NARINDER SINGH & ORS. versus DIVESH BHUTANI & ORS.
Parties
- NARINDER SINGH & ORS. (PETITIONER)
- DIVESH BHUTANI & ORS. (RESPONDENT)
Cited by (1)
Counts citations resolved within this build's own ingested judgment corpus. The true corpus-wide count will be higher until more of the corpus is ingested.
Cites (1 resolved of 35 detected)
- [2018] 11 SCR 384 (2018)
Statutes cited (1)
- constitution of india, article-1 (1950)
Full text
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[2022] 15 S.C.R.
NARINDER SINGH & ORS.
DIVESH BHUTANI & ORS.
(Civil Appeal No. 10294 of 2013)
BJULY 21, 2022
[A. M. KHANWILKAR, ABHAY S. OKA ANDC. T. RAVIKUMAR, JJ.]
Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 – s.2 – Punjab LandPreservation Act, 1900 [As amended by Punjab land preservationC(Haryana Amendment) Act, 2019] – s.4 – Forest Act, 1927 – Whethera land covered under special order issued by the State Governmentu/s. 4 of the PLPA is ‘forest land’ within the meaning of the 1980Forest Act – Held: The lands covered by the special orders issuedu/s. 4 of PLPA have all the trappings of forest lands within theDmeaning of s.2 of the 1980 Forest Act and, therefore, the StateGovernment or competent authority cannot permit its use for non-forest activities without the prior approval of the CentralGovernment w.e.f. 25.10.1980 – Prior permission of the CentralGovernment is the quintessence to allow any change of user offorest or so to say deemed forest land – Even during the subsistenceEof the special orders u/s. 4 of PLPA, with the approval of the CentralGovernment, the State or competent authority can grant permissionfor non-forest use – If such non-forest use is permitted in accordancewith s.2 of the 1980 Forest Act, to that extent, the restrictions imposedby the special orders u/s. 4 of PLPA will not apply in view of theFlanguage used in the opening part of s.2 of the 1980 Forest Act – Itis also clarified that only because there is notification issued u/s.3 of PLPA, the land which is subject matter of such notification, willnot ipso facto become forest land within the meaning of the 1980Forest Act.GDisposing of the appeals and writ petitions, the Court
HELD: 1. The various restrictions, regulations andprohibitions in different clauses in Section 4 of Punjab LandPreservation Act, 1900 (PLPA) can be invoked necessarily inrespect of forest lands. Whereas, Section 3 of PLPA contemplatesHthe issuance of general notification in respect of any area subject
to erosion or likely to become liable to erosion when it appearsto the State Government that it is desirable to provide for theconservation of sub-soil water or the prevention of erosion. Asnoted earlier, one of the objectives of PLPA is to prevent erosionof land which may be caused due to deforestation. When the StateGovernment is satisfied that as result of deforestation orimpending deforestation, erosion of particular area out of thearea notified under Section 3 is likely to take place, the StateGovernment may exercise the power under Section 4 by issuinga special order. The reason is that the measures provided inSection 4 are intended to prevent deforestation of forest area.Section 3 of PLPA contemplates the issuance of notification inrespect of larger area when it is desirable to provide for theconservation of sub-soil water or prevention of erosion. Whenthe State Government is satisfied that deforestation of forestarea forming part of larger area notified under Section 3 is likelyto lead to erosion of soil, the power under Section 4 can beexercised. Therefore, it follows that the specific land in respectof which special order under section 4 of PLPA has been issuedwill have all the trappings of forest governed by clauses (ii) to(iv) of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act. Therefore, in respect ofthe lands covered by special orders under Section 4 of PLPA,the State Government or authorities of the State can permitdiversion to non-forest use only after prior approval of the CentralGovernment is granted in accordance with Section 2 of the 1980Forest Act. [Para 47][1104-A-F]2. Clause (a) of Section 5 of PLPA provides for restrictingor prohibiting the cultivation of any land ordinarily undercultivation prior to the publication of the notification under Section3. However, the power under Section 5 to restrict or prohibit canbe exercised in case where prior to the publication of thenotification under Section 3, quarrying of any stone or the burningof any lime was being made. Thus, there is marked differencebetween the language used in Section 4 and that in Section 5 ofPLPA. However, as noted earlier, it is not necessary to decidethe issue whether land forming part of special notificationunder Section 5 of PLPA ipso facto becomes forest under the1980 Forest Act. [Para 48][1104-F-H]
ABC
A3. In this group of petitions, this Court is concerned withthree special orders under Section 4 issued on 18[th] August 1992in respect of the said three villages. The effect of the said ordersis that the lands referred to therein are forest lands within themeaning of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act. Even if such ordersare cancelled or amended or rescinded or their duration comesBto an end, the status of the lands covered by the same as forestlands governed by Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act cannot bealtered without following the due process provided therein. Oncea land is found to be ‘forest’ within the meaning of the 1980Forest Act, its user for non-forest purposes will be alwaysCgoverned by Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act. Secondly, clause(i) of Section 2 provides that even in the case of reserved forestunder the 1927 Forest Act, the State Government cannot pass anorder declaring that the same shall cease to be reserved forest,without the prior approval of the Central Government. Thirdly,Section 2 starts with non obstante clause which overrides anythingDcontained in any other law for the time being in force in Statewhich will include all State and Central legislations applicable tothe State. Therefore, prima facie, the 2019 Amendment Actenacted by the State Legislature would be repugnant to andviolative of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act, if construedEotherwise. Hence, whether the 2019 Amendment Act is giveneffect or not, it will not change the status of the lands covered bythe special orders under Section 4 of PLPA as the said landspossess all the trappings of forest with effect from 25[th] October1980 within the meaning of the 1980 Forest Act. Therefore, it isnot necessary in these petitions to deal with the issue whetherFthe order dated 01[st] March 2019 passed in Writ Petition (Civil)No.4677 of 1985 should be modified. The said prayer will have tobe considered by the Bench dealing with the said writ petition.[Para 63][1114-D-H; 1115-A-B]
4. The lands covered by the special orders issued underGSection 4 of PLPA have all the trappings of forest lands withinthe meaning of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act and, therefore,the State Government or competent authority cannot permit itsuse for non-forest activities without the prior approval of theCentral Government with effect from 25[th] October 1980. PriorHpermission of the Central Government is the quintessence to
allow any change of user of forest or so to say deemed forestland. This Court may add here that even during the subsistenceof the special orders under Section 4 of PLPA, with the approvalof the Central Government, the State or competent authoritycan grant permission for non-forest use. If such non-forest use ispermitted in accordance with Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act, tothat extent, the restrictions imposed by the special orders underSection 4 of PLPA will not apply in view of the language used inthe opening part of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act. This Courtmay also clarify that only because there is notification issuedunder Section 3 of PLPA, the land which is subject matter of suchnotification, will not ipso facto become forest land within themeaning of the 1980 Forest Act. [Para 64][1115-C-E]T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India andOrs. (1997) 2 SCC 267 : [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 982; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India andOrs. (2008) 16 SCC 401; M.C. Mehta v. Union of Indiaand Ors. (2004) 12 SCC 118 : [2004] 3 SCR 126; M.C.Mehta v. Union of India & Ors.(2008) 17 SCC 294 :[2008] 8 SCR 828; B.S. Sandhu v. Government of Indiaand Ors (2014) 12 SCC 172; M.C. Mehta (Kant EnclaveMatters, In Re.) v. Union of India & Ors. (2018) 18SCC 397 : [2018] 11 SCR 384; Rajeev Suri v. DelhiDevelopment Authority and Others (2021) SCC onlineSC 7; Citizens for Green Doon and Others v. Union ofIndia and Others (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1243 –referred to.
Vijay Bansal & Others v. State of Haryana & others2009 SCC online P & 8073; Laxman Ichharam v.The Divisional Forest Officer, Raigarh AIR 1953 Nagpurpage 51 – referred to.
A[2014] 6 SCR 329referred toPara 15[2018] 11 SCR 384referred toPara 16
CIVIL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Civil AppealNo.10294 of 2013BFrom the Judgment and Order dated 03.05.2013 of the NationalGreen Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in Application No.42 of2013.
With
Civil Appeal Nos.8454 of 2014, 8173 of 2016, 11000 of 2013 andCWrit Petition (Civil) Nos.1008, 1031 And 1320 of 2021.
Tushar Mehta, SG, K. M. Natraj, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, ASGs,Anil Grover, Sr. AAG, B. K. Satija, AAG, Arun Bhardwaj, Vikas Singh,Sanjay Parikh, Colin Gonsalves, Manoj Swarup, Narender Hooda, D.N. Goburdhun, Sr. Advs., Ajay Bansal, Rahul Kr. Sharma, Navin Gupta,DSamar Vijay Singh, Abhishek Sharma, Ms. Gauraan, Sanjay Kumar Visen,Dr. Monika Gusain, Ms. Babita Mishra, Sarad Kr. Singhania, GurmeetSingh Makker, Sumit Teterwal, Vanshdeep Dalmia, Chinmayee Chandra,Ms. Monisha Handa, Rajul Shrivastav, Mohit D. Ram, Ms. SrishtiAgnihotri, Satwick Parikh, Ms. Sanjana Thomas, Kawalpreet Kaur,Haider Ali, Ms. Amit Shukla, Satya Mitra, Neelmani Pant, Raghav Bhatia,EArunesh Grover, Ankit Swarup, Shekhar G. Devasa, Manish Tiwari,Shashi Bhushan Nagar, Ms. Satvisa Pattanayak, M/s Devasa & Co.,Aakarsh Kamra, Ms. Gauri Goburdhun, Ms. Sunita Singh Chauhan,Hitesh Kumar Sharma, S. K. Rajora, Akhileshwar Jha, E. Vinay Kumar,Naresh Kumar, Ms. Ranjeeta Rohatgi, Sourabh Tandon, Ms. CharuFNarula, Anuj Gupta, Tejaswi Kumar Pradhan, Manoranjan Paikaray,Ritwick Dutta, Rahul Choudhary, Ms. K. V. Bharathi Upadhyaya, KedarNath Tripathy, Sibo Sankar Mishra, Vijay Kumar, Ms. Manjeet Kirpal,Advs. for the appearing parties.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered byGABHAY S. OKA, J.
1. The broad issue involved in these appeals and writ petitions is“Whether land covered under special order issued by the Governmentof Haryana under Section 4 of the Punjab Land Preservation Act, 1900(for short, ‘PLPA’) is ‘forest land’ within the meaning of the ForestH(Conservation) Act, 1980 (for short, ‘the 1980 Forest Act’)?”
FACTUAL ASPECTS
2. Civil Appeal No.10294 of 2013, Civil Appeal No.8454 of 2014,Civil Appeal No.8173 of 2016 and Civil Appeal No.11000 of 2013 takeexception to the orders passed by the National Green Tribunal (for short,‘the NGT’).
3. Civil Appeal No.10294 of 2013 takes exception to the orderdated 03[rd] May 2013 passed by the NGT in Original Application No.42of 2013. The said application was filed for inviting the attention of theNGT to the illegal non-forest activities of the encroachers on the landsbearing Khasra Nos.1359, 1374 and 1378 of Village Anangpur TehsilBallabhgarh, District Faridabad in the State of Haryana. The NGT passedthe impugned order restraining the carrying on of any non-forest activitieson the subject lands. The NGT proceeded on the footing that the landsat village Anangpur covered by the order dated 18[th] August 1992 issuedunder Section 4 of PLPA were forest lands within the meaning of the1980 Forest Act. Before the said order dated 18[th] August 1992 waspassed, notification dated 10[th] April 1992 under Section 3 of PLPAwas issued notifying the entire area covered by Ballabhgarh Tehsil ofFaridabad District. The appellants are running marriage halls on the landsubject matter of the said order dated 18[th] August 1992, issued underSection 4 of PLPA.
4. Civil Appeal No.8173 of 2016 impugns the order dated 16[th]May 2016 passed by the NGT in Original Application No.519 of 2015.In Original Application No.519 of 2015, prayer was made to stop thecommercial and non-forest activities on the lands bearing Khasra No.182Min, RECT No.61, Kila No.19 (8-0), 20/1(0-7) and 22/2 (7-17) of VillageAnkhir, Tehsil Ballabhgarh, District Faridabad in the State of Haryana.The said lands were the subject matter of another order issued on 18[th]August 1992 by the Government of Haryana in the exercise of the powerunder Section 4 of PLPA in respect of certain lands in village Ankhir.The NGT held that the lands covered by the said order under Section 4were forest lands within the meaning of the 1980 Forest Act.
5. Civil Appeal No.11000 of 2013 takes exception to the sameorder dated 03[rd] May 2013 passed by the NGT in Original ApplicationNo.42 of 2013, which is also the subject matter of challenge in CivilAppeal No.10294 of 2013. The appellants claim to be the owners of arestaurant on the land subject matter of the order dated 18[th] August1992, issued under Section 4 of PLPA.
A6. Civil Appeal No.8454 of 2014 also takes exception to the sameorder dated 03[rd] May 2013 of the NGT. The appellants therein are havingmarriage halls on the subject land.
7. The petitioners in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1031 of 2021 haveinvoked Article 32 of the Constitution of India. The petitioners claim toBbe the holders of the lands in Villages Anangpur, Ankhir and MewlaMaharajpur (for short, ‘the said three villages’) in Tehsil Ballabhgarh,District Faribadad in the State of Haryana. The lands held by them arethe subject matter of the three separate orders dated 18[th] August 1992issued under Section 4 of PLPA in respect of certain lands in the saidthree villages. The petition is based on Public Notice dated 21[st] AugustC2021 issued by the Municipal Corporation of Faridabad informing that incompliance with the orders passed by this Court, time of two days hasbeen granted to the members of the public to remove illegally constructedfarm houses/banquet halls/ structures on forest lands, failing which theMunicipal Corporation and Forest Department of the State GovernmentDwill undertake action to remove the said structures on 23[rd] August 2021.In the writ petition, it is contended that the said notice was issued basedon the orders passed by this Court from time to time in the Petitions forSpecial Leave to Appeal (Civil) Nos.7220-7221 of 2017 (MunicipalCorporation of Faridabad v. Khori Gaon Residents WelfareAssociation through its President). declaration was prayed for thatEthe orders dated 18[th] August 1992 issued under Section 4 of PLPA wereillegal apart from praying for the other reliefs. It was contended that thesaid orders dated 18[th] August 1992 were illegal as the compliance withthe mandatory provisions of Sections 3, 6, 7 and 14 of PLPA was notmade. prayer was also made for issuing writ of mandamus to the
FState of Haryana to notify and implement the Punjab Land Preservation(Haryana Amendment) Act, 2019 (for short, ‘the 2019 Amendment Act’).
8. The petitioner in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1008 of 2021 claims tobe resident of Village Ankhir. He claims to be the owner of the landbearing Khasra Nos.32 and 39 of Village Ankhir. One of the contentionsGraised by the petitioner is that the construction on the subject lands wasmade before 18[th] August 1992. Therefore, direction is sought to restrainthe respondents from disturbing the peaceful possession of the petitionerover the subject land and from demolishing structures thereon.
9. The petitioners in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1320 of 2021 claim toHbe the residents of Village Old Lakkarpur Khori. They contend that the
Faridabad Municipal Corporation acting in collusion and connivance withthe owners of the hotels and farmhouses mentioned in the petition hasillegally demolished their structures. It is contended that the said MunicipalCorporation has implemented orders passed by this Court in the Petitionsfor Special Leave to Appeal Nos.7220-7221 of 2017 by picking andchoosing some structures while not disturbing the hotels and farmhousesconstructed on the lands subject matter of the orders passed under Section4 of PLPA. The prayer in the petition is for issuing writ of mandamus,directing the respondents to restore possession of the petitioners in respectof their residential structures in Village Old Lakkarpur Khori.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PETITIONERS/APPELLANTS
10. Shri Vikas Singh, the learned Senior Counsel appearing forthe petitioners in Writ Petition (Civil) No.1031 of 2021, has made detailedsubmissions. His primary submission is that merely because the subjectlands are covered by the notifications/orders issued by the State ofHaryana under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of PLPA, the same cannot be ipsofacto treated as forest lands within the meaning of the 1980 Forest Act.He submitted that though the lands in question have been shown asunclassified forests in the records of the State Forest Department, it isnot conclusive as the Forest Department is only supervisory department.He invited our attention to the scheme of PLPA and particularly, Sections3, 4 and 5. He pointed out that notification under Section 3 of PLPAcan be issued only when, according to the opinion of the StateGovernment, conservation of sub-soil water or the prevention of erosionis needed in any area subject to erosion or likely to become liable toerosion. He submitted that the orders under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPAcould only be issued in respect of the lands covered by valid notificationunder Section 3. His submission is that issuing proper notification underSection 3 of PLPA is sine qua non for issuing the orders under Sections4 and 5 of PLPA. His submission is that notification under Section 3 ofPLPA was not issued regarding any of the lands in the said three villages.He relied upon the notification dated 17[th] October 1989 issued under thePunjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (for short, ‘the Land Revenue Act’)and contended that by the said notification, the State Government variedthe limits of Tehsil Ballabhgarh, District Faridabad by excluding the areaof the said three villages. He submitted that after 17[th] October 1989, anotification under Section 3 of PLPA was not issued regarding the landsin the said three villages. Therefore, the orders issued in respect of the
Athree villages under Sections 4 and 5 are illegal. He pointed out thatafter the amendment made in 1926 to PLPA, the orders contemplatedunder Sections 4 and 5 could be issued only for temporary period. Hesubmitted that once the period specified in the orders under Sections 4and 5 expires, the restrictions imposed by the said orders cease to apply.He pointed out that in any case, the orders dated 18[th] August 1992 issuedBunder Section 4 of PLPA prohibit certain activities such as clearing orbreaking up of lands and quarrying of the stones, etc., without permissionof the authorities mentioned therein. Thus, the only restriction imposedby the orders under Section 4 is of prohibiting certain activities withoutobtaining prior permission from the authorities mentioned therein. HeCurged that the provisions of PLPA are not intended to protect any forestor forest activities.
11. He invited our attention to the provisions of the Indian ForestAct, 1927 (for short, ‘the 1927 Forest Act’). He submitted that the Actdeals with three categories of forest lands. The first category is of theDreserved forests covered by Sections 3 to 27. The second category is ofthe protected forests or waste-lands which are the property of theGovernment and not included in the reserved forests. Sections 29 to 34enable the State Government to notify such lands as protected forests.The third category is of private lands. Sections 35 to 38 allow the StateGovernment to regulate or prohibit certain activities, such as, breakingEup or clearing of land for cultivation, etc., in any forest or waste lands.He pointed out that the important difference between Section 4 of PLPAand Section 35 of the 1927 Act is that Section 4 contains permissive orenabling provisions, and Section 35 is completely prohibitory. He urgedthat what is prohibited under Section 35 cannot be permitted even by theFauthorities. He submitted that even the lands covered by Sections 35 to38 of the 1927 Act, which are private lands with forests, do not vest inthe Government. He pointed out that the acquisition of such lands canbe made under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 by the State Governmentor upon the request of the owners, which should be made within not less
than three months from the notification issued under Section 35 and notGlater than twelve years from the date of such notification. He urged thatthe 1927 Act is the appropriate legislation dealing with forests. The factthat the provisions of Sections 35 to 38 dealing with private lands havebeen included in Chapter V of the 1927 Act fortifies the submission ofthe petitioners that PLPA is not legislation which deals with or is intendedHto deal with forests on private properties.
12. Without prejudice to the submission that PLPA does not dealwith forests at all, the learned senior counsel submitted that after the1927 Forest Act came into force, the provisions of the PLPA, to theextent to which the same deal with lands which fall within the domain ofthe 1927 Forest Act, became inoperative being repugnant to the 1927Forest Act. The 1927 Forest Act is central legislation, which mustprevail. Hence, if any private land is to be treated as forest land, thesame must satisfy the tests laid down in Chapter V of the 1927 ForestAct.
13. Another limb of his argument is that the subject lands were apart of the controlled area notified under Section 29 of the FaridabadComplex (Development and Regulation) Act, 1971 (for short, ‘the 1971Act’) and in fact, the final development plan covering the subject landswas prepared and notified on 17[th] December 1991. The developmentplan under the 1971 Act is prepared after following detailed procedureof assessment of areas which are likely to be notified as controlled areasfor the purposes of planned development. Once land is designated asa controlled area, it will cease to be forest.
14. The learned senior counsel urged that as mandated by Section6 of PLPA, no inquiry was conducted before imposing the regulationsand restrictions under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA. Public notice of theGovernment Orders dated 18[th] August 1992 was not published inaccordance with Section 7 of PLPA. Moreover, under Section 7(b), theland owners are entitled to receive compensation from the StateGovernment on account of restrictions imposed by Sections 4 or 5 ofPLPA. But the land owners affected by the orders dated 18[th] August1992 have not been paid any compensation. He submitted that evenSection 37 of the 1927 Forest Act provides for payment of compensationto the owners of the private lands having forest. He urged that assumingthat the orders dated 18[th] August 1992 under Section 4 are legal, thepetitioners ought to have been paid adequate compensation. He submittedthat once the 2019 Amendment Act is allowed to be implemented bymodifying the order dated 1[st] March 2019 passed in Writ Petition (Civil)No.4677 of 1985, the entire issue will be ironed out. He submitted thatthe 2019 Amendment Act seeks to strike balance between the rightsof the land owners and the need to have environmental protection.
15. Referring to the decision of this Court in the case of T.N.Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India and Ors.[1] (1997
1 (1997) 2 SCC 267
AGodavarman’s case), he submitted that the said decision does not dealwith PLPA. He also invited our attention to the further order passed inthe case of T. N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India andOrs.[2 ](2008 Godavarman’s case) and submitted that this Court consideredlands covered by the orders under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA only in thecontext of carrying on mining activity. The core issue of whether theBlands subject matter of the orders under Section 4 and 5 of PLPA ipsofacto become forest lands under the 1980 Forest Act is not consideredby this Court. He also commented upon another decision of this Court inthe case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India and Ors.[3] (1[st ]M.C.Mehtacase). He submitted that what is considered by this Court is the stand ofCthe Forest Department of the State Government that the areas notifiedunder Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA are not forests. He pointed out thatwhile rejecting the said contention, this Court has not dealt with the coreissue of the legal effect of the orders issued under Sections 4 and 5. Thesame is the argument made by him about decision of this Court in thecase of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors.[4] (2[nd ]M.C. Mehta case).DHowever, he submitted that in the case of B.S. Sandhu v. Governmentof India and Ors.[5], this Court has categorically held that the landscovered by the orders under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA may or may notbe forest lands within the meaning of the 1980 Act.
16. The learned counsel made extensive submissions on theEdecisions of this Court in the case of M.C. Mehta (Kant EnclaveMatters, In Re.) v. Union of India & Ors.[6](3[rd] M.C. Mehta case).His submission is that though this Court has dealt with the issue raisedby the applicant (R. Kant & Co.) about the order dated 18[th] August1992 issued under Section 4, the decision is per incuriam as this CourtFhas failed to consider and follow the binding decision of co-ordinateBench in the case of B.S. Sandhu[5]. Moreover, he has submitted thatthe applicant in the said case did not challenge the validity of the orderdated 18[th] August 1992 made under Section 4 of PLPA.
17. Relying upon various maps tendered across the bar, he urgedGthat if the lands covered by the notifications/orders under Sections 3, 4and 5 of PLPA are to be treated as forests, the entire Districts of Faridabad
2 (2008) 16 SCC 4013 (2004) 12 SCC 1184 (2008) 17 SCC 2945 (2014) 12 SCC 172H6 (2018) 18 SCC 397
and Gurugram will have to be treated as forests under the 1980 ForestAct, which will have disastrous consequences.
18. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants in Civil AppealNo.8173 of 2016 firstly urged that the Faridabad Tehsil has not beennotified under Section 3 of PLPA. He pointed out that Ballabhgarh andFaridabad are the Tehsils within District Faridabad. The notification underSection 3 of PLPA dated 10[th] April 1992 is only in respect of BallabhgarhTehsil. His submission is that there was no notification issued underSection 3 of PLPA in respect of the land of the appellants in villageAnkhir and therefore, the order under Section 4 is illegal. He submittedthat the 1927 Forest Act provides for grant of compensation in respectof the private lands declared as forests. He submitted that there is aninconsistency between the 1927 Forest Act which is Central legislationand PLPA which is State Legislation. He urged that under Sections 4,29 and 35 of the 1927 Forest Act, there is provision to declare lands ofdifferent categories as forests. However, the same can be done onlyafter prior notice and after granting an opportunity of being heard to theaffected persons. Moreover, under Section 37 of the 1927 Forest Act,there is provision for acquiring private land declared as forest andconsequently, there is provision regarding payment of compensation.Assuming that the lands covered by the orders issued under Section 4and 5 of PLPA are forests under the 1980 Forest Act, there is no provisionfor giving hearing to the owners/affected persons before issuing theorders. There is no provision for acquiring such lands and only limitedcompensation is payable under PLPA to the owners. He pointed out theearlier affidavits filed on behalf of the State of Haryana. The FirstAffidavit is of Shri Banarsi Dass, Principal Chief Conservator of Forests,Haryana which is dated 08[th] December 1996. He also pointed out theaffidavit dated 25[th] February 1997 filed by Shri S.K. Maheswari,Commissioner and Secretary to the Government of Haryana, ForestDepartment. He submitted that assuming that the contentions raised inboth the affidavits are correct, the area covered by the notificationsunder Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA will continue to be the forest onlyduring the currency of the periods specified in the orders. The learnedcounsel also relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of B. S.Sandhu[5] in support of his case that the lands covered by the orderspassed under Sections 4 and 5 are not necessarily forests within themeaning of the 1980 Forest Act. He submitted that the limited object ofPLPA was to preserve sub-soil water and to stop soil erosion. He
Asubmitted that PLPA was never intended to deal with forests or forestlands. He submitted that whether particular land is forest within themeaning of the 1980 Forest Act, is an issue to be considered and decidedin the facts of each case. Lastly, he urged that Section 4 of PLPA prohibitsonly certain activities without permission of the authorities named therein.This is an indication that the lands covered by the orders under SectionB4 are not forests.
19. The submissions of the appellants in Civil Appeal No.10294 of2013 are also similar. In addition, submission was made that as requiredby Section 7 of PLPA, notifications/orders under Sections 3, 4 and 5were not published in vernacular language.The appellants also reliedCupon the provisions of Section 29 of the 1971 Act and Section 27 of theNational Capital Region Planning Board Act, 1985 (for short, ‘the NCRAct’). He submitted that the NCR Act will have an overriding effectover PLPA, which is State Act.THE SUBMISSIONS OF THE STATE GOVERNMENTD20. The learned Solicitor General of India appearing for the StateGovernment extensively relied upon the Additional Affidavit filed by ShriSuresh Dalal, Addl. Principal Chief Conservator of Forest, Haryana. Hesubmitted that the effect of the 1980 Forest Act is that except for certainpurposes mentioned in Section 2, forest lands can always be diverted forEnon-forest use with the prior permission of the Central Government.Our attention was invited to various provisions of PLPA and amendmentscarried out thereto from time to time. He submitted that the Statementof Objects and Reasons of the 2019 Amendment Act makes it clear thatthe object of PLPA was not to extinguish property rights. The learnedFcounsel urged that the main object was to prevent erosion of soil andconservation of sub-soil water. It was contended that PLPA has noconnection whatsoever with the issue of forests. He submitted that theonly decision of this Court that deals with the effect of the orders underSections 4 and 5 is in the case of B. S. Sandhu[5], which clearly holdsthat land covered by such orders may or may not be forest. HisGsubmission is that the decision in the 3[rd] M.C. Mehtacase[6] ignores thebinding decision of co-ordinate Bench in the case of B. S. Sandhu[5].The learned counsel clarified the stand taken on oath by the StateGovernment in earlier proceedings. He submitted that in the case ofPanchkula, Ambala, Yamunanagar, Gurugram, Faridabad and some otherHDistricts, practically 100% area had been notified under Sections 3, 4
and 5 of PLPA, and therefore, the entire area covering the said Districtscannot be forest. It was pointed out that about 39.35% of thegeographical area of the State of Haryana has been notified under PLPA.His submission is that all the lands notified under PLPA cannot be treatedas forest lands under the 1980 Forest Act as the consequences thereofwill be disastrous. Our attention was invited to paragraph 81 of the saidAdditional Affidavit, in which it is pointed out that about 59 public projectshave come up in the areas notified under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of PLPA.The projects/structures include CRPF Group Centre, Terminal BallisticResearch Laboratory, Police Lines, Government ITI College, etc.Helaid emphasis on the 2019 Amendment Act. It was submitted that asthere is no challenge to the validity of the 2019 Amendment Act, theState Government may be permitted to implement the same. The learnedcounsel further stated that the only factual statement made in the earlieraffidavits dated 08[th] December 1996 and 25[th] February 1997 is that theareas notified under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA were being shown asState regulated forest areas during the currency of the notifications.However, that practice was discontinued later. The affidavits do notdeal with the status of the notified lands.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE INTERVENORS/APPLICANTS
21. The learned senior counsel Shri Colin Gonsalves appearingfor the applicant in I.A. No. 33254 of 2022 firstly submitted that theclaim made by the State that very large areas of the State and in particularFaridabad and Gurgaon districts have been notified under PLPA isfallacious. For that purpose, he relied upon the statistics produced by theState Government itself in its additional affidavit. He submitted that avery tall and incorrect claim has been made by the State Governmentthat nearly 40% of the area of the State will be forest if the landsnotified under Sections 3 and 4 of PLPA are treated as forest lands.Relying upon paragraph 50 of the said affidavit, he pointed out that outof the geographical area of 1,25,800 hectares of Gurugram district, thespecial orders under Sections 4 and 5 cover only an area of 6821 hectares.Similarly, out of the geographical area of 74,100 hectares of Faridabaddistrict, only an area of 5611 hectares has been covered by the specialorders under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA. He pointed out that as stated inparagraph 49 of the same affidavit, the total area of the forests underthe 1927 Forest Act and unclassified forests represents 3.31 per cent ofthe geographical area of the State. He submitted that even the State
AGovernment has taken consistent stand that the areas covered bynotifications issued under clause (a) of Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA areforests within the meaning of the 1980 Forest Act. He submitted that thesame stand was specifically taken by the State Government in I.A. filedby it before the High Court in the case of Vijay Bansal & Others v.State of Haryana & others[7]. He urged that Section 2 of the 1980BForest Act overrides all the laws for the time being in force in the State.He submitted that the only effect of Section 2 of the 1980 Act is thatthere is an embargo on the State Government or any other authority onpassing an order permitting the use of any forest land for non-forestpurposes without the prior approval of the Central Government. HeCsubmitted that as far as the order dated 18[th] August 1992 under Section4 of the PLPA in respect of the lands in village Anangpur is concerned,the issue has been concluded in the 3[rd] M.C. Mehtacase[6] by this Courtby upholding the validity of the same and by holding that the lands coveredby the order are forest lands under the 1980 Forest Act.
D22. The submission of Shri Sanjay Parikh, the learned senior counselis that the lands notified under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA were not onlyrecorded as forest lands in the Government records but were alwaystreated as forests by the Forest Department of the State of Haryana.23. He submitted that the State of Haryana filed an affidavit ofShri Banarasi Das, the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests in CivilEWrit Petition No. 171 of 1996 which was the connected case heardalong with the main case in which the decision of this Court in the caseof 1997 T.N. Godavaran’s case[1] was rendered. The stand taken bythe State Government in the said affidavit was that the areas covered bythe notifications issued under PLPA are forest lands. The learned counselFsubmitted that this Court has deprecated an attempt made by theGovernment of Haryana to take somersault and to take stand contraryto what is stated in the said affidavit.
24. The learned counsel appearing for the applicant in I.A. No.14685/2021 supported the submissions made by other applicants/intervenors. His submission is that any land shown as forest land in theGgovernment records will be forest within the meaning of the 1980Forest Act. He submitted that narrow meaning cannot be given to theconcept of the government records by holding that only the revenuerecords/land records are government records. He urged that even the
7 2009 SCC online P&H 8073H
records maintained by the Forest Department are also governmentrecords. The learned Amicus curiae also made brief submissions.
CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS
THE APPROACH OF THE COURT IN INTERPRETINGTHE LAWS RELATING TO FORESTS AND THEENVIRONMENT
25. While interpreting the laws relating to forests, the Courts willbe guided by the following considerations:
i.Under clause (a) Article 48A forming part of Chapter IVcontaining the Directive Principles of State Policy, it is theCobligation of the State to protect and improve theenvironment and to safeguard the forests;
ii.Under clause (g) of Article 51A of the Constitution, it is afundamental duty of every citizen to protect and preservethe natural environment, including forests, rivers, lakes andwildlife etc.;
iii.Article 21 of the Constitution confers fundamental righton the individuals to live in pollution-free environment.Forests are, in sense, lungs which generate oxygen forthe survival of human beings. The forests play veryimportant role in our ecosystem to prevent pollution. Thepresence of forests is necessary for enabling the citizens toenjoy their right to live in pollution-free environment;
iv.It is well settled that the Public Trust Doctrine is part ofour jurisprudence. Under the said doctrine, the State is atrustee of natural resources, such as sea shores, runningwaters, forests etc. The public at large is the beneficiary ofthese natural resources. The State being trustee of naturalresources is under legal duty to protect the naturalresources. The public trust doctrine is tool for exertinglong-established public rights over short-term public rightsand private gains;
v.Precautionary principle has been accepted as part of thelaw of the land. conjoint reading of Articles 21, 48A and51-A(g) of the Constitution of India will show that the Stateis under mandate to protect and improve the environment
and safeguard the forests. The precautionary principlerequires the Government to anticipate, prevent and remedyor eradicate the causes of environmental degradationincluding to act sternly against the violators;
vi.While interpreting and applying the laws relating to theBenvironment, the principle of sustainable development mustbe borne in mind.In the case of Rajeev Suri v. DelhiDevelopment Authority and Others[8], Bench of thisCourt to which one of us is party (A.M. Khanwilkar, J.)has very succinctly dealt with the concept of sustainabledevelopment. Paragraphs 507 and 508 of the said decisionCreads thus:
“507. The principle of sustainable development andprecautionary principle need to be understood in propercontext. The expression“sustainable development”incorporates wide meaning within its fold. ItDcontemplates that development ought to besustainable with the idea of preservation of naturalenvironment for present and future generations.It would not be without significance to note thatsustainable development is indeed principle ofEdevelopment - it posits controlled development.The primary requirement underlying this principleis to ensure that every development workis sustainable; and this requirement ofsustainability demands that the first attempt ofevery agency enforcing environmental rule of lawFin the country ought to be to alleviateenvironmental concerns by proper mitigatingmeasures. The future generations have an equalstake in the environment and development. Theyare as much entitled to developed society as theyGare to an environmentally secure society. ByDeclaration on the Right to Development, 1986, theUnited Nations has given express recognition to rightto development. Article 1 of the Declaration defines thisright as:
8 (2021) SCC online SC 7H
“1. The right to development is an inalienable humanright by virtue of which every human person and allpeoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, andenjoy economic, social, cultural and political development,in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms canbe fully realized.”
508. The right to development, thus, is intrinsicallyconnected to the preservance of dignified life. Itis not limited to the idea of infrastructuraldevelopment, rather, it entails human developmentas the basis of all development. The jurisprudencein environmental matters must acknowledge thatthere is immense inter-dependence between rightto development and right to natural environment.In International Law and Sustainable Development,Arjun Sengupta in the chapter “Implementing the Rightto Development” notes thus:
“… Two rights are interdependent if the level ofenjoyment of one is dependent on the level of enjoymentof the other…”
vii.Even ‘environmental rule of law’ has role to play. ThisCourt in the case of Citizens for Green Doon and Othersv. Union of India and Others[9] has dealt with anotherimportant issue of lack of consistent and uniform standardsfor analysing the impact of development projects. This Courtobserved that the principle of sustainable development maycreate differing and arbitrary metrics depending on thenature of individual projects. Therefore, this Courtadvocated and accepted the need to apply and adopt thestandard of ‘environmental rule of law’. Paragraph 40 ofthe said decision reads thus:
“40. cogent remedy to this problem is to adopt thestandard of the ‘environmental rule of law’ to testgovernance decisions under which developmentalprojects are approved. In its 2015 Issue Brief titled“Environmental Rule of Law: Critical to Sustainable
9 (2021) SCC OnLine SC 1243
1084SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Development”, the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme has recommended the adoption of such anapproach in the following terms:
“Environmental rule of law integrates the criticalenvironmental needs with the essential elements of theBrule of law, and provides the basis for reformingenvironmental governance. It prioritizes environmentalsustainability by connecting it with fundamental rightsand obligations. It implicitly reflects universal moralvalues and ethical norms of behaviour, and it provides afoundation for environmental rights and obligations.CWithout environmental rule of law and the enforcementof legal rights and obligations, environmental governancemay be arbitrary, that is, discretionary, subjective, andunpredictable.”
FORESTS UNDER THE 1927 FOREST ACT
26. The concept of forest under the 1927 Forest Act appears tobe different from the concept of forest under the 1980 Forest Act. Theanalysis of the provisions of both the enactments will show that theirspheres of operation are not the same though there may be some overlap.
27. The 1927 Forest Act deals with reserved forests (Chapter II),Evillage forests (Chapter III) and protected forests (Chapter IV). ChapterV contains provisions which apply to forests which are not vested in theState Government. First three categories of forests are on the landsvesting in the State. Under the 1927 Forest Act, every forest does notipso facto become reserved forest or protected forest. Chapter IIFcontains an elaborate procedure for declaring any land vested in theState Government as reserved forest. Only after following an elaborateprocess laid down in Chapter II that land vesting in the State Governmentcan be declared as reserved forest. Once notification is issued underSection 20 in the official gazette declaring particular land as reservedforest, prohibitions contained in Sections 26 of the 1927 Forest Act apply.GSection 26 reads thus:
“26. Acts prohibited in such forests.–(1) Any person who–
(a) makes any fresh clearing prohibited by section 5, or
(b) sets fire to reserved forest, or, in contravention of anyrules made by the State Government in this behalf, kindles any
fire, or leaves any fire burning, in such manner as to endangersuch forest;
or who, in reserved forest–
(c) kindles, keeps or carries any fire except at such seasons asthe Forest-officer may notify in this behalf,
(d) trespasses or pastures cattle, or permits cattle to trespass;
(e) causes any damage by negligence in felling any tree orcutting or dragging any timber;
(f) fells, girdles, lops, or bums any tree or strips off the bark orleaves from, or otherwise damages, the same;
(g) quarries stone, bums lime or charcoal, or collects,subjects to any manufacturing process, or removes, anyforest-produce;
(h) clears or breaks up any land for cultivation or anyother purpose;
(i) in contravention of any rules made in this behalf by theState Government hunts, shoots, fishes, poisons water or setstraps or snares; or
(j) in any area in which the Elephants’ Preservation Act, 1879(6 of 1879), is not in force, kills or catches elephants incontravention of any rules so made,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for term which mayextend to six months, or with fine which may extend to fivehundred rupees, or with both, in addition to such compensationfor damage done to the forest as the convicting Court maydirect to be paid.
(2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to prohibit-
(a) any act done by permission in writing of the Forest-officer,or under any rule made by the state Government; or
(b) the exercise of any right continued under clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 15, or created by grant or contract inwriting made by or on behalf of the Government undersection 23.
A(3) Whenever fire is caused willfully or by gross negligence in areserved forest, the State Government may (notwithstanding thatany penalty has been inflicted under this section) direct that insuch forest or any portion there of the exercise of all rights ofpasture or to forest produce shall be suspended for such period asit thinks fit.B
(emphasis added)
In the context of clause (a) of Sub-Section (1) of Section 26,Section 5 of the 1927 Forest Act is also relevant which reads thus:
“5. Bar of accrual of forest-rights.-After the issue of aCnotification under section 4, no right shall be acquired in or overthe land comprised in such notification, except by succession orunder grant or contract in writing made or entered into by or onbehalf of the Government or some person in whom such rightwas vested when the notification was issued; and no freshDclearings for cultivation or for any other purpose shall bemade in such land except in accordance with such rules asmay be made by the State Government in this behalf.”
(emphasis added)
28. There is power vested in the State Government under SectionE28 to assign to any village community the rights of the State Governmentover any land which has been constituted as reserved forest. Oncethis power is exercised in respect of reserved forest, it becomes avillage forest.
29. Under Chapter IV of the 1927 Forest Act, there is powerFvested in the State Government to declare any forest land or waste-landvested in it, which is not included in reserved forest, as protectedforest. The consequences of land being declared as protected forestare not as stringent as the consequences of the declaration of land asa reserved forest. Sections 30 and Section 33 are relevant for thatpurpose, which read thus:G
“30. Power to issue notification reserving trees, etc.–TheState Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette,
(a) declare any trees or class of trees in protected forest tobe reserved from date fixed by, the notification;
(b) declare that any portion of such forest specified in thenotification shall be closed for such term, not exceeding thirtyyears, as the State Government thinks fit, and that the rights ofprivate persons, if any, over such portion shall be suspendedduring such terms, provided that the remainder of such forestbe sufficient, and in locality reasonably convenient, for thedue exercise of the right suspended in the portion so closed; or
(c) prohibit, from date fixed as aforesaid, the quarryingof stone, or the burning of lime or charcoal, or thecollection or subjection to any manufacturing process,or removal of, any forest-produce in any such forest, andthe breaking up or clearing for cultivation, for building,for herding cattle or for any other purpose, of any land inany such forest.
33. Penalties for acts in contravention of notification undersection 30 or of rules under section 32.—(1) Any personwho commits any of the following offences, namely:–
(a) fells, girdles, lops, taps or bums any tree reserved undersection 30, or strips off the bark or leaves from, or otherwisedamages, any such tree;
(b) contrary to any prohibition under section 30, quarries anystone, or bums any lime or charcoal or collects, subjects to anymanufacturing process, or removes any forest-produce;
(c) contrary to any prohibition under section 30, breaks up orclears for cultivation or any other purpose any land in anyprotected forest;
(d) sets fire to such forest, or kindles fire without taking allreasonable precautions to prevent its spreading to any treereserved under section 30, whether standing fallen or felled, orto say closed portion of such forest;
(e) leaves burning any fire kindled by him in the vicinity of anysuch tree or closed portion;
(f) fells any tree or drags any timber so as to damage any treereserved as aforesaid;
[2022] 15 S.C.R.
A(g) permits cattle to damage any such tree;
(h) infringes any rule made under section 32,
shall be punishable with imprisonment for term which mayextend to six months, or with fine which may extend to fivehundred rupees, or with both.
(2) Whenever fire is caused wilfully or by gross negligence ina protected forest, the State Government may, notwithstandingthat any penalty has been inflicted under this section, directthat in such forest or any portion thereof the exercise of anyright of pasture or to forest-produce shall be suspended forCsuch period as it thinks fit.”
(emphasis added)
30. Chapter V of the 1927 Forest Act applies to forests or waste-lands not being the property of the Government. Thus, Chapter V appliesDto forests on private properties as the title of the Chapter is “Of thecontrol of forests and lands not being property of Government”. Sections35 to 37 are relevant which read thus:
“35. Protection of forests for special purposes.-(1) The StateGovernment may, by notification in the Official Gazette, regulateor prohibit in any forest or waste-land
(a) the breaking up or clearing of land for cultivation;
(b) the pasturing of cattle; or
(c) the firing or clearing of the vegetation;
Fwhen such regulation or prohibition appears necessary for any ofthe following purposes:–
(i) for protection against storms, winds, rolling stones, floods andavalanches;
(ii) for the preservation of the soil on the ridges and slopes and inGthe valleys of hilly tracts, the prevention of land slips or of theformation of ravines, and torrents, or the protection of land againsterosion, or the deposit thereon of sand, stones or gravel;
(iii) for the maintenance of water-supply in springs, rivers andtanks;
(iv) for the protection of roads, bridges, railways and other linesof communication;
(v) for the preservation of the public health.
(2) The State Government may, for any such purpose, constructat its own expense, in or upon any forest or waste-land, suchwork as it thinks fit.
(3) No notification shall be made under sub-section (1) nor shallany work be begun under sub-section (2), until after the issue of anotice to the owner of such forest or land calling on him to showcause, within reasonable period to be specified in such notice,why such notification should not be made or work constructed, asthe case may be, and until his objections, if any, and any evidencehe may produce in support of the same, have been heard by anofficer duly appointed in that behalf and have been considered bythe State Government.
36. Power to assume management of forests.–
(1) In case of neglect of, or wilful disobedience to, any regulationor prohibition under section 35, or if the purposes of any work tobe-constructed under that section so require, the State Governmentmay, after notice in writing to the owner of such forest or landand after considering his objections, if any, place the same underthe control of Forest-officer, and may declare that all or any ofthe provisions of this Act relating to reserved forests shall applyto such forest or land.
(2) The net profits, if any, arising from the management of suchforest or land shall be paid to the said owner.
37. Expropriation of forests in certain cases.–
(1) In any case under this Chapter in which the State Governmentconsiders that, in lieu of placing the forest or land under the controlof Forest-Officer, the same should be acquired for publicpurposes, the State Government may proceed to acquire it in themanner provided by the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894).
(2) The owner of any forest or land comprised in any notificationunder section 35 may, at any time not less than three or more thantwelve years from the date thereof, require that such forest or
Aland shall be acquired for public purposes, and the StateGovernment shall require such forest or land accordingly.”
31. Once notification is issued by exercising the power undersub-section (1) of Section 35, there is complete prohibition on breakingup or clearing forest lands for cultivation, the pasturing of cattle or clearingBof vegetation. There is power to assume management of such privateforests by exercising the power under Section 36. There is also powerto acquire such private land. In fact, under sub-section (2) of Section 37,an option is given to the owner of forest land comprised in any notificationissued under Section 35 to require the State Government to acquire suchforest land. But the owner must make requisition at any time not lessCthan three months from the date of the notification or more than twelveyears from the said date.
32. Though, the 1927 Forest Act does not define the terms ‘forest’,‘reserved forest’ and ‘protected forest’, forest land does not becomea reserved forest unless notification is issued under Section 20 of theD1927 Forest Act. Similarly, forest can be declared as protected forestonly by publishing notification under Section 29 of the 1927 Forest Act.
CONCEPT OF FORESTS UNDER THE 1980 FORESTACT
E33. Now, we come to the 1980 Forest Act. This is complementaryenactment, dealing with matters concerning conservation of forests. Inits statement of objects and reasons, it is noted that deforestation iscausing ecological imbalance and is leading to environmental deterioration.It also notes that widespread concern has been caused due todeforestation taking place on large scale in our country.F
The preamble of the 1980 Forest Act recites that:-
“An Act to provide for the conservation of forests and formatters connected therewith or ancillary or incidental thereto.”
(emphasis added)
It must be borne in mind that the 1927 Forest Act is pre-Constitution legislation. The said legislation is confined to only threecategories of forests. The 1980 Forest Act has not repealed the 1927Forest Act. In sense, the 1980 Forest Act supplements the provisionsof the 1927 Forest Act. During the last four decades, there has been aHrealization of the adverse impact of deforestation on the environment.
The depletion of the green cover was one of the consequences ofdeforestation. Cutting down forests led to environmental degradation.Since the forests absorb carbon dioxide, its destruction considerablyaffects the ability of the nature to keep emissions out of the atmosphere.This is one of the causes of global warming. The law relating to theenvironment gradually evolved during the last three decades in the lightof the Constitutional provisions and ever-increasing awareness andgrowing concern about environmental degradation. Perhaps, to preventlarge-scale deforestation, the Legislature thought it fit to come out withanother legislation for protecting the forests.
34. The 1980 Forest Act came into force with effect from 25[th]October 1980. It has only 5 Sections. The most important is Section 2which reads thus:
“2. Restriction on the dereservation of forests or use offorest land for non-forest purpose.—
Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for thetime being in force in State, no State Government or otherauthority shall make, except with the prior approval of theCentral Government, any order directing—
(i) that any reserved forest (within the meaning of theexpression “reserved forest” in any law for the time beingin force in that State) or any portion thereof, shall cease tobe reserved;
(ii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be usedfor any “non-forest” purpose.
[(iii) that any forest land or any portion thereof may beassigned by way of lease or otherwise to any private personor to any authority, corporation, agency or any otherorganization not owned, managed or controlled byGovernment;
(iv) that any forest land or any portion thereof may be clearedof trees which have grown naturally in that land or portion,for the purpose of using it for reafforestation.]
[Explanation—For the purposes of this section non-forest purposemeans the breaking up or clearing of any forest land or portionthereof for
A(a) the cultivation of tea, coffee, spices, rubber, palms, oil-bearingplants, horticultural crops or medicinal plants;
(b) any purpose other than reafforestation,
but does not include any work relating or ancillary to conservation,development and management of forests and wild life, namely,Bthe establishment of check-posts, fire lines, wirelesscommunications and construction of fencing, bridges and culverts,dams waterholes, trench marks, boundary marks, pipelines or otherlike purposes.]
[emphasis added]
35. Section 2 overrides all the laws applicable to particular Statewhich will include not only the laws of that particular State but also therelevant Central laws applicable to that particular State. Clause (i) ofSection 2 applies to reserved forest within the meaning of any law forthe time being in force in that State. Clauses (ii), (iii) and (iv) of SectionD2 apply to “any forest land”. As clause (i) specifically refers to reservedforest within the meaning of any law in force, it is obvious that clauses(ii), (iii) and (iv) apply to any other forest, whether or not recognized ordeclared as such under any law in force in that State. Hence, clauses(ii), (iii) and (iv) of Section 2 apply to any forest land which may not beEnecessarily reserved forest or protected forest or private forestgoverned by Chapter V under the 1927 Forest Act. Restrictions imposedby Section 2 (except clause (i) thereof) apply to every forest land inrespect of which no declarations have been made either under the 1927Forest Act or any other law relating to the forests in force in that State.
F36. Before we deal with the concept of forest under the 1980Forest Act, we must note here that this enactment does not provide foran absolute prohibition on the use of any forest land or part thereof forany non-forest purposes. The State Government or any other authoritycan always permit the use of any forest land or any portion thereof fornon-forest purposes only with the prior approval of the CentralGGovernment. In sense, this enactment provides for permissive use offorest land for non-forest activities with the prior approval of the CentralGovernment. Therefore, the owner of private land which is forestwithin the meaning of Section 2 can convert its use for non-forest purposesonly after obtaining requisite permission of the State Government orconcerned competent authority. However, the State Government or theH
competent authority, as the case may be, cannot permit such use fornon-forest activities without obtaining prior approval from the CentralGovernment. This provision has been made to check further depletionof already depleted green cover and to ensure that only such non-forestactivities are permitted by the Central Government which will not causeecological imbalance leading to environmental degradation. Consideringthe scheme of the 1980 Forest Act, the title holder of private landwhich is forest within the meaning of Section 2 is not divested of hisright, title or interest in the land. But there is an embargo on using hisforest land for any non-forest activity.
37. The object of the embargo on permitting non-forest use offorest land without prior permission of the Central Government is not tocompletely prevent the conduct of non-forest activities. This provisionenables the Central Government to regulate non-forest use of forestlands. While exercising the power to approve non-forest use, the CentralGovernment is under mandate to keep in mind the principles ofsustainable development as evolved by this Court including in its decisionin the case of Rajeev Suri[8]. The embargo imposed by Section 2 ensuresthat the development and use of forest land for non-forest use isgoverned by the principle of sustainable development. In sense, Section2 promotes the development work on forest land only to the extent it canbe sustained while alleviating environmental concerns. The power givento the Central Government under Section 2 must be exercised by adoptingscientific and consistent yardsticks for applying the principles ofsustainable development.38. Now, coming to the meaning of “forest” or “any forest land”covered by Section 2, this Court in 1997 Godavaraman’s case[1 ]hasexplained the legal position. Paragraphs 3 and 4 of the said decision readthus:-
“3. It has emerged at the hearing, that there is misconception incertain quarters about the true scope of the Forest ConservationAct, 1980 (for short “the Act”) and the meaning of the word“forest” used therein. There is also resulting misconception aboutthe need of prior approval of the Central Government, as requiredby Section 2 of the Act, in respect of certain activities in the forestarea which are more often of commercial nature. It is necessaryto clarify that position.
4. The Forest Conservation Act, 1980 was enacted with viewto check further deforestation which ultimately results in ecologicalimbalance; and therefore, the provisions made therein for theconservation of forests and for matters connected therewith, mustapply to all forests irrespective of the nature of ownership orclassification thereof. The word “forest” must be understoodaccording to its dictionary meaning. This description coversall statutorily recognised forests, whether designated asreserved, protected or otherwise for the purpose of Section2(i) of the Forest Conservation Act. The term “forest land”,occurring in Section 2, will not only include “forest” asunderstood in the dictionary sense, but also any arearecorded as forest in the Government record irrespectiveof the ownership. This is how it has to be understood forthe purpose of Section 2 of the Act. The provisions enactedin the Forest Conservation Act, 1980 for the conservationof forests and the matters connected therewith must applyclearly to all forests so understood irrespective of theownership or classification thereof. This aspect has been madeabundantly clear in the decisions of this Court in Ambica QuarryWorks v. State of Gujarat [(1987) 1 SCC 213], Rural Litigationand Entitlement Kendra v. State of U.P. [1989 Supp (1) SCC504] and recently in the order dated 29-11-1996 (Supreme CourtMonitoring Committee v. Mussoorie Dehradun DevelopmentAuthority [ WP (C) No 749 of 1995 decided on 29-11-1996]).The earlier decision of this Court in State of Bihar v. Banshi RamModi [(1985) 3 SCC 643] has, therefore, to be understood in thelight of these subsequent decisions. We consider it necessary toreiterate this settled position emerging from the decisions of thisCourt to dispel the doubt, if any, in the perception of any StateGovernment or authority. This has become necessary also becauseof the stand taken on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, even at thislate stage, relating to permissions granted for mining in such areawhich is clearly contrary to the decisions of this Court. It isreasonable to assume that any State Government which has failedto appreciate the correct position in law so far, will forthwithcorrect its stance and take the necessary remedial measureswithout any further delay.”
[emphasis added]
Thus, according to the aforesaid decision, Section 2 applies tothree categories of forests:
i.Statutorily recognized forests such as reserved or protectedforests to which clause (i) of Section 2 is applicable;
ii.The forests as understood in accordance with dictionarysense and
iii.Any area recorded as forest in Government records.
So far as the first category of forests is concerned, it poses nodifficulty as the forests under the said category covered by Clause (i) ofSection 2 are statutorily recognized forests.
39. It is the second category which poses some difficulty. As theobject of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act is to ensure that only sustainablegrowth/development takes place on forest lands. The need for giving awider meaning to “forest” or “forest land” contemplated by the 1980Forest Act can be well understood and justified. Moreover, the object ofthe 1980 Forest Act is to prevent ecological imbalance resulting fromdeforestation. The provision is aimed at protecting inter-dependencebetween the right to development of an individual and the right to thenatural environment of the public at large. The Legislature has used thewords “any forest” in Clauses (ii) to (iv) of Section 2 after referring tothe reserved forests in Clause (i) of Section 2. The intention is to bringall the forests, whether covered by the 1927 Forest Act or not, within thesweep of the 1980 Forest Act. dictionary always contains the meaningof the words as they are understood by people for generations. It containsthe meaning of word which is already legitimized. Lexicographersinclude word in the dictionary when it is used by many in the sameway. Therefore, forest as understood by its dictionary meaning is coveredby Section 2.
40. Hence, the question is what is the dictionary meaning of theword ‘forest’. Most of the well-known dictionaries are more or lessconsistent when it comes to the meaning of the word ‘forest’. Theerstwhile Nagpur High Court in the case of Laxman Ichharam v. TheDivisional Forest Officer, Raigarh[10]made an attempt to define‘forests’ by referring to dictionary meaning of the word ‘forest’ in theOxford English dictionary. Paragraph 13 of the said decision reads thus:
A“13. The term ‘forest’ has not been defined anywhere in the ForestAct. In the absence of such definition the word ‘forest’ must betaken in its ordinary dictionary sense. The Shorter OxfordEnglish Dictionary, Vol.I, gives the following meaning to it:
‘1. An extensive tract of land covered with trees and undergrowth,Bsometimes intermingled with pasture……….2. Law. woodland district, usually belonging to the king, setapart for hunting wild beasts and game etc.,………
3. wild uncultivated waste.”
CThe Cambridge dictionary defines forest as under:
“a large area of land covered with trees and plants usuallylarger than wood, or the trees and plants themselves.”
Merriam-Webster dictionary defines forest as under:-
“1: dense growth of trees and underbrush covering largeDtract
2: attract of wooded land in England formerly owned bythe sovereign and used for game
3: something resembling forest especially in profusion orElushness.”
Therefore, when we consider the meaning of forest or forestland within the meaning of Clauses (ii) to (iv) of Section 2, it has to be alarge or extensive tract of land having dense growth of trees, thickets,mangroves etc. small isolated plot of land will not come within theFambit of Clauses (ii) to (iv) of Section 2 merely because there are sometrees or thickets thereon, as opposed to extensive tract of land coveredwith dense growth of trees and underbrush or plants resembling forestin profusion or lushness.41. If land is shown as forest in Government records, it will beGgoverned by Section 2. Government record is record maintained byits various departments. Government record is always made afterfollowing certain process. Only the entries made after following dueprocess can be part of any Government record. Government recordswill include land or revenue records, being statutory documents. For thesame reason, it will also include the record of the forest department.HAfter all, the forest department is the custodian of forests. It is this
department of the State which is under an obligation to protect the forestsfor upholding the constitutional mandate. Further, it is this departmentwhich identifies the forest lands and maintains record. Therefore, therecord maintained by the Forest Department of forest lands after dulyidentifying the forest lands will necessarily be Government record.
42. Whether particular land is ‘forest land’ within the meaningof Clauses (ii) to (iv) of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act, is questionwhich is required to be decided in the facts of each case in the light ofthe aforesaid parameters.
43. Clause (i) of Section 2 mandates that no reserved or declaredforest should be divested of its status by the State Government withoutprior approval of the Central Government. The effect of Clause (i) isthat the State Government cannot exercise the power under Section 27of the 1927 Forest Act of declaring that particular land will cease to bea reserved forest unless there is prior approval from the CentralGovernment. The test for the grant of prior approval which we have laiddown above will also apply to such prior approval. In this background,we proceed to discuss the issue which we have been called upon todecide in this group of cases.
THE IMPACT OF THE NOTIFICATIONS/ORDERSISSUED UNDER PLPA
44. PLPA was published in the Government Gazette of Punjab on15[th] November 1900. PLPA was brought into force from that very day.A photocopy of the proceedings of the Council of the Lieutenant Governorof Punjab along with photocopy of the Gazette dated 15[th] November1900 has been placed on record. Reliance was placed on the address ofHon’ble Mr H.C. Fanshawe while tabling the Bill of PLPA. His addressreflects the intention of the legislature. The proceedings record that:
“The Hon’ble Mr. Fanshawe moved for leave to introduce Billto provide for the better preservation and protection of certainportions of the territories of the Punjab situate within or adjacentto the Siwalik Mountain range or affected or liable to be affectedby the action of streams and torrents, such as are commonly calledchos flowing through or from, or by the deboisement of forestswithin, that range.”
Mr. Fanshawe in his address, further notes that prior to 1852, thewaste-lands of Siwaliks were well protected by trees and bushes and
Agrass. He further stated that grass and trees on the hillsides have beenlargely destroyed. He, therefore, stated that legislative action is requiredto be taken to check the evils in question. In the Preamble of PLPA, asoriginally enacted, it is stated thus :
“Act to provide for the better preservation and protection ofBcertain portions of the territories of the Punjab situate withinor adjacent to the Siwalik mountain range or affected orliable to be affected by the deboisement of forests withinthat range, or by the action of streams and torrents, such as arecommonly called chos flowing through or from it.”
[emphasis added]
45. The Preamble specifically refers to the deboisement of theforests. The dictionary meaning of the word “deboisement” is“deforestation”. Thus, the object of PLPA is also to protect the territorieslikely to be affected by deforestation. It is argued that PLPA has beenDenacted essentially for the conservation of sub-soil water or the preventionof erosion and it has nothing to do with forests. Deforestation is one ofthe accepted and recognized causes of erosion of soil. There is an articlepublished on the website of the World Wildlife Fund. The article dealswith deforestation and recognizes it as cause of soil erosion. The relevantEportion of the said article reads thus:
“Deforestation
Without plant cover, erosion can occur and sweep the landinto rivers. The agricultural plants that often replace theFtrees cannot hold onto the soil and many of these plants,such as coffee, cotton, palm oil, soybean and wheat, canactually worsen soil erosion. And as land loses its fertile soil,agricultural produces move on, clear more forest and continuethe cycle of soil loss.”
(emphasis added)
Thus, one of the objects of PLPA undoubtedly appears to be theprotection and preservation of forests as it is one of the measures forpreventing erosion of soil. Significantly, Clause (c) of Section 2 of PLPAprovides that the expressions, ‘tree’, ‘timber’, ‘forest-produce’ and ‘cattle’
shall have the same meaning which is assigned in Section 2 of the 1927Forest Act.
46. The material Sections in PLPA are Sections 3 to 7. Firstly, weare dealing with Section 3, which reads thus:
“3. Notification of areas— Whenever it appears to the ProvincialGovernment that it is desirable to provide for the conservation ofsub-soil water or the prevention of erosion in any area subject toerosion or likely to become liable to erosion, such Governmentmay by notification make direction accordingly.”
Section 3 enables the State Government to notify an area subjectto erosion or likely to become liable to erosion. When it appears to theState Government that it is desirable to provide for the conservation ofsub-soil water or the prevention of erosion in any area subject to erosionor likely to become liable to erosion, the State Government may by anotification issue direction accordingly. By the inclusion of any area ina notification under Section 3, per se, there are no constraints orrestrictions imposed on the use of the lands. There is nothing in Section3 to suggest that the power to issue notification can be exercisednecessarily in respect of forest lands. The lands covered by thenotification may also include non-forest lands. However, in respect ofthe areas notified under Section 3, the State Government can exercisethe powers under Section 5A. Section 5A reads thus:
“5-A. Power to require execution of works and taking ofmeasures.— In respect of areas notified under section 3generally or the whole or any part of any such area, the ProvincialGovernment may, by general or special order, direct—
(a) the levelling, terracing, drainage and embanking of fields;
(b) the construction of earth-works in fields and ravines;
(c) the provision of drains for storm water;
(d) the protection of land against the action of wind or water; (e)the training of streams; and
(f) the execution of such other works and the carrying out of suchother measures as may, in the opinion of the Provincial
1100SUPREME COURT REPORTS
AGovernment, be necessary for carrying out the purposes of thisAct.”
Before the amendment made in the year 1926, Sections 4 and 5empowered the State Government to pass general or special ordersproviding for regulations, restrictions and prohibitions as mentioned inBthe said sections either temporarily or permanently. However, by the1926 amendment, the word ‘permanently’ has been deleted. Sections 4and 5 of PLPA, as they stood before the 2019 Amendment Act, readthus:
“4. Power to regulate, restrict or prohibit, by general orCspecial order, within notified areas, certain matters.-Inrespect of areas notified under section 3 generally or the whole orany part of any such area, the Provincial Government may, bygeneral or special order temporarily regulate, restrict or prohibit-
(a)the clearing or breaking up or cultivating of land notDordinarily under cultivation prior to the publication ofthe notification under section 3;
(b)the quarrying of stone or the burning of lime at placeswhere such stone or lime had not ordinarily been soquarried or burnt prior to the publication of theEnotification under section 3;
(c)the cutting of trees or timber, or the collection orremoval or subjection to any manufacturing process,otherwise than as described in clause (b) of this sub-Fsection of any forest-produce other than grass, savefor bonafide domestic or agricultural purposes ofrightholder in such area;
(d)the setting on fire of trees, timber or forest produce;
(e)the admission, herding, pasturing or retention of sheep, goatsGor camels;
(f)the examination of forest-produce passing out of any sucharea; and
(g)the granting of permits to the inhabitants of towns andHvillages situate within the limits or in the vicinity of any
such area, to take any tree, timber or forest produce fortheir own use therefrom, or to pasture sheep, goats or camelsor to cultivate or erect buildings therein and the productionand return of such permits by such persons.
5. Power, in certain cases to regulate, restrict or prohibit,by special order within notified areas, certain furthermatters. - In respect of any specified village or villages, or partor parts thereof, comprised within the limits of any area notifiedunder section 3, the Provincial Government may, by special order,temporarily regulate, restrict or prohibit-
(a)the cultivating of any land ordinarily under cultivation priorto the publication of the notification under section 3;
(b)the quarrying of any stone or the burning of any lime atplaces where such stone or lime had ordinarily been soquarried or burnt prior to the publication of the notificationunder section 3;
(c)the cutting of trees or timber or the collection or removal orsubjection to any manufacturing process, otherwise thanas described in clause (b) of this sub-section of any forest-produce for any purposes; and
(d)the admission, herding, pasturing or retention of cattlegenerally other than sheep, goats and camels or of any classor description of such cattle.”
Section 6 lays down the procedural requirement of publishingnotifications/orders issued under Sections 4, 5 or 5A in the official gazetteafter recording the satisfaction of the State Government, after due inquiry,that the directions contained in the orders are necessary for the purposesof giving effect to the provisions of PLPA. Section 7 enables the personsaffected by special orders under Sections 4, 5 and 5A to seekcompensation.
47. Though in this group of cases, wider submissions have beencanvassed, we find that the entire challenge concerns only the threeseparate Government orders dated 18[th] August 1992 issued under Section4 of PLPA in relation to the specific lands in the said three villages.There is no challenge in any of the Writ Petitions to any order issued
Aunder Section 5 of PLPA. Even the NGT in the impugned orders hasrelied upon only the special orders under Section 4. Therefore, we areconfining our discussion to the question whether the lands covered byspecial orders issued under Section 4 of PLPA are forest lands withinthe meaning of the 1980 Forest Act. When an order is issued underSection 4 in respect of specifically identified area which is part of aBlarger area notified under Section 3 for imposing any of the specificprohibitions or restrictions provided in Section 4, such an order can betermed as special order under Section 4. Section 3 of PLPAcontemplates the issuance of notification in respect of larger areawhen it is desirable to provide for the conservation of sub-soil water orCprevention of erosion. When the State Government is satisfied thatdeforestation of forest area forming part of larger area notified underSection 3 is likely to lead to erosion of soil, the power under Section 4can be exercised. Various clauses of sub-section (4) refer to trees, timber,forest produce and cattle. Clause (c) of Section 2 of PLPA specifically
provides that the said words shall have the meaning severally assignedDto these expressions in Section 2 of the 1927 Forest Act. Clause (a) ofSection 4 empowers the State Government to restrict or prohibit clearingor breaking up or cultivating of land not ordinarily under cultivation priorto the publication of the notification under Section 3. In the context ofClause (a) of Section 4, we may note here that Clause (a) of sub-sectionE(1) of Section 26 read with Section 5 of the 1927 Forest Act prohibitsclearing of reserved forest for cultivation. Sub-section (1) of Section35 of the 1927 Forest Act empowers the State Government to prohibitbreaking up or clearing private forest land, pasturing of cattle or clearingvegetation on forest lands not vested in the Government. Such prohibitioncan be imposed in respect of privately owned forest lands for variousFreasons set out in the provision. One of the specified reasons is theprotection of lands from erosion. Even clause (h) of sub-section (1) ofSection 26 of the 1927 Forest Act prohibits breaking up or clearing anyland forming part of reserved forest for cultivation or for any otherpurpose. Clause (g) of Section 4 of PLPA empowers the StateGGovernment to prohibit or prevent quarrying of stones or burning of limeat places where such stones or lime had not ordinarily been so quarriedor burnt prior to the notification issued under Section 3. Similar are therestrictions imposed by clause (g) of sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the1927 Forest Act in respect of the lands forming part of reserved forest.clause (c) of Section 4 of PLPA which empowers the Government toHimpose restrictions on the cutting of trees or timber is also pointerwhich indicates that special order under Section 4 has to be necessarilyin respect of forest land. similar restriction is applicable to reservedforest as provided in clause (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the1927 Forest Act. Clause (d) of Section 4 of PLPA empowers the StateGovernment to prohibit the setting on fire of trees, timber or forestproduce. Such restriction is also found in clauses (b) and (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 26 in respect of reserved forest. Clause (f) ofSection 4 empowers the State Government to regulate, restrict or prohibitthe admission, herding, pasturing or retention of sheep, goats or camels.Clause (d) of sub-section (1) of Section 26 of the 1927 Forest Act imposesa similar restriction on the lands forming part of reserved forest.Clauses (f) and (g) of Section 4 of PLPA refer to forest producegenerated out of any such area notified under Section 4. As noted earlier,PLPA incorporates the definition of “forest produce” in the 1927 ForestAct in PLPA by reference. Sub-Section (4) of Section 2 of the 1927Forest Act defines “forest produce” which reads thus:
“2(4)”forest-produce” includes -
(a) the following whether found in, or brought from, forest ornot, that is to say:-
timber, charcoal, caoutchouc, catechu, wood-oil, resin, naturalvarnish, bark, lac, mahua flowers, mahua seeds, kuth andmyrabolams, and
(b) the following when found in, or brought from forest, that isto say –
(i) trees and leaves, flowers and fruits, and all other parts or producenot hereinbefore mentioned, of trees,
(ii) plants not being trees (including grass, creepers, reeds andmoss), and all parts or produce of such plants,
(iii) wild animals and skins, tusks, horns, bones, silk, cocoons, honeyand wax, and all other parts or produce of animals, and
(iv) peat, surface soil, rock and minerals (including lime-stone,laterite, mineral oils, and all products of mines or quarries).”
AThus, it appears to us that various restrictions, regulations andprohibitions in different clauses in Section 4 of PLPA can be invokednecessarily in respect of forest lands. Whereas, Section 3 of PLPAcontemplates the issuance of general notification in respect of anyarea subject to erosion or likely to become liable to erosion when itappears to the State Government that it is desirable to provide for theBconservation of sub-soil water or the prevention of erosion. As notedearlier, one of the objectives of PLPA is to prevent erosion of land whichmay be caused due to deforestation. When the State Government issatisfied that as result of deforestation or impending deforestation,erosion of particular area out of the area notified under Section 3 isClikely to take place, the State Government may exercise the power underSection 4 by issuing special order. The reason is that the measuresprovided in Section 4 are intended to prevent deforestation of forestarea. Section 3 of PLPA contemplates the issuance of notification inrespect of larger area when it is desirable to provide for the conservationof sub-soil water or prevention of erosion. When the State GovernmentDis satisfied that deforestation of forest area forming part of largerarea notified under Section 3 is likely to lead to erosion of soil, the powerunder Section 4 can be exercised. Therefore, it follows that the specificland in respect of which special order under section 4 of PLPA hasbeen issued will have all the trappings of forest governed by clausesE(ii) to (iv) of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act. Therefore, in respect ofthe lands covered by special orders under Section 4 of PLPA, the StateGovernment or authorities of the State can permit diversion to non-forestuse only after prior approval of the Central Government is granted inaccordance with Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act.F48. Clause (a) of Section 5 of PLPA provides for restricting orprohibiting the cultivation of any land ordinarily under cultivation prior tothe publication of the notification under Section 3. However, the powerunder Section 5 to restrict or prohibit can be exercised in case whereprior to the publication of the notification under Section 3, quarrying ofany stone or the burning of any lime was being made. Thus, there is aGmarked difference between the language used in Section 4 and that inSection 5 of PLPA. However, as noted earlier, it is not necessary for usto decide the issue whether land forming part of special notificationunder Section 5 of PLPA ipso facto becomes forest under the 1980Forest Act.H
THE EFFECT OF THE STAND TAKEN BY THE STATEGOVERNMENT IN PLEADINGS / AFFIDAVITS ANDCORRESPONDENCE.
49. At this stage, it is relevant to note that on 08[th] December 1996an affidavit was filed by Mr. Banarsi Dass, Principal Chief Conservatorof Forests of the State of Haryana in Civil Writ Petition No.171 of 1996.The said civil writ petition was dealt with by this Court in the 1997Godavarman’s case[1] in its judgment dated 12[th] December 1996. Thestand taken in the said affidavit was that the State was treating the landsnotified under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA as forests. It must be notedhere that similar stand was taken by the State Government even in thesubsequent correspondence/ affidavits/pleadings. In the letter dated 21[st]December 1992 addressed by the Deputy Inspector General of Forestsof the Government of India to the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests,the Government of Haryana, it was stated that the area notified underSections 4 and 5 of the PLPA has been recorded as forest in theGovernment record. As stated in the said letter, this factual position hasbeen noted on the basis of what is stated in the letter dated 09[th] December1992 addressed by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests of theGovernment of Haryana. Record of Discussions in meeting of PrincipalChief Conservator of Forests held under the Chairmanship of DirectorGeneral of Forests and Special Secretary (DGF & SS) of the Governmentof India on 25[th] August 2014 is placed on record along with notesubmitted by Shri A.D.N. Rao, the learned counsel. The meeting wasattended by various officers of the Ministry of Environment, Forests andClimate Change as well as the Principal Chief Conservator of Forestsof Government of Haryana - Shri C.R. Jojriwal. It is noted in paragraph2 that subject to the approval of this Court various areas stated thereinshall be mandatorily treated as ‘forest’ for the purposes of the 1980Forest Act. The lands which were to be mandatorily treated as forestswere divided into two categories. Category (A) was of Recorded ForestAreas and Category (B) of Forests by Dictionary meaning. In clause(c) of Category (A), it is provided that the areas covered by thenotifications issued under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA shall be treated asforests for the purposes of the 1980 Forest Act. The stand of theGovernment of Haryana is also reflected in the decision of the DivisionBench of Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Vijay Bansal[7].The said decision, rendered on 15[th] May 2009, proceeded to hold thatthe areas forming parts of notification under Section 3 of PLPA in respect
Aof which restrictions have been imposed under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPAare to be treated as forest lands for the purposes of 1980 Forest Act. Anapplication being C.M. No.12170 of 2009 was filed in the said case bythe State of Haryana seeking modification of the judgment. Prayer 5 ofthe said application is relevant which is reproduced for convenience.
B“(5) It has been accordingly prayed that only those lands whereclearing, breaking-up or cultivation has been prohibited by aspecial order notified under Section 4(a) or 5(a) of the PLPA,1900 may be treated as ‘forest lands’ as has been so held bythe Hon’ble Supreme Court in M.C. Mehta’s case (supra) andCnot those lands in respect whereto general restrictions havebeen imposed under Section 4(c) and (d) or Section 5(c) and(d) of the PLPA, 1900.”
In the said application, there is specific pleading that the landscovered by the notifications under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA were treatedas forest lands.D
50. The Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Courtby the order dated 04[th] December 2009 accepted the aforesaid prayerand held that those lands which are covered by notifications imposingrestrictions/prohibitions under clause (a) of Section 4 and clause (a) ofESection 5 of PLPA are declared as ‘forest lands’ for the purposes of1980 Forest Act. Thus, this was the categorical stand taken by the StateGovernment in the pending proceedings on oath.
51. We may note here that the statements made on behalf of theState Government in the letters, affidavits and pleadings cannot beFconclusive to decide the issue of the status of the lands covered by aspecial notification under Section 4 of PLPA. The finding on the issuecannot be based only on the stand taken earlier by the State Governmentin the correspondence and affidavits. Independently of the stand takenas aforesaid, on careful analysis of Section 4 of PLPA, we have cometo conclusion that the lands covered by the special orders under SectionG4 of PLPA have all the trappings of forest within the meaning of Section2 of the 1980 Forest Act. Therefore, we have held that the lands coveredby the special notification under Section 4 will be forest lands within themeaning of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act.
EARLIER DECISIONS OF THIS COURT
52. The 1997 Godavarman’s case does not even refer to thelegal effect of the orders under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA. Even the2008 Godavarman’s case does not consider the aforesaid issue. Inparagraph 21, this Court directed that mining activity in the areas coveredby orders under Section 4 and 5 of PLPA shall be prohibited on theground that the said lands were recorded as forests in government records.The 1[st] M.C. Mehta’s case was decided by Bench of two Hon’bleJudges. As can be seen from paragraph 79 of the said decision, the issueof the legal effect of the orders under Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA verymuch arose before the Bench in the context of the applicability of Section2 of the 1980 Forest Act. However, in paragraph 82, the Bench specificallyobserved that it is not necessary to decide the legal effect of the ordersunder Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA. This Court relied upon only the affidavitsfiled on behalf of the State Government including the affidavit of ShriBanarasi Dass. This Court observed that the State Government cannottake somersault and take stand contrary to what is stated in theirearlier affidavits. Thus, the issue which we have decided about the legaleffect of Section 4 of PLPA was not decided by this Court in the saidcase. The 3[rd] M.C. Mehta was decided by Bench of two Hon’bleJudges. From the first two paragraphs of the decision, it is apparent thatthis Court dealt with an application made by M/s. R. Kant & Co. Theissue was about the contravention of the order dated 18[th] August 1992under Section 4 in respect of certain lands in village Anangpur. TheBench dealt with contention that the land notified under the said orderdated 18[th] August 1992 was not forest. Even in this judgment, we findthat closer examination was not made of the scheme of Section 4 ofPLPA and its legal effect vis-à-vis Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act.Even the decision of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case ofVijay Bansal[7] does not deal with the issue of the legal effect of ordersunder Sections 4 and 5 of PLPA Act.
53. The decision of Bench of two Hon’ble Judges of this Courtin the case of B.S. Sandhu[5] dealt with the order dated 12[th] October2004 passed by Division Bench of Punjab and Haryana High Court.The appellant before this Court Mr.B.S. Sandhu had contended beforethe High Court that the lands in village Karoran in District Ropar inpossession of Forest Hill Golf and Country Club, of which he was theproprietor, were not forest lands and the lands were either agricultural
DEF
Alands or uncultivable waste lands. The High Court did not accept thesaid contention and held that Village Karoran has been notified underSection 3 of PLPA and is regulated by prohibitory directions underSections 4 and 5 of PLPA. Therefore, it was held that the lands in theentire village were forests within the meaning of the 1980 Forest Act. Inparagraph 18 of the said decision, this Court held thus:B
“18. It will be clear from the language of Section 3 of the PLPAct, 1900 extracted above that for the better preservation andprotection of any local area, situated within or adjacent toShivalik mountain range which is liable to be affected byCdeboisement of forests in that range or by the action of “cho”,such Government may by notification make directionaccordingly. The expression “local area” has not been definedin the PLP Act, 1900 and may include not only “forest land”but also other land. In Section 4 of the PLP Act, 1900 extractedabove, the local Government was empowered by general orDspecial order, temporarily or permanently to regulate, restrictor prohibit various activities mentioned in clauses (a), (b), (c),(d), (e), (f) and (g) thereof. reading of these clauses wouldshow that activities such as cultivation, pasturing of sheep andgoats and erection of buildings by the inhabitants of towns andEvillages situated within the limits of the area notified underSection 3 can be regulated, restricted or prohibited by generalor special order of the local Government. All these activitiesare not normally carried on in forests. Similarly, under Section5 of the PLP Act, 1900, the local Government was empoweredby special order, temporarily or permanently to regulate, restrictFor prohibit the cultivating of any land or to admit, herd, pastureor retain cattle generally other than sheep and goats. Theseactivities are also not normally carried on in forests.”
In paragraph 19 this Court observed thus :
“19. In our view, therefore, land which is notified under Section3 of the PLP Act, 1900 and regulated by orders of the localGovernment under Sections 4 and 5 of the PLP Act, 1900 mayor may not be “forest land”. Therefore, the conclusion of theHigh Court in the impugned order that the entire land of VillageKaroran, District Ropar, which has been notified under Section
3 of the PLP Act, 1900 and is regulated by the prohibitorydirections notified under Sections 4 and 5 thereof is “forestland” is not at all correct in law. The basis for inclusion of theentire area in Village Karoran, District Ropar, in the list offorest areas in the State of Punjab pursuant to the order dated12-12-1996 of this Court in T.N. GodavarmanThirumulpad v. Union of India [T.N. GodavarmanThirumulpad v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 267] is legallynot correct. Similarly, the conclusion of the High Court in theimpugned order [Court on Its Own Motion v. State of Punjab,(2004) 4 RCR (Civil) 619 : (2005) 2 ICC 16 (P&H)] that theentire land in Village Karoran, District Ropar, having beennotified under Section 3 of the PLP Act, 1900 and being underthe regulatory regime of Sections 4 and 5 of the said Act is“forest land” is also legally not correct.”
What is material are the observations made in paragraph 23 ofthe said decision which read thus:
“23. We have also examined the two decisions of this Courtin the first and second cases of M.C. Mehta [M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, (2004) 12 SCC 118] , [M.C.Mehta v. Union of India, (2008) 17 SCC 294] cited on behalfof the State of Punjab and we find that the aforesaid decisionshave been rendered in the case of Aravalli Hills in the Stateof Haryana and it was held therein that as the State ForestDepartment had been treating and showing the areas as“forest”, in fact and in law, the area was forest and non-forestactivities could not be allowed in such areas without the priorpermission of the Central Government under Section 2 of theForest (Conservation) Act, 1980. In these two decisions, thisCourt has not enquired into the basis of inclusion of the areasin forest by the State Forest Department nor has this Courtconsidered as to whether land becomes “forest land”by mere inclusion of the same under the notificationunder Section 3 of the PLP Act, 1900. In the present case,on the other hand, the State Government has in its affidavitstated before this Court that the basis of inclusion of the entireland of Village Karoran, District Ropar, in forest areas in therecords of the Forest Department of Government of Punjab
1110SUPREME COURT REPORTS
Awas that the land was closed under the PLP Act, 1900 and wehave found this basis as not correct in law.”
54. The Bench has not gone into the scheme of the 1927 ForestAct and the object sought to be achieved by PLPA. Thus, the entireemphasis of the appellant in B.S. Sandhu’s case[5] was that mere inclusionBof an area in the notification under Section 3 of PLPA will not ipsofacto lead to the conclusion that the area is forest for the purposes of1980 Forest Act.
55. Thus, essentially in the case of B.S. Sandhu[5], this Court dealtwith notification under Section 3 of PLPA which was applicable to theCentire village in question. Though Sections 4 and 5 are referred in thesaid decision, it is not clear whether there was special order issuedunder Sections 4 in respect of the lands of Mr. B.S. Sandhu. Moreover,the said decision overlooks that one of the objects of PLPA was toprevent deforestation as the same may result in erosion of soil. TheDCourt did not notice that the restrictions provided in Section 4 show thatthe same can be applied only to the lands having trappings of forestwithin the meaning of the 1980 Forest Act. The decision in the case ofB.S. Sandhu[5], with great respect, does not take note of these cruciallegal and factual aspects.
ETHE OTHER ISSUES
56. We may note here that the petitioners in Writ Petition (Civil)No.1031 of 2021 represented by the learned senior counsel Shri VikasSingh are claiming that they are residents of Villages Anangpur, MewlaMaharajpur and Ankhir covered by three separate orders issued on 18[th]FAugust 1992 under Section 4. perusal of the said orders on record ofCivil Appeal No.10294 of 2013 will show that the orders are specialorders relating to only certain specific lands mentioned therein in theschedules thereto. The lands in the schedule are specific lands describedby reference to Killa or other relevant numbers. Even the area of thelands covered has been incorporated. The notifications do not relate toGthe entire village. The same are in respect of specific lands in the saidthree villages. By placing reliance on the figures quoted in the additionalaffidavit of the State of Haryana and by producing certain maps, ShriVikas Singh, the learned senior counsel tried to contend that if thecontentions of some of the intervenors are accepted, the entire districtsHof Gurugram and Faridabad will be forests within the meaning of Section
2 of 1980 Forest Act. On this aspect, what is relevant is the chartincorporated by the State Government in paragraph 50 of the additionalaffidavit. We are reproducing the chart for ready reference:
AREAS NOTIFIED UNDER PLP ACT, 1900 (AREA INHECTARE)
57. Thus, the special orders under Sections 4 and 5 in respect of22 districts of Haryana including the districts of Gurugram and Faridabadcover only an area of 31,738 hectare, out of the total area of 44,21,200hectares.In at least 8 districts, not single land is governed by specialorders under Sections 4 and 5. Hence, only about 7.1% of the total landsin 22 districts are covered by special orders issued under Sections 4 and5 of PLPA. Going by these figures of the lands covered by the specialorders under Section 4 and 5, the percentage of the lands covered byspecial orders under Section 4 must be insignificant as compared to thetotal area of the districts. Thus, the picture tried to be projected by thepetitioners and the State Government is completely misleading andfallacious.
58. In this group of appeals, we are concerned only with the threeseparate orders dated 18[th] August 1992 in relation to the said threevillages. submission was canvassed that there was no notification issuedunder Section 3 of PLPA covering the said three villages. It is contended
Athat the requisite procedure was not followed. We may note here that itis too late in the day to challenge the said orders after the lapse of morethan 20 years. The ground of the gross delay is itself sufficient to negativethe said challenge. The State Government cannot be called upon to showcompliance with procedural aspects for the first time after lapse of morethan 20 years. Therefore, it will not be appropriate to entertain challengeBto the said orders on the ground of non-compliance with the proceduralprovisions of Sections 6 and 7 after lapse of more than 20 years. Reliancewas placed on notification dated 17[th] October 1989 issued by the StateGovernment under Section 5 of the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887.By the said notification, the State Government excluded certain areasCfrom the limits of Ballabhgarh Tehsil in Faridabad District. new Tehsilwas formed of the said excluded areas known as Faridabad Tehsil.However, on 10[th] April 1992, notification was issued under Section 3of PLPA in respect of the entire Tehsil of Ballabhgarh. The three specialorders dated 18[th] August 1992 are in respect of specifically describedlands in the said three villages in Tehsil of Ballabhgarh. Therefore, apartDfrom the gross delay, it cannot be accepted that the special orders underSection 4 dated 18[th] August 1992 were not preceded by general orderunder Section 3 of PLPA in respect of Tehsil Ballabhgarh. The threespecial orders specifically refer to due inquiry made by the StateGovernment for coming to the conclusion that prohibitions contained inEthe said orders are necessary for the purpose of giving effect to theprovisions of PLPA.
59. Another argument canvassed was that the said three villagesare covered by controlled areas declared under the 1971 Act as well asa final development plan. In view of the language used by Section 2 ofFthe 1980 Forest Act, the said provision overrides all other laws applicableto the State of Haryana including the Central laws. Moreover, once it isfound that the lands covered by the said three orders dated 18[th] August1992 are forest lands covered by clauses (ii) to (iv) of Section 2 of the1980 Forest Act, its status as forest lands cannot be altered unless Section2 is followed.G60. vague attempt was made to contend that firstly the landscovered by special orders under Section 4 can be treated as forestswithin the meaning of the 1980 Forest Act only from the date of therespective orders and that it will continue to be forest for limitedduration for which the said special orders are in force. Both the argumentsHdo not commend us at all. An occasion for passing special orders under
Section 4 arises when the lands in respect of which special orders aresought to be issued, are forest lands. It is true that, to such lands, Section2 of the 1980 Forest Act will apply from 25[th] October 1980 when thesame was brought into force. Once land is covered by the sweep ofSection 2 of the 1980 Forest Act, whether the special orders under Section4 continue to be in force or not, the lands covered by the said notificationswill continue to fall in the category of forests covered by Section 2 of the1980 Forest Act.
THE 2019 AMENDMENT ACT
61. The State Government as well as the appellants have reliedupon the 2019 Amendment Act. Our attention was also invited to theorder dated 01[st] March 2019 in Writ Petition (Civil) No.4677 of 1985(M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors.). By the said order, this Courtdirected that the 2019 Amendment Act shall not be acted upon withoutpermission of this Court. I.A.No.93600/2021 has been filed by the Stateof Haryana in Writ Petition (Civil) No.4677 of 1985 seeking permissionto implement the provisions of 2019 Amendment Act. In one of ourorders passed in this group of appeals, we had observed that the saidprayer can be considered in this group itself.
62. By the 2019 Amendment Act, Section 3 has been substitutedfrom the date of publication of the Amendment Act in the GovernmentGazette. Substituted Section 3 contemplates the State Government issuinga preliminary notification before issuing final notification under Section3. It also provides for inviting objections to the preliminary notificationand giving hearing to the objectors. Section 3A was added whichprovides that the provisions of PLPA shall not apply, amongst others, tothe lands included in the final development plans or any other townimprovement plans or schemes published under the provisions of thesaid Act of 1971, the Haryana Development and Regulation of UrbanAreas Act, 1975 etc. proviso has been added to Section 4 laying downthat the period of validity of any order issued under Section 4 shall notexceed the period of validity of the corresponding notification underSection 3. Section 23 was incorporated in the principal Act by the 2019Amendment Act. It provides that the orders and notifications issuedunder PLPA shall be deemed to have been amended so as to excludethe categories of land covered under Section 3A with effect from thedate of issuance or publication of such orders or notification. Moreover,clause (c) of sub-section (2) of Section 23 provides that after the expiry
Aof the period stated in such orders or notifications, the regulations,restrictions or prohibitions imposed shall cease to exist. Another importantfeature of the 2019 Amendment Act is that Section 4A has beenincorporated. It provides that in respect of the areas notified under Section3, the State Government may, in the whole or any part of such areas, bygeneral order temporarily regulate, restrict or prohibit the cutting of treesBand timber. Sub-section (3) of Section 4A provides that all subsistinggeneral orders issued under Section 4 prior to the date of commencementof 2019 Amendment Act shall be deemed to have been issued underSection 4A. note appended to Section 4A clarifies that all the subsistinggeneral orders issued under Section 4 or notifications made thereunderCprior to the publication of the 2019 Amendment Act shall be solely forthe purpose of temporarily regulating, restricting or prohibiting felling oftrees and not for regulating any other activity or imposing restrictions orchange in the permissible land use for such area. Sub-section (2) ofSection 1 of 2019 Amendment Act is of some importance. It lays downthat the said Amendment Act shall be deemed to have come into forceDfrom 01[st] November 1966 except unless expressly provided otherwise.
63. In this group of petitions, we are concerned with three specialorders under Section 4 issued on 18[th] August 1992 in respect of the saidthree villages. The effect of the said orders is that the lands referred totherein are forest lands within the meaning of Section 2 of the 1980EForest Act. Even if such orders are cancelled or amended or rescindedor their duration comes to an end, the status of the lands covered by thesame as forest lands governed by Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Actcannot be altered without following the due process provided therein.Once land is found to be ‘forest’ within the meaning of the 1980FForest Act, its user for non-forest purposes will be always governed bySection 2 of the 1980 Forest Act. Secondly, clause (i) of Section 2 providesthat even in the case of reserved forest under the 1927 Forest Act, theState Government cannot pass an order declaring that the same shallcease to be reserved forest, without the prior approval of the CentralGovernment. Thirdly, Section 2 starts with non obstante clause whichGoverrides anything contained in any other law for the time being in forcein State which will include all State and Central legislations applicableto the State. Therefore, prima facie, the 2019 Amendment Act enactedby the State Legislature would be repugnant to and violative of Section2 of the 1980 Forest Act, if construed otherwise. Hence, whether theH2019 Amendment Act is given effect or not, it will not change the status
of the lands covered by the special orders under Section 4 of PLPA asthe said lands possess all the trappings of forest with effect from 25[th]October 1980 within the meaning of the 1980 Forest Act. Therefore, it isnot necessary for us in these petitions to deal with the issue whether theorder dated 01[st] March 2019 passed in Writ Petition (Civil) No.4677 of1985 should be modified. The said prayer will have to be considered bythe Bench dealing with the said writ petition.
CONCLUSIONS AND OPERATIVE PART
64. Thus, we hold that the lands covered by the special ordersissued under Section 4 of PLPA have all the trappings of forest landswithin the meaning of Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act and, therefore,the State Government or competent authority cannot permit its use fornon-forest activities without the prior approval of the Central Governmentwith effect from 25[th] October 1980. Prior permission of the CentralGovernment is the quintessence to allow any change of user of forest orso to say deemed forest land. We may add here that even during thesubsistence of the special orders under Section 4 of PLPA, with theapproval of the Central Government, the State or competent authoritycan grant permission for non-forest use. If such non-forest use is permittedin accordance with Section 2 of the 1980 Forest Act, to that extent, therestrictions imposed by the special orders under Section 4 of PLPA willnot apply in view of the language used in the opening part of Section 2 ofthe 1980 Forest Act. We also clarify that only because there is notificationissued under Section 3 of PLPA, the land which is subject matter ofsuch notification, will not ipso facto become forest land within themeaning of the 1980 Forest Act.
65. Therefore, the lands covered by the special orders dated 18[th]August 1992 issued under Section 4 of PLPA will be governed by theorders passed by this Court in the Petition for Special Leave to Appeal(Civil) Nos.7220-7221 of 2017. Hence, all the concerned authorities shalltake action to remove the remaining illegal structures standing on landcovered by the special orders and used for non-forest activities on thesaid lands erected after 25[th] October 1980, without prior approval of theCentral Government, and further to restore status quo ante including toundertake reforestation/afforestation programmes in right earnest. Asfar as the lands covered by special orders under Section 5 are concerned,we are not making any adjudication. Therefore, the authorities will haveto decide the status of the lands covered by the said orders under Section5 on case to case basis.
A66. To avoid any prejudice to the affected persons, we direct thatbefore the action of removal of the illegal structures and/or action ofstopping non-forest activities is taken in respect of the lands covered bythe special orders dated 18[th] August 1992 issued under Section 4 ofPLPA, the concerned competent authority shall afford an opportunity ofbeing heard to the affected persons and conclude such proceedings finallyBnot later than three months from today and submit compliance report inthat regard within the same time.
67. Writ Petition (Civil) Nos. 1008 and 1031 of 2021 stand disposedof in above terms. Civil Appeal Nos. 10294 of 2013, 8454 of 2014, 8173of 2016 and 11000 of 2013 also stand disposed of in above terms and theCorders impugned passed by the NGT stand modified accordingly.
68. As regards Writ Petition (Civil) No.1320 of 2021, the samewill be governed by the directions issued in Petitions for Special Leaveto Appeal (Civil) No.7220-7221 of 2017 for rehabilitation of the eligibleoccupants. The petitioners can always move the concerned authorityDfor that purpose. Writ Petition (C) No.1320 of 2021 be disposed ofaccordingly.
69. There will be no order as to costs.
EAnkit Gyan(Assisted by : Aarsh Choudhary, LCRA)
Appeals and Writ petitions disposed of.