondents No. 1 to 6 againapproached the High Court and filed second round of review applicationsseeking review of the common order and judgment dated 9th July, 2013which have been allowed by the impugned order. The learned SingleDJudge has upheld the surrender order dated 31st March, 1967 passed bythe Tehsildar, Shadnagar whereby the names of the protected tenants(predecessors-in-interest of the appellants) were deleted from the finalrecords of tenancy.

4. Arguing for the appellant, Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi, learnedESenior Advocate has contended that the review petitions filed by therespondents No. 1 to 6 are not maintainable as they do not satisfy any ofthe conditions for review provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CivilProcedure Code, 1908[4]. He submitted that the grounds taken in the secondset of review petitions were akin to those taken in the first set of reviewpetitions and once the first set of review petitions were dismissed by theFHigh Court, vide order dated 20th February, 2014 and no new groundswere taken by the respondents No.1 to 6 subsequently, there was nooccasion to allow the second set of review petitions; that the respondentsNo. 1 to 6 did not take plea that the documents subsequently filed bythem, were not in their knowledge when they had filed the civil revisionGpetitions and the first set of review petitions before the High Court forattracting the provisions of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Stating that thescope of review is very limited and review application can only beentertained if there is any error apparent on the face of the record,which the respondents No. 1 to 6 have failed to point out in the instant

H4 For short ‘CPC’

case, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the High Court ought tohave dismissed the same outright. It was argued that by virtue of theimpugned order, the High Court has virtually treated the review petitionsfiled by the respondents No. 1 to 6 as independent appeals, which isimpermissible. To buttress the aforesaid submissions made on the limitedambit and scope of review petition and the bar on filing successivereview petitions, the decisions of this Court inBabboo Alias Kalyandasand Others v. State of Madhya Pradesh5 andLilly Thomas and Othersv. Union of India and Others6 have been cited.

5. Another plea sought to be taken on behalf of the appellant isthat the name of the father of the protected tenants, Chandra Reddy andChenna Reddy has been stated to be Papi Reddy in the surrenderproceedings whereas, his correct name is Buchi Reddy which goes toshow that the surrender proceedings conducted by the Tehsildar werefabricated and the fact of the matter is that neither the appellant, nor hisancestors had ever surrendered the tenancy rights in favour of therespondents/their ancestors/ predecessors- in-interest. It was contendedthat this fact is borne out from the declaration made by the landlord inthe ceiling proceedings where he had admitted that 38-E Certificatewas granted in respect of the subject land and the tenants were inpossession thereof. It was canvassed that the High Court has failed toappreciate that had surrender of lands by the protected tenants in favourof the landlord actually taken place in the year 1967, as alleged, therewas no occasion for the landlord to have later on claimed exemption ofthese lands for being computed as part of his holdings under the AndhraPradesh Land Reforms (Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973[7].6. The aforesaid submissions made on behalf of the appellanthave been vehemently contested by Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, learned SeniorAdvocate appearing for the respondents. It was submitted that thesurrender proceedings had attained finality in the year 1967 and aftermaintaining silence for almost 35 years, the legal heirs of the protectedtenants, had filed misconceived appeal under Section 90(1) of the LandCeiling Act. Pertinently, the respondents being the purchasers of thesubject land, were not made parties in the said proceedings and theAppellate Authority had proceeded to pass an order dated 2nd April,

5 (1979) 4 SCC 74

6 (2000) 6 SCC 224

7 For short ‘the Land Ceiling Act’

A2005 allowing the said appeals behind their back. Aggrieved by the saidex parte order, when the respondents approached the High Court, thematters were remanded back to the Appellate Authority for freshadjudication. The Appellate Authority allowed the appeals, once againcompelling the respondents to approach the High Court by filing freshappeals which were knocked off vide order dated 09[th] July, 2013 andBtheir review petitions were also dismissed on 20[th] February, 2014. Againstthe said dismissal orders, the respondents had to approach this Court.The petitions for special leave to appeal preferred by them were disposedof vide order dated 4th July, 2014 that has been extracted in para 5hereinabove.C

7. Learned Senior Advocate submitted that in the light of thepermission granted by this Court, the respondents had filed review petitionsin the Civil Revision Petitions before the High Court after obtainingcertified copies of the relevant documents forming part of the revenuerecords. Only after considering the said documents did the learned SingleDJudge allow the review petitions for cogent and valid reasons that do notdeserve any interference. It has been canvassed on behalf of therespondents that the legal heirs of the protected tenant had knowledgeabout the surrender of the subject land right from the year 1967 to 2001and they were also aware of the fact that the names of their ancestorswere not reflected in the protected tenants register. The real position isEthat the ancestors of the appellant were never in possession of the subjectland after 1967. Despite that, they had approached the Appellate Authoritychallenging the surrender proceedings after passage of 35 years.Contending that said appeals were highly belated and deserved to bethrown out on the ground of limitation alone without going into the merits,Fthe decisions in Sakuru v. Tanaji8 and Dharappa v. Bijapur Coop.Milk Products Societies Union Limited9 have been cited. It has beenurged that the appeals preferred by the ancestors of the appellant werenot maintainable, being patently barred by limitation which aspect hasbeen gone into by the High Court while passing the impugned judgmentallowing the review petitions filed by the respondents.G

8. As for the mis-description of the predecessor-in-interest of theappellant, it was submitted that Buchi Reddy was also known Papi Reddyin the village which fact is reflected from the revenue records, namely,

8 (1985) 3 SCC 590H9 (2007) 9 SCC 109

Faisal Patti record of the village, as recorded by the Patwari. Counselfor the respondents also sought to negate the ground taken by the otherside with reference to the landlord claiming exemption under the landceiling proceedings on the ground that Land Reforms Tribunal did notaccept such plea of exemption. It was thus submitted that surrender ofthe tenancy rights had attained finality in the year 1967 itself and theappellant and his ancestors have reopened settled issues after passageof 35 years reckoned from the date of surrender only for the reason thatthe price of the subject land, which is situated close to the InternationalAirport at Shamshabad, have escalated and he wants to encash thesame.9. This Court has carefully perused the impugned judgment andthe orders preceding the impugned judgment, gone through the recordsand given its thoughtful consideration to the arguments advanced bylearned counsel for the parties. The only point that arises for considerationin these appeals is whether the respondents/review petitioners had madeout case for reviewing the judgment and order dated 23[rd] March, 2013by satisfying the criteria for entertaining second set of review petitions,having failed to succeed in the first set of review petitions.

10. The core argument advanced on behalf of the appellant thatthe High Court ought not to have entertained successive review petitionsfiled by the respondents when they could not demonstrate emergence ofany new facts or point out any error apparent on the face of the record,for allowing the review applications, must be put to test by examiningthe relevant provisions of law that governs review jurisdiction.

11. Section 114 of the CPC which is the substantive provision,deals with the scope of review and states as follows:

“Review:- Subject as aforesaid, any person considering himselfaggrieved:-

(a) by decree or order from which an appeal is allowed by thisCode, but from which no appeal has been preferred;

(b) by decree or order from which no appeal is allowed by thisCode; or

(c) by decision on reference from Court of Small Causes,may apply for review of judgment to the court which passed thedecree or made the order, and the court may make such orderthereon as it thinks fit.”

[2022] 11 S.C.R.

A12. The grounds available for filing review application against ajudgment have been set out in Order XLVII of the CPC in the followingwords:

“1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any personconsidering himself aggrieved -

(a) by decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, butfrom which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by decree ororder from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by decision on areference from Court of Small Causes, and who, from thediscovery of new and important matter or evidence which, afterCthe exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge orcould not be produced by him at the time when the decree waspassed or order made, or on account of some mistake or errorapparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficientreason, desires to obtain review of the decree passed or ordermade against him, may apply for review of judgment to theDCourt which passed the decree or made the order.

(2) party who is not appealing from decree or Order mayapply for review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency ofan appeal by some other party except where the ground of suchappeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when,Ebeing respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the caseon which he applies for the review.

1[Explanation-The fact that the decision on question of law onwhich the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed ormodified by the subsequent decision of superior Court in anyFother case, shall not be ground for the review of such judgment.]’’

13. glance at the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that areview application would be maintainable on (i) discovery of new andimportant matters or evidence which, after exercise of due diligence,were not within the knowledge of the applicant or could not be producedGby him when the decree was passed or the order made; (ii) on accountof some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record; or (iii) forany other sufficient reason.

14. In Col. Avatar Singh Sekhon v. Union of India and Others[10],this Court observed that review of an earlier order cannot be doneH10 1980 Supp SCC 562

unless the court is satisfied that the material error which is manifest onthe face of the order, would result in miscarriage of justice or undermineits soundness. The observations made are as under:

“12. review is not routine procedure. Here we resolved tohear Shri Kapil at length to remove any feeling that the party hasbeen hurt without being heard. But we cannot review our earlierorder unless satisfied that material error, manifest on the face ofthe order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage ofjustice. In Sow Chandra Kante and Another v. Sheikh Habib[11]this Court observed :

‘A review of judgment is serious step and reluctantresort to it is proper only where glaring omission orpatent mistake or like grave error has crept in earlierby judicial fallibility. … The present stage is not virginground but review of an earlier order which has thenormal feature of finality.’ ’’

(emphasis added)

15. In Parsion Devi and Others v. Sumitri Devi and Others[12],stating that an error that is not self- evident and the one thathas to bedetected by the process of reasoning, cannot be described as an errorapparent on the face of the record for the Court to exercise the powersof review, this Court held as under:

“7. It is well settled that review proceedings have to be strictlyconfined to the ambit and scope of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. InThungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. Govt. of A.P.[13] this Courtopined:

‘11. What, however, we are now concerned with is whetherthe statement in the order of September 1959 that the casedid not involve any substantial question of law is an ‘errorapparent on the face of the record’. The fact that on theearlier occasion the Court held on an identical state of factsthat substantial question of law arose would not per se beconclusive, for the earlier order itself might be erroneous.Similarly, even if the statement was wrong, it would not

11 (1975) 1 SCC 674

12 (1997) 8 SCC 715

13 1964 SCR (5) 174

Afollow that it was an ‘error apparent on the face of therecord’, for there is distinction which is real, though itmight not always be capable of exposition, between mereerroneous decision and decision which could becharacterized as vitiated by ‘error apparent’. review isby no means an appeal in disguise whereby anBerroneous decision is reheard and corrected, but liesonly for patent error.’

8. Again, in Meera Bhanja v. Nirmala Kumari Choudhury[14]while quoting with approval passage from Aribam TuleshwarSharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma[15] this Court once again heldCthat review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have tobe strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1CPC.

9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC judgment may be open toreview inter alia if there is mistake or an error apparentDon the face of the record. An error which is not self-evidentand has to be detected by process of reasoning, can hardlybe said to be an error apparent on the face of the recordjustifying the court to exercise its power of review underOrder 47 Rule 1 CPC. In exercise of this jurisdiction underEOrder 47 rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an erroneousdecision to be ‘reheard and corrected’. review petition,it must be remembered has limited purpose and cannotbe allowed to be ‘an appeal in disguise’”.

[emphasis added]

F16. The error referred to under the Rule, must be apparent on theface of the record and not one which has to be searched out. Whilediscussing the scope and ambit of Article 137 that empowers theSupremeCourt to review its judgments and in the course of discussing the contoursof review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 of the CPC in LilyGThomas (supra), this Court held as under :

“54. Article 137 empowers this court to review its judgmentssubject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or anyrules made under Article 145 of the Constitution. The Supreme14 (1995) 1 SCC 17015 (1979) 4 SCC 389H

Court Rules made in exercise of the powers under Article 145 ofthe Constitution prescribe that in civil cases, review lies on any ofthe grounds specified in Order 47 rule 1 of the Code of CivilProcedure which provides:

“1. Application for review of judgment - (1) Any personconsidering himself aggrieved -

(a) by decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, butfrom which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by decision on reference from Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter orevidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was notwithin his knowledge or could not be produced by him at thetime when the decree was passed or order made, or on accountof some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record,or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain review ofthe decree passed or order made against him, may apply for areview of judgment to the Court which passed the decree ormade the order.’

Under Order XL Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules no reviewlies except on the ground of error apparent on the face of therecord in criminal cases. Order XL Rule 5 of the Supreme CourtRules provides that after an application for review has beendisposed of no further application shall be entertained in the samematter.

XXX XXX XXX

56. It follows, therefore, that the power of review can beexercised for correction of mistake but not to substitutea view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits ofthe statute dealing with the exercise of power. The reviewcannot be treated like an appeal in disguise. The merepossibility of two views on the subject is not ground forreview. Once review petition is dismissed no furtherpetition of review can be entertained. The rule of law offollowing the practice of the binding nature of the larger Benchesand not taking different views by the Benches of coordinated

jurisdiction of equal strength has to be followed and practised.However, this Court in exercise of its powers under Article136or Article 32of the Constitution and upon satisfaction thatthe earlier judgments have resulted in deprivation of fundamentalrights of citizen or rights created under any other statute, cantake different view notwithstanding the earlier judgment.

XXX XXX XXX

58. Otherwise also no ground as envisaged under Order XL ofthe Supreme Court Rules read with Order 47 of the Code of CivilProcedure has been pleaded in the review petition or canvassedCbefore us during the arguments for the purposes of reviewing thejudgment in Sarla Mudgal case[16]. It is not the case of thepetitioners that they have discovered any new and important matterwhich after the exercise of due diligence was not within theirknowledge or could not be brought to the notice of the Court atthe time of passing of the judgment. All pleas raised before usDwere in fact addressed for and on behalf of the petitioners beforethe Bench which, after considering those pleas, passed thejudgment in Sarla Mudgal[16] case. We have also not found anymistake or error apparent on the face of the record requiring areview. Error contemplated under the rule must be suchEwhich is apparent on the face of the record and not an errorwhich has to be fished out and searched. It must be an errorof inadvertence. No such error has been pointed out by thelearned counsel appearing for the parties seeking review of thejudgment. The only arguments advanced were that the judgmentinterpreting Section 494 amounted to violation of some of theFfundamental rights. No other sufficient cause has been shown forreviewing the judgment. The words “any-other sufficientreason appearing in Order 47 Rule 1 CPC” must mean “areason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to thosespecified in the rule” as was held in Chajju Ram v. NekiGRam17 and approved by this Court in Moran Mar BasseliosCatholicos. v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius18. Errorapparent on the face of the proceedings is an error which is

16 (1995) 3 SCC 635, Sarla Mudgal, President, Kalyani and Others v. Union of India andOthers

17 AIR 1922 PC 112H18 1955 SCR 520

based on clear ignorance or disregard of the provisions oflaw. in T.C. Basappa v. T. Nagappa19 this Court held thatsuch error is an error which is patent error and not amere wrong decision. In Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad20, itwas held:

“It is essential that it should be something more than amere error; it must be one which must be manifest onthe face of the record. The real difficulty with reference tothis matter, however, is not so much in the statement of theprinciple as in its application to the facts of particular case.When does an error, cease to be mere error and become anerror apparent on the face of the record? Learned Counsel oneither side were unable to suggest any clear-cut rule by whichthe boundary between the two classes of errors could bedemarcated.

Mr. Pathak for the first respondent contended on thestrength of certain observations of Chagla, CJ in – ‘Batuk KVyas v. Surat Borough Municipality’[21], that no error couldbe said to be apparent on the face of the record if it was notself-evident and if it required an examination or argument toestablish it. This test might afford satisfactory basis for decisionin the majority of cases. But there must be cases in whicheven this test might break down, because judicial opinions alsodiffer, and an error that might be considered by one Judge asself-evident might not be so considered by another. The factis that what is an error apparent on the face of the recordcannot be defined precisely or exhaustively, there beingan element of indefiniteness inherent in its very nature,and it must be left to be determined judicially on thefacts of each case.Therefore, it can safely be held that the petitioners have notmade out any case within the meaning of Article 137read withOrder XL of the Supreme Court Rules and Order 47 Rule 1CPC for reviewing the judgment in Sarla Mudgal case[16].

19 1955 SCR 250

20 AIR 1955 SC 233

21 ILR 1953 Bom 191

AThe petition is misconceived and bereft of any substance.”(emphasis added)

17. It is also settled law that in exercise of review jurisdiction, theCourt cannot reappreciate the evidence to arrive at different conclusioneven if two views are possible in matter. In Kerala State ElectricityBBoard v. Hitech Electrothermics & Hydropower Ltd. and Others[22],this Court observed as follows:

“10. ....In review petition it is not open to this Court toreappreciate the evidence and reach different conclusion,even if that is possible. Learned counsel for the Board at bestCsought to impress us that the correspondence exchanged betweenthe parties did not support the conclusion reached by this Court.We are afraid such submission cannot be permitted to beadvanced in review petition. The appreciation of evidenceon record is fully within the domain of the appellate court.If on appreciation of the evidence produced, the courtDrecords finding of fact and reaches conclusion, thatconclusion cannot be assailed in review petition unless itis shown that there is an error apparent on the face of therecord or for some reason akin thereto. It has not beencontended before us that there is any error apparent on the faceEof the record. To permit the review petitioner to argue on aquestion of appreciation of evidence would amount toconverting review petition into an appeal in disguise.”

(emphasis added)

18. Under the garb of filing review petition, party cannot beFpermitted to repeat old and overruled arguments for reopening theconclusions arrived at in judgment. The power of review is not to beconfused with the appellate power which enables the Superior Court tocorrect errors committed by subordinate Court. This point has beenelucidated in Jain Studios Ltd. V. Shin Satellite Public Co. Ltd.[23]whereit was held thus:G

“11. So far as the grievance of the applicant on merits is concerned,the learned counsel for the opponent is right in submitting that

22 (2005) 6 SCC 651H23 (2006) 5 SCC 501

virtually the applicant seeks the same relief which had been soughtat the time of arguing the main matter and had been negatived.Once such prayer had been refused, no review petition wouldlie which would convert rehearing of the original matter. It issettled law that the power of review cannot be confusedwith appellate power which enables superior court tocorrect all errors committed by subordinate court. It isnot rehearing of an original matter. repetition of old andoverruled argument is not enough to reopen concludedadjudications. The power of review can be exercised withextreme care, caution and circumspection and only inexceptional cases.

12. When prayer to appoint an arbitrator by the applicant hereinhad been made at the time when the arbitration petition was heardand was rejected, the same relief cannot be sought by an indirectmethod by filing review petition. Such petition, in my opinion,is in the nature of ‘second innings’ which is impermissibleand unwarranted and cannot be granted.”

(emphasis added)

19. After discussing series of decisions on review jurisdiction inKamlesh Verma v. Mayawati and Others[24], this Court observed thatreview proceedings have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambitof Order XLVII Rule 1, CPC. As long as the point sought to be raised inthe review application has already been dealt with and answered, partiesare not entitled to challenge the impugned judgment only because analternative view is possible. The principles for exercising reviewjurisdiction were succinctly summarized in the captioned case as below:“20. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of revieware maintainable as stipulated by the statute:

20.1. When the review will be maintainable:

(i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,after the exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge ofthe petitioner or could not be produced by him;

(ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;

A(iii) Any other sufficient reason.

The words “any other sufficient reason” has been interpreted inChajju Ram vs. Neki[17], and approved by this Court in MoranMar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar PouloseAthanasius & Ors.[18] to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds atBleast analogous to those specified in the rule”. The same principleshave been reiterated in Union of India v. Sandur Manganese& Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors.[25],.

20.2. When the review will not be maintainable: -

(i) repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough toCreopen concluded adjudications.

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import.

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the originalhearing of the case.

D(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifeston the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results inmiscarriage of justice.

(v) review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby anerroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patentEerror.

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be aground for review. (vii) The error apparent on the face of therecord should not be an error which has to be fished out andsearched.

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within thedomain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advancedin the review petition.

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought atthe time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

20. In Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma[15],this Court was examining an order passed by the Judicial Commissionerwho was reviewing an earlier judgment that went in favour of theappellant, while deciding review application filed by the respondents

H25 (2013) 8 SCC 337

therein who took ground that the predecessor Court had overlookedtwo important documents that showed that the respondents were inpossession of the sites through which the appellant had soughteasementary rights to access his home-stead. The said appeal was allowedby this Court with the following observations:

“3 …It is true as observed by this Court in Shivdeo Singh andOthers v. State of Punjab26 there is nothing in Article 226of theConstitution to preclude High Court from exercising the powerof review which inheres in every court of plenary jurisdiction toprevent miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and pulpableerrors committed by it. But, there are definitive limits to the exerciseof the power of review. The power of review may be exercisedon the discovery of new and important matter or evidencewhich, after the exercise of due diligence was not withinthe knowledge of the person seeking the review or couldnot be produced by him at the time when the order wasmade; it may be exercised where some mistake or errorapparent on the face of the record is found; it may also beexercised on any analogous ground. But, it may not beexercised on the ground that the decision was erroneouson merits. That would be the province of court of appeal.A power of review is not to be confused with appellatepower which may enable an appellate court to correct allmanner of errors committed by the subordinate court.”

(emphasis added)

21. In State of West Bengal and Others v. Kamal Senguptaand Another[27], this Court emphasized the requirement of the reviewpetitioner who approaches Court on the ground of discovery of newmatter or evidence, to demonstrate that the same was not within hisknowledge and held thus:

“21. At this stage it is apposite to observe that where review issought on the ground of discovery of new matter or evidence,such matter or evidence must be relevant and must be of such acharacter that if the same had been produced, it might have alteredthe judgment. In other words, mere discovery of new or

26 (1979) 4 SCC 389

27 (2008) 8 SCC 612

Aimportant matter or evidence is not sufficient ground forreview ex debito justitiae. Not only this, the party seekingreview has also to show that such additional matter orevidence was not within its knowledge and even after theexercise of due diligence, the same could not be producedbefore the court earlier.”

(emphasis added)

22. In the captioned judgment, the term ‘mistake or error apparent’has been discussed in the following words:

“22. The term ‘mistake or error apparent’ by its veryCconnotation signifies an error which is evident per se fromthe record of the case and does not require detailedexamination, scrutiny and elucidation either of the facts orthe legal position. If an error is not self-evident and detectionthereof requires long debate and process of reasoning, it cannotDbe treated as an error apparent on the face of the record for thepurpose of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC or Section 22(3)(f) of the Act.To put it differently an order or decision or judgment cannotbe corrected merely because it is erroneous in law or onthe ground that different view could have been taken bythe court/tribunal on point of fact or law. In any case, whileEexercising the power of review, the court/tribunal concernedcannot sit in appeal over its judgment/decision”.

(emphasis added)

23. In S. Nagaraj and Others v. State of Karnataka andFAnother[28], this Court explained as to when review jurisdiction couldbe treated as statutory or inherent and held thus :

“18. Justice is virtue which transcends all barriers. Neither therules of procedure nor technicalities of law can stand in its way.The order of the court should not be prejudicial to anyone. Rule ofstare decisis is adhered for consistency but it is not as inflexible inGAdministrative Law as in Public Law. Even the law bends beforejustice. Entire concept of writ jurisdiction exercised by thehigher courts is founded on equity and fairness. If the courtfinds that the order was passed under mistake and it would

not have exercised the jurisdiction but for the erroneousassumption which in fact did not exist and its perpetrationshall result in miscarriage of justice then it cannot on anyprinciple be precluded from rectifying the error. Mistakeis accepted as valid reason to recall an order. Differencelies in the nature of mistake and scope of rectification,depending on if it is of fact or law. But the root from whichthe power flows is the anxiety to avoid injustice. It is eitherstatutory or inherent. The latter is available where themistake is of the Court”.

(emphasis added)

24. In Patel Narshi Thakershi and Others v. Shri PradyumanSinghji Arjunsinghji[29], this Court held as follows:

“4….. It is well settled that the power to review is not aninherent power. It must be conferred by law eitherspecifically or by necessary implication. No provision in theAct was brought to notice from which it could be gathered thatthe Government had power to review its own order. If theGovernment had no power to review its own order, it is obviousthat its delegate could not have reviewed its order.……”

(emphasis added)

25. In Ram Sahu (Dead) Through LRs and Others v. VinodKumar Rawat and Others[30], citing previous decisions and expoundingon the scope and ambit of Section 114 read with Order XLVII Rule 1,this Court has observed that Section 114 CPC does not lay any conditionsprecedent for exercising the power of review; and nor does the Sectionprohibit the Court from exercising its power to review decision.However, an order can be reviewed by the Court only on the groundsprescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said power cannot beexercised as an inherent power and nor can appellate power be exercisedin the guise of exercising the power of review.

26. As can be seen from the above exposition of law, it has beenconsistently held by this Court in several judicial pronouncements thatthe Court’s jurisdiction of review, is not the same as that of an appeal. Ajudgment can be open to review if there is mistake or an error apparent

29 (1971) 3 SCC 844

30 (2020) SCC Online SC 896

Aon the face of the record, but an error that has to be detected by aprocess of reasoning, cannot be described as an error apparent on theface of the record for the Court to exercise its powers of review underOrder XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In the guise of exercising powers of review,the Court can correct mistake but not substitute the view taken earliermerely because there is possibility of taking two views in matter. ABjudgment may also be open to review when any new or important matterof evidence has emerged after passing of the judgment, subject to thecondition that such evidence was not within the knowledge of the partyseeking review or could not be produced by it when the order was madedespite undertaking an exercise of due diligence. There is clearCdistinction between an erroneous decision as against an error apparenton the face of the record. An erroneous decision can be corrected bythe Superior Court, however an error apparent on the face of the recordcan only be corrected by exercising review jurisdiction. Yet anothercircumstance referred to in Order XLVII Rule 1 for reviewing judgmenthas been described as “for any other sufficient reason”. The said phraseDhas been explained to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at leastanalogous to those specified in the rule” (Refer: Chajju Ram v.Neki Ram[17] and Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos and Anr. v. MostRev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and Others18).

27. In the light of the legal position crystalized above, let us nowEexamine the grievance raised by the appellant. The learned Single Judgeof the High Court has taken great pains to discuss the three circumstancesavailable under Order XLVII CPC for maintaining review applicationand observed that in the instant case, the respondents had stated beforethis Court that they had in their possession, genuine documents relatingFto surrender of the protected tenancy rights in respect of the subjectland and in view of the said submission, the petitions for Special Leaveto Appeal were disposed of with an observation that if the respondentswere able to obtain such documents, it would be open to them to file areview petition before the High Court. What is relevant is that this Court

had even then declined to interfere with the findings on merits returnedGby the High Court vide Judgment dated 09[th] July, 2013; nor was thereview order dated 20[th] February, 2014, interfered with. Under the garbof the liberty granted to them to approach the High Court again, all thatthe respondents have done is to obtain certified copies of the revenuerecords in respect of the subject land and enclosed them with the second

set of review petitions. This is so when photocopies of the said documentshad been filed by them earlier.

28. Nothing prevented the respondents from filing the certifiedcopies of the revenue records even earlier, but they elected to file onlyphotocopies of the very same surrender proceedings along with the revisionpetitions that were ultimately dismissed by the High Court vide commonjudgment dated 9[th] July, 2013. The High Court refused to accept theversion of the respondents that the protected tenants had surrenderedthe subject lands in favour of the landlord. The discussion in the judgmentregarding the purported surrender proceedings of protected rights bythe tenants before the Tehsildar in the year 1967 is revealing and extractedhereinbelow for ready reference :-

“2. …………The legal representatives of the protected tenantswere not parties to the alleged surrender proceedings before thethen Tahsildar in the year 1967. There is nothing on record toshow that they were ever dispossessed from the lands, so thatthey can take necessary steps under relevant provisions of theAct before the authorities concerned. After coming to know aboutearlier proceedings which are stated to be in the year 1967, theyrushed to the Joint Collector with the present appeals. There isnothing on record to impute knowledge of the proceedings of theyear 1967 to them at any time prior to filing of the appeals beforethe Joint Collector.

3. Though the alleged surrender of protected tenancy rights byone protected tenant and three legal representatives of the otherprotected tenant was stated to be in the year 1967, it is pointedout by the Joint Collector in the impugned order that the originalland holder/landlord sought for exemption from computing theselands in his holding under the Andhra Pradesh Land Reforms(Ceiling on Agricultural Holdings) Act, 1973. If really the allegedsurrender of lands by the protected tenants in favour of the landlordwas in the year 1967, the landlord would not have claimedexemption for these lands from being computed in his holding underthe Ceiling Act. No doubt, the Land Reforms Tribunal rejectedthe plea of exemption put forward by the landlord on the groundthat he did not produce proper evidence of granting certificatesunder Section 38-E of the Act in favour of the protected tenantsfor these lands. Therefore, these lands were computed in the

holding of the landlord not on the ground of the protected tenantssurrendering their protected tenancy rights, but on the ground thatthe landholder could not produce relevant documents for exemption.Therefore, the Joint Collector rightly came to the conclusion thatfile relating to surrender of lands by the protected tenants in theyear 1967 was manipulated by ante dating the same after the landceiling case was finalized by the Land Ceiling Tribunal.

4. Further, the Joint Collector rightly disbelieved the allegedsurrender of protected tenancy rights in the year 1967 on the groundthat if the surrender in the year 1967 was correct, the question ofagain terminating protected tenancy rights for Ac.36.34 guntasby order dated 16.06.2008 does not arise.

5. Record of the then Tahsildar in the year 1967 discloses thatone protected tenant and legal heirs of other protected tenantintended to surrender protected tenancy rights in favour of thelandlord as the landlord intended to cultivate these lands personally.DFurther, the Joint Collector came to the conclusion that the allegedsurrender in the year 1967 was without knowledge of the protectedtenant and legal heirs of another protested tenant inasmuch as thelandholder pleaded before the Land Ceilings Tribunal in his landcelling declaration that these lands are in possession of theEprotected tenants. From the above circumstances, it can be safelyconcluded that record of the then Tahsildar, Shamshadnagar byway of surrender of protected tenancy rights under Section 19 ofthe Act was not only ante dated but also cooked up. Hence, findno reason to come to different conclusion from that of the JointCollector in this revision petition. The common order passed byFthe Joint Collector is proper, legal and regular.”

29. In the first round of the review proceedings filed by therespondents for seeking review of the order and judgment dated 9[th] July,2013, they had sought to raise, amongst others, the plea of limitation, thepurported error on the part of the Appellate Authority in calling for theGrecords from the office of the Revenue Divisional Officer for decidingthe case and the alleged misconstruction of the ceiling proceedingsconducted by the Land Reforms Tribunal, all of which were earlier arguedand did not find favour with the High Court. But, at no stage was pleataken by the respondents with regard to the discovery of new documentsHwhich could not have been produced by them after undertaking due

diligence before the order dated 9[th] July, 2013 came to be passed. Whenthe first set of review petitions were dismissed by the learned SingleJudge by detailed order dated 20[th] February, 2014, it was specificallyobserved in para 2 that the respondents did not plead that any new factshad come to light for the consideration of the Court. In fact, perusal ofthe said order shows that the respondents only sought to reargue thepoints that had already been taken by them and were rejected outrightly,vide judgment dated 9[th] July, 2013.

30. The sequence of events narrated in the order dated20[th] February, 2014, passed by the High Court while dismissing the firstset of review applications brings to the fore the fact that the respondentshad approached the High Court twice by filing Civil Revision Petitions.In the first round, two Revision Petitions [CRPs No. 4620 and 4988 of2005] filed by the respondents against the order dated 2[nd] April, 2005,passed by the Appellate Authority, were allowed by the High Court videorder dated 19[th] September, 2006 on the ground that the proceedingsinitiated by the legal heirs of the protected tenants went uncontestedbefore the Appellate Authority. Accordingly, the appeals were remittedback to the Appellate Authority for fresh consideration. On remand, thesaid appeals were disposed of by the Appellate Authority on merits videorder dated 23[rd] March, 2013. The second set of Revision Petitions filedby the respondents questioning the said decision, were turned down onmerits by the common order dated 9[th] July, 2013, review whereof wasalso dismissed vide order dated 20[th] February, 2014.31. The above chronology of events gains significance as it goesto amply demonstrate that several opportunities were available to therespondents if they really wished to file authenticated copies of therevenue records relating to the purported surrender proceedings beforethe Tehsildar which they did not avail of, for reasons best known tothem. The first opportunity arose when the respondents challenged theex parte order dated 2[nd] April, 2005 passed by the Appellate Authoritywhen they filed two Civil Revision Petitions which were allowed and thematter was remanded back to the Appellate Authority for freshconsideration; the second opportunity arose when the Appellate Authorityre-considered the appeals remitted by the High Court and passed anorder dated 23[rd] March, 2013, in favour of the predecessors-in-interestof the appellant; the third opportunity arose when the respondentspreferred second set of Civil Revision Petitions assailing the order

Adated 23[rd] March, 2013 that culminated in the common judgment andorder dated 9[th] July, 2013 passed by the High Court; the fourth opportunityarose when the respondents filed two review applications for seekingreview of the common judgment and order dated 9[th] July, 2013, thatcame to be dismissed vide order dated 20[th] February, 2014; and the fifthopportunity arose when the respondents preferred petitions for specialBleave to appeal before this Court being aggrieved by the commonjudgment and orders dated 9[th] July, 2013 and the review order dated 20[th]February, 2014 passed by the High Court.

32. Pertinently, this Court had declined to entertain the said petitionspreferred by the respondents but having regard to the submission madeCon their behalf that they would be in position to file documents to showthat there was surrender of tenancy on the part of the protected tenantsand their legal heirs, it was left open to the respondents to file reviewpetition before the High Court. It was only thereafter that the respondentswoke up to filing certified copies of those documents, xerox copiesDwhereof had already been filed by them in the second round of revisionpetitions preferred before the High Court. That being the position, therespondents cannot be heard to state that the documents in questionwere not to their knowledge or that the certified copies of the revenuerecord could not be produced by them before the High Court passed thecommon judgment and order dated 09[th] July, 2013. At the time of filingEthe second set of review petitions, the respondents raised plea that thelearned Single Judge did not consider the relevant record produced bythem regarding the surrender proceedings and had erroneously returneda finding that the file relating to surrender of the land by the protectedtenants in the year 1967, was manipulated by ante-dating the same afterFthe land ceiling was finalized by the Land Ceiling Tribunal. However,apart from the bald averment by the respondents that the documentswere not considered, which averment has been replicated in the impugnedorder, perusal of the earlier judgment of the High Court does not suggestany such non-consideration. Rather, it appears that the High Courtconsidered the records available before it, which included the copies ofGthe revenue records as admitted by the parties and passed certainobservations.”

33. perusal of the averments made in the second set of reviewpetitions shows that there is no explanation offered regarding discoveryof new material in the form of the documents sought to be filed. When it

is the case of the respondents themselves that the relevant documentswere all along available in the revenue records and they had alreadyfiled xerox copies thereof during the second revision proceedings, theycan hardly be heard to state that the said documents were unknown tothem and were unavailable for being produced before the learned SingleJudge prior to passing of the common judgment and order dated 9[th] July,2013. It is evident from the above that the respondents had not discoveredany new material for them to have moved second set of review petitions.In order to satisfy the requirements prescribed in Order XLVII Rule 1CPC, it is imperative for party to establish that discovery of the newmaterial or evidence was neither within its knowledge when the decreewas passed, nor could the party have laid its hands on such documents/evidence after having exercised due diligence, prior to passing of theorder. What to speak of conclusive proof of having undertaken an exerciseof due diligence for accessing the relevant documents, there is not anaverment made by the respondents in the second set of review petitionsto the effect that they could not trace the documents in question earlieror that they had made sincere efforts to obtain certified copies thereofbefore the common order dated 9[th] July, 2013 was passed, but could notdo so for some cogent and valid reasons.

34. In other words, nothing has been stated on affidavit tosubstantiate the plea taken by the respondents at such belated stagethat the documents sought to be filed by them with the second set ofreview petitions had come to light after passing of the judgment andorder dated 9[th] July, 2013. Under the garb of the liberty granted to them,the respondents have tried to fill in the glaring loopholes and introduceevidence in the review proceedings that was all along in their power andpossession and ought to have seen the light of the day much earlier. Infact, it appears that the Civil Revision Petitions were originally argued tothe hilt on several other grounds, not limited just to the revenue record,which were all considered and turned down as meritless. Therefore, wehave no hesitation in holding that non-production of the relevantdocuments on the part of the respondents at the appropriate stage cannotbe ground for seeking review of the judgment and order dated 9[th] July,2013 particularly, when five opportunities enumerated in para 31 above,were available to them for production of the said documents, whichwere all frittered away, one by one.

35. In our opinion, even otherwise, recourse to successive reviewpetitions against the same order is impermissible more so, when the

ABC

Arespondents have miserably failed to draw the attention of this Court toany circumstances that would entitle them to invoke review jurisdictionwithin the ambit of the Rules. Under the rules, the respondents were notrequired to produce “genuine” documents but new documents/evidencethat was not within their knowledge and could not have been so evenafter exercise of due diligence, which could have turned the tables inBtheir favour. Nor has any error apparent on the face of the record beenbrought out by them.

36. Given the above facts and circumstances, we are of the firmview that the second set of review petitions were nothing short of anabuse of the process of the court and ought to have been rejected by theCHigh Court as not maintainable, without having gone into the merits ofthe matter. In the result, the present appeals are allowed. The impugnedjudgment dated 29[th] April, 2022, is set aside and the common judgmentand order dated 9[th] July, 2013 passed in CRP No.2786/2013 and CRPNo. 2787 of 2013, is restored.

D37. Parties are left to bear their own expenses.

Ankit Gyan

(Assisted by : Shevali Monga, LCRA)

Appeals allowed.